I



                    18 October 1787



To the Citizens of the State of New-York.



When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which 

not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but 

upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great 

measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly 

interested in the result.



In this situation, I trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to lead the 

minds of the people to a wise and prudent determination, cannot fail of 

being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate part of the community. 

Encouraged by this consideration, I have been induced to offer my thoughts 

upon the present important crisis of our public affairs.



Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their political 

concerns. We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these 

United-States are held together, and the want of sufficient energy in our 

present confederation, to manage, in some instances, our general concerns. 

Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have 

succeeded. At length a Convention of the states has been assembled, they 

have formed a constitution which will now, probably, be submitted to the 

people to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power, to whom alone 

it of right belongs to make or unmake constitutions, or forms of government, 

at their pleasure. The most important question that was ever proposed to 

your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you, 

and you are to decide upon it by men of your own election, chosen specially 

for this purpose. If the constitution, offered to your acceptance, be a wise 

one, calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of liberty, to secure 

the inestimable rights of mankind, and promote human happiness, then, if you 

accept it, you will lay a lasting foundation of happiness for millions yet 

unborn; generations to come will rise up and call you blessed. You may 

rejoice in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming filled 

with freemen, who will assert the dignity of human nature. You may solace 

yourselves with the idea, that society, in this favoured land, will fast 

advance to the highest point of perfection; the human mind will expand in 

knowledge and virtue, and the golden age be, in some measure, realised. But 

if, on the other hand, this form of government contains principles that will 

lead to the subversion of liberty -- if it tends to establish a despotism, 

or, what is worse, a tyrannic aristocracy; then, if you adopt it, this only 

remaining assylum for liberty will be shut up, and posterity will execrate 

your memory.



Momentous then is the question you have to determine, and you are called 

upon by every motive which should influence a noble and virtuous mind, to 

examine it well, and to make up a wise judgment. It is insisted, indeed, 

that this constitution must be received, be it ever so imperfect. If it has 

its defects, it is said, they can be best amended when they are experienced. 

But remember, when the people once part with power, they can seldom or never 

resume it again but by force. Many instances can be produced in which the 

people have voluntarily increased the powers of their rulers; but few, if 

any, in which rulers have willingly abridged their authority. This is a 

sufficient reason to induce you to be careful, in the first instance, how 

you deposit the powers of government.



With these few introductory remarks, I shall proceed to a consideration of 

this constitution:



The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a 

confederated government be the best for the United States or not? Or in 

other words, whether the thirteen United States should be reduced to one 

great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one 

executive and judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen 

confederated republics, under the direction and controul of a supreme 

federal head for certain defined national purposes only?



This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the 

convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it 

approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and 

infallibly terminate in it.



This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable power, 

legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which 

it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is 

declared "that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be 

necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and 

all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the 

United States; or in any department or office thereof." And by the 6th 

article, it is declared "that this constitution, and the laws of the United 

States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or 

which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the 

supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 

thereby, any thing in the constitution, or law of any state to the contrary 

notwithstanding." It appears from these articles that there is no need of 

any intervention of the state governments, between the Congress and the 

people, to execute any one power vested in the general government, and that 

the constitution and laws of every state are nullified and declared void, so 

far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this constitution, or the laws 

made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the 

United States. -- The government then, so far as it extends, is a complete 

one, and not a confederation. It is as much one complete government as that 

of New-York or Massachusetts, has as absolute and perfect powers to make and 

execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, 

and annex penalties, with respect to every object to which it extends, as 

any other in the world. So far therefore as its powers reach, all ideas of 

confederation are given up and lost. It is true this government is limited 

to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is 

still left to the states, but a little attention to the powers vested in the 

general government, will convince every candid man, that if it is capable of 

being executed, all that is reserved for the individual states must very 

soon be annihilated, except so far as they are barely necessary to the 

organization of the general government. The powers of the general 

legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance -- there is 

nothing valuable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is 

within its power. It has authority to make laws which will affect the lives, 

the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the 

constitution or laws of any state, in any way prevent or impede the full and 

complete execution of every power given. The legislative power is competent 

to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; -- there is no limitation to 

this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which 

those taxes, and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation: 

but this is no restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are 

to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and 

general welfare of the United States; but the legislature have authority to 

contract debts at their discretion; they are the sole judges of what is 

necessary to provide for the common defence, and they only are to determine 

what is for the general welfare; this power therefore is neither more nor 

less, than a power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, at their 

pleasure; not only [is] the power to lay taxes unlimited, as to the amount 

they may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise them in any mode 

they please. No state legislature, or any power in the state governments, 

have any more to do in carrying this into effect, than the authority of one 

state has to do with that of another. In the business therefore of laying 

and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, and that of 

one entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that the 

authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that 

can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or at least 

will in process of time draw all other after it; it is the great mean of 

protection, security, and defence, in a good government, and the great 

engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the 

case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this 

constitution, to the late [state?] governments, on this article of raising 

money. No state can emit paper money -- lay any duties, or imposts, on 

imports, or exports, but by consent of the Congress; and then the net 

produce shall be for the benefit of the United States: the only mean 

therefore left, for any state to support its government and discharge its 

debts, is by direct taxation; and the United States have also power to lay 

and collect taxes, in any way they please. Every one who has thought on the 

subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can be collected in 

any country, by direct taxe[s], when the foederal government begins to 

exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the 

several states will find it impossible to raise monies to support their 

governments. Without money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle 

away, and, as before observed, their powers absorbed in that of the general 

government.



It might be here shewn, that the power in the federal legislative, to raise 

and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and their 

controul over the militia, tend, not only to a consolidation of the 

government, but the destruction of liberty. -- I shall not, however, dwell 

upon these, as a few observations upon the judicial power of this 

government, in addition to the preceding, will fully evince the truth of the 

position.



The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, 

and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and 

establish. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction 

comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the 

same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the 

constitution. One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each 

state, at least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It 

is easy to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will 

eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state 

courts. These courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the 

states, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving from 

them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, 

that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective 

states.



How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to do 

away all idea of confederated states, and to effect an entire consolidation 

of the whole into one general government, it is impossible to say. The 

powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may 

receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to 

make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into 

execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the 

United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very 

comprehensive and definite [indefinite?], and may, for ought I know, be 

exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures. 

Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to 

support their government and pay the state debt, may the Congress repeal 

this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may 

think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the 

United States? For all laws made, in pursuance of this constitution, are the 

supreme lay of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound 

thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of the different states to 

the contrary notwithstanding. -- By such a law, the government of a 

particular state might be overturned at one stroke, and thereby be deprived 

of every means of its support.



It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution 

would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the 

people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to 

pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an 

individual state, further than they are less responsible to the people. But 

what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with 

the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, 

imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, 

organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and 

other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of 

making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into 

execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all 

the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And 

if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that 

the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon 

the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will 

be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth 

confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body 

of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire 

a superiority over every thing that stands in their way. This disposition, 

which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature 

to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such 

advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds 

at all. It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of 

being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one 

complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and 

executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire 

in its exercise and operation.



Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best 

the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? 

It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever 

government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed 

as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to 

admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The question 

then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such 

principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United 

States, reduced into one state?



If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who 

have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be 

constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country 

of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these 

encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States. 

Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this 

point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the baron de 

Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. "It is natural 

to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long 

subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and 

consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in 

any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that 

he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and 

that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a 

large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is 

subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the 

interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more 

within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course 

are less protected." Of the same opinion is the marquis Beccarari.



History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent 

of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also 

was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, 

extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the 

consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free 

governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.



Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are 

against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be 

drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, 

the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme 

authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily 

expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure 

democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by 

themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and 

decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a 

country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or 

at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently 

assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and 

declare their opinion concerning it.



In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the 

people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, 

but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds 

of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this 

mind.



In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by 

which they are governed. This is the true criterion between a free 

government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the 

whole, expressed in any manner they may agree upon; the latter by the will 

of one, or a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by 

persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the choice and the 

number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and consequently 

qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know, 

or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not 

govern, but the sovereignty is in a few. Now, in a large extended country, 

it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of 

integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous 

and unwieldly, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a 

democratic government.



The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near 

three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten 

times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous 

as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their 

sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of 

transacting public business? It certainly is not.



In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should 

be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of 

opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving 

against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, 

and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply 

this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced 

that it forbids that we should be one government. The United States includes 

a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union 

are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their 

manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and 

their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the 

several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; 

each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of 

consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective 

parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but 

would be composed of such heterogenous and discordant principles, as would 

constantly be contending with each other.



The laws cannot be executed in a republic, of an extent equal to that of the 

United States, with promptitude.



The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of 

the laws, either by an armed force, maintained at the public expence for 

that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his 

command, in case of resistance.



In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, 

standing armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince or the 

magistrate, and are employed for this purpose when occasion requires: But 

they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and [are] abhorrent to 

the spirit of a free republic. In England, where they depend upon the 

parliament for their annual support, they have always been complained of as 

oppressive and unconstitutional, and are seldom employed in executing of the 

laws; never except on extraordinary occasions, and then under the direction 

of a civil magistrate.



A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must 

depend upon the support of its citizens. But when a government is to receive 

its support from the aid of the citizens, it must be so constructed as to 

have the confidence, respect, and affection of the people." Men who, upon 

the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are 

influenced to do it either by affection to the government, or from fear; 

where a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated 

by the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will 

obey: but, where this is not the case, the government must rest for its 

support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their 

government and laws. The body of the people being attached, the government 

will always be sufficient to support and execute its laws, and to operate 

upon the fears of any faction which may be opposed to it, not only to 

prevent an opposition to the execution of the laws themselves, but also to 

compel the most of them to aid the magistrate; but the people will not be 

likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive 

as the United States, as necessary for these purposes. The confidence which 

the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their 

knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and 

from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave: but in a 

republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be 

acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large would know 

little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change 

them. The people in Georgia and New-Hampshire would not know one another's 

mind, and therefore could not act in concert to enable them to effect a 

general change of representatives. The different parts of so extensive a 

country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their 

representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures were 

founded. The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their 

legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure 

they adopt, and will not support the laws they pass. Hence the government 

will be nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it 

otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the 

point of the bayonet -- a government of all others the most to be dreaded.



In a republic of such vast extent as the United-States, the legislature 

cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It 

cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition 

and wants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it 

should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of 

cases of this nature, that would be continually arising.



In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon 

become above the controul of the people, and abuse their power to the 

purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust committed 

to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United-States, 

must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and navy of 

the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning offences, 

the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expending them, 

with a number of other powers, must be lodged and exercised in every state, 

in the hands of a few. When these are attended with great honor and 

emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interest 

men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing 

men, such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them. They will 

use the power, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying 

their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very 

large republic, to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent 

their abuse of power.



These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free republic 

cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If 

then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states 

into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.



Though I am of opinion, that it is a sufficient objection to this 

government, to reject it, that it creates the whole union into one 

government, under the form of a republic, yet if this objection was 

obviated, there are exceptions to it, which are so material and fundamental, 

that they ought to determine every man, who is a friend to the liberty and 

happiness of mankind, not to adopt it. I beg the candid and dispassionate 

attention of my countrymen while I state these objections -- they are such 

as have obtruded themselves upon my mind upon a careful attention to the 

matter, and such as I sincerely believe are well founded. There are many 

objections, of small moment, of which I shall take no notice -- perfection 

is not to be expected in any thing that is the production of man -- and if I 

did not in my conscience believe that this scheme was defective in the 

fundamental principles -- in the foundation upon which a free and equal 

government must rest -- I would hold my peace.



                                                Brutus.



                          II



                    1 November 1787



To the Citizens of the State of New-York.



I flatter myself that my last address established this position, that to 

reduce the Thirteen States into one government, would prove the destruction 

of your liberties.



But lest this truth should be doubted by some, I will now proceed to 

consider its merits.



Though it should be admitted, that the argument[s] against reducing all the 

states into one consolidated government, are not sufficient fully to 

establish this point; yet they will, at least, justify this conclusion, 

that in forming a constitution for such a country, great care should be 

taken to limit and definite its powers, adjust its parts, and guard against 

an abuse of authority. How far attention has been paid to these objects, 

shall be the subject of future enquiry. When a building is to be erected 

which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid. 

The constitution proposed to your acceptance, is designed not for yourselves 

alone, but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which 

the social compact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely 

stated, and the most express and full declaration of rights to have been 

made -- But on this subject there is almost an entire silence.



If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America, from their own 

most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as self evident, that all men 

are by nature free. No one man, therefore, or any class of men, have a 

right, by the law of nature, or of God, to assume or exercise authority over 

their fellows. The origin of society then is to be sought, not in any 

natural right which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in 

the united consent of those who associate. The mutual wants of men, at first 

dictated the propriety of forming societies; and when they were established, 

protection and defence pointed out the necessity of instituting government. 

In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest; in this 

pursuit it frequently happened, that the possessions or enjoyments of one 

were sacrificed to the views and designs of another; thus the weak were a 

prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were subject to impositions from 

those who were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, every 

individual was insecure; common interest therefore directed, that government 

should be established, in which the force of the whole community should be 

collected, and under such directions, as to protect and defend every one who 

composed it. The common good, therefore, is the end of civil government, and 

common consent, the foundation on which it is established. To effect this 

end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be 

surrendered, in order, that what remained should be preserved: how great a 

proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individuals, 

when they submit to government, I shall not now enquire. So much, however, 

must be given up, as will be sufficient to enable those, to whom the 

administration of the government is committed, to establish laws for the 

promoting the happiness of the community, and to carry those laws into 

effect. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, that individuals should 

relinquish all their natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they 

cannot be surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the right 

of enjoying and defending life, etc. Others are not necessary to be resigned, 

in order to attain the end for which government is instituted, these 

therefore ought not to be given up. To surrender them, would counteract the 

very end of government, to wit, the common good. From these observations it 

appears, that in forming a government on its true principles, the foundation 

should be laid in the manner I before stated, by expressly reserving to the 

people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be 

parted with. The same reasons which at first induced mankind to associate 

and institute government, will operate to influence them to observe this 

precaution. If they had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of 

immutable righteousness, government would not have been requisite. It was 

because one part exercised fraud, oppression, and violence on the other, 

that men came together, and agreed that certain rules should be formed, to 

regulate the conduct of all, and the power of the whole community lodged in 

the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to them. But rulers have the 

same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power with 

which they are vested for private purposes, and to the injury and oppression 

of those over whom they are placed, as individuals in a state of nature are 

to injure and oppress one another. It is therefore as proper that bounds 

should be set to their authority, as that government should have at first 

been instituted to restrain private injuries.



This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of 

things, is confirmed by universal experience. Those who have governed, have 

been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and abridge the 

public liberty. This has induced the people in all countries, where any 

sense of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments of 

their rulers. The country from which we have derived our origin, is an 

eminent example of this. Their magna charta and bill of rights have long 

been the boast, as well as the security, of that nation. I need say no more, 

I presume, to an American, than, that this principle is a fundamental one, 

in all the constitutions of our own states; there is not one of them but 

what is either founded on a declaration or bill of rights, or has certain 

express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of them. From this it 

appears, that at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high and when an 

appeal was made to the people to form constitutions for the government of 

themselves, it was their universal sense, that such declarations should make 

a part of their frames of government. It is therefore the more astonishing, 

that this grand security, to the rights of the people, is not to be found in 

this constitution.



It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declaration[s] of 

rights, however requisite they might be in the constitutions of the states, 

are not necessary in the general constitution, because, "in the former case, 

every thing which is not reserved is given, but in the latter the reverse of 

the proposition prevails, and every thing which is not given is reserved." 

It requires but little attention to discover, that this mode of reasoning is 

rather specious than solid. The powers, rights, and authority, granted to 

the general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect 

to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government -- It 

reaches to every thing which concerns human happiness -- Life, liberty, and 

property, are under its controul. There is the same reason, therefore, that 

the exercise of power, in this case, should be restrained within proper 

limits, as in that of the state governments. To set this matter in a clear 

light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of 

the individual states, and apply them to the case in question.



For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of 

most of the states have declared, that no man shall be held to answer for a 

crime until he is made fully acquainted with the charge brought against him; 

he shall not be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself -- 

The witnesses against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be 

fully heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security of 

life and liberty, that trial of facts be in the vicinity where they happen. 

Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general government, as 

in that of a particular state? The powers vested in the new Congress extend 

in many cases to life; they are authorised to provide for the punishment of 

a variety of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its 

exercise, save only, that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of 

impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be in the state where 

the said crimes shall have been committed." No man is secure of a trial in 

the county where he is charged to have committed a crime; he may be brought 

from Niagara to New-York, or carried from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for 

an offence, supposed to be committed. What security is there, that a man 

shall be furnished with a full and plain description of the charges against 

him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor? That 

he shall see the witnesses against him face to face, or that he shall be 

fully heard in his own defence by himself or counsel?



For the security of liberty it has been declared, "that excessive bail 

should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual 

punishments inflicted -- That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to 

search suspected places, or seize any person, his papers or property, are 

grievous and oppressive."



These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that 

of the individual states; for the power of the former is as complete to the 

purpose of requiring bail. imposing fines, inflicting punishments, granting 

search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, in certain cases, 

as the other.



For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is declared by 

all the states, "that in all controversies at law, respecting property, the 

ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of 

the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable."



Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right, under this 

national compact, as in that of these states? Yet nothing is said respecting 

it. In the bills of rights of the states it is declared, that a well 

regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a free government -- 

That as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be 

kept up, and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, 

and controuled by the civil power.



The same security is as necessary in this constitution, and much more so; 

for the general government will have the sole power to raise and to pay 

armies, and are under no controul in the exercise of it; yet nothing of this 

is to be found in this new system.



I might proceed to instance a number of other rights, which were as 

necessary to be reserved, such as, that elections should be free, that the 

liberty of the press should be held sacred; but the instances adduced, are 

sufficient to prove, that this argument is without foundation. -- Besides, 

it is evident, that the reason here assigned was not the true one, why the 

framers of this constitution omitted a bill of rights; if it had been, they 

would not have made certain reservations, while they totally omitted others 

of more importance. We find they have, in the 9th section of the 1st 

article, declared, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 

unless in cases of rebellion -- that no bill of attainder, or expost facto 

law, shall be passed -- that no title of nobility shall be granted by the 

United States, &c. If every thing which is not given is reserved, what 

propriety is there in these exceptions? Does this constitution any where 

grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus, to make expost facto laws, 

pass bills of attainder, or grant titles of nobility? It certainly does not 

in express terms. The only answer that can be given is, that these are 

implied in the general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said, that 

all the powers, which the bills of right, guard against the abuse of, are 

contained or implied in the general ones granted by this constitution.



So far it is from being true, that a bill of rights is less necessary in 

the general constitution than in those of the states, the contrary is 

evidently the fact. -- This system, if it is possible for the people of 

America to accede to it, will be an original compact: and being the last, 

will, in the nature of things, vacate every former agreement inconsistent 

with it. For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the 

whole people, all other forms, which are in existence at the time of its 

adoption, must yield to it. This is expressed in positive and unequivocal 

terms, in the 6th article, "That this constitution and the laws of the 

United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties 

made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 

shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be 

bound thereby, any thing in the constitution, or laws of any state, to the 

contrary notwithstanding.



"The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the 

several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of 

the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or 

affirmation, to support this constitution."



It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively 

expressed. that the different state constitutions are repealed and entirely 

done away. so far as they are inconsistent with this, with the laws which 

shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with treaties made. or which shall be 

made, under the authority of the United States; of what avail will the 

constitutions of the respective states be to preserve the rights of its 

citizens? should they be plead, the answer would be. the constitution of the 

United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is the supreme law, 

and all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the general or state 

governments, are bound by oath to support it. No priviledge, reserved by the 

bills of rights, or secured by the state government, can limit the power 

granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. It stands 

therefore on its own bottom, and must receive a construction by itself 

without any reference to any other -- And hence it was of the highest 

importance, that the most precise and express declarations and reservations 

of rights should have been made.



This will appear the more necessary, when it is considered, that not only 

the constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, but all treaties made, 

or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are the 

supreme law of the land, and supersede the constitutions of all the states. 

The power to make treaties, is vested in the president, by and with the 

advice and consent of two thirds of the senate. I do not find any 

limitation, or restriction, to the exercise of this power. The most 

important article in any constitution may therefore be repealed, even 

without a legislative act. Ought not a government, vested with such 

extensive and indefinite authority. to have been restricted by a declaration 

of rights? It certainly ought.



So clear a point is this, that I cannot help suspecting, that persons who 

attempt to persuade people, that such reservations were less necessary under 

this constitution than under those of the states, are wilfully endeavouring 

to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage.



                                                Brutus.



                         III



                   15 November 1787



To the Citizens of the State of New-York.



In the investigation of the constitution, under your consideration, great 

care should be taken, that you do not form your opinions respecting it, from 

unimportant provisions, or fallacious appearances.



On a careful examination, you will find, that many of its parts, of little 

moment, are well formed; in these it has a specious resemblance of a free 

government -- but this is not sufficient to justify the adoption of it -- 

the gilded pill, is often found to contain the most deadly poison.



You are not however to expect, a perfect form of government, any more than 

to meet with perfection in man: your views therefore, ought to be directed 

to the main pillars upon which a free government is to rest; if these are 

well placed, on a foundation that will support the superstructure, you 

should be satisfied, although the building may want a number of ornaments, 

which, if your particular tastes were gratified, you would have added to it: 

on the other hand. if the foundation is insecurely laid. and the main 

supports are wanting, or not properly fixed, however the fabric may be 

decorated and adorned, you ought to reject it.



Under these impressions, it has been my object to turn your attention to the 

principal defects in this system.



I have attempted to shew, that a consolidation of this extensive continent, 

under one government, for internal, as well as external purposes, which is 

evidently the tendency of this constitution, cannot succeed, without a 

sacrifice of your liberties; and therefore that the attempt is not only 

preposterous, but extremely dangerous; and I have shewn, independent of 

this, that the plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle, which 

ought to be found in every free government; to wit, a declaration of rights.



I shall now proceed to take a nearer view of this system, to examine its 

parts more minutely, and shew that the powers are not properly deposited, 

for the security of public liberty.



The first important object that presents itself in the organization of this 

government, is the legislature. This is to be composed of two branches; the 

first to be called the general assembly, and is to be chosen by the people 

of the respective states, in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, 

and is to consist of sixty five members, with powers in the legislature to 

encrease the number, not to exceed one for every thirty thousand 

inhabitants. The second branch is to be called the senate, and is to consist 

of twenty-six members, two of which are to be chosen by the legislatures of 

each of the states.



In the former of these there is an appearance of justice, in the appointment 

of its members -- but if the clause, which provides for this branch, be 

stripped of its ambiguity, it will be found that there is really no equality 

of representation, even in this house.



The words are "representatives and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among 

the several states, which may be included in this union, according to their 

respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number 

of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and 

excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons." -- What a 

strange and unnecessary accumulation of words are here used to conceal from 

the public eye. what might have been expressed in the following concise 

manner. Representatives are to be proportioned among the states 

respectively, according to the number of freemen and slaves inhabiting them, 

counting five slaves for three free men.



"In a free state." says the celebrated Montesquieu, "every man. who is 

supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government. 

therefore the legislature should reside in the whole body of the people, or 

their representatives." But it has never been alledged that those who are 

not free agents, can, upon any rational principle, have any thing to do in 

government, either by themselves or others. If they have no share in 

government. why is the number of members in the assembly, to be increased on 

their account? Is it because in some of the states, a considerable part of 

the property of the inhabitants consists in a number of their fellow men, 

who are held in bondage, in defiance of every idea of benevolence, justice, 

and religion, and contrary to all the principles of liberty, which have been 

publickly avowed in the late glorious revolution? If this be a just ground 

for representation, the horses in some of the states, and the oxen in 

others, ought to be represented -- for a great share of property in some of 

them. consists in these animals; and they have as much controul over their 

own actions, as these poor unhappy creatures, who are intended to be 

described in the above recited clause, by the words, "all other persons." By 

this mode of apportionment, the representatives of the different pans of the 

union, will be extremely unequal: in some of the southern states, the slaves 

are nearly equal in number to the free men; and for all these slaves, they 

will be entitled to a proportionate share in the legislature -- this will 

give them an unreasonable weight in the government, which can derive no 

additional strength, protection, nor defence from the slaves, but the 

contrary. Why then should they be represented? What adds to the evil is, 

that these states are to be permitted to continue the inhuman traffic of 

importing slaves, until the year 1808 -- and for every cargo of these 

unhappy people, which unfeeling. unprincipled, barbarous, and avaricious 

wretches, may tear from their country, friends and tender connections, and 

bring into those states, they are to be rewarded by having an increase of 

members in the general assembly.



There appears at the first view a manifest inconsistency, in the 

apportionment of representatives in the senate, upon the plan of a 

consolidated government. On every principle of equity, and propriety, 

representation in a government should be in exact proportion to the numbers, 

or the aids afforded by the persons represented. How unreasonable, and 

unjust then is it. that Delaware should have a representation in the senate, 

equal to Massachusetts, or Virginia? The latter of which contains ten times 

her numbers. and is to contribute to the aid of the general government in 

that proportion? This article of the constitution will appear the more 

objectionable, if it is considered, that the powers vested in this branch of 

the legislature are very extensive, and greatly surpass those lodged in the 

assembly, not only for general purposes, but. in many instances, for the 

internal police of the states. The Other branch of the legislature, in 

which, if in either, a f[a]int spark of democracy is to be found, should 

have been properly organized and established -- but upon examination you 

will find, that this branch does not possess the qualities of a just 

representation, and that there is no kind of security, imperfect as it is. 

for its remaining in the hands of the people. 



It has been observed, that the happiness of society is the end of government 

-- that every free government is founded in compact: and that, because it is 

impracticable for the whole community to assemble, or when assembled, to 

deliberate with wisdom, and decide with dispatch, the mode of legislating by 

representation was devised.



The very term, representative, implies, that the person or body chosen for 

this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them -- a representation of 

the people of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people. It 

ought to be so constituted, that a person, who is a stranger to the country, 

might be able to form a just idea of their character, by knowing that of 

their representatives. They are the sign -- the people are the thing 

signified. It is absurd to speak of one thing being the representative of 

another, upon any other principle. The ground and reason of representation, 

in a free government, implies the same thing. Society instituted government 

to promote the happiness of the whole, and this is the great end always in 

view in the delegation of powers. It must then have been intended, that 

those who are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments 

and feelings, and be governed by their interests, or, in other words, should 

bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose room they are substituted. 

It is obvious, that for an assembly to be a true likeness of the people of 

any country, they must be considerably numerous. -- One man. or a few men, 

cannot possibly represent the feelings, opinions, and characters of a great 

multitude. In this respect, the new constitution is radically defective. -- 

The house of assembly, which is intended as a representation of the people 

of America, will not, nor cannot, in the nature of things, be a proper one 

-- sixty-five men cannot be found in the United States, who hold the 

sentiments, possess the feelings, or are acqainted with the wants and 

interests of this vast country. This extensive continent is made up of a 

number of different classes of people; and to have a proper representation 

of them. each class ought to have an opportunity of choosing their best 

informed men for the purpose; but this cannot possibly be the case in so 

small a number. The state of New-York, on the present apportionment, will 

send six members to the assembly: I will venture to affirm, that number 

cannot be found in the state, who will bear a just resemblance to the 

several classes of people who compose it. In this assembly, the farmer, 

merchant, mecanick. and other various orders of people, ought to be 

represented according to their respective weight and numbers; and the 

representatives ought to be intimately acquainted with the wants, understand 

the interests of the several orders in the society, and feel a proper sense 

and becoming zeal to promote their prosperity. I cannot conceive that any 

six men in this state can be found properly qualified in these respects to 

discharge such important duties: but supposing it possible to find them, is 

there the least degree of probability that the choice of the people will 

fall upon such men? According to the common course of human affairs, the 

natural aristocracy of the country will be elected. Wealth always creates 

influence, and this is generally much increased by large family connections: 

this class in society will for ever have a great number of dependents; 

besides, they will always favour each other -- it is their interest to 

combine -- they will therefore constantly unite their efforts to procure men 

of their own rank to be elected -- they will concenter all their force in 

every part of the state into one point, and by acting together, will most 

generally carry their election. It is probable, that but few of the 

merchants, and those the most opulent and ambitious, will have a 

representation from their body -- few of them are characters sufficiently 

conspicuous to attract the notice of the electors of the state in so limited 

a representation. The great body of the yeomen of the country cannot expect 

any of their order in this assembly -- the station will be too elevated for 

them to aspire to -- the distance between the people and their 

representatives, will be so very great, that there is no probability that a 

farmer, however respectable, will be chosen -- the mechanicks of every 

branch, must expect to be excluded from a seat in this Body -- It will and 

must be esteemed a station too high and exalted to be filled by any but the 

first men in the state, in point of fortune; so that in reality there will 

be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of 

the legislature, which is called the democratic. -- The well born, and 

highest orders in life, as they term themselves, will be ignorant of the 

sentiments of the midling class of citizens, strangers to their ability, 

wants, and difficulties, and void of sympathy, and fellow feeling. This 

branch of the legislature will not only be an imperfect representation, but 

there will be no security in so small a body, against bribery, and 

corruption -- It will consist at first, of sixty-five, and can never exceed 

one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; a majority of these, that is, 

thirty-three, are a quorum, and a majority of which, or seventeen, may pass 

any law -- so that twenty-five men, will have the power to give away all the 

property of the citizens of these states -- what security therefore can 

there be for the people, where their liberties and property are at the 

disposal of so few men? It will literally be a government in the hands of 

the few to oppress and plunder the many. You may conclude with a great 

degree of certainty, that it, like all others of a similar nature, will be 

managed by influence and corruption, and that the period is not far distant, 

when this will be the case, if it should be adopted; for even now there are 

some among us, whose characters stand high in the public estimation, and who 

have had a principal agency in framing this constitution, who do not scruple 

to say, that this is the only practicable mode of governing a people, who 

think with that degree of freedom which the Americans do -- this government 

will have in their gift a vast number of offices of great honor and 

emolument. The members of the legislature are not excluded from 

appointments; and twenty-five of them, as the case may be, being secured, 

any measure may be carried.



The rulers of this country must be composed of very different materials from 

those of any other, of which history gives us any account, if the majority 

of the legislature are not, before many years, entirely at the devotion of 

the executive -- and these states will soon be under the absolute domination 

of one, or a few, with the fallacious appearance of being governed by men of 

their own election.



The more I reflect on this subject, the more firmly am I persuaded, that the 

representation is merely nominal -- a mere burlesque; and that no security 

is provided against corruption and undue influence. No free people on earth, 

who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence 

in so small a number. The British house of commons consists of five hundred 

and fifty-eight members; the number of inhabitants in Great-Britain, is 

computed at eight millions -- this gives one member for a little more than 

fourteen thousand, which exceeds double the proportion this country can ever 

have: and yet we require a larger representation in proportion to our 

numbers, than Great-Britain, because this country is much more extensive, 

and differs more in its productions, interests, manners, and habits. The 

democratic branch of the legislatures of the several states in the union 

consists, I believe at present, of near two thousand; and this number was 

not thought too large for the security of liberty by the framers of our 

state constitutions: some of the states may have erred in this respect, but 

the difference between two thousand, and sixty-five, is so very great, that 

it will bear no comparison.



Other objections offer themselves against this part of the constitution -- I 

shall reserve them for a future paper, when I shall shew, defective as this 

representation is, no security is provided, that even this shadow of the 

right, will remain with the people.



                                                Brutus.



                         IV



                   29 November 1787



To the People of the State of New-York.



There can be no free government where the people are not possessed of the 

power of making the laws by which they are governed, either in their own 

persons, or by others substituted in their stead.



Experience has taught mankind, that legislation by representatives is the 

most eligible, and the only practicable mode in which the people of any 

country can exercise this right, either prudently or beneficially. But 

then, it is a matter of the highest importance, in forming this 

representation, that it be so constituted as to be capable of understanding 

the true interests of the society for which it acts, and so disposed as to 

pursue the good and happiness of the people as its ultimate end. The object 

of every free government is the public good, and all lesser interests yield 

to it. That of every tyrannical government, is the happiness and 

aggrandisement of one, or a few, and to this the public felicity, and every 

other interest must submit. -- The reason of this difference in these 

governments is obvious. The first is so constituted as to collect the views 

and wishes of the whole people in that of their rulers, while the latter is 

so framed as to separate the interests of the governors from that of the 

governed. The principle of self love, therefore, that will influence the one 

to promote the good of the whole, will prompt the other to follow its own 

private advantage. The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, 

appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is 

committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects 

as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible 

way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation; this, 

therefore, is the great desideratum in politics. However fair an appearance 

any government may make, though it may possess a thousand plausible articles 

and be decorated with ever so many ornaments, yet if it is deficient in this 

essential principle of a full and just representation of the people, it 

will be only like a painted sepulcher -- For, without this it cannot be a 

free government; let the administration of it be good or ill, it still will 

be a government, not according to the will of the people, but according to 

the will of a few.



To test this new constitution then, by this principle, is of the last 

importance -- It is to bring it to the touch-stone of national liberty, and 

I hope I shall be excused, if, in this paper. I pursue the subject commenced 

in my last number, to wit, the necessity of an equal and full representation 

in the legislature. -- In that, I showed that it was not equal, because the 

smallest states are to send the same number of members to the senate as the 

largest, and, because the slaves, who afford neither aid or defence to the 

government, are to encrease the proportion of members. To prove that it was 

not a just or adequate representation, it was urged, that so small a number 

could not resemble the people, or possess their sentiments and dispositions. 

That the choice of members would commonly fall upon the rich and great, 

while the middling class of the community would be excluded. That in so small 

a representation there was no security against bribery and corruption.



The small number which is to compose this legislature, will not only expose 

it to the danger of that kind of corruption, and undue influence. which will 

arise from the gift of places of honor and emolument, or the more direct one 

of bribery, but it will also subject it to another kind of influence no less 

fatal to the liberties of the people, though it be not so flagrantly 

repugnant to the principles of rectitude. It is not to be expected that a 

legislature will be found in any country that will not have some of its 

members, who will pursue their private ends. and for which they will 

sacrifice the public good. Men of this character are, generally, artful and 

designing, and frequently possess brilliant talents and abilities; they 

commonly act in concert, and agree to share the spoils of their country 

among them; they will keep their object ever in view, and follow it with 

constancy. To effect their purpose, they will assume any shape, and, Proteus 

like. mould themselves into any form -- where they find members proof 

against direct bribery or gifts of offices, they will endeavor to mislead 

their minds by specious and false reasoning, to impose upon their 

unsuspecting honesty by an affectation of zeal for the public good; they 

will form juntos, and hold out-door meetings; they will operate upon the 

good nature of their opponents, by a thousand little attentions, and teize 

them into compliance by the earnestness of solicitation. Those who are 

acquainted with the manner of conducting business in public assemblies, know 

how prevalent art and address are in carrying a measure, even over men of 

the best intentions, and of good understanding. The firmest security against 

this kind of improper and dangerous influence, as well as all other, is a 

strong and numerous representation: in such a house of assembly, so great a 

number must be gained over, before the private views of individuals could be 

gratified that there could be scarce a hope of success. But in the foederal 

assembly, seventeen men are all that is necessary to pass a law. It is 

probable, it will seldom happen that more than twenty-five will be requisite 

to form a majority, when it is considered what a number of places of honor 

and emolument will be in the gift of the executive, the powerful influence 

that great and designing men have over the honest and unsuspecting, by their 

art and address, their soothing manners and civilities, and their cringing 

flattery, joined with their affected patriotism; when these different 

species of influence are combined, it is scarcely to be hoped that a 

legislature, composed of so small a number, as the one proposed by the new 

constitution, will long resist their force.



A farther objection against the feebleness of the representation is. that it 

will not possess the confidence of the people. The execution of the laws in 

a free government must rest on this confidence, and this must be founded on 

the good opinion they entertain of the framers of the laws. Every government 

must be supported, either by the people having such an attachment to it, as 

to be ready, when called upon, to support it, or by a force at the command 

of the government, to compel obedience. The latter mode destroys every idea 

of a free government; for the same force that may be employed to compel 

obedience to good laws, might, and probably would be used to wrest from the 

people their constitutional liberties. -- Whether it is practicable to have 

a representation for the whole union sufficiently numerous to obtain that 

confidence which is necessary for the purpose of internal taxation, and 

other powers to which this proposed government extends, is an important 

question. I am clearly of opinion, it is not, and therefore I have stated 

this in my first number, as one of the reasons against going into an entire 

consolidation of the states -- one of the most capital errors in the system, 

is that of extending the powers of the foederal government to objects to 

which it is not adequate, which it cannot exercise without endangering 

public liberty, and which it is not necessary they should possess, in order 

to preserve the union and manage our national concerns; of this, however, I 

shall treat more fully in some future paper -- But, however this may be. 

certain it is, that the representation in the legislature is not so formed 

as to give reasonable ground for public trust.



In order for the people safely to repose themselves on their rulers, they 

should not only be of their own choice. But it is requisite they should be 

acquainted with their abilities to manage the public concerns with wisdom. 

They should be satisfied that those who represent them are men of integrity, 

who will pursue the good of the community with fidelity; and will not be 

turned aside from their duty by private interest, or corrupted by undue 

influence; and that they will have such a zeal for the good of those whom 

they represent, as to excite them to be diligent in their service; but it is 

impossible the people of the United States should have sufficient knowledge 

of their representatives, when the numbers are so few, to acquire any 

rational satisfaction on either of these points. The people of this state 

will have very little acquaintance with those who may be chosen to represent 

them; a great part of them will, probably, not know the characters of their 

own members, much less that of a majority of those who will compose the 

foederal assembly; they will consist of men, whose names they have never 

heard, and whose talents and regard for the public good, they are total 

strangers to; and they will have no persons so immediately of their choice 

so near them, of their neighbours and of their own rank in life, that they 

can feel themselves secure in trusting their interests in their hands. The 

representatives of the people cannot, as they now do, after they have passed 

laws, mix with the people, and explain to them the motives which induced the 

adoption of any measure, point out its utility, and remove objections or 

silence unreasonable clamours against it. -- The number will be so small 

that but a very few of the most sensible and respectable yeomanry of the 

country can ever have any knowledge of them: being so far removed from the 

people, their station will be elevated and important, and they will be 

considered as ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed by the people 

as part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them, and having separate 

interests to pursue; the consequence will be, that a perpetual jealousy will 

exist in the minds of the people against them; their conduct will be 

narrowly watched; their measures scrutinized; and their laws opposed, 

evaded, or reluctantly obeyed. This is natural, and exactly corresponds with 

the conduct of individuals towards those in whose hands they intrust 

important concerns. If the person confided in, be a neighbour with whom his 

employer is intimately acquainted, whose talents, he knows, are sufficient 

to manage the business with which he is charged, his honesty and fidelity 

unsuspected, and his friendship and zeal for the service of this principal 

unquestionable, he will commit his affairs into his hands with unreserved 

confidence, and feel himself secure; all the transactions of the agent will 

meet with the most favorable construction, and the measures he takes will 

give satisfaction. But, if the person employed be a stranger, whom he has 

never seen, and whose character for ability or fidelity he cannot fully 

learn -- If he is constrained to choose him, because it was not in his power 

to procure one more agreeable to his wishes, he will trust him with caution, 

and be suspicious of all his conduct.



If then this government should not derive support from the good will of the 

people, it must be executed by force, or not executed at all; either case 

would lead to the total destruction of liberty. -- The convention seemed 

aware of this, and have therefore provided for calling out the militia to 

execute the laws of the union. If this system was so framed as to command 

that respect from the people, which every good free government will obtain, 

this provision was unnecessary -- the people would support the civil 

magistrate. This power is a novel one, in free governments -- these have 

depended for the execution of the laws on the Posse Comitatus, and never 

raised an idea, that the people would refuse to aid the civil magistrate in 

executing those laws they themselves had made. I shall now dismiss the 

subject of the incompetency of the representation, and proceed, as I 

promised, to shew, that, impotent as it is, the people have no security that 

they will enjoy the exercise of the right of electing this assembly, which, 

at best, can be considered but as the shadow of representation.



By section 4, article I, the Congress are authorized, at any time, by law, 

to make, or alter, regulations respecting the time, place, and manner of 

holding elections for senators and representatives, except as to the places 

of choosing senators. By this clause the right of election itself, is, in a 

great measure, transferred from the people to their rulers. -- One would 

think, that if any thing was necessary to be made a fundamental article of 

the original compact, it would be, that of fixing the branches of the 

legislature, so as to put it out of its power to alter itself by modifying 

the election of its own members at will and pleasure. When a people once 

resign the privilege of a fair election, they clearly have none left worth 

contending for.



It is clear that, under this article, the foederal legislature may 

institute such rules respecting elections as to lead to the choice of one 

description of men. The weakness of the representation, tends but too 

certainly to confer on the rich and well-born, all honours; but the power 

granted in this article, may be so exercised, as to secure it almost beyond 

a possibility of controul. The proposed Congress may make the whole state 

one district, and direct, that the capital (the city of New-York, for 

instance) shall be the place for holding the election; the consequence would 

be, that none but men of the most elevated rank in society would attend, and 

they would as certainly choose men of their own class; as it is true what 

the Apostle Paul saith, that "no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but 

nourisheth and cherisheth it." -- They may declare that those members who 

have the greatest number of votes, shall be considered as duly elected; the 

consequence would be that the people, who are dispersed in the interior 

parts of the state, would give their votes for a variety of candidates, 

while any order, or profession, residing in populous places, by uniting 

their interests, might procure whom they pleased to be chosen -- and by this 

means the representatives of the state may be elected by one tenth part of 

the people who actually vote. This may be effected constitutionally, and by 

one of those silent operations which frequently takes place without being 

noticed, but which often produces such changes as entirely to alter a 

government, subvert a free constitution, and rivet the chains on a free 

people before they perceive they are forged. Had the power of regulating 

elections been left under the direction of the state legislatures, where the 

people are not only nominally but substantially represented, it would have 

been secure; but if it was taken out of their hands, it surely ought to have 

been fixed on such a basis as to have put it out of the power of the 

foederal legislature to deprive the people of it by law. Provision should 

have been made for marking out the states into districts, and for choosing, 

by a majority of votes, a person out of each of them of permanent property 

and residence in the district which he was to represent.



If the people of America will submit to a constitution that will vest in 

the hands of any body of men a right to deprive them by law of the privilege 

of a fair election, they will submit to almost any thing. Reasoning with 

them will be in vain, they must be left until they are brought to reflection 

by feeling oppression -- they will then have to wrest from their oppressors, 

by a strong hand. that which they now possess, and which they may retain if 

they will exercise but a moderate share of prudence and firmness.



I know it is said that the dangers apprehended from this clause are merely 

imaginary, that the proposed general legislature will be disposed to 

regulate elections upon proper principles, and to use their power with 

discretion, and to promote the public good. On this, I would observe, that 

constitutions are not so necessary to regulate the conduct of good rulers as 

to restrain that of bad ones. -- Wise and good men will exercise power so as 

to promote the public happiness under any form of government. If we are to 

take it for granted, that those who administer the government under this 

system, will always pay proper attention to the rights and interests of the 

people, nothing more was necessary than to say who should be invested with 

the powers of government, and leave them to exercise it at will and 

pleasure. Men are apt to be deceived both with respect to their own 

dispositions and those of others. Though this truth is proved by almost 

every page of the history of nations, to wit, that power, lodged in the 

hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always exercised to the 

oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves; yet most men 

think if it was lodged in their hands they would not employ it in this 

manner. -- Thus when the prophet Elisha told Hazael, "I know the evil that 

thou wilt do unto the children of Israel; their strong holds wilt thou set 

on fire, and their young men, wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash 

their children, and rip up their women with child." Hazael had no idea that 

he ever should be guilty of such horrid cruelty, and said to the prophet, 

"Is thy servant a dog that he should do this great thing." Elisha answered, 

"The Lord hath shewed me that thou shalt be king of Syria." The event 

proved, that Hazael only wanted an opportunity to perpetrate these 

enormities without restraint, and he had a disposition to do them, though he 

himself knew it not.



                                                Brutus.



                          V



                   13 December 1787



To the People of the State of New-York.



It was intended in this Number to have prosecuted the enquiry into the 

organization of this new system; particularly to have considered the 

dangerous and premature union of the President and Senate, and the mixture 

of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Senate.



But there is such an intimate connection between the several branches in 

whom the different species of authority is lodged, and the powers with which 

they are invested, that on reflection it seems necessary first to proceed to 

examine the nature and extent of the powers granted to the legislature.



This enquiry will assist us the better to determine, whether the legislature 

is so constituted, as to provide proper checks and restrictions for the 

security of our rights, and to guard against the abuse of power -- For the 

means should be suited to the end; a government should be framed with a view 

to the objects to which it extends: if these be few in number, and of such a 

nature as to give but small occasion or opportunity to work oppression in 

the exercise of authority, there will be less need of a numerous 

representation, and special guards against abuse, than if the powers of the 

government are very extensive, and include a great variety of cases. It will 

also be found necessary to examine the extent of these powers, in order to 

form a just opinion how far this system can be considered as a 

confederation, or a consolidation of the states. Many of the advocates for, 

and most of the opponents to this system, agree that the form of government 

most suitable for the United States, is that of a confederation. The idea of 

a confederated government is that of a number of independent states entering 

into a compact, for the conducting certain general concerns, in which they 

have a common interest, leaving the management of their internal and local 

affairs to their separate governments. But whether the system proposed is of 

this nature cannot be determined without a strict enquiry into the powers 

proposed to be granted. 



This constitution considers the people of the several states as one body 

corporate, and is intended as an original compact, it will therefore 

dissolve all contracts which may be inconsistent with it. This not only 

results from its nature, but is expressly declared in the 6th article of 

it. The design of the constitution is expressed in the preamble, to be, "in 

order to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic 

tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, 

and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity." These are 

the ends this government is to accomplish, and for which it is invested with 

certain powers, among these is the power "to make all laws which are 

necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and 

all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United 

States, or in any department or officer thereof." It is a rule in construing 

a law to consider the objects the legislature had in view in passing it, and 

to give it such an explanation as to promote their intention. The same rule 

will apply in explaining a constitution. The great objects then are declared 

in this preamble in general and indefinite terms to be to provide for the 

common defence, promote the general welfare, and an express power being 

vested in the legislature to make all laws which shall be necessary and 

proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the general 

government. The inference is natural that the legislature will have an 

authority to make all laws which they shall judge necessary for the common 

safety, and to promote the general welfare. This amounts to a power to make 

laws at discretion: No terms can be found more indefinite than these, and it 

is obvious, that the legislature alone must judge what laws are proper and 

necessary for the purpose. It may be said, that this way of explaining the 

constitution, is torturing and making it speak what it never intended. This 

is far from my intention, and I shall not even insist upon this implied 

power, but join issue with those who say we are to collect the idea of the 

powers given from the express words of the clauses granting them; and it 

will not be difficult to shew that the same authority is expressly given 

which is supposed to be implied in the forgoing paragraphs.



In the 1st article, 8th section, it is declared, "that Congress shall have 

power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 

debts, and provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United 

States." In the preamble, the intent of the constitution, among other 

things, is declared to be to provide for the common defence, and promote the 

general welfare, and in this clause the power is in express words given to 

Congress "to provide for the common defence, and general welfare." -- And in 

the last paragraph of the same section there is an express authority to make 

all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution 

this power. It is therefore evident, that the legislature under this 

constitution may pass any law which they may think proper. It is true the 

9th section restrains their power with respect to certain objects. But these 

restrictions are very limited, some of them improper, some unimportant, and 

others not easily understood, as I shall hereafter shew. It has been urged 

that the meaning I give to this part of the constitution is not the true 

one, that the intent of it is to confer on the legislature the power to lay 

and collect taxes, etc. in order to provide for the common defence and 

general welfare. To this I would reply, that the meaning and intent of the 

constitution is to be collected from the words of it, and I submit to the 

public, whether the construction I have given it is not the most natural and 

easy. But admitting the contrary opinion to prevail, I shall nevertheless, 

be able to shew, that the same powers are substantially vested in the 

general government, by several other articles in the constitution. It 

invests the legislature with authority to lay and collect taxes, duties, 

imposts and excises, in order to provide for the common defence, and promote 

the general welfare, and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and 

proper for carrying this power into effect. To comprehend the extent of this 

authority, it will be requisite to examine 1st. what is included in this 

power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.



2d. What is implied in the authority, to pass all laws which shall be 

necessary and proper for carrying this power into execution.



3d. What limitation, if any, is set to the exercise of this power by the 

constitution.



1st. To detail the particulars comprehended in the general terms, taxes, 

duties, imposts and excises, would require a volume, instead of a single 

piece in a news-paper. Indeed it would be a task far beyond my ability, and 

to which no one can be competent, unless possessed of a mind capable of 

comprehending every possible source of revenue; for they extend to every 

possible way of raising money, whether by direct or indirect taxation. Under 

this clause may be imposed a poll-tax, a land-tax, a tax on houses and 

buildings, on windows and fire places, on cattle and on all kinds of 

personal property: -- It extends to duties on all kinds of goods to any 

amount, to tonnage and poundage on vessels, to duties on written 

instruments, newspapers, almanacks, and books: -- It comprehends an excise 

on all kinds of liquors, spirits, wines, cyder, beer, etc. and indeed takes 

in duty or excise on every necessary or conveniency of life; whether of 

foreign or home growth or manufactory. In short, we can have no conception 

of any way in which a government can raise money from the people, but what 

is included in one or other of three general terms. We may say then that 

this clause commits to the hands of the general legislature every 

conceivable source of revenue within the United States. Not only are these 

terms very comprehensive, and extend to a vast number of objects, but the 

power to lay and collect has great latitude; it will lead to the passing a 

vast number of laws, which may affect the personal rights of the citizens of 

the states, expose their property to fines and confiscation, and put their 

lives in jeopardy: it opens a door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue 

and excise officers to pray [sic] upon the honest and industrious part of 

the community, eat up their substance, and riot on the spoils of the 

country.



2d. We will next enquire into what is implied in the authority to pass all 

laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry this power into execution. 



It is, perhaps, utterly impossible fully to define this power. The authority 

granted in the first clause can only be understood in its full extent, by 

descending to all the particular cases in which a revenue can be raised; the 

number and variety of these cases are so endless, and as it were infinite, 

that no man living has, as yet, been able to reckon them up. The greatest 

geniuses in the world have been for ages employed in the research, and when 

mankind had supposed that the subject was exhausted they have been 

astonished with the refined improvements that have been made in modem times, 

and especially in the English nation on the subject -- If then the objects 

of this power cannot be comprehended, how is it possible to understand the 

extent of that power which can pass all laws which shall be necessary and 

proper for carrying it into execution? It is truly incomprehensible. A case 

cannot be conceived of, which is not included in this power. It is well 

known that the subject of revenue is the most difficult and extensive in the 

science of government. It requires the greatest talents of a statesman, and 

the most numerous and exact provisions of the legislature. The command of 

the revenues of a state gives the command of every thing in it. -- He that 

has the purse will have the sword, and they that have both, have every 

thing; so that the legislature having every source from which money can be 

drawn under their direction, with a right to make all laws necessary and 

proper for drawing forth all the resource of the country, would have, in 

fact, all power.



Were I to enter into the detail, it would be easy to shew how this power in 

its operation, would totally destroy all the powers of the individual 

states. But this is not necessary for those who will think for themselves, 

and it will be useless to such as take things upon trust, nothing will 

awaken them to reflection, until the iron hand of oppression compel them to 

it.



I shall only remark, that this power, given to the federal legislature, 

directly annihilates all the powers of the state legislatures. There cannot 

be a greater solecism in politics than to talk of power in a government, 

without the command of any revenue. It is as absurd as to talk of an animal 

without blood, or the subsistence of one without food. Now the general 

government having in their controul every possible source of revenue, and 

authority to pass any law they may deem necessary to draw them forth, or to 

facilitate their collection; no source of revenue is therefore left in the 

hands of any state. Should any state attempt to raise money by law, the 

general government may repeal or arrest it in the execution, for all their 

laws will be the supreme law of the land: If then any one can be weak enough 

to believe that a government can exist without having the authority to raise 

money to pay a door-keeper to their assembly, he may believe that the state 

government can exist, should this new constitution take place.



It is agreed by most of the advocates of this new system, that the 

government which is proper for the United States should be a confederated 

one; that the respective states ought to retain a portion of their 

sovereignty, and that they should preserve not only the forms of their 

legislatures, but also the power to conduct certain internal concerns. How 

far the powers to be retained by the states shall extend, is the question; 

we need not spend much time on this subject, as it respects this 

constitution, for a government without the power to raise money is one only 

in name. It is clear that the legislatures of the respective states must be 

altogether dependent on the will of the general legislature, for the means 

of supporting their government. The legislature of the United States will 

have a right to exhaust every source of revenue in every state, and to annul 

all laws of the states which may stand in the way of effecting it; unless 

therefore we can suppose the state governments can exist without money to 

support the officers who execute them, we must conclude they will exist no 

longer than the general legislature choose they should. Indeed the idea of 

any government existing, in any respect, as an independent one, without any 

means of support in their own hands, is an absurdity. If therefore, this 

constitution has in view, what many of its framers and advocates say it has, 

to secure and guarantee to the separate states the exercise of certain 

powers of government[,] it certainly ought to have left in their hands some 

sources of revenue. It should have marked the line in which the general 

government should have raised money, and set bounds over which they should 

not pass, leaving to the separate states other means to raise supplies for 

the support of their governments, and to discharge their respective debts. 

To this it is objected, that the general government ought to have power 

competent to the purposes of the union; they are to provide for the common 

defence, to pay the debts of the United States, support foreign ministers, 

and the civil establishment of the union, and to do these they ought to have 

authority to raise money adequate to the purpose. On this I observe, that 

the state governments have also contracted debts, they require money to 

support their civil officers, and how this is to be done, if they give to 

the general government a power to raise money in every way in which it can 

possibly be raised, with such a controul over the state legislatures as to 

prohibit them, whenever the general legislature may think proper, from 

raising any money. It is again objected that it is very difficult, if not 

impossible, to draw the line of distinction between the powers of the 

general and state governments on this subject. The first, it is said, must 

have the power of raising the money necessary for the purposes of the union, 

if they are limited to certain objects the revenue may fall short of a 

sufficiency for the public exigencies, they must therefore have 

discretionary power. The line may be easily and accurately drawn between the 

powers of the two governments on this head. The distinction between external 

and internal taxes, is not a novel one in this country, it is a plain one, 

and easily understood. The first includes impost duties on all imported 

goods; this species of taxes it is proper should be laid by the general 

government; many reasons might be urged to shew that no danger is to be 

apprehended from their exercise of it. They may be collected in few places, 

and from few hands with certainty and expedition. But few officers are 

necessary to be imployed in collecting them, and there is no danger of 

oppression in laying them, because, if they are laid higher than trade will 

bear, the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their goods. We have 

therefore sufficient security, arising from the nature of the thing, against 

burdensome and intolerable impositions from this kind of tax. But the case 

is far otherwise with regard to direct taxes; these include poll taxes, land 

taxes, excises, duties on written instruments, on every thing we eat, drink, 

or wear; they take hold of every species of property, and come home to every 

man's house and packet. These are often so oppressive, as to grind the face 

of the poor, and render the lives of the common people a burden to them. The 

great and only security the people can have against oppression from this 

kind of taxes, must rest in their representatives. If they are sufficiently 

numerous to be well informed of the circumstances, and ability of those who 

send them, and have a proper regard for the people, they will be secure. The 

general legislature, as I have shewn in a former paper, will not be thus 

qualified, and therefore, on this account, ought not to exercise the power 

of direct taxation. If the power of laying imposts will not be sufficient, 

some other specific mode of raising a revenue should have been assigned the 

general government; many may be suggested in which their power may be 

accurately defined and limited, and it would be much better to give them 

authority to lay and collect a duty on exports, not to exceed a certain rate 

per cent, than to have surrendered every kind of resource that the country 

has, to the complete abolition of the state governments, and which will 

introduce such an infinite number of laws and ordinances, fines and 

penalties, courts, and judges, collectors, and excisemen, that when a man 

can number them, he may enumerate the stars of Heaven.



I shall resume this subject in my next, and by an induction of particulars 

shew, that this power, in its exercise, will subvert all state authority, 

and will work to the oppression of the people, and that there are no 

restrictions in the constitution that will soften its rigour, but rather 

the contrary.



                                                Brutus.



                         VI



                   27 December 1787



It is an important question, whether the general government of the United 

States should be so framed, as to absorb and swallow up the state 

governments? or whether, on the contrary, the former ought not to be 

confined to certain defined national objects, while the latter should retain 

all the powers which concern the internal police of the states?



I have, in my former papers, offered a variety of arguments to prove, that a 

simple free government could not be exercised over this whole continent, and 

that therefore we must either give up our liberties and submit to an 

arbitrary one, or frame a constitution on the plan of confederation. Further 

reasons might be urged to prove this point -- but it seems unnecessary, 

because the principal advocates of the new constitution admit of the 

position. The question therefore between us, this being admitted, is, 

whether or not this system is so formed as either directly to annihilate the 

state governments, or that in its operation it will certainly effect it. If 

this is answered in the affirmative, then the system ought not to be 

adopted, without such amendments as will avoid this consequence. If on the 

contrary it can be shewn, that the state governments are secured in their 

rights to manage the internal police of the respective states, we must 

confine ourselves in our enquiries to the organization of the government and 

the guards and provisions it contains to prevent a misuse or abuse of power. 

To determine this question, it is requisite, that we fully investigate the 

nature, and the extent of the powers intended to be granted by this 

constitution to the rulers.



In my last number I called your attention to this subject, and proved, as I 

think, uncontrovertibly, that the powers given the legislature under the 8th 

section of the 1st article, had no other limitation than the discretion of 

the Congress. It was shewn, that even if the most favorable construction was 

given to this paragraph, that the advocates for the new constitution could 

wish, it will convey a power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and 

excises, according to the discretion of the legislature, and to make all 

laws which they shall judge proper and necessary to carry this power into 

execution. This I shewed would totally destroy all the power of the state 

governments. To confirm this, it is worth while to trace the operation of 

the government in some particular instances.



The general government is to be vested with authority to levy and collect 

taxes, duties, and excises; the separate states have also power to impose 

taxes, duties, and excises, except that they cannot lay duties on exports 

and imports without the consent of Congress. Here then the two governments 

have concurrent jurisdiction; both may lay impositions of this kind. But 

then the general government have supperadded to this power, authority to 

make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying the foregoing 

power into execution. Suppose then that both governments should lay taxes, 

duties, and excises, and it should fall so heavy on the people that they 

would be unable, or be so burdensome that they would refuse to pay them both 

-- would it not be necessary that the general legislature should suspend the 

collection of the state tax? It certainly would. For, if the people could 

not, or would not pay both, they must be discharged from the tax to the 

state, or the tax to the general government could not be collected. -- The 

conclusion therefore is inevitable, that the respective state governments 

will not have the power to raise one shilling in any way, but by the 

permission of the Congress. I presume no one will pretend, that the states 

can exercise legislative authority, or administer justice among their 

citizens for any length of time, without being able to raise a sufficiency 

to pay those who administer their governments.



If this be true, and if the states can raise money only by permission of the 

general government, it follows that the state governments will be dependent 

on the will of the general government for their existence.



What will render this power in Congress effectual and sure in its operation 

is, that the government will have complete judicial and executive authority 

to carry all their laws into effect, which will be paramount to the judicial 

and executive authority of the individual states: in vain therefore will be 

all interference of the legislatures, courts, or magistrates of any of the 

states on the subject; for they will be subordinate to the general 

government, and engaged by oath to support it, and will be constitutionally 

bound to submit to their decisions.



The general legislature will be empowered to lay any tax they chuse, to 

annex any penalties they please to the breach of their revenue laws; and to 

appoint as many officers as they may think proper to collect the taxes. They 

will have authority to farm the revenues and to vest the farmer general, 

with his subalterns, with plenary powers to collect them, in any way which 

to them may appear eligible. And the courts of law, which they will be 

authorized to institute, will have cognizance of every case arising under 

the revenue laws, the conduct of all the officers employed in collecting 

them; and the officers of these courts will execute their judgments. There 

is no way, therefore, of avoiding the destruction of the state governments, 

whenever the Congress please to do it, unless the people rise up, and, with 

a strong hand, resist and prevent the execution of constitutional laws. The 

fear of this, will, it is presumed, restrain the general government, for 

some time, within proper bounds; but it will not be many years before they 

will have a revenue, and force, at their command, which will place them 

above any apprehensions on that score.



How far the power to lay and collect duties and excises, may operate to 

dissolve the state governments, and oppress the people, it is impossible to 

say. It would assist us much in forming a just opinion on this head, to 

consider the various objects to which this kind of taxes extend, in European 

nations, and the infinity of laws they have passed respecting them. Perhaps, 

if leisure will permit, this may be essayed in some future paper.



It was observed in my last number, that the power to lay and collect duties 

and excises, would invest the Congress with authority to impose a duty and 

excise on every necessary and convenience of life. As the principal object 

of the government, in laying a duty or excise, will be, to raise money, it 

is obvious, that they will fix on such articles as are of the most general 

use and consumption; because, unless great quantities of the article, on 

which the duty is laid, is used, the revenue cannot be considerable. We may 

therefore presume, that the articles which will be the object of this 

species of taxes will be either the real necessaries of life; or if not 

these, such as from custom and habit are esteemed so. I will single out a 

few of the productions of our own country, which may, and probably will, be 

of the number.



Cider is an article that most probably will be one of those on which an 

excise will be laid, because it is one, which this country produces in great 

abundance, which is in very general use, is consumed in great quantities, 

and which may be said too not to be a real necessary of life. An excise on 

this would raise a large sum of money in the United States. How would the 

power, to lay and collect an excise on cider, and to pass all laws proper 

and necessary to carry it into execution, operate in its exercise? It might 

be necessary, in order to collect the excise on cider, to grant to one man, 

in each county, an exclusive right of building and keeping cider-mills, and 

oblige him to give bonds and security for payment of the excise; or, if this 

was not done, it might be necessary to license the mills, which are to make 

this liquor, and to take from them security, to account for the excise; or, 

if otherwise, a great number of officers must be employed, to take account 

of the cider made, and to collect the duties on it.



Porter, ale, and all kinds of malt-liquors, are articles that would probably 

be subject also to an excise. It would be necessary, in order to collect 

such an excise, to regulate the manufactory of these, that the quantity made 

might be ascertained or otherwise security could not be had for the payment 

of the excise. Every brewery must then be licensed, and officers appointed, 

to take account of its product, and to secure the payment of the duty, or 

excise, before it is sold. Many other articles might be named, which would 

be objects of this species of taxation, but I refrain from enumerating them. 

It will probably be said, by those who advocate this system, that the 

observations already made on this head, are calculated only to inflame the 

minds of the people, with the apprehension of dangers merely imaginary. That 

there is not the least reason to apprehend, the general legislature will 

exercise their power in this manner. To this I would only say, that these 

kinds of taxes exist in Great Britain, and are severely felt. The excise on 

cider and perry, was imposed in that nation a few years ago, and it is in 

the memory of every one, who read the history of the transaction, what great 

tumults it occasioned.



This power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into every 

comer of the city, and country -- It will wait upon the ladies at their 

toilett, and will not leave them in any of their domestic concerns; it will 

accompany them to the ball, the play, and the assembly; it will go with them 

when they visit, and will, on all occasions, sit beside them in their 

carriages, nor will it desert them even at church; it will enter the house 

of every gentleman, watch over his cellar, wait upon his cook in the 

kitchen, follow the servants into the parlour, preside over the table, and 

note down all he eats or drinks; it will attend him to his bed-chamber, and 

watch him while he sleeps; it will take cognizance of the professional man 

in his office, or his study; it will watch the merchant in the 

counting-house, or in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop, 

and in his work, and will haunt him in his family, and in his bed; it will 

be a constant companion of the industrious farmer in all his labour, it will 

be with him in the house, and in the field, observe the toil of his hands, 

and the sweat of his brow; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; 

and finally, it will light upon the head of every person in the United 

States. To all these different classes of people, and in all these 

circumstances, in which it will attend them, the language in which it will 

address them, will be GIVE! GIVE!



A power that has such latitude, which reaches every person in the community 

in every conceivable circumstance, and lays hold of every species of 

property they possess, and which has no bounds set to it, but the discretion 

of those who exercise it[,] I say, such a power must necessarily, from its 

very nature, swallow up all the power of the state governments.



I shall add but one other observation on this head, which is this -- It 

appears to me a solecism, for two men, or bodies of men, to have unlimited 

power respecting the same object. It contradicts the scripture maxim, which 

saith, "no man can serve two masters," the one power or the other must 

prevail, or else they will destroy each other, and neither of them effect 

their purpose. It may be compared to two mechanic powers, acting upon the 

same body in opposite directions, the consequence would be, if the powers 

were equal, the body would remain in a state of rest, or if the force of the 

one was superior to that of the other, the stronger would prevail, and 

overcome the resistance of the weaker.



But it is said, by some of the advocates of this system, "That the idea that 

Congress can levy taxes at pleasure, is false, and the suggestion wholly 

unsupported: that the preamble to the constitution is declaratory of the 

purposes of the union, and the assumption of any power not necessary to 

establish justice, &c. to provide for the common defence, &c. will be 

unconstitutional. Besides, in the very clause which gives the power of 

levying duties and taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be 

appropriated, are specified, viz. to pay the debts, and provide for the 

common defence and general welfare."[1] I would ask those, who reason thus, 

to define what ideas are included under the terms, to provide for the common 

defence and general welfare? Are these terms definite, and will they be 

understood in the same manner, and to apply to the same cases by every one? 

No one will pretend they will. It will then be matter of opinion, what tends 

to the general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in the 

matter. To provide for the general welfare, is an abstract proposition, 

which mankind differ in the explanation of, as much as they do on any 

political or moral proposition that can be proposed; the most opposite 

measures may be pursued by different parties, and both may profess, that 

they have in view the general welfare; and both sides may be honest in their 

professions, or both may have sinister views. Those who advocate this new 

constitution declare, they are influenced by a regard to the general 

welfare; those who oppose it, declare they are moved by the same principle; 

and I have no doubt but a number on both sides are honest in their 

professions; and yet nothing is more certain than this, that to adopt this 

constitution, and not to adopt it, cannot both of them be promotive of the 

general welfare.



It is as absurd to say, that the power of Congress is limited by these 

general expressions, "to provide for the common safety, and general 

welfare," as it would be to say, that it would be limited, had the 

constitution said they should have power to lay taxes, &c. at will and 

pleasure. Were this authority given, it might be said, that under it the 

legislature could not do injustice, or pursue any measures, but such as were 

calculated to promote the public good, and happiness. For every man, rulers 

as well as others, are bound by the immutable laws of God and reason, always 

to will what is right. It is certainly right and fit, that the governors of 

every people should provide for the common defence and general welfare; 

every government, therefore, in the world, even the greatest despot, is 

limited in the exercise of his power. But however just this reasoning may 

be, it would be found, in practice, a most pitiful restriction. The 

government would always say, their measures were designed and calculated to 

promote the public good; and there being no judge between them and the 

people, the rulers themselves must, and would always, judge for themselves.



There are others of the favourers of this system, who admit, that the power 

of the Congress under it, with respect to revenue, will exist without 

limitation, and contend, that so it ought to be.



It is said, "The power to raise armies, to build and equip fleets, and to 

provide for their support, ought to exist without limitation, because it is 

impossible to foresee, or to define, the extent and variety of national 

exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may 

be necessary to satisfy them.["]



This, it is said, "is one of those truths which, to correct and unprejudiced 

minds, carries its own evidence along with it. It rests upon axioms as 

simple as they are universal: the means ought to be proportioned to the end; 

the person, from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought 

to possess the means by which it is to be attained."[2]



This same writer insinuates, that the opponents to the plan promulgated by 

the convention, manifests a want of candor, in objecting to the extent of 

the powers proposed to be vested in this government; because he asserts, 

with an air of confidence, that the powers ought to be unlimited as to the 

object to which they extend; and that this position, if not self-evident, is 

at least clearly demonstrated by the foregoing mode of reasoning. But with 

submission to this author's better judgment, I humbly conceive his reasoning 

will appear, upon examination, more specious than solid. The means, says the 

gentleman, ought to be proportioned to the end: admit the proposition to be 

true it is then necessary to enquire, what is the end of the government of 

the United States, in order to draw any just conclusions from it. Is this 

end simply to preserve the general government, and to provide for the common 

defence and general welfare of the union only? certainly not: for beside 

this, the state governments are to be supported, and provision made for the 

managing such of their internal concerns as are allotted to them. It is 

admitted, "that the circumstances of our country are such, as to demand a 

compound, instead of a simple, a confederate, instead of a sole government," 

that the objects of each ought to be pointed out, and that each ought to 

possess ample authority to execute the powers committed to them. The 

government then, being complex in its nature, the end it has in view is so 

also; and it is as necessary, that the state governments should possess the 

means to attain the ends expected from them, as for the general government. 

Neither the general government, nor the state governments, ought to be 

vested with all the powers proper to be exercised for promoting the ends of 

government. The powers are divided between them -- certain ends are to be 

attained by the one, and other certain ends by the other; and these, taken 

together, include all the ends of good government. This being the case, the 

conclusion follows, that each should be furnished with the means, to attain 

the ends, to which they are designed.



To apply this reasoning to the case of revenue; the general government is 

charged with the care of providing for the payment of the debts of the 

United States; supporting the general government, and providing for the 

defence of the union. To obtain these ends, they should be furnished with 

means. But does it thence follow, that they should command all the revenues 

of the United States! Most certainly it does not. For if so, it will follow, 

that no means will be left to attain other ends, as necessary to the 

happiness of the country, as those committed to their care. The individual 

states have debts to discharge; their legislatures and executives are to be 

supported, and provision is to be made for the administration of justice in 

the respective states. For these objects the general government has no 

authority to provide; nor is it proper it should. It is clear then. that the 

states should have the command of such revenues, as to answer the ends they 

have to obtain. To say, "that the circumstances that endanger the safety of 

nations are infinite," and from hence to infer, that all the sources of 

revenue in the states should be yielded to the general government, is not 

conclusive reasoning: for the Congress are authorized only to controul in 

general concerns, and not regulate local and internal ones; and these are as 

essentially requisite to be provided for as those. The peace and happiness 

of a community is as intimately connected with the prudent direction of 

their domestic affairs, and the due administration of justice among 

themselves, as with a competent provision for their defence against foreign 

invaders, and indeed more so.



Upon the whole, I conceive, that there cannot be a clearer position than 

this, that the state governments ought to have an uncontroulable power to 

raise a revenue, adequate to the exigencies of their governments; and, I 

presume, no such power is left them by this constitution.



                                                Brutus.



1. Vide an examination into the leading principles of the federal 

constitution, printed in Philadelphia, Page 34.



2. Vide the Federalist, No. 23.



                         VII



                     3 January 1788



The result of our reasoning in the two preceeding numbers is this, that in a 

confederated government, where the powers are divided between the general 

and the state government, it is essential to its existence, that the 

revenues of the country, without which no government can exist, should be 

divided between them, and so apportioned to each, as to answer their 

respective exigencies, as far as human wisdom can effect such a division and 

apportionment.



It has been shewn, that no such allotment is made in this constitution, but 

that every source of revenue is under the controul of the Congress; it 

therefore follows, that if this system is intended to be a complex and not a 

simple, a confederate and not an entire consolidated government, it contains 

in it the sure seeds of its own dissolution. -- One of two things must 

happen -- Either the new constitution will become a mere nudum pactum, and 

all the authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened to 

the present confederation -- Or the authority of the individual states will 

be totally supplanted, and they will retain the mere form without any of the 

powers of government. -- To one or the other of these issues, I think, this 

new government, if it is adopted, will advance with great celerity.



It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of revenue, cannot 

be made without endangering the public safety -- "unless (says a writer) it 

can be shewn that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are 

reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this 

position can be fairly and rationally disputed; it must be admitted as a 

necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority 

which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community, &c."[1]



The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly vanish, when it is 

considered, that the protection and defence of the community is not intended 

to be entrusted solely into the hands of the general government, and by his 

own confession it ought not to be. It is true this system commits to the 

general government the protection and defence of the community against 

foreign force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the high seas, 

and against insurrections among ourselves. They are also authorised to 

provide for the administration of justice in certain matters of a general 

concern, and in some that I think are not so. But it ought to be left to the 

state governments to provide for the protection and defence of the citizen 

against the hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by 

individuals to each other -- Protection and defence against the murderer, 

the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust person, is to be derived 

from the respective state governments. -- The just way of reasoning 

therefore on this subject is this, the general government is to provide for 

the protection and defence of the community against foreign attacks, &c., 

they therefore ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as 

is consistent with the providing for our internal protection and defence. 

The state governments are entrusted with the care of administring justice 

among its citizens, and the management of other internal concerns, they 

ought therefore to retain power adequate to the end. The preservation of 

internal peace and good order, and the due administration of law and 

justice, ought to be the first care of every government. -- The happiness of 

a people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon all that glory 

and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant martial achievements 

-- and I believe history will furnish but few examples of nations who have 

duly attended to these, who have been subdued by foreign invaders. If a 

proper respect and submission to the laws prevailed over all orders of men 

in our country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, oeconomy and 

industry influenced the people, we need not be under any apprehensions but 

what they would be ready to repel any invasion that might be made on the 

country. And more than this, I would not wish from them -- A defensive war 

is the only one I think justifiable -- I do not make these observations to 

prove, that a government ought not to be authorised to provide for the 

protection and defence of a country against external enemies, but to shew 

that this is not the most important, much less the only object of their 

care.



The European governments are almost all of them framed, and administered 

with a view to arms, and war, as that in which their chief glory consists; 

they mistake the end of government -- it was designed to save men[']s lives, 

not to destroy them. We ought to furnish the world with an example of a 

great people, who in their civil institutions hold chiefly in view, the 

attainment of virtue, and happiness among ourselves. Let the monarchs, in 

Europe, share among them the glory of depopulating countries, and butchering 

thousands of their innocent citizens, to revenge private quarrels, or to 

punish an insult offered to a wife, a mistress, or a favorite: I envy them 

not the honor, and I pray heaven this country may never be ambitious of it. 

The czar Peter the great, acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was 

nothing, compared with the true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his 

rude and barbarous subjects, diffusing among them knowledge, and 

establishing, and cultivating the arts of life: by the former he desolated 

countries, and drenched the earth with human blood: by the latter he 

softened the ferocious nature of his people, and pointed them to the means 

of human happiness. The most important end of government then, is the proper 

direction of its internal policy, and oeconomy; this is the province of the 

state governments, and it is evident, and is indeed admitted, that these 

ought to be under their controul. Is it not then preposterous, and in the 

highest degree absurd, when the state governments are vested with powers so 

essential to the peace and good order of society, to take from them the 

means of their own preservation?



The idea, that the powers of congress in respect to revenue ought to be 

unlimited, "because the circumstances which may affect the public safety are 

not reducible to certain determinate limits," is novel, as it relates to the 

government of the united states. The inconveniencies which resulted from the 

feebleness of the present confederation was discerned, and felt soon after 

its adoption. It was soon discovered, that a power to require money, without 

either the authority or means to enforce a collection of it, could not be 

relied upon either to provide for the common defence, the discharge of the 

national debt, or for support of government. Congress therefore, so early as 

February 1781, recommended to the states to invest them with a power to levy 

an impost of five per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a fund to be 

appropriated to discharge the debts already contracted, or which should 

hereafter be contracted for the support of the war, to be continued until 

the debts should be fully and finally discharged. There is not the most 

distant idea held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect taxes, 

duties and excises was necessary to be vested in the united states, and yet 

this was a time of the most pressing danger and distress. The idea then was, 

that if certain definite funds were assigned to the union, which were 

certain in their natures, productive, and easy of collection, it would 

enable them to answer their engagements, and provide for their defence, and 

the impost of five per cent was fixed upon for the purpose.



This same subject was revived in the winter and spring of 1783, and after a 

long consideration of the subject, and many schemes were proposed; the 

result was, a recommendation of the revenue system of April 1783; this 

system does not suggest an idea that it was necessary to grant the United 

States unlimited authority in matters of revenue. A variety of amendments 

were proposed to this system, some of which are upon the journals of 

Congress, but it does not appear that any of them proposed to invest the 

general government with discretionary power to raise money. On the contrary, 

all of them limit them to certain definite objects, and fix the bounds over 

which they could not pass. This recommendation was passed at the conclusion 

of the war, and was founded on an estimate of the whole national debt. It 

was computed, that one million and an half of dollars, in addition to the 

impost, was a sufficient sum to pay the annual interest of the debt, and 

gradually to abolish the principal. -- Events have proved that their 

estimate was sufficiently liberal, as the domestic debt appears upon its 

being adjusted to be less than it was computed, and since this period a 

considerable portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been 

discharged by the sale of the western lands. It has been constantly urged by 

Congress, and by individuals, ever since, until lately, that had this 

revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was recommended, it would 

have been adequate to every exigency of the union. Now indeed it is 

insisted, that all the treasures of the country are to be under the controul 

of that body, whom we are to appoint to provide for our protection and 

defence against foreign enemies. The debts of the several states, and the 

support of the governments of them are to trust to fortune and accident. If 

the union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise, they 

will leave a portion for the state, but this must be a matter of mere grace 

and favor. Doctrines like these would not have been listened to by any state 

in the union, at a time when we were pressed on every side by a powerful 

enemy, and were called upon to make greater exertions than we have any 

reason to expect we shall ever be again. The ability and character of the 

convention, who framed the preferred constitution, is sounded forth and 

reiterated by every declaimer and writer in its favor, as a powerful 

argument to induce its adoption. But are not the patriots who guided our 

councils in the perilous times of the war, entitled to equal respect. How 

has it happened, that none of these perceived a truth, which it is pretended 

is capable of such clear demonstration, that the power to raise a revenue 

should be deposited in the general government without limitation? Were the 

men so dull of apprehension, so incapable of reasoning as not to be able to 

draw the inference? The truth is, no such necessity exists. It is a thing 

practicable, and by no means so difficult as is pretended, to limit the 

powers of the general government in respect to revenue, while yet they may 

retain reasonable means to provide for the common defence.



It is admitted, that human wisdom cannot foresee all the variety of 

circumstances that may arise to endanger the safety of nations -- and it may 

with equal truth be added, that the power of a nation, exerted with its 

utmost vigour, may not be equal to repel a force with which it may be 

assailed, much less may it be able, with its ordinary resources and power, 

to oppose an extraordinary and unexpected attack; -- but yet every nation 

may form a rational judgment, what force will be competent to protect and 

defend it, against any enemy with which it is probable it may have to 

contend. In extraordinary attacks, every country must rely upon the spirit 

and special exertions of its inhabitants -- and these extraordinary efforts 

will always very much depend upon the happiness and good order the people 

experience from a wise and prudent administration of their interna