Of compacts made with an enemy.
I. AMONG public compacts,
those, which suppose a state of war, and are made with an enemy, deserve
particular attention. Of these there are two kinds; some, which do not put an
end to the war, but only moderate or suspend the acts of hostility; and others,
which end the war entirely. But before we consider these compacts in
particular, let us inquire into the validity of them in general.
Whether we ought to keep cur faith given to an enemy?
II. This question is certainly one of the most curious and important,
belonging to the law of nations. Grotius and Puffendorf are not agreed in this
point. The former maintains, that all compacts, made with an enemy, ought to be
kept with an inviolable fidelity. But Puffendorf is somewhat dubious with
respect to those compacts, which leave us in state of war, without a design to
remove it. Let us therefore endeavour to establish some principles, by means of
which we may determine with respect to these two opinions.
III. I observe, 1. That though war of itself destroys the state of
society between two nations, we must not thence conclude that it is subjected
to no law, and that all right and obligation are absolutely at an end between
2. On the contrary, every body grants that there is a right of war,
obligatory of itself, between enemies, and which they cannot violate, without
being defective in their duty. This is what we have proved before by showing,
that there are just and unjust wars; and that, even in the justest, it is not
allowable to push acts of hostility to the utmost extremity, but that we ought
to keep within certain bounds; and consequently, that there are things
unjust and unlawful, even with respect to an enemy. Since
therefore war does not, of itself, subvert all the laws of society, we cannot
from this alone conclude, that, because two nations are at war with each other,
they are dispensed from keeping their word, and from fulfilling the engagements
they have made with each other, during the course of the war.
3. As war is in itself a very great evil, it is the common interest of
nations not to deprive themselves voluntarily of the means, which prudence
suggests to moderate the rigor, and to suspend the effects of it. On the
contrary, it is their duty to endeavour to procure such means, and to make use
of them upon occasion; so far at least, as the attainment of the lawful end of
war will permit. Now there is nothing but public faith, that can procure
to the parties, engaged in war, the liberty to take breath; nothing but this
can secure to towns, that have surrendered, the several rights, which they have
reserved by capitulation. What advantage would a nation gain, or rather, what
is it they would not lose, if they were to have no regard to their faith, given
to an enemy, and if they looked upon compacts, made in such circumstances, only
as the means of circumventing one another? Surely it is not to be supposed that
the law of nature approves of maxims so manifestly opposite to the common good
of mankind. Besides, we ought never to wage war, merely for the sake of it, but
only through necessity, in order to obtain a just and reasonable satisfaction,
and a solid peace; whence it evidently follows, that the right of war between
enemies cannot extend so far, as to render hostilities perpetual, and to create
an invincible obstacle to the reestablishment of the public tranquillity.
4. And yet this would certainly be the consequence, if the law of nature
did not lay us under an indispensable obligation of performing whatever
agreement we have voluntarily made with the enemy during the war; whether these
agreements tend only to suspend, or moderate acts of hostility, or whether they
are designed to make them cease entirely, and to reestablish peace.
For in short there are only two ways of obtaining peace. The first is
the total and entire destruction of our enemy; and the second is the entering
into articles of treaty with him. If therefore treaties and compacts, made
between enemies, were not in themselves sacred and inviolable, there would be
no other means of procuring a solid peace, than carrying on the war to the
utmost extremity, and to the total ruin of our enemies But who does not see
that a principle, which tends to the destruction of mankind, is directly
contrary to the law of nature and nations, whose principal end is the
preservation and happiness of human society?
5. There is no distinction, in this respect, between the different
treaties, that we may enter into with an enemy; for the obligation, which the
laws of nature lay upon us, to observe them inviolably relates as well to
those, which do not put an end to the war, as to those, which tend to
reestablish peace. There is no medium, and we must lay it down as a general
rule, that all compacts with an enemy are obligatory, or that none of them are
And indeed, if it were lawful for instance to break a solemn truce, and
to detain, without any reason for it, people, to whom we had given passports,
&c. what harm would there be in circumventing an enemy, under a pretext of
treating of peace? When we enter into a negotiation of this kind, we are still
enemies; and it is properly but a kind of truce, which we agree to, in order to
see if there be any means of coming to an accommodation. If the negotiations
prove unsuccessful, it is not then a new war, which we begin, since the
differences, that occasioned our taking up arms, are not yet adjusted; we only
continue the acts of hostility, which had been suspended for some time; so that
we could no more rely on the enemy's sincerity, with respect to compacts, which
tend to reestablish peace, than to those, whose end is only to suspend, or
moderate acts of hostility. Thus distrusts would be continual, wars eternal,
and a solid peace unattainable.
6. The more frequent unnecessary wars are become, through the avarice
and ambition of sovereigns, the more a steady adherence to the principles, here
established, is indispensably necessary for the interest of mankind. Cicero
therefore justly affirms, that there is a right of war, which ought to be
observed between the contending parties, and that the enemy retains certain
rights, notwithstanding the war.
Nor is it sufficient to say, as Puffendorf does, that it is a custom,
which, among others, has obtained among civilized nations, out of particular
respect to military bravery, that all compacts made with an enemy ought to be
looked upon as valid. He should also have added, that this is an indispensable
duty, that justice requires it, that it is not in the power of nations to
establish things on another footing, and that they cannot justly deviate from
the rules, which the law of nature prescribes, in this case, for their common
IV. It will not be difficult, by means of the principles here
established, to answer the arguments, by which Puffendorf pretends to show,
that all compacts, made with an enemy, are not of themselves obligatory. We
shall be content with observing, 1. that those arguments prove nothing, because
they prove too much, &c. and 2. all, that can be concluded from them, is,
that we ought to act prudently, and take proper precautions before we pass our
word, or enter into any engagement with an enemy; because mankind are apt to
break their promises for their own interest, especially when they have to deal
with people, whom they hate, or by whom they are hated.
V. But it will be said, is it not a principle of the law of nature, that
all conventions and treaties, extorted by injustice and violence, are void of
themselves; and consequently, that he, who has been forced to make them against
his will, may lawfully break his word, if he thinks he can do it with safety?
Violence and force are the characteristics of war; and it is generally
the conqueror, that obliges the vanquished to treat with him, and by the
superiority of his arms, constrains them to accept the conditions he proposes
to them, whether the war he has undertaken be just or not. How then is it
possible, that the law of nature and nations should declare treaties, made in
those circumstances, to be sacred and inviolable?
I answer, that however true the principle, on which this objection is
founded, may be in itself, yet we cannot apply it, in all its extent, to the
The common interest of mankind requires, that we should make some
difference between promises, extorted by fear, among private persons, and
those, to which a sovereign prince or people is constrained, by the superiority
of the arms of a conqueror, whose pretensions were unjust. The law of nations
then makes an exception here to the general rule of the law of nature, which
disannuls conventions, extorted by unjust fear; or, in other words, the law of
nations holds for just on both sides that dread or apprehension, which induces
enemies to treat with each other, during the course of a war, for otherwise,
there would be no method, either of moderating its fury, or of putting a final
period to it, as we have already demonstrated.
VI. But, that nothing may be omitted, relating to this question, we
shall add something for the further illustration of what we have been
First then, it is necessary I think to distinguish here, whether he, who
by the superiority of his arms has compelled his enemy to treat with him, had
undertaken the war without reason; or whether he could alledge some specious
pretext for it. If the conqueror had undertaken the war for some plausible
reason, though perhaps unjust at bottom, then it is certainly the interest of
mankind, that the law of nations should make us regard the treaties, concluded
in such circumstances, as valid and obligatory; so that the conquered cannot
refuse to observe them under a pretext, that they were extorted by an unjust
But if we suppose, that the war was undertaken without reason, or if the
motive alledged be manifestly frivolous or unjust, as Alexander's going to
subdue remote nations, who had never heard of him, &c. as such a war is a
down right robbery, I confess I do not think the vanquished more obliged to
observe the treaty, to which they were compelled, than a man, fallen into the
hands of thieves, is bound to pay a sum of money, which he had promised them,
as a ransom for his life or liberty.
VII. We must also add, as a very necessary remark, that even supposing
the war was undertaken for some apparent and reasonable cause, if the treaty,
which the conqueror imposes on the vanquished, includes some condition
manifestly barbarous, and entirely contrary to humanity; we cannot, in those
circumstances, deny the vanquished a right of receding from their engagement,
and of beginning the war afresh, in order to free themselves, if they can, from
the hard and inhuman conditions, to which they were subjected, by the abuse
their enemy nude of his victory, contrary to the laws of humanity. The justest
war does not authorize the conqueror to keep no measures, or to use all
liberties with respect to the vanquished; and he cannot reasonably complain of
the breaking of a treaty, the conditions of which are both unjust in
themselves, and full of barbarity and cruelty.
VIII. The Roman history furnishes us with an example to this purpose,
which deserves our notice.
The Privernates had been several times subdued by the Romans, and as
often revolted; but their city was at last retaken by the consul Plautius. In
these distressed circumstances, they sent ambassadors to Rome to sue for peace.
Upon a senator's asking them what punishment they thought they deserved; one of
them answered, that, which is due to men, who think themselves worthy of
liberty. Then the counsel asked them, whether there was any room to hope,
that they would observe the peace, if their faults were pardoned? "The peace
shall be perpetual between us, replied the ambassador, and we shall faithfully
observe it, if the conditions you lay upon us are just and reasonable; but if
they are hard and dishonorable, the peace will not be of long continuance, and
we shall very soon break it."
Though some of the senators were offended at this answer, yet most of
them approved of it, and said, that it was worthy of a man, and of a man, who
was born free; acknowledging therefore the rights of human nature, they cried
out, that those alone deserved to be citizens of Rome, who esteemed nothing in
comparison of liberty. Thus the very persons, who were at first threatened with
punishment, were admitted to the privilege of citizens, and obtained the
conditions they wanted; and the generous refusal of the Privernates to comply
with the terms of a dishonorable treaty gained them the honor of being
incorporated into a state, which at that time could boast of the bravest, and
roost virtuous subjects in the universe.
Let us therefore conclude, that a due medium is to be observed; that we
ought inviolably to observe treaties made with an enemy, and that no exception
of an unjust fear should authorise us to break our promise, unless the war was
a downright robbery, or the conditions imposed on us were highly unjust, and
full of barbarity and cruelty.
IX. There is still another case, in which we may avoid the crime of
perfidiousness, and yet not perform what we have promised to an enemy; which
is, when a certain condition, supposed to be the basis of the engagement, is
wanting. This is a consequence of the very nature of compacts; by this
principle, the infidelity of one of the contracting parties sets the other at
liberty; for, according to the common rule, all the articles of the same
agreement are included one in the other, in the manner of a condition, as if a
person were expressly to say, I will do such or such a thing, provided you
do so or so.
1. Est etiam jus bellicum; fidesque
jurisjurandi sæpe cum hoste servanda. Off. lib. iv. cap. 29.
2. Livy lib. viii, cap. xx, xxi.
3. See above.
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