| Dedication |
|
| Book |
I |
[Decisions
made by the Romans pertinent to the internal affairs of the City] |
| Chapter |
I |
What have
generally been the beginnings of some Cities, and what was that of Rome |
| |
II |
Of the kinds of
Republics there are, and of which was the Roman Republic |
| |
III |
What events
caused the creation of the Tribunes of the Plebs in Rome, which made
the Republic more perfect |
| |
IV |
That disunion
of the Plebs and the Roman Senate made that Republic free and powerful |
| |
V |
Where the
guarding of liberty is more securely placed, either in the People or in
the Nobles; and which have the greater reason to become tumultuous
either he who wants to acquire or he who wants to maintain |
| |
VI |
Whether it was
possible to establish a government in Rome which could eliminate the
enmity between the Populace and the Senate |
| |
VII |
How much the
faculty of accusing (Judiciary) is necessary for a Republic for the
maintenance of liberty |
| |
VIII |
As much as
accusations are useful to a Republic, so much so are calumnies
pernicious |
| |
IX |
How it is
necessary for one man alone in desiring to organize a new Republic to
reform its institutions entirely outside the ancient ones |
| |
X |
As much as the
founders of Republics and Kingdoms are laudable, so much are those of a
Tyranny shameful |
| |
XI |
Of the
religions of the Romans |
| |
XII |
Of how much
importance should be given Religion; and how Italy, because the medium
of the Roman Church was lacking, was ruined |
| |
XIII |
How the Romans
served themselves of Religion to establish the City and to carry out
their enterprises and stop tumults |
| |
XIV |
The Romans
interpreted the auspices according to necessity, and with their
prudence made a show of observing Religion, even when they were forced
not to observe it, and if anyone recklessly disparaged it they punished
him |
| |
XV |
How the
Samnites had recourse to Religion as an extreme remedy for the things
afflicting them |
| |
XVI |
A People
accustomed to living under a Prince, if by some accident becomes free,
maintains its liberty with difficulty |
| |
XVII |
A corrupt
People coming into their liberty can maintain itself free only with the
greatest difficulty |
| |
XVIII |
In what way in
a corrupt City a free State can be maintained, if there is one there,
or if not, how to establish it |
| |
XIX |
A weak Prince
who succeeds an excellent Prince can be maintained, but any Kingdom
cannot be maintained if a weak one is succeeded by another weak one |
| |
XX |
Two continuous
successions of Princes of virtu achieve great results; and that well
organized Republics of necessity have successions of virtu; therefore
their acquisitions and expansions are great |
| |
XXI |
How much blame
that Prince and Republic merit who lack their own arms |
| |
XXII |
What is to be
noted in the case of the three Roman Horatii and of the three Alban
Curatii |
| |
XXIII |
That one ought
not to put in peril all his fortune and all his forces; and because of
this the guarding of passes is often harmful |
| |
XXIV |
Well organized
Republics establish rewards and penalties for their Citizens, but never
compensate one (at the expense) of the other |
| |
XXV |
Whoever wants
to reform an ancient State into a free City, should retain at least a
shadow of the ancient forms |
| |
XXVI |
A new Prince in
a City or Province taken by him ought to organize everything anew |
| |
XXVII |
Very rarely do
men know how to be entirely good or entirely bad |
| |
XXVIII |
For what
reasons the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens than the
Athenians |
| |
XXIX |
Which is more
ungrateful, a People or a Prince |
| |
XXX |
What means a
Prince or a Republic ought to use to avoid this vice of ingratitude,
and what that Captain or that Citizen ought to do so as not to be
touched by it |
| |
XXXI |
That Roman
Captains were never extraordinarily punished for errors committed; nor
were they yet punished when, by their ignorance or bad proceedings
undertaken by them, harm ensued to the Republic |
| |
XXXII |
A Republic or a
Prince ought not to defer benefiting men in their necessity |
| |
XXXIII |
When an evil
has sprung up either within a State or against a State, it is a more
salutary proceeding to temporize with it than to attack it rashly |
| |
XXXIV |
The dictatorial
authority did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that the
authority which Citizens take away, not those are given them by free
suffrage, are pernicious to Civil Society |
| |
XXXV |
The reason why
the creation of the Decemvirs in Rome was harmful to the liberty of
that Republic, notwithstanding that it was created by public and free
suffrage |
| |
XXXVI |
Citizens who
have been given the higher honors ought not to disdain the lesser |
| |
XXXVII |
What troubles
the Agrarian law brought forth in Rome; and how troublesome it is to
make a law in a Republic which greatly regards the past but contrary to
the ancient customs of the City |
| |
XXXVIII |
Weak Republics
are irresolute and do not know how to decide; and if they take up any
proceeding, it results more from necessity than from election |
| |
XXXIX |
The same
incidents often happen to different People |
| |
XL |
The creation of
the Decemvirate in Rome, and what is to be noted in it; and where it
will be considered among many other things how a Republic can be saved
or ruined because of similar accidents |
| |
XLI |
To jump from
humility to pride and from mercy to cruelty without profitable means,
is an imprudent and useless thing |
| |
XLII |
How easily man
may be corrupted |
| |
XLIII |
Those who
combat for their own glory are good and faithful Soldiers |
| |
XLIV |
A multitude
without a head is useless, and one ought not to threaten first, and
then seek authority |
| |
XLV |
It is a bad
example not to observe a Law that has been made, and especially by the
author of it; and it is most harmful to renew every day new injuries in
a City and to the one who governs it |
| |
XLVI |
Men jump from
one ambition to another, and first they seek not to be offended, then
to offend others |
| |
XLVII |
Men, although
they deceive themselves in general matters do not deceive themselves in
the particulars |
| |
XLVIII |
Whoever wants a
Magistracy not to be given to a vile or wicked one, will have it asked
by a man more vile and more wicked, or by one more noble and more good |
| |
XLIX |
If those Cities
which had their beginning free as Rome, have had difficulty in finding
laws that would maintain them, those that had their beginning in
servitude have almost an impossibility |
| |
L |
A Council or
Magistrate ought not to be able to stop the activities of a City |
| |
LI |
A Republic or a
Prince ought to feign to do through liberality, that which necessity
constrains them |
| |
LII |
To reprimand
the insolence of a powerful one who springs up in a Republic, there is
no more secure and less troublesome way than to forestall him those
ways by which he comes to power |
| |
LIII |
The People many
times desire their ruin, deceived by a false species of good: and how
great hopes and strong promises easily move them |
| |
LIV |
How much
authority a great Man has in restraining an excited Multitude (mob) |
| |
LV |
How easily
things are managed in that City where the Multitude is not corrupt, and
that where there is equality a Principality cannot be established, and
where there is none a Republic cannot be established |
| |
LVI |
Before great
events occur in a City or a Province, signs come which foretell them,
or men who predict them |
| |
LVII |
Together the
Plebs are strong, dispersed they are weak |
| |
LVIII |
The Multitude
is wiser and more constant than a Prince |
| |
LIX |
Which Alliances
or Leagues can be trusted, whether those made with a Republic or those
made with a Prince |
| |
LX |
How the
Consulship and every other Magistracy in Rome ought to be (bestowed)
without any regard to age |
| Book |
II |
[That
which the Roman people did pertinent to the aggrandizement of their
Empire] |
| Chapter |
I |
Whether Virtu
or Fortune was the greater cause for the Empire which the Romans
acquired |
| |
II |
With what
People the Romans had to combat, and how obstinately they defended
their liberty |
| |
III |
Rome became a
great City by ruining the surrounding Cities and admitting foreigners
easily to her honors |
| |
IV |
Republics have
had three ways of expanding |
| |
V |
That the
changes of sects and languages, together with the accident of deluges
and pestilence, extinguished the memory of things |
| |
VI |
How the Romans
proceeded in making war |
| |
VII |
How much land
the Romans gave each colonist |
| |
VIII |
The reason why
People depart from their national places and inundate the country of
others |
| |
IX |
What causes
commonly make wars arise between the powerful |
| |
X |
Money is not
the sinew of war although this is common opinion |
| |
XI |
It is not a
prudent proceeding to make an alliance with a Prince who has more
reputation than power |
| |
XII |
Is it better,
fearing to be assaulted, to carry out or await war |
| |
XIII |
That one comes
from the bottom to a great fortune more by fraud than by force |
| |
XIV |
Men often
deceive themselves believing that by humility they overcome haughtiness |
| |
XV |
Weak States are
always ambiguous in their resolutions, and weak decisions are always
harmful |
| |
XVI |
How much the
soldiers in our times are different from the ancient organization |
| |
XVII |
How much the
army ought to esteem the artillery in the present times, and if that
opinion that is generally had of it is true |
| |
XVIII |
That because of
the authority of the Romans and by the example of ancient armies, the
infantry ought to be more esteemed than cavalry |
| |
XIX |
That
acquisitions in Republics not well organized and that do not proceed
according to Roman virtu, are the ruin and not the exaltation of them |
| |
XX |
What perils are
brought to that Prince or that Republic which avails itself of
auxiliary and mercenary troops |
| |
XXI |
The first
Praetor which the Romans sent any place was the Capua, four hundred
years after they had begun to make war (against that City) |
| |
XXII |
How often the
opinions of men in judging things (to be) great are false |
| |
XXIII |
How much the
Romans, in judging the matters for any incident that should necessitate
such judgment, avoided half-way measures |
| |
XXIV |
Fortresses are
generally more harmful than useful |
| |
XXV |
That the
assaulting of a disunited City in order to occupy it by means of its
disunion is an error |
| |
XXVI |
Contempt and
insult generate hatred against those who employ them, without any
usefulness to them |
| |
XXVII |
To prudent
Princes and Republics, it ought to be enough to win, for often it is
not enough if they lose |
| |
XXVIII |
How dangerous
it is for a Prince or a Republic, not to avenge an injury made against
the public or a private (citizen) |
| |
XXIX |
Fortune blinds
the minds of men when she does not want them to oppose her designs |
| |
XXX |
Truly powerful
Republics and Princes do not purchase friendship with money, but with
virtu and reputation of strength |
| |
XXXI |
How dangerous
it is to believe exiles |
| |
XXXII |
In how many
ways the Romans occupied Towns |
| |
XXXIII |
How the Romans
gave their Captains of armies uncontrolled commissions |
| Book |
III |
[Preservation
and governance of the State] |
| Chapter |
I |
To want that a
Sect or a Republic exist for long, it is necessary to return them often
to their Principles |
| |
II |
How at times it
is a very wise thing to simulate madness |
| |
III |
How it was
necessary, in wanting to maintain the newly acquired liberty, to kill
the sons of Brutus |
| |
IV |
A prince does
not live securely in a Principality while those who have been despoiled
of it live |
| |
V |
That which
makes a King lose the Kingdom that was inherited by him |
| |
VI |
Of conspiracies |
| |
VII |
Whence that
when changes take place from liberty to slavery, and from slavery to
liberty, some are effected without bloodshed, and some are full of it |
| |
VIII |
He who wants to
alter a Republic ought to consider its condition |
| |
IX |
How one must
change with the times, if he wants to have good fortune always |
| |
X |
That a Captain
cannot avoid an engagement if the Adversary wants to do so in every way |
| |
XI |
That he who has
to do with many, even though he is inferior, as long as he resists the
first attack, wins |
| |
XII |
How a prudent
Captain ought to impose every necessity for fighting on his soldiers,
and take them away from the Enemy |
| |
XIII |
Where one
should have more confidence, either in a good Captain who has a weak
Army, or in a good Army which has a weak Captain |
| |
XIV |
What effects
the new invention and new voices have that appear in the midst of battle |
| |
XV |
That an Army
should have one, and not many, in charge, and that many Commanders are
harmful |
| |
XVI |
That true virtu
is difficult to find in difficult times, and in easy times it is not
men of virtu that prevail, but those who have more favor because of
riches or (powerful) relation |
| |
XVII |
That one who
has been offended ought not to be placed in any administration and
government of importance |
| |
XVIII |
Nothing is more
worthy of a Captain than to penetrate the proceedings of the Enemy |
| |
XIX |
Whether
obsequies are more necessary than punishment in ruling a multitude |
| |
XX |
An example of
how humanity did influence the Faliscians more than all the power of
Rome |
| |
XXI |
Whence it
happened that Hannibal, with a different method of proceeding than
Scipio, achieved the same result in Italy as the latter (did in Spain) |
| |
XXII |
How the
harshness of Manlius Torquatus and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus
acquired the same glory for each |
| |
XXIII |
For what reason
Camillus was driven out of Rome |
| |
XXIV |
The
prolongation of (military) commands made Rome slave |
| |
XXV |
Of the poverty
of Cincinnatus and many Roman citizens |
| |
XXVI |
How a State is
ruined because of women |
| |
XXVII |
How a divided
City is to be united, and how that opinion is not true which supposes
that it is necessary to keep a City disunited in order to hold it |
| |
XXVIII |
That the
actions of citizens ought to be observed, for many times a beginning of
tyranny is hidden under a pious act |
| |
XXIX |
That the faults
of the People arise from the Princes |
| |
XXX |
For a citizen
who wants to do some good deed in his Republic on his own authority, it
is first necessary to extinguish envy; and how the defense of a City
ought to be organized on the coming of the Enemy |
| |
XXXI |
Strong
Republics and excellent men retain the same courage and dignity in any
fortune |
| |
XXXII |
What means some
have had to disturb a peace |
| |
XXXIII |
In wanting to
win an engagement, it is necessary to make the army have confidence
both in themselves and in their captain |
| |
XXXIV |
What fame or
voice or opinion which a people make begins to favor a citizen; and
whether they distribute the magistracies with greater prudence than a
Prince |
| |
XXXV |
What dangers
occur in making oneself head in counselling a thing, and how much the
danger increases when it is an extraordinary thing |
| |
XXXVI |
The reason why
the Gauls have been, and still are, judged at the beginning of a battle
to be more than men, and afterwards less than women |
| |
XXXVII |
Whether
skirmishes before an engagement are necessary, and how to recognize a
new enemy if they are avoided |
| |
XXXVIII |
How a Captain
ought to be constituted, in whom in army can confide |
| |
XXXIX |
That a Captain
ought to be one having a knowledge of sites |
| |
XL |
That to use
deceit in the managing of a war is a glorious thing |
| |
XLI |
That one's
country ought to be defended, whether with ignominy or with glory, but
it can be defended in whatever manner |
| |
XLII |
That promises
made by force ought not to be observed |
| |
XLIII |
That men born
in a province observe for all time almost the same natures |
| |
XLIV |
Impetuosity and
audacity many times can obtain that which, with ordinary means, can
never be obtained |
| |
XLV |
What is the
better proceeding in battle, either to sustain the first shock of the
enemy, and having sustained it, hurl them back, or rather to assault
him first with fury |
| |
XLVI |
Whence it
happens that a family in a city for a time, have the same customs |
| |
XLVII |
That for the
love of his country, a good citizen ought to forget private injuries |
| |
XLVIII |
When a good
error is seen to be made by the enemy, it ought to be believed that it
is done under deceit |
| |
XLIX |
A Republic
wanting to maintain itself free has some need of new precautions, and
it was by such methods that Q. Fabius was called Maximus |