IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1999 _________ No. 99-6117 _________ John A. Langworthy, Petitioner v. Robert L. Dean, et al. Respondents __________________________________________ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT __________________________________________ JOHN A. LANGWORTHY Petitioner in proper person 14104 Forest Ridge Drive North Potomac, Maryland 20878-4822 (301) 738-3879 TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS OPINION BELOW JURISDICTION TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Statutes Constitututional Provisions United States Treaties Federal and Maryland Rules Miscellaneous PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI A. Opinion Below B. Statutory Context of Case I. STATEMENT OF CASE A. The District Court’s Ruling as Reversible Error B. Private Actors C. The Eleventh Amendment D. Requests for Rehearing II. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION A. Doctrine of Acquiescence B. Judicial Immunity? C. Prosecutorial Duty without Discretion D. ICCPR Article 4.3 E. The Medical Evidence F. Injunctive Relief G. Private Prosecution H. Common Law as Federa Remedy I. Jurisdiction III. CONCLUSION APPENDIX U.S. Ct. App. 4th Cir. dismisal of appeal U.S. Ct. App. 4th Cir. denial of rehearing U.S. Dist. Ct. Md. dismissal of case U.S. Dist. Ct. Md. denial of rehearing ICCPR treaty Torture treaty QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether physical acts of torture, cruelly inhuman treatment, nonconsensual medical experimentation and sexual mayhem by a private, State-licensed physician in the United States are crimes prohibited, without governmental discretion, by two United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994) - especially when State and Federal officials have knowingly acquiesced to those acts? 2. Whether torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation in the United States are crimes under international law that have been criminalized and forbidden with no acquiecence nor derogation allowed by reason of the treaty-making power of the United States government? 3. Whether a United States citizen has the constitutional right to due process and equal protections of the laws to be protected by Maryland State and Federal officials against the crimes of torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation with sexual mayhem maliciously inflicted by a Maryland State-licensed physician in the United States? 4. Whether a United States citizen has a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be deprived of State government intervention and protection against torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation in the State’s jurisdiction as required by two self-executing United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994)? 5. Whether the Fourth Circuit Court has violated its duty under two United States self-executing treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994) as well as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect Petitioner John A. Langworthy under due process of law from the crimes of torture and a nonconsensual medical experiment that were maliciously inflicted with sexual maiming on November 27, 1992 in the State of Maryland by Maryland State-licensed physician Juvenal R. Goicochea? 6. Whether the Fourth Circuit has capriciously, arbitrarily and unreasonably violated: A) its Federal treaty-enforcement power found in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); and Kessler v. Grand Central, ______ Fed. No. 97-7503 ______ (2nd Cir. 1997); B) the Federal doctrine of informed consent for medical patients found in Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 125 (1990); C) the Federal and international doctrine of acquiescence after the fact as found in Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 381 (1991); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980); Southern PAC Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 263, 267 (1965); and Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (International Tribunal of the United Nations for the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda - guilty verdict on September 8, 1998) (http://www.ictr.org/english/judgments/akayesu.html); D) the Federal doctrines against absolute and qualified immunity found in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. _____ (1977); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259? 7. Whether it is reversible error for the Fourth Circuit to have violated the Federal doctrine that acquiescence to torture after the fact is cognizable under the United States self-executing treaty The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) ("ICCPR") as found in the Ninth Circuit’s United Mexican v. Woods, ______ Fed. No. 97-5878 ______ (9th Cir. 1997) and Hilao v. Marcos, ______ Fed. No. 95-16779 ______ (9th Cir. 1995)? 8. Whether the Fourth Circuit needs to be reversed for violating the Federal doctrine that the Respondents’ administrative, pre-probable cause, out-of-court and nonjudicial conduct is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity as found in other Circuits like Giuffre v. Bissell, _____ F.2d _____ (3rd Cir. 1994)? 9. Whether the Fourth Circuit reversibly violated Federal treaty enforcement power that the Respondents, as State and Federal Officials, could not be entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for their having violated the legal duty not to violate United States treaties as found in other Circuits like Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1533 (10th Cir. 1988)? 10. Whether the Fourth Circuit reversibly violated the Federal doctrine that prosecutors are not entitled to prosecutorial discretion when the Federal legislature has established a duty to prosecute as well as when the Federal legislature has established a duty to perform mandatory, nondiscretionary administrative functions as found in the D.C. Circuit’s Wren v. Merit System Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867, 875, n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)? 11. Whether the Fourth Circuit, in violation of United Mexican v. Wood, supra; and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), reversibly erred by finding that injunctive, declaratory and/or summary relief could not be granted to Petitioner for enforcement of the two self-executing United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994)? 12. Whether, under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343 along with 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 pursuant to the United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994), it is a Federal civil rights violation for Maryland State administrative officials, acting under color of State law in coordinated agreement and with the meeting of their minds, to refuse to protect a nonmilitary victim via the State’s common law from the international crimes of torture, cruelly inhuman treatment and nonconsensual medical experimentation with sexual mayhem maliciously inflicted in their State by a State-licensed physician? 13. Whether Petitoner’s Fourth Amended Complaint and Motion to Alter Judg- ment were wrongly denied by the District Court and then the Fourth Circuit? PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS Petitioner Langworthy, a private citizen here, was brutally, violently, maliciously and criminally victimized by deliberate torture, a nonconsensual medical experiment and mayhem upon this Petitioner’s sexual anatomy by Dr. Juvenal R. Goicochea in Bethesda, Montgomery County, State of Maryland in the Federal Fourth Judicial Circuit. Petitioner Langworthy is the victim of torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation and sexual mayhem who seeks mandatory redress in this case. The Respondents are Maryland State and Federal officials who are and have been directly responsible for enforcing and violating the two United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 717, ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) (hereafter "ICCPR") and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 [1984], ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994) (hereafter Torture Convention). This Petition is justified because the Respondents, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have unreasonably, capriciously, arbitrarily and unlawfully refused to enforce the requirements of the two treaties ICCPR and Torture Convention sub judice, unlawfully in violation of the Constitution of the United States of America Article II, Section 2. (2); Article III, Section 2. (1); Article IV, Section 2. (1) and Article VI (2) as well as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, Section 1. Specifically, the Respondents are: 1) Robert L. Dean, State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, 50 Maryland Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 20850. Mr. Dean had administrative, investigative and judicial duty for prosecution of and policy-making for Maryland State crimes committed in Montgomery County. As State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, Mr. Dean’s functions were largely administrative, instead of investigatory and judicial. Most judicial functions in Mr. Dean’s State’s Attorney’s Office were performed by his Deputy and Assistant State’s Attorneys. Mr. Dean is personally and/or officially responsible for the administrative, investigative and judicial actions by the employees in his State’s Attorney’s Office. Since Douglas Gansler has since replaced Respondent Dean as Montgomery County’s State’s Attorney and since Mr. Gansler has subsequently supported Mr. Dean’s constitutional violations sub judice, Mr. Gansler was named as a substitute Defendant/Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 25 (d) (1) in Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint. 2) Richard P. Crane, Prosecution Management Coordinator for the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, 50 Maryland Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 20850. Mr. Crane had the administrative and investigative duty for coordinating decisions on crimes in Montgomery County, Maryland. 3) Sue Dudley, Legal Assistant to the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, 50 Maryland Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 20850. Ms. Dudley had the duty of providing administrative and possibly investigative aid to the State’s Attorney’s Office for Montgomery County. 4) Douglas M. Duncan, County Executive for Montgomery County, 101 Monroe Street, Rockville, Maryland 20850. Mr. Duncan has the administrative duty of supervising the Montgomery County Police Department for investigating and arresting criminals. 5) Respondent William Jeffereson Cinton is President of the United States at The White House, Washington, D.C. 20051. 6) The unnamed Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents were located in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. OPINION BELOW The unpublished opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and United States District Court for the District of Maryland reversibly deny Petitioner’s asserted Federal rights to be protected against the crimes of inflicted torture, cruelly inhuman treatment, nonconsensual medical experimentation and sexual mayhem; and said opinions appear in the Appendix (App.1-21). All remedies, except this Court’s review, have been exhausted. JURISDICTION This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is being filed within ninety days of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s having denied Petitioner’s timely Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1), 2101(c) and S.Ct. Rule 13.1. This Court’s jurisdiction is also established by Constitution of the United States Article III, Section 2. (1) through (2); Article VI (2) as well as the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1885) The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) Armstrong v. State, 444 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1982), citing Commonwealth v. Newell, 7 Mass. 244 (1810 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. O’Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912) Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763, 30 L.Ed. 766 Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 Beverly v. Maryland, 707 A.2d 91, 98 (Md. 1998) Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, No. 95-1100, 520 U.S. _______, _______ S.Ct. _________ (April 28, 1997) Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875) Boudinot v. United States (Cherokee Tobacco), 11 Wall. 616, 20 L.Ed. 227 (U.S.) Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 91 (1944) Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 at paragraph II (1984) Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980) Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919) Chryssikos v. Demarco, 134 Md. 533, 107 A. 358 (1919) City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966) Clark v.Braden, 16 How. 635, 14 L.Ed. 1090 (U.S.) Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932) Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 125 (1990) Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872) De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S.Ct. 143, 45 L.Ed. 1041 Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 71, citing Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853) Doe v. Mayor and City Council of Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. 1137, 1139 (D.Md. 1990) Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974) Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908) Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603, 3 L.Ed. 453 (U.S.) Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366, 15 L.Ed. 684 (U.S.) Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (U.S.) Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 863 (1984), quoting 630 F.2d 876, 884, 888, 890 Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, at 314 (1829) Georgia v. Rachael, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) Giuffre v. Bissell, _____ F.2d _____ (3rd Cir. 1994) Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co. , 244 U.S. 499 (1977) Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-490 (1880) Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3rd 285 (9th Cir. 1994) Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) Hilao v. Marcos, ______ Fed. No. 95-16779 ______ (9th Cir. 1995) Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) Home Tel.&Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925) Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 381 (1991) Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 Jeker v. Magee (Haver & Yaker), 9 Wall 32, 19 L.Ed. 571 (U.S.) Jenkins by Hall v. Talledega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3rd 821, 823 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ______ U.S. ______, 118 S.Ct. 412, 139 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918) Jones v. Mayer Co., 393 U.S. 409 (1968) Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. ______ (1997) Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed. 316 (U.S.) Kessler v. Grand Central, _____ Fed. No. 97-7503 _____ (2nd Cir. 1997) Koon v. United States, _______ U.S. _______ (1996) Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3rd 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917) Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918) Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926) Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1533 (10th Cir. 1988) Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) Morley v. Walker, _____ Fed. No. 97-16883 ______ (9th Cir. - May 4, 1999) Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, especially at 840-848 (Md. 1975) National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc et al., Fed. No. 96-568 (U.S.) The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 9 N.E.2d 46, 49-50, 110 A.L.R. 1303 Pfeiffer v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Circuit 1991) Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419, Case No. IT-94-1-T (International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 at The Hague, Nether lands: guilty verdict for torture and other atrocities by private actor on May 7, 1997) Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (International Tribunal of the United Nations for the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda - guilty verdict on September 8, 1998) Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979) Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 435 U.S. 151 (1978) Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, House of Lords on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division (Great Britain - 24 March 1999) Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887) Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988) Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908) Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974) Sellner v. Panagoulis, et al., 565 F.Supp. 238, 248-249 (D.Md. 1982), aff’d without opinion, 796 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1986) Seminole Tribe v. Florida, _____ U.S. ______, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) Southern PAC Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 263, 267 (1965) Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice O’Connor’s dissenting Footnote 10 State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1961) Steel Co., aka Chicago Steel and Pickling Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environment, _____ Fed. No. 96-643 _____ (7th Cir. - October 6, 1997) Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 9 L.Ed. 1137 (U.S.) Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-240 (1969) Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Footnote 34 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) United Mexican v. Woods, _____ Fed. No. 97-5878 ______ (9th Cir. 1997) United States v. The Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (U.S.) United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 3055 (1987) United States v. Wong, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-321 Wold v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) Wren v. Merit System Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867, 875, n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) Young v. United States ex el. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) STATUTES 1 U.S.C. 113 18 U.S.C. 2340, 2340B and 3286 28 U.S.C. 1254(1), 1331, 1343, 2101(c), 2201 and 2202 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Articles 2, 5, 6, 19, 24 and 47 Constitution of the United States of America Article I, Section 10 Article II, Section 2. (2) Article III, Section 2. (1) and (2) Article IV, Section 2. (1) Article VI (2) First Amendment Fourth Amendment Seventh Amendment Eighth Amendment Ninth Amendment Tenth Amendment Eleventh Amendment Thirteenth Amendment Fourteenth Amendment UNITED STATES TREATIES Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 [1984], ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994) Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 10 (signed with the United Nations at Vienna on May 23, 1969 and ratified by the United States Senate on January 27, 1980) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 717, ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) FEDERAL and MARYLAND RULES Maryland Rules 4-202 and 4-211 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 25 (d) Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 44.1, 56 AND 65 Fed. R. Ev. 201 S.Ct. Rule 13.1 MISCELLANEOUS 1 W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (New York: 2d Ed. 1929), page 556 Q. Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: 1922), pages 101-102 Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, Doctors of Infamy: The Story of Nazi Medical Crimes (New York: Henry Schumann, 1949) M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 2nd Rev. Edition (Boston: Dordretch, 1987) Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968), pages 113-122 Theodore Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 554 (1995) Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (New York: Basic Books, 1986) Magnus Linklater, The Nazi Legacy: Klaus Barbie and the International Neo-Fascist Connection (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1986) Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear (London: Latin American Bureau, 1992) Victor W. Sidel, M.D., "The Social Responsibilities of Health Professionals: Lessons from Their Role in Nazi Germany", Journal of the American Medical Association, Volume 276 (20) (Chicago: American Medical Association, November 27, 1996), pp. 1679-1681 John A. Langworthy respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered in this proceeding on June 24, 1999, with rehearing denied on July 27, 1999. OPINION BELOW A copy of the unpublished denials by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Langworthy v. Dean, et al., No. 99-1404, Petitioner/Appellant’s appeal as well as rehearing and rehearing en banc denied on June 24 and July 27, 1999, respectively, appears in the Appendix (hereafter referred to as "App. --") at App.1-3. A copy of the unpublished dismissal and last Docket Entries by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland Langworthy v. Dean, et al., No. CA-98-2631-AW, Defendant’s motion to dismiss granted on February 9, 1999, Petitioner/Plaintiff’s motion to alter judgment denied on March 9, 1999 appears in App.4-21, respectively. STATUTORY CONTEXT OF THE CASE 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343 along with 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 provide statutory remedies to enforce Petitioner’s Federal rights as guaranteed herein by two United States treaties The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 717, ratified by the United States Senate on September 8, 1992) (hereafter "ICCPR") and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 [1984], ratified by the United States Senate on or about November 20, 1994) (hereafter Torture Convention). I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On November 27, 1992 at age 44, Petitioner Langworthy went to Dr. Juvenal R. Goicochea’s office in Bethesda, Maryland for a medical examination. While at the doctor’s reception desk, Mr. Langworthy invited the doctor’s staff to attend a live musical performance by his Legendary Band in Arlington, Virginia. The doctor’s Office Manager/wife became extremely upset at Mr. Langworthy. Petitioner was then later escorted to the doctor’s examination room, where Dr. Goicochea entered and had the intended victim disrobe. Under the color, usage, law and custom of the doctor’s Maryland State medical license and with the intended victim now under the doctor’s physical control, Dr. Goicochea knowingly, wilfully and maliciously inflicted severe, permanent, disabling pain into the Petitioner’s sexual anatomy by the doctor’s stabbing the spermatic cord inside victim Petitioner’s left inguinal canal as hard as the doctor could with all the doctor’s strength, with criminally excessive force, with criminal intent to torture and to maim, without the victim’s informed consent, without any accepted medical purpose, without any legal authority and against the victim’s will for the brutally prolonged period of approximately five (5) minutes by the doctor’s having used the tip of his index finger "like a scalpel". The doctor then performed similar criminal abuse to the victim’s right spermatic cord for approximately two-and-a-half (2.5) minutes. The severe pain that is permanently inflicted resulted from Dr. Goicochea’s maliciously acting under the color of Maryland State law for his license to practice medicine in order to punish Petitioner Langworthy for the patient’s act of having exercised his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, expression and association by having invited the doctor’s staff to a live performance by the victim’s Legendary Band. Subsequently in writing to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on or about February 15, 1995, Dr. Goicochea falsely accused Petitioner Langworthy of making "racial epithets" against this doctor. This alerted Mr. Langworthy that the doctor’s maliciously inflicted punishment was also motivated out of the doctor’s racial animus because of Langworthy’s being caucasian and the doctor’s being apparently mongoloid. Respondents’ policies illegally allow the doctor’s international crimes. Contrary to the District Court’s ruling that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit, Dr. Goicochea’s racial malice under color of the Maryland State law that gives the doctor his medical license invokes the Respondents’ duties under 42 U.S.C. 1981(c): "The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovern- mental discrimination and impairment under color of State law." With Respondents’ policies, subsequent derogation and acquiescence being forbidden by ICCPR and the Torture Convention, the Respondents, under color of State law, subsequently impaired Langworthy’s Federal rights to be protected from Dr. Goicochea’s violent racial animus of having maliciously tortured, maimed and experimented upon the intentionally victimized patient. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 393 U.S. 409 (1968). Apart from the severe pain, the permanent internal injury was unknown and unknowable to Mr. Langworthy until Dr. Paul Rudolf diagnosed the resulting left ilioinguinal neuropathy on November 4, 1994. Since the internal wound has continued to worsen instead of improve, Langworthy began to complain to Maryland State authorities. There is no statute of limitations for crimes punishable by imprisonment in the Maryland State Penitentiary, and the Respondents, acting under color of Maryland State law, administratively began to acquiesce to Dr. Goicochea’s crimes of torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation and sexual maiming on or about January 6, 1997. This ongoing administrative acquiecence by the Respondents to Dr. Goicochea’s alleged torture, nonconsensual medical experiment and sexual mayhem violates the two United States treaties ICCPR Articles 1.1 (right to self-determination), 2, 3, 4.2, 4.3, 5, 7, 9.1 ("right to liberty and security of person"), 10.1, 14.1 and 15 as well as Torture Convention Articles 1.1, 2.1, 4, 5.3, 6, 7, 8.4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Also see Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Articles 2, 5, 6, 19, 24 and 47. The government action required for official torture to occur in unconstitutional derogation of ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 as well as the Torture Convention Article 1 happened when the Respondents acquiesced to the severe pain that is permanently inflicted as illegal punishment by Dr. Goicochea. After Langworthy filed a timely Civil Rights Violations Complaint, the District Court and Fourth Circuit also acquiesced unlawfully to the doctor’s torture and nonconsenual medical experiment in unconstitutional derogation of ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 as well as the Torture Convention. Contrary to the rulings by the Fourth Circuit and U.S. District Court sub judice, the administrative functions knowingly performed by the Respondents under color of State law do not entitle them to judicial immunity - neither absolute nor qualified. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. ______ (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409. Also see Giuffre v. Bissell, _____ F.2d _____ (3rd Cir. 1994). The administrative functions knowingly performed by the Respondents’ acting under color of State law in unconstitutional violation of the self-executing treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention are: 1) Respondents unlawfully refused to define Dr. Goicochea’s alleged torture, inhuman treatment, nonconsensual medical experiment and sexual maiming as crimes; 2) Respondents unlawfully refused to conduct an immediate and adequate investigation of the alleged torture, medical experiment and sexual mayhem in this case; 3) Respondents administratively refused to consider the criminal confessions of criminal liability by Dr. Goicochea as evidence that a crime has been committed; 4) Respondents refused to make the required administrative finding of the overwhelming probable cause that alleged crimes were committed by Dr. Goicochea; 5) Respondents administratively refused to effect the detention of Dr. Goicochea; 6) Respondents have administratively denied Petitioner’s right to receive compensation and rehabilitation for Dr. Goicochea’s having tortured him with the severe pain that is permanently inflicted; and 7) Respondents, including Respondent Clinton, administratively refused to report their derogations of ICCPR Article 4.2 to "the Secretary-General of the United Nations" and to report when these derogations would have ceased in violations of ICCPR Article 4.3. The Fourth Circuit and U.S. District Court reversibly ruled that the Respondents are entitled to prosecutorial discretion as well as judicial immunity (absolute and qualified) for these obviously administrative decisions. With no derogation allowed, the self-executing treaties ICCPR and Torture Convention also require judicial functions as a legal duty, thus eliminating prosecutorial discretion, as follows: The criminal prosecution of Dr. Goicochea for the alleged torture and involuntary medical experiment with sexual maiming. For Langworthy’s Fourteenth Amendment right to informed consent against the unwanted medical torture, experiment and mayhem by Dr. Goicochea, see Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 125 (1990); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); and Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). Also see ICCPR Article 4.2 and 7. The duty of private citizens, government employees and judges to obey United States treaties from the day of ratification is clearly established and known to reasonable persons. See, e.g., Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed. 316 (U.S.); and Chryssikos v. Demarco, 134 Md. 533, 107 A. 358 (1919). Also see Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights Article 2. A citizen’s liberty interest to enforce his rights with State and Federal officials pursuant to the Ninth, Tenth and Fourthteen Amendments as required by a treaty is also well-established. Indeed, the Constitution of the United States has long made ratified treaties the supreme law of the land. See Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603, 3 L.Ed. 453 (U.S.); Jeker v. Magee (Haver & Yaker), 9 Wall 32, 19 L.Ed. 571 (U.S.); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S.Ct. 143, 45 L.Ed. 1041; United States v. The Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (U.S.); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366, 15 L.Ed. 684 (U.S.); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763, 30 L.Ed. 766; Boudinot v. United States (Cherokee Tobacco), 11 Wall. 616, 20 L.Ed. 227 (U.S.); Clark v.Braden, 16 How. 635, 14 L.Ed. 1090 (U.S.); Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 9 L.Ed. 1137 (U.S.); and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Our Federal treaties have long been a basis for determining individual rights in litigation under the United States Constitution. The legislative intent of ICCPR and the Torture Convention is that all persons be protected from torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation. These two treaties were publicly published by the United States Government after they were signed by the United States President and ratified by the United States Senate pursuant to United States Constitution Article II, Section 2. (2) and 1 U.S.C. 113. The United States Judiciary "shall be bound thereby" pursuant to U.S. Constitution Article VI (2); and the Respondents are bound thereto by U.S. Constituion Article IV, Section 2. (1) as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. Also see U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2. (1), with this Court’s "appellate jurisdiction" established by the Constitution’s Article III, Section 2. (2). The Fourth Circuit, District Court and Respondents unlawfully violated the legislated requirement under international law that "The text of a treaty is estab- lished as authentic and definitive:" in violation of the United States treaty Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 10 (signed with the United Nations at Vienna on May 23, 1969 and ratified by the United States Senate on January 27, 1980). Ratified treaties are to be construed based upon what they say, and it was unlawful for the Fourth Circuit to allow the District Court’s and Respondents’ misrepresentations of the definitive texts in ICCPR and the Torture Convention. Prior to having filed his Civil Rights Violations Complaint in the District Court, Langworthy repeatedly and conscientiously informed the Respondents of their duty to protect him against Dr. Goicochea’s criminal torture and involuntary medical experiment with sexual mayhem as explicitly required by the two treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention. Langworthy repeatedly tried to inform the Respondents of their duty to enforce the specific requirements of ICCPR and the Torture Convention as these treaties apply to the facts and law of Dr. Goicochea’s international crimes sub judice. Respondents repeatedly refused to communicate with Petitioner. The Respondents had ample opportunity to read ICCPR and the Torture Convention prior to Langworthy’s having filed his Complaint in the District Court, and, at all times, Respondents knew that they have a duty not to violate Petitioner Langworthy’s constitutional rights. But unreasonable pride, capricious arrogance, deliberately arbitrary ignorance, gross indifference, unlawful hostility and unconstitutional misfeasance blocked the Federally required justice sub judice from the Respondents’ cognition. Petitioner Langworthy has therefore established a Federal cause of action in compliance with the requirements in Conn v. Gabbert, ______ U.S. _______ (No. 97-1802 - April 5, 1999). Although it is hard to imagine that the Circuit Judges for the Fourth Circuit en banc likewise lacked the constitutionally required cognizance under the two treaties ICCPR’s and Torture Convention’s jurisdiction as those treaties apply to the facts and law of this case, such is the controversy to be resolved by this Court. All other administrative and judicial remedies have been exhausted, and ICCPR and the Torture Convention entitle Petitioner to this Court’s intervention. In this Court, this case appears to be a matter of first impression for victims of torture and/or unwanted medical experimentation since ICCPR and the Torture Convention were ratified as United States treaties by the United States Senate. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice O’Connor’s dissenting Footnote 10; and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Footnote 34 (juvenile’s rights against death penalty under 8th/14th Amendments). Indeed, "The treaty is . . . . a law made by proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States." Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853). Needless to say, this Court is consistently intent upon performing its duty. This Court has no higher duty under international law than to protect citizens in the United States from such atrocities as genocide, slavery, piracy, tyranny, torture and nonconsensual medical experiments. E.g., see the Thirteenth Amendment and ICCPR Articles 4.2 and 8 against slavery. For this Court to deny this Petition would illegally nullify the treaty-making power of the United States Senate, and thus would petty tyrants like Dr. Goicochea be unlawfully enabled to maim, torture and experiment on unwilling citizens with criminal impunity. Dr. Goicochea is an Emergency Room surgeon at hospitals in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area. Another patient Murilo von Meien repeatedly accused Dr. Goicochea of having tried to kill him at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Montgomery County, Maryland; and another patient David White said, "It was a little weird" what Dr. Goicochea did to him during surgery on the patient’s foot! Well, it was highly criminal what Dr. Goicochea did to exceed Petitioner Langworthy’s consent for a medical examination! Unlawful prejudice against Petitioner Langworthy’s Federal rights may, in part, be motivated by Respondent Dean’s having reportedly hired Dr. Goicochea as a medical expert in Montgomery County, Maryland. At a bare minimum, Petitioner Langworthy is entitled to present evidence in the District Court that he was in fact tortured and experimented upon by Dr. Goicochea with the Respondents’ acquiescence in unlawful derogation of ICCPR Articles 2, 3, 4.2, 5, 7, 9.1, 14.1, 15 and 16 and as well as the Torture Convention. By illegally upholding the United States District Court’s final judgment to grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss sub judice without any hearing in violation of the treaties ICCPR and Torture Convention as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s fundamental due process right to a hearing, the Fourth Circuit reversibly affirmed that Respondents are entitled to absolute and qualified immunity, that Respondents are allowed to acquiesce to an act of torture after the fact and that the treaties ICCPR and Torture Convention cannot apply to the facts alleged in this case. The trial court and Fourth Circuit actually ignored and violated ICCPR Article 7’s prohibition against nonconsensual medical experiments with no such derogation allowed pursuant to ICCPR Article 4.2. Respondents’ policies were thus illegally allowed. By misconstruing as well as misapplying ICCPR and the Torture Convention in violation of the Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Fourth Circuit reversibly and summarily upheld the District Court’s summary ruling that Petitioner Langworthy had failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988; 28 U.S.C 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202; as well as Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65 and 56. This case concerns the procedural, statutory and constitutional due process that must be followed by government officials when a nonmilitary citizen in the United States has been tortured and medically experimented upon against his will. The aggravated circumstance of sexual mayhem with actual malice accompanies this cause of action as a direct result of Dr. Goicochea’s criminal torture and experiment upon Mr. Langworthy. See State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1961) (medical mayhem); and Armstrong v. State, 444 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1982), citing Commonwealth v. Newell, 7 Mass. 244 (1810) (common law mayhem and statutory maiming are basically synonymous). Pursuant to ICCPR Article 4.3, this Court has the duty to order the Fourth Circuit, the District Court and the Respondents to report their derogation of ICCPR Articles 7 and 15 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as to report when these derogations have ceased. ICCPR and the Torture Convention establish this Court’s duty to grant this Petition: ICCPR and the Torture Convention eliminate this Court’s discretion not to grant this Petition. Ordinarily, writs of certiorari are granted as a matter of discretion, but international law as ratified by the United States Senate in ICCPR and the Torture Convention declare the crimes of torture and unwanted medical experiments to be such "jus cogens" that judicial discretion is purposefully eliminated. Quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). This Court’s duty to enforce Federal treaties without discretion is nothing new for this Court. See The Amistad 40 U.S. 518 (1841); and Jones v. Mayer Co., supra, 423-441 (1968) (judicial duty against piracy, slavery and racial discrimination). Medical torture, involuntary medical experiments, deliberate medical maiming, medical murder and medical genocide are historic crimes that have pretty much stayed out of the United States. However, please see Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968), pages 113-122, for the Federal military trial and execution of Confederate physician Captain Henry Wirth for his criminal murder and torture of Union prisoners at Andersonville Prison, Georgia during the Civil War (1861-1865). With increasing numbers of immigrants like Dr. Goicochea who come from countries where torture has been widely practised with impunity, torture with maiming and even murder may become an increasing problem within the United States. E.g., see Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear (London: Latin American Bureau, 1992). Dr. Wirth was a Swiss immigrant, and Dr. Goicochea is a Peruvian immigrant. While Dr. Goicochea cannot be discriminated against because of his national origin, immigrants and citizens are equally expected to obey our laws. See United States v. Wong, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Petitioner Langworthy knows another abused patient Murilo von Meien who complains that Dr. Goicochea tried to kill him at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland in 1997. Obviously, Dr. Goicochea did not murder Petitioner Langworthy, but Dr. Goicochea did torture, experiment upon and sexually maim Petitioner against his will and without his informed consent. Dr. Goicochea has knowingly and maliciously tormented Petitioner Langworthy with severe, permanent pain criminally and violently inflicted since November 27, 1992. To protect all persons in the United States from torture, unwanted medical experiments and sexual maiming is an important duty for our government, including this Court in this case - with no derogation, acquiescence, immunity nor discretion allowed by ICCPR and the Torture Convention. Who will Dr. Goicochea’s next victim be? Langworthy complained about the Respondents to the U.S. District Court for injunctive, declaratory or summary relief via 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988; 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202; as well as Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65 and 56. See Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Civil Rights Violations Complaint that was reversibly denied by the U.S. District Court (App.21 - Docket Entry) and Fourth Circuit Court (App.1-3). Because the Respondents, District Court and Fourth Circuit Court have officially acquiesced to the severe pain that is permanently and maliciously inflicted as unjustifiable punishment by Dr. Goicochea into Petitioner Langworthy’s sexual anatomy, the Torture Convention’s Article 1 definition of torture applies here. For the right to injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 after all administrative remedies have been exhausted, see National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The two treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention are self-executing in the United States by Maryland State authorities under common law by reason of the Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Constitution of Maryland Declaration of Rights Articles 2, 5, 19 and 24. Also see ICCPR Articles 2, 3 and 5 as well as 42 U.S.C. 1988, whereby Petitioner Langworthy has the constitutional right to Maryland State common law as the required remedy for the Respondents to enforce Petitioner’s Federal rights under the two treaties. Maryland common law readily accepts the internationally required criminalization, investigative procedures, administrative protections and criminal prosecution against Dr. Goicochea’s torture and involuntary medical experiment upon victim Langworthy pursuant to Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights Articles 2, 5, 6, 19, 24 and 47 as well as 42 U.S.C. 1988. Without any derogation allowed; ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 require criminalization, criminal interventions and criminal prosecution against Dr. Goicochea. The Respondents therefore have the duty that requires them to seek a common law indictment against Dr. Goicochea for the common law crimes of torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation and mayhem. See Maryland Rules 4-202 and 4-211. This common law remedy for Dr. Goicochea’s international crimes jus cogens as required by 42 U.S.C. 1988 did not exist prior to the ratification of ICCPR. Contrary to the District Court’s and Fourth Circuit Court’s reversible error, the legislative intent of the two treaties is to protect all persons in the United States after as well as before or during the criminal acts of torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation. Pursuant to FRE R201 and FRCVP R44.1, Petitioner petitions this Court to remand back to the Fourth Circuit so the District Court can take judicial notice that Dr. Goicochea’s alleged torture and nonconsensual medical experiment are crimes alleged under the international law of nations. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 2nd Rev. Edition (Boston: Dordretch, 1987). Because of ICCPR Articles 4.2 and 15, sexual mayhem of adult male sexual anatomy must also be included in the Respondents’ duty to criminalize sub judice. Intentional injuring of human adult male sexual anatomy by a physician for the maliciously sadistic purpose of permanently rendering the victim less able in fighting as Dr. Goicochea has done to Mr. Langworthy is universally regarded as an interna- tional common law crime among the law of nations. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit Court, the Respondents are thus constitutionally required by ICCPR Articles 4.2 and 15 to define this mayhem as a common law crime. See, e.g., State v. Bass, supra; and Armstrong v. State, supra. Pursuant to FRE R201 and FRCVP R44.1, Petitioner petitions this Court to remand back to the Fourth Circuit so the District Court can take judicial notice that sexual mayhem by a physician with the malicious intent to attempt castrating a nonconsenting adult patient, like Mr. Langworthy sub judice, is internationally regarded as a crime among the law of nations. A. THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION AS REVERSIBLE ERROR The District Court granted Respondents prosecutorial and partial immunity on the erroneous basis that ICCPR and the Torture Convention have established no duty for the Respondents to act. If the District Court were correct that Respondents had discretion instead of a required duty, then Langworthy would not have sued Respondents in the first place. Not one of the cases relied upon by the trial court involved the alleged violation of any United States treaty. Stare decises involving a United States treaty overwhelmingly reject the Fourth Circuit’s having upheld the District Court’s order to dismiss this case. B. PRIVATE ACTORS The trial court reversibly erred by having found that ICCPR and the Torture Convention do not apply to private actors like Dr. Goicochea who have allegedly tortured and experimented upon a private citizen. Like nongovernment slavers, pirates as well as highjackers; private torturers and sadistic medical experimenters such as Dr. Goicochea sub judice are "hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 863 (1984), quoting 630 F.2d 876, 884, 888, 890. Fundamental justice in this case moves this Court to reverse the Fourth Circuit’s capriciously upholding the trial court’s gross injustice to the contrary. Private actors who commit such international crimes as torture and genocide are criminally liable, and government authorities have no legal authority to acquiesce to the crimes of such torture or genocide after the fact. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419, Case No. IT-94-1-T (International Tribunal for the Prosecu- tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 at The Hague, Netherlands: guilty verdict for torture and other atrocities by private actor on May 7, 1997). See the Tribunal’s Opinion denying the Defense Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ¶¶ 42, 51, 61, 65 and 68 at http://diana.law.yale.edu/diana/db/4298-25.html. With the two treaties, the District is in reversible error for having ruled, "As there is not a clearly established constitutional right to have claims of criminal activity by a private actor investigated, the doctrine of qualified immunity will bar these claims." "No derogation" allowed by Articles 4.2 and 15.2; ICCPR Article 7 guarantees, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." So even with the District Court’s finding torture inapplicable, Dr. Goicochea’s abuse at least constitutes "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment [and] punishment". Contrary to the the Circuit Court’s reversible decision to uphold the District Court’s arbitrary ruling, ICCPR nowhere requires that the crime of "torture" or "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" must be performed by a government actor. The District Court’s and Fourth Circuit’s refusal to order the Respondents’ defining Dr. Goicochea’s criminal actions as crimes as well as the Respondents’ conducting a pre-probable cause investigation unlawfully derogates ICCPR and the Torture Convention. Since torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation and sexual mayhem by a private physician are universally classified as crimes among the law of nations, ICCPR Article 15.2 requires the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of Dr. Goicochea’s alleged international crimes with no "prejudice" nor derogation by the Respondents allowed. The legislative intent of ICCPR and the Torture Convention is that torture and involuntary medical experiments by private actors shall not be tolerated. It was unreasonable for the Fourth Circuit to have found that civilization has not progressed to this advancement under international law. "As required by the Torture Covention ‘all’ torture wherever committed world-wide was made criminal under United Kingdom law and triable in the United Kingdom", and torturers must be detained in the jurisdiction wherever they may be found. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, House of Lords on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division (Great Britain - 24 March 1999). So in addition to the required international criminalization, investigation, arrest and prosecution of anyone who tortures the physical person of another as Goicochea in fact did to Petitioner Langworthy with the doctor’s criminal malice to maim this victim, torturers may be prosecuted by the jurisdiction wherever they may be found. See Theodore Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 554 (1995). The Respondents, District Court and Fourth Circuit have unlawfully disobeyed 42 U.S.C. 1988 that Maryland common law provides the crimi- nal remedy to enforce Langworthy’s Federal rights against the international crimes allegedly committed by Dr. Goicochea in this case. Otherwise, this Court will illegally derogate the two treaties and will illegally acquiesce to Dr. Goicochea’s torture. The District Court improperly and reversibly ignored Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint (App.21) that the severe pain that is permanently inflicted by Dr. Goicochea was maliciously motivated as punishment by the doctor for Langwor- thy’s act of having invited the doctor’s staff to a musical event and of having thus upset the doctor’s Office Manager/wife. Because Repondents’ officially and/or personally acquiesced to it, this brutal punishment by the doctor has invoked the definition of torture by the Torture Convention Article 1 as well as ICCPR Article 7. The Fourth Circuit totally ignored that ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 as well as Torture Convention require the Respondents to classify Dr. Goicochea’s torture and nonconsensual medical experiment as crimes - without the derogation unlawfully allowed by the District Court. The unconstitutional outrage of same sex sexual harassment by private actors in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc et al., Fed. No. 96-568 (U.S.) certainly appears no more outrageous than the criminal outrage of sexual torture, sexually cruel/inhuman treatment, unwanted sex-change experiment and sexual mayhem by Dr. Goicochea in this case. Contrary to the facts and law in this case, the District Court reversibly found, investigative acts taken by a prosecutor prior to the probable cause determination are subject to qualified instead of absolute immunity. The Court believes that the failure to act prior to the probable cause determination should be subject to the same standard as well. Respondents refused to take any pre-probable cause actions because Respondents unlawfully insisted that Dr. Goicochea’s alleged conduct was not an alleged crime. The District Court unjustly found that Langworthy had failed to allege any discrimination by the Respondents. Langworthy had clearly alleged that the Respondents and their policies were granting Dr. Goicochea unlawful impunity from criminalization and investigation by Respondents’ discriminating against Petitioner Langworthy as a member of the class of persons who have been tortured, experimented upon and maimed by a medical doctor. Langworthy even alleged how this class of persons factually exists in the United States. For example, contact: Children of Auschwitz Nazi Deadly Lab Experiments Survivors (CANDLES), 1532 South 3rd Street, Terra Haute, Indiana 47802, telephone (812) 232-6017. Respondent Dean’s reportedly paying Dr. Goicochea as a medical expert further entitles Langworthy to conduct discovery in the District Court. The Respondents have unlawfully discriminated against this identified class with invidious prejudice in favor of the class of persons who are State-licensed physicians. The Respondents’ concerted conspiracy to deprive Langworthy of his Federal right to equal protection of the laws under the ICCPR treaty, the Ninth/ Fourteenth Amendments and Constitution of the United States Article IV, Section 2.(1) as a member of the class of persons tortured, experimented upon and maimed by a physician provides the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" for stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. Sellner v. Panagoulis, 565 F.Supp. 238, at 248 (1982). The Federal criminal torture statute 18 U.S.C. 2340 and its eight-year statute of limitations 18 U.S.C. 3286 do not apply because, unlike the two treaties, those statutes require the torture to have been inflicted by a government official acting under color of law. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as precluding the application of State or local laws on the same subject . . . ." 18 U.S.C. 2340B. C. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT The District Court reversibly reserved judgment whether or not Respondents are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The State of Maryland long ago gave sovereignty for treaty-making power to the Federal government. See Constitution of the United States, Article VI (2) - signed by James McHenry, Daniel Carroll and Dan of St. Thomas Jenifer for the State of Maryland on September 17, 1787. The U.S. Constitution is a ratified agreement between the States, just as ICCPR and the Torture Convention are ratified agreeements between the United Nations. Neither the State of Maryland nor any of its employees are entitled to violate terms of the U.S. Constitution and Federal treaties as Respondents have done in this case. A State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit cannot be "reserved" as done by the trial court sub judice, because the Fourteenth Amendment provides clear-cut exceptions to State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for the Respondents having personally violated the two treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, _____ U.S. ______, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68; and Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445. In 1998 prior to the filing of this claim, Defendant Crane consented to this suit as follows: Langworthy told Crane, "I am going to have to sue you." Crane answered, "Well, do what you have to do. So go ahead, sue us." This consent by Defendant Crane to be sued eliminates any reliance by this Court upon Eleventh Amendment immunity for the Respondents. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, supra. ¬ The Eleventh Amendment is further inapplicable because the Plaintiff is not suing the State of Maryland. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Petitioner’s intent is not that damages be paid out of the Maryland State treasury, but by the Respondents personally. Langworthy also seeks Federal injunctive relief. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment cannot be applied. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908). D. REQUESTS FOR REHEARING The Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner’s timely request for rehearing on July 27, 1999 (App.3). The District Court for the District of Maryland denied Petitioner’s motion to alter judgment on March 9, 1999 (App.21 - Docket Entries). II. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION Like medical genocide, medical torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation threaten constitutional democracy. To eradicate atrocities such as genocide, slavery, torture and nonconsensual medical experiments, the United States and the United Nations via the international law of ICCPR and the Torture Convention require mandatory criminalization of these atrocities with no derogation to be allowed by this Court. See ICCPR Articles 4.2, 6.3, 7, 8 and 15. Millions of people have been tortured and subjected to nonconsensual medical experiments without any legal protection or remedy. See, e.g., Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, Doctors of Infamy: The Story of Nazi Medical Crimes (New York: Henry Schumann, 1949); Viktor E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning; and Magnus Linklater, The Nazi Legacy: Klaus Barbie and the International Neo-Fascist Connection (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1986). Thus, ICCPR and the Torture Convention were adopted by the United Nations to protect victims like Petitioner Langworthy in this case. See Victor W. Sidel, M.D., "The Social Responsibilities of Health Professionals: Lessons from Their Role in Nazi Germany", Journal of the American Medical Association, Volume 276 (20) (Chicago: American Medical Association, November 27, 1996), pp. 1679-1681. The writ of certiorari should be issued by this Court because the Fourth Circuit’s, District Court’s and Respondents’ intentional decriminalization of, unconstitutional derogation of and arbitrary acquiescence in Dr. Goicochea’s criminal torture, experiment and mayhem are constitutionally prohibited by ICCPR and the Torture Convention. A. DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE Obviously reversible error occurred when the District Court ruled that, if the Torture Convention were to apply, acquiescence by government officials can only occur before or during but not after torture. This arbitrary decision by the trial court flies against the logic and reason that government authorities repeatedly examine criminal behavior retrospectively. The Federal docrine of acquiescence has established the undeniable principle that acquiecence can occur after as well as before or during a transaction. See Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 381 (1991); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980); and Southern PAC Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 263, 267 (1965). To insist that acquiescence cannot occur after a criminal act flies against the common law logic of aiding and abetting in the commision of a felony after the fact.Similar to the doctrine of acquiescence, the law of aiding and abetting can apply after as well as before or during a criminal act. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit sub judice, the Ninth Circuit specifically found that acquiescence can occur after torture: In referring to ICCPR, the 9th Circuit found ‘The facts relating to the analysis of whether the proceedings met constitutional requirements are fixed and must be viewed through a retrospective lens.’ This refutes the district court only giving present tense or future tense to acquiescence - instead of also including past tense after the torture for required retrospective adjudication. United Mexican v. Woods, _____ Fed. No. 97-5878 ______ (9th Cir. 1997). Also see Hilao v. Marcos, ______ Fed. No. 95-16779 ______ (9th Cir. 1995). This Court needs to resolve this discrepancy between the Ninth and Fourth Circuits. International law has likewise found that cognizable acquiescence can occur after an act of torture has been completed. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (International Tribunal of the United Nations for the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda - guilty verdict on September 8, 1998) (http://www.ictr.org/english/judgments/akayesu.html). Contrary to the courts below, acquiescence as well as the withdrawal of acquiescence may be retrospective after the fact. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 71, citing Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (referring to "withdrawal of acquiescence"). Because the Torture Convention forbids government officials to acquiesce to acts of torture and because ICCPR Articles 2, 3, 4.2, 5, 7 and 15 forbid any derogation against the criminalization of Dr. Goicochea’s torture and nonconsensual medical experiment upon the violently victimized Petitioner Mr. Langworthy, this Court has the duty to order the withdrawal of any further acquiescence and derogation by the Fourth Circuit, trial court and Respondents. B. JUDICAL IMMUNITY? The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s having granted Respondents absolute and qualified immunity from civil liability. However, the personal out-of-court misconduct alleged against the Respondents in this case cannot be reasonably construed as judicial in nature; therefore, judicial immunity cannot and does not apply. See Georgia v. Rachael, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966). This Court has repeatedly applied this principle to prosecutors like Respondent Dean who performed nonjudicial acts that are civil rights violations. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. _____ (1977); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259. The nonjudicial acts performed by the Respondents sub judice are: (1) their explicit administrative refusals to define Dr. Goicochea’s torture, experiment and sexual maiming as alleged crimes under international law; (2) their explicit administrative refusals to recognize required jurisdiction over Dr. Goicochea’s criminal offenses (See Torture Convention Article 5.1); (3) their explicit administrative refusals to conduct an adequate investigation of the alleged facts; (4) their explicit administrative refusals to consider Dr. Goicochea’s two known admissions of liability for having abused the victim against the doctor’s self-interest as confessions; (4) their explicit administrative refusal to allow any and all administrative procedure for finding probable cause that a crime has in fact been committed; (5) their administrative denials of Langworthy’s common law right to proceed as a Private Prosecutor against Dr. Goicochea; (6) their explicit administrative denials of Langworthy’s guaranteed right to complain to Respondents about the torture that has been inflicted (See Torture Convention Article 13); (7) their explicit administrative denials of Langworthy’s guaranteed right to redress, compensation and rehabilitation under Torture Convention Article 14 for Dr. Goicochea’s having tortured this victim; and (8) the administrative failure by Respondents Dean, Gansler, Duncan and Clinton to ensure the required "education and information regarding the prohibition against torture" in violation of the Torture Convention Article 10. The contours of the asserted constitutional rights violated by the Respondents were sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would have known that what they were doing violates those rights. In the light of already existing law, the unlawfulness of the Respondents’ duly alleged misconduct is obvious and apparent. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversibly erred by having allowed the District Court to give Respondents qualified immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Fourth Circuit, District Court and Respondents capriciously refused to accept their nondiscretionary duty to accept the treaty requirements of ICCPR and the Torture Convention, even though Petitioner Langworthy had consistently informed them of their legal obligation to do so according to due process of law. A reasonable person would know that, in the United States, he would have to obey the law of United States treaties. A reasonable official would also know that it is criminal for a physician to torture, maim, and perform bizarre experimental surgery upon a healthy, unwilling patient without his informed consent; whereby Langworthy should not have had to rely upon ICCPR and the Torture Convention for the Respondents to criminalize Dr. Goicochea’s criminal abuse under Maryland common law. The specific laws and clearly established constitutional rights upon which Langworthy has explicitly relied lawfully preclude the Respondents from having received qualified or absolute immunity. See Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); and Jenkins by Hall v. Talledega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3rd 821, 823 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ______ U.S. ______, 118 S.Ct. 412, 139 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Therefore, this Court should find that neither qualified nor absolute immunity should have been allowed by the Fourth Circuit. Since none of the Respondents performed any judicial function and since none functioned as officers of any court sub judice, the Fourth Circuit reversibly erred by upholding the trial court’s having granted judicial immunity to Respondents. See Pfeiffer v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Circuit 1991). This Court needs to resolve this discrepancy between the Tenth and Fourth Circuits, especially because State and Federal Officials are not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for their having violated their duty to enforce United States treaties as found in Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1533 (10th Cir. 1988). C. PROSECUTORIAL DUTY WITHOUT DISCRETION The District Court and Fourth Circuit arbitrarily relied upon prosecutors’ prosecutorial discretion as a false basis for granting Respondents Dean, Crane and Dudley judicial immunity. Of course, prosecutors routinely have prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute a crime; and prosecutors normally have absolute immunity for their decision whether or not to prosecute a crime. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, supra. However, ICCPR and the Torture Convention explicitly and constitutionally remove a prosecutor’s discretion under common law when international crimes like torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation, genocide, slavery or piracy have occurred. Without any acquiescence or derogation allowed, ICCPR and the Torture Convention require a prosecutor’s duty to prosecute international crimes of torture and nonconsensual medical experiments. The Respondents’, District Court’s and Fourth Circuit’s having capriciously derogated the prosecutorial duty to prosecute Dr. Goicochea’s torture and unwanted medical experiment in this case directly, reversibly violates ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 as well as the Torture Convention Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 7.2 and 9. Judicial immunity, whether absolute or qualified, can only apply to discretionary and not mandatory functions. Qualified immunity applies to government officials who have performed discretionary acts that are objectively reasonable. See Morley v. Walker, _____ Fed. No. 97-16883 ______ (9th Cir. - May 4, 1999), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 818; and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Here we see the reversible error in the Fourth Circuit’s having affirmed the District Court’s having granted qualified immunity to Respondents. It was totally unreasonable for Respondents to insist that Dr. Goicochea’s alleged crimes of torture, involuntary experimentation and sexual mayhem were not alleged crimes. It was totally unreasonable for Respondent Dean to insist that an investigation had been conducted when no adequate investigation ever occurred. It was totally unreasonable for Respondent Crane to claim that Dr. Goicochea’s confessions were not confessions - especially since the Respondents refused to conduct any adequate investigation. It was totally unreasonable for Respondents to claim immunity for their having violated their nondiscretionary duties in unlawful deroga- tion of ICCPR and the Torture Convention. It was totally unreasonable for the Respondents to claim that the two treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention do not even exist; but, that if they do exist, then they cannot be applied to the facts and law of this case. It was totally unreasonable for the Respondents to have successfully claimed that the administrative, nonjudicial functions required of them by ICCPR and the Torture Convention entitled them to judicial immunity. It was furthermore totally unreasonable for Respondent Crane to attempt obtaining confidential medical information from Langworthy’s treating physician Dr. Rudolf without first obtaining a waiver of physician/patient confidentiality from Mr. Langworthy. It was then totally unreasonable for Respondents to then drop any further inquiry into the facts of this case. The blatantly direct refusals of Respondents Dean, Crane, Dudley, Gansler (under color of State law) and Clinton to allow Langworthy to complain about the facts of Dr. Goicochea’s crimes were reckless disregard for the truth in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee against deliberate governmental indifference. See Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, No. 95-1100, 520 U.S. _______ (April 28, 1997). It was totally unreasonable for the District Court and Fourth Circuit Court to derogate ICCPR Articles 4.2, 4.3, 7 and 15 by ignoring Petitioner Langworthy’s complaints that he had been subjected to an involuntary medical experiment in violation of ICCPR Article 7. Since nonconsensual medical experimentation is a crime among the community of nations, it was totally unreasonable for the Respondents to have prejudiced the criminal trial and punishment of Dr. Goicochea in unlawful derogation of ICCPR Articles 4.2, 4.3 and 15.2 as averred in Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint. (For District Court’s denial of Fourth Amended Complaint, see App.21.) Contrary to the Fourth Circuit sub judice, Respondents’ failure to consider probable cause legally prevented the Respondents from having summarily defeated Langworthy’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim via Respondents’ motions to dismiss in the trial court. See Morley v. Walker, supra, citing Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3rd 285 (9th Cir. 1994). It was not objectively reasonable for Respondents’ repeatedly and recklessly to misstate and omit facts material to the existence of probable cause as later specifically alleged in Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint. Morley v. Walker, supra, citing Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3rd 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997). The Respondents, District Court and Fourth Circuit have reversibly misrepre- sented the nondiscretionary function to prosecute torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation as being discretionary. This unreasonable misrepresentation allowed by the Fourth Circuit is expressly forbidden as an unlawful derogation of ICCPR and the Torture Convention. This international remedy is an international duty that provides the international community with guaranteed prosecutorial protection against government officials who acquiesce to these international crimes after the fact. Without this international remedy, ICCPR and the Torture Convention would be illegally derogated as was done unconstitutionally by the Fourth Circuit in this case. Petitioner Langworthy’s Fourth Amended Complaint specifically alleges such unconstitutionally gross disregard for Federal law and factual truth in this case that it was totally unreasonable for the Fourth Circuit to uphold the District Court’s having summarily granted the Respondents’ motion to dismiss. Under these circumstances, it was "inappropriate" for the District Court to have dismissed this case for failure to state a claim. Morley v. Walker, supra. ICCPR and the Torture Convention expressly eliminate prosecutorial discretion for certain international crimes like torture, nonconsensual medical experimentation and genocide. Via ICCPR in 1966 and the Torture Convention in 1984, the United Nations was already aware of and prepared for the methods the Respondents have used to avoid prosecution of Dr. Goicochea’s torture and inhuman experiment upon Mr. Langworthy. The United States has entered into an international contract with the United Nations that the international community under international law shall not and cannot allow Dr. Goicochea’s criminal torture and experiment on Petitioner Langworthy. With obvious standing, Petitioner Langworthy petitions this Court to protect nonmilitary persons who may be tortured or medically experimented upon against their will in the jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 3055 (1987). The Fourth Circuit reversibly violated the Federal doctrine that prosecutors are not entitled to prosecutorial discretion when the Federal legislature has established a duty to prosecute as well as when the Federal legislature has established a duty to perform mandatory, nondiscretionary, administrative functions as found in the D.C. Circuit’s Wren v. Merit System Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867, 875, n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Since the constitutional provision United States Constitution Article I, Section 10 against ex post facto laws does not apply to procedural enactments, it was acceptable for Petitioner Langworthy to expect the Respondents to obey the required procedures of the Torture Convention in 1997 because said treaty had been ratified in 1994. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 9 N.E.2d 46, 49-50, 110 A.L.R. 1303. The crime of torture by any person had already been criminalized without derogation by ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 when it was ratified on September 8, 1992 - two months before Dr. Goicochea tortured Petitioner on November 27, 1992. The criminalization of torture by the Torture Convention is not affected by the Constitution’s ex post facto prohibition, because torture by private actors had already been criminalized by ICCPR before Dr. Goicochea tortured Mr. Langworthy on November 27, 1992. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (U.S.); and Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216. Langworthy thus eliminates this Court’s consideration of the Torture Convention as ex post facto in this case, even though no one else has presented this issue in this case. D. ICCPR ARTICLE 4.3 It was totally unreasonable for the Fourth Circuit, District Court and Respondents to have refused to report their derogations of ICCPR Articles 4.2, 4.3, 7 and 15 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as required by ICCPR Article 4.3. According to Article 4.3, it was also totally unreasonable for Respondents to have refused to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations when these unlawful derogations would cease. ICCPR Article 4.3 is another required procedure to ensure that victims of torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation like Mr. Langworthy are protected by ICCPR under international law against private as well as government physicians. E. THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE When excessive force has been used in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the Judiciary looks to the extent of the resulting injury. Criteria for excessive force are: 1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) "[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (evaluation of excessive force by police officer). On November 27, 1992, Dr. Goicochea obviously had to used some force in conducting the medical examination to which Langworthy had consented. However, Dr. Goicochea exceeded the scope of a hernia examination by the doctor’s violently stabbing the patient’s left and then right spermatic cords as hard as the doctor could for a total of about 7.5 brutally prolonged minutes until the doctor physically tired - instead of the doctor’s lightly, gently and briefly feeling for a hernia as required by the standard of medical care. Langworthy did not scream out in excruciating pain as he was being maliciously tortured, because this Petitioner had been taught to trust doctors and, at age 13, had also been taught not to say anything during a hernia exam. Because the doctor’s maliciously sadistic purpose was to inflict severe bodily harm permanently, Dr. Goicochea did not apply his brutally violent force in a good faith effort to maintain or to restore health for the victim’s perfectly healthy and pain-free left spermatic cord. As a result of Dr. Goicochea’s brutally sadistic experiment without any accepted medical purpose, physical outrage has ensued. On January 13, 1993, with Petitioner Langworthy now in severe chronic pain where no pain had ever previously existed, Dr. Goicochea revealed that this doctor had attempted an experimental orchiectomy against the patient’s will and without the patient’s informed consent by the doctor’s insisting upon examining the patient’s scrotum and testicles at a free "Follow-up Consultation". The doctor was attempting to see how much pathological blood, if any, had accumulated in the victim’s scrotum as a result of the doctor’s experimentally surgical torture to maim and castrate Petitioner Langworthy. The spermatic cords contain essential arterties and veins that lead to and from the testicles. The permanently severe pain that is thereby maliciously inflicted by Dr. Goicochea as punishment into Petitioner Langworthy’s sexual anatomy conforms to the Torture Convention’s Article 1 definition of torture. It was totally unreasonable for the Fourth Circuit to allow the District Court’s gross disregard of this applicable definition of torture to the facts and international law of this case. Medical experts have subsequently made relevant findings. Forensic pathologist Dr. Cohen found that the procedure allegedly performed by Dr. Goicochea would inflict severe pain unnecessarily. Three physicians Rudolf, Gil.Montero and Sheff have diagnosed that the resulting chronic injury of left ilioinguinal neuropathy (nerve damage) was caused by Dr. Goicochea, and Drs. Rudolf and Gil.Montero suggested to Petitioner Langworthy that this is a matter for the police. One of these physicians Dr. Sheff diagnosed that Petitioner Langworthy is permanently 50% disabled from this injury by Dr. Goicochea. Drs. Swerdlow and Ulrey diagnosed the internal injury being caused by "blunt trauma". Drs. Swerdlow and Partin diagnosed discontinuity of soft tissues around the left spermatic cord, i.e. blunt trauma "laceration" according to Petitioner Langworthy. Further evidence of the severe pain that is permanently inflicted by Dr. Goicochea’s torture in 1992 is the diagnosed, visible swelling/bulge/lipoma of Petitioner Langworthy’s left groin. The permanently and intentionally inflicted pain is so severe that Langworthy has at times been unable to walk. Because of this pain, Langworthy can only walk slowly and for short distances. Langworthy was a well-conditioned athlete prior to the torture. But now he can no longer use his legs for cardiovascular exercise because of the severe pain that is permanently and intentionally inflicted by Dr. Goicochea. The seriousness of this injury is relevant in judicial as well as administrative determinations against a criminal’s use of excessive force. See Graham v. Connor, supra; Koon v. United States, _______ U.S. _______ (1996); and Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-321. Drs. Harvey and McGee found that Dr. Goicochea’s having used his index fingers "like a scalpel" to stab the spermatic cords inside Petitioner Langworthy’s inguinal canals for about five (5) minutes in the left groin and then about two-and-a- half (2.5) minutes in the right groin so Dr. Goicochea could thereby determine if the patient’s testicles would become castrated against the patient’s will, without the patient’s informed consent and without any accepted medical purpose during a consensual hernia examination is a nonconsensual medical experiment. This unwanted medical experiment of attempted surgical castration (orchiectomy) performed by Dr. Goicochea is explicitly outlawed as a crime by ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15. Nonconsensual orchiectomy as attempted by Dr. Goicochea without the patient’s informed consent and against the human male patient’s will is universally regarded as a crime jus cogens among the nations of the world. Another criminal purpose of Dr. Goicochea’s deliberate experiment and blunt trauma torture against Langworthy’s will and without the patient’s informed consent was to see how severely the doctor could inflict permanent bodily harm with severe pain upon the selected victim. The Respondents, the District Court and the Fourth Circuit unlawfully disregarded Langworthy’s complaint that Dr. Goicochea criminally subjected Petitioner to a nonconsensual medical experiment to castrate him in violation of ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15. In order not to violate ICCPR as well as the Torture Convention with the doctor’s having had no legal authority or justification, Respondents were required to define Dr. Goicochea’s nonconsensual surgical experiment and punitive torture as crimes. Otherwise, the Fourth Circuit and District Court will unconstitutionally continue to render ICCPR’s and Torture treaty’s prohibitions against torture and unwanted medical experiments after the fact, as if null and void. This Court has the duty to stop the Circuit Court’s, District Court’s and Respondents’ ongoing disregard of ICCPR’s factual and legal requirements in this case. See Kessler v. Grand Central, _____ Fed. No. 97-7503 _____ (2nd Cir. 1997). This Court needs to resolve this discrepancy between the Second and Fourth Circuits. The resulting abnormal blood accumulating in Langworthy’s scrotum has been diagnosed and recommended for surgery by Dr. Partin. Dr. Sklar prescribed antibiotics to treat the urologic infection that Dr. Goicochea’s violent surgical experiment has caused to Mr. Langworthy’s sexual anatomy. Dr. Sklar also diagnosed the resulting "chronic scrotum". Dr. Sklar informed Petitioner Langworthy that Sklar’s only urologic remedy for the severe pain that is permanently inflicted by Dr. Goiochea would be surgical removal of the left testicle and spermatic cord with burning off the ilioinguinal nerve ending above the point of blunt trauma injury. Dr. Goicochea’s surgical experiment of attempted orchiechtomy is particularly causing this victim’s left testicle to shrivel into morbid mush. Certainly this torture and experimentally attempted surgery of nonconsensual orchiectomy acquiesced to by the Fourth Circuit deserves this Court’s judicious intervention! Proof of the shrinking of Langworthy’s testicles has been preserved via Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) ordered by Dr. Kravitz. Petitioner Langworthy would not have brought this action if he had not been intentionally maimed by the torture, unwanted medical experiment and inhuman punishment that were maliciously inflicted by Dr. Goicochea. Hitherto unheard of in clinical practice and now amusingly identified as "goiking", the bizarre torture and perverse experiment of the criminally attempted castration by Dr. Goicochea and acquiesced to by the Fourth Circuit are to be condemned by this Court. See Wold v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). Also see Mr. Langworthy’s Federal right to informed consent as a guarantee to Petitioner’s liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in Cruzan v. Director, MDH, supra; Canterbury v. Spence, supra; and Cobbs v. Grant, supra. The Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee Langworthy’s liberty interest to self-determination and security of his physical person against the Fourth Circuit’s acquiescence to the bizarre torture and experimental surgery of the hitherto unheard of nonconsensually attempted orchiectomy maliciously performed by Dr. Goicochea. The Fourth Circuit’s subsequent derogation of ICCPR and the Torture Convention is explicitly prohibited under international law. A medical patient’s right to self-determination of what will be done to his body gave cognizance to physical security and informed consent long before Dr. Goicochea experimentally "goiked" Langworthy. Obviously, Langworthy would not have gone through all this trouble with the Respondents, District Court and Fourth Circuit Court if he had not been brutally tortured, experimented upon and severely maimed by Dr. Goicochea: PLEASE HELP THIS VICTIM WITH YOUR HONORS’ INTERVENTION! F. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Even if we distort due process to make the Fourth Circuit seem correct in having agreed with the District Court that Respondents are entitled to sweeping immunity from 42 U.S.C. 1983 liability, such immunity does not prevent a Federal injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 as well as Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65, declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202 or summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56 for the District Court and the Respondents to enforce their mandatory obligations required by the two treaties ICCPR and the Torture Convention. See Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975); and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). See Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 52. The ongoing, serious harm of Petitioner’s being unlawfully deprived, into perpetuity, of the legislatively intended protections, safeguards and remedies guaranteed by ICCPR and the Torture Convention is obvious, is it not? G. PRIVATE PROSECUTION With the Respondents’ ongoing refusal to define as criminal, to investigate and to prosecute Dr. Goicochea’s criminal torture and experiment, the Fourth Circuit unconstitutionally upheld the District Court’s judgment that Langworthy’s common law right to proceed as a Private Prosecutor in this case does not rise to a Federal guarantee. See Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 91 (1944). The final judgment by the Fourth Circuit arbitrarily and reversibly derogates the international prohibition against torture and nonconsensual medical experiments found in ICCPR Articles 4.2, 7 and 15 as well as the Torture Convention. If this Court find that the Respondents do have prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute Dr. Goicochea, Langworthy retains his asserted Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to proceed as a Private Prosecutor before the grand jury in Montgomery County, Maryland for Dr. Goicochea’s international crimes of torture, unwanted experimentation and sexual mayhem. See 42 U.S.C. 1988 for the Maryland common law remedy of Langworthy’s Federal standing as a Private Prosecutor to enforce ICCPR and the Torture treaty with the reversibly errant Respondents. In full view of ICCPR, the Torture treaty and 42 U.S.C. 1988 in addition to Langworthy’s personal right to proceed as a Private Prosecutor, the District Court reversibly relied upon Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988); Doe v. Mayor and City Council of Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. 1137, 1139 (D.Md. 1990); Sellner v. Panagoulis, et al., 565 F.Supp. 238, 249 (D.Md. 1982), aff’d without opinion, 796 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1986); and Beverly v. Maryland, 707 A.2d 91, 98 (Md. 1998)that a private citizen has no standing nor right to compel a State criminal prosecution. Langworthy understands the argument that since Private Prosecution is not guaranteed in all States that it cannot therefore be applied as a Federal right. However, since several States and the Federal Judiciary do allow Private Prosecution of crimes and since 42 U.S.C. 1988 does guarantee common law remedies so that Federal rights will be enforced, Private Prosecution in the Federal District of Maryland against Dr. Goicochea is guaranteed by ICCPR and the Torture Convention - even if this means that Langworthy is entitled to present his case to a Federal grand jury, instead of the grand jury for Montgomery County, Maryland. In either case, Dr. Goicochea has brought Langworthy’s Private Prosecution for the doctor’s criminal liability upon himself by reason of this doctor’s criminal abuses. For Private Prosecution, see Young v. United States ex el. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); and Steel Co., aka Chicago Steel and Pickling Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environent, _____ Fed. No. 96-643 _____ (7th Cir. - October 6, 1997). To enforce ICCPR and Torture treaty, the 9th/14th Amendments guarantee Langworthy’s Federal right to prosecute Dr. Goicochea criminally in the Maryland State Judiciary also under the common law theory of the doctor’s gross negligence. H. COMMON LAW AS FEDERAL REMEDY The Respondents’, District Court’s, Fourth Circuit’s and this Court’s duty to apply State "common law" in order to avoid any further violation of Petitioner’s Federal rights against torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 has been clearly established. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 at paragraph II (1984); and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-240 (1969). 42 U.S.C. 1988 is a two-edged sword that enables application to State officials as well as importation into Federal courts for enforcement of Federal rights via a State’s common law. 42 U.S.C. 1988 cuts both ways in Langworthy’s favor. Also see 18 U.S.C. 2340B and Constitution of Maryland Declaration of Rights Article 5 (England’s evolving concept of common law established before July 4, 1776 to adapt to changing requirements of ongoing society was adopted by the State of Maryland). The only available remedy for the Respondents’ having violated each treaty is this Civil Rights action. For this Court to allow the Fourth Circuit’s affirming the District Court’s grant of Respondents’ motions to dismiss would unlawfully render the treaty null and void in violation of the United States and Maryland Constitutions. See Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 2.(1): The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority Maryland common law readily makes the international criminalization and mandatory prosecution of Dr. Goicochea’s torture and experiment on Langworthy’s sexual anatomy self-executing under the treaty - especially since no derogation is allowed by ICCPR’s Article 4.2. 'In England and America the courts of justice have hitherto exercised the same authority in the most ample manner, and the legislatures have in no instance (it is believed) in either country interfered to provide any positive regulations. The common law of both countries has been expanded to meet the exigencies of the times as they have arisen, and, so far as the practice, of nations, or the 'jus gentium privatum,' has been supposed to furnish any general principle, it has been followed out.' Story, Confl. Laws, 23-24 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). Also see Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights Article 5. Maryland common law makes the ICCPR treaty self-executing so that no further legislation is necessary to effectuate the treaty pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981(c) and 1988. The treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision." Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, at 314 (1829). Since ICCPR and the Torture Convention need no further legislation to make themselves operative by Respondents according to Maryland common law, the treaty is self-executing. See, e.g., Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, supra. "Treaty provisions which define the rights and obligations of private individuals and lay down general principles for the guidance of military, naval or administrative officials in relation thereto are usually considered self-executing." Q. Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: 1922), pages 101-102. Also see ICCPR Article 2. The ICCPR treaty gives Langworthy the constitutional, historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, prudential, necessary, substantive and procedural authority to prevail over the arbitrary injustice by the lower Federal courts. If it were not for the two Federal treaties, Plaintiff Langworthy would not have all this overwhelming constitutional justification for these Federal questions against the Respondents. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Contrary to Respondents’ granted motions to dismiss, the Petitioner had stated violation of Federal rights arising under a Federal treaty for which relief may be granted. [I]n all that properly relates to matters of international rights and obligations, whether these rights and obligations rest upon the general principles of international law or have been conventionally created by specific treaties, the United States possesses all the powers of a constitutionally centralized sovereign State; and, therefore, that when the necessity from the international standpoint arises the treaty power may be exercised, even though thereby the rights ordinarily reserved to the States are invaded. 1 W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (New York: 2d Ed. 1929), page 556. In Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, especially at 840-848 (Md. 1975) cited by Respondents in District Court, Petitioner receives support for common law criminalization of torture and nonconsensual medical experimentation as required by the ICCPR’s Articles 4.2, 5, 7 and 15 - with no allowable derogation. The legislature, i.e. the United States Senate by having ratified the two treaties for this cause of action with no derogation allowed, had the "power" to take away the Respondent prosecutors’ discretion under common law not to prosecute crimes of torture or nonconsensual medical experimentation. See Murphy v. Yates, Ibid., at 848. In this regard, the Respondents are unquestionably employed in the Executive branches of Maryland State and Federal government. See Murphy v. Yates, Ibid.. The common law as well as State laws must yield to constitutional Federal treaties, and the Respondents’ duty to be held accountable and correctable as State and Federal Executive employees in this Court for their having violated the two treaties under color of Maryland State and Federal law is guaranteed by Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights Articles 2, 6, 19, 24 and 47 as well as 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Also see Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-490 (1880). The Respondents had no legitimate State interest nor right in their having refused to enforce the requirements of ICCPR and the Torture Convention against Dr. Goicochea in violation of Langworthy’s Federal rights. When it comes to the judicial "construction" of individual rights under a treaty, the "liberal" application by Langworthy is preferred over the "restrictive" one capriciously applied by the lower Federal courts. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, Ibid., 487. I. JURISDICTION Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s reversible misjudgment in this case, jurisdiction is mandatory, not discretionary. Without jurisdiction as a required duty of government, the law would have no teeth: there would be no required authority to enforce laws. This Court has the required jurisdiction over ICCPR and the Torture Convention at this time. International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700. Immunity from suit can no longer be wrongly extended to Respondents as State and Federal officials because of their wilful and negligent disregard of the Maryland and Federal Constitutions in violation of ICCPR and the Torture treaty. See Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918), Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918); and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974). Also see Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875); Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1885); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Home Tel.&Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (enjoining state welfare officials from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified recipients because they were aliens); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (imposing half the costs of mandated compensatory education programs upon State through order directed to governor and other officials); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co. , 244 U.S. 499 (1977); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917). III. CONCLUSION The thousands of hours Petitioner has spent in legal, medical and scholarly research since Dr. Goicochea’s crimes were committed in 1992 have been motivated by Mr. Langworthy’s civic duty to protect himself and future victims from criminal torture, unwanted medical experimentation and maiming. Petitioner Langworthy pleads with this Court that this case will prevent government authorities in the future from granting physicians unconstitutional impunity for crimes of torture, nonconsen- sual medical experimentation and mayhem performed against unwilling patients without their informed consent. Constitutional law supports Petitioner’s basic right to justice in this Court. Wherefore, Petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for any such other reasons and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, JOHN A. LANGWORTHY Petitioner in proper person