On the CAUSES of the







AUTHOR of the PERSIAN LETTERS . Translated from the FRENCH,


Printed for W. INNYS and R. MANBY, at the Weft End of St. Paul's; C. DAVIS in Pater-Noster-Row; and A. LYON in Russel-Street, Covent-Garden. MDCCXXXIV.



THE Infancy of Rome. 2. The Wars it sustain'd. Page 1

CHAP. II. Of the Science of War as practised by the Romans. 13

CHAP. III. The Methods by which the Romans rais'd themselves to Empire. 20

CHAP. IV. 1. Of the Gauls. 2. Of Pyrrhus. 3. Parallel between Carthage and Rome. 4. The War of Hannibal. 23

CHAP. V. The State of Greece, of Macedonia, of Syria and of Egypt, after the Depression of Carthage. 39

CHAP. VI. The Conduct which the Romans observ'd, in order to subdue all Nations.

54 CHAP. VII. How it was possible for Mithri-

dates to resist the Romans. 71

CHAP. VIII. Of the Divisions which always

subsisted in the City. 75

CHAP. IX. Two Causes which destroyed

Rome. 85

CHAP. X. Of the Corruption of the Romans.


CHAP. XL Of Sylla, Pompey and Csar.

98 CHAP. XII. Observations on the State of

Rome after the Death of Csar. 116 CHAP. XIII. Augustus. 125

CHAP. XIV. Tiberius. 138

CHAP. XV. Remarks on the Emperors from

Gaius Caligula to Antoninus. 146

CHAP. XVI. Considerations on the State of

the Empire from Antoninus to Probus.


CHAP. XVII. Changes in the State. 176

CHAP. XVIII. An Account of some new Maxims received by the Romans. 189

CHAP. XIX. Some Particulars of the Grandeur of Attila, The Establishment of the Barbarians accounted for. Reasons why the Western Empire was overturned before that in the East. 199

CHAP. XX. 1. The Conquests of Justinian. 2. Some Account of his Government. 211

CHAP. XXI. Disorders in the Eastern Empire. 226

CHAP. XXII. The Weakness of the Eastern

Empire. 234.

CHAP. XXIII. 1. The Duration of the Eastern Empire accounted for. 2. Its Destruction. 254.


On the CAUSES of the







1. The Infancy of Rome. 2. The Wars it


WE must not form to our selves an Idea of the City of Rome, in its Infancy, from the Cities which exist at this Time, unless we have in View those of the Crim Tartars, built for the stowing and securing of Plunder, Cattle, Fruits, and other Produce of

the Country. The antient Names of the chief Places in Rome, are all relative to this


The City was even without Streets, unless we will give this Name to the Continuation of Roads which centered in it. The Houses were straggling, built after an irregular Manner, and very small; for the Inhabitants being always either at their Work, or in the publick Square, were very seldom at home.

ROMULUS, and his Successors, were engag'd in almost perpetual Wars with their Neighbours, to increase the Number of their Citizens, their Women and their Territories. They us'd to return to the City, loaded with the Spoils of conquer'd Nations; and these Spoils, which consisted of Wheat-Sheaves and Flocks, us'd to fill 'em with the greatest Joy. Such is the Origin of Triumphs, to which that City, afterwards, chiefly ow'd its Grandeur.

The Strength of the Romans was greatly increas'd by their Union with the Sabines, a stubborn, warlike People, resembling the

Lacedmonians from whom they sprung.

Romulus a copied the Form of their Shields, which were large, and us'd 'em ever after-

wards instead of the small Buckler of Argos:

a Plutarch's Life of Romulus.

And 'tis to be observ'd, that the Circumstance which chiefly raised the Romans to the Sovereignty of the World, was, their laying aside their own Customs as soon as they met with better among the People they conquer'd; and 'tis well known that they fought successively against all Nations.

The Reign of NUMA, being long and pacific, was very well adapted to leave the Romans in their humble Condition; and had their Territory in that Age been less confin'd, and their Power greater, 'tis probable their Fortune would have been fix'd for ever.

SEXTUS the Son of TARQUIN, by violating the Chastity of LUCRETIA, committed a Crime which has generally drove Tyrants from the Cities they presided over; for when once a People are made strongly sensible, by the Commission of so enormous a Crime, of the Slavery to which they are reduc'd, they immediately form a desperate Resolution.

A People may suffer, without murmuring, the imposing of new Tributes, since they are not certain but that some Advantage may accrue to themselves, from the Disposal of the Monies so levied: But when an Insult is put upon them, they are affected with their Misfortune only; and this they

aggravate, by affixing to it the Idea of all the Calamities which can possibly happen.

It must however be confess'd, that the Death of Lucretia, did no more than occasion, accidentally, the Revolution which happened; for a haughty, enterprizing, bold People, confin'd within Walls, must necessarily either shake off the Yoke, or soften the Asperity of their Manners.

From the Situation of Things at that time, this was the Result; Either that Rome should change the Form of its Government, or continue for ever a small, poor Monarchy.

Modern History furnishes us with a very remarkable Example of what happened at that time in Rome; for as Men have been sensible to the same Passions in all Ages, the Occasions which give Rise to great Revolutions, are various, but the Causes are for ever the same.

As HENRY VII of England increas'd the Power of the Commons, merely to humble the Nobility; so SERVIUS TULLIUS enlarged the Privileges of the People, in order to depress the Senate; but the People growing afterwards bolder, ruin'd each of the Monarchies under which they liv'd.

No flattering Colours have been employ'd, in the Picture which is left us of TARQUIN; his Name has not escap'd any of the Orators who declaimed against Tyranny; but his Conduct before his Calamities, which 'tis evident he foresaw; his Gen-

tleness and Humanity towards the Conquer'd, his Beneficence to the Soldiers, the Arts by which he engaged such Numbers to endeavour at his Preservation, the Edifices he rais'd for the publick Use, his Courage in the Field, the Constancy and Patience with which he bore his Misfortunes, a Twenty Years War he either carried on, or caus'd to be carried on against the Romans^ tho' depriv'd of his Kingdom, and very poor; these Things, and the Resources he perpetually found, prove manifestly, that he was no'contemptible Person.

The Rank or Place which Posteriry beilows, is subjecl:, as all others are, to the Whim and Caprice of Fortune: Woe to the Reputation of that Monarch who is oppressed by a Party which after becomes the prevailing one; or who has endeavour'd to destroy a Prepossession that survives him.

The Romans, after having banish'd their Kings, appointed Consuls annually, a Circumstance which contributed to raise *em to so exalted a Pitch. In the Lives of all Princes there are certain Periods of Ambition, and these are afterwards succeeded by other Passions, and even by Indolence; but the Commonwealth being govern'd by Magistrates who were changed every Year, and who endeavour'd to signalize themselves in their Employment, in the View of obtaining new ones, Ambition had not a Moment to losc.

Hence it was that these Magistrates were ever persuading the Senate to stir up the People 10 War, and ppinted out to Jem new Enemies every Day.

This Body (the Senate) was inclin'd enotigh to do this of their own Accord; for, being quite tir'd of the Complaints and Demands of the People, they endeavour'd to remove the Occasion of their Disquiet, and to employ them in foreign Wars.

Now the common People were generally 'pleas'd with War, because a Method had been found to make it beneficial to 'em, by the judicious Distribution that was made of the Spoils.

Rome being a City in which neither Trade nor Arts flouriihed, the several Individuals had no other Way of enriching themselvcs, but by Rapine.

An Order and Discipline was therefore established in the Way and Manner of pillaging, and this was pretty near the same with that now praftised among the Inhabitants of Lejsir fartary*.

The Plunder was laid together, and afterwards distributed among the Soldiers ^ not even the minutest Article was lost, because every Man, before he set out, swore not to emoezzle any thing ^ besides that the Romans 'were, of all Nations, the most re-

bSee Polybius, Book X.

ligious Observers of-Oaths, these being consider'd as the Sinews of their Military Disciplinc.

In fine, those Citizens who staid at home, shar'd also in the Fruits of the Vi&ory; for part of the conquer'd Lands was confiscated, and this was lubdividcd into two Portions, one of which was sold for the Benefit of the Publick, and the other divided by the Commonwealth, among such .Citizens as were but in poor Circumstances, upon Condition of their paying a small Acknowledgment.

As the Coniuls had no other Way of obtaining the Honour of a Triumph, than by . a Conquest or a Vidlory, rhis made 'em ruih into the Field with unparallel'd Impetuosity ; they march'd directly to the Enemy, when Force immediately decided the Contest,

Rome was therefore engag'd in an eternal, and ever-obllinate War: Now, a Nation that is always c at War, and that too from the very Frame and Esience of its Government, mud necessarily be destroy'd, or subdue all other Nations; for, these being sometimes at War, and at other times in Peace, could never be so able to invade others, nor so well prepared to defend them lei ves.

c The "Romani consider'J Foreigners as Enemies: H'jjli?, according to 1'iirro dc L'nvua Lat. lib. 4. significd ;H firil a Foreigner who liv\i iccording to his own Laws.

By this means the Romans attained a perfect Knowledge'in the Military Arts: In transient Wars molt of the Examples are lost; Peace suggests different Ideas, and we forget not only our Faults but even Virtues.

Another Consequence of the Maxim of waging perpetual War, was, that the Romans never concluded a Peace but when they were victorious; and indeed, to what Purpole would it be to make an ignominious Pence with one Nation, and afterwards go .ind invade another?

In this View, their Pretensions rose always in proportion to their Defeat; by this fhcy surpnVd the Conquerors, and laid themselves under a greater Necessity of conquering.

Being for ever obnoxious to the most severe Vengeance -, Perseverance and Valour became necessary Virtues: And these could not be distinguish'd, among them, from Self-Love, from the Love of one's Family, of one's Country, and of whatever is deareit among Men.

The same had happened to Italy^ which befel America in late Ages ; the Natives of the former, quite helpless and dispers'd up and down, having resign'd their Habitations

^^ ^t 1 T~%

to new Comers, it was afterwards Peopled by three different Nations, the "Tus-

cans, d the Gauls and the Greeks. The Gauls had no Manner of Relation or Affinity either with the Greeks or Tuscans; the latter form'd a Society which had its peculiar Language, Customs and Morals; and the Grecian Colonies, who desended from different Nations that were often at Variance, had pretty separate Interests.

The World in that Age was not like the World in ours: Voyages, Conquest, Traffick j the Establilhment of mighty States; the Invention of Post-Offices, of the Sea-Compass, and of Printing> these, with a certain general Pdity, have made Correspondence much easier, and given Rise, atnong us, to an Art, calPd by the Name of, Politicks: Every Man sees at one Glance whatever is transacting in the whole Universe ; and if a People discover but ever so little Ambition, all the Nations round 'em are immediately terrified.

The People of Italy had c none of those Engines which were employ'd in Sieges: And further, as the Soldiers were not allow'd any Stipend, there was no Possibility of keeping them long before a Town or Fdr-


d 'Tis not known whether they were originally of that Country, or only a Colony; .butDiott.IJa/tfarnassem is of the former Opinion. Lib. i>

cD, llalicarnajs. declares so expressly, Lib. 9. and this appears by History: They us'ci to attempt the Sealado of Cities with Ladders.

tress: Hence it was, that few of their Wars were decisive: These fought from no other Motive, but merely to plunder the Enemy's Camp or his Lands ; after which both the Conqueror and the Conquered march'd back to their respective Cities. This Circumstance gave Rise to the strong Resinance which the People of'Italy made, and at the same time to the inflexible Resolution the Romans form'd to subdue 'em ; this favour'd the latter with Victories which no way deprav'd their Morals, and left them in their original Poverty.

Had the Romans made a rapid Conquest of the neighbouring Cities, they would have been ;n a declining Condition at the Arrival of Pyrrhus, of the Gauls and of Hannibal; and by a Fate common to most Governments in the World, they would have made too quick a Transition from Poverty to Riches, and from Riches to Depravity^

But Rome, for ever struggling, arid "ever meeting with Obstacles, made other Nations tremble at its Power, and at the lame time was unable to extend it; and exercised in a very narrow Compass of Ground, a Train of Virtues that were to prove of the most fatal Consequence to the Universe.

All the, People of Italy were not equally warlike: Those who inhabited the eastern Part, as the 'Tarentines and the Papuans ; all the Cities of Campania, and of Gratia Ma-

jor, were quite immcrs'd in Indolence and in Pleasures; but the Latins* the Hernia^ the Sabines^ the jEqui and the Volsdans were passionately fond of War: These Nations lay round Rome\ the Resi(lance they made to that City wis incredible, and they surpass'd them in S:ubborness and Inflexibility.

The Latin Cities sprung from Allan Colonies, which were founded f by LATINUS SYLVIUS: Besules their common Extraction with the Romans, there were several Rites and Ceremonies common to both; and SERviusTi'LLius hads engag'd them to build

a Temple in Rome* to serve as the Center of Union of the Two Nations. Losing a Battle near the Lake Regillus, they were subjecled to an Alliance, and forc'd to associate in the h Wars which the Romans wagM

'Twas manifestly seen, during the short Time that the Tyranny of the Decemvirs lasted, how much the aggrandizing of Rome depended on its Liberty. The Government seem'd to have lost the ' Soul which animated even to the minuted Part of it.

f As appears from the Treatise entitled Origo Ggntis

Romatitf, ascribed to Aurelius fitter.

g />. Ha/icarnass.

h See in D. Halicarnajs. Lib. 6. one of the Treaties concluded with ihis People.

* These Dec?m-:>iri, upon- Pretence of giving written Laws to the People, seiVd upon the Government. See D. Hatictirnass. Lib. 11.

There remain'd at that Time but Two Sorts of People in the City, those who submitted to Slavery, and those who, for their own private Interest, endeavour'd to enslave the rest. The Senators withdrew from Rome as from a foreign City; and the neighbouring Nations did not meet with the least Resishince from any Quarter.

The Senate having found Means to give the Soldiers a regular Stipend, the Siege of Veil was undertaken, which Jailed ten Years. But now a new Art, and a new System of War, were seen to arise among the Romans; their SuccerTes were more signal and conspicu'ous; they1 made a better Advantage of their Viftories; their Conquests were greater-, they sent out more Colonies j in fine, the taking of K' prov'd a Kind of Revolution.

Bi;t all this did not lesien their Toils: If, on one Side, they attacked with greater Vigour the ^TuscanS) the JEqin, and the VolJcians; fbr this very Reason they were abancfcn'd by the Latins and the Hernici their A.1lie.0, who were arm'd after the same Manner, and observ'd the sume Disciplinc with thrmselyes; tlvisengag-M the Tuscans to form new Alliances; and prompted the Samnites, the most martial People of all Italy^ to involve em in a furiotw War.

The taking of Rome by the Gauls did no way lessen its Strengths almost the whole

Army, which was dispers'd rather than overcome, withdrew to Veil -, the People shelter'd themselves in the adjacent Cities; and the Burning of Rome was no more than the setting fire to a few Cottages of Shepherds.


Of the Science of War as praElised by the


AS the .Rotoam devoted themselves entirely to War, and consider'd it as the only Science, they therefore bent all *their Thoughts, and the Genius with which they were inform'd, to the Improvement of it:: Doubtless a God, says a Vegetiu^ inspired them with the Idea of the Legion.

They judged that it would be necessary to arm the Soldiers who compos'd the Legion with Weapons, whether offensive or defensive, ot a ilronger and b heavier Kind than those of any other Nation.

But as some Things must be done in War, which a heavy Body is not able to execute,

� L. 2. Cap. i;.

b See in Polybius, and in Josipbus, de Bello Judaito, Lib. 2. a Description of the Arms of die Roman Soldiers. There is. but little Difference, says the latter, between a Roman Soldier and a loaded Horse.

the Romans would have the Legion include within it sclf a" Band of light Forces, which might issue from it in order to provoke the Enemy to Battle, or draw back into it in case of Necessity * they alib would have this Legion strengthen'd with Cavalry, with Spearmen and Slingers, to pursue those who fled, and complete the Victory ; that it should be defended by military Engines of every Kind, which it drew after it; that every Evening this Body should entrench it self, and be, as Vegetius cobserves, a kind of Strong-hold.

But that the Roman Soldiers might be able to carry heavier Arms than other Men, it was necessary they should become more than Men j and this they became by perpetual Labour which increas'd their Vigour, and by Exercises that gave them an Activity, which is no more than a just Distribution of the Strength we are invigorated with.

'Tis observ'd in this Age, that the d immoderate Labour which Soldiers are oblig'd to undergo,-destroys our Armies -, and yet 'twas by 'incredible Labour that the Romans p-esrrv'd thfmselves. The Reason I take to be this ; Their Toils were continual and uninterrupted, whereas our Soldiers are ever shifcing from the Extremes of Labour

r Lib. 2. Cap. 25.

d Particularly the throwing up of the Ground,

to the Extremes of Idleness, than which nothing can possibly be more destru<5bive.

I must here take notice of what Authors e relate concerning the training up of the Roman Soldiery. They were inur'd to the military Pace, that is, to walk twenty Miles, and sometimes four and twenty, in five Hours. During these Marches, they carried Burthens of threescore Pound Weight; they habituated themselves to running and leaping, arm'd Cap-a-pee* in their f Exercises they made use of Swords, Javelins and Arrows, double the Weight of common Weapons; and these Exercises were carried on without Interrriisiion.

The Camp was not the only military School �> there being, in Rome, a Place m which the Citizens us'd to perform Exercises ('twas the Campus Martins): After their Fatigues g they plung'd into the Sjyfor, to accustom themselves to swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat.

e See in Vegetiui Lib. I. and in Livy, Lip. XXVI. the Exerciscs which Scipio Africanus made the Soldiers per-, form after the taking of Carthago Nova. Marius us'd to go every Day to the Campus Martius, even in his extreme old Age. Twos customary for Pompey, when 58 Years of Age, to arm himlclf Cap-a-pee, and engage in smgle Combat with the Roman Youths He us'd to exercile himself in Riding, when he would run with the swi ft cit Career, and hurl the Javelin. Plutarch in the1 Lives of Miiriiti and Potupey.

t I'evctius Lib. 1. � B Idem ibid.

Whenever the Romans thought themselves cxpos'd to any Danger, or were desirous of repairing some Loss, 'twas a constan t Practice among 'em to invigorate and give new Life to their military Disciuline. Are they engag'd in a War with the Latines, a People no less martial than themselves? MANLIUS reflects upon the best Methods of strengthning the Command in the Field, and puts to Death his own Son, for conquering without his Orders. Are they defeated before Numantia ? So IP r o JEM 11.1 ANUS immediately removes the several BLmdiihments, which had enervated them. Have the-Roman Legions pa st under the Yoke at Nwnidia? METELLUS wipes away theirJgnominyr the Instant he has"-obliged ?em to resume then* ancient Institutions. M A K. i us, that he may be enabled to vanquim the CimIri and theFeutones, begins by diverting the Course ofh Rivers; and SYLLA employs in such hard Labour, his Soldiers, who were terrified at the War which was carrying aga-inst Mit'bridates, that they sue for Battle, to put an End to their Hardmips.

PUBLI.US NASICA. made the Romans build a Fleet of Ships, at a Time when they had no Occasion for such a Force: Thele People dreaded IdJeness more than an F,~ nemy.

hFront in. Stratagem* Li If. I. Cap* 11.

In the Battles fought in our Age, every single Soldier has very little Security and Confidence except in the Multitude; but among the Romans, every Individual, more robust and of greater Experience in War, as well as more inur'd to the Fatigues of it, than his Enemy, relied upon himself only. He was naturally endued with Courage, or in other Words, with that Virtue which a Senlibility of our own Strength inspires.

Thele Men thus, inur'd were generally healthy and vigorous: We don't find by Historians, that the Roman Armies, which wag'd War in so great a Variety of Cli- , mates, fell often a Prey to Diseases; whereas in the present Age we daily see Armies, without once engaging, perish. and melt away, if I may use the Expression, in a single Campaign.

Desertions are very frequent among us for this Reason, because the Soldiers are the Dregs of every Nation, and not one of them possesses, or thinks himself possess'd of, a certain Advantage which gives him a Superiority over his Comrades. But among the Romans they were less frequent-, it being scarce postlble that Soldiers, rais'd from among a People naturally so haughty and imperious, and so lure of commanding over others, should demean thcmselves to such a Degree, as to ccascj to be Romans.

As their Armies were not great, they were easily stlbsisted: The Commander had a better Opportunity of knowing the several Individuals; and could more easify perceive the various Faults and Misdemeanours committed by the Soldiery.

As no Troops in the World were, in any Age, sb well disciplin'd, 'twas hardly possible that in a Battle, how unfortunate soever, but seme Romans rnust rally in one part or other of it; or on the other Side, but that the Enemy must be defeated in some part of the Field : And, indeed, we find every where in History, that whenever the Romans happen'd to be overpowered at the Beginning,' either by Numbers, or the Ficrcencls of the Onset, they at lad wrested the Lawrel out of the Enemy's Hand.

Their chief Care was to examine, in what Particular their Enemies had an Advantage over them, and when this was found, they immediately rectified it. The cutting Swords 1 of the Gauls, and the Elephants of Pyrrhus intimidated them but once. They strengthen'd their Cavalry, k first, by taking the Bridies from the Horses; that their Impe-

* The Romani usM to prcsent their Javelin*, when the Gauls {truck at them with their Swords, and by that ir.cans blunted them.

* At the Time thit they wzirr'd against the Icsscr Nations of ///?/}', their Horse was superior \j that of their Kncmie<, and HA ihL RAMUM, the Cuv.ilry were com-

tuosity might be boundless, and afterwards by intermixing them with Velites ': They baffled all the Art of the most experienc'd Pilots, by the Invention of an Engine which is dcscrib'd by Polybius. In fine, as Josephvs oblerves m, War was a Subject of Meditation to the Romans, and Peace an Exer<_ise.

If any Nation boasted, either from Nature or its Institution, any peculiar Advantage, the Romans immediately made use of it : They employ'd their utmost Endeavours to procure Horses from Numidia9 Bowmen from Crete, Slingers from the, and Ships from the Rhodians.

To conclude, no Nation in the World ever prepar'd for War with so much Wisdom, and carried it on with so much Intrepidity.

posM of none but the ablest bodied Men, and the most considerable among the Citizens, each of" whom had a Horse maintain'd at the publick Expence. When they alighted, no Infantry was more formidable, and they very often turn'd the Scale of Vidory.

1 These were young Men lightly arm'd, and the most nimble of all the Legion. At the Icast Signal that wa> given, they wou'd either leap behind a Horscman, or fight on Foot. Valerius Maximum Lib. II. Livy, Lib. XXVI.

" De ttello Jutaico, Lib. II.


The Methods bv which the ROMANS rals'cl


tbemselves to Empire.

AS the People of Europe, in this Age, have very near the same Arts, the jame Arms, the same Discipline, and the same Manner of making War -, the prodigious Fortune to which the Romans a.ttzm\\) seems incredible to us. Besides, Power is at this time divided so disproportionably, that 'tis not possible for a petty State to raise it .self, rnerejy by its own Strength, from the low Condition in which Providence has plac'd it.

This merits some Reflections, otherwise we might behold several Events without being able to account for them ; and for want of having a, perfect Idea of the different Situation of Things, we should believe, in perusing antient History, that we view a Sett of Men different from our selves.

Experience has shewn perpetually, that an European Prince who has a Million of Subjects, -cannot, without destroying himself, keep up and maintain above Ten thousand Soldiers; consequently, great Nations only are possess'd of Armies.

But the Case was different antiently with regard to Commonwealths: For this Pro-

portion between the Soldiers and the rest of the People, which is now as One to an Hundred , might, in thole Times, be, pretty near, as One is to Eight.

The Founders of ancient Commonhealths had made an equal Distribution of ^he Lands : This Circumstance alone rais'cl a Nation to Power-, that is to say, made it a well-regulated Society: This also gave Strength to its Armies-, it being equally the Interest (and this too was very great ) of every Individual, to exert himself in Defence of his Country.

When Laws were not executed in their full Rigour, Affairs raturn'd back to the same Point in which we now see 'em: The; Avariceof some particular Persons, and the Livisb Profuseneis of others, occasion'd the Lands to become the Property of a Few; jmrnediately Arts were introduced to supply the reciprocal Wants of the Rich and Poor; by which Meads there were but very few Soldiers or Citizens seen; for the Revenues of the Lands that had before been employ *d to support the latter, were now beitqw'd wholly on Slaves and Artificers, who admimstred to the Luxury of the new Proprietors-, for otherwisc the Government, which, how licentious soever it be, mult exist, would have been destroy'd: And 'twas impossible that People of this Cast should be good Soldiers, they being cowardly and abjeft; al-

ready corrupted by the Luxury of Cities, and often by the very Art they prosess'd ; not to mention^ that as they could not properly call any Country their own, and reap'd the Fruits of their Industry in every Clime, they had very Iktle either to lose or keep.

aAgis and Cleomenes observing, that in(lead of Thirty thousand Citizens, (for so many were at Sparta in Lycurgus's Time) there were but Seven hundred, scarce a hundred of whom were posiess'd of Lands ; and that all the rest were no more than a cowardly Populace j they undertook to revive the Laws enacted on this Occasion ; and from that jPeriod Lacedcsmoma recover'd its former Power, and again became formidable to all the Greeks.

'Twas the equal Distribution of Lands that at first enabled Rome to soar above its humble Condition; and this the Remans were strongly iensib'le of in their corrupted State.

This Commonwealth was confin'd to narrowBounds, when the Latins, having refus'd to succour them with the Troops which had beenb stipulatcd, Ten Legions were presently rais'd in the City only: Scarce at this time, says Livy, Rome, wnom the whole Universe is not able to contain, could levy such a *

a Sec Plutarch'* Life rfC/e emeries.

bLivy i l)fc,id. L. VII. Tliis WJB some time after the taking of Rorr;ry under the Consulship of L. Furius Camillus, and App. Claudius Grajsus.

Force, were an Enemy to appear suddenly under its Walls; a sure Indication that we have not rose in Power, and have only increas'd the Luxury and Wealth which incommode us.

Tell me, would TIBERIUS GRACCHUS siy c to the Nobles, which is the most valuable Character, that of a Citizen or of a perpetual Slave ? Who is molt useful, a Soldier, or a Man entirely unfit for War? Will you, merely for the sake of enjoying .a few more Acres of Land than the rest of the Citizens, quite lay aside the Hopes of conquering the rest of the World, or be expos'd to see your selves ciispossess'd by the Enemy of those very Lands which you re1'use us?


j. Of the Gauls. 2. Of Pyrrhus. 3. Parallel between Carthage and Rome. 4. *Thc War of Hannibal.

'"Tp H E Romans were engag'd in ^several 1 Wars against the Gauls: A Thirst of Glory, a Contempt of Death, and an inflexible Resolution of Conquering, were equal in both Nations, but the Weapons they us'd were different *, the Bucklers of


the latter were sinal 1, and their Swords unfit for Execution j and indeed, the Gauh were cut to Pieces by the Romans, much after the same Manner as the Mexicans, in these latter Ages, by the Spaniards ; and a surpriing Circumstance is, that tho' these People were combatting perpetually with the Romans, they yet sufter'd themselves to be dcstroy'd one after another, without their ever being scnsible of, enquiring after, or obviating the Cause of their Calamities.

Pv K RHUS invaded the Romans at a time when they were rtrong enough to oppose the Power of his Arms, and to be taught by the Vi&ories he obtained over 'em: From him they learnt to intrench themselves, as also the Choice and proper Disposition of a Camp : tie accustom'd them to Elephants, and prcpar'd 'em for mightier Wars.

The Grandeur of Pyrrhus was coniin'd merely to his personal Qualities. Plutarch 11 informs us, that he was oblig'd to begin the War of Macedonia, from his Inability to maintain any longer the Six thouiand Foot, and Five hundred Horse in his Service. This Prince, Sovereign of a small Country which has never made the least Figure since his Time, was a military Rambler, who was continually forming new Enterprises, because he could *not subsist but by Enterprizing.

8 In' his Life of Pyrrhus.

As the CART HAG i NT i ANS grew wealthy sooner than the Romans, so they were sooner corrupted : Thus whilst at Rome, public Employments were made the Reward of Virtue only, and no other'Emolument accrued from them than Honour, and a Preference in Toils; at Carthage^ the several Advantages which the Public can bestow on particular Persons were venal, and every Service done by such Persons was there paid by the Public.

A Monarchy is not dragged nearer to the Brink of Ruin, by the Tyranny of a Prince, than a Commonwealth, by a Lukewarmnest and Indifference for the'general Good. The Advantage of a free State is, to have its Revenues employ'd to better Purposes, but where the Reverse of this happens! The Advantage of a free State is, to be free from Favourites *, but when the contrary is seen! and that instead of the Friends and Relations of a Prince, great Fortunes must be amass'd for the Friends and Relations of all Persons who have any Share in the Government ; in this Case an universal Ruin rnust ensue; the Laws are then eluded more dangerously, than they are infringed by a Sove. reign Prince, who being always the greatest Citizen in the State, is most concern'd to labour at its Preservation.

By the constant Practice of ancient Gti-* stoms and Manners, and a peculiar Use that

was made of Poverty, the Fortunes of al' the People in Rome"were very near upon a Level -, but in Carthage, some particular Persons boasted the Wealth of Kings.

The two prevailing Faftions in Carthage were so divided, that the one was always for* Peace, and the other always for War; by which Means it was imposslble for that City, either to enjoy the one, or engage in the other to Advantage.

In Rome, b War immediately united the several Intereits, but in Carthage it divided them still more.

In a Monarchy, Feuds and Divisions are easily quieted, because the Prince is invested with a coercive Power to curb both'Parties; but they are more lasting in a Commonwealth, because the Evil generally seizes the very Power which only could have wrought a Cure.

In Rome? which was governed by Laws, the People entrusted the Senate with the Management of Affairs; but in Carthage,

b Hannibars Pretence put an End to all the Feuds and Divisions which tijl then prevailed among the Ro~ mans; but the Presence of Scipio irritated those which already subsisted among the Carthaginians, and lhackled, as it were, the Strength of the City; for the common People now grew diffident of the Generals, the Senate, and the Great Men, and this made the People more furious. dppian has given us the Hillory of this War, carried, 01} by the First Scipit.

which was governed by Fraud and Dissbluteness, the People would themselves transaft all things.

Carthage, in warring with all its Riches against the Poverty of Rome, had a Disadvantage in this very Circumstance; for Gold and Silver may be exhausted, but Virtue, Pcrseverance, Strength and Poverty are inexhaustible.

The Romans were ambitious thro* Pride, and the Carthaginians thro* Avarice; the former would command, the latter amass; and these, whose Minds were wholly turn'd to Traffick, perpetually casting up their Income and Expences, never engag*d i# any War from Inclination.

The Loss of Battles, the Decrease of a People, the Decay of Trade, the Consumj>tion of the publick Treasure, the Insiirre* ftion of neighbouring Nations, might force the Carthaginians to submit to the severest Terms of Peace: RutRome was not sway'dby the Consideration of Blessings or Calamities, being determin'd by no other Motive but its Glory ; and as the Romans were persua* ded they could not exist without commanding over others, neither Hopes or Fears of any kind, could prevail with them to con* elude a Peace, the Conditions of which were not drawn up by themselves.

Nothing is so powerful as a Common* wealth in which the Laws are exadlly ob-

serVd, and this not from Fear nor from Reason, but from a passionate Impulse, as in Rome and Lacedemonian for then the Wisdom of a good Legislature is united to all the Strength a Fadlion could possibly boast.

The Carthaginians made use of foreign Forces, and the Romans employed none but their own. As the latter had never consider'd the Vanquished but merely as so many Instruments for future Triumphs; they made Soldiers of the several People they conquer'd j and the greater Opposition those jmade, the more wprthy they judg'd 'em of being incorporated into theii* Republic. 'Thus we find the Samnites^ .who were not sufadu'd till after Four and twenty Triumphs b, become Auxiliaries to the Romans; and some time before the second Punic War, they rais'd from among that Nation and their Allies0, that is, from a Country of little more Extent than the Territories of the ^ope and Naples, Seven hundred thousand Foot, and Seventy thousand Horse, to oppose the Gauls.

In the Height of the second Punic War, Rome had always a standing Army of Twen-

* Flor. 1. i.

* See Polybius. According to the Epitome of Florus they raised Three hundred thousand Mtfn out of the City and among the Latins.

ty two or Twenty four Legions; and yet it appears by Livy, that at this time the Census, or general Survey, amounted to but about 137000 Citizens.

The Carthaginians employed a greater Number of Troops in invading others, and^ the Romans in defending themselves ; the' latter arm'd, as was just now seen, a prodigious Multitude of Men to oppose the' Gauls and Hannibal who invaded them ; and they sent out no more than two Legions, against the rnost powerful Kings; by th& Means their Strength was eternal.

Carthage was not so strong from its Situation, as Rome from the Spot on which it �stood: The latter had Thirty Colonies * round it, alt which were as so many Bulwarks. The Romans were never abandoned by one of their Allies till the Battle of Can* n<z -9 and for this Reason, the Samnites and other Nations of Italy were us'd to theitf Sovereignty.

As most.of the Cities of Africa were poorly fortified, they presently surrendred to the first Enemy that appeared under their Walls; and indeed Agathodes^ Regulus* Scifio, in & word, all who macfc a Descent on rfiose places, immediately ipread Destru&ion thro* all Carthage.

* Sec Lk% Lib. 27.

We can scarce ascribe but to an evil Ad* ministration, the several Calamities which the Carthaginians sufter'd during the War that Scipio carried on again st them ; their City % and even their Armies were famishcd, at the same time that the Romans enjoyM

a Profusion of all things. i

Among the Carthaginians, the Armies which had been defeated grew more insolent upon it, insomuch that they sometimes us'd to crucify their Generals, punishing them in this Manner for their own Cowardice. Among the Romans^ the Consul, after punishing such Soldiers as had fled from their Colours, by af Decimation, march'd the surviving Forces against the Enemy.

The Government of the Curtbagimans was vastly oppressive8: They had trampled so much upon the Spaniards, that when the Romans arriv'd among them, they were consider'd as their Deliverers y and if we refleft upon the immense Sums it cost them to maintain, in that Country, a War which prov'd

*See dppian, Lib. Lifatu*.

* This Putfitoicnt, which was infilled on those who had run from their Colours, on Mutineers, &V. was thus: The Names of all the Criminals being put together In a V^ssel or Shield,. were afterwards drawn out, every Tenth Man being to die without Reprieve. By this 'Means, tho' all were not put to Death, yet all were terrifted .into Obedience. Note by the Traftslato^.

8 See what is related by Polybius concerning their Exa&ions.

fatal to 'em, 'twill appear that Injustice is very improvident, and does not fulfil all her Promises

The founding of Alexandria had very

much lessen'd the Trade of Carthage. ^ In

the first Ages, Superstition us'd to banish*

in some measure, all Foreigners from E-

gypt; and after the Persiam had conquered

this Kingdom, they had bent their whole

Thoughts to the weakning of their new

Subje&s -, but under the Grecian Monarchs,

Egypt possess'd almost the whole Commerce

of the Universe, and that of Carthage began

to decay.

Such Rowers as are establish'd by Commerce, may subsist for a long Series of Years in their humble Condition, but their Grandeur is of Ihort Duration j they rise by little and little, and in an imperceptible Manner, for they don't perform any particular Exploit which may make a Noise, and sigimlize their Power: But when they have once rais'd themselves to so exalted a Pitch, that *tis impossible but all must see *em, every one endeavours to deprive this Nation of an Advantage which it had snatch'd, as it were, from the rest of the World.

The Carthaginian Cavalry was preferable to that of the Romans^ for these two Rcasons *, First, because the Horses of Ntimidia and Spain were better than those of Italy i Secondly, because the Roman Cavalry was

but indifferently, provided with Arms; for the Romans, as gPolybius informs us, did not introduce any Change on this Occasion, till such time as they fought in Greece.

In the first Punic War, Regulas was defeated assoon as the Carthaginians made Choice of Plains for their Cavalry to engage in; and in the second, hHannibal ow'd his most glorious Victories to the Numidians.

Scipio^ by the Conquest of Spain and tjie Alliance he made with Majsanissa^ deprived the Carthaginians of this Superiority: The Numidian Cavalry won the Battle of Zamay and put an End to the War.

The Carthaginians had greater Experience at Sea, and were better skill'd in the tferking of Ships than the Romans: But this Advantage seems to have been less in those Agds thaft it would be in the present.

As the Ancients had not the Use of the Sea-Compass, they were confin'd almost to Coasting-, arid indeed they had nothing but Gallics, which were small and flat-bottom*d; most Roads were to them as so many Harbours ; the Knowledge of their Pilots was

g Book VI.

11 The Circumstance which gave the Romans an Opportunity-of taking a little Breath in the second Pjfurifc War, was this, Whole Bodies of Ntimidiim Cavalry went over into Siffy and Italy, and there join'd thejn.

very narrow and contracted, and they had but very little Tackling. Their Art it self was so imperfect, that as much is now done with an hundred Oars, .as in those Ages with a thousand. .

Their larger Vessels had a Disedvantage in this, that being moVd with Difficulty by the Crew of Galley-Slaves, it was impoffible for 'em to make the necesiary Evolutions. Mark Anthony experienced this, in-the most fatal Manner, at Aftium; for his Ships were not able to move about, when attacked on all Sides by the lighter Vessels of Augu* seus.

As the Antients us'd nothing but Galleons,, the lighter Vessels easily bsoke the Oars of the greater ones, which were then but as so many unwieldy, immoveable Ma^ chines, like modern Ships when they, hayc lost their Masts.

Since the Invention of the Sea-Compass, different Methods have been employed ; Oars have been laid aside ; the main Ocean has been i visited, great Ships have.been built; the Machine is become more complicated, and the Praftiees have been multiplied.

* Hence we may judge of the Imperfection of the an* ticnt Navies, since we have laid aside a Practice in which we liad so much Superiority over them.

The Discovery of Gun-Powder has occasion'd a Circumstance one would no ways have suspefted, which is, that the Strength of Fleets- depends more than ever upon Art; for in order to resist the Fury of the Cannon, and prevent the being expos'd to a superior Fire, it was necessary to build great Ships; but the Power of the Art must have been proportion'd to the Bulk of the Machine.

The small Vesiels of the Antients us'd often to grapple suddenly with one another, on which Occasion the Soldiers engag'd on both Sides: A whole Land-Army was shipped on board a Fleet. In the Sea-Fight won by Reguius and his Collegue, an hundred and thirty thouland Romans fought against an hundred and fifty thousand Cartbagini4ns: At that time Soldiers were look'd upon as considerable, and Artists the very reverse; but in these Ages, the Soldiers are -Consider'c} as little or nothing, and Artists the .very contrary.

A strong Proof of the Difference isr the Victory won by Bwllius the Cbnsul: The Romans were totally ignorant of Navigation, when a Carthaginian Galley happening, to be stranded on their Coast, serv'd them as a Model for' the building of others; In three Months time their Sailors were^train'd, their Fleet was completely fitted out;. the

Romans put to Sea, came up with the C#rthaginianSi and defeated them.

In this Age, the whole Life of a Prince would scarce suffice for the founding and equipping of a Navy capable to make Head against a Power who is already possess'd of the Empire of the Sea: This perhaps may be the only thing which Money alone cannot effect; and tho' a great k Monarch in our Days succeeded immediately in an Attempt of this Kind, Experience has prov'd to others, that such an }Example is to be admired rather than imitated.

The second Punic War made so much Noise in the World, that 'tis known to every t>ne: When we survey attentively the Croud of Obstacles which started up before HANNIBAL, and'refleft, that this extraordinary Man surmounted *em all, we view the most august Spectacle that Antiquity can possibly exhibit.

Rbme was a Miracle in Constancy and Re-^ solution after the Battles of'TfittVflK, of STr*Via, and ffinijymtne; after the Defeat at Cannce^ which was stnTmore fatal to them; tho' they saw themselves abandon'd by most of the Nations in Italy^ they yet would not sue for Peace*, and for this Reason, the Senate never once receded from their antientr Maxims: They conducted themsehnes to

* LtMi XIV. * 'Sffiin and Mfafievy*

wards Hannibal^ in the same Manner as they had before behav'd \fath regard to Pyrrhus? to whom they refus'd all Terms of Accommodation, till such time as he should leave Italy; and Dionysius Halicarnasseus minforms us, that when Coriolanus was treating with tii&Romatts, the Senate declared they would never infringe their antient Customs i that their People could not conclude a Peace sa long as the Enemy should continue in their Territories ; but that in case the Volscians would think fit to retire, they then ihould agree to any Terms that were just and reasonable.

Rome was sav'd,by the Strength and Vigour of'its Institution; after the Battle of Canna, their very Women were not allow'd to shed Tears ; the Senate refus'd to ransom the Prisoners, and sent the miserable Remains of the Army to carry on the War in &V#y, unrecompens'd, and deprived of every military Honour, till such time as Hannibal was drove out of Italy.

On the other side, lerentius Varro tho Consul had fled ignominiously as far as VcHusta: This Man, whose Extraction was very mean, had been rais'd to the Consulship merely to morfify the Nobles. "However the Senate would not enjoy the unhappy Triumph: They saw how ncccssary it was

* Antlq. Rom. L. VIII.

for them to gain the Confidence of the People on this Occasion; they therefore went out to meet Varro, and returned him Thanks for not despairing of the Safety of the Commonwealth.

'Tis commonly not.the real Loss sustained in a Battle, (that of the Slaughter of some thousand Men) which proves fatal to a State, but the imaginary Loss, the general Damp, which deprives it even of that Strength and Vigour which Fortune had left it.

Some things are asierted by all Men, because they have been asserted once: 'Tis thought Hannibal committed an egregious Error, in not lay ing Siege to Rome after the Battle of Conn*?: It mult be confess'd, that the Inhabitants of the former were at first seiz'd with a Pannic\ but then the Surprize and Dread of a martial People, which always turns to Bravery, is not like that of & despicable Populace, who are sensible to nothing but their Weakness: A Proof Hanr nlbal would not have succeeded, is, that the Romans were still powerful enough tO; send Succours where any were waatecj. . .

'Tis also said, that Hannibal was greatly overseen, in marching his Army to Capua, where his Soldiers enervated themselves; but People who make these Assertions should consider, that they don't go back to the true Cause of it: Would not every Place

have ptov'd a Capua to a Body of Men; who had enrich'd themselves with the Spoils f so many Victories? Alexander, whose Army consisted of his own Subjects, made use, pn a like Occasion, of an Expedient which Hannibal, whose Army was cortipos'd wholly of Mercenaries, could not employ *, and- this was, the setting Fire to the Baggage of his Soldiers, and burning, all,their Wealth and his own.

The very Conquests of Hannibal began to change the Fortune of the War: He did not receive any Succours^ from Carthage, either by the Jealousy of one Party* or the too great Confidence of the other: So long as he kept his whole Army together, he always defeated the Romans; but when he was blig'd to put Garrisons into Cities, to defend his Allies, to besiege Strong-Holds or prevent their being besieged, he then found himself too weak, and lost a great part of his Army by piece-meal: Conquests are easily made, because we atchieve 'em with our whole Force i they are retain'd with Difficulty, because we defend 'em with only a. part of our Forces.


<fhe State of Greece * (/Macedonia, of Syria: and of Egypt, after the Deprejsion ^Carthage.

AS the Carthaginians lost every Battle they fought, either in Spain, in Sicily, or in Sardinia; Hannibal, whose Enemies were fortifying themselves incessantly, whilst very inconsiderable Reinforcements were sent himself, was reduc'd to the Necessity of engaging in a defensive War: This suggested to the Romani the Design of making Africa the Seat of War: Accordingly Scipio went into that Part of the World, and so great was his Success, that the Carthaginians were forc'd to recall from Italy, Hannibal, who wept for Grief at his surrendring to the Romans tliose very Plains, in which, he had so often triumph'd over them.

Whatever is in the Power of a great General and a great Soldier to perform, alb this Hannibal did to save his Country : Having fruitkssly endeavoured to bring Scipio to pacific Terms, he fought a Battle, in which Fortune seem'd to delight in confounding his Ability, his Experience and good Sense.

Carthage received the Conditions of Peace* not from an Enemy, but from a Sovereign 5

the Citizens of it oblig-'d themselves to pay Ten thousand Talents in Fifty Years, to give Hostages, to deliver up their Ships and Elephants, and not to engage in any War without the Consent of the Romans; and in order that this Republic might always continue in a dejefted State, the Viftors heightned the Power of Massinissa, its irreconcilable Enemy.

After the Depression of Carthage^ the Romans were scarce engag'd but in petty Wars and obtain'd mighty Viftories, whereas before, they had obtain'd but petty Vi&ories and been engag'd in mighty Wars.

There were in those Times two Worlds, as k were, separate from each other; in One, the Carthaginians and Romans fought, and the other was shaken by the Feuds and Divisions which had subsisted ever since the Death of Alexander: In the latter, no Regard was had n to the Transaftions of the Western World: For tho* Philip King of Matedon had concluded a Treaty with Han#jW,yet very little resulted from it; and this Monarch, who gave the Carthaginians,but very inconsiderable Succours, jtist seew'd the Romans that he bore them a fruitless 111Witt.

n 'Tis surprizing, as Josepftits obse^es in his Treatllq agjiiast Appion, that neither Herodotus nor ibutydtfax make the least Mention of the Romans, tho*1 they had been engag'd in such mighty Wars.

When two mighty People are scen to wage a long and obstinate War, 'tis often ill Policy to imagine that 'tis safe for the rest of the World to continue as so maay idle Spectators; for which soever of the two People triumphs over the other, engages immediately in new Wars ; and a Nation of Soldiers marches and invades Nations who are but so many Citizens.

This was very manifest in those Ages* for scarce had the Romans subjected the Carthaginians , but they immedktely invaded other Nations, and appear'd in all Parts of ,the Earth, carrying *on an universal Invasion.

There were at that time in the Eajst, but four Powers capable of making Head against-the "Romans*, Gr^o-, the Kingdoms ^f Macedonia* Syria and Egyft: We must mfc a View of the Condition,, at that time, *ft the two first of those Powers; bdcausc tjbfc Romans began by subjeftkg them.

There were at that time three coaside*a?ble People in Grwec* the Mtdims^ the A~ chaians* and the Mcsotiam \ these were so many Assbciations formed by free Cities, which had their general Asiemblies and Magistrates in common. The jEtoliam were martial, bold, rash; greedy of Gain, verf4frv8n of their Promises and Oaths j in fine* a People W!K> warr'd on Land in the same Manner as Pirates do at Sea. The dckaiAm

were incommoded perpetually by troublesome Neighbours or Defenders. The Baotians, who were the mpst heavy People of all Greece, but at the same time the wisest, liv'd generally in Peace; guided entirely by a Sensation of Happiness and Misery, they had not Genius enough to be either rouz'd or misguided by Orators.

Lacedamonia had preserv'd its Power,. whereby I mean that warlike Spirit whicb the Institutibns of Lycurgus inspir'd. The ^hessalians were, in some measure, enslav'd by the Macedonians. The lllyrian Kings had already been very much deprcss'd by the Romans. The Acarnanians and Atbamanto had been cruelly irifested by the Troops of Macedon and Mtolia successively. The Atbenians, weak in themselves and unsupport^d by Allies, no longer aitonish'd the World, except by the Flatteries they lavish*d onr Kings; and the Orators iio moi asceaded the Restra where Demostb&nes had harangued, unless to propose thfc bascst and most scandalous Decrees.

Besides, Greece was formidable from its S^atioft, its Strength, the Multitude of ics Cities, the great Numbers of its SoldiGTS, its Polity, Manners and Laws; the Greeks delighted in War; they knew th6

* They were not engag'd in any Alliance with the <tther Nations of Greece. Polyb. Lib. VIII.

whole Art of it; and, had they united, would have been invincible.

They indeed had been terrified by the First Philip, by Alexander and by Antipater, but not subdued; and the Kings of Macedon^ who could not prevail with themselves to lay aside their Pretensiofts and their Hopes, made the most obstinate Attempts to enslave them.

The greatest part of Macedonia was surrounded with inaccessible Mountains; the Inhabitants of it were form'd by Nature for War, courageous, obedient, industrious and indefatigable \ and these-Qualities must necessirily have been owing to the Climate, since the Natives of it ate, to this Day, the best Soldiers in the Furki/b Empire.

Greece maintain'd it self by a kind of Ba~ lance: The Lacedam&nians were generally in Alliance with the Mteliam> and tho Macedonians with the Acb&ians \ but the Arrival of the Romans quite destroy*d the JEqui-


As the Kings of Macedonia were not able to maintain a large Body of Troops, the least Loss was of Consequence to them; be* sides, 'twas difficult for these Monarchs to aggrandize themselves;because, as their ambitious Views were not unknown, other Nations kept a watchful Eye over every Sfep fj^ey took; and the Successis they obttia'd m the Wars undiflaken for the sake

of their Allies,was an Evil which these very Allies endeavour'd immediately to remedy.

But the Kings of ^Macedonia generally possess'cl great Talents; their Monarchy was not like those which proceed for ever in the same Steps that were taken at the Foundation of them ; instrufted perpetually by Dangers arid by Affairs, involv'd in all the Disputes of Greece^ it was necessary for 'em either to bribe the principal Magistrates of Cities, to raise a Mist before the Eyes of Nations, or to divide or unite their Interests ; in a word, they were oblig'd to expose, every Moment, their Persons to the greatest Dangers.

Philip, who in the Beginning ofhis Reign had won the Love and Confidence of the Gneks .by his Moderation, changed om a Hidden.; .he became p a cruel Tyrant, at a Time when he oqght to have behav'd with Justke, both from Policy an<j Ambiticm: He sewj tho* at a Distance, the Romms possess'd of numberless Forces; he had coneluded the War to the Advantage of his AiUies, and was reconcil'd to ih dSteKans: *Twas natural he should now endeavour to uniie all the Greeks with himself, in ordef to prevent the Romans from sctling in their Country* but so far from this, he exasper-

P Sec Pelyb. vwho relates the unjust and cruel Adions |>y^vduch Klty lost the Favour of the People.

rated them by petty Usurpations; and trifled away his Time in examining^ Affairs of little or no Consequence, at a Time when his very Existence was endangered; by the* commission of three or four evil Aftions, he made himself odious and detestable to all Greece.

The jEtolians were most exasperated, and the Romans snatching the Opportunity of their Resentment, or rather of their Folly, made an Alliance with them, entred Greece* and arm'd it against Philip. This Prince was defeated at the Battle of Cywocephal^^ and the Victory was partly gain'd by the Valour of the Mtoliam: Sb great was his Terror on this Occasion, that he concluded a Treaty, which was not so properly a Ptface, as the renouncing his own Strength; for he evacuated his Garrisons in all Greece^ deliver'd up his Ships, and bound himself under an Obligation of paying a thousand Talents in ten Years.

Polybius compares, with his usual good Sense, the Disposition of the. Roman Armies with that of theqMacedonians, which

* A Circumstance which had contributed very much to the Danger to which the Romans were exposed in the^ seosmd Punic War, was, Hannibal's presently arming his Soldiers after the Roman Manner j but the Greeks did not change either their Arms or their Way of fightSn q, and could not prevail with thcrnselvcs to Jay astde C us cams, by the Observancc of which they had perfiMOTErf such mighty Things. �

was observ'd by all the Kings who succeeded Alexander: He points out the Conveniencies as well as Inconveniencies of the Phalanx and of the Legion: He prefers the Disposition us'd by the Romans, in which he very probably was right, since all the Batfles fought at that Time show it to have been preferable.

The Success which the Romans obtain'd over Philip^ was the greatest Step they ever took towards a general Conquest: To make sure of Greece, they employed all Methods posslble to depress the JEtolians, by whose Assistance they had been victorious: They of dain'd, moreover, that every City of Greece whjch had been subjeft to Philip, or any other sovereign Prince, should from that time be govern'd by its own Laws.

'Tis very evident, that these petty Commonwealths must necessarily be dependent : The Greeks abandoned themselves to a stupid Joy, and fondly imagined they were really free, because the Romans had declar'd them to be so.

The Mtolians, who had imagin'd they Ihould bear Sway in Greece, finding they had only brought themselves under Subjeftion, were seiz'd with the deepest Grief; and as they had always form'd desperate Resolurions, they invited, in order to correft me Extravagance by another, ANTIOCHUS King of Syria into Grme, in the same Man-

ner as they had before invited the Romans.

The Kings of Syria were the most powerful of all Alexander's Succesibrs, they being posiess'd of almost all the Dominions of Darius^ Egypt excepted j but by the Concurrence of several Circumstances, their Power had been much weakned.

Seleucus, who founded the Syrian Empire, had destroy'd, towards the latter End of his Life, the Kingdom of Lysimacbus.. During the Feuds and Distractions, several Provinces took up Arms; the Kingdoms of Pergamus, of Cappadacia and of Eitbynla started up; but these petty, fearful States, always consider'd the DepresJion of their former Matters as the making of their own Fortune.

As the Kings of Syria always beheld^ with a most invidious Eye, the Felicity or the Kingdom of Egypt, they bent their whole Thoughts to the Conquest of that Country; by this Means, neglecting the East, they were dispol&ss'd of several Provinces there, and but indifferently obey'd in the rest.

In fine, the Kings of Syria ppsssess'd upper and lower Asia \ but Experience }ias shewn, that in this Case, when the Capital City and the chief Forces are in the lower Provinces of^s/ia^ there is no PossibiUty of maintaining the upper ones; and on the contrary, when the Seat of the Empire is

in the upper Provinces, the Monarch weakens himself by maintaining the lower ones. Neither the Persian nor Syrian Empires were ever so powerful as that of the Partbiansy tho* these reign'd over but Part of the Provinces which form'd the Dominions of those two rowers. Had Cyrus not conquered the Kingdom of Lyctia ; had Seleucus continu'd in Babylon, and let the Successbrs of Antigonus possess the Maritime Provinces, the Greeks wou'd never have conquer'd the Per~ Jian Empire, nor the Romans that of Seleucus. Nature has prescrib'd certain Limits to States, purposely to mortify the Ambition of Mortals: When the Romans steppM beyond those Limits, the greatest part of them were destroy'd by the ParthiansT; when the Parthians presum'd to pass 'em, they were forc'd immediately to retire back* and in our Days, such Turks' as advanc'd beyond those Boundaries, were oblig'd to return whence they came.

The Kings of Syria and Egypt had, in their respe&ive Dominions, two Kinds of Subjects, victorious Nations, and Nations vanquished; the former, still pufi'd up with the Idea of their Origin, were ruPd with very great Difficulty: They were not fir'd witti

r I have given the Reason of this in the XV. Charter, borrow'd partly from the Geographical Dispositinn^

of the Two Empires.

that Spirit of Independahce which animates us to shakc off the Yoke, but with that Impatience which makes us wish to change our Sovereign.

But the chief Weakness of the Kingdom of Syria sprung from that of the Court, where such Monarchs presided as were Successors to Darius, not to Alexander. Luxury, Vanity and Effeminacy ,which have prevail'd thro* all Ages in the Asiatic Courts, triumphed more particularly in that of Syria: The Evil infedled the common People and the Soldiers, and catch'd the very Romans themselves.-, since the War in which they engag'd against Antiochus, is the true -ffira of their Corruption.

Such was the Condition of the Kingdom of Syria * vthGmtntiocbus, who had performed such mighty Things, declared War against the Romans; but he did not conduct himself in it with even the Wlsdorh which is employed in common Affairs: Hannibal requested, either to have the War reviv'd in Italy, and Philip bribed; or ^Me that he might be prevailed upon to stand neuter: Antwchw did not follow any part of this Advice: He appeared in Greece with only a sefrifl Part of his Forces: And*as tho* he were come merely to see the, War, not to dfty it on, he followed nothing but hk Pkosores, by which means he was defeated,

and fled out of Asia^ terrified rather than conquered.

PHILIP, who was dragged to this War by the Romans, as tho' a Flood had swept him along, employ'd his whole Power in their Service, and became the Instrument of their Vi&ories: The Pleasure of taking Vengeance of, and laying waste Mtolm ; the Promise made him of lessening the Tribute he paid, and of leaving him the Possession of certain Cities \ some personal Jealousy of Antiochus *, in a word, a few inconsiderable Motives sway'd his Resolutions; and not daring so muclv^s to think of lhaking off the Yoke, he only consider'd how he might best lighten if.

Antioch}** fbrrn'd so wrong a Judgment of Thiftgs, as to fancy that the Romans would not molest him in Ast a; however,-they follow'd bim thither; he was again overcome, and in his Consirmation, consented to the rnost infemous Treaty that ever was concluded by so mighty & Prince.

I cannot recolleft any thing so magnanimous, as a Resolution taken by a Monarch in our Days1,, to bury himself under the Rvuns of the ^htone, raster thain accept of Tefms which were unworthy of ^ King: Sp haughty was his Soul, that he could not

* ln* XIV.

stoop lower than his Misfortunes had thrown him ; and he* was very sensible, that Courage may, but Infamy can never, give fresh Strength to the Regal Diadem.

We often meet with Princes who have Skill enough to fight a Battle, but with very few that have the Talents requisite for carrying on a War; who are equally capable -of making a proper Use of Fortune and of waiting for her; and who join to a Frame of Mind, which raises Suspicions before it exe~ cutes, such a Disposition as makes them fearless after they have once executed.

'After the Depression of Antiochus^ some inconsiderable Powers only remained, if we except Egypt, which, from the Advantage of its Situation, its Fertility, its Commerce^ the great Number of its Inhabitants, its Naval and Land-Forces, might have beeii ft>r* midable; but the Cruelty of its Kings, their Cowardice, their Avarice, their ImbeciHity, and their enormous Sensualities, made *em so odious to their Subjects, that they sup* ported themselvcs, for the most part, by the Protection of the Rotnaits.

*Twas a kind of fundamental Law, with regard to the Crown of gypt, tbspt the Sisters should suceeed with the Brothers j and in order to preserve Unity in rhe Governiqcnt, the Brother was, married to the Si* iter. Now, 'tis scarce possible to fignre any thing more pernicious in Politicks than

such an Order of Succession j for as all the little domestic Feuds rose so high as to disorder the State, whichsoever of the Two Parties had the least Dlscontent* immediately excited against the other, the Inhabitants of Alexandria^ a numberless Multitude, always prepared to join with the first of their Kings who should rouze them ; so that there were for ever Princes who actually reigo'd, and Pretenders to the Crown; and as the Kingdoms of Cyrene and Cyprus were generally possess'd by other Princes of that House, who laid their respeftive Claims to the whole; by that Means the Throne of these Princes was ever tottering; and being indifferently settled at home, they had no Power abroad.

, The Forces of the Kings of Egypt, like those of the Asiatic Monarchs, were compos'd of auxiliary Greeks. Besides the Spirit of Liberty, of Honour, and of Glory, Which animated the latter People, they were incessandy employed in bodily Exercises of every Kind, Jn all their chief Cities Games were instituted, wherein )the Victors were crown'd in the Presence of all Greece^ which rais'd a general Emulation: Now, in an Age when Combatants fought with Arms, the Success of which depended on their Strength and Dexterity, 'tis natural to supTOse that Men thus .exercis'd, "taust have had a great Advantage over a Croid of

Barbarians, who were enlisted at Random, and dragg'd indiscriminately into the Field, as was evident from the Armies of Darius.

The Romans, in order to deprive the Kings of such a Body of Soldiery, and to bereave them, but in an easy, silent Manner, of their principal Forces, observ'd two Things: First, theyestablilh'd byinsenliblt Degrees as a Maxim, with respeft to all the Cities of Greece^ that they should not conclude any Alliance, give any Succour, or make War against any Nation whatsoever without their Consent! Secondly, in their Treaties with' Kings, they forbid them to levy any Forces from among the Allies of the Romans, by which Means, those Monarchs were reduc'd to employ their national Troops only.

* They had before observ'd -this political Conduft wkh regard to the CartbaginianS) whom they obliged, by tlie Treaty cpnchided with them, to employ no longer auxf liary Troops, as appears from a Fragment of Dfon.


fbeConduft which the ROMANS observ*d> in order to subdue All Nations.

DURING the Course of so mighty a Prosperity> in which'tis usual for Mankind to forget themselves, the Senate continu'd to act with the* same Depth of Judgment i and whilst their Armies were Spreading an universal Terror, they would not suffer those to rise who were once cast to the Ground.

A Tribunal ^rose which judgM all Nations : At the Close of every War they <tetermin'd the Rewards or Punishments which every one had merited: They took away from the vanquilh'd People, part of their Lands, and gave 'em to their Allies, in which they did two things; they engag'd in the Interests ofRotne> Princes from whom they had little to fear, and much to hope j and they weakned others from whom they had nothing to hope, and every thing to fear.

In warring wkh an Enemy they made use of their Allies, but immediately extirpated the Destroyers. Philip was overcome by the Assistance of the Mtoliam^ who were destroy'd presently after, for having join'd themselves to Antiochus. This King was

overcome by the Assistance of the Rhodians; but after the most conspicuous Rewards had been bestow'd upon'em, they.were depressed for ever, upon Pretence that they had demanded to have a Peace concluded with Persetts.

When the Romans were oppos'd by several Enemies at the same time, they granted a Truce to the Weakest, who thought themielves happy in obtaining it; conndering it as a great Advantage, that their Ruin had been suspended.

When they were engag'd in a mighty War, the Senate wkikfd at Wrongs of every Kind, and silentfy waked the Season prtfper for Chastisement: If at any time a reop!e sent 'em the Offenders, they refus'd .10 puniih 'emr chusing rather to constdcr the whole Nation as guilty, and reservs to5 themselves a useful Vengeance.

As they made their Enemies suffer inex pressible Evils, very few Leagues were formed against them; for He wko'was'at tie greatdQk IMstance from the Danger, did nor care to come near it.

For this Reason War was seldom denouncM against *emr but themselves always made it at a Season, in the Manner, and with a People, as best suited their latere^^ and among the great,Number of Nations they invaded, there were very few but would have submitted to Injuries of evwy

__ V ^m J

Kind, provided they cou'd but be suffer'd to live in Peace.

As 'twas usual for them to deliver themselves always in a magisterial Way, such EmbasTadors as they sent to Nations who had not yet felt the Weight of their Power, werfc sure to meet with ill Treatment, which furnish'd them with a surea pretence to .'engage in a new War.

As they never concluded a Peace with Sincerity and Integrity, and intended a general Invasion, their Treaties were properly but so many Suspensions from War; they inserted such Conditions in them, as always pav'd the Way tcnthe Ruin of those States who accepted *em: They us'd to send the Garrisons out of the Strong-Holds; they regulated the Number of the Land-Forces, or had the Horses and Elephants deliver'd up to them ; and, in case this People were powerful at Sea, they oblig'd them to burn their Ships, and sometimes to remove higher up in the Country.

After having destroy'd the Armies of a Prince, they drained his Treasury, by imposing a heavy Tribute, or taxing him immoderately, under Colour of*making him defray the Expence of the War: A new Species of Tyranny, which obliged him to

* Sec an Example of this, in their War witK the DMf mates. See Polybius.

oppress his Subjects, and thereby lose their Affection.

Whenever they granted a Peace to some Prince, they us'd to take one of his Brothers or Children by way of Hostage, which gave them an Opportunity of railing, at Pleasure T Commotions in his Kingdom: When they had the next Heir among them, 'twas their Custom to intimidate the Possessbr : Had they only a Prince of a remote Degree, they made use pf Kim to foment the Insurrections of the Populace.

Whenever any Prince or any People had withdrawn from their Allegiance, they im~ mediately indulged 'em the Tide ofb Atty to tfie Romans * and by this Means they became sacred and inviolable; so th^t/t^fcr was no Monarch, how formidable soevcFt who could rely one Moment upon his Subjects, or even upon tiis own Family..

Altho' the Title of their Ally was a kihd of Servitude, itc yet was very much sought after j for those who enjoy'd it were mre to receive no Injuries but from them, anci had Reason to flatter themselves they would be less grievous j hence Nations and Kings

b See particularly their Treaty with the Jews, in the 1st Book of the Maccabees, Ch 8.

cAriaratbet ofFerr*ii a Sacrifice to the Gods, says #*tyl>iu!> by way of Thanks for having obuinM their Al-

%� * w


were ready to undertake any kind of Services, and submitted to the meanest and most groveling A6ts, merely for the sake of obtaining it.

They had various Kinds of Allies; some were united to them by Privileges and a~ Participation in their Grandeur, as the Latins and the Hernici -, others by the Settlement it self, as thejr Colonies; some by good Offices, as Massamssa^ Eumenes, and Attains, who were obliged to them for their Kingdoms or their Exaltation ; others by free" and unconstrain'd Treaties, and these, by the long Continuation of the Alliance, became Subjects, as the Kings of Egypt', Eitbynia^ Cappadocia, and most of the 6r<?eian Cities; in fine, many by forc'd and involuntary Treaties, and by the Law of their Subjection, as Philip and Antwcbus \ for every. Peace the Romans granted an Enemy, included alsoan Alliance with him i or in other Words, they made every Nation subdued by them contribute to the Depression of others.

When rhey permitted any Cities the Enr joyment of their Liberties,,, they immediaately rais'd two d Factions in them, one of which defended ,the Laws and Liberties of the-Country, whilst the other asserted, that the Will of the Romans was the only Law 5

^ See Polybius on the Cities of Greece,

and as the latter Faction was always the most powerful, 'tis plain such aLiberty but a mere Name.

They sometimes possess'd themselves of a Country upon Pretence of being Heirs to it: They entred Asia^ Btihynia and Libya by the Last Wills of Attains, of Nicomedes% and of Appion -, and Egypt was enslav' that of the King of Cyrene.

To keep great Princes for ever in a weak Condition, they would not siiffer *em to conclude an Alliance with those Nations to whom they had granted theirsf; and as. thjey did not refuse it to any People who* border'd upon a powerful.Prince, this Condition inserted in a Treaty of Peace,.deprived him of all his Allies.

Besides,. when they had overcome anyr censiderable Prince, one of the Articles of the Treaty was, that he should not make War, upon Account of any; Feuds of Ks. own,, with the Allies of the Romans (that

' \ \ ,

is to say, generally with all his Neighbours); but should submit 'em to.Atbitr^tion,, which deprived him of a Military Power for time to come.

And in order to keep the sole Possesiioiv of it in their own Hands, they bereavM their

very Allies of this Force j the Instant these


*' The Son of Pbilopator, * Tljk was Antiochuss Case.


had .the least Contest, they sent Embassa*dors, who oblig'd 'em 6 conclude a Peace: We need but consider the Manner ih which, they terminated the Wars of Attains and Prusias.

When any Prince had gain'd such a Conquest: as often had exhausted him, immediately a Roman Embassador came and wrested it out of his Hands: Among a Multitude of Examples, we may remember how they, with a single Word, drove Antioches out of Egypt.

Fully sensible how well the European Nations were turned for War, they establishM as a Law., that no * Asiatic Monarch shpuld be suffer*d to come into Europe, and there invade any People whatsoever. The chief Motive of their declaring War against Mithridates b was, for his having subdu'd some Barbarians contrary to this Prohibition.

When they saw two Nations engaged in War, altho* they were not in Alliance, nor had .any Contest with either of *em, they gevertheiess appear'd upon the Stage of Action, and, lilce our Knight-Errants, always sided with the Weakest: *Twas an j an-

g The Order Tent (o Antidcbus, even before the War,

for him not to cross into- Europe, was made general with icgard to all other.Kings.

*> 4ppian, de Bello Mitbri-dat.

* A Fragment of Dionyjius, copied fiom the Extract cf Ettibassics, iimde by Canstantine Parpbyrogeantta.

tient Custom, says Dionysius Halicarnajscus, for the Romans to grant Succour to all who came to implore it.

These Customs of the Romans were nat certain particular Incidents, which happened by chance, but were sb many invariable Principles \ and thrs is easy to perceive, for the Maxims they put in Practice against the greatest Monarchs were exactly the same with those they had employ'd^ in their Infant State, against the little Cities which stood round *em.

They made Eumenes and Majjanijsa contribute to the Subjeftion&of Philip and Antio-* chus, as they had before employ'd the Latins and the Hernici to sobdire the Vot/ti&ns aitd the Tuscans: They oblig'd the Carthaginians and the Kings of Asia, to surrender their Fleets to them, in like Manner as they had forc'd the Citizens of Antium to give up their little Vessels.

Whenever there happenM any Feud in a State, they immediately judged the Affair, and thereby were sure of having that Party only, wnom they ctrttfemn*d\ for their Enemy. If Princes of the same Blood were at Variance for the Crown, they sometimes declared *em both Kings, and by thrs Means crush'd the Power of both: If one of 'em was a k Minor, they declarM hblus

1 To enable themsclves to ruin Syria* In quality of Guardians, they declared in Favour of the Son of An-

Favour, and made themfelves his Guardians in quality of Protectocs of the World; for they had carried Matters to so high a Pitch,, that Nations and Kings were their Subjects, without knowing directly upon what Right or Title j it being a Maxim, that the bare hearing of their Names, was sufficient for a People to acknowledge them their Sovereigns.

When any State compos'd too formidable a.Bqdy from its Situation or Union, they never fajPd to divide it. The Republic of Acbaia was form'd by an Assbciation of free Cities; the Senate declared, that ev;ery City shpujd from that time be gpvern'd by its gwn Laws, independent on the general Authority.

The .Commonwealth,of Btvotia rose likewise from a League m,ade between several (jjtjies; but, as in the War of Perseus, one City declared for that Prince, and others for the Rdnians, the latter receiv'd them into Favour, when.the common Alliance was dissblvU

M&ctdQjm wassurroundedrby inacciessib^e Mountains: The Senate divided it into four Parts; declared those free; prohibited thern every Kind of Alliance among themselves.

&Q(bttiSt who was but a Child, in Opposition tp DemetHus t^ho was their Hostage, and conjur'd *em to do Jhim Judice, crying, that'Rome was his Mother, and jthe Senators his Fathers.

by Marriage; carried off all the Nobles inr to Italy) and by that Means reduc'd this Power to nothing.

Had a great Monarch who reigp'd in our Time followed these Maxims, when he lav? a neighb'ring Prince dethroned, he would have employ'd a stronger Force in his Support, and have confin'd him to the Island which continu'd faithful to him. By dividing the orily Power that cou'd have oppofed his iPeQgns, he woulcl have drawn infinite Ad vantages, even from the Misfortunes

of his Ally.

The R&mans never engaged in far-dastan*

Wars, till they had first made an Alliance whh some Power contiguous to the Enemy they invaded, who might ignite his Troops to the Army they sentj and as this was ner ver consider#j>Ie with regard to Numbers,, they always had l another in that Prpvinoe which lay nearest the Enemy, and a thir^l in Rome~+mn~ ever ready to march, at a Moment's Warning. In this Manner they ne-? ver hazarded but a small part of their FOJ> ces, whiMl their Enemy ventured all His..

They sometimes insidiously abus'd the Subtlety of the Words of *their Langu^e: They destroy'd Carthage^ upon pretence that they had promis'd to preserve the Ci-

1 This was their coustant Practke, as appears from" Histoiy,

�vitas not the Urbs m. 'Tis well known in ttrhat Manner the jEtolians, who-iiad abandon'd themselvcs to their Faith, were impos'd upon; the Romans pretended, that the Signification of these Words, Abandon one's self to the Faith of an Enemy, imply *d, the Loss of all Things; of Persons, Lands, Cities, Temples, and even of Burial Places.

The Romans would even go sb far, as to give arbitrary Explanations to Treaties : Thus, when they were resolv'd to depress the Radians, they declar'd, that they had formerly given them Lyciay not by way of Present, but as a B^iend and Ally.

When one of their Generate concluded a Peace, merely to preserve liis Army which ~w&s just upon the point of being <:ut toPiecek, the Senate, who did not ratify it, took Advantage^ of this Peace and continu-'d the War. Thus when JUGURTHA had surrounded an Army of Romany and permitted them to march away unmoksted, upon the Fatth of a Treaty, these very Troops he had sav*d were employed against him: And When the Numantines had reduced Twenty thousand Romans just perishing with Hunger, to the Neqesslty of suing for Peace;

m There is sometimes this Difference betw&n Civitas and Urbt j the former (ignifks the Inhabitante, the latter the Buildings. Note by the Tranjlator*

this Peace, which had sav'd the Lives of so many thousand Citizens, was broke at Rome, and the Public Faith was eluded by n sending back the Consal who had sign'd it.

They sometimes would conclude a Peace with a Monarch upon reasonable Conditions, and the Instant he had executed them, they added others of so injurious a Nature, that he was forc'd to renew the War. Thu^' when they had forc'd Jugurtha to deliver up his Elephants, hisHorses, his Treasures, and his Deserters, they requir'd him to sur.render up his Person, which beingthe greatcst Calamity that can befal a Prince, .canadt for that Reason be ever made an* Article <ef Peace.

Inr fine, they set up a Tribunal over Kings, whom they judg'd for their particular Vices and Crimes: They heard the Complaints of all Person&who had any Dif* pute with PHI L i P:ltThey sent Deputies with 'em by way of Safeguard, and ob%*act Ptrseus to appear before these, to ansv^er for certain Murthers and certain Quarrels

n After Claudius Glycias bad granted theCerpwsis a Peace, the Senate gave Orders for renewing the \^ar agaiast them* and delivered up Gtjaat to the Inhabitants of tire. J/bad, who would not receive him. Every doe knows what happen'd at the Furc<f Caudin*.

0 They adled the same part with regard to Vtriatuit After having oblig'd him to give up the Deserters, he wi order'd to surrender up his^Vrms, to which neithet KlraTelf nor his Army could content, fragment tf&kn*

he had with some Inhabitants of the confederate Cities.

As Men judg'd of the Glory of a General by the Quantity of the Gold and Silver carried in his Triumph, the Romans stripp'd the vanquish'd Enemy of all things. Rome was fpr ever enriching it self; and every War they engag'd in, enabled 'em to undertake a new one.

All the Nations who were either Friends or Confederates, quite p ruin'd themselves by the immensely-rich Presents they made, ia order, to procure the Continuance of the Favours already bestow'd upon 'em, or to ojbtaia greater; and^haJf the Monies which us'd to be sent upon thele Occasions to the Romans, would have sufficM to conquer them.

Being Matters of the Universej they ar* rogated to themselves all the Treasuresof k; and were less unjust Robbers, coasider'd as Conquerors, than consider*d as Legislacors. HeariBjg that PTOLEMY King of Cyprus was possess'd of immense Wealth, they q enacted a Law, propos'd by a Tribune, by which they gave to themselves the Ihhe-

P The Presents which the Senate us'd to send King* were mere Trifles, as 'a Chair and an Ivory Staff, or a Jtobe like to that worn by their Ma^istrates.

9 Qtvittaxum tantafama erat, says F/orui, ut victor Gittiufft populusj & dware Regna consultus, socii viriqut figis wajiscatwnem manfaverit. Lib. til. c, 9,

ritance of a Man still living, and confiscated to their own Use the Estates of a confederate Prince.

In a little time, the Greedinese of particular Persons quite devoured whatever had escap'd the public Avarice; Magistrates and Governors us'd to fell their Injustice tp Kings: Two Competitors would ruin one another, for the sake of purchasing an everdubious Protection against a Rival who was not quite undone; for the Romans had not even the Justice of Robbers, who disco^cr a certain Probity in the Exercise of Guilt. In fine, as Rights, Whether lawful or ;usupped, were naaiotaia'd by Mo^eypnly; Prior ces? to obtain jt, despoil'd Temples, and copfiscated the tolTessiQjQS of tbe we^lthiiest^Citizens; a thousend Crimes werje committed , purely for tbe lake of giving to the Romans all the Money m the Urnycrse.

But nothing was iof greater Advantage tp thjs People than the Awe wiih which ti^ey struck the whole Earth: la an Instant, Kir^gs were put to Silence, and, seem'd as though they were stupid \ no Regard was had to their Eminence, but their very Persons were attack'd ; to hazard a War, was to expose themsclves to Captivity, to Death, to the Infemy of a Triumph. Thus Kings, who liv'd in the midst of Pomps and I^kiUili, did not dare tx> fix their Eyes sted&ltly ,cm

the Roman People; and their Courage failing them, they hop*d t6 suspend a: little the Miseries with which they were threatnetf, by their Patience and groveling Aftfons.

Observe, I intreat you, the ConducS of the Romans. After the Defeat of ANTIOCHUS <they were possess'd of Africa^ Asia and Greece^ without having scarce a singfc City in these Countries that were immediately their own. They seem'd to conquer with no other View but to bestow; but then they obtain'd so complete a Sovereignty, that whenever they engaged in War with toy Prince, they oppress'd him, as it were, with the Weight of the whole Universe,

The Time proper for seizing upon the corajuer'd Countries was not yet come: Had the Romans kept the Cities they took from -Philipi the Greeks would have seea at once into their Designs: Had they, after the Second Punic War f or that with Antwcbus* poHess'd th_emse!ves of Lands in rAfrica and in Asia, thfcy could never have preservfa Conquesbso sfipriy dfeblishfd. . ^Twas the Interest of the Romam to wait till all Nations were accustomy to obey, as free and as confederate, "before they should