Advance Internet Edition; Cite As:
31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. [ page] ( Summer 2000 )
HOW THE JUDICIARY STOLE THE RIGHT TO
JOHN E. WOLFGRAM(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ARROGANCE TO FOUR CENTRAL ASPECTS OF THE
A)ASPECT ONE: THE RIGHT OF PETITION FOR
REDRESS vs. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
B)ASPECT TWO: JUDICIALLY CREATED PERSONAL & OFFICIAL
C)ASPECT THREE: POLITICAL PERSECUTION FOR EXERCISING
D)ASPECT FOUR: THE JUDICIAL CONTEMPT FOR PETITIONING TO
REDRESS GRIEVANCES WITH GOVERNMENT IN FEDERAL COURT
II.THE DUEL MEANING OF THE PETITION CLAUSE: PROCEDURAL vs.
III. THE JUDICIARY IS ORGANIZED TO AVOID SUBSTANTIVE REDRESS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEVANCES AND REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF UNREDRESSABILITY
The right (of petition) embraces dissent,
and "would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican
government, since it results from the very nature and structure of its
institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until the
spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared and the people had become so servile
and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of freemen."
"[D]eprivation of it would at once be felt by every freeman as a
This writer accepts the political wisdom and practical truth of the above
quotation from a case that he presented and lost to the Court of Appeals. This
Article examines the mechanisms by which the government has undermined and
stolen the Right of Petition presently, and prospectively. To be sure, it has
"practically denied" the Right of Petition.
The theme suggests a practical implication. It is not that government has
accomplished the "impossible" of practically denying the right, but
rather that the "spirit of liberty" has almost "wholly
disappeared and the people have become servile and debased." But
"fitness" to exercise the rights of freemen is never determined by
the many who have become servile, but by the few who refuse, at any cost, to
surrender their rights to government.
It is for those very important few, lawyers, ordinary citizens and patriots,
who carry the Nation's full burden of liberty on their shoulders, for whom this
Article is written.
Forward: The Supreme Court has addressed the
Petition Clause in many contexts, but four central aspects of it have
been completely ignored. Those central aspects tell the story of how the
Judiciary stole the most important parts of the First Amendment Petition
Clause: The right of the individual to enforce his rights against government
and its agents.
The First Aspect is the right to sue government for redress. Instead
of such a right, "sovereign immunity" is the rule, and
government can only be sued according to its consent. Immunity abridges the
right to redress grievances with government. This aspect demonstrates that
sovereign immunity is unconstitutional and irrational. The reason: The right to
petition government for redress and governmental immunity from redress, are
direct contradictions. The former is our First Amendment. The latter is the
progressive result of Supreme Court decisions.
The Second Aspectis the inconsistency of personal and official
immunities with the Petition Clause. Immunity "law" evolved from the
Court attempting to navigate between that contradiction, on the one hand, and
exposing that its immunity jurisprudence has rendered the Constitution all but
unenforceable by the people against their government, on the other. That made
the law so unnecessarily complex, compound and convoluted that only the rich
can afford the attorneys necessary to protect constitutional rights or
prosecute rights violators. That is a two-class society in the making because
only the rich can obtain justice under the law.
If there is to be personal or official immunity then there must be
alternatives consistent with the Petition Clause. Both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Harlan proposed alternatives in their respective opinions in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).(3) Both the Court, and Congress, has ignored their
The Third Aspect is judicial persecution of persons for
"criminal exercise" of the Right to Petition. Because the
significance of the Petition Clause is so judicially downplayed, United States
Attorneys frequently charge protected activity as crimes. Defense lawyers and
public defenders are not trained to spot or effectively defend against such
abuses. The result is putting thousands of "Political Prisoners" in
jail for "criminal exercise" of Petition Clause Rights.
The Right to Petition is necessarily obnoxious to government's will.
After all, a petition for redress is a complaint that government violated
rights and a demand that it stop, and to compensate the complainant for
damages. It should not surprise anyone that government does not want the people
doing that effectively. In America, a person who petitions government over
grievances of constitutional rights violations that government does not want to
hear, can go to prison for felonies like obstruction of justice, bank or mail
fraud, or making "false claims."
In the United States today there are thousands of people in federal prisons
for acts and intents that were merely an exercise of a Petition Rights that is
obnoxious when government (because of immunity) is stone deaf to petitions to
redress grievances. It has whole systems of laws to politically persecute those
who press their grievances "too far." But the common law history of
the Right demonstrates that "too far" is in most cases, a part of the
Right of Petition.
The Fourth Aspect is the way the judiciary itself treats the Right
of Petition when exercised in the courts. The Court has worked out stringent
tests to protect First Amendment Rights requiring government meet standards of
"compelling state interest"; "clear and present danger",
and striking laws for "vagueness" and "over breadth" that
fail the tests. Yet, in petitioning before government's very own courts, the
rules are vague, ambiguous, overly broad and judges determine such petitions
arbitrarily and without care for the merits by dismissals which are by
"law" with prejudice, as if on the merits. Appellate courts simply
refuse to address major constitutional issues in unpublished opinions that
decide cases without addressing the merits. The Court refuses to hear any of
the four aspects raised in this article.
The combined effect of these four arrogances to the Right to Petition leaves
the people without effective means to communicate with government through
process of law. The Court has often acknowledged that the alternative to
judicial process is force. Therefore, in so abridging the right of the people
to obtain just redress through the compulsory process of law, the judiciary is
setting the people up for violence against government by refusing to hear their
cries for justice. That is our government wagging a war of oppression against
its own people.
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ARROGANCE TO FOUR
CENTRAL ASPECTS OF THE PETITION CLAUSE
A) ASPECT ONE:
The RIGHT of PETITION For REDRESS vs. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Almost from the beginning of our Nation, the Court assumed away a major
significance of the Petition Clause, holding that as a sovereign nation, the
United States is immune from suit, without addressing the affect of the
Constitution generally(4) or of the Petition
Clause specifically, on that "sovereign immunity."
In 1793, barely two years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Chief
Justice Jay first announced the rule giving way to "sovereign
immunity" in obiter dictum .(5)He
noted that the issue was affected by the difference between a republic and a
personal sovereign and saw no reason why a state may not be sued. But he
doubted a suit would lie against the United States because "there is no
power which the courts can call to their aid" to enforce a judgment. So
began America's journey into judicial tyranny. It is based on an irrational
fear that if the courts ordered government to redress its wrongs arising under
the Constitution, the government could refuse and make the judiciary seem weak.
Judicial cowardice is not a very good reason to refuse to support the
Among other things, it assumes that the legislative and executive branches,
when faced with a judicial determination that government owes compensation to
redress grievances arising under the Constitution, would refuse to support the
First Amendment Petition Clause and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause rather
than to raise the taxes necessary to fill an order arising under the
Judiciary's Article III jurisdiction.
So, instead of standing tall for the Constitution and its enforceability
against the government, our very first Supreme Court announced the "Rule
of Unaccountability" of government to the people. That rule is this:
"Because the Judiciary cannot enforce its order against the government
requiring it to be fair and just under the Constitution, the judiciary will not
require it to be."
That is hardly a rule upon which to found a great nation, but it is the rule
upon which the relationship between the American Government and its citizens is
founded. It is a rule of cowardice under an assumption that government is will
basically rule by brute force.
But more than anything, it is a self fulfilling prophesy. It lays the
foundations for eventual federal arrogance to state and individual rights.
In Cohens v. Virginia, (6) Chief
Justice Marshall avoided Justice Jay's weakness by simply asserting "the
universally received opinion is that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States." Later, In United States v. Clarke,
(7) he declared that because the United States
is not "suable of common right, the party who institutes such suit must
bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress, or the court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over it."(8)
There can see from the trail of cases a common design to ignore the Petition
Clause and the "Petition of Right" that it necessarily implies,
without addressing it, but without specifically denying it either. In that
sense, if the Petition Clause of the First Amendment does not mean that the
People have a right to petition for just redress from government under the law
that even Congress cannot abridge, what does it mean? Yet, over the first half
of the Nineteenth Century, judicial arrogance to the single most important
right of justice against government became our "common law", the
express declarations and implications of the Constitution as it is written to
the contrary, notwithstanding.
The United States v. Lee :(9)
It wasn't until 1882 that the "Right of Petition" was discussed at
all in the sovereign immunity context. In U.S. v. Lee, Justice Miller
held that under the Due Process and Just Compensation clauses government agents
could be sued for unlawful takings, as a matter of right. At 27 L. Ed. 176, he
"concedes" that sovereign immunity is "the established law of
this country, and of this Court at the present day."
Then he discusses the English "Right to Petition." He observes
that it is uncertain whether the King "was not suable in his own courts
and in his kingly character" but after the Right was established, it
"was practiced and observed in the administration of justice in England
(and) has been as effective in securing the rights of suitors against the
Crown, in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which the law
affords in legal controversies between the subjects of the King among
Notice the strange effect. Justice Miller determined that the "Right of
Petition" is a part of the common law that we would normally inherit from
England absent anything to the contrary in our Constitution. But he doesn't
treat it like that at all. What he does is to assume away our Petition Clause
without so much as a curtsy to it:
There is in this country, however, no such thing as the petition of right,
as there is no such thing as a kingly head to the Nation, nor of any of the
states which compose it. There is vested in no officer or body the
authority to consent that the State shall be sued, except in the law
making power, which may give such consent on the terms that it may choose to
impose.(10) ( emphasis added).
Justice Miller's statement is absolutely false. If the Framers, noticing the
English "Petition of Right", wrote it into the First Amendment as
they wrote other "common law" rights into it, then it is our right
too. No act of Congress is necessary to give it effect. In fact, the First
Amendment precludes Congress from making any law "abridging" it. That
is the strongest argument possible for a Right to sue government
directly: It is written into our Constitution and may not be abridged even by
The issue is The People's Right to hold government to Constitutional
restraint. If they cannot hold it to account for such violations, then either
the Constitution is not the supreme law, or the supreme law does not bind
government. The supreme law of the land must be as binding on government when
government doesn't like it as it is on citizens whether they like it or not. If
either the people or government do not like certain constitutional clauses the
remedy is to amend the Constitution, not "interpret" it contrary to
its express and contextual meanings. The Constitution contains its own terms
for amendment, and "judicial fiat" is not among them.
The Defense of Sovereign Immunity: The fallacies of sovereign
immunity are best seen through its defense in the Lee dissent. It has
only two basic propositions.
The first is that the United States is a "sovereign", and as such,
cannot be sued without its consent. The Second is a parade of horribles, if the
Sovereign is subject to suit.
The first argument: "The United States is Sovereign and cannot be
That maxim (immunity from suit) is not limited to a monarchy, but is of
equal force in a republic. In the one, as in the other, it is essential to the
common defense and general welfare, that the Sovereign should not, without his
consent, be dispossessed by judicial process, of forts, arsenals, military
posts and ships of war necessary to guard the national existence against
insurrection and invasion; of custom houses and revenue cutters, employed in
the collection of revenues; or of light-houses and light-ships established for
the security of commerce with foreign Nations and among different parts of the
This argument contains Two Major Fallacies:
The First Fallacy: Where does this idea that government is immune
from suit come from? The History of the Right to Sue Government dates to 1215
A.D. and the signing of the Magna Carta . How in that light, is
"sovereign immunity from suit" a "maxim?" And even if it
were such in England, what would make it a "maxim" in post
Put more closely to the point raised by the dissent, who determines what is
essential to the common defense and general welfare? To be sure, government
through the Congress, and even through the executive, has a role. But the
People, in framing the Constitution, had first choice of the values to be
enshrined. If they determined it is government's duty to redress their
grievances for rights violations, it is not for government to re-evaluate that
decision, but to carry it into effect. That is the Petition Clause command
which "Congress shall make no law abridging."
The first fallacy in defense of sovereign immunity then, is a "boot
strap" argument. By assuming that sovereign immunity is a
"maxim", the Dissent begs the question at issue.
The Second Fallacy:The argument ignores the government's right of
condemnation. Where petition rights would dispose of government of essentials,
government has a right to condemn what it needs, but it must pay a just
compensation for it. Thus the parade of horribles the Dissent sets out
has nothing to do with loss of necessary facilities by judicial process. What
they want to protect is government's "right" to take property
without just compensation : Theft.
That is today the people's grievance with government: When it comes to the
people's rights, the official disposition is the same as that of organized
crime: "Take what you want, and don't pay for it unless you get caught and
then stonewall the aggrieved into oppression."
The real substantive Petition Clause vs. Sovereign Immunity
issue:What sovereign immunity allows government to wrongfully injure its
citizens, their liberty and property, without just compensation?
It is not injury to rights that is in issue. Rather, it is just
compensation for such injury that is in issue: Government wants the right to
be a crook.
The idea of government taking what ever it wants by force and oppression is
the basic barbarian notion rejected by our Constitution, but resurrected by
judicial interpretation. "Immunity" is "justified" by the
very ancient (pre Magna Carta ) "common law" of England, where
the King took what he wanted and wasted the property and lives of those who
As to the "parade of horribles" objection, Justice Miller
In this connection, many cases of imaginary evils have been
suggested, if the contrary doctrine should prevail. Among these are seizure of
vessels of war, invasions of forts and arsenals of the United States.
Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by the particularly fruitful
imagination in regard to almost every law upon which depends the rights of the
individual or of the government, and if the existence of laws is to depend
upon their capacity to withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of law must
United States v. Lee allowed suit against the
"Sovereign's" officers. But Courts since have given great weight
"to the particularly fruitful imagination in regard to almost every law
upon which depends the rights of the individual or of government."(12)
Sovereign Immunity Violates International Law: As shown, sovereign
immunity finds no support in our history. It was not in our common law before
the Constitution; it is actually prohibited by the Constitution, and its
assumption is a living contradiction to the very idea of limited government
designed into the Constitution. Sovereign immunity is inconsistent with
government accountability for injuries caused in violation of its own law.
Beyond arguments arising out of history and the clear language of the
Petition Clause itself, the future prospects of governments remaining
unaccountable to their own citizens for the injuries they cause in violation
rights, is not very persuasive either. On that point, The Universal
Declaration, Art. 8, states the essence of our Petition Clause, as to all
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
constitution or by law.
Notice the words "right to an effective remedy ." What is
an "effective remedy" for rights violations if it is not the right to
sue government for just redress under law? That is a founding treaty of the
United States with the United Nations forbidding our government from exercising
immunity from its citizens for its violations of Constitutional Rights. Notice
here, for later consideration, that the right to an effective remedy, is a
substantive right .
The International Covenant (13)
Article II, §§ 2 and 3 declares:
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or
other measures, each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized
in the present Covenant.(14)
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
Effective Rights is the Hallmark of Civilization : The
argument that the Right of Petition includes the right of use the compulsory
process of law against government to redress grievances with it does not depend
on any particular idea of the common law or of history. The most important
argument of all is that of the Petition Clause as it is written and in its
context. What else can be meant by those words then that government is
accountable under the law for the wrongs that it does to the people. That is a
fundamental concept of civilization, as we know it.
Any barbarian state can say its people have rights and point
to a "bill of rights". But "rights" don't mean a thing
unless enforceable: People enforce rights, either with bombs and guns, or in a
civilized world, through effective compulsory process of law; to wit: The
Sovereign immunity is the judicial theft of the people's right to a
civilized relationship between themselves, individually, and their government.
It should be seen for what it is.
Concluding Aspect 1: Thus began the myth of governmental
sovereignty from the people. Today, the logic flows: Since the United
States can only be sued by and through its consent, suits against it can be
brought only as prescribed by Congress.(16)
Only Congress can waive immunity. Its officers have no power to waive it.(17)
Even when allowed, suits can be brought only in designated courts.(18) Congress may grant immunity to
corporations.(19) And on it goes: Government is
immune, by its own declaration, to violate rights with impunity. What are
Rights if Government is immune to violate them?
What is a "Right" without the effective right to redress
for its violation? Rights means Accountability of Government directly to
their own people for violations of their own people's rights. That is the
public policy of the United States, by treaty; (20) and by Constitution.
Today, we have treaty obligations to expand judicial remedy to include
rights violations "committed by persons acting in official capacity"
and requiring effective remedies for violations of domestic law.
But we are harnessed with a judiciary that insists on immunity from the people
based in the bygone philosophy of "The Divine Right of Kings." Per
Justice Jay, the "reason" America adopted that medieval judicial
philosophy is his lack of the courage of constitutional conviction. A few years
later, Justice Marshall designed judicial supremacy over the Constitution so
that it now means whatever The Court says that it means(21). Between them, they found a novel way to
avoid the "messy business" of amending the Constitution. We can call
that "Constitutional Amendment by Judicial Fiat." It is not legal,
and in effect, it undermines the entire reason for having a constitution at
all. That is just cause for grievance with our "Justice System.." The
problem: How to capture the government's attention?
B) ASPECT TWO:
JUDICIALLY CREATED PERSONAL & OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Initially, the Petition Clause protects the Right to Petition
Government for redress; not necessarily its officers. Hence,
while Government may not abridge the right to Petition it for redress, it
plausibly may immunize its officials from personally being sued,
providing it leaves an unabridged remedy against government for the
official's conduct in government's name.(22)
Nothing so epitomizes the danger of abridging the Petition Clause, vis a
vis personal immunities, more than Congress' l988 amendment of the Tort Claims
In l971 Chief Justice Burger wrote, in his dissent in Bivens :(23) "The venerable doctrine of respondeat
superior (A master is liable for his agent's acts) in our tort law provides
an entirely appropriate conceptual basis for this remedy" (directly
The Tort Law, 28 U.S.C. 2674, allowed: "The United States shall be
liable, ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances..."
In 1988 Congress amended it to reflect judicial
... The United States shall be entitled to assert any defense
based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would be available
to the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
The 1988 amendment anticipates future abridgments including by Congress;
but Congress didn't conceive of agent immunity until the judiciary made
immunity a part of daily life. Given the judicial teaching, that is not
surprising, but lest we forget, it is the First Amendment Congress is
abridging .(25) The Tort Claims Act is
itself, a response by Congress to Court Created Sovereign Immunity, to relieve
the harshness of the judicial doctrine. Now Congress endorses it.
Immunity Centralizes Power:The purpose of "Separation of
Powers" was to protect the people from a unified "kingly
sovereign". But as the judiciary granted special immunities to the other
branches, it co-opted their independence and centralized power in the
Judiciary. In effect, the judiciary is uniting the "sovereign
branches" against the people :(26)
First came absolute immunity to the President.(27)
Then, almost immediately, was absolute immunity to Judges, state and
Then to the President's officers for discretionary acts.(29)
Then to the States; vis a vis a reinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
to provide the states with immunity from their own rights conscious
Then qualified immunity to government agents.(31)
With all immunities and "good faith extensions" of it, the law is
so convoluted and contradictory that no one knows what the "law"
is.(32) That creates arbitrary power in all
government officials. They not only have court created immunity, but they live
a myth of extended unaccountability far beyond where even the Court ever
dreamed it would go.
Notice: This takes the Effective Right to Petition away from the
people and centralizes it in the federal government. Having bridged
"Separation of Powers" to unite all of the federal government against
the governed, it now co-opts the states by bribing them with a shield from
their own citizens while amending the Tort Claims Act to take advantage of ever
broadening judicial and legislative immunity. Should you be worried about this
This is "Big Government" uniting at all levels against its own
people, creating the suspicion and fear that are the conditions for war and
terrorism which then justifies more power to chill, punish and intimidate the
restlessness it is causing. Such is government, somersaulting out of control,
into worse and worse relations to its own people.(33) Yes, you should be worried.
Immunity has its own Momentum: Given sovereign immunity and stare
decisis, (34) arguments to extend immunity
are much more persuasive than those to curtail it.(35) Such is the result of government's
organization to refine itself to do better what it is supposed to do.
Unfortunately, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the primary
thing government is "supposed to do" is protect itself from
accountability to the people for violating there Constitutional Rights.
Eventually, the Court recognized Congress' power to "abrogate"
state immunity for violation of Civil Rights; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976)(36) and the Commerce Clause;
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). But the
"doctrine" of abrogation is a token to pacify Congress and conceal
the true fact that Congress has no practical control over immunity at all. The
law is so complex that immunity exists, as a practical matter whenever a judge
wants it to; and he is not accountable for deprivation of rights to redress, or
any constitutional rights. He has absolute immunity too.
As the reader no doubt knows: "Power corrupts and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." Immunity is the absoluteness of any limited
power, which corrupts absolutely.
This Difference of Orientation: Absent a showdown between sovereign
immunity and the Petition Clause, abridgments are increasing because
government, from individual agents, up through its organizational levels have
organized to defend themselves from accountability based on the "Kings
Sovereignty" as a foundational concept in government to governed
This is a pervasive orientation away from the Constitution and human
rights, and toward not just "big government" but "sovereign big
government" where unaccountability to those injured in the
"Sovereign's" name is a national way of life.(37)
And if you think that is a national problem, consider that the United
States is by far the World's greatest power; it is not accountable to its own
people for its abuses of power, and that abuse of power flows freely into
international circles. Given that reality, there is not a nation in the world
that should not fear us in the same way that a reasonable person fears a child
with a gun. We, as a nation, are capable of, and as a People, conditioned to
the arbitrary and unreasonable use of force by government, against its own
citizens, and against any nation that stands in the way of the corrupt flows of
power from our government into the private sector.
Direct enforceability of the Constitution is the difference between
personal loyalty to temporal government vs. loyalty to constitutional
principles. Temporal loyalty to government becomes loyalty to every corruption
officials undertake in government's name. That is a powerful difference. Of
that the difference the Constitution itself requires by oath, "to support
this Constitution"(38) and
not to support its officers who may fail or refuse to support it.(39)
The Right to a Judicial Remedy is the right to enter an adversarial
system. Such systems are supposed to tend toward "excellence". But
there is a huge disparity in this system. The people are not organized to
defend against government's coercive claims to "immunity", but
government is organized to take every advantage, systematically, of
opportunities to extend it's agents' immunity. They are agents of the
sovereign and entitled to immunity and to all of the highly
skilled lawyers necessary to secure their "rights" against a legally
Under the premises, it is no longer an "adversarial system" but a
system that has defeated the "Separation of Powers"; co-opted the
states; and is now redesigned and manned by a "new nobility" of a
"unified sovereign" to promote and protect "government
sovereignty" from the people. That is another name for "government
unaccountability to the governed", at every level of government, all of
Put another way, with an effective Petition Clause the Nation has 260
million citizen policemen to insure that officials do not sell the Constitution
to the highest bidder or to personal desire. Immunity disables the
Constitution's "citizen policemen". What is left is government
accountable only to itself and to the free wheeling interests of the wealthy.
That is a dictatorship in waiting ... for a Hitler, a Stalin; a Pol Pot; or
maybe a more charismatic dictator who promises what the wealthy and corporate
interests want, and then delivers those interests to infamy.
But America will first find tyranny more diversified. It is called
"Judicial Tyranny". It is plain common sense that
people are "corruptible" in the absence of effective controls over
the means by which they satisfy human desires. That is the principle:
"Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." If Lord
Acton's Dictum is not "absolutely true"; it is so nearly true that it
warns against insulating government power from accountability. Judges have
"power" within the meaning of Lord Action's Dictum. Immunity for
abuse of power puts such a degree of "absoluteness" into its use and
abuse, that if judicial corruption is not the dominant characteristic of our
judicial system, it is so rampant within it that the system cannot be trusted
by anyone, at any time. Justice goes to the highest bidder, and all bids are
kept secret from the people, and even from the participants. If it isn't that
way, it looks that way and no one can reasonably determine that it is not that
way in any given case.
This is not just because "power corrupts the just", but as the
judicial system becomes more the locus of arbitrary power it tends to draw more
of those who seek that environment. The Judiciary is a dynamic system of people
who adapt to their environment according to principles of human nature. Change
the environment to become a safe haven for corruption, as Bradley v.
Fisher changed the judiciary after 1872, and "Judicial substance"
changes to reflect its new clientele. Its new clientele depend on immunity to
wield arbitrary power.
Where once it drew men of iron character and the will to do justice, today
the system actively selects in favor of would be politicians who lack the
courage to state their convictions, if any they have. They are rewarded with
judgeships as "political plums" for political favors traded behind
closed doors. The judiciary creates the kind of judges it wants: In Stump v.
Sparkman, (40) the Court held that
constitutional standards are not enforceable against judges, even where the
violations are in excess of jurisdiction and corrupt or malicious.
Over the 135 years since the Civil War, the Court has redesigned the
judiciary and indeed, all of government, to protect and promote corruption in
office. If Judges are not corrupt when they became judges, the system offers an
irresistible occasion to become corrupt because it gives them the power to
violate the rights of the people who our Supreme Court has ruled, shall have no
effective recourse against them.
As official immunity causes endemic corruption, the stepping stones for a
new, modern day Hitler in the United States is through 20,000 insulated judges
protecting themselves and all of government from accountability to the people
they injure in violation Constitutional Rights. They are insulated from all
accountability, except one. That is accountability to their
"superiors." Who are their "superiors?" They are government
officials who hold the same arbitrary power over the judges that the judges
hold over us. And they also hold arbitrary power to dispense government favors
to private parties and to other nations; favors we pay for, and favors that can
get us into war; war without accountability by those who make war, to anyone.
Is this just cause for a rights conscious people to distrust their
C) ASPECT THREE
POLITICAL PERSECUTION FOR EXERCISING PETITION RIGHTS
The Right of Petition in History: In order to understand why
government takes such a dim view of the Petition Clause we must realize its
About eight hundred years ago King John of England and his upper class
nobility had a running dispute with the lower nobility, the barons. The barons
had the loyalty of most of the common people and that gave them an advantage at
the "ballot box" that consisted of mostly swords and bows and arrows.
The people siding with the barons gave them the military power to strongly
suggest to King John that it would be in his interests to negotiate a bargain
on June 15, in the year 1215 AD at Runningmead. The Great King bowed to the
will of a People angered at his incursions against common decency. King John
agreed to the terms of what is now the cornerstone of both British and American
Constitutional Law: The Magna Carta .
There is something very important about that date.
Since 1215 there has not been a "sovereign" head of state, or
"kingly sovereign" in our common law. Examine Chapter 61 of the
Magna Carta .You will see why a "common law of sovereign
immunity" wherein the king can't be sued without his consent, is utterly
false dogma. Our judicial doctrines of sovereign and official immunity depend
on that false dogma.
Our Supreme Court's concepts of "sovereign immunity" depend on the
idea that we had a "sovereign" in our English Common Law that was not
accountable to the people for his wrongs to them. The fact is that there is no
such sovereign as the Supreme Court has systematically created in America, for
almost 800 years back into our English Common Law.
Very few cases describe the origins of the right of Petition. One such case
was brought (and lost) by this writer.(41) The
California Appeals Court describes the origin as follows:
A. The Common or Natural Law Origin of the Right to Petition.
The Right to petition for redress of grievances is the right to complain
about and to the government. The Magna Carta, chapter 61, purported
to grant the right. Now it is viewed as a "natural" right.(42) [It] was confirmed by parliamentary
resolution in 1669 as an inherent right (43)
and was lodged in the Bill of Rights of 1689.(44) '… it is the right of the subjects to
petition the king…[and] all commitments and prosecutions for such
petitioning are illegal'.(45) The right
embraces dissent, and 'would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a
republican government, since it results from the very nature and structure of
its institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until
the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared and the people had become so
servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of
freemen.'(46) '[D]eprivation of it would at
once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The right of petitioning is
indeed a necessary consequence of the right of free speech and deliberation, --
a simple, primitive, and natural right.'(47)
Understand the significance of those origins: There was war between the
royal government and the people and our ancestors were on the verge of tearing
the royal government down and replacing it with one of their own choosing. The
king was deeply troubled by the prospects of the heavy hand of the
executioner's axe, so he had to promise to be good.
But the Magna Carta is not just a document of promises. It embodies
the tradition of limited tolerance for government that eventually inspired the
Revolution of 1776 and framed the concepts of limited government that were
written into our Constitution in 1789. It is that "Common Law
Tradition" that is ultimately important because it reminds would be false
"sovereigns" that if they get too oppressive, the people can and will
tear unconstitutional government down and replace it again, with one that
conforms to the Constitution.
That act of tearing government down when it becomes unresponsive to the
people's need for justice, and replacing it with a more accountable government,
is itself an exercise of the "Right of Petition" when government
oppressively abridges its otherwise free exercise.(48)
That is what is meant by the declarations of Commons in 1669 and 1689, that
the right of petition is a natural or inherent right. Our Declaration of
Independence was an exercise of that inherent right, declaring to the world the
refusals of the King to hear the petitions for redress by the Colonies, and the
consequences thereof: Rebellion.
Of particular significance here is the means by which the Magna Carta
declared that its limitations on government power and respect for rights was to
be enforced. That is the common law foundation of our Petition Clause. It is
Chapter 61 of the Magna Carta. It is worth examining in detail to get
the full flavor of what the Right of Petition really means in the ongoing
dialogue between government and governed.(49)
The Magna Carta, Chapter 61.
Since, moreover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the
better allaying of the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we
have granted all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in
complete and firm endurance forever, we give and grant them the underwritten
security, namely the barons choose five and twenty barons from the kingdom,
whomever they will, who will be bound with all of their might, to observe and
hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and
confirmed to them by this our present Charter, so that if we … or any one
of our officers shall in anything be at fault towards anyone, or shall have
broken any one of the articles of this peace or of this security, and the
offence be notified to four barons of the foresaid five and twenty, the said
four barons shall repair to us and, laying the transgression before us,
petition to have the transgression redressed without delay. And if we have not
corrected the transgression […] within forty days, reckoning from the time
that it has been intimated to us […] the four barons aforesaid shall refer
the matter to the rest of the five and twenty barons, and those five and
twenty barons shall together with the community of the whole realm disdain and
distress us in all possible ways, namely by seizing our castles, lands,
possessions and in any other way they can until redress has been obtained as
they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of our queen and
children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old
relations toward us. And let whoever in the country desires it, swear to
obey the orders of the said five and twenty barons for the execution of all the
aforesaid matters, and along with them, to molest us to the utmost of his
power; and we publicly and freely grant leave to everyone who wishes to
swear, and we shall never forbid anyone to swear. All those, moreover, in the
land who of themselves and of their own accord are unwilling to swear to the
twenty five to help them in constraining and molesting us, we shall by our
command compel the same to swear to the effect foresaid. …(50)
The development of our common law understanding of the Right of Petition
began, but didn't end with the Magna Carta . Over the next 450 years it
became the cornerstone upon which the House of Commons built its relationship
with the King. Then in 1669, Commons resolved with authority that every
commoner in England had "the inherent right to prepare and present
petitions" to Commons "in case of grievance" and for Commons to
receive the same and judge its fitness. Twenty years later, after the
"Glorious Revolution" Chapter 5 of the "Bill of Rights" of
1689 declared the Right of the Subjects to Petition the King directly, and
"all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be
That is our "common law". It explains why our Supreme Court said
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of
force. In an organized society, it is the right conservative of all
other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government.(52)
That is what the Right of Petition is. It is the right conservative of all
others. It is designed to bring government to account under the law of the
land, or by force if necessary, for the violation of other rights. It is so
powerful that its free use will prevent the hostilities of war between
government and governed and the mere promise to respect it can restore peace to
warring factions because it is the instrument of justice under law, as between
government and governed. It is intended to subject government to the compulsory
process of law when government does not want to fairly redress the
grievance. It is so important that "law" without it, is "law
without justice", and that is another name for oppression.
Abridgment of the Right of Petition is advance notice of government's intent
to relentlessly oppress its people. We in America, whose right of petition is
so abridged and burdened by government created immunities from redress and
accountability, are on notice of government's intent to progressively and
relentlessly oppress us into tyranny.
Understand something: "Government's intent to oppress" is not an
intention agreed to by officials meeting in secret and designing a program of
oppression. Such a "secret conspiracy" is not what we are talking
about. What we are talking about is the natural and inevitable result of
increasing abridgment of petition rights, whether protected by a constitution
or not. That's what it means to be a "natural" or "unalienable
right." Abridgment of the right to complain to the oppressor about his
oppression is necessarily unnatural and progressively oppressive and that lays
the seeds of rebellion and the foundations for terrorism.
But there is something uniquely threatening about oppressing the unalienable
right of petition because it is the "right conservative of all
others." The reason government abridges it is to allow its officers to
violate all other rights with impunity and unaccountability. When government
does that, there is only one just and proper response: To throw off such
government by any means necessary. That is the bottom line of the
"unalienable right of petition for redress."
The Scope of the Right: It is important to understand what the full
scope of the right entails. The right to petition government for redress of
grievances includes recourse to force and violence against the government when
it abridges the free exercise of that right. Read the Magna Carta,
Chapter 61 again. If the formal process for exercising the right is abridged,
it describes in detail what the unredressed aggrieved can do. He may harass and
molest the government in every way to get justice, save only that he not molest
the physical persons of the King or His Family.
What does this mean? It means that the legal or constitutional "Right
of Petition" includes the people's natural right of rebellion against
oppression when government so abridges the established processes for
petitioning it for just redress.
In a real sense, the Right of Petition is like the right of self-defense.
Where a person is justly aggrieved, government has in effect previously
assaulted him or his rights. By petitioning for redress, he is exercising his
right of self-defense against that onslaught. When government fails or refuses
to justly redress, the conditions of assault and aggrievement continue and the
individual is entitled by that right, to take greater and greater measures to
obtain justice from his government oppressor, as his means of self defense
against government oppression.
Violence in response to oppression is a natural expression of the Right of
Petition when its non-violent expression is abridged. Just as the common law
countenances the violence necessary to defend oneself, so too it authorizes
violence against government necessary to get its attention, when it abridges
the non violent avenues of seeking just redress for its wrongs.
Just as government has a primary duty to provide police and military
protection for the people, government has a primary duty to justly redress
the people's grievances against it.
That is a non-delegable duty that goes to the very essence of government
functions. Who will tolerate a government that systematically levies injustice
upon the people? The duty to redress grievances justly is the duty to provide
systems of justice for the people. Police or military
powers without domestic justice between government and governed is tyranny. Who
needs a government that is organized to impose tyranny with its police and
It is the province of the Petition Clause to impose justice on an unjust
A "people's right" that powerful can cause fear in government that
it will be "abused" to interfere with the governing processes. No
doubt, it can be abused and it is intended to always keep government conscious
of its limitations. Governments should want to prevent conditions where the
people can lawfully molest and harass it. There are only two ways to prevent
people from molesting and harassing government, and government should always be
conscious of them.
The first is to render the right so accessible and just that the people find
no need to coerce government to redress grievances with it. This is not just
common sense for America, but it is common sense for every government, both as
to the relations of government to governed, and as to the relations among
nations. The right to just redress of grievances is the right to both justice,
and the appearance of it.
Terrorism, both international and domestic, all have two things in common.
Whoever is behind it believes that he has unredressed grievances with the
government at which the terrorism is directed. And he is able to convince
others that his perception is correct.
The only way to solve this problem is to change both the reality and
perception from that of injustice to one of justice, at every level of
government, from the local community all the way to the United Nations. The
only way to do that is with open and fluid systems by which all grievances with
government, real or imagined, can freely be addressed and justly redressed.
The only way to do that is when every government in all of its functions, is
accountable to the governed in every way that it may create grievances with
them, and that means that no government functionary can have immunity from just
redress of grievances with it.
The second is what we are experiencing. That is government progressively
narrowing and abridging the right to petition while at the same time
criminalizing the inevitable alternative avenues of petitioning that the people
develop. That is oppression. Forbidding that oppression is exactly what our
English common law imparted to the Right of Petition in 1689.(53)
Those are the alternatives: Systematic justice, or increasing
oppression. It is that simple: The people either have a just relationship with
government, or they suffer oppression.
Initially, the government oppresses petitioning for redress by policies
of sovereign and official immunity for it and its officers. What those policies
mean is that the people cannot obtain redress as a matter of right against the
government entities that are "immunized".
Today in America, such policies outright deny just redress in most
cases. Where redress is theoretically allowed, immunity causes such increased
complexity in the petitioning process that it generally frustrates petitioners
seeking justice against government through the systems that are supposed to
deliver justice under law.
It is NOT that the judicial system is over burdened with petitions for
redress. Rather, the law respecting just redress in both federal and state
courts is so complex and convoluted with special privileges and immunities that
government lawyers know that in most cases they can litigate petitioners into
submission without ever getting to the merits or before a jury.
What does that do? That prevents settlement out of court in even the
most righteous petitions for redress because government lawyers know that they
can beat the aggrieved unjustly in court. Government actually depends on
judicial oppression to cover up its violations of constitutional rights. The
judicial system, with its own "law making power" creating immunity
and deciding how to apply what it creates, has redesigned itself for systematic
oppression of Petition Rights. That reality annuls the "Separation of
Powers" doctrine in every important sense. "Separation of
Powers" is now: "All of government organized against just redress to
The increased complexity of "redress law" further causes
increased need for lawyers and raises litigation costs immensely. The resulting
high cost of petitioning for redress creates class divisions along lines of
wealth where only the wealthy can effectively petition government for redress.
That in turn gives wealth a capricious voice in shaping government and law not
available or even apparent to common people. But the resulting oppression is
apparent to them.
These things combine to so increase the costs of petitioning so as to
cause more people to turn to alternative forms to "harass and molest the
government" into tending to the emerging judicial crisis. As might be
expected, government does not take the people trying to "harass and molest
Criminalizing the Right of Petition: Government passes and
enforces laws limiting the "legal" assistance the people can get in
petitioning for redress. For example, it may limit attorney fees that can be
charged for petitioning in some kinds of cases. That limits the claims that can
be economically pursued.(54) That protects
government from accountability for rights violations that can't be economically
vindicated. That causes petty bureaucrats to become little tyrants
unaccountable for petty dereliction and abuses to the people in government's
It passes and enforces attorney licensing laws that broadly prohibit
"practicing law" by non-attorneys. These laws abridge the right to
petition in two separate ways:
First, licensed attorneys are generally inadequate and prohibitively
expensive for most abridged petitioning processes. They are controlled by their
license and can not prosecute petitions effectively where government through
its courts tells them that they should not. They are limited in the assistance
they can give clients to the government approved means of petitioning.
As government progressively abridges the petitioning process, licensed
attorneys more and more become apologists for the abridgments. As we have seen,
the actual common law right of petition contemplates that when government
abridges effective petitioning processes, the people may go over, around or
through the abridgments in any way necessary. In that way, licensing attorneys
aids and abets government abridgments of the First Amendment Right by
preventing effective counsel to the people as to what their common law rights
are against government oppression. In effect, licensed lawyers tell the people
that there are no alternatives to government oppression. That makes them the
government's "Judas Goats" leading the people into ever deepening
wells of oppression from which there is less and less recourse to violence.
Second, licensing lawyers unlawfully burdens the right to petition.
Hiring a non-lawyer to help you petition government for redress is
protected assembly to petition, and choosing the person to speak for you in the
petitioning process is the very heart of freedom of speech. How dare the
government license and control the people who you may choose to speak for you
to government? In effect, such an assembly now becomes a "Criminal
Exercise of First Amendment Rights"(55) by
non-lawyer participants "practicing law to speak for you, without a
license". Next, it becomes "Conspiracy to obstruct justice."
One can hardly find words to express the intellectual garbage involved
in selling the idea that government can license the persons you choose to speak
for you to government about your grievances with government. The ONLY license
necessary, is the "license" you give by your selection of those you
authorize to speak for you. All licensing of persons to whom you may give that
authority is necessarily a multiple abridgment of the First Amendment.
As the people's frustration increases with their licensed spokesmen and
what they are allowed to say to government, they turn to further extremes. They
might create their own courts ("Common Law Courts") and record
"common law liens" against government and its officers. This too is
protected activity where government has previously so abridged the Right of
Petition so as render it ineffective. But now government uses other kinds of
laws to criminalize this conduct. For example, participating in a common law
court may be conspiracy to obstruct government agents. Filing a lien against an
I.R.S. or other government agency is treated as "filing a false
claim" or "obstruction of justice" or "interfering in the
administration of justice." Sending a notice of lien by mail is prosecuted
as "mail fraud", and associating to exercise these Petition Rights
becomes "aiding and abetting" or "conspiracy to commit"
Those are abuses of legal process and malicious prosecutions to oppress
the right of petition for which government prosecutors have absolute immunity.
The problem is that licensed attorneys don't know how to deal with government
oppression because it is not taught in government approved law schools.
Attorneys are programmed to believe that government acts in good faith
execution and enforcement of the law; and they are afraid to deviate from that
government created belief system that they are licensed to follow. The
punishment for attorneys deviating from their licensed program is professional
The result is that people charged with "criminal exercise of
rights" are harnessed with "ineffective assistance of government
licensed counsel" who lead them, like Judas Goats leading sheep through a
"legal system" redesigned to convict and punish those who oppose
government oppression according to the culture of our common law. This not only
renders assistance of counsel ineffective, but it is reminiscent of British
Star Chamber Practices.(57)
Today, these kinds of cases are proliferating throughout the Nation. The
Montana Freemen cases where the "Freemen" were charged and convicted
of substantive crimes like bank and mail fraud are cases in point, and there
were untold scores of similar prosecutions in their wake. In point, these were
really Petition Clause cases where the government oppressively refused to allow
the real facts and the First Amendment Law to go to the jury. The Montana
Freemen and many others were convicted of the "Criminal Exercise of First
What is the Solution to Criminalizing the Exercise of Petition Clause
The common law specifically forbidding criminal prosecution of persons
for petitioning government for redress developed out of Britain's
"Glorious Revolution" of 1689. Thereafter, the English Parliament
made it unlawful to prosecute people for petitioning government for redress.
But simply outlawing such persecutions does not solve the problem when
government and its officers are immunized for such misconduct.
Our First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law
abridging…" Would it make any difference if it also added that the
executive "shall enforce no law abridging…?" It is extremely
doubtful since the Executive is already sworn, "to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."(59) That includes the First Amendment.
How can anyone prevent the executive from enforcing constitutionally
corrupt laws corruptly, if he is already free from the consequences of
violating his oath? All government prosecutors and judges are absolutely immune
from accountability for malicious prosecution. So they are not accountable to
the people whose constitutional rights they violate. If they are not
accountable to the people they wrongfully injure, who, pray tell, are they
The power to be unaccountable for corruption in office must be
Today in America, the language of the First Amendment notwithstanding,
persecution for exercise of Constitutional Rights is a substantial portion of
all federal criminal convictions.
To find a solution one must first understand the problem.
Abridgment of Petition Rights does not authorize unreasonable attacks on
the government. But under the common law guidance of the Magna Carta, it
does justify reasonable attacks on government authority like establishing
common law courts and filing liens against government and its officers that
have no greater effect then harassing government, when procedural and
substantive petition rights are abridged or rendered ineffective. Whether or
not it "authorizes" violence against government depends upon how
oppressive government becomes.
The problem is that even reasonable harassment attacks against government
spiral out control because government has immense power and little or no
accountability for its use or abuse, and, would you believe, it has no sense of
humor; and no humility, at all.
So, for example, some people are frustrated with governmental
unaccountability and prefer to live in isolation from government. From that
Petition Clause response and government's lack of a sense of humor, we got
"Ruby Ridge", and a young mother shot dead while holding her baby, by
a government sniper with a high powered sniper rifle. And government's best
excuse: We didn't mean to shoot her or her baby. We only meant to kill her
husband who was within a couple of feet of her and the baby, and who was not
then endangering us.
So for another example, there are people whose frustration with lack of
government protection and redress problems leads them to isolate themselves in
more or less self-sufficient communities. Again, government's refusal to
believe that sane and decent people could reasonably want to isolate themselves
from unconstitutional government interference in their lives, gave us the
flames and mass killings of Waco, and the federal organized cover-up that
includes persecuting the victims for defending themselves against armed
It should not be concluded that only government lacks a sense of humor in
these matters. It seems that a former candidate for same United States Army
"Delta" team that it appears more and more certain staged a military
assault upon the Branch Dividian Compound, took the matter personally and waged
an "eye for an eye" campaign against government. That gave us
Oklahoma City and the bombing deaths of more innocent men, women and children.
That too has an aftermath which includes unreasonably increased government
security for itself, and as Y2K demonstrated, for the Nation. That increased
security not only erodes Petition Clause Rights, but it increases tension
between government and governed. Instead of the government trying to solve the
Petition Clause problem by making petitioning for redress more effective, it
tries to increase its security from accountability by an organized attack on
the Second Amendment disguised as a "war on crime" against
"potential criminals" with guns.
Do we need to be reminded that the Hallmark of government oppression is that
we are all "potential criminals?" We become actual criminals by mere
resistance to oppression.
This article does not try to excuse or justify any of these attacks. It
merely points out that the "logic of war" is already upon us and it
is a major part of the problem. That logic makes more "Wacos" and
"Oklahoma Cities" all the more likely, and it does something worse.
Government is organized to control anything that it believes may injure it.
The aftermath of Waco is wide spread exposure to criticism. Government does not
admit any wrong at Waco, but it admits that it suffered wide spread criticism.
It will do little to prevent more "Wacos", but it will do much to
prevent the wide spread criticism. What it will do is act to contain freedom of
information to the people, upon which widely spread criticism depends.
What will that do to those who already believe government can not be
Perhaps it will convince them all the more that the only recourse to
government corruption is armed rebellion in the style the world has come to
know as "terrorism". That is the style of rebellion the Nation felt
at Oklahoma City. It can be worse: Much worse as greater and greater means of
mass destruction and mass killing are being designed privately or escape from
both foreign and domestic government control. The world is developing markets
for the instruments of mass terrorism … and we are the target. The
solution is to release our Petition Clause to do its work, then to export it to
every nation in the world: "Made in America".
At this point the reader is reminded that the common law purpose and logic
of the Petition Clause is to prevent this kind of cycle, to reduce government
to governed tensions, and even to bring peace among warring factions, with its
mere promise. We, the People, and the Nation and its government, all of us: We
need that promise.
Solving the Problem: If you understand the nature of the problem;
that it is caused by governmental arrogance to the Right of Petition, then you
also understand that the solution is to release the Right of Petition to do its
work in bringing the government under our Constitution.
Then we have to teach other nations to do the same, by our example.
How can we do that? It is one thing to say "Release the Petition Clause
to do its work", but without a concrete plan, the statement is so much
rhetoric. What can be done?
The immediate problem is that government is increasing the stakes by
persecuting people for "criminal exercise of First Amendment Rights"
in violation of the common law right established in 1689 in Article 5 of the
British Bill of Rights. That spiral has to be stopped in a way that is
meaningful to both government and governed.
There are legitimate applications of the kind of laws (conspiracy, aiding
and abetting, obstruction, interference with government, bank and mail fraud,
etc.) that also entrap legitimate exercise of Petition Clause rights. These
laws chill and punish the most important political expression there is:
Political dissent to government oppression. But there is no practical way to
throw all of those statutes or applications out as unconstitutional, even
though they chill the First Amendment and are in that application, overly broad
The normal mechanism for testing these applications is to wait until the
legal theories that demonstrate abridgment of First Amendment rights develop,
and then for the courts to address the issues in terms of "vagueness and
over breadth" of laws chilling First Amendment rights. One major problem
here is that there are so many laws that can be applied to abridge Petition
Clause rights. Normally, it takes years, even decades to develop the legal
theories necessary to overturn a very limited number of similar statutes; and
during all of that time; the government resists development of such theories
and persecutes those who develop them.
Presently, there are a large number of laws that are applied to persecute
the exercise of petition rights. By the time the legal theories are developed
and applied, the pressures for violence will have increased dramatically, and
government will have adopted new and even more oppressive measures to contain
the increased pressures for violence.
Moreover, all of that assumes that the courts are trustworthy as to this
issue, and a major theme of this article is that they are not. The judiciary is
a part of government and government does not want to see an effective Petition
Clause because that nullifies arbitrary power at all levels. Effective petition
rights create problems for all of government by requiring direct accountability
of government officials to the people they injure. As demonstrated in Part I,
supra, the judicial theft of the First Amendment Petition of Right is a fact
the judiciary has effectively concealed for over 200 years. Why should anyone
believe that the judges would change that concealment and denial policy now?
There is a collateral problem. The longer it takes to show that government
will honor the Petition Clause and make it effective, the more skeptical more
people become and doubt that it ever will. That increases the pressures for
modern rebellion (terrorism) to organize.
Of course, government will develop its own counter measures, and that will
inevitably stimulate a more vigorous response by those who fear tyranny. That
is the "Logic for War". The way out of the cycle is to effectuate the
right of petition so that persons accused of "Criminal exercise of
Petition Rights can have the evidence and the First Amendment submitted to the
Paired with such an instruction is opening up the federal defender system so
that the accused may select any counsel, as a matter of right, that is willing
to work for him at the same price as conflict counsel. The reason is that the
federal defender system is closed to competition and the result is to
institutionalize ineffective assistance of counsel at public expense.
Compulsory State Bars should be abolished as state organized First Amendment
abridgments. Voluntary associations competing to raise standards would replace
On the one hand, this combination would chill government from bringing
Petition Clause cases. On the other, it would begin the mending process as
juries feed back the information Congress needs to determine proper Petition
Clause non abridgment policy.(60)
Such jury instruction and freeing lawyers to compete for effective
public defense can be accomplished by an executive order, or by legislation. It
need only declare that in any criminal prosecution, on request, a verbatim
First Amendment jury instruction must be given and all evidence relevant to
that issue be presented to the jury. It also should require that an accused
otherwise entitled to counsel at public expense may select any willing counsel
and no federal official may discriminate against any freely chosen counsel on
the basis that such counsel is not a member of any State Bar Association.
This does not solve the immunity vs. Petition Clause problem. It is a
stopgap measure to prevent persecution for exercising First Amendment rights
under color of criminal prosecution, and it begins to unwind the tension and
increase dialogue between government and governed.
There are other things that need be done to restore the Petition Clause,
and through it, our Constitution to a state of political health. Some of these
are discussed under Aspect Four.
D) ASPECT FOUR:
THE JUDICIAL CONTEMPT FOR PETITIONING
TO REDRESS GRIEVANCES WITH GOVERNMENT IN FEDERAL COURT
We have discussed three central aspects of the Petition Clause that are
never addressed by the judiciary. Those aspects are:
1.The Petition Clause vs. Sovereign Immunity Issue.
2.The Petition Clause vs. Personal and Official Immunities Issue.
3.The persecution of persons for "Criminal Exercise of Petition
The Fourth Aspect is intimately related to the first three because it
inquires into why the judiciary refuses to address constitutional issues of
major importance, generally, and specifically why it refuses to address the
first three aspects of the Petition Clause.
In point, there is no more serious constitutional issue then whether
judicially created sovereign and official immunity violates the Petition
Clause. Is there any jurisprudential thinker who does not immediately know that
the United States under the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an entirely
different nation than the United States with an effective Right of Petition?
How do we account for the line of Supreme Court cases that established
sovereign immunity while consistently refusing to address that issue in the
Petition Clause context?
It is not as if the Court totally ignores the Petition Clause. It just
ignores the three central aspects of it mentioned above. For example:
The right to petition has expanded. It no longer is confined to demands
for "a redress of grievances" in any accurate meaning of these
words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by government of its powers in
furtherance of the interests and prosperity of the petitioners and of their
views on politically contentious matters. (61)
"The right extends to the 'approach of citizens or groups of them to
administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms
of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the
right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
There is no doubt that the Judiciary recognizes that the Right to Access
the Courts is a First Amendment Petition Clause Right. If it recognizes
that, does it also recognize that the business conducted before the courts once
accessed, is also a Petition Clause Right?
A few cases have addressed that issue in a non-governmental context. One
such line of U.S. Supreme Court cases arises out of federal antitrust law. The
issue: When can the filing of a lawsuit lead to antitrust liability?
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc .(63) the Court refined the
"Noerr-Pennington" antitrust immunity doctrine and the "sham
exception" to it. "Sham" suits enjoy no constitutional immunity.
They are to a Right to Petition like pornography is to the freedom of the
press. Real Estate Investors clarified earlier cases and set out a
two-part test for "shamness."
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Once that
is established, the court can examine the litigant's subjective motivation to
see if it conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor through governmental process, as opposed to
interfering by reason of the outcome of that process. That is essentially the
"malice" or wrongful subjective motive part of the two part test.
But notice: Professional Real Estate Investors is not a
"Petition to Government" to redress grievances with it. It is a suit
between private parties to determine which party will get the government power
to compel the other to obey the law. This line of cases deals with lawsuits as
a procedural due process issue. That is, the issue is access to the courts as a
right to use them as neutral arbitrators to resolve disputes between private
parties. As a "Petition Clause" function, it does not necessarily
have its common law roots in the Magna Carta.
It is important to notice the difference in these functions.
The judiciary performs two separate Petition Clause functions.
The first is providing a neutral dispute resolution forum for suites among
private parties. That function incidentally but necessarily includes providing
the same forum to resolve disputes between government and governed. Why?
Because the Petition Clause is couched in terms of "Congress shall make no
law abridging…". Establishing separate compulsory avenues for
petitioning government for redress like exhaustion of administrative remedies
or through "star chamber" process necessarily abridges the right to
petition government and is unconstitutional.(64)
The second is to provide a "neutral forum" by which private
persons can obtain access to the compulsory processes of law to use against
government to compel it to obey the law, or to redress injuries suffered by
government action in violation of the law.
Notice that both the first and second functions are met by the same due
process of law consideration: Unabridged access to the courts. The Courts call
this "unabridged access" a Petition Clause right, but it is really a
due process right that is all the more binding on the government when it
concerns substantive Petition Clause rights.
It is in this second function that we run into substantive Petition Clause
issues that find their roots in the Magna Carta. These are the issues
that deal with substantive grievances with government's conduct in its
governing affairs. In this sense, petitioning through the courts is only one of
many petitioning methods. For example, a picket at a courthouse protesting a
particular judge, is both protected speech and petition. Likewise with lobbying
the legislature or filing complaints with the executive regarding the executive
conduct of governing.
But while there are many methods of petitioning for redress with government,
up to and including assembly to riot or to use force against it, only one
method can use the law to subject the government to the law and to the redress
consequences of violating it.(65) That is to
petition the government for redress through the courts. That is the right of
the citizen to use the compulsory process of the law to compel the government,
just like any other party, to answer and to be accountable for its wrongs to
the citizen, under the law.
There is something very important to notice about this particular process.
Its effectiveness in administering justice relies on the fairness of the law as
between government and governed. Presumably, law that is fair as between
private parties will also be fair as between government and governed. The
reason? In making law as between private parties generally, the lawmaker seeks
justice for the people, generally without bias. But if the lawmaker makes
special laws for government, as a part of government, he has a bias for the
governing function, and that function is necessarily to regulate the liberties
of the people.
Thus, the important function of substantive Petition Clause activity through
the courts (obtaining justice between government and governed) depends on the
regularity of both the compulsory processes of law and substantive law that is
to be applied to determine what, if any redress against government, the citizen
is entitled to.(66)
So, for example, the right to sue the government in court is a due process
right that applies to all grievances among parties, including grievances with
government, albeit, the latter has a substantive Petition Clause status. In
substantive Petition Clause cases, the right to that due process regularity is
also a Petition Clause right because Congress may not abridge access to the
courts for substantive Petition Clause purposes with special procedural
But that Due Process right, even "raised" to Petition Clause
status, is meaningless unless by that process you can subject the government to
the common law, (67) as opposed to
special laws designed to protect government from being compelled to redress
So, for example, what good does it do to have a due process right protected
by the Petition Clause to bring suits against government to redress grievances,
if government is protected from accountability for the grievance by substantive
laws of immunity? It is those substantive "laws" that violate the
substance of the Petition Clause.
The point here is that government immunity is the major substantive
mechanism by which Petition Clause rights are undermined and gutted. There are
other laws specially protective of government that undermine or gut substantive
Petition Clause rights, but the immunity "laws" are by so far the
greatest offenders that none of the others, like "tort claims" and
"exhaustion of administrative remedies" acts need be examined for the
purposes of this article.
II. THE DUEL MEANING OF THE PETITION
PROCEDURAL vs. SUBSTANTIVE
The Petition Clause has two separate meanings. A procedural
meaning, (The right to petition government for redress through all the means
amiable to that end including judicial) and a substantive meaning. (Substantive
redress shall not be abridged merely because government or its officers are
defendants. It is "The right to substantively just redress". )
How do you know it has two separate meanings? The First
Amendment prohibits both procedural and substantive abridgments on its face.
What more can be said than "Congress shall make no law
abridging…" unless it be added, "and the Judiciary shall make no
law at all."(68)
Now, understanding this duel meaning: We are ready to examine
the mechanics of how the judiciary systematically refuses to treat substantive
Petition Clause suits with the dignity to which they are entitled under the
"Common Law". That is both as common to our people, and as derived
through our legal heritage from the original understanding of the Magna
Distinguish between procedural due process and a substantive
Petition Clause Right, albeit, the procedural right is raised to a First
Amendment status. The substantive right is for instance: "The government
build a road across my land without paying a just compensation". That is a
Fifth Amendment violation. You have a due process right to sue the government
on your claim in court. Doing that is a Petition Clause right, but to this
point, it is all process. What about the right to have the claim heard on the
merits? That is also a due process right. What about the right to have the
claim decided by a jury? That also is a procedural right protected by the
Seventh Amendment. What about the right to have the claim justly redressed?
That is a substantive Petition Right. But what does that mean?
In this case it means the right to make claim for and receive
Fifth Amendment Just Compensation for government's condemnation of a right of
way across your property.
In other words the substance of the Petition Clause right is
the right to compel government to obey the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation
Notice how the substantive right can be usurped. Suppose you
sue the state highway commission in federal court for violation of your Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. You are exercising
the procedure of Petitioning for Redress. The highway commission moves to
dismiss on the basis that it is a state agency constructing a state road and it
has "State Sovereign Immunity" under the Eleventh Amendment. The suit
is dismissed. What happened? The substantive doctrine of state immunity cut off
the substantive Petition Clause right. You had your procedural right to
petition for redress. The judge can't doubt that you are making a Fifth
(Fourteenth) Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 pursuant to the Petition
Clause, but substantive redress is barred. Why? You have two substantive
constitutional rights to just compensation for the easement: The First and
Fifth Amendments. Immunity of your own state government isn't even mentioned in
How then does state immunity bar redress for constitutional
In effect, the judiciary allows a procedural due process right
to exercise your Petition Clause Rights through the judicial system, and it
calls that the "Right of Petition" through judicial process. But it
ignores the substantive nature of the Right that demands just redress be
Let's get this concept straight. Our common law Right of
Petition can be stated in different words to convey the same meaning. Observe
again, the words of The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article II, § 3, as it conveys the Right of Petition.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
Subsection (a) means: "No government immunity." Subsection (b)
goes on to ensure "effective remedy" by requiring states to
"develop the possibilities of judicial remedy" which, by way of sub
paragraph (a) is an "effective judicial remedy."
Would it make any difference if our Petition Clause used the same words,
that the people shall have "effective judicial remedies" for the
violation of constitutional rights? Did we miss something along the way? When
the Framers adopted the Bill of Rights, could they possibly have intended
"a bill of unenforceable rights", or did they intend all along that
"rights are enforceable through judicial remedies that are
You know without being told that there was no misunderstanding. The Framers
did not intend to sell the American People a "bill of rights" in name
only. They intended the Rights they enshrined into our Constitution to be
enforced by the people, individually, against the government. They did that in
these words: "Congress shall make no law abridging the right to petition
government for a redress of grievances" and combined it with Article III,
§ 2, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution."
Tell me: Does a Petition to Redress a violation of an enumerated Right by
say, a federal judge, or federal prosecutor, or an FBI agent, or all of them in
concert, "arise under this Constitution?" If it does, what law may be
made to contravene just redress?
There is only one answer: "None". In both law and logic, it is
that simple. Only Congress can make law, and nothing can contravene a legal
right but another law. And as to the right to petition government for redress
under law, Congress shall make no law abridging.
Notice that using different words but of the same meaning, our Petition
Clause and the common law from which it came, has been extended to the most
important clauses of the most important Treaties influencing the entire
civilized world. Under it, prospectively, the peoples of the world shall be
entitled to an "effective remedy" for violation of rights.
But not so once you enter the courts of the "Leader of the Free
World." Petition Clause Rights have no substantive value here. That is,
you can petition for redress of grievances with government as a heightened due
process right, but once in court, there is no effective right to justice. In
America, the "Land of the Free" you cannot sue the
"Sovereign" without his consent. And his "consent" is
couched in governmental and official immunities and special procedures and
limitations which are applied by judges whose role is to protect government
from accountability, and they are absolutely immune for the most outrageous
violations of rights.(70)
Our procedural judicial remedy is designed to be substantively ineffective.
Understand: We are not saying that the law is substantively hollow. We are
saying, that just as government immunity is not the law, but a systematic
judicial practice that nullifies substantive rights, that, and other judicial
practice hollows out the substantive law. While judicially created immunity is
practiced openly, many of the ways in which courts allow access but deny
substantive redress in cases do not come under established immunity practice,
but are just plain outright corrupt, and there is no other way to fairly
One state Supreme Court has recognized that the right to sue government is
at the heart of the First Amendment. The California Supreme Court led by Chief
Justice Rose Bird addressed this highly volatile issue in City of Long Beach
v. Bozak, (71) saying:
The right of petition is of parallel importance to the right of free
speech and the other overlapping cognate rights contained in the First
Amendment and in equivalent provisions of the California Constitution. Although
it has seldom been independently analyzed, it does contain an inherent meaning
and scope distinct from the right of free speech. It is essential to protect
the ability of those who perceive themselves to be aggrieved by the activities
of governmental authorities to seek redress through all the channels of
government. A tort action against a municipality is but one of the available
means of seeking redress. (emph. added)
There is an important point to those words that is implicit in the Right to
Petition. It is as important that wrongly perceived grievances be redressed
with adequate explanation, as it is for real grievances to receive just
This is just common sense: If we are not to beg the question by assuming
that all grievances are imaginary, then the process of obtaining redress
must be designed to effectively sort them out; to redress imagined
grievance with a reasonable explanation and to redress substantial grievances
with just redress. That is a maxim of jurisprudence: Justice must not only be
done, but appear to be done.
While it is clear that the California Court recognizes a substantive value
to the Right of Petition, its emphasis is on the process by which redress is
sought or made available. The opinion protects the Petition Right to bring the
suit, regardless of whether it wins or loses. It only seems to imply that the
process must be "Effective". That implication relies on an assumption
that the judiciary will do justice and that it doesn't take a heightened
standard of substantive consideration to get the judiciary to do justice to the
case. That is, "Justice" is "Justice" and that is what the
judiciary delivers. Therefore, no specially heightened standard is required.
Ignores Systematic Bias: This assumption turns out to be utter
nonsense in all cases except one: That one case is where the Petition Clause
guarantees admission to a process in which the dice, in both appearance and
fact, can't be loaded against justice or substantive redress. It ignores the
fact that the judiciary is part of government and judges are biased for their
paymaster which demands by custom and practice, their obedience to government's
will over justice.
The opposite of that assumption is declared very clearly in the Petition
Clause's common law ancestor, Chapter 61 of the Magna Carta .It
proclaims the substantive Petition Right to just redress. While it is concerned
with a "right of access" to the barons, the main concern is for
timely (40 days) administration of substantive justice by granting appropriate
redress. Thus Chapter 61 commands on that score:
… And if we have not corrected the transgression […]
within forty days, reckoning from the time that it has been intimated to us
[…] the four barons aforesaid shall refer the matter to the rest of the
five and twenty barons, and those five and twenty barons shall together with
the community of the whole realm disdain and distress us in all possible ways,
namely by seizing our castles, lands, possessions and in any other way they can
until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own
person, and the persons of our queen and children; …
The Magna Carta's focus is almost entirely substantive: "And
if we have not corrected the transgression within forty days," a state
of moderate to severe war exists where the governed may lawfully ravage the
government, and that continues "until redress has been obtained as they
deem fit." It could hardly be more powerfully stated that substantive
redress is the issue, and process is only the lubricant to obtain substantive
Understand what that emphasis on substantive redress does to judicial bias.
The command is, "Just Redress or War." The reason for injustice is
not relevant. If the grievance is brought to the barons, thereafter, "your
fault, my fault, nobody's fault" it doesn't matter. The Substantive Right
is "Justice or War." That is what keeps the barons, now the judges,
honest. Where the people have effective recourse to judicial prejudice and
self-dealing, judicial bias ceases to be a problem.
Today, with immunity in place, the Right of Petition is mostly process and
little or no substance, and all effective alternatives to petitioning through
systems designed to be ineffective, is illegal. Thus, not only does the
petitioner have to deal with substantive immunity, but with unbridled judicial
bias in a judiciary insulated against accountability for violation of rights.
In effect, under the existing judicial "law", you have a right to
petition, but no right to justice, and no Court of Appeals has ever admitted
the issue, or examined the conceptual difference. Let's examine it to
understand it better.
If the right to sue is the alternative to force, then the right to sue
government is the alternative to rebellion or terrorism. If that is true, one
aspect of the Right of Petition is access to the compulsory process of law to
use against government as the civilized alternative to rebellion
and terrorism. If judiciary is to serve that purpose, it must both fairly
apply, and appear to fairly apply the law as between government and governed or
the "civilized alternative" will be rejected.
What is the Substance of the Petition Clause? If the Courts treat
the Right of Petition as mere procedure, what is its substance? The answer is
simple and direct.
The substance of the Right of Petition is: "Unconditionally effective
enforcement of the rest of the Bill of Rights and Limitations on Government,
and just redress for their violation."
The reason the answer is so simple and direct is because the alternative is
lawful rebellion, terrorism and ultimately, civil war. That is
the teaching of our Common Law.
Underlying that teaching is a repetitive reality that the people learn and
learn again. Allow judges to be biased for government and they will be
prejudiced against redressing the people's grievances. And government will
abuse power more and more because of that bias.
Allow government to decide when and if it will give just redress, and it
will decide to give less and less justice. The result is simple logic: Less
justice means more oppression.
Compound, complex, convoluted, vague and ambiguous "law" protects
government from accountability. That environment maximizes judges' ability to
pick and choose the "law" or interpretation of it, which is most
pleasing to their bias for government. Add to that "absolute judicial
immunity" for exercising pro government anti redress bias, and pardon us
if we observe that you have got to be stupid; or desperate; to pray for justice
from that system.
The only rational alternative to progressive oppression is a policy of
"no excuses." It is a primary duty of government to provide an
effective system of just redress of grievances. Just like its duty to provide
an effective military defense, there is no excuse for failure to provide
justice as between government and governed. That is America's Common Law
III. THE JUDICIARY IS ORGANIZED TO AVOID
REDRESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEVANCES AND
REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF UNREDRESSABILITY
The Court said in Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148: "The right to sue
and defend in the courts is the alternative of force ." That
it is an alternative to force; there is no doubt. But if the
judicial function merely replaces trial by combat with another arbitrary
process for deciding winners, it can be done a lot cheaper and more fairly,
with a roll of dice.(72)
While our judiciary has evolved some characteristics of justice, its
redesign accents its barbarian origins as "The Sovereign's" tool to
control His subjects. That, instead of the unbiased administration of justice,
has become the primary judicial function. Note the conflict between the two
functions.(73) That conflict involves some
basic judicial intrusions into the Constitution that totally nullify the
judicial function to administer justice under the law. Examine some of
1. The Judiciary interprets the Constitution, and only
its interpretation counts. The Judiciary is a branch of government. Thus, in
disputes between government and governed over the meaning of the constitution,
only government's version counts . Is that "fairness?" That is
the official state philosophy of "Judicial Supremacy" in action, and
it is hardly "fair."(74) Under that
philosophy, government gets to be the only and final interpreter of the
Constitution by which it regulates the people. How convenient for government.
How unfortunate for the People.
2. Government has sovereign immunity; most of its agents have qualified
immunity; and its prosecutors and judges have absolute immunity even for
malicious prosecution and cover ups of civil rights violations by non-immune
persons. What does that do to the idea of justice?
3. The First Amendment doesn't exactly mean what it says by "Congress
shall make no law abridging..." Instead, Congress can make laws abridging,
providing they meet judicial tests of "state interest, narrowly
drawn", and all of the immunities the judiciary has created.
4. While we have personal freedom of speech within parameters, the only
freedom we have to select our own spokes persons in the most important forums
affecting our rights, the court's of law, is by government licensed attorneys
duly propagandized into the dogma of judicial supremacy. Government has
propagandized and licensed the people's Petition Clause spokesmen into
believing that the Constitution means what the judicial branch of government
says that it means; and they lead us into submission to endless bureaucratic
and judicial control.
5. Article I, which vests all legislative power in Congress, doesn't quite
mean what it says either. The Judiciary can veto Congress and it can
affirmatively write its own law as it did in the "immunities acts"
which are judicial enactments that actually amend the Constitution, not just a
little bit, but to the very foundations of the relationship between government
and governed. These Judicial Amendments redefine and annul the very concept of
"Justice under Law."
6. As to the Second Amendment, well the people should forget about keeping
arms just in case our own government gets too far out of line. Since government
is sole interpreter of the Constitution, it interprets that interpretation out
of existence, and possession of arms becomes a common nuisance to be abated in
every way bureaucrats can conceive.
7. The troublesome Fourth Amendment: The only time people need security
against government is if they are crooks. So, in that
"constitutional" spirit, government protects crooks by excluding
evidence obtained in violation of their rights. As to the rest of the people,
government is protected by immunity, and not being crooks, honest people have
no need for privacy anyway.
8. By the way, government can take liberty interests without any
compensation, if it can find a "rational state interest"; and it has
plenty of those.
9. Property interests are more protected. We are entitled to "just
compensation" if government "takes" our property for public use.
So what it does instead, supported and authorized in advance by judicial
"interpretations" of "taking," is to outlaw broad ranging
uses of property though zoning; environmental and endangered species protection
acts; and regulations of every sort, all for esteemed "public
benefits" but avoiding the necessity of a "just compensation."
Understand what such takings of property rights do. It is not that
environmental and endangered species protection and zoning, are not worthy
causes to spend tax dollars on. But that is not what the government does.
Instead it coerces these "public benefits" from property owners, one
individual at a time, without paying for it. That is, the cost of these
collectively huge benefits is born by individuals, not by taxpayer/voters vis a
vis government. And by and large, it is the judiciary that makes the rules by
which these huge transfers of latent wealth occur.
And on it goes. Nothing to be alarmed about. Government could do all of
these things with constitutional amendments: "So, judicial amendments to
the Constitution are just matters of procedure!" and subjective
rationalization justifying abandonment of principle, rolls on.
The point is not merely that the Judiciary usurped powers not delegated to
it; but it has become so involved in and biased toward controlling the people
for government, that it cannot fairly administer justice. The judiciary is no
longer fit to perform its primary judicial function.
Where does that leave our Nation? The primary right of the People to
control their own destiny through self government has been usurped; not boldly
as by an invader, but surreptitiously by the branch of our own government that
we trusted most.
The people never got to decide the most important issues relevant to the
kind of government they want for themselves and for their children. Oh, to be
sure, they vote for "representatives" but the fact is that the
judiciary has so totally undermined the concept of limited government and
unalienable rights that those running for office actually think that
"Rights are the privileges government tolerates at any particular
time" and "libertarians" think government should tolerate more
In other words, today's politicians and legal/constitutional/political
scholars have not the foggiest idea of what the Constitution means,
independently of what The Court says that it means. They rely on the Court to
determine what "rights" are, and what their own job as our
Representatives is supposed to be. In a real sense, the Court dictates the
entire political atmosphere to the people and their politicians. Most people
who think about it, especially lawyers, actually believe that it is the right
of the Court to be the "sole and finale arbitrator of Constitutional
meaning and design."
They can't conceive that it could be any other way, let alone can they get
a picture of what the Supreme Court is doing to fundamental concept of
individual rights and constitutional limitations on governmental power.
Others see the arbitrary power wielded by the Court, but think of it as if
we are governed by nine wise and noble legal scholars. That is, in effect, the
"Rule by Philosopher Kings" that Plato seemed to favor. But, aside
from the observation that if we are to be governed by "benevolent
philosopher kings" then it should be openly so and pursuant to an amended
Constitution that authorizes "Philosopher King Supremacy" over it,
and over the other branches.
But the analogy fails in another respect. We are governed by the Court, as
an institution, and far from the individual justices being "philosopher
kings" they are "servants" of that institution and its rules;
particularly of the rule of stare decisis and their own precedents .
To the Court, stare decisis means more than simply following
precedent. Of course, the Court has the power to over turn its prior decisions.
Sometimes, as in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
and Garcia v. San Antionio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
(concerning Tenth Amendment Limits on the federal regulation Congress can
subject states to under the Commerce Power) the same Court reverses its
previous 5-4 decision by another 5-4 decision accomplished by one justice
switching sides. That hardly reflects a "philosopher king" kind of
But more to the point, when it comes to national policy like sovereign
immunity, the Court has a much greater problem: How can it reverse itself
without undermining its own basis of political power? How can it say to the
People, "Look, we made a mistake these past 200 years and never exactly
noticed what the Petition Clause did to sovereign immunity, and, well, to be
frank, we rewrote the Constitution the wrong way. Now we want to rewrite it the
It's not only, "Who's going to trust them this time", but why
should we let the Court rewrite the Constitution again, when in the face of its
admission, it never should have rewritten it the first time? Look, we are not
talking about just any "mistake". We are talking about a
"mistake" that ignores the very foundation of democratic control over
government. That "mistake" annuls the very purpose of having a
constitution (to limit government by holding it to account for its violations)
and it is a "mistake" that benefits the party in error.
In common law, that kind of "mistake" is not a mistake, but
constructive fraud. Even if the Court didn't know that it didn't have
Constitutional authority to make such a policy. But even if it didn't know
about the Petition Clause, such usurpation for its own benefit is still
"constructive fraud." What's moreover, who will believe that the
Court didn't know those things.
That is to say, if the Court ever admits that Sovereign and court created
official immunity is not constitutional, it opens a "Pandora's Box."
The Court has never faced the kind of scrutiny that sometimes occurs to the
political branches. But suddenly, there would be questions about how it could
have made such a "mistake"; and then, "was it a mistake?"
Then, if not a mistake, what is it for a branch of government to consciously
undermine the People's interests in the enforceability of what is after all,
Some, perhaps many, will call it "treason". But that brings up a
new concept. The Justices actions are largely dictated by the institution in
which they find themselves confined. If it is "treason" it is not a
personal kind of treason, but something that is more like "institutional
treason". That is a concept that we legal philosophers don't quite know
what to do with. It is "out there". It has some meaning, but as a
concept that can help explain the perverse directions that Constitutional
Democracies might take that lead 180 degrees away from what you'd expect under
their Constitution, it requires a lot of exploration and analysis.
As a concept of moral and legal judgment, it is almost useless. We do not
begin to understand the psychological and sociological pressures and dynamics
of legal institutions at that level of government. If it is
"treason", then we will have to deal with such additional concepts as
"involuntary treason", or "treason" under coercion and
undue influence by the entire governmental structure of the nation against
which the treason occurs.
The Purpose of this Law Review Article is not to tell you, the reader,
"the way that the law is." At best, it can provide only a snapshot of
a small piece of it, central to the law though it may be. The philosophy of law
is much too young to know enough to tell you anything but small snapshots and
rough outlines of legal theory, and the science of law has not yet been born.
There is so much to be done in the philosophy of law that one's lifetime is
hardly time enough to start. Its future holds all of the excitement of a new
science, undreamed of before. Its limits are so bound to human destiny that we
shape today, by the understanding that we give, or fail to give to its
substance, the themes of human civilization, as it will exist forever, or as it
may fail to exist beyond 21st Century.
The purpose of this Law Review Article is to start the next generation of
legal philosophers thinking about what the law is, and why it is, and where it
will take mankind, so that they can begin the journey that I only dream of.
That journey is into the realm of law as a science for future civilizations to
set mankind free, to redesign and reconstruct his government as a vehicle to
take him to the heights of freedom and dignity that his God, and his soul for
adventure, made him to seek.
The Right of Petition is the right to substantive justice between
government and governed. Upon that Right rests our hopes for freedom and
dignity in the twenty-first century.
Freedom and dignity thrive in Justice. They cannot survive without it.
Copyright © John E. Wolfgram, 2000.
* John E. Wolfgram, B.A. Degree ( University
of Wisconsin ), J.D. Degree ( Southwestern University 1977 ) Wolfgram founded
the Constituional Defender Association in 1989 to advance Petition Clause
Principles. Its name derives from the observation that the practical value of a
Constitution depends on the effective enforcement of constitutional rights and
limits against government, by the people. The Petition Clause is the People's
Right to redress government violations of the Constitution. It is The
Constitution's Defense system against government usurpation and oppression.
More about the author and his legal philosophy can be obtained on line at
www.constitution.org. There, look up his name
under "Confirmed Abuses."
1Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App.
4th 43, 51 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997)
(citing Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 707 (1833)); see
also Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS : PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY
728 (8th ed. 1927) (quoting Lieber, LIBERTY AND SELF
GOVERNMENT 124(2d ed. 1859)).
2 Chief Justice Burger proposed that
"Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy
against the government itself to afford
compensation and restitution for persons whose fourth amendment rights been
violated." 403 US at 422. His error is in thinking such a system should
originate in Congress, or be limited to fourth amendment rights. U.S. v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), recognized a right similar to that in
Bivens, arising out of the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivins is that a direct action
should lie for violation of any Constitutional Right. The question is not
"judicial vs congressional power to create such a system." The first
amendment says "Congress shall make no law abridging ... the right of the
people ... to petition government for a redress of grievances". Thus,
Congress does not have the power to abridge the right to sue government
for redress . But it can create alternatives that people are
induced to use, so long as it does not abridge the basic right to
sue for redress. The judiciary can not legislate, but the "Petition
Clause" problem is not a legislative problem, but pre-emption of common
law remedies by judicially created "sovereign immunity". Thus, the
end the Chief Justice urged, is not up to Congress, nor directly
up to the judiciary. Rather, it is for the judiciary to free the people from
"sovereign immunity". Only by renouncing that assumption can it free
the common law to develop remedies for rights violations. Then Congress can
develop alternatives that the people freely choose over the Right to sue in the
3Justice Brennan believed "sovereignty was
surrendered in the Plan of the Convention". see Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974). see Art. I, Sections 9 and 10 for some specific
"surrenders" by both federal and states at the Convention. The ninth
and tenth amendments imply absence of federal immunity. The Due Process and
just compensation clauses implies accountability by government for its wrongs.
But for those who still doubt, The Petition Clause is the specific
"surrender" of governmental immunity from the people.
4 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. ( 2 Dall.)
5 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. ( 6 Wheat.)
6United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. ( 8
Pet.) 436 (1834).
7 The Court repeated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in at least a dozen cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, but it has never analyzed the constitutionality of the doctrine. The
tenth amendment states that the powers not delegated to the United States are
reserved. Where is the power of "sovereign immunity" delegated? If it
is not fairly within the four corners of the Constitution, it is not a federal
power; a fortiori, when it is also expressly prohibited
to the United States by the Petition Clause. Some cases that assumed
sovereign immunity without justifying it are: United States v. McLemore,
45 U.S. ( 4 How.) 286 ( 1846); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. ( 9 How.)
386, 389 (1850); De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. ( 5 Wall.) 419, 431
(1867); United States v. Eckford , 73 U.S. ( 6 Wall.) 484,
488 (1868); The Siren, 74 U.S. ( 7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869); Nichols v.
United States, 74 U.S. ( 7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869); The Davis, 77
U.S. ( 10 Wall.) 15, 20 (1870); Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433,
437-39 (1879); Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. ( 8 Wall.) 269, 275
(1869); United Statess v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530, 539 (1913); Koekuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922). In Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Justice Holmes stated the reason for
sovereign immunity is because "there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends." His explanation
begs both the tenth amendment and Petition Clause questions, and portrays
government power as not bound by any law, not even its own. Again, government
is portrayed as a "Brut of Force" that trounces its own people
without accountability for the wrongs it does. Such is a shocking statement by
a man of his intellect, for it is obvious that the ultimate recourse against
the authority that makes law but disregards rights, is revolution ... and then
to institute a new government that is not so impertinent to the basis of power.
That is exactly what our forebears did in 1776. Notwithstanding government's
objection to such an interpretation, that right of rebellion is embodied in the
Common Law behind the Petition Clause.
8 The United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882). George Lee was the son of the Southern General from Virginia, Robert E.
Lee. Before the Civil War, then Col. Robert E. Lee worked for Abraham Lincoln
and held an estate in 1100 acres on the banks of the Potomac over looking
Washington D.C. Before the War the property was known as "Arlington
Estates". But during the war, tens of thousands of dead soldiers from both
North and South, were brought into Washington with no place to bury them. One
popular story is that General Sherman inquired of who owned the property to
purchase it for a cemetery. But upon learning that it belonged to Lee, he
commandeered it, and today, 400 acres of it are best known as "Arlington
The story behind U.S. v. Lee is even more
interesting. Arlington Estates was visible from the White House. In advance of
the War Abraham Lincoln asked his Chief of Staff Col. Robert E. Lee, to Command
the Army of the Potomac. Lee took leave back to Virginia to consider the offer.
Two weeks later he returned and told Lincoln that his loyalties were with his
Home State of Virginia. He left an embittered President behind. Lincoln knew
that Lee was his best military strategist and history records the magnitude of
his loss as Lee beat back Lincoln's armies time after time.
So the story goes, Lincoln, looking across the Potomac to
Lee's estate conceived a plan to hurt Lee and help finance the war effort at
the same time. He would lay a war tax on property and require landowners to pay
the tax personally to the tax collector, and not by agent. Southerners who
owned land in the North wouldn't be able to pay the tax, and would lose the
property. Eventually the Court determined that it violated due process to
refuse to accept a tax paid by an agent. But Robert E. Lee never offered to pay
the tax at all. After the war, Lee lost his civil rights, but under U.S. Const.
art. III, § 3, the forfeiture is limited to during the General's
When Lee died, his son sought to regain title to Arlington
Estates which included by then, two post Civil War military forts and Arlington
National Cemetery. His theory was based in the common law of contract. If one
to whom performance is due, refuses tender, or announces in advance that tender
will be refused, the law treats it as if performance has been made. Thus, even
though his father never offered to pay the tax, George Lee could treat it as
paid. Because the United States had "sovereign immunity" Lee sued the
generals in whose name the property was being held for the United States, to
eject them. The case went to a Virginia jury to determine whether General Lee's
performance had been prevented by the tax collector's announcement that it
would not accept payment by an agent. The Virginia Jury, generally sympathetic
to the Robert E. Lee family, found that performance had been prevented, and
that the prevention was, according to previous Supreme Court Decision,
unlawful. Therefore the issue must be treated as if the tax had been paid. That
meant that the title that transferred the property to the generals was void and
Lee's son came into title upon Lee's death. George Lee owned the property and
could eject government officers.
On certiorari to the Court, the United States interpleaded
saying that it was the real party in interest, that it was a necessary party;
that it had Sovereign Immunity, and that immunity extended to the generals as
agents of the United States. Justice Miller's treatment of the "Necessary
Party" argument is most interesting. Citing from other cases, principally
from Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of U.S ., 22 U.S. ( 9
Wheat.) 738 (1824) he concluded: "Where the State is concerned, the State
should be made a party, if it can be done. That it cannot be done (because of
immunity) is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the State, in all respects as if the
State were a party to the record."
9See 27 L. Ed. at 176.
10Id. at 183.
11The reasons identified in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 at 240 for official immunity are more illusory than
real. While fear of personal liability may tend to intimidate officials, most
officials are or can be covered by insurance or indemnity agreements. The idea
that such fears would injure government performance is the same argument as
"Doctors must be immune from negligence actions or otherwise hospitals
will be intimidated from providing medical services." The question is
whether the complexity of rules carved out to immunize government officials
become so burdensome so as to chill the people from seeking just redress for
grievances with government. As that happens, government loses contact with
accountability for the wrongs of its agents, and with that, all motives to
become more fair, more kind and more gentle with its people. In Owen,
445 U.S. at 629, n. 6, the Court notes that "Ironically, the publication
of the libelous documents was caused by City Counselor's assurance that 'the
City does have immunity in this area." Thus, immunity creates its own
Constitutional violations and neither the Judiciary nor Congress have any idea
how extensive that problem is. Likewise, when the Court makes immunity policy,
it has no scientific support for its finding that "fear of potential
liability for doing his official duty" really impairs any public interest.
In fact, one can come to the opposite conclusion: That exposure to liability
for wrongs in office selects for more honest and diligent officials who know
that the best defense to intimidation from potential liability for doing one's
job under the Constitution, is to understand and support the Constitution in
the performance of that job.
12The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights was adopted by the United Nations on 12/16/66, and signed
by the United States on October 5, 1977. The Senate by resolution of 4/2/92,
gave its advice and consent to ratification, subject to Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations. Instrument of Ratification, signed by
President George Bush, 6/1/92. There, Art. III, § .3 declares: "That
the United States declares that it accepts the competence of the Human Rights
Committee to receive and consider communications under Art. 41 in which a State
Party clams that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under
13In the present context, the emphasized
clauses obligate the United States Judiciary to free the Constitution's
Petition Clause to do its work by undoing the assumption of sovereign immunity.
The Covenant is presented for both its binding force as "Supreme Law of
the Land", and also for its persuasive force in reason, to help understand
the nature of our own Petition Clause, that it is a law of reason freely chosen
by our founders: If we now choose it freely as a basis for the organization
of free nations, why should we presume that it was less compelling when our
Founding Fathers brought the Thirteen Colonies together under one
14The International Covenant's preamble
states the purpose of effective judicial remedies notwithstanding the violation
is committed by persons acting in official capacity, as follows:
"Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political
rights , as well as his economic, social and cultural rights." A
condition necessary for enjoyment of rights, is compulsory process of law to
protect those rights; and to obtain just redress for their violation.
15Lonergan v. United States, 303 U.S. 33
16United States v. New York Rayon Co. 329
U.S. 654 (1947).
17United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495
18Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S.
19The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Gen. Assem. Res. 217, A(III), 10 Dec. 1948, is a cornerstone human
rights treaty of the United States with the United Nations. It's Preamble sets
out the important role that government accountability to its own people plays
in international peace: "Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of
20The case that is credited with founding
Judicial Supremacy is Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137 (1803), by
Chief Justice Marshall. Actually, it founded the judicial policy of
"Judicial Review" and that is not quite the same thing as
"Judicial Supremacy" where in addition to supremacy over the other
branches, the judiciary assumes supremacy over the Constitution itself. In all
probability, Chief Justice Marshall would be absolutely astounded at the
judicial philosophy he is credited with founding.
21At least the Petition Clause does not
forbid it. There are other clauses that might forbid it. For example, the
nobility clause and due process clauses; and at some point, the equal
protection clause. We should not forget that the class of "government
officials" is the "ruling class". It is doubtful the
Constitution allows special privileges and immunities on the basis of that
class distinction alone.
22Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422.
23The Chief Justice was referring to the Tort
Claims Act as a remedies model for violations of the Constitution by government
officials. The Tort Claims Act does not cover Constitutional Torts, as
24The problem is not that we arenot able to
trust Congress to determine how much abridgment is too much. Rather, Congress
has never examined the issue in the light of the specific "public
policy" written into the Petition Clause, because the judiciary has hidden
that policy. There are reasonable market place alternatives to the public
policy reasons for most immunity. i.e. government defends and insures or
indemnifies its non-immune officers in most cases now, so what is the purpose
of immunity? see Scheuer,416 U.S. at 240. ( Chief Justice Burger
identified the two "mutually dependent rationales" on which the
doctrine of official immunity rested.) They are the injustice of subjecting an
officer to liability where he is required by his position to exercise
discretion, and the danger that such liability would deter his willingness to
execute his offices with the decisiveness and judgment required for the public
good. Government indemnification, like insurance, lifts most, if not all of the
burden from personal liability. But as to the basic argument, what is the
difference between the discretion exercised by a public servant and a medical
doctor such that the former is immune, even for intentional constitutional
torts (Judges, Prosecutors) but a medical doctor in life and death decisions,
is liable for a negligent twitch of a finger?
25A Judicially created immunity is a complete
abridgment of the right to redress. To the victim of immunized conduct, all of
government, local, state, federal; and all of its branches, are aligned against
him, saying in effect, "You must accept the violation and injury, without
recourse." In a real sense, the Supreme Court has assumed the role of
"king of kings" dispensing immunity to the lessor kings
according to its pleasure.
26State v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1867);
Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
27Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. ( 13 Wall.)
335 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (l967); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978),; Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
Bradley v. Fisher is the seminal case on judicial immunity. It sets the
stage for unlimited personal immunities. Bradley is based on two false
premises. One is that we inherited the British Common Law on that subject. That
was handsomely refuted by Justice Black in Bridges v. State, 314 U.S.
252, 260 (1941). The other was that judicial immunity WAS the
British Common Law. In fact, Chief Justice Lord Denman stated that law in
Kendillon v. Maltby, 174 Eng. Rep. 562, 566 (N.P. 1842) as follows:
"I have no doubt on my mind, that a magistrate, be he the highest judge in
the land, is answerable in damages for slanderous language, either not relevant
to the cause before him or uttered after the cause is at an end; but for words
uttered in the course of his duty, no magistrate is answerable, either civilly
or criminally, unless express malice and absence of reasonable or
probable cause be established. " Today, constitution based
commonwealth countries have no judicial immunity for violation of
Constitutional Rights. see THE DIGEST OF BRITISH, COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPEAN
CASES,, Note 3641, "No Liability for acts done in Judicial Capacity --
Unless Interference with Rights or Freedoms Under Constitution"
28Suggested in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 812-13 (1982); qualified immunity to Attorney General, Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Absolute immunity to Prosecutors; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 ( 1976);
29Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The prevailing eleventh
amendment doctrine was that it did not prohibit suits against the States
arising under federal question jurisdiction, nor suits against a State by its
own citizens. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. ( 6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). It was
not until after the Civil War that the Court found that the eleventh amendment
barred suits of citizens against their own Government as the
prelude to Hans v. Louisiana. Then in Edelman v. Jordan, in 1974,
Justice Rhenquist married the eleventh amendment to the State Sovereignty
doctrine. We should remember that it is abridgment of the Right to Petition
one's own Government that the Petition Clause forbids. The
eleventh amendment specifically does not abridge the right to petition one's
own state government in federal court for redress. The Court amended both the
first and eleventh amendments by one simple act of judicial fiat, and by that
judicial act, changed the "legal" relationship between government and
30O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975) ([s]uperintendent of Schools); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) ([s]choolboard members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(state executive officers for discretionary acts).
31A few examples from 42 U.S.C.A. 1983
demonstrates the point: "Qualified immunity covers liability for claims
brought against police officers under both Section 1983, and common law."
Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102 ( 3d Cir. 1989); Police officers have
absolute immunity for perjury at probable cause hearing.
White v. Frank, 680 F. Supp. 629 ( S.D.N.Y. 1988). Officers have
qualified immunity for use of deadly force, where at time of incident, law is
unsettled. Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766 ( 11th Cir. 1989).
Once issue of qualified immunity is injected into civil rights case,
"plaintiff has burden of demonstrating that defendants
violated some 'clearly established' constitutional right," Olzinski v.
Maciona, 714 F. Supp. 401 ( E.D. Wis. 1989); For qualified immunity, the
officer must demonstrate good faith belief and reasonable grounds for his
actions, and that they were within course of official conduct. But where a
citizen's right is clearly established, the officer may be immune if he neither
knew, nor should have known of the legal standard due to extraordinary
circumstances. Alexander v. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751 (6th Cir.
1983). Qualified immunity applies if either the officer didn't
know and shouldn't have known his acts would violate rights, or
where he acted "without malicious intention" to violate rights.
Allen v. Dorsey, 463 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Executive officials as
a rule, enjoy qualified good-faith immunity. Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d
719 ( 7th Cir. 1985).
Then there is a whole different line of immunity, for
"discretionary acts". "A limited immunity from personal
liability for unconstitutional conduct may be applied to many classes of public
officials who are required to exercise discretion the course of their
responsibilities." Atcherson v. Siebenmann , 605 F.2d 1058
(8th Cir. 1979); 'Acts which are discretionary in nature by a public
official do clothe him with a governmental immunity of a limited nature.'
Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 ( 10 th Cir. 1974) Immunity is extended
to private parties performing government contracts; Devargus v. Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Co,. 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
demied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991). Absolute prosecutorial immunity is extended
to cover qualified immunity of a sheriff who holds a prisoner for 18 days
without hearing on the grounds that he informed the prosecutor to arrange time
for appearance, but the prosecutor didn't act. Coleman v. Frantz , 754
F.2d 719 ( 7th Cir. 1985).
32Immunity is Based on a Dangerous
Myth: That unredressed grievances just go away. They don't. They fester,
and spread as rumor to become common knowledge of government's injustice, to
gradually rot the moral fiber of the Nation. The only protection Government has
from the people, is to provide effective redress of just grievance.
That is the teaching of the Magna Carta, the first amendment Petition
Clause, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is extremely dangerous to
believe those principles do not apply to The United States of America in the
33In the early nineteenth century beginnings
of our "sovereign immunity" tradition, stare decisis impelled
Courts to turn to British Common Law for authority and guidance, because there
was very little else.
34U.S. v. Lee, 27 L. Ed. at 184. ( Lee,
J., dissenting) (attributes Lee's success to overcoming these factors:
"These principles appear to us to be axioms of public law, which would
need no reference to authorities in their support, were it not for the
exceeding importance and interest of the case, the great ability with which it
has been argued, and the difference of opinion that has been manifested as to
application of the precedents.")
35Neither the fourteenth amendment, nor
§ 5 authorizes Congress to contravene the express purposes of the
Amendment, which is to extend protection of U.S. Constitutional Rights to all
the People from State Abridgment: Creation of State Immunity, whether by the
Court, or Congress, contradicts the face and substance of the fourteenth
amendment, not to mention what it does to the Petition Clause.
36The philosophy that government may
unlawfully injure some citizens for the greater good of the people, the nation,
its government or of the "proletariat" are all variations of the same
discredited philosophy that "The ends justify the means". Given that
governments will unlawfully injure some citizens, as a necessary incident to
governing, the only rational alternative to "The Ends Justify the
Means" is an effective system of just redress for Constitutional
violations arising out of the governing process. fifth amendment just
compensation for taking private property for public use doesn't require
culpability. Why should unlawful taking of liberty be less redressed?
37U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 3: "The
Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath of Affirmation, to
support this Constitution; ... ".
38One of the more profound descriptions of
the duty to support the Constitution notwithstanding that other officers may
fail to do so was made by Judge Liddle in, Wuebker v. James (Bowles), 58
N.Y.S. 2d 671 (1944). On what the Oath requires of a Judge, his Opinion is one
of only two cited in the US Code Annotated; Art. VI, § 3, U.S.C.A.
"Under the Constitutional requirement that all ... judicial officers of
the several states shall take an oath to support the Constitution, the
Constitution, alone, as it is written, is the sole test, and the support of an
act of Congress or any law promulgated by any other federal official or any
court decision, is not required." That is the USCA quotation. His
statement goes on in Wuebker : " Only the Constitution and laws
made in pursuance (not in violation thereof) are declared to be the supreme law
of the land. Decisions of the Court are not included as any part of the supreme
law of the land. That court may support the Constitution, as its oath requires,
or it may fail to do so, but it cannot change it. Under Article 6, only the
Constitution and the laws made pursuant to it are binding on this
39Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
40Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal.
App. 4th,43, 50 - 51 9 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937
41See Paterson, LIBERTY OF PRESS, SPEECH
& PUBLIC WORSHIP: RIGHT TO PETITION PARLIAMENT 30 (1980).
42See Corwin, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 1914(2d ed. 1964).
43See 1 W. & M. sess. 2, ch. 2 [3
Stats at Large 417]
44San Filippo v. Bongiovanni 30 F.3d 424,
443 n. 23; (3rd Cir. 1994); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143.
45See Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION 707 (1833); see also 1 Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:
PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 728 (8th ed. 1927) (quoting
Lieber, LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT 124 (2d ed. 1859).
46The Court of Appeals cites a footnote at
this point suggesting that "The 'right to petition' is distinct from the
petition of right,' permitting claims against the Crown. see generally
Clode, PETITION OF RIGHT (1887); Wade & Bradley, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 684
(1965); Chitty, PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 340 (1820). This writer disagrees.
While one can conceptually distinguish between them, what we are looking at is
the legal and cultural evolution of a single right that differs somewhat upon
its uses. That conceptual distinction breaks down in post Revolution and
Constitution America. Here, we never had a "kingly sovereign" by
which to distinguish petitioning government from petitioning the Crown. Thus,
the first amendment "Right to Petition Government for a Redress of
Grievances" recognizes only the end product of that evolution, as it
applies in America. The emphasis is on the right to petition
47As you read Chapter 61 of the Magna
Carta, infra, observe that it claims the right of petition to
include tearing the government down, then after redress is obtained
resubmitting to the king's authority. In a nation without a "kingly
sovereign" the equivalant is tearing the government down and replacing it
with one conformable to the Constitution. That is the common law implication of
the first amendment right, as it applies to a constitutional nation. If any
further proof that it includes replacing unconstitutional government by force
if necessary, observe that the Second Amendment requires the people keep the
instruments by which they can effectively do exactly that.
48The Magna Carta was originally written
in Latin. There are many translations of it and the wording may vary depending
upon the translation referred to.
49The rest of Chapter 61 guarantees that the
King and his heirs shall never interfere with the Petitioning
Process or punish or intimidate anyone for assisting the barons to coerce just
redress from the government.
50See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1188 (1992); see generally 12
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1934).
51Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
52Chapter 5 of the English Bill of Rights of
1689 outlawed criminal prosecutions for petitioning.
53For example, it limits the contingency fee
chargeable under the tort claims act and it limits the dollar amount attorneys
may charge for Veteran's petitions. The effect of these limitations is not to
literally limit fees. Rather it limits and frustrates the claims for redress
that can be economically made.
54The author considers this expression
("criminal exercise of [f]irst [a]mendment [r]ights") to be a
contradiction in terms. Yet, it accurately describes government's efforts to
chill the people from effectively seeking redress of grievances with it.
55The author is a "blacklisted
attorney". Part of the story of his blacklisting can be reviewed on the
Internet at "Constitution.org" under "confirmed abuses",
and find John Wolfgram. Another part of that blacklisting is recorded in
Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997). What should be noted in that case is
that he is being blacklisted under California's Vexatious Litigant Statutes for
having lost five cases against immunized government in seven years. see
generally Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. App. 4th at
47: "… Wolfgram filed at least five unsuccessful suits against judges
and other officials alleging misdeeds…" In other words, Wolfgram
Petitioned Government for Redress of Grievances with Government, and lost at
least five petitons when he tried to penetrate government immunities. Now he is
blacklisted from such petitioning. But what he learned in the process are the
foundations for this article, and a book that is introduced under
"prelude" at the above web site. In point, "Justice"
Morrison, who wrote the opinion, was so impressed by the intellectual quality
of the brief that he wanted to show his own intellectual prowess in his
opinion. When the opinion issued, it was "Not for Publication". But
because of the intellectual quality of the opinion, mostly borrowed from
Wolfgram and his attorney Kurt Simmons, Wolfgram was able to force publication
of that part of the opinion that addresses the Petition Clause issues under the
California Rules for Appeals. Then he took the case to the California Supreme
Court and certiorari was denied. Then to the Court where cert. was again
denied. Of five cases raising Petition Clause issues that Wolfgram has taken to
the Court (all cert. denied .) Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo is the
only published opinion, and the only reason that it is published is because the
judge was badgered into writing the History of the Petition Clause into an
opinion that was intended "Not for Publication". The rest of the
opinion still is "Not for Publication".
56Attorney Licensing Undermines Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Cases of "Criminal Exercise of Rights".
While the issue is somewhat different, the Court examined the relevant text and
meaning of the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel in Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 818, 820 (1975). "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right … to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; … and to have the Assistance of Counsel for HIS
defense ." (emphasis added)
That is what the sixth amendment says. The purpose of the
right to counsel is for the Accused's Defense, not just defenses that
counsel finds expedient for government. " … An unwanted counsel
'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal
fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the
defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution."
Id . at 821.
While the Faratta issue was the right to defend
one's self, that right necessarily includes the right, when you have counsel,
that counsel assist you in YOUR DEFENSE. The Court, in that vein, observed that
an attorney is an assistant, and no matter how expert, an assistant is still an
assistant. Then at page 821 the Court described the only court in our legal
history to force counsel on unwilling clients: The British Star Chamber.
The Court described the impermissible thing the Star
Chamber did by forcing counsel on the accused in footnotes 17 & 18. That
impermissible thing now seen as characteristic of "Star Chamber
practice" was to make sure that no defense the King didn't want made was
made. The Court described what happened to counsel in Star Chamber practice
who presented a defense the King didn't want to hear. His fate was as bad as
that of his "client".
Thus, the Sixth Amendment Issue is not merely the right to
counsel, but as it says on its face, it is the right to expert assistance in
investigating and presenting the defendant's very own defense . Licensed
attorneys can't present the defendant's own defense against "political
crimes" because "the king" doesn't want that, and the king
controls the lawyers through their licenses. Such attorney licensing is in
effect, the foundation for a modern day transition to "star chamber"
courts and the legal practices necessary to sustain political
57A case of "Criminal exercise of First
Amendment Rights" just came down as this article was being written, form
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In USA v. Fleming, (Ninth Cir. No.
99-10324, June 7, 2000) ___Fed 3rd ___, Fleming reacted to Federal
Judge Coyle's abridgments of his petition right by filing a lien against Judge
Coyle for $10,000,000. He was charged and convicted of obstruction of justice
under 18 U.S.C. 1503. The issue of his First Amendment Petition Clause rights
was not raised on appeal. Fleming asserted such a common law right, but his
Federal Defender Attorney "conceded in his brief to this court that no
such right exists." (2nd page of Opinion.)
58U.S. Const., art. II: Presidential
59 The question for the jury in each case is
whether the proposed application of law abridges a reasonable exercise of
Petition Clause rights under the face of the first amendment, the evidence and
argument. If it does, they must acquit. If it does not, then they determine the
case according to the other issues presented. While no one case informs
Congress on what policy to adopt, many such cases where the jury refuses to
convict, does send such a message. This process of the jury applying the first
ato the case guides both Congress and the Executive in determining the temper
of the people on the Petition Clause issue.
60See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1188 (1992); see also De Jonge v.
Oregon, 209 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry , 301 U.S. 242
61Id. at 1188-89; California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).; see
also NAACP v. Cliborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-15
62Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
63The Author believes that compulsory
administrative procedures for non-contractual grievances, violates the Petition
Clause. There is something inherently coercive that abridges the right to
petition when administrative procedures are required. But the government may
offer them and induce people to exercise them with such advantages as fair
standards, speedy resolution, right to raise constitutional issues, simplicity
of petition, low cost and so on. People may be induced to waive constitutional
rights. But the problem emerges when government can force you to exercise
administrative remedies instead of inducing you. In that case they use
abridgment of petition rights as a whip, and there is no inducement for
government to make such procedures fair with just redress.
64Notice that this is the principle violated
by Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. ( 2 Dall.) 419, 478
(1793). That case began the United States on the journey of "sovereign
immunity" which is translated as "immunity from accountability to the
people". see supra page 4.
65Notice the common law observation of
Justice Miller in U.S. v. Lee, 27 L. E.d. 176. He "concedes" that
sovereign immunity is "the established law of this country, and of this
Court at the present day". Then he discusses the English "Right to
Petition". He observes that it is uncertain whether the King "was not
suable in his own courts and in his kingly character" but after the Right
was established, it "was practiced and observed in the administration of
justice in England (and) has been as effective in securing the rights of
suitors against the Crown, in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as
that which the law affords in legal controversies between the subjects of the
King among themselves." Not withstanding that Justice Miller ignored our
Petition Clause, that does describe our Common Law Right to Petition Government
for Redress under our Petition Clause.
66As used here, "common law" has a
peculiar meaning that the author believes is also part of the meaning of that
term as used in the seventh amendment. It means "the law that is common to
and binding on all of the people." It is in contradistinction to law
specially designed for government, especially for government protection from
the people under the "common law". Notice that all seeking redress
for any grievance that you have with government falls under the Petition
Clause, and as to that, Congress shall make no law abridging. The necessary
result is the right to petition for redress of grievances with government
through the courts under the law that is common to the people without
abridgment for government's benefit.
67U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, is conclusive
of the issue. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, …". "Shall be vested" is
mandatory. The Supreme Court is not a part of Congress. Therefore no
legislative powers by any name shall vest in it. Likewise, with the Executive
68The eleventh amendment states: "The
Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." On its face, it does not apply to suits by citizens against their
69In Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991)
Judge Mireles ordered his bailiff to find Attorney Waco and he
"ordered" his bailiff to "use excessive force" to bring
Waco before the court. The bailiff located, assaulted and battered Attorney
Waco, then brought him before Judge Mireles. Waco sued Judge Mireles, all the
way to the Supreme Court. That Honorable Court held that Judge Mireles had
judicial immunity from accountability to Waco for his absurd
"order" that violated Waco's Constitutional Rights.
7031 F.3d 527, 535 ( 7th Cir.
1994). Judgment vacated and cause remanded by U.S. Supreme Court in 459 U.S.
1095 ( 1983). Judgment reiterated under both State and Federal Constitutions by
California Supreme Court in 33 Ca.l. 3d 727 (1983).
71Both actual fairness and its appearance are
an issue to avoid class-based conflict. The Judicial System is biased in favor
of government, wealth, and large corporate structure. For the purpose of
avoiding class war, a "judicial roll of the dice" would be more
effective than systematic injustice based on government bias against a
72The Constitution precludes a "Personal
Sovereign". What remains, is simply "government". Governmental
sovereignty over the people contradicts the very notion of a Constitution and
Rights. The effect of the judiciary's service to a sovereign not only violates
a maxim of its trust: "No one shall serve two masters, for he shall love
the one and despise the other", but because the design precludes a
"sovereign", re-creating government as "sovereign" creates
the status of "Kings" and puts the judicial creator at the head of
the kingdom it created.
73"Judicial Supremacy" is the
official legal philosophy of the United States. It's origins are credited to
Chief Justice John Marshal in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). Actually, that founded the judicial policy of
"Judicial Review". That is not quite the same thing as "Judicial
Supremacy" where in addition to supremacy over the other branches, the
judiciary assumes supremacy over the Constitution itself. In all probability,
Chief Justice Marshall would be absolutely astounded at the judicial philosophy
he is credited with founding. While there are alternatives to Judicial
Supremacy, it is taught in America as if there are none, and attorneys just
learn to accept it as an inherent part of law practice. The alternative to
Judicial Supremacy that is built into the Constitution, is the right to trial
by jury where the jury determines the law as well as the fact. We still have
the right, but it has been watered down so that the jury's real function is
instructed away by the corts. That function is the commonsense of a group of
lay persons interposed between the accused and his accuser. The point is,
Constitutional (and all "legal") issues should be submitted to the
Jury for their commonsense interposition. That is the constitutional balancing
force against government having a monopoly on legal interpretation. It is
practical that on any constitutional issue, the Nation has two separate lines
of thought going all the time, as to what the real law is. One is the Supreme
Court's interpretation as government's official spokesperson of what the
Constitution means. The other is the version that emanates from a case by case
evaluation by juries. That is the enforceable version. The push and pull
between these two versions is the life of the "living constitution".
Everyday, the confluence of these two separate interpretations is the bargain
struck between government and governed on what the Constitution really