

so many abuses, this immense people still continued, by virtue of their ancient laws, to elect their magistrates, to pass laws, to judge causes, and to expedite both public and private affairs, with as much facility as could have been done in the Senate itself.

CHAP. V. *On a tribunate.*

WHEN it is impracticable to establish an exact proportion between the component parts of a state, or that inevitable causes perpetually operate to change their relations, a particular magistracy is instituted, which, not incorporating with the rest, replaces every term in its true relation, and constitutes in itself a due medium either between the prince and the people, between the prince and the sovereign, or, in cases of necessity, at once between both.

This body, which I shall call a *Tribunate*, is the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power. It serves sometimes to protect the sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome; sometimes to protect the government against the people, as at present the council of the *ten* do at Venice; and again, at others, to maintain an equilibrium both on the one part and the other, as did the Ephori at Sparta.

The Tribunate is not a constitutional part of the city, and ought not, therefore, to have any share in the legislative or executive power. Even in this, however, its own is much greater: for being able to do nothing itself, it may prevent any thing from being done by others. It is more sacred and revered, as defender of the

laws, than the prince who executes them, or the sovereign who enacts them. This was very evident at Rome, when the haughty patricians, who always despised the people collectively, were nevertheless obliged to give place to their common officers, without command or jurisdiction.

The Tribunate, when judiciously moderated, is the firmest support of a good constitution; but if it have ever so little ascendancy of power, it subverts every thing. With regard to its weakness, it is not natural to it; for, provided it have any existence at all, it can never have too little power.

It degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power, of which it is only the moderator, and when it would interpret the laws which it should only protect. The enormous power of the Ephori, which was exercised without danger while Sparta retained its purity of manners, served only to increase the corruption of them when once begun. The blood of Agis spilt by those tyrants was revenged by his successor: the crime and the punishment of the Ephori accelerated equally the ruin of that republic; for after the time of Cleomenes, Sparta was nothing. The destruction of the Roman republic was effected in the same manner: the excessive power which the Tribunes by degrees usurped, served at length, with the help of the laws made in defence of liberty, as a security to the Emperors who destroyed it. As for the council of *ten* at Venice, it is a most sanguinary tribunal, equally horrible to the patricians and the people; and which is so far from openly protecting the laws, that it now serves but secretly to effect the breach of them.

The

The Tribunate is enfeebled, as well as the government, by increasing the number of its members. When the Roman Tribunes, at first two, and afterwards five, had a mind to double their number, the Senate did not oppose it; being well assured they should be able to make one a curb to another; which was actually the case.

The best way to prevent the usurpations of so formidable a body, a way that no government hath hitherto adopted, would be to render such a body not permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it should remain dissolved. These intervals, which should not be so great as to give abuses time to strengthen into customs, might be fixed by law, in such a manner that it would be easy to abridge them, in case of necessity, by extraordinary commissions.

This method appears to me to be attended with no inconvenience; because, as I have already observed, the Tribunate making no essential part of the constitution, may be suppressed without injury: and it appears to me effectual, because a magistrate newly re-established doth not succeed to the power of his predecessor, but to that which the law confers on him.

CHAP. VI. *Of the dictatorship.*

THAT inflexibility of the laws, which prevents their yielding to circumstances, may in some cases render them hurtful, and in some critical juncture bring on the ruin of the state. The order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occasion will not always admit. A thousand accidents may happen for which the legislature hath not provided; and

and it is a very necessary foresight to see that it is impossible to provide for every thing.

We should not be desirous, therefore, of establishing the laws so firmly as to suspend their effects. Even Sparta itself sometimes permitted the laws to lie dormant.

Nothing, however, but the certainty of greater danger should induce a people to make any alteration in government; nor should the sacred power of the laws be ever restrained unless the public safety is concerned. In such uncommon cases, when the danger is manifest, the public safety may be provided for by a particular act, which commits the charge of it to those who are most worthy. Such a commission may pass, in two different ways, according to the nature of the danger.

If the case require only a greater activity in the government, it should be confined to one or two members; in which case, it would not be the authority of the laws, but the form of the administration only, that would be changed. But if the danger be of such a nature, that the formality of the laws would prevent a remedy, then a supreme chief might be nominated who should silence the laws, and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, the general will cannot be doubted; it being evident, that the principal intention of the people must be to save the state from perdition. By this mode of temporary suspension the legislative authority is not abolished; the magistrate who silences it, cannot make it speak, and though he over-rules cannot represent it; he may do every thing indeed but make laws.

The first method was taken by the Roman Senate,

Senate, when it charged the consuls, in a sacred manner, to provide for the safety of the commonwealth. The second took place when one of the consuls nominated a dictator*; custom which Rome adopted from the example of Alba.

In the early times of the republic, the Romans had frequent recourse to the dictatorship, because the state had not then sufficient stability to support itself by the force of its constitution. The manners of the people, also, rendering those precautions unnecessary which were taken in after-times, there was no fear that a dictator would abuse his authority, or that he would be tempted to keep it in his hands beyond the term. On the contrary, it appeared, that so great a power was burdensome to the person invested with it, so eager were they to resign it; as if it were a difficult and dangerous post to be superior to the laws.

Thus it was not the danger of the abuse, but of the debasement of this supreme magistracy, that gave occasion to censure the indiscreet use of it in ancient times. For when they came to prostitute it in the affair of elections and other matters of mere formality, it was very justly to be apprehended that it would become less respectable on pressing occasions; and that the people would be apt to look upon an office as merely titular, which was instituted to assist at empty ceremonies.

Toward the end of the republic, the Romans, becoming more circumspect, were as sparing of the dictatorship, as they had before been prodigal
of

* This nomination was secretly made in the night, as if they were ashamed of the action of placing any man so much above the law.

of it. It was easy to see, however, that their fears were groundless, that the weakness of the capital was their security against the internal magistrate; that a dictator might in some cases have acted in defence of public liberty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged in Rome itself, but in its armies abroad. The weak resistance which Marius made to Sylla, and Pompey to Cæsar, shewed plainly how little the authority from within the city could do against the power from without.

This error led them to commit great blunders. Such, for instance, was their neglecting to appoint a dictator in the affair of Catiline. For, as it engaged only the city, or at most a province in Italy, a dictator invested with that unlimited authority which the laws conferred on him might easily have dissipated that conspiracy, which was with difficulty suppressed by a numerous concurrence of fortunate circumstances, which human prudence had no reason to expect. Instead of that, the Senate contented itself with committing all its power into the hands of Consuls; whence it happened that Cicero, in order to act effectually, was obliged to exceed that power in a capital circumstance; and though the public, in their first transports, approved of his conduct, he was very justly called to an account afterwards for the blood he had spilt contrary to the laws; a reproach they could not have made to a dictator. But the eloquence of the Consul carried all before it; and preferring, though a Roman, his own glory to his country, he thought less of the most legal and certain method of saving the state, than the means of securing all the honour
of

of such a transaction to himself *. Thus was he very justly honoured as the deliverer of Rome, and as justly punished as the violator of its laws. For, however honourable was his repeal, it was certainly a matter of favour.

After all, in whatever manner this important commission may be conferred, it is of consequence to limit its duration to a short term; which should on no occasion be prolonged. In those conjunctures, when it is necessary to appoint a Dictator, the state is presently saved or destroyed; which causes being over, the dictatorship becomes useless and tyrannical. At Rome, the Dictators held their office only for six months; and the greater part resigned before that term expired. Had the time appointed been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer still; as did the *Decemvir*, whose office lasted a whole year. The Dictator had no more time allowed him than was necessary to dispatch the business for which he was appointed; so that he had not leisure to think of other projects.

CHAP. VII. *Of the censorship.*

AS the declaration of the general will is made by the laws, so the declaration of the public judgment is made by their censure. The public opinion is a kind of law, which the Censor puts in execution, in particular cases, after the example of the prince.

So far, therefore, is the censorial tribunal from
being

* This is what he could not be certain of, in proposing a Dictator; not daring to nominate himself, and not being assured his colleague would do it.

being the arbiter of popular opinions, it only declares them; and, whenever it departs from them, its decisions are vain and ineffectual.

It is useless to distinguish the manners of a nation by the objects of its esteem; for these depend on the same principle, and are necessarily confounded together. Among all people in the world, it is not nature, but opinion, which determines the choice of their pleasures. Correct the prejudices and opinions of men, and their manners will correct themselves. We always admire what is beautiful, or what appears so; but it is in our judgment we are mistaken; it is this judgment then we are to regulate. Whoever judges of manners, takes upon him to judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion.

The opinions of a people depend on the constitution; though the laws do not govern manners, it is the legislature that gives rise to them. As the legislature grows feeble, manners degenerate, but the judgment of the censors will not then effect what the power of the laws have not before effected.

• It follows hence, that the office of a Censor may be useful to the preservation of manners, but never to their re-establishment. Establish Censors during the vigour of the laws; when this is past, all is over; no legal means can be effectual when the laws have lost their force.

• The Censor is preservative of manners, by preventing the corruption of opinions, by maintaining their morality and propriety, by judicious applications, and even sometimes by settling them when in a fluctuating situation. The use of seconds in duels, though carried to the greatest excess

excess in France, was abolished by the following words inserted in one of the king's edicts; *As to those who have the cowardice to call themselves seconds.* This judgment anticipating that of the public, was effectual, and put an end to that custom at once. But when the same edicts pronounced it cowardice to fight a duel; though it is certainly true, yet as it was contrary to the popular opinion, the public laughed at a determination so contrary to their own,

I have observed elsewhere *, that the public opinion being subjected to no constraint, there should be no appearance of it in the tribunal established to represent it. One cannot too much admire with what art this spring of action, entirely neglected among the moderns, was employed by the Romans, and still more effectually by the Lacedemonians.

A man of bad morals, having made an excellent proposal in the council at Sparta, the Ephori, without taking any notice of it, caused the same proposal to be made by a citizen of character and virtue. How honourable was this proceeding to the one, and how disgraceful to the other; and that without directly praising or blaming either! Some drunkards of Samos having behaved indecently in the tribunal of the Ephori, it was the next day permitted, by a public edict, that the Samians might become slaves. Would an actual punishment have been so severe as such impunity? When the Spartans had once passed their judgment on the decency or propriety of any behaviour, all Greece submitted to their opinion.

VOL. X.

O

CHAP.

* I do but slightly mention here, what I have treated more at large in my Letter to M. d'Alambert.

CHAP. VIII. *Of political religion.*

IN the first ages of the world, men had no other kings than gods, nor any other government than what was purely theocratical. It required a great alteration in their sentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on themselves to look upon a fellow-creature as a master, and think it went well with them.

Hence, a deity being constantly placed at the head of every political society, it followed that there were as many different gods as people. Two communities, personally strangers to each other, and almost always at variance, could not long acknowledge the same master; nor could two armies, drawn up against each other in battle, obey the same chief. Thus Polytheism became a natural consequence of the division of nations, and thence the want of civil and theological toleration, which are perfectly the same, as will be shewn hereafter.

The notion of the Greeks, in pretending to trace their own gods among those of the Barbarian nations, took its rise evidently from the ambition of being thought the natural sovereigns of those people. In this age, however, we think that a most absurd part of erudition which relates to the identity of the deities of different nations, and according to which it is supposed that Moloch, Saturn, and Chronos, were one and the same god; and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and the Jupiter of the Latins, were the same deity: as if any thing could be found in common between chimerical beings bearing different names!

If it be asked why there were no religious wars among the Pagans, when every state had thus its peculiar deity and worship; I answer, it was plainly for this very reason, that each state having its own peculiar religion as well as government, no distinction was made between the obedience paid to their gods and that due to their laws. Thus their political were at the same time theological wars; and the departments of their deities were prescribed by the limits of their respective nations. The god of one people had no authority over another people; nor were these Pagan deities jealous of their prerogatives, but divided the adoration of mankind amicably between them. Even Moses himself sometimes speaks in the same manner of the God of Israel. It is true the Hebrews despised the gods of the Canaanites, a people proscribed and devoted to destruction, whose possessions were given them for an inheritance: but they speak with more reverence of the deities of the neighbouring nations whom they were forbidden to attack. *Wilt thou not possess that, says Jephtha to Sihon king of the Ammonites, which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess.* There is in this passage, I think, an acknowledged similitude between the rights Chemosh, and those of the God of Israel.

But when the Jews, being subjected to the kings of Babylon, and afterwards to those of Syria, persisted in refusing to acknowledge any god but their own, this refusal was esteemed an act of rebellion against their conqueror, and drew upon them those persecutions we read of in their history, and of which no other example is extant

previous to the establishment of Christianity*.

The religion of every people being thus exclusively annexed to the laws of the state, the only method of converting nations was to subdue them: warriors were the only missionaries; and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquished, they were first to be conquered before they were solicited on this head. So far were men from fighting for the gods, that their gods, like those of Homer, fought in behalf of mankind. Each people demanded the victory from its respective deity, and expressed their gratitude for it by the erection of new altars. The Romans, before they besieged any fortress, summoned its gods to abandon it; and though it be true they left the people of Farentum in possession of their angry deities, it is plain they looked upon those gods as subjected and obliged to do homage to their own: They left the vanquished in possession of their religion, as they sometimes did in that of their laws; a wreath for Jupiter of the Capitol being often the only tribute they exacted.

At length, the Romans having extended their religion with their empire, and sometimes even adopted the deities of the vanquished, the people of this vast empire found themselves in possession of a multiplicity of gods and religions; which not differing essentially from each other, Paganism became insensibly one and the same religion throughout the world.

Things were in this state when Jesus came to establish his spiritual kingdom on earth; a design

* It is evident that the war of the Phocians, called an holy war, was not a religious war. Its object was to punish sacrilege, and not to subdue infidels.

sign which, necessarily dividing the theological from the political system, gave rise to those intestine divisions which have ever since continued to embroil the profession of Christianity. Now this new idea of a kingdom in the other world having never entered into the head of the Pagans, they regarded the Christians as actual rebels, who, under an hypocritical shew of humility, waited only a proper opportunity to render themselves independent, and artfully to usurp that authority, which in their weak and infant state they pretended to respect: and this was undoubtedly the cause of their being persecuted.

What the Pagans were apprehensive of, also did, in process of time, actually come to pass. Things put on a new face; and the meek Christians, as their number increased, changed their tone, while their invisible kingdom of the other world became, under a visible head, the most despotic and tyrannical in this.

As in all countries, however, there were civil governors and laws; there resulted from this twofold power a perpetual struggle for jurisdiction, which renders a perfect system of domestic policy almost impossible in Christian states; and prevents us from ever coming to a determination, whether it be the prince or the priest we are bound to obey.

Some nations indeed, even in Europe or its neighbourhood, have endeavoured to preserve or re-establish the ancient system, but without success; the spirit of Christianity hath universally prevailed. Religious worship hath always remained, or again become independent of the sovereign, and without any necessary connection with the body of the state. Mahomet had very

salutary and well-connected views in his political system; and so long as his modes of government subsisted under the caliphs and their successors, that government remained perfectly uniform, and so far good. But the Arabians becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent, and cowardly, were subdued by the Barbarians: then the division between the two powers recommenced; and though it be less apparent among the Mahometans than among Christians, it is nevertheless to be distinguished, particularly in the sect of Ali: there are some states also, as in Persia, where this division is constantly perceptible.

Among us, the kings of England are placed at the head of the church, as are also the Czars in Russia: but by this title they are not so properly masters as ministers of the religion of those countries: they are not possessed of the power to change it, but only to maintain its present form. Whenever the Clergy constitute a collective body*, they will be both masters and legislators in their own cause. There are therefore two sovereigns in England and Russia, as well as elsewhere.

Of all Christian authors, Mr. Hobbes was the only one who saw the evil and the remedy, and
 who

* It must be observed, that it is not so much the formal assemblies of the clergy, such as are held in France, which unite them together in a body, as the communion of their churches. Communion and excommunication form the social compact of the clergy; a compact by means of which they will always maintain their ascendancy over both kings and people. All the priests that communicate together are fellow-citizens, tho' they should be personally as distant as the extremities of the world. This invention is a master-piece in policy. The Pagan priests had nothing like it; and therefore never had any clerical body.

who hath ventured to propose the re-union of the two heads of this eagle, and to restore that political union, without which no state or government can be well constituted. But he ought to have seen, that the prevailing spirit of Christianity was incompatible with his system, and that the interest of the church would be always too powerful for the state. It was not so much that which was really false and shocking in the writings of this philosopher, as what was really just and true, that rendered him odious †.

I conceive that, by a proper display of historical facts, in this point of view, it would be easy to refute the opposite sentiments both of Bayle and Warburton; the former of which pretends that no religion whatever can be of service to the body-politic, and the latter that Christianity is its best and firmest support. It might be proved against the first, that every state in the world hath been founded on the basis of religion; and against the second, that the precepts of Christianity are at the bottom more prejudicial than conducive to the strength of the state.

In order to make myself fully understood, I need only give a little more precision to the vague ideas generally entertained of political religion.

Religion, considered as it relates to society, which is either general or particular, may be distinguished into two kinds, *viz.* the religion of the man, and that of the citizen. The first, desti-

† In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the 11th of April 1643, may be seen what that great Civilian approved and blamed in his book *De civitate*. It is true, that Grotius, being indulgent, seems inclined to forgive the author the faults of his book, for the sake of its merits; the rest of the world, however, were not so candid.

destitute of temples, altars, or rites, confined purely to the internal worship of the Supreme Being, and to the performance of the eternal duties of morality, is the pure and simple religion of the gospel; this is genuine theism, and may be called the law of natural divinity. The other, adopted only in one country, whose gods and tutelary fairs are hence peculiar to itself, is composed of certain dogmas, rites, and external modes of worship prescribed by the laws of such country; all foreigners being accounted infidels, aliens, and barbarians; this kind of religion extends the duties and privileges of men no farther than to its own altars. Such were all the religions of primitive ages, to which may be given the name of the law of civil or positive divinity.

There is a third kind of religion still more extraordinary, which dividing society into two legislatures, two chiefs, and two parties, subjects mankind to contradictory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas, of the Japanese, and of the Roman Catholics; which may be denominated the religion of the priests, and is productive of a sort of mixed and unfociable obligation, for which we have no name.

If we examine these three kinds of religion in a political light, they have all their faults. The third is so palpably defective, that it would be mere loss of time to point them out. Whatever contributes to dissolve the social union is good for nothing: all institutions which set man in contradiction with himself are of no use.

The second is so far commendable as it unites
divine

divine worship with a respect for the laws, and that, making the country the object of the people's adoration, the citizen is taught that to serve the state is to serve its tutelary divinity. This is a species of theocracy, in which there should be no other pontiff than the prince, no other priests than the magistrates. To die, in such a state, for their country, is to suffer martyrdom; to violate the laws is impiety; and to doom a criminal to public execration, is to devote him to the anger of the gods.

It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falsehood and deceit, it leads mankind into error; rendering them credulous and superstitious, it substitutes vain ceremonies instead of the true worship of the Deity. It is further blameable, in that, becoming exclusive and tyrannical, it makes people sanguinary and persecuting; so that a nation shall sometimes breathe nothing but murder and massacre, and think at the same time they are doing an holy action in cutting the throats of those who worship the gods in a different manner from themselves. This circumstance places such a people in a natural state of war with all others, which is very unfavourable to their own safety.

There remains then only the rational and manly religion of Christianity; not, however, as it is professed in modern times, but as it is displayed in the gospel, which is quite another thing. According to this holy, sublime, and true religion, mankind, being all the children of the same God, acknowledge themselves to be brothers, and the society which unites them dissolves only in death.

But this religion, having no particular relation
to

to the body-politic, leaves the laws in possession only of their own force, without adding any thing to it; by which means the firmest bonds of such particular society are of no effect. Add to this, that Christianity is so far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the state, that it detaches them from it, as well as from all worldly objects in general: than which nothing can be more contrary to the spirit of society.

It is said, that a nation of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable. To this assertion, however, there is one great objection; and this is, that a society of true Christians would not be a society of men. Nay, I will go so far as to affirm, that this supposed society, with all its perfection, would neither be of the greatest strength nor duration. In consequence of its being perfect, it would want the strongest ties of connection; and thus this very circumstance would destroy it.

Individuals might do their duty, the people might be obedient to the laws, the chiefs might be just, the magistrate incorrupt, the soldiery might look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in such a state. So far all would go well; but let us look further.

Christianity is a spiritual religion, relative only to celestial objects: the Christian's inheritance is not of this world. He performs his duty, it is true; but this he does with a profound indifference for the good or ill success of his endeavours. Provided he hath nothing to reproach himself with, it is of little importance to him whether matters go well or ill here below. If the state be in a flourishing situation, he can
hardly

hardly venture to rejoice in the public felicity, lest he should be puffed up with the inordinate pride of his country's glory; if the state decline, he blesses the hand of God that humbles his people to the dust.

It is farther necessary to the peace and harmony of society, that all the citizens should be without exception equally good Christians; for if unhappily there should be one of them ambitious or hypocritical, if there should be found among them a Catiline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an easy prey of his pious countrymen. Christian charity doth not easily permit the thinking evil of one's neighbour. No sooner should an individual discover the art of imposing on the majority, and be invested with some portion of public authority, than he would become a dignitary; Christians must not speak evil of dignities: thus respected, he would thence assume power; Christians must obey the superior powers. Does the depositary of power abuse it? he becomes the rod by which it pleases God to chastise his children.

And, would their consciences permit them to drive out the usurper, the public tranquillity must be broken, and violence and bloodshed succeed: all this agrees but ill with the meekness of true Christians; and, after all, what is it to them, whether they are freemen or slaves in this vale of misery? Their essential concern is to work out their salvation, and obtain happiness in another world; to effect which, their resignation in this is held to be their duty.

Should such a state be forced into a war with any neighbouring power, the citizens might march readily to the combat without thinking
of

of flight; they might do their duty in the field, but they would have no ardour for victory, being better instructed to die than to conquer. Of what consequence is it to them, whether they are victors or vanquished? Think what advantages an impetuous and sanguine enemy might take of their stoicism! Draw them out against a brave and generous people, ardently inspired with the love of glory and their country; suppose, for instance, your truly Christian republic against that of Sparta or of Rome; what would be the consequence? Your devout Christians would be beaten, discomfited, and knocked on the head, before they had time to look about them; their only security depending on the contempt which their enemy might entertain for them. It was, in my opinion, a fine oath that was taken by the soldiers of Fabius. They did not make a vow either to die or conquer; they swore they would return conquerors, and punctually performed their oath. Christian troops could not have made such a vow, they would have been afraid of tempting the Lord their God.

But I am all this while committing a blunder, in speaking of a Christian republic; one of these terms necessarily excluding the other. Christianity inculcates servitude and dependence; the spirit of it is too favourable to tyrants, for them not sometimes to profit by it. True Christians are formed for slaves; they know it, and never trouble themselves about conspiracies and insurrections; this transitory life is of too little value in their esteem.

Will it be said, The Christians are excellent soldiers? I deny it. Produce me your Christian troops. For my part, I know of no true Christian

lian

Christian soldiers. Do you name those of the Crusades? I answer, That, not to call in question the valour of the Crusaders, they were very far from being Christian citizens: they were the soldiers of the priest, the citizens of the church; they fought for its spiritual country, which, some how or other, it had converted into a temporal one. To set this matter in the best light, it was a kind of return to Paganism; for as the gospel did not establish any national religion, an holy war could not possibly be carried on by true Christians.

Under the Pagan emperors, the Christian soldiers were brave; of this all the Christian writers assure us, and I believe them; the motive of their bravery was a spirit of honour or emulation, excited by the Pagan troops. But when the emperors became Christians, this motive of emulation no longer subsisted; and when the Cross had put the Eagle to flight, the Roman valour disappeared.

But, laying aside political considerations, let us return to the matter of right, and ascertain its true principles with regard to this important point. The right which the social compact confers on the sovereign, extending no farther than to public utility *, the subject is not accountable to that sovereign on account of any opi-

VOL. X.

P

nions

* *In a republic, says the Marquis d'A. everyone is perfectly equal, because no one may injure another.* This is the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor is it possible to state the same more precisely. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of sometimes quoting this manuscript, though unknown to the public, in order to do honour to the memory of an illustrious and respectable personage, who preserved the integrity of the citizen even in the ministry, and adopted the most upright and salutary views in the government of his country.

nions he may entertain that have nothing to do with the community. Now it is of great importance to a state, that every citizen should be of a religion that may inspire him with a regard for his duty: but the tenets of that religion are no farther interesting to the community than as they relate to morals, and to the discharge of those obligations which the professor lies under to his fellow-citizens. If we except these, the individual may profess what others he pleases, without the sovereign's having any right to interfere; for, having no jurisdiction in the other world, it is nothing to the sovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they discharge the duties incumbent on them in the present.

There is a profession of faith, therefore, purely political; the articles of which it is in the province of the sovereign to ascertain, not precisely as articles of religion, but as the sentiments due to society, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or faithful subject †. Without compelling any one to adopt these sentiments, the sovereign may also equitably banish him the society; not indeed as impious, but as unfociable, as incapable of having a sincere regard to justice, and of sacrificing his life, if required, to his duty. Again, should any one, after having made a public profession of such sentiments,

† Caesar, in pleading for Catiline, endeavoured to establish the doctrine of the mortality of the Soul: Cato and Cicero, in answer to him, did not enter into a philosophical discussion of the argument; but contented themselves with shewing that Caesar had spoken like a bad citizen, and advanced a dogma pernicious to the state. And this was in fact in the only point that came before the Senate of Rome, and not a question in theology.

iments, betray his disbelief of them by his misconduct, he may equitably be punished with death; having committed the greatest of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of the laws.

The tenets of political religion should be few and simple; they should be laid down also with precision, and without explication or comment. The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and provident Deity; a future state; the reward of the virtuous, and the punishment of the wicked; the sacred nature of the social contract, and of the laws; these should be its positive tenets. As to those of a negative kind, I would confine myself solely to one, by forbidding persecution.

Those who affect to make a distinction between civil and religious toleration, are, in my opinion, mistaken. It is impossible to live cordially in peace with those whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation: to love them would be to hate the Deity for punishing them; it is therefore absolutely necessary for us either to persecute or to convert them. Wherever the spirit of religious persecution subsists, it is impossible it should not have some effect on the civil-police; in which case, the sovereign is no longer sovereign even in a secular view; the priests become the real masters, and kings only their officers.

In modern governments, where it is impossible to support an exclusive national religion, it is requisite to tolerate all such as breathe the spirit of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are not contradictory to the duty of a good citizen. But whosoever should presume to say,

There is no salvation out of the pale of our church, ought to be banished the state, unless indeed the state be an ecclesiastical one, and the prince a pontiff. Such a dogma is of use only in a theocratical government; in every other it is destructive. The reason which it is said Henry IV. gave for embracing the Roman Catholic religion, ought to have made an honest man reject it, and more particularly a prince capable of reasoning on the subject.

CHAP. IX. *The conclusion.*

HAVING thus stated the true principles of politic law, and endeavoured to fix the state on its proper basis, it remains to shew in what manner it is supported by external relations.

Under this head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of war and conquest, leagues, negotiations, treaties, &c. But these present a new prospect, too vast and extensive for so short a sight as mine; which should be confined to objects less distant, and more adapted to my limited capacity.

A
P R O J E C T
F O R A
P E R P E T U A L P E A C E.

AS a more noble, useful, and delightful Project never engaged the human mind, than that of establishing a perpetual peace among the contending nations of Europe, never did a writer lay a better claim to the attention of the public than he who points out the means to carry such a design into execution. It is, indeed, very difficult for a man of probity and sensibility, not to be fired with a kind of enthusiasm on such a subject: nay, I am not clear that the very illusions of an heart truly humane, whose warmth makes every thing easily surmountable, are not in this case more eligible than that rigid and forbidding prudence, which finds, in its own indifference and want of public spirit, the chief obstacle to every thing that tends to promote the public good.

I doubt not that many of my readers will be fore-armed with incredulity, to withstand the pleasing temptation of being persuaded; and indeed I sincerely lament their dulness in mistaking obstinacy for wisdom. But I flatter myself, that many an honest mind will sympathise with me in that delightful emotion, with which

I take up the pen to treat of a subject so greatly interesting to the world. I am going to take a view, at least in imagination, of mankind united by love and friendship: I am going to take a contemplative prospect of an agreeable and peaceful society of brethren, living in constant harmony, directed by the same maxims, and joint sharers of one common felicity; while, realizing to myself so affecting a picture, the representation of such imaginary happiness will give me the momentary enjoyment of a pleasure actually present.

I could not resist the impulse of devoting a few lines, at the beginning of my performance, to a sentiment with which my heart is replete. Let us now endeavour to reason coolly on the subject. Being resolved to advance nothing which I cannot prove, I think myself authorized to desire the reader to deny nothing which he cannot confute: for I am not so much afraid of those who may argue, as of such as withhold their assent to arguments to which they will nevertheless make no objection.

It requires no very long or close attention to the means of bringing any kind of government to perfection, to perceive many obstacles and embarrassments, which arise less from the nature of the constitution than from its external relations: so that the care, which ought to be devoted to the domestic policy of a state, is necessarily bestowed on securing its dependency; more pains been taken to enable it to resist other states, than to improve its own government. If the social union were, as pretended, rather the effect of reason than the passions, how could men have been so long in finding out that they
have

have always done either too much or too little for their own happiness; that individuals, being in a social state with regard to their fellow countrymen, and in a state of nature with respect to the rest of the world, they have only prevented civil bloodshed among particulars, to excite national wars, a thousand times more general and destructive; and that by attaching ourselves to the interest of particular persons, we become enemies to our whole species.

If there be any way to remove these fatal contradictions, it is perhaps by a confederative form of government only; which, connecting whole nations by the same ties that unite individuals, may equally subject both the one and the other to the authority of the laws. This mode of government appears, besides, preferable to every other, as it comprehends at once the advantages both of great states and small ones: it is respectable abroad from its power; its laws are vigorously executed; and it is the only form which is adapted equally to restrain the subject, the magistrate, and foreign states.

This form of government, indeed, although it seem novel in some respects, and has been well understood only by the moderns, was not unknown to the ancients. The Greeks had their Amphictiones, the Tuscans their Leucumoni, the Latins their Fœderæ, the Gauls their cities, and the expiring state of Greece became famous for the Achean League. None of those ancient confederacies, however, displayed so much wisdom as the modern ones of the German Empire, the Helvetic League, or the union of the States-General. If these bodies-politic also are still but few, and far from being arrived at that perfec-

tion

tion they are capable of, it is because the best of them is not so easily put in execution as may be imagined; and that in politics as well as in morals, the extent of our knowledge proves hardly any thing any more than that of our misfortunes.

To these public confederacies may be added others not less real, though less apparent, which are tacitly formed by the union of interests, a conformity of maxims, a similarity of customs, and various other circumstances which admit certain common relations to subsist even between divided nations. Thus it is that all the powers of Europe form a kind of system among themselves, which unites them by the same religion, by the same law of nations, by morals, literature, commerce, and by a sort of equilibrium which is the necessary result of them all; and which, though nobody studies to preserve, is not so easily destroyed as many people imagine.

The national society has not always subsisted in Europe; the particular causes, which first gave rise to it, still serving to preserve and maintain it. In fact, before the Roman conquests, the people of this part of the world were all barbarians, unknown to each other: they had nothing in common but the most simple faculties of human beings; faculties that, debased by slavery, hardly raised them a degree above the brutes. Hence the Greeks took upon them, out of their philosophical vanity, to distinguish mankind, as it were, into two species; one of which, viz. their own, was formed to command; and the other, comprehending the rest of the world, to obey. It followed from this principle, that a Gaul or an Iberian was looked upon by a Greek, as we look upon a Hottentot

or

of a North-American Indian: while the barbarian nations themselves bore as little affinity to each other, as the Greeks bore to any of them.

But when this people, naturally pre-eminent, had been subdued by the Romans their slaves, and great part of the known world had submitted to the same yoke, a civil and political union of course formed itself between the several members of the same empire; an union that was rendered much closer by that very wise or very foolish maxim, of conferring on the vanquished the rights and privileges of the victors; and more particularly by the famous decree of Claudius, which admitted all the subjects of Rome into the number of Roman citizens.

To the political chain, which thus united all the members in one body, were now added civil institutions and laws, which gave new force to such connections, by determining, in a clear, precise, and equitable manner (at least as far as the extent of so vast an Empire would admit of) the reciprocal rights and duties of the sovereign and subjects, as well as those of the latter among themselves. The Theodosian code, and after that the books of JUSTINIAN, formed new links in the chain of reason and justice, aptly substituted for those of the sovereign power, which were in a very palpable state of relaxation. This substitute greatly delayed the dissolution of the Empire, and long maintained its drooping jurisdiction over those very barbarians who were working its desolation.

A third tie, still stronger than the preceding, was that of religion: nor can it be denied that Europe is particularly indebted to Christianity for that kind of social union which is constantly
kept

kept up between its members : so that the people which have not adopted the sentiments of the rest, in this particular, have always remained aliens among them. Christianity, the subject of contempt, at its rise, served at length as an asylum to its detractors : nay, the Roman empire itself, after having so cruelly and vainly persecuted it, found in it those resources which it could not draw from its military power. Its missions were of more service than its conquests. It sent Bishops to repair the blunders of its Generals, and triumphed by its Priests when its Soldiers were defeated. It was thus the Franks, the Goths, the Lombards, and a thousand others, submitted to the authority of Rome, after they themselves had reduced her empire ; and received with the law of the Gospel, that of the Prince who first caused it to be promulgated among them.

Such was the respect still paid to that imperial body, that its destroyers prided themselves in its titles, even in its expiring moments ; while those very conquerors, who had debased the Empire, became officers of it ; and the greatest Kings contended for Patrician honours, governments, and consulships : even as a lion cringing to the man he might devour, those tremendous victors paid homage to that throne which they had the power to subvert when they pleased.

It was thus the Priesthood and the Empire formed a social chain between various people ; who, without having any real connection of interests, privileges, or dependence, enjoyed a community of maxims and opinions ; the influence of which has remained after the principle has been destroyed. The ancient state of
the

the Roman Empire hath continued to form a kind of union between the members of which it was composed: while Rome possessing another sort of dominion after the dissolution of the Empire, there resulted from this twofold connection a closer society among the nations of Europe, where the centre of the two powers had existed, than in other parts of the world, where the inhabitants are too much dispersed to hold correspondence with each other, and have besides no particular point of union.

Add to this, the peculiar situation of Europe, more equally populous and fertile, better connected in its several parts; the continual admixture of interests, which consanguinity, commerce, arts, and navigation, continually effect between sovereigns; the multitude of rivers, and diversity of their course, which facilitate the communication of different parts; the inconstancy of the inhabitants, which induces them to travel and pass frequently from one country to another; the invention of printing, and prevailing taste for letters, which hath formed a community of knowledge and studies; and lastly, that multiplicity and small extent of many states, which, added to the calls of luxury, and to the diversity of climates, render the one always necessary to the other: all these things united form in Europe, not merely, as in Asia or Africa, an ideal collection of people, who have nothing but a nominal community between them; but an actual society, which has its religion, morals, customs, and even its laws, from which none of the people composing it can separate without causing an immediate disturbance.

To behold, on the other hand, the perpetual
dis-

dissensions, depredations, usurpations, rebellions, wars, and murders, which are constantly ravaging this respectable abode of philosophers, this brilliant asylum of the arts and sciences; to reflect on the sublimity of our conversation and the meanness of our proceedings, on the humanity of our maxims and the cruelty of our actions, on the meekness of our religion and the horror of our persecutions, on a policy so wise in theory and so absurd in practice, on the beneficence of sovereigns and the misery of their people, on governments so mild and wars so destructive; we are at a loss to reconcile these strange contrarieties, while this pretended fraternity of European nations appears to be only a term of ridicule, serving ironically to express their reciprocal animosity.

And yet, in all this, things only take their natural course; every society destitute of laws or magistrates, every union formed or supported by chance, must necessarily degenerate into quarrels and dissensions upon the first change of circumstances. The ancient union of the European nations hath rendered their interests and privileges extremely complicated: they bear against each other in so many points, that the least agitation of any one puts the whole in motion. Their dissensions are also by so much the more fatal as their connections are intimate; while their frequent quarrels are almost as unnatural and cruel as civil wars.

It must be admitted, therefore, that the present relative state of the European powers is a state of war; and that the partial treaties subsisting between some of them, are rather temporary truces, than a state of actual peace; whether

ether it be owing to those treaties having no other guarantees than the contracting parties, or that their respective rights are never duly ascertained, and the pretensions thence subsisting among powers who acknowledge no superior infallibly prove the source of new wars, as soon as different circumstances empower the pretenders to assert their claims.

To this it may be added, that the law of nations not being universally concerted and established, but having no general principles, and incessantly varying according to time and place, it is full of contradictory maxims, which can never be reconciled but by the right of the strongest: so that the judgment being without a sure guide, and always biased in doubtful cases by self-interest, war becomes sometimes inevitable, even when both parties may be desirous of acting justly. All that can be done, with the best intentions, therefore, is to decide this kind of disputes by force of arms, or to palliate them by temporary treaties. But no sooner is occasion taken to revive the cause of quarrel, than it takes a new form, and all is complication and confusion: the real grounds of the affair are not to be seen; usurpation passes for right, and weakness for injustice; while, amidst the general disorder, every one finds himself insensibly so far displaced, that, if it were possible to recur to the real and primitive right, there would be few sovereigns in Europe who ought not to refund every thing they possess.

Another source of war, less obvious though not less real, is, that things do not change their form in changing their nature; that states which are hereditary in fact, remain elective in ap-

pearance ; that there are parliaments or national states in monarchies, and hereditary chiefs in republics ; that one power really dependent on another, still preserves the appearance of liberty ; that all the subjects of the same sovereign are not governed by the same laws ; that the order of succession is different in different provinces of the same state ; in fine, that all governments naturally tend to a change, without there being a possibility of preventing it. Such are the general and particular causes which connect us for our ruin, and lead us to describe the charms of social virtue with our hands constantly stained with human gore.

The causes of an evil being once known, the remedy, if any such there be, is sufficiently indicated by the same means. It is plain to every one, that society is formed by a coalition of interests ; that every dissension arises from an opposition of interests ; that, as a thousand fortuitous events may change and modify both the one and the other, it is necessary that every society should possess a coercive force, to direct and concert the movements of its several members, in order to give their common interests and reciprocal engagements that solidity which they could not separately acquire.

It would otherwise be a great mistake to suppose, that such a state of constraint could ever change, merely from the nature of things, and without the assistance of art. The present system of Europe hath attained precisely that degree of solidity, which may keep it in a perpetual agitation, without ever effectually subverting it : thus, if our misfortunes cannot be increased, they are still less capable of being put

an end to; because no great revolution can now ever happen.

To prove this, as far as it is necessary, we shall begin with taking a general view of the present state of Europe. The situation of the mountains, seas, and rivers, which serve as boundaries to the several nations inhabiting it, seem also to have determined the number and extent of those nations; so that the political order of this part of the world may be said to be, in some respects, the work of nature.

In fact, we are not to suppose that the boasted balance of power in Europe hath been actually established; or that any body has done any thing really with a view to support it. It is found, indeed, to exist; and those who find they have not weight enough to destroy it, cover their own particular designs with the pretence of maintaining it. But whether attended to or not, this balance certainly subsists, and needs no other support than itself, if it were to remain uninterrupted: nay, though it should occasionally be disturbed on one side, it presently recovers itself on the other: so that if the princes, who are accused of aspiring to universal monarchy, were really so aspiring, they displayed in this particular much more ambition than judgment; for how could they reflect a moment on such a project, without discovering it to be ridiculous? How could they be insensible, that there is no power in Europe so much superior to the rest, as to be able ever to become their master? Those conquerors, who have brought about great revolutions, have always effected it by the sudden march of unexpected armies; by bringing foreign troops, differently trained to

war, against people difarmed, divided, or undisciplined: But where shall we find an European prince whole forces the others are not acquainted with? where find one to subdue the rest, when the greatest of them all forms so small a part of the whole, and they are all so vigilant against each other's encroachments? Can any one maintain more troops than all the rest? He could not; or, if he could, he would only be the sooner ruined, or his troops would be so much the worse as they were more numerous. Could he have them better disciplined? They would be less in proportion. Besides, military discipline is nearly the same, or shortly will be so, all over Europe. Can he have more money? Pecuniary resources are common, and money never was known to make any great conquests. Could he make a sudden invasion? Want of subsistence, or fortified towns, would every moment oppose his progress. Would he insensibly augment his power and dominion? He will then afford his enemies the means of uniting to resist him: time, money, and men, will soon fail him. Will he create dissensions among other powers, in order to conquer them one after another? The maxims of European policy will render that scheme ineffectual; nor could the weakest of princes be taken in such a snare. In short, not one of them having exclusive resources, the resistance he will meet with must at length equal his efforts; and time will soon repair the casualties of fortune, if not with regard to each particular prince, at least with regard to the general system.

Will it be supposed, that two or three potentates might enter into an agreement to subdue
the

the rest? Be it so. These three potentates, be who they may, will not possess half the power of all Europe. The other parts will, therefore, certainly unite against them; and to succeed, they must be able to subdue a power greater than themselves. Add to this, that the views of any three such powers are too opposite, and their jealousy of each other too great, ever to permit the forming of such a project; and also, that if they had formed it, and actually begun to put it into execution with success, that very success would sow the seeds of dissension among the allied conquerors, as it would be morally impossible that their conquests should be so equally divided that each should be satisfied with his acquisition: in which case the dissatisfied party would of course oppose the progress of the others; who, for the like reasons also, would soon disagree between themselves.

I much doubt if, since the world existed, there ever were seen three, or even two, great potentates, that cordially united to subdue the rest, without quarrelling about the contingencies of the war, or their share of the conquest; and affording, by their misunderstanding, new resources to the weaker party. Thus, suppose what we will, it is highly improbable that any prince, or league of princes, will hereafter be able to effect any considerable and permanent change in the political state of Europe.

Not that I pretend to say that the Alps and Pyreneans, the Rhine or the Sea, are insurmountable obstacles to ambition: but these obstacles are supported by others, which strengthen them, or serve to make states recur to their former limits, whenever they have been occasion-

ally removed. The present system of Europe has its support, in a great measure, in the arts of political negotiations, which almost always balance each other. But it hath a still more solid support in the Germanic body; situated almost in the centre of Europe, keeping the other parts in awe, and serving more effectually perhaps to the support of its neighbours than to that of its own members; a body that is formidable to other states on account of its extent and the number and wealth of its inhabitants, at the same time that it is useful to all by its constitution; which, depriving it of the means and inclination of making conquests, is the rock on which conquerors generally split. It is certain, that, notwithstanding the defects in the constitution of the Empire, the balance of power in Europe will never be destroyed so long as that constitution subsists; that no potentate need be apprehensive of being dethroned by another; but that the treaty of Westphalia will be always the basis of our political system. Thus the law of nations, the study of which is so much cultivated in Germany, appears to be of much greater importance than is generally imagined; being not only the law of Germany, but, in some respects, that of all Europe.

But though the present system is not to be removed, it is for that very reason the more tempestuous; as there subsists between the European powers a kind of continual action and re-action, which, without entirely displacing them, keeps them in constant agitation; their efforts being always ineffectual and always regenerating, like the waves of the ocean, which incessantly agitate its surface without raising it above the shore:

so that the people are perpetually harrassed, without any sensible advantage being derived from it to their sovereign.

It would be easy for me to deduce the same truth from the particular interests of all the courts in Europe: for I could readily shew, that these interests are so connected as to restrain their forces within reciprocal respect. But the notions of wealth and commerce having given rise to a species of political fanaticism, they occasion such sudden changes in the apparent interests of princes, that no stable maxim can be established upon those which are the true: because at present every thing depends on œconomical, and most of them whimsical principles, which are taken into the heads of ministers. Be this, however, as it may, commerce, which tends daily to an equilibrium, will, by depriving some potentates of their exclusive advantages, deprive them, at the same time, of one of the greatest means they possessed of giving laws to others*.

If I have insisted on that equal distribution of power which results from the present constitution of Europe, it has been in order to deduce from it an important inference regarding the establishment of a general association: for to form
a solid

* There has been a change of circumstances since I wrote the above; my principle, nevertheless, will always remain true, Thus for example, it is easy to foresee, that, before twenty years are at an end, England, glorious as it now is, will be undone, and will besides have lost the remainder of its liberty. It is generally affirmed, that agriculture flourishes in that island: but for my part, I would venture to lay a wager it is upon its decline. London is daily increasing, the country therefore must be depopulating. The English are proud of being conquerors, it will not therefore be long before they are slaves.

a solid and durable confederacy, it is requisite that all the members of it should be under such reciprocal dependence, that no one of them should be in a capacity to withstand all the rest; and that such particular associations as might injure the general one, should meet with obstacles sufficient to prevent their execution: for, without this, the confederacy would be fruitless, and each member, though under an apparent subjection, would be really independent. Now, if these obstacles are such as I have before described, even at present, when all the powers of Europe are at liberty to make with each other what treaties offensive or defensive they please; let the reader judge what would be the case if one grand confederacy were entered into, armed with power, and always ready to oppose such as would attempt to disturb or destroy it. This suffices to shew, that such an association would not consist of futile deliberations, which each party might disregard with impunity; but that there would arise from it an efficient power, capable of restraining the ambitious within the limits of the General Treaty.

From this state of the case may be deduced three incontestable truths. One is, that, if we except the Turk, there subsists between all the nations of Europe a social connection; which, tho' but imperfect, is still closer than the looser ties of humanity in general. The second is, that the imperfect state of this society makes the condition of those who compose it worse than it would be if they had no society at all among them. The third is, that the primitive ties, which makes this society hurtful, render it, at the same time, improveable, and more easy to be

be brought to perfection : so that all its constituents might derive their happiness from that which is at present the cause of their misery; and convert that state of war, which now subsists among them, into a perpetual peace.

Let us inquire now in what manner this great work, commenced by fortune, may be compleated by reason ; and how that free and voluntary society, which unites all the European states, assuming the force and solidity of a body truly political, may be converted into a real confederacy. It is indubitable that such an establishment, giving to this association its necessary perfection, would remove its abuses, extend its advantages, and compel all parties to concur to the common good. But to this end it is necessary that no considerable power should refuse to enter into the association ; that a judiciary tribunal should be established, invested with authority to institute such laws and regulations as all the members are to obey ; that this tribunal be invested with a coercive and coactive force to compel each particular state to submit to the result, whether active or restrictive, of the general deliberations ; in short, that it be fixed and durable, to prevent the several members from withdrawing themselves from it at pleasure, whenever they conceive their own particular interests incompatible with the general. These are the tokens by which it might be certainly known if the institution were prudent, useful, and impregnable. We come now to extend this supposition, in order to find out by analysis what effects ought to result from such a confederacy ; what means are proper to establish it,

it, and what reasonable hope may be formed of its being carried into execution.

It is a custom among us, for a kind of general diets to assemble, from time to time, under the appellation of a Congress; to which envoys are solemnly deputed from all the states of Europe, to return back just as they went: for they either meet to say nothing, or to treat of public affairs as if they were private, to deliberate gravely whether the table should be round or square, whether there shall be more or fewer doors to their assembly-room, whether a certain plenipotentiary should sit with his face or his back toward the window, whether another should advance a foot more or less on a visit of ceremony, or on a thousand other points of the like importance, ineffectually debated for these three centuries past, and undoubtedly well worthy to employ the politicians of the present.

It is possible that the members of some one of these assemblies may be endowed with common sense; it is not even impossible that they may be sincerely disposed to the public good; and by the reasons hereafter to be deduced, it may be conceived, that, after having obviated many difficulties, they may have orders from their respective sovereigns to sign the general confederacy; a summary of which I suppose to be contained in the five following articles.

By the first, the contracting sovereigns should establish between themselves a perpetual and irrevocable alliance; appointing plenipotentiaries to hold a fixed and permanent diet, or congress, at a certain place; in which diet all the differences arising between the contracting parties shall

shall be regulated and decided by way of arbitration.

By the second, the number of sovereigns should be specified whose plenipotentiaries are to have votes in the Congress, with those who should be invited to accede to the treaty; also the order, time, and manner, in which the office of President is to pass from one to another at equal intervals; and, lastly, the respective quota of contributions, and the manner of raising them, to supply the general expences.

By the third, the confederacy should guarantee to each of its members the possession and government of all the states it at present possesses, as well as the elective or hereditary succession, as it may be established by the fundamental laws of each country. In order also to cut off at once the source of disputes incessantly recurring among them, it should be agreed to make the actual possession and the treaties last concluded, the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting powers; who are to renounce for ever and reciprocally all their prior pretensions, except future successions liable to be contested, and other rights in reversion, which are to be determined by arbitration at the diet, without the parties being ever permitted to do themselves justice by force, or to take up arms against each other, under any pretence whatever.

By the fourth, it should be specified that every ally, who shall break the treaty, shall be put under the ban of the empire, and proscribed as a common enemy; that is, if he refuses to comply with the decisions of the diet, makes preparations for war, negotiates treaties repugnant to the confederacy, or takes up arms to resist or
 attack

attack any of the allies. It should be farther agreed also, by the same article, that all the contracting parties shall arm themselves to act offensively, jointly, and at the common expence, against every state put under the ban of the empire, until such state shall lay down its arms, and submit to execute the determinations of the congress, repair the wrongs, reimburse the expence, and even compensate for making preparations for war contrary to treaty.

And, lastly, by the fifth article, the plenipotentiaries of the European confederacy should always be empowered to form, in the diet, such regulations as shall be judged expedient to procure all possible advantage to the whole of the European Republic, and its several members, in consequence of instructions from their respective courts, and having a majority of votes for the proposition of such regulations, and three-fourths five years after for their final determination. But that no alteration shall ever be made in these five fundamental articles, without the unanimous consent of the whole confederacy.

I know not but these articles, thus concisely expressed and couched in general terms, may be liable to a thousand little objections, many of which may require explanations more at large; but little difficulties easily yield to necessity, and are of no consequence in a project of such importance as the present. When the regulation of the Congress itself should come to be minutely considered, no doubt a thousand obstacles will present themselves; but there will be found ten thousand ways of removing them. The point in question now is, Whether, from the nature of things, the project be or be not
pos-

possible. A man might write volumes to no purpose, if every exigence were to be foreseen, and its expedient provided. So long as one adheres to incontestable principles, it is not requisite to convince every one's understanding, to obviate all objections, or to point out particularly how things are to be brought about. It is sufficient to shew, that what is proposed is not impracticable.

What remains, therefore, to be examined, in order to form a judgment of our system? Only two questions; for I would not affront the reader's understanding so much as to offer to prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war.

The first of these questions is, Whether the confederacy proposed will certainly attain the proposed end, and prove sufficient to secure a solid and lasting peace to Europe?

The second is, Whether it be the interest of sovereigns to establish such a confederacy, and buy a constant peace at such a rate?

If the general and particular utility of our project may be thus demonstrated, there will appear no longer any cause, in the reason of things, that can prevent the effects of an establishment that depends altogether on the will of those who are interested in it.

To begin with the discussion of the first article, let us apply what has been already advanced on the general system of Europe, and the common effort which confines each potentate in a certain degree within his own limits, and prevents his encroaching so far as to prove the entire destruction of others. To make my arguments also on this head more clear, I shall here subjoin a list of the nineteen potentates which

may be conceived to constitute our European Republic; each of which having an equal vote, there will of course be nineteen votes in the Congress.

The Emperor of the Romans.

The Emperor of Russia.

The King of France.

The King of Spain.

The King of England.

The States-General.

The King of Denmark.

Sweden.

Poland.

The King of Portugal.

The Sovereign of Rome.

The King Prussia.

The Elector of Bavaria and his associates.

The Elector Palatine and his associates.

The Swiss and their allies.

The Ecclesiastical Electors and their associates.

The Republic of Venice and her associates.

The King of Naples.

The King of Sardinia.

The many less considerable sovereigns, such as the Republic of Genoa, the Dukes of Modena and Parma, with several others omitted in this list, are to be joined to the least powerful of those mentioned, in form of association, enjoying a right to vote with them, after the manner of the *votum curiatum* of the Counts of the Empire. It were useless to give here a more particular enumeration, because accidents may daily arise to give occasion for reforming our project, even to the very moment of putting it in execution. Such accidents, however, make no alteration in the basis of our system.

One need only cast an eye on the above list, to perceive very evidently, that it is impossible for either of the powers composing it, to be in a situation capable of opposing all the others united; or that any partial league can be formed among them, able to make head against the grand confederacy.

For how would such league be formed? Would it be concerted by some of the most powerful princes? We have already shewn, that even in such a case it could not be durable; and it is now easy to see farther, that it is inconsistent with the general system of every great potentate, and with the interests inseparable from their constitution. Would such a league be concerted between one great state and several small ones? The other great powers, united in one confederacy, would presently crush it: it is indeed natural to suppose, that the grand alliance being always united and armed, it would be easy for it, by virtue of the fourth article, to prevent, or instantly to suppress, every partial and seditious alliance that should tend to disturb the public tranquillity.

Observe what happens in the Germanic body, notwithstanding the abuse of its police, and the great inequality of its members; is there yet one, even of the most powerful, amongst them, that will venture to expose himself to the ban of the Empire, by directly infringing the laws of its constitution? unless he has reason, indeed, to think that the Empire will not act in earnest against him.

I look upon it, therefore, as demonstrated, that, if the European congress were once established, there would be no danger of future re-

bellions; and that though some abuses would probably be introduced, they never could proceed so far as to elude the design of the institution. It remains now to inquire, Whether that design will be properly effected by the institution itself.

To this end, we shall consider the motives which induce princes to take up arms. These are either to make conquests, to defend themselves against invaders, to reduce a too powerful neighbour, to protect the injured, to decide disputes that cannot be amicably adjusted, or, lastly, to enforce obedience to treaties. There can be no cause or pretext for war that may not be ranged under one of these six heads: now it is evident, that not one of all the six can subsist in the new state of things under a confederacy.

In the first place, all hopes of conquest must be given up, from the impossibility of making any; it being certain, that whoever attempts it must be presently stopped in his career by a superior force; so that he will risk the losing his all, while he is sure he cannot gain any thing. Every ambitious prince, desirous to aggrandize himself in Europe, does two things: he begins by strengthening himself with good alliances; after this, he endeavours to surprize his enemy unprovided. But particular alliances will avail nothing against a general and stronger one always subsisting; while princes, having no longer any pretext to take up arms, they cannot take such a step without being perceived, prevented, and punished by the confederacy, which is constantly in arms.

The same reason which takes from each prince the hope of conquest, takes from him also the
fear

fear of being conquered; his dominions, guaranteed by all Europe, being as well secured to him as the estates of private subjects in a well-governed kingdom; nay more so, even in the same proportion as their sovereign, their sole protector, is less powerful than the potentates of all Europe united.

There would no longer be excited a desire to reduce a neighbouring power, from whom there would be no longer any thing to fear; nor would there even be any temptation to it when there would exist no hopes of success. With regard to the maintenance of the rights of each party, it may be remarked, at first view, that a deal of chicanery, with many obscure and confused pretensions, will be annihilated by the third article of the confederacy; which definitively regulates all the reciprocal rights of the allied sovereigns, on the footing of their actual possessions. Hence all possible pretensions and demands will become clear for the future, and be determined by the congress, as they occasionally arise. Add to this, that if my rights are infringed, I ought to defend them by the same means. Now as no one can encroach upon them by force of arms, without incurring the ban of the congress; so it is no longer necessary that I should by force of arms defend them. The same may be said of slighter injuries, wrongs, and reparations, and of all the unforeseen differences that may arise between sovereigns. The same power which protects their rights, ought also to redress their grievances.

As to the last article, its solution is evident. It is plain, at first sight, that, as there is no aggressor to be feared, there is no need of any de-

ensive treaty; and that, as none could be formore solid and effectual than that of the grand confederacy, every other would be useless, unlawful, and of course null and void.

It is impossible, therefore, that the confederacy being once established, should there remain any seeds of hostility among the confederates, or that the design of a perpetual peace should not be fully accomplished by the execution of the system projected.

It remains now for us to examine the other question, respecting the interests of the several contracting parties: for it is easily discernible, that the public interest may plead in vain against that of individuals. To prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war, would be saying nothing to one who should think he had reasons to prefer war to peace; while to point out the means of establishing a lasting peace, would be only to excite him to oppose it.

It may indeed be said, that sovereigns will, by this project, be deprived of the right of doing themselves justice, or of doing injustice to others, when they please; they will be deprived of the power of aggrandizing themselves; they must renounce that formidable pomp of power with which they delight to terrify the world, and that glory of conquest from which they now derive honour. In fine, they will be reduced to the necessity of being just and peaceable. What will be their indemnification for the loss of all these?

I will not venture to reply, with the Abbe de ST PIERRE, that the real glory of princes consists in their promoting the public good and the happiness of their subjects; that their true inter-
rest