THE SPIRIT OF LAWS



By Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu



Translated by Thomas Nugent, revised by J. V. Prichard



Based on an public domain edition published in 1914 by G. Bell & Sons,

Ltd., London



Rendered into HTML and text by Jon Roland of the Constitution Society



------------------------------------------------------------------------



The Translator to the Reader



by Thomas Nugent



1752



The following work may with the strictest justice be said to have done

honour to human nature as well as to the great abilities of the author.

The wisest and most learned man, and those most distinguished by birth

and the elevation of their stations, have, in every country in Europe,

considered it as a most excellent performance. And may we be permitted

to add, that a sovereign prince [1] as justly celebrated for his probity

and good sense, as for his political and military skill, has declared

that from M. de Montesquieu he has learnt the art of government. But had

the illustrious author received no such distinguished honour, the

numerous editions of this work in French, and their sudden spreading

through all Europe, are a sufficient testimony of the high esteem with

which it has been received by the public.



But notwithstanding the deserved applause which has been so liberally

bestowed on the author, there have been some who have not only

endeavoured to blast his laurels, but have treated him with all that

scurrility which bigotry and superstition are apt, on every occasion, to

throw out against truth, reason and good sense. These M. de Montesquieu

has himself answered, in a separate treatise intitled, A Defense of the

Spirit of Laws, from whence we have thought proper to extract, for the

sake of such as have not seen that treatise, the principal of those

objections, and the substance of what has been given in reply: Only

first observing, that this defense is divided into three parts, in the

first of which he answers the general reproaches that have been thrown

out against him; in the second he replies to particular reproaches; and

in the third, he gives some reflections on the manner in which his work

has been criticized.



The author first complains of his being charged both with espousing the

doctrines of Spinoza, and with being a Deist, two opinions directly

contradictory to each other. To the former of these he answers, by

placing in one view the several passages in the Spirit of Laws directly

levelled against the doctrines of Spinoza; and then he replies to the

objections that have been made to those passages, upon which this

injurious charge is founded.



The critic asserts that our author stumbles at his first setting out,

and is offended at his saying, that Laws in their most extensive

signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of

things. To this he replies, that the critic had heard it said that

Spinoza had maintained that the world was governed by a blind and

necessary principle; and from hence on seeing the word necessary, he

concludes that this must be Spinozism; tho' what is most surprising,

this article is directly levelled at the dangerous principles maintained

by Spinoza: That he had Hobbes's system in his eye, a system, which, as

it makes all the virtues and vices depend on the establishment of human

laws, and as it would prove that men were born in a state of war, and

that the first law of nature is a war of all against all, overturns,

like Spinoza, all religion, and all morality. Hence he laid down this

position, that there were laws of justice and equity before the

establishment of positive laws: hence also he has proved that all beings

had laws; that even before their creation they had possible laws; and

that God himself had laws, that is, the laws which he himself had made.

He has shewn [2] that nothing can be more false than the assertion that

men were born in a state of war; and he has made it appear that wars did

not commence till after the establishment of society. His principles are

here extremely clear; from whence it follows, that as he has attacked

Hobbes's errors, he has consequently those of Spinoza; and he has been

so little understood, that they have taken for the opinions of Spinoza,

those very objections which were made against Spinozism.



Again, the author has said that the creation which appears to be an

arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as the fatality of the

Atheists. From these words the critic concludes that the author admits

the fatality of the Atheists.



To this he answers, that he had just before destroyed this fatality, by

representing it as the greatest absurdity to suppose that a blind

fatality was capable of producing intelligent beings. Besides, in the

passage here censured, he can only be made to say what he really does

say: he does not speak of causes, nor does he compare causes; but he

speaks of effects and compares effects. The whole article, what goes

before and what follows, make it evident, that there is nothing here

intended but the laws of motion, which, according to the author, had

been established by God: these laws are invariable; this he as asserted,

and all natural philosophy has asserted the same thing; they are

invariable because God has been pleased to make them so, and because he

has pleased to preserve the world. When the author therefore says that

the creation which appears to be an arbitrary act, supposes laws as

invariable as the fatality of the Atheists, he cannot be understood to

say that the creation was a necessary act like the fatality of the

Atheists.



Having vindicated himself from the charge of Spinozism, he proceeds to

the other accusation, and from a multitude of passages collected

together proves that he has not only acknowledged the truth of revealed

religion; but that he is in love with Christianity, and endeavours to

make it appear amiable in the eyes of others. He then enquires into what

his adversaries have said to prove the contrary, observing that the

proofs ought to bear some proportion to the accusation; that this

accusation is not of a frivolous nature, and that the proofs therefore

ought not to be frivolous.



The first objection is, that he has praised the Stoics, who admitted a

blind fatality, and that this is the foundation of natural religion. To

this he replies, "I will for a moment suppose that this false manner of

reasoning has some weight: has the author praised the philosophy and

metaphysics of the Stoics? He has praised their morals, and has said

that the people reaped great benefit from them: he has said this, and he

has said no more: I am mistaken, he has said more, he has at the

beginning of his book attacked this fatality, he does not then praise

it, when he praises the Stoics."



The second objection is, that he has praised Bayle, in calling him a

great man. To this he answers, "It is true that the author has called

Bayle a great man, but he has censured his opinions: if he has censured

them, he has not espoused them: and since he has censured his opinions,

he does not call him a great man because of his opinions. Every body

knows that Bayle had a great genius which he abused; but this genius

which he abused, he had: the author has attacked his sophisms, and

pities him on account of his errors. I don't love the men who subvert

the laws of their country; but I should find great difficulty in

believing that Caesar and Cromwell had little minds: I am not in love

with conquerors, but it would be very difficult to persuade me to

believe that Alexander and Jenghiz-Khan were men of only a common

genius. Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men

make but little impression on any except those who are angry: the

greatest part of the readers are men of moderation, and seldom take up a

book but when they are in cool blood; for rational and sensible men love

reason. Had the author loaded Bayle with a thousand injurious

reproaches, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle had

reasoned well or ill; all that his readers would have been able to

conclude from it would have been, that the author knew how to be

abusive."



The third objection is, that he has not in his first chapter spoken of

original sin. To which he replies: "I ask every sensible man if this

chapter is a treatise of divinity? if the author had spoken of original

sin, they might have imputed it to him as a crime that he had not spoken

of redemption."



The next objection takes notice, that "The author has said that in

England self-murder is the effect of a distemper, and that it cannot be

punished without punishing the effects of madness; the consequence the

critic draws from thence is, that a follower of natural religion can

never forget that England is the cradle of his sect, and that he rubs a

sponge over all the crimes he found there." He replies, "The author does

not know that England is the cradle of natural religion; but he knows

that England was not his cradle. He is not of the same religious

sentiments as an Englishman, any more than an Englishman who speaks of

the physical effects he found in France, is not of the same religion as

the French. He is not a follower of natural religion; but he wishes that

his critic was a follower of natural logic."



These are the principle objections levelled against our author, on this

head, from which our readers will sufficiently see on what trifling,

what puerile arguments this charge of Deism is founded. He concludes

however this article, with a defense of the religion of nature, and such

a defense as every rational Christian must undoubtedly approve.



"Before I conclude this first part, I am tempted to make one objection

against him who has made so many; but he has so stunned my ears with the

words follower of natural religion, that I scarcely dare pronounce them.

I shall endeavour however to take courage. Do not the critic's two

pieces stand in greater need of an explication, than that which I

defend? Does he do well, while speaking of natural religion and

revelation, to fall perpetually upon one side of the subject, and to

lose all traces of the other? Does he do well never to distinguish those

who acknowledge only the religion of nature, from those who acknowledge

both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to turn frantic

whenever the author considers man in the state of natural religion, and

whenever he explains any thing on the principles of natural religion?

Does he do well to confound natural religion with Atheism? Have I not

heard that we have all natural religion? Have I not heard that

Christianity is the perfection of natural religion? Have I not heard

that natural religion is employed to prove the truth of revelation

against the Deists? and that the same natural religion is employed to

prove the existence of a God against the Atheists? He has said that the

Stoics were the followers of natural religion; and I say, that they were

Atheists, since they believed that a blind fatality governed the

universe; and it is by the religion of nature that we ought to attack

that of the Stoics. He says that the scheme of natural religion is

connected with that of Spinoza; and I say, that they are contradictory

to each other, and it is by natural religion that we ought to destroy

Spinoza's scheme. I say, that to confound natural religion with Atheism,

is to confound the proof with the thing to be proved, and the objections

against error with error itself, and that this is to take away the most

powerful arms we have against this error."



The author now proceeds to the second part of his defence, in which he

has the following remarks. "What has the critic done to give an ample

scope to his declamations, and to open the widest door to invectives? he

has considered the author, as if he had intended to follow the example

of M. Abbadye, and had been writing a treatise on the Christian

religion: he has attacked him, as if his two books on religion were two

treatises on divinity; he has cavilled against him, as if while he had

been talking of any religion whatsoever which was not Christian, he

should have examined it according to the principles, and doctrines of

Christianity; he has judged him as if in his two books relating to

religion he ought to have preached to Mahometans and Idolators the

doctrines of Christianity. Whenever he has spoken of religion in

general, whenever he has made use of the word religion, the critic says,

'that is the Christian religion'; whenever he has compared the religious

rites of different nations and has said that they are more conformable

to the political government of these countries, than some other rites,

the critic again says, 'you approve them then and abandon the Christian

faith': when he has spoken of a people who have never embraced

Christianity, or who have lived before Christ, again says the critic,

'you don't then acknowledge the morals of Christianity'; when he has

canvassed any custom whatsoever, which he has found in a political

writer, the critic asks him, 'Is this a doctrine of Christianity?' He

might as well add, 'You say you are a civilian, and I will make you a

divine in spite of yourself: you have given us elsewhere some very

excellent things on the Christian religion, but this was only to conceal

your real sentiments, for I know your heart, and penetrate into your

thoughts. It is true I do not understand your book, nor it is material

that I should discover the good or bad design with which it has been

written; but I know the bottom of all your thoughts: I don't know a word

of what you have said, but I understand perfectly well, what you have

not said.'"



But to proceed. The author has maintained the polygamy is necessarily

and in its own nature bad; he has wrote a chapter expressly against it,

and afterwards has examined in a philosophical manner, in what

countries, in what climates, or in what circumstances it is least

pernicious; he has compared climates with climates, and countries with

countries, and has found, that there are countries, where its effects

are less pernicious than in others; because, according to the accounts

that have been given of them, the number of men and women not being

every where equal, it is evident, that if there are places where there

are more women than men, polygamy, bad as it is in itself, is there less

pernicious than in others. But as the title of this chapter [3] contains

these words, That the law of polygamy is an affair of calculation, they

have seized this title as an excellent subject for declamation. Having

repeated the chapter itself, against which no objection is made, he

proceeds to justify the title and adds: "Polygamy is an affair of

calculation when we would know, if it is more or less pernicious in

certain climates, in certain countries, in certain circumstances than in

others; it is not an affair of calculation when we would decide whether

it be good or bad in itself. It is not an affair of calculation when we

reason on its nature; it may be an affair of calculation when we combine

its effects; in short, it is never an affair of calculation when we

enquire into the end of marriage, and it is even less so, when we

enquire into marriage as a law established and confirmed by Jesus

Christ."



Again, the author having said, that [4] polygamy is more conformable to

nature in some countries than in others, the critic has seized the words

more conformable to nature, to make his say, that he approves polygamy.

To which he answers, "If I say, that I should like better to have a

fever than the scurvy, does this signify that I should like to have a

fever? or only that the scurvy is more disagreeable to me than a fever?"



Having finished his reply to what had been objected to on the subject of

polygamy, he vindicates that excellent part of his work which treats of

the climates; when speaking of the influence these have upon religion,

he says, "I am very sensible that religion is in its own nature

independent of all physical causes whatsoever, that the religion which

is good in one country is good in another, and that it cannot be

pernicious in one country without being so in all; but yet, I say, that

as it is practiced by men, and has a relation to those who do not

practice it, any religion whatsoever will find a greater facility in

being practiced, either in the whole or in part, in certain

circumstances than in others, and that whoever says the contrary must

renounce all pretensions to sense and understanding."



But the critic has been greatly offended by our author's saying, [5]

that when a state is at liberty to receive or to reject a new religion,

it ought to be rejected; when it is received, it ought to be tolerated.

From hence he objects, that the author has advised idolatrous princes,

not to admit the Christian religion into their dominions. To this he

answers first by referring to a passage in which he says, [6] that the

best civil and political laws are, next to Christianity, the greatest

blessings that men can give or receive; and adds, "If then Christianity

is the first and greatest blessing, and the political and civil laws the

second, there are no political or civil laws in any state that can or

ought to hinder the entrance of the Christian religion."



His second answer is, "That the religion of heaven is not established by

the same methods as the religions of the earth; read the history of the

church, and you will see the wonders performed by the Christian

religion: was she to enter a country, she knew how to open its gates;

every instrument was able to effect it; at one time God makes use of a

few fisherman, at another he sets an emperor on the throne, and makes

him bow down his head under the yolk of the gospel. Does Christianity

hide herself in subterranean caverns? stay a moment, and you see an

advocate speaking from the imperial throne on her behalf. She traverses,

whenever she pleases, seas, rivers, and mountains; no obstacles here

below can stop her progress: implant aversion in the mind, she will

conquer this aversion: establish customs, form habits, publish edicts,

enact laws, she will triumph over the climate, over the laws which

result from it, and over the legislators who have made them. God acting

according to decrees which are unknown to us, extends or contracts the

limits of his religion."



______



1. The present Kind of Sardinia.



2. Book i. Chap. 1.



3. Book xvi. Chap. 4.



4. Book xvi. Chap. 4.



5. Book xxv. Ch. 10.



6. Ibid. Ch. 1.





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The Spirit of Laws



by Charles de Montesquieu



CONTENTS



Preface



Advertisement



Book I. Of Laws in General



1. Of the Relation of Laws to Different Beings



2. Of the Laws of Nature



3. Of Positive Laws



Book II. Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government



1. Of the Nature of the Three Different Governments



2. Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in Relation to Democracy



3. Of the Laws in Relation to the Nature of Aristocracy



4. Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government



5. Of the Laws in Relation to the Nature of a Despotic Government



Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government



1. Difference Between the Nature and Principle of Government



2. Of the Principle of Different Governments



3. Of the Principle of Democracy



4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy



5. That Virtue Is Not the Principle of a Monarchical Government



6. In What Manner Virtue Is Supplied in a Monarchical Government



7. Of the Principle of Monarchy



8. That Honour Is Not the Principle of Despotic Government



9. Of the Principle of Despotic Government



10. Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments



11. Reflections on the Preceding Chapters



Book IV. That the Laws of Education Ought to Be in Relation to the

Principles of Government



1. Of the Laws of Education



2. Of Education in Monarchies



3. Of Education in a Despotic Government



4. Difference between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education



5. Of Education in a Republican Government



6. Of some Institutions among the Greeks



7. In What Cases These Singular Institutions May Be of Service



8. Explanation of a Paradox of the Ancients in Respect to Manners



Book V. That the Laws Given by the Legislator Ought to Be in Relation to

the Principle of Government



1. Idea of This Book



2. What Is Meant by Virtue in a Political State



3. What Is Meant by a Love of the Republic in a Democracy



4. In What Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality Is Inspired



5. In What Manner the Laws Establish Equality in a Democracy



6. In What Manner the Laws Ought to Maintain Frugality in a Democracy



7. Other Methods of Favouring the Principle of Democracy



8. In What Manner the Laws Should Relate to the Principle of Government

in an Aristocracy



9. In What Manner the Laws Are in Relation to Their Principle in

Monarchies



10. Of the Expedition Peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies



11. Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government



12. The Same Subject Continued



13. An Idea of Despotic Power



14. In What Manner the Laws Are in Relation to the Principles of

Despotic Government



15. The Same Subject Continued



16. Of the Communication of Power



17. Of Presents



18. Of Rewards Conferred by the Sovereign



19. New Consequences of the Principles of the Three Governments



Book VI. Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments with

Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws, the Form of

Judgments, and the Inflicting of Punishments



1. Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws in Different Governments



2. Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws in Different Governments



3. In What Governments and in What Cases the Judges Ought to Determine

According to the Express Letter of the Law



4. Of the Manner of Passing Judgment



5. In What Governments the Sovereign May Be Judge



6. That in Monarchies Ministers Ought Not to Sit as Judges



7. Of a Single Magistrate



8. Of Accusation in Different Governments



9. Of the Severity of Punishments in Different Governments



10. Of the Ancient French Laws



11. That When People Are Virtuous, Few Punishments Are Necessary



12. Of the Power of Punishments



13. Insufficiency of the Laws of Japan



14. Of the Spirit of the Roman Senate



15. Of the Roman Laws in Respect to Punishments



16. Of the Just Proportion between Punishments and Crimes



17. Of the Rack



18. Of Pecuniary and Corporal Punishments



19. Of the Law of Retaliation



20. Of the Punishment of Fathers for the Crimes of Their Children



21. Of the Clemency of the Prince



Book VII. Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three

Governments with Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Condition of

Women



1. Of Luxury



2. Of Sumptuary Laws in a Democracy



3. Of Sumptuary Laws in an Aristocracy



4. Of Sumptuary Laws in a Monarchy



5. In What Cases Sumptuary Laws Are Useful in a Monarchy



6. Of the Luxury of China



7. Fatal Consequences of Luxury in China



8. Of Public Continency



9. Of the Condition or State of Women in Different Governments



10. Of the Domestic Tribunal among the Romans



11. In What Manner the Institutions Changed at Rome, Together with the

Government



12. Of the Guardianship of Women among the Romans



13. Of the Punishments Decreed by the Emperors against the Incontinence

of Women



14. Sumptuary Laws among the Romans



15. Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages in Different Constitutions



16. An Excellent Custom of the Samnites



17. Of Female Administration



Book VIII. Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments



1. General Idea of This Book



2. Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy



3. Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality



4. Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People



5. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy



6. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy



7. The Same Subject Continued



8. Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchical Government



9. How Ready the Nobility Are to Defend the Throne



10. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Despotic Government



11. Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of

Government



12. The Same Subject Continued



13. The Effect of an Oath among Virtuous People



14. How the Smallest Change of the Constitution Is Attended with the

Ruin of its Principles



15. Sure Methods of Preserving the Three Principles



16. Distinctive Properties of a Republic



17. Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy



18. Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy



19. Distinctive Properties of a Despotic Government



20. Consequence of the Preceding Chapters



21. Of the Empire of China



Book IX. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force



1. In What Manner Republics Provide for Their Safety



2. That a Confederate Government Ought to Be Composed of States of the

Same Nature, Especially of the Republican Kind



3. Other Requisites in a Confederate Republic



4. In What Manner Despotic Governments Provide for their Security



5. In What Manner a Monarchical Government Provides for Its Security



6. Of the Defensive Force of States in General



7. A Reflection



8. A Particular Case in Which the Defensive Force of a State Is Inferior

to the Offensive



9. Of the Relative Force of States



10. Of the Weakness of Neighbouring States



Book X. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force



1. Of Offensive Force



2. Of War



3. Of the Right of Conquest



4. Some Advantages of a Conquered People



5. Gelon, King of Syracuse



6. Of Conquest Made by a Republic



7. The Same Subject Continued



8. The Same Subject Continued



9. Of Conquests Made by a Monarchy



10. Of One Monarchy That Subdues Another



11. Of the Manners of a Conquered People



12. Of a Law of Cyrus



13. Charles XII



14. Alexander



15. New Methods of Preserving a Conquest



16. Of Conquests Made by a Despotic Prince



17. The Same Subject Continued



Book XI. Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to

the Constitution



1. A General Idea



2. Different Significations of the Word Liberty



3. In What Liberty Consists



4. The Same Subject Continued



5. Of the End or View of Different Governments



6. Of the Constitution of England



7. Of the Monarchies We Are Acquainted With



8. Why the Ancients Had Not a Clear Idea of Monarchy



9. Aristotle's Manner of Thinking



10. What Other Politicians Thought



11. Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece



12. Of the Government of the Kings of Rome, and in What Manner the Three

Powers Were There Distributed



13. General Reflections on the State of Rome after the Expulsion of its

Kings



14. In What Manner the Distribution of the Three Powers Began to Change

after the Expulsion of the Kings



15. In What Manner Rome, in the Flourishing State of That Republic,

Suddenly Lost its Liberty



16. Of the Legislative Power in the Roman Republic



17. Of the Executive Power in the Same Republic



18. Of the Judiciary Power in the Roman Government



19. Of the Government of the Roman Provinces



20. The End of This Book



Book XII. Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, in Relation to the

Subject



1. Idea of This Book



2. Of the Liberty of the Subject



3. The Same Subject Continued



4. That Liberty is Favoured by the Nature and Proportion of Punishments



5. Of Certain Accusations That Require Particular Moderation and

Prudence



6. Of the Crime against Nature



7. Of the Crime of High Treason



8. Of the Misapplication of the Terms Sacrilege and High Treason



9. The Same Subject Continued



10. The Same Subject Continued



11. Of Thoughts



12. Of Indiscreet Speeches



13. Of Writings



14. Breach of Modesty in Punishing Crimes



15. Of the Enfranchisement of Slaves in Order to Accuse Their Master



16. Of Calumny with Regard to the Crime of High Treason



17. Of the Revealing of Conspiracies



18. How Dangerous It Is in Republics to Be Too Severe in Punishing the

Crime of High Treason



19. In What Manner the Use of Liberty Is Suspended in a Republic



20. Of Laws Favourable to the Liberty of the Subject in a Republic



21. Of the Cruelty of Laws in Respect to Debtors in a Republic



22. Of Things That Strike at Liberty in Monarchies



23. Of Spies in Monarchies



24. Of Anonymous Letters



25. Of the Manner of Governing in Monarchies



26. That in a Monarchy the Prince Ought to Be of Easy Access



27. Of the Manners of a Monarch



28. Of the Regard Which Monarchs Owe to Their Subjects



29. Of the Civil Laws Proper for Mixing Some Portion of Liberty in a

Despotic Government



30. The Same Subject Continued



Book XIII. Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness

of the Public Revenues Bear to Liberty



1. Of the Public Revenues



2. That It Is Bad Reasoning to Say That the Greatness of Taxes Is Good

in its Own Nature



3. Of Taxes in Countries Where Part of the People Are Villains or

Bondmen



4. Of a Republic in the Like Case



5. Of a Monarchy in the Like Case



6. Of a Despotic Government in the Like Case



7. Of Taxes in Countries where Villainage is Not Established



8. In What Manner the Deception Is Preserved



9. Of a Bad Kind of Impost



10. That the Greatness of Taxes Depends on the Nature of the Government



11. Of Confiscations



12. Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty



13. In What Government Taxes Are Capable of Increase



14. That the Nature of the Taxes Is in Relation to the Government



15. Abuse of Liberty



16. Of the Conquests of the Mahometans



17. Of the Augmentation of Troops



18. Of an Exemption from Taxes



19. Which Is More Suitable to the Prince and to the People, the Farming

the Revenues, or Managing Them by Commission?



20. Of the Farmers of the Revenues



Book XIV. Of Laws in Relation to the Nature of the Climate



1. General Idea



2. Of the Difference of Men in Different Climates



3. Contradiction in the Tempers of Some Southern Nations



4. Cause of the Immutability of Religion, Manners, Customs, and Laws, in

the Eastern Countries



5. That Those Are Bad Legislators Who Favour the Vices of the Climate,

and Good Legislators Who Oppose Those Vices



6. Of Agriculture in Warm Climates



7. Of Monkery



8. An Excellent Custom of China



9. Means of Encouraging Industry



10. Of the Laws in Relation to the Sobriety of the People



11. Of the Laws in Relation to the Distempers of the Climate



12. Of the Laws against Suicides



13. Effects Arising from the Climate of England



14. Other Effects of the Climate



15. Of the Different Confidence Which the Laws Have in the People,

According to the Difference of Climates



Book XV. In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Relate to the Nature

of the Climate



1. Of Civil Slavery



2. Origin of the Right of Slavery among the Roman Civilians



3. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery



4. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery



5. Of the Slavery of the Negroes



6. The True Origin of the Right of Slavery



7. Another Origin of the Right of Slavery



8. Inutility of Slavery among Us



9. Several Kinds of Slavery



10. Regulations Necessary in Respect to Slavery



11. Abuses of Slavery



12. Danger from the Multitude of Slaves



13. Of Armed Slaves



14. The Same Subject Continued



15. Precautions to Be Used in Moderate Governments



16. Regulations between Masters and Slaves



17. Of Enfranchisements



18. Of Freedmen and Eunuchs



Book XVI. How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Bear a Relation to the Nature

of the Climate



1. Of Domestic Servitude



2. That in the Countries of the South There Is a Natural Inequality

between the Two Sexes



3. That a Plurality of Wives Greatly Depends on the Means of Supporting

Them



4. That the Law of Polygamy Is an Affair That Depends on Calculation



5. The Reason of a Law of Malabar



6. Of Polygamy Considered in Itself



7. Of an Equality of Treatment in Case of Many Wives



8. Of the Separation of Women from Men



9. Of the Connection between Domestic and Political Government



10. The Principle on Which the Morals of the East Are Founded



11. Of Domestic Slavery Independently of Polygamy



12. Of Natural Modesty



13. Of Jealousy



14. Of the Eastern Manner of Domestic Government



15. Of Divorce and Repudiation



16. Of Repudiation and Divorce among the Romans



Book XVII. How the Laws of Political Servitude Bear a Relation to the

Nature of the Climate



1. Of Political Servitude



2. The Difference between Nations in Point of Courage



3. Of the Climate of Asia



4. The Consequences Resulting from This



5. That When the People in the North of Asia and Those of the North of

Europe Made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquests Were Not the Same



6. A new Physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia, and of the Liberty of

Europe



7. Of Africa and America



8. Of the Capital of the Empire



Book XVIII. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to the Nature of the Soil



1. How the Nature of the Soil Has an Influence on the Laws



2. The Same Subject Continued



3. What Countries Are Best Cultivated



4. New Effects of the Fertility and Barrenness of Countries



5. Of the Inhabitants of Islands



6. Of Countries Raised by the Industry of Man



7. Of Human Industry



8. The General Relation of Laws



9. Of the Soil of America



10. Of Population in the Relation It Bears to the Manners of Procuring

Subsistence



11. Of Savage and Barbarous Nations



12. Of the Law of Nations among People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth



13. Of the Civil Laws of Those Nations Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth



14. Of the Political State of the People Who Do Not Cultivate the Land



15. Of People Who Know the Use of Money



16. Of Civil Laws among People Who Know Not the Use of Money



17. Of Political Laws among Nations Who Have Not the Use of Money



18. Of the Power of Superstition



19. Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars



20. Of the Law of Nations as Practised by the Tartars



21. The Civil Law of the Tartars



22. Of a Civil Law of the German Nations



23. Of the Regal Ornaments among the Franks



24. Of the Marriages of the Kings of the Franks



25. Childeric



26. Of the Time When the Kings of the Franks Became of Age



27. The Same Subject Continued



28. Of Adoption among the Germans



29. Of the Sanguinary Temper of the Kings of the Franks



30. Of the National Assemblies of the Franks



31. Of the Authority of the Clergy under the First Race



Book XIX. Of Laws in Relation to the Principles Which Form the General

Spirit, Morals, and Customs of a Nation



1. Of the Subject of This Book



2. That It Is Necessary People's Minds Should Be Prepared for the

Reception of the Best Laws



3. Of Tyranny



4. Of the General Spirit of Mankind



5. How Far We Should Be Attentive Lest the General Spirit of a Nation Be

Changed



6. That Everything Ought Not to Be Corrected



7. Of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians



8. Effects of a Sociable Temper



9. Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations



10. Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese



11. A Reflection



12. Of Customs and Manners in a Despotic State



13. Of the Behaviour of the Chinese



14. What Are the Natural Means of Changing the Manners and Customs of a

Nation



15. The Influence of Domestic Government on the Political



16. How some Legislators Have Confounded the Principles Which Govern

Mankind



17. Of the Peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government



18. A Consequence Drawn from the Preceding Chapter



19. How This Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs among the

Chinese Was Effected



20. Explanation of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese



21. How the Laws Ought to Have a Relation to Manners and Customs



22. The Same Subject Continued



23. How the Laws Are Founded on the Manners of a People



24. The Same Subject Continued



25. The Same Subject Continued



26. The Same Subject Continued



27. How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character

of a Nation



Book XX. Of Laws in Relation to Commerce, Considered in its Nature and

Distinctions



1. Of Commerce



2. Of the Spirit of Commerce



3. Of the Poverty of the People



4. Of Commerce in Different Governments



5. Of Nations That Have Entered into an Economical Commerce



6. Some Effects of an Extensive Navigation



7. The Spirit of England with Respect to Commerce



8. In What Manner Economical Commerce Has Been Sometimes Restrained



9. Of the Prohibition of Commerce



10. An Institution Adapted to Economical Commerce



11. The Same Subject Continued



12. Of the Freedom of Commerce



13. What It Is That Destroys This Liberty



14. The Laws of Commerce Concerning the Confiscation of Merchandise



15. Of Seizing the Persons of Merchants



16. An Excellent Law



17. A Law of Rhodes



18. Of the Judges of Commerce



19. That a Prince Ought Not to Engage Himself in Commerce



20. The Same Subject Continued



21. Of the Commerce of the Nobility in a Monarchy



22. A Singular Reflection



23. To What Nations Commerce Is Prejudicial



Book XXI. Of Laws in Relation to Commerce, Considered in the Revolutions

It Has Met With in the World



1. Some General Considerations



2. Of the People of Africa



3. That the Wants of the People in the South Are Different from those of

the North



4. The Principal Difference between the Commerce of the Ancients and the

Moderns



5. Other Differences



6. Of the Commerce of the Ancients



7. Of the Commerce of the Greeks



8. Of Alexander: His Conquests



9. Of the Commerce of the Grecian Kings after the Death of Alexander



10. Of the Circuit of Africa



11. Of Carthage and Marseilles



12. The Isle of Delos. Mithridates



13. Of the Genius of the Romans as to Maritime Affairs



14. Of the Genius of the Romans with Respect to Commerce



15. Of the Commerce of the Romans with the Barbarians



16. Of the Commerce of the Romans with Arabia, and the Indies



17. Of Commerce after the Destruction of the Western Empire



18. A Particular Regulation



19. Of Commerce after the Decay of the Roman Power in the East



20. How Commerce Broke Through the Barbarism of Europe



21. The Discovery of Two New Worlds, and in What Manner Europe Is

Affected by It



22. Of the Riches Which Spain Drew from America



23. A Problem



Book XXII. Of Laws in Relation to the Use of Money



1. The Reason of the Use of Money



2. Of the Nature of Money



3. Of Ideal Money



4. Of the Quantity of Gold and Silver



5. The Same Subject Continued



6. Why Interest Was Lowered One Half after the Conquest of the Indies



7. How the Price of Things Is Fixed in the Variation of the Sign of

Riches



8. The Same Subject Continued



9. Of the Relative Scarcity of Gold and Silver



10. Of Exchange



11. Of the Proceedings of the Romans with Respect to Money



12. The Circumstances in Which the Romans Changed the Value of Their

Specie



13. Proceedings with Respect to Money in the Time of the Emperors



14. How Exchange Is a Constraint on Despotic Power



15. The Practice of Some Countries in Italy



16. The Assistance a State May Derive from Bankers



17. Of Public Debts



18. Of the Payment of Public Debts



19. Of Lending upon Interest



20. Of Maritime Usury



21. Of Lending by Contract, and the State of Usury among the Romans



22. The Same Subject Continued



Book XXIII. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to the Number of

Inhabitants



1. Of Men and Animals with Respect to the Multiplication of Their

Species



2. Of Marriage



3. Of the Condition of Children



4. Of Families



5. Of the Several Orders of Lawful Wives



6. Of Bastards in Different Governments



7. Of the Father's Consent to Marriage



8. The Same Subject Continued



9. Of Young Women



10. What It Is That Determines Marriage



11. Of the Severity of Government



12. Of the Number of Males and Females in Different Countries



13. Of Seaport Towns



14. Of the Productions of the Earth Which Require a Greater or Less

Number of Men



15. Of the Number of Inhabitants with Relation to the Arts



16. The Concern of the Legislator in the Propagation of the Species



17. Of Greece, and the Number of its Inhabitants



18. Of the State and Number of People before the Romans



19. Of the Depopulation of the Globe



20. That the Romans Were under the Necessity of Making Laws to Encourage

the Propagation of the Species



21. Of the Laws of the Romans Relating to the Propagation of the Species



22. Of the Exposing of Children



23. Of the State of the World after the Destruction of the Romans



24. The Changes Which Happened in Europe, with Regard to the Number of

the Inhabitants



25. The Same Subject Continued



26. Consequences



27. Of the Law Made in France to Encourage the Propagation of the

Species



28. By What Means We May Remedy a Depopulation



29. Of Hospitals



Book XXIV. Of Laws in Relation to Religion, Considered in Itself, and in

Its Doctrine



1. Of Religion in General



2. A Paradox of M. Bayle's



3. That a Moderate Government Is Most Agreeable to the Christian

Religion, and a Despotic Government to the Mahometan



4. Consequences from the Character of the Christian Religion and That of

the Mahometan



5. That the Catholic Religion Is Most Agreeable to a Monarchy, and the

Protestant to a Republic



6. Another of M. Bayle's Paradoxes



7. Of the Laws of Perfection in Religion



8. Of the Connection between the Moral Laws and Those of Religion



9. Of the Essenes



10. Of the Sect of Stoics



11. Of Contemplation



12. Of Penances



13. Of Inexpiable Crimes



14. In What Manner Religion Has an Influence on Civil Laws



15. How False Religions Are Sometimes Corrected by the Civil Laws



16. How the Laws of Religion Correct the Inconveniences of a Political

Constitution



17. The Same Subject Continued



18. How the Laws of Religion Have the Effect of Civil Laws



19. That It Is Not So Much the Truth or Falsity of a Doctrine Which

Renders It Useful or Pernicious to Men in Civil Government, as the Use

or Abuse of It



20. The Same Subject Continued



21. Of Metempsychosis



22. That It Is Dangerous for Religion to Inspire an Aversion for Things

in Themselves Indifferent



23. Of Festivals



24. Of the Local Laws of Religion



25. The Inconvenience of Transplanting a Religion from One Country to

Another



26. The Same Subject Continued



Book XXV. Of Laws in Relation to the Establishment of Religion and its

External Polity



1. Of Religious Sentiments



2. Of the Motives of Attachment to Different Religions



3. Of Temples



4. Of the Ministers of Religion



5. Of the Bounds Which the Laws Ought to Prescribe to the Riches of the

Clergy



6. Of Monasteries



7. Of the Luxury of Superstition



8. Of the Pontificate



9. Of Toleration in Point of Religion



10. The Same Subject Continued



11. Of Changing a Religion



12. Of Penal Laws



13. A Most Humble Remonstrance to the Inquisitors of Spain and Portugal



14. Why the Christian Religion Is So Odious in Japan



15. Of the Propagation of Religion



Book XXVI. Of Laws in Relation to the Order of Things Which They Determine



1. Idea of This Book



2. Of Laws Divine and Human



3. Of Civil Laws Contrary to the Law of Nature



4. The Same Subject Continued



5. Cases in Which We May Judge by the Principles of the Civil Law, in

Limiting the Principles of the Law of Nature



6. That the Order of Succession or Inheritance Depends on the Principles

of Political or Civil Law, and Not on Those of the Law of Nature



7. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Precepts of Religion What Belongs

Only to the Law of Nature



8. That We Ought Not to Regulate by the Principles of the Canon Law

Things Which Should Be Regulated by Those of the Civil Law



9. That Things Which Ought to Be Regulated by the Principles of Civil

Law Can Seldom Be Regulated by Those of Religion.



10. In What Case We Ought to Follow the Civil Law Which Permits, and Not

the Law of Religion Which Forbids



11. That Human Courts of Justice Should Not Be Regulated by the Maxims

of Those Tribunals Which Relate to the Other Life



12. The Same Subject Continued



13. In What Cases, with Regard to Marriage, We Ought to Follow the Laws

of Religion; and in What Cases We Should Follow the Civil Laws



14. In What Instances Marriages between Relatives Should Be Regulated by

the Laws of Nature; and in What Instances by the Civil Laws



15. That We Should Not Regulate by the Principles of Political Law Those

Things Which Depend on the Principles of Civil Law



16. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Rules of the Civil Law, When It

Is Proper to Decide by Those of the Political Law



17. The Same Subject Continued



18. That It Is Necessary to Inquire Whether the Laws Which Seem

Contradictory Are of the Same Class



19. That We Should Not Decide Those Things by the Civil Law Which Ought

to Be Decided by Domestic Laws



20. That We Ought Not to Decide by the Principles of the Civil Laws

Those Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations



21. That We Should Not Decide by Political Laws Things Which Belong to

the Law of Nations



22. The Unhappy State of the Inca Athualpa



23. That When, by Some Circumstance, the Political Law Becomes

Destructive to the State, We Ought to Decide by Such a Political Law, as

Will Preserve It, Which Sometimes Becomes a Law of Nations



24. That the Regulations of the Police Are of a Different Class from

Other Civil Laws



25. That We Should Not Follow the General Disposition of the Civil Law

in Things Which Ought to Be Subject to Particular Rules Drawn from Their

Own Nature



Book XXVII.



1. Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Roman Laws on Successions



Book XXVIII. Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Civil Laws among the

French



1. Different Character of the Laws of the Several People of Germany



2. That the Laws of the Barbarians Were All Personal



3. Capital Difference between the Salic Laws, and Those of the Visigoths

and Burgundians



4. In What Manner the Roman Law Came to Be Lost in the Country Subject

to the Franks, and Preserved in That Subject to the Goths and

Burgundians



5. The Same Subject Continued



6. How the Roman Law Kept its Ground in the Demesne of the Lombards



7. How the Roman Law Came to Be Lost in Spain



8. A False Capitulary



9. In What Manner the Codes of Barbarian Laws, and the Capitularies Came

to Be Lost



10. The Same Subject Continued



11. Other Causes of the Disuse of the Codes of Barbarian Laws, as well

as of the Roman Law, and of the Capitularies



12. Of Local Customs. Revolution of the Laws of Barbarous Nations, as

well as of the Roman Law



13. Difference between the Salic Law, or That of the Salian Franks, and

That of the Ripuarian Franks, and other Barbarous Nations



14. Another Difference



15. A Reflection



16. Of the Ordeal or Trial by Boiling Water, Established by the Salic

Law



17. Particular Notions of Our Ancestors



18. In What Manner the Custom of Judicial Combats Gained Ground



19. A New Reason of the Disuse of the Salic and Roman Laws, as Also of

the Capitularies



20. Origin of the Point of Honour



21. A new Reflection on the Point of Honour among the Germans



22. Of the Manners in Relation to Judicial Combats



23. Of the Code of Laws on Judicial Combats



24. Rules Established in the Judicial Combat



25. Of the Bounds Prescribed to the Custom of Judicial Combats



26. On the Judiciary Combat between One of the Parties and One of the

Witnesses



27. Of the Judicial Combat between One of the Parties and One of the

Lords' Peers. Appeal of False Judgment



28. Of the Appeal of Default of Justice



29. Epoch of the Reign of St. Louis



30. Observation on Appeals



31. The Same Subject Continued



32. The Same Subject Continued



33. The Same Subject Continued



34. In What Manner the Proceedings at Law Became Secret



35. Of the Costs



36. Of the Public Prosecutor



37 In What Manner the Institutions of St. Louis Fell into Oblivion



38. The Same Subject Continued



39. The Same Subject Continued



40. In What Manner the Judiciary Forms Were Borrowed from the Decretals



41. Flux and Reflux of the Ecclesiastic and Temporal Jurisdiction



42. The Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result Thereof. Change of

Tribunals



43. The Same Subject Continued



44 Of the Proof by Witnesses



45. Of the Customs of France



Book XXIX. Of the Manner of Composing Laws



1. Of the Spirit of a Legislator



2. The Same Subject Continued



3. That the Laws Which Seem to Deviate from the Views of the Legislator

Are Frequently Agreeable to Them



4. Of the Laws Contrary to the Views of the Legislator



5. The Same Subject Continued



6. The Laws Which Appear the Same Have Not Always the Same Effect



7. The Same Subject Continued. Necessity of Composing Laws in a Proper

Manner



8. That Laws Which Appear the Same Were Not Always Made through the Same

Motive



9. That the Greek and Roman Laws Punished Suicide, but Not through the

Same Motive



10. That Laws Which Seem Contrary Proceed Sometimes from the Same Spirit



11. How to Compare Two Different Systems of Laws



12. That Laws Which Appear the Same Are Sometimes Really Different



13. That We Must Not Separate Laws from the End for Which They Were

Made: of the Roman Laws on Theft



14. That We Must Not Separate the Laws from the Circumstances in Which

They Were Made



15. That Sometimes It Is Proper the Law Should Amend Itself



16. Things to Be Observed in the Composing of Laws



17. A bad Method of Giving Laws



18. Of the Ideas of Uniformity



19. Of Legislators



Book XXX. Theory of the Feudal Laws among the Franks in the Relation

They Bear to the Establishment of the Monarchy



1. Of Feudal Laws



2. Of the Source of Feudal Laws



3. The Origin of Vassalage



4. The Same Subject Continued



5. Of the Conquests of the Franks



6. Of the Goths, Burgundians, and Franks



7. Different Ways of Dividing the Land



8. The Same Subject Continued



9. A Just Application of the Law of the Burgundians, and of That of the

Visigoths, in Relation to the Division of Lands



10. Of Servitudes



11. The Same Subject Continued



12. That the Lands Belonging to the Division of the Barbarians Paid No

Taxes



13. Of Taxes Paid by the Romans and Gauls, in the Monarchy of the Franks



14. Of What They Called Census



15. That What They Called Census Was Raised Only on the Bondmen and Not

on the Freemen



16. Of the Feudal Lords or Vassals



17. Of the Military Service of Freemen



18. Of the Double Service



19. Of Compositions among the Barbarous Nations



20. Of What Was Afterwards Called the Jurisdiction of the Lords



21. Of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Churches



22. That the Jurisdictions Were Established before the End of the Second

Race



23. General Idea of the Abbé Du Bos' Book on the Establishment of the

French Monarchy in Gaul



24. The Same Subject Continued. Reflection on the Main Part of the

System



25. Of the French Nobility



Book XXXI. Theory of the Feudal Laws among the Franks, in the Relation

They Bear to the Revolutions of their Monarchy



1. Changes in the Offices and in the Fiefs. Of the Mayors of the Palace



2. How the Civil Government Was Reformed



3. Authority of the Mayors of the Palace



4. Of the Genius of the Nation in Regard to the Mayors



5. In What Manner the Mayors Obtained the Command of the Armies



6. Second Epoch of the Humiliation of Our Kings of the First Race



7. Of the Great Offices and Fiefs under the Mayors of the Palace



8. In What Manner the Allodial Estates Were Changed into Fiefs



9. How the Church Lands Were Converted into Fiefs



10. Riches of the Clergy



11. State of Europe at the Time of Charles Martel



12. Establishment of the Tithes



13. Of the Election of Bishops and Abbots



14. Of the Fiefs of Charles Martel



15. The Same Subject Continued



16. Confusion of the Royalty and Mayoralty. The Second Race



17. A Particular Circumstance in the Election of the Kings of the Second

Race



18. Charlemagne



19. The Same Subject Continued



20. Louis the Debonnaire



21. The Same Subject Continued



22. The Same Subject Continued



23. The Same Subject Continued



24. That the Freemen Were Rendered Capable of Holding Fiefs



25. The Principal Cause of the Humiliation of the Second Race. Changes

in the Allodia



26. Changes in the Fiefs



27. Another change Which Happened in the Fiefs



28. Changes Which Happened in the Great Offices and in the Fiefs



29. Of the Nature of the Fiefs after the Reign of Charles the Bald



30. The Same Subject Continued



31. In What Manner the Empire Was Transferred from the Family of

Charlemagne



32. In What Manner the Crown of France Was Transferred to the House of

Hugh Capet



33. Some Consequences of the Perpetuity of Fiefs



34. The Same Subject Continued





------------------------------------------------------------------------



PREFACE



IF amidst the infinite number of subjects contained in this book there

is anything which, contrary to my expectation, may possibly offend, I

can at least assure the public that it was not inserted with an ill

intention: for I am not naturally of a captious temper. Plato thanked

the gods that he was born in the same age with Socrates: and for my part

I give thanks to the Supreme that I was born a subject of that

government under which I live; and that it is His pleasure I should obey

those whom He has made me love.



I beg one favour of my readers, which I fear will not be granted me;

this is, that they will not judge by a few hours' reading of the labour

of twenty years; that they will approve or condemn the book entire, and

not a few particular phrases. If they would search into the design of

the author, they can do it in no other way so completely as by searching

into the design of the work.



I have first of all considered mankind; and the result of my thoughts

has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners,

they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.



I have laid down the first principles, and have found that the

particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all

nations are only consequences of them; and that every particular law is

connected with another law, or depends on some other of a more general

extent.



When I have been obliged to look back into antiquity, I have endeavoured

to assume the spirit of the ancients, lest I should consider those

things as alike which are really different; and lest I should miss the

difference of those which appear to be alike.



I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices, but from the nature

of things.



Here a great many truths will not appear till we have seen the chain

which connects them with others. The more we enter into particulars, the

more we shall perceive the certainty of the principles on which they are

founded. I have not even given all these particulars, for who could

mention them all without a most insupportable fatigue?



The reader will not here meet with any of those bold flights which seem

to characterise the works of the present age. When things are examined

with never so small a degree of extent, the sallies of imagination must

vanish; these generally arise from the mind's collecting all its powers

to view only one side of the subject, while it leaves the other

unobserved.



I write not to censure anything established in any country whatsoever.

Every nation will here find the reasons on which its maxims are founded;

and this will be the natural inference, that to propose alterations

belongs only to those who are so happy as to be born with a genius

capable of penetrating the entire constitution of a state.



It is not a matter of indifference that the minds of the people be

enlightened. The prejudices of magistrates have arisen from national

prejudice. In a time of ignorance they have committed even the greatest

evils without the least scruple; but in an enlightened age they even

tremble while conferring the greatest blessings. They perceive the

ancient abuses; they see how they must be reformed; but they are

sensible also of the abuses of a reformation. They let the evil

continue, if they fear a worse; they are content with a lesser good, if

they doubt a greater. They examine into the parts, to judge of them in

connection; and they examine all the causes, to discover their different

effects.



Could I but succeed so as to afford new reasons to every man to love his

prince, his country, his laws; new reasons to render him more sensible

in every nation and government of the blessings he enjoys, I should

think myself the most happy of mortals.



Could I but succeed so as to persuade those who command, to increase

their knowledge in what they ought to prescribe; and those who obey, to

find a new pleasure resulting from obedience -- I should think myself

the most happy of mortals.



The most happy of mortals should I think myself could I contribute to

make mankind recover from their prejudices. By prejudices I here mean,

not that which renders men ignorant of some particular things, but

whatever renders them ignorant of themselves.



It is in endeavouring to instruct mankind that we are best able to

practise that general virtue which comprehends the love of all. Man,

that flexible being, conforming in society to the thoughts and

impressions of others, is equally capable of knowing his own nature,

whenever it is laid open to his view; and of losing the very sense of

it, when this idea is banished from his mind.



Often have I begun, and as often have I laid aside, this undertaking. I

have a thousand times given the leaves I had written to the winds: I,

every day, felt my paternal hands fall. I have followed my object

without any fixed plan: I have known neither rules nor exceptions; I

have found the truth, only to lose it again. But when I once discovered

my first principles, everything I sought for appeared; and in the course

of twenty years, I have seen my work begun, growing up, advancing to

maturity, and finished.



If this work meets with success, I shall owe it chiefly to the grandeur

and majesty of the subject. However, I do not think that I have been

totally deficient in point of genius. When I have seen what so many

great men both in France, England, and Germany have said before me, I

have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage: I have

said with Correggio, "And I also am a painter."



ADVERTISEMENT



1. For the better understanding of the first four books of this work, it

is to be observed that what I distinguish by the name of virtue, in a

republic, is the love of one's country, that is, the love of equality.

It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it is

the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honour is

the spring which gives motion to monarchy. Hence it is that I have

distinguished the love of one's country, and of equality, by the

appellation of political virtue. My ideas are new, and therefore I have

been obliged to find new words, or to give new acceptations to old

terms, in order to convey my meaning. They, who are unacquainted with

this particular, have made me say most strange absurdities, such as

would be shocking in any part of the world, because in all countries and

governments morality is requisite.



2. The reader is also to notice that there is a vast difference between

saying that a certain quality, modification of the mind, or virtue, is

not the spring by which government is actuated, and affirming that it is

not to be found in that government. Were I to say such a wheel or such a

pinion is not the spring which sets the watch going, can you infer

thence that they are not to be found in the watch? So far is it from

being true that the moral and Christian virtues are excluded from

monarchy, that even political virtue is not excluded. In a word, honour

is found in a republic, though its spring be political virtue; and

political virtue is found in a monarchical government, though it be

actuated by honour.



To conclude, the honest man of whom we treat in the third book, chapter

5, is not the Christian, but the political honest man, who is possessed

of the political virtue there mentioned. He is the man who loves the

laws of his country, and who is actuated by the love of those laws. I

have set these matters in a clearer light in the present edition, by

giving a more precise meaning to my expression: and in most places where

I have made use of the word virtue I have taken care to add the term

political.





------------------------------------------------------------------------





Book I. Of Laws in General



1. Of the Relation of Laws to different Beings. Laws, in their most

general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the

nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity[1]

His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man

their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.



They who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we

behold in this world talk very absurdly; for can anything be more

unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive

of intelligent beings?



There is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations subsisting

between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one

another.



God is related to the universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by

which He created all things are those by which He preserves them. He

acts according to these rules, because He knows them; He knows them,

because He made them; and He made them, because they are in relation to

His wisdom and power.



Since we observe that the world, though formed by the motion of matter,

and void of understanding, subsists through so long a succession of

ages, its motions must certainly be directed by invariable laws; and

could we imagine another world, it must also have constant rules, or it

would inevitably perish.



Thus the creation, which seems an arbitrary act, supposes laws as

invariable as those of the fatality of the Atheists. It would be absurd

to say that the Creator might govern the world without those rules,

since without them it could not subsist.



These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. In bodies moved, the

motion is received, increased, diminished, or lost, according to the

relations of the quantity of matter and velocity; each diversity is

uniformity, each change is constancy. 



Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but

they have some likewise which they never made. Before there were

intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible

relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there

were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or

unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same

as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not

equal.



We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the

positive law by which they are established: as, for instance, if human

societies existed, it would be right to conform to their laws; if there

were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another being,

they ought to show their gratitude; if one intelligent being had created

another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in its original

state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures another, it

deserves a retaliation; and so on.



But the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the

physical. For though the former has also its laws, which of their own

nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the

physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent

beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on

the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do

not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their

own instituting they frequently infringe. 



Whether brutes be governed by the general laws of motion, or by a

particular movement, we cannot determine. Be that as it may, they have

not a more intimate relation to God than the rest of the material world;

and sensation is of no other use to them than in the relation they have

either to other particular beings or to themselves. 



By the allurement of pleasure they preserve the individual, and by the

same allurement they preserve their species. They have natural laws,

because they are united by sensation; positive laws they have none,

because they are not connected by knowledge. And yet they do not

invariably conform to their natural laws; these are better observed by

vegetables, that have neither understanding nor sense.



Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which we have; but they have

some which we have not. They have not our hopes, but they are without

our fears; they are subject like us to death, but without knowing it;

even most of them are more attentive than we to self-preservation, and

do not make so bad a use of their passions. 



Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies governed by invariable

laws. As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws

established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is left

to his private direction, though a limited being, and subject, like all

finite intelligences, to ignorance and error: even his imperfect

knowledge he loses; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by a

thousand impetuous passions. Such a being might every instant forget his

Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of

religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself;

philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed to

live in society, he might forget his fellow-creatures; legislators have

therefore by political and civil laws confined him to his duty.



2. Of the Laws of Nature. Antecedent to the above-mentioned laws are

those of nature, so called, because they derive their force entirely

from our frame and existence. In order to have a perfect knowledge of

these laws, we must consider man before the establishment of society:

the laws received in such a state would be those of nature.



The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines

us towards Him, is the first in importance, though not in order, of

natural laws. Man in a state of nature would have the faculty of

knowing, before he had acquired any knowledge. Plain it is that his

first ideas would not be of a speculative nature; he would think of the

preservation of his being, before he would investigate its origin. Such

a man would feel nothing in himself at first but impotency and weakness;

his fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from

instances (were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in

forests,[2] trembling at the motion of a leaf, and flying from every

shadow. 



In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality,

would fancy himself inferior. There would therefore be no danger of

their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature.



The natural impulse or desire which Hobbes attributes to mankind of

subduing one another is far from being well founded. The idea of empire

and dominion is so complex, and depends on so many other notions, that

it could never be the first which occurred to the human understanding.



Hobbes[3] inquires, "For what reason go men armed, and have locks and

keys to fasten their doors, if they be not naturally in a state of war?"

But is it not obvious that he attributes to mankind before the

establishment of society what can happen but in consequence of this

establishment, which furnishes them with motives for hostile attacks and

self-defence?



Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants.

Hence another law of nature would prompt him to seek for nourishment.



Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the

marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to

associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from. the very

pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same

species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of sexes

would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for

each other would form a third law.



Beside the sense or instinct which man possesses in common with brutes,

he has the advantage of acquired knowledge; and thence arises a second

tie, which brutes have not. Mankind have therefore a new motive of

uniting; and a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in

society.



3. Of Positive Laws. As soon as man enters into a state of society he

loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the

state of war.



Each particular society begins to feel its strength, whence arises a

state of war between different nations. The individuals likewise of each

society become sensible of their force; hence the principal advantages

of this society they endeavour to convert to their own emolument, which

constitutes a state of war between individuals.



These two different kinds of states give rise to human laws. Considered

as inhabitants of so great a planet, which necessarily contains a

variety of nations, they have laws relating to their mutual intercourse,

which is what we call the law of nations. As members of a society that

must be properly supported, they have laws relating to the governors and

the governed, and this we distinguish by the name of politic law. They

have also another sort of law, as they stand in relation to each other;

by which is understood the civil law. 



The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle, that

different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good

they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without

prejudicing their real interests.



The object of war is victory; that of victory is conquest; and that of

conquest preservation. From this and the preceding principle all those

rules are derived which constitute the law of nations.



All countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois

themselves, though they devour their prisoners: for they send and

receive ambassadors, and understand the rights of war and peace. The

mischief is that their law of nations is not founded on true principles.



Besides the law of nations relating to all societies, there is a polity

or civil constitution for each particularly considered. No society can

subsist without a form of government. "The united strength of

individuals," as Gravina[4] well observes, "constitutes what we call the

body politic."



The general strength may be in the hands of a single person, or of many.

Some think that nature having established paternal authority, the most

natural government was that of a single person. But the example of

paternal authority proves nothing. For if the power of a father relates

to a single government, that of brothers after the death of a father,

and that of cousins-german after the decease of brothers, refer to a

government of many. The political power necessarily comprehends the

union of several families.



Better is it to say, that the government most conformable to nature is

that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in

whose favour it is established.



The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of

all their wills. "The conjunction of those wills," as Gravina again very

justly observes, "is what we call the civil state."



Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the

inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation

ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.



They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are

framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit

another.



They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each

government; whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or

whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.



They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the

quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal

occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds:

they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the

constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their

inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine,

they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the

intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are

established; in all of which different lights they ought to be

considered. 



This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These

relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I

call the Spirit of Laws. 



I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do

not pretend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit

consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different

objects, it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of

laws as that of these relations and objects. 



I shall first examine the relations which laws bear to the nature and

principle of each government; and as this principle has a strong

influence on laws, I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly:

and if I can but once establish it, the laws will soon appear to flow

thence as from their source. I shall proceed afterwards to other and

more particular relations.



______



1. "Law," says Plutarch, "is the king of mortal and immortal beings."

See his treatise, A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince.



2. Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover, who was carried

over to England during the reign of George I.



3. In pref., De cive.



4. Italian poet and jurist, 1664-1718. 





------------------------------------------------------------------------



Book II. Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government



1. Of the Nature of the three different Governments. There are three

species of government: republican, monarchical, and despotic. In order

to discover their nature, it is sufficient to recollect the common

notion, which supposes three definitions, or rather three facts: that a

republican government is that in which the body, or only a part of the

people, is possessed of the supreme power; monarchy, that in which a

single person governs by fixed and established laws; a despotic

government, that in which a single person directs everything by his own

will and caprice.



This is what I call the nature of each government; we must now inquire

into those laws which directly conform to this nature, and consequently

are the fundamental institutions.



2. Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in relation to

Democracy.[1] When the body of the people is possessed of the supreme

power, it is called a democracy. When the supreme power is lodged in the

hands of a part of the people, it is then an aristocracy.



In a democracy the people are in some respects the sovereign, and in

others the subject.



There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their suffrages, which

are their own will; now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself.

The laws therefore which establish the right of suffrage are fundamental

to this government. And indeed it is as important to regulate in a

republic, in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what,

suffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the

prince, and after what manner he ought to govern.



Libanius[2] says that at Athens a stranger who intermeddled in the

assemblies of the people was punished with death. This is because such a

man usurped the rights of sovereignty.



It is an essential point to fix the number of citizens who are to form

the public assemblies; otherwise it would be uncertain whether the

whole, or only a part of the people, had given their votes. At Sparta

the number was fixed at ten thousand. But Rome, designed by Providence

to rise from the weakest beginnings to the highest pitch of grandeur;

Rome, doomed to experience all the vicissitudes of fortune; Rome, who

had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls, and sometimes all

Italy and a considerable part of the world within them; Rome, I say,

never fixed the number[3] and this was one of the principal causes of

her ruin.



The people, in whom the supreme power resides, ought to have the

management of everything within their reach: that which exceeds their

abilities must be conducted by their ministers.



But they cannot properly be said to have their ministers, without the

power of nominating them: it is, therefore, a fundamental maxim in this

government, that the people should choose their ministers -- that is,

their magistrates.



They have occasion, as well as monarchs, and even more so, to be

directed by a council or senate. But to have a proper confidence in

these, they should have the choosing of the members; whether the

election be made by themselves, as at Athens, or by some magistrate

deputed for that purpose, as on certain occasions was customary at Rome.



The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are

to entrust with part of their authority. They have only to be determined

by things to which they cannot be strangers, and by facts that are

obvious to sense. They can tell when a person has fought many battles,

and been crowned with success; they are, therefore, capable of electing

a general. They can tell when a judge is assiduous in his office, gives

general satisfaction, and has never been charged with bribery: this is

sufficient for choosing a prætor. They are struck with the magnificence

or riches of a fellow-citizen; no more is requisite for electing an

edile. These are facts of which they can have better information in a

public forum than a monarch in his palace. But are they capable of

conducting an intricate affair, of seizing and improving the opportunity

and critical moment of action? No; this surpasses their abilities.



Should we doubt the people's natural capacity, in respect to the

discernment of merit, we need only cast an eye on the series of

surprising elections made by the Athenians and Romans; which no one

surely will attribute to hazard.



We know that though the people of Rome assumed the right of raising

plebeians to public offices, yet they never would exert this power; and

though at Athens the magistrates were allowed, by the law of Aristides,

to be elected from all the different classes of inhabitants, there never

was a case, says Xenophon,[4] when the common people petitioned for

employments which could endanger either their security or their glory.



As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified

to be chosen, so the people, though capable of calling others to an

account for their administration, are incapable of conducting the

administration themselves.



The public business must be carried on with a certain motion, neither

too quick nor too slow. But the motion of the people is always either

too remiss or too violent. Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they

overturn all before them; and sometimes with a hundred thousand feet

they creep like insects.



In a popular state the inhabitants are divided into certain classes. It

is in the manner of making this division that great legislators have

signalised themselves; and it is on this the duration and prosperity of

democracy have ever depended.



Servius Tullius followed the spirit of aristocracy in the distribution

of his classes. We find in Livy[5] and in Dionysius Halicarnassus,[6] in

what manner he lodged the right of suffrage in the hands of the

principal citizens. He had divided the people of Rome into 193

centuries, which formed six classes; and ranking the rich, who were in

smaller numbers, in the first centuries, and those in middling

circumstances, who were more numerous, in the next, he flung the

indigent multitude into the last; and as each century had but one

vote[7] it was property rather than numbers that decided the election.



Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes. In this he was

directed by the spirit of democracy, his intention not being to fix

those who were to choose, but such as were eligible: therefore, leaving

to every citizen the right of election, he made[8] the judges eligible

from each of those four classes; but the magistrates he ordered to be

chosen only out of the first three, consisting of persons of easy

fortunes.[9]



As the division of those who have a right of suffrage is a fundamental

law in republics, so the manner of giving this suffrage is another

fundamental.



The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to

aristocracy.[10]



The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one, but

animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country.



Yet as this method is in itself defective, it has been the endeavour of

the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it.



Solon made a law at Athens that military employments should be conferred

by choice; but that senators and judges should be elected by lot.



The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies, attended with

great expense, should be given by choice; and the others by lot.



In order, however, to amend the suffrage by lot, he made a rule that

none but those who presented themselves should be elected; that the

person elected should be examined by judges[11] and that every one

should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office:[12]

this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot, and of that

by choice. When the time of their magistracy had expired, they were

obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct.

Persons utterly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giving

in their names to be drawn by lot.



The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage is likewise

fundamental in a democracy. It is a question of some importance whether

the suffrages ought to be public or secret. Cicero observes[13] that the

laws[14] which rendered them secret towards the close of the republic

were the cause of its decline. But as this is differently practised in

different republics, I shall offer here my thoughts concerning this

subject.



The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public[15] and this should

be considered as a fundamental law of democracy. The lower class ought

to be directed by those of higher rank, and restrained within bounds by

the gravity of eminent personages. Hence, by rendering the suffrages

secret in the Roman republic, all was lost; it was no longer possible to

direct a populace that sought its own destruction. But when the body of

the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy[16] or in a democracy the

senate[17] as the business is then only to prevent intrigues, the

suffrages cannot be too secret.



Intriguing in a senate is dangerous; it is dangerous also in a body of

nobles; but not so among the people, whose nature is to act through

passion. In countries where they have no share in the government, we

often see them as much inflamed on account of an actor as ever they

could be for the welfare of the state. The misfortune of a republic is

when intrigues are at an end; which happens when the people are gained

by bribery and corruption: in this case they grow indifferent to public

affairs, and avarice becomes their predominant passion. Unconcerned

about the government and everything belonging to it, they quietly wait

for their hire.



It is likewise a fundamental law in democracies, that the people should

have the sole power to enact laws. And yet there are a thousand

occasions on which it is necessary the senate should have the power of

decreeing; nay, it is frequently proper to make some trial of a law

before it is established. The constitutions of Rome and Athens were

excellent. The decrees of the senate[18] had the force of laws for the

space of a year, but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by

the consent of the people.



3. Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of Aristocracy. In an

aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number

of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and executive

authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them, the same

as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.



They do not vote here by lot, for this would be productive of

inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most

mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be

chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious; it is the

nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.



When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate the

affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding, and to

prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said that the

aristocracy is in some measure in the senate, the democracy in the body

of the nobles, and the people are a cipher.



It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the people, in some

measure, could be raised from their state of annihilation. Thus at

Genoa, the bank of St. George being administered by the people[19] gives

them a certain influence in the government, whence their whole

prosperity is derived.



The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own

members; for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses. At Rome,

which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy, the senate did not

fill up the vacant places in their own body; the new members were

nominated by the censors.[20]



In a republic, the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant power

produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy. In the latter the

laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted themselves to, the

constitution; and the principle of government checks the monarch: but in

a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant

power,[21] the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws

foresaw it not, and consequently made no provision against it.



There is an exception to this rule, when the constitution is such as to

have immediate need of a magistrate invested with extraordinary power.

Such was Rome with her dictators, such is Venice with her state

inquisitors; these are formidable magistrates, who restore, as it were

by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that these

magistracies are so very different in these two republics? It is because

Rome supported the remains of her aristocracy against the people;

whereas Venice employs her state inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy

against the nobles. The consequence was that at Rome the dictatorship

could be only of short duration, as the people acted through passion and

not with design. It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should

be exercised with lustre and pomp, the business being to intimidate, and

not to punish, the multitude. It was also proper that the dictator

should be created only for some particular affair, and for this only

should have an unlimited authority, as he was always created upon some

sudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occasion for a

permanent magistracy; for here it is that schemes may be set on foot,

continued, suspended, and resumed; that the ambition of a single person

becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many.

They have occasion for a secret magistracy, the crimes they punish being

hatched in secrecy and silence. This magistracy must have a general

inquisition, for their business is not to remedy known disorders, but to

prevent the unknown. In a word, the latter is designed to punish

suspected crimes; whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment

even for crimes that were openly avowed.



In all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by

the brevity of the duration. This most legislators have fixed to a year;

a longer space would be dangerous, and a shorter would be contrary to

the nature of government. For who is it that in the management even of

his domestic affairs would be thus confined? At Ragusa[22] the chief

magistrate of the republic is changed every month, the other officers

every week, and the governor of the castle every day. But this can take

place only in a small republic environed[23] by formidable powers, who

might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant magistrates.



The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the

legislature are so few and inconsiderable that the governing party have

no interest in oppressing them. Thus when[24] Antipater made a law at

Athens that whosoever was not worth two thousand drachms should have no

power to vote, he formed by this method the best aristocracy possible;

because this was so small a sum as to exclude very few, and not one of

any rank or consideration in the city.



Aristocratic families ought therefore, as much as possible, to level

themselves in appearance with the people. The more an aristocracy

borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection: and, in

proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect.



But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the people

that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command, as the

aristocracy of Poland, where the peasants are slaves to the nobility.



4. Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government. The

intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers constitute the nature of

monarchical government; I mean of that in which a single person governs

by fundamental laws. I said the intermediate, subordinate, and dependent

powers. And indeed, in monarchies the prince is the source of all power,

political and civil. These fundamental laws necessarily suppose the

intermediate channels through which the power flows: for if there be

only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the

state, nothing can be fixed, and of course there is no fundamental law.



The most natural, intermediate, and subordinate power is that of the

nobility. This in some measure seems to be essential to a monarchy,

whose fundamental maxim is: no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no

monarch; but there may be a despotic prince.



There are men who have endeavoured in some countries in Europe to

suppress the jurisdiction of the nobility, not perceiving that they were

driving at the very thing that was done by the parliament of England.

Abolish the privileges of the lords, the clergy and cities in a

monarchy, and you will soon have a popular state, or else a despotic

government.



The courts of a considerable kingdom in Europe have, for many ages, been

striking at the patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords and clergy. We do

not pretend to censure these sage magistrates; but we leave it to the

public to judge how far this may alter the constitution. Far am I from

being prejudiced in favour of the privileges of the clergy; however, I

should be glad if their jurisdiction were once fixed. The question is

not whether their jurisdiction was justly established; but whether it be

really established; whether it constitutes a part of the laws of the

country, and is in every respect in relation to those laws: whether

between two powers acknowledged independent, the conditions ought not to

be reciprocal; and whether it be not equally the duty of a good subject

to defend the prerogative of the prince, and to maintain the limits

which from time immemorial have been prescribed to his authority.



Though the ecclesiastic power be so dangerous in a republic, yet it is

extremely proper in a monarchy, especially of the absolute kind. What

would become of Spain and Portugal, since the subversion of their laws,

were it not for this only barrier against the incursions of arbitrary

power? A barrier ever useful when there is no other: for since a

despotic government is productive of the most dreadful calamities to

human nature, the very evil that restrains it is beneficial to the

subject.



In the same manner as the ocean, threatening to overflow the whole

earth, is stopped by weeds and pebbles that lie scattered along the

shore, so monarchs, whose power seems unbounded, are restrained by the

smallest obstacles, and suffer their natural pride to be subdued by

supplication and prayer.



The English, to favour their liberty, have abolished all the

intermediate powers of which their monarchy was composed. They have a

great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty; were they ever to be

so unhappy as to lose it, they would be one of the most servile nations

upon earth.



Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a republican and monarchical

constitution, was one of the greatest promoters of absolute power ever

known in Europe. Besides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to

his direction, he would fain suppress all the intermediate ranks, and

abolish the political communities. He was dissolving[25] the monarchy by

his chimerical reimbursements, and seemed as if he even wanted to redeem

the constitution.



It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy; there must

be also a depositary of the laws. This depositary can only be the judges

of the supreme courts of justice, who promulgate the new laws, and

revive the obsolete. The natural ignorance of the nobility, their

indolence and contempt of civil government, require that there should be

a body invested with the power of reviving and executing the laws, which

would be otherwise buried in oblivion. The prince's council are not a

proper depositary. They are naturally the depositary of the momentary

will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Besides, the

prince's council is continually changing; it is neither permanent nor

numerous; neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the

people; consequently it is capable of setting them right in difficult

conjunctures, or of reducing them to proper obedience.



Despotic governments, where there are no fundamental laws, have no such

kind of depositary. Hence it is that religion has generally so much

influence in those countries, because it forms a kind of permanent

depositary; and if this cannot be said of religion, it may of the

customs that are respected instead of laws.



5. Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government. From

the nature of despotic power it follows that the single person, invested

with this power, commits the execution of it also to a single person. A

man whom his senses continually inform that he himself is everything and

that his subjects are nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and

ignorant. In consequence of this, he neglects the management of public

affairs. But were he to commit the administration to many, there would

be continual disputes among them; each would form intrigues to be his

first slave; and he would be obliged to take the reins into his own

hands. It is, therefore, more natural for him to resign it to a

vizir,[26] and to invest him with the same power as himself. The

creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government.



It is related of a pope that he had started an infinite number of

difficulties against his election, from a thorough conviction of his

incapacity. At length he was prevailed on to accept of the pontificate,

and resigned the administration entirely to his nephew. He was soon

struck with surprise, and said, "I should never have thought that these

things were so easy." The same may be said of the princes of the East,

who, being educated in a prison where eunuchs corrupt their hearts and

debase their understandings, and where they are frequently kept ignorant

even of their high rank, when drawn forth in order to be placed on the

throne, are at first confounded: but as soon as they have chosen a

vizir, and abandoned themselves in their seraglio to the most brutal

passions; pursuing, in the midst of a prostituted court, every

capricious extravagance, they would never have dreamed that they could

find matters so easy.



The more extensive the empire, the larger the seraglio; and consequently

the more voluptuous the prince. Hence the more nations such a sovereign

has to rule, the less he attends to the cares of government; the more

important his affairs, the less he makes them the subject of his

deliberations.



______



1. Compare Aristotle, Politics, vi. 2.



2. Declamations, 17, 18.



3. See the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of

the Romans, 9.



4. Pp. 691, 693, ed. Wechel, 1596.



5. Bk. i.



6. Bk. iv, art. 15 et seq.



7. See in the Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline

of the Romans, 9, how this spirit of Servius Tullius was preserved in

the republic.



8. Dionysius Halicarnassus, Eulogium of Isocrates, ii, p. 97, ed.

Wechel. Pollux, viii. 10, art. 130.



9. See Aristotle's Politics, ii. 12.



10. Ibid, iv. 9.



11. See the oration of Demosthenes, De Falsa legat., and the oration

against Timarchus.



12. They used even to draw two tickets for each place, one which gave

the place, and the other which named the person who was to succeed, in

case the first was rejected.



13. De Leg., i, iii.



14. They were called leges tabulares; two tablets were presented to each

citizen, the first marked with an A, for Antique, or I forbid it; and

the other with an U and an R, for Uti rogas, or Be it as you desire.



15. At Athens the people used to lift up their hands.



16. As at Venice.



17. The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered the suffrages of the

Areopagites to be public, in order to manage them as they pleased. --

Lysias, Orat. contra Agorat. 8.



18. See Dionysius Halicarnassus, iv, ix.



19. See Mr. Addison, Travels to Italy, p. 16.



20. They were named at first by the consuls.



21. This is what ruined the republic of Rome. See Considerations on the

Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans, 14, 16.



22. Tournefort, Voyages.



23. At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months.



24. Diodorus, xviii, p. 601, ed. Rhodoman.



25. Ferdinand, king of Aragon, made himself grand master of the orders,

and that alone changed the constitution.



26. The Eastern kings are never without vizirs, says Sir John Chardin.



------------------------------------------------------------------------



Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government



1. Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government. Having

examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government, we must

investigate those which relate to its principle.



There is this difference between the nature and principle[1] of

government, that the former is that by which it is constituted, the

latter that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure,

and the other the human passions which set it in motion.



Now, laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of

each government. We must, therefore, inquire into this principle, which

shall be the subject of this third book.



2. Of the Principle of different Governments. I have already observed

that it is the nature of a republican government that either the

collective body of the people, or particular families, should be

possessed of the supreme power; of a monarchy, that the prince should

have this power, but in the execution of it should be directed by

established laws; of a despotic government, that a single person should

rule according to his own will and caprice. This enables me to discover

their three principles; which are thence naturally derived. I shall

begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of

democracy.



3. Of the Principle of Democracy. There is no great share of probity

necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of

laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct

and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is

necessary, namely, virtue.



What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of

historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it

is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the

laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue

than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the

execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their

direction.



Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence,

ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil;

he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But

when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as

this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is

certainly undone.



A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent

efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they

who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue;

as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of

their members;[2] as the prevailing parties were successively animated

by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the

people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a

commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent

shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which

they had so wantonly proscribed. 



When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city

was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble

remains of virtue, which were continually diminishing. Instead of being

roused from her lethargy by Cæsar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and

Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows,

her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.



The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other

support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely

taken up with manufacture, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.



When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are

disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The

objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has

become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws,

but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen

is like a slave who has run away from his master, that which was a maxim

of equity he calls rigour; that which was a rule of action he styles

constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and

not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of

individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this has become the

patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on

the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the

licence of many.



Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so

gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty

thousand citizens[3] when she defended the Greeks against the Persians,

when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had

twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them[4] as slaves are

told by the head in a market-place. When Philip attempted to lord it

over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens[5] she had even then

lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to

awaken her; she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of

her pleasures.[6] This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats,

and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes,

was overthrown at Chæronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of

resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners,

if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over

the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.



How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal,

upon his being made prætor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from

plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans?

Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and be beholden for

their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having

three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them

next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war.[7]

From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city, one may judge of

what she might have performed in her full vigour, and assisted by

virtue.



4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy. As virtue is necessary in a popular

government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in

the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.



The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects

with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have,

therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But

how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws

against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting

against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the

very nature of the constitution.



An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy.

The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own

particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there

are laws in being to see them executed.



But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people,

it is difficult to restrain themselves.[8] Such is the nature of this

constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the

power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.



Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by

a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a

level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic;

or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one

another, and upon this their preservation depends.



Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation,

I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and

pusillanimity.



5. That Virtue is not the Principle of a Monarchical Government. In

monarchies, policy effects great things with as little virtue as

possible. Thus in the nicest machines, art has reduced the number of

movements, springs, and wheels.



The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the

thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest

interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the

ancients, and to us are known only by tradition. 



The laws supply here the place of those virtues; they are by no means

wanted, and the state dispenses with them: an action performed here in

secret is in some measure of no consequence.



Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a

distinction between crimes really public and those that are private,

which are so called because they are more injurious to individuals than

to the community.



Now in republics private crimes are more public, that is, they attack

the constitution more than they do individuals; and in monarchies,

public crimes are more private, that is, they are more prejudicial to

private people than to the constitution.



I beg that no one will be offended with what I have been saying; my

observations are founded on the unanimous testimony of historians. I am

not ignorant that virtuous princes are so very rare; but I venture to

affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be

virtuous.[9]



Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning

the courts of monarchs; let us recollect the conversations and

sentiments of people of all countries, in respect to the wretched

character of courtiers, and we shall find that these are not airy

speculations, but truths confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience.



Ambition in idleness; meanness mixed with pride; a desire of riches

without industry; aversion to truth; flattery, perfidy, violation of

engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope

from his weakness, but, above all, a perpetual ridicule cast upon

virtue, are, I think, the characteristics by which most courtiers in all

ages and countries have been constantly distinguished. Now, it is

exceedingly difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves,

and the inferior sort to be honest; for the former to be cheats, and the

latter to rest satisfied with being only dupes.



But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man[10] among the

people. Cardinal Richelieu, in his political testament, seems to hint

that a prince should take care not to employ him.[11] So true is it that

virtue is not the spring of this government! It is not indeed excluded,

but it is not the spring of government.



6. In what Manner Virtue is supplied in a Monarchical Government. But it

is high time for me to have done with this subject, lest I should be

suspected of writing a satire against monarchical government. Far be it

from me; if monarchy wants one spring, it is provided with another.

Honour, that is, the prejudice of every person and rank, supplies the

place of the political virtue of which I have been speaking, and is

everywhere her representative: here it is capable of inspiring the most

glorious actions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us to the

end of government as well as virtue itself.



Hence, in well-regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects,

and very few good men; for to be a good man[12] a good intention is

necessary,[13] and we should love our country, not so much on our own

account, as out of regard to the community. 



7. Of the Principle of Monarchy. A monarchical government supposes, as

we have already observed, pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble

descent. Now since it is the nature of honour to aspire to preferments

and titles, it is properly placed in this government.



Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has some good

effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this

advantage, that it is in no way dangerous, because it may be continually

checked.



It is with this kind of government as with the system of the universe,

in which there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the

centre, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honour sets

all the parts of the body politic in motion, and by its very action

connects them; thus each individual advances the public good, while he

only thinks of promoting his own interest.



True it is that, philosophically speaking, it is a false honour which

moves all the parts of the government; but even this false honour is as

useful to the public as true honour could possibly be to private

persons.



Is it not very exacting to oblige men to perform the most difficult

actions, such as require an extraordinary exertion of fortitude and

resolution, without other recompense than that of glory and applause?



8. That Honour is not the Principle of Despotic Government. Honour is

far from being the principle of despotic government: mankind being here

all upon a level, no one person can prefer himself to another; and as on

the other hand they are all slaves, they can give themselves no sort of

preference.



Besides, as honour has its laws and rules, as it knows not how to

submit; as it depends in a great measure on a man's own caprice, and not

on that of another person; it can be found only in countries in which

the constitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.



How can despotism abide with honour? The one glories in the contempt of

life; and the other is founded on the power of taking it away. How can

honour, on the other hand, bear with despotism? The former has its fixed

rules, and peculiar caprices; but the latter is directed by no rule, and

its own caprices are subversive of all others.



Honour, therefore, a thing unknown in arbitrary governments, some of

which have not even a proper word to express it,[14] is the prevailing

principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic,

to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.



9. Of the Principle of Despotic Government. As virtue is necessary in a

republic, and in a monarchy honour, so fear is necessary in a despotic

government: with regard to virtue, there is no occasion for it, and

honour would be extremely dangerous.



Here the immense power of the prince devolves entirely upon those whom

he is pleased to entrust with the administration. Persons capable of

setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create disturbances.

Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least

sense of ambition.



A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and without the least

danger, relax its springs. It supports itself by the laws, and by its

own internal strength. But when a despotic prince ceases for one single

moment to uplift his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom

he has entrusted with the first employments,[15] all is over: for as

fear, the spring of this government, no longer subsists, the people are

left without a protector.



It is probably in this sense the Cadis maintained that the Grand

Seignior was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited

thereby his authority.[16]



It is necessary that the people should be judged by laws, and the great

men by the caprice of the prince, that the lives of the lowest subject

should be safe, and the pasha's head ever in danger. We cannot mention

these monstrous governments without horror. The Sophi of Persia,

dethroned in our days by Mahomet, the son of Miriveis, saw the

constitution subverted before this resolution, because he had been too

sparing of blood.[17]



History informs us that the horrid cruelties of Domitian struck such a

terror into the governors that the people recovered themselves a little

during his reign.[18] Thus a torrent overflows one side of a country,

and on the other leaves fields untouched, where the eye is refreshed by

the prospect of fine meadows.



10. Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments. In

despotic states, the nature of government requires the most passive

obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought

infallibly to produce its effect.



Here they have no limitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms,

equivalents, or remonstrances; no change to propose: man is a creature

that blindly submits to the absolute will of the sovereign.



In a country like this they are no more allowed to represent their

apprehensions of a future danger than to impute their miscarriage to the

capriciousness of fortune. Man's portion here, like that of beasts, is

instinct, compliance, and punishment.



Little does it then avail to plead the sentiments of nature, filial

respect, conjugal or parental tenderness, the laws of honour, or want of

health; the order is given, and, that is sufficient.



In Persia, when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful

to mention his name, or to intercede in his favour. Even if the prince

were intoxicated, or non compos, the decree must be executed;[19]

otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no

contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in that country in all

ages; as the order which Ahasuerus gave, to exterminate the Jews, could

not be revoked, they were allowed the liberty of defending themselves.



One thing, however, may be sometimes opposed to the prince's will,[20]

namely, religion. They will abandon, nay they will slay a parent, if the

prince so commands; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. The laws of

religion are of a superior nature, because they bind the sovereign as

well as the subject. But with respect to the law of nature, it is

otherwise; the prince is no longer supposed to be a man.



In monarchical and moderate states, the power is limited by its very

spring, I mean by honour, which, like a monarch, reigns over the prince

and his people. They will not allege to their sovereign the laws of

religion; a courtier would be apprehensive of rendering himself

ridiculous. But the laws of honour will be appealed to on all occasions.

Hence arise the restrictions necessary to obedience; honour is naturally

subject to whims, by which the subject's submission will be ever

directed.



Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of

government, the power is the same. On which side soever the monarch

turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is

that in a monarchy the prince receives instruction, at the same time

that his ministers have greater abilities, and are more versed in public

affairs, than the ministers of a despotic government.



11. Reflections on the preceding Chapters. Such are the principles of

the three sorts of government: which does not imply that in a particular

republic they actually are, but that they ought to be, virtuous; nor

does it prove that in a particular monarchy they are actuated by honour,

or in a particular despotic government by fear; but that they ought to

be directed by these principles, otherwise the government is imperfect.



______



1. This is a very important distinction, whence I shall draw many

consequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws.



2. Cromwell.



3. Plutarch, Pericles; Plato, in Critias.



4. She had at that time twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand

strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves. See Athenæus, vi.



5. She had then twenty thousand citizens. See Demosthenes in Aristog.



6. They had passed a law, which rendered it a capital crime for any one

to propose applying the money designed for the theatres to military



7. This lasted three years.



8. Public crimes may be punished, because it is here a common concern;

but private crimes will go unpunished, because it is the common interest

not to punish them.



9. I speak here of political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is

directed to the public good; very little of private moral virtue, and

not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths. This will

appear better in v. 2.



10. This is to be understood in the sense of the preceding note.



11. We must not, says he, employ people of mean extraction; they are too

rigid and morose. -- Testament Polit., 4.



12. This word good man is understood here in a political sense only.



13. See Footnote 1.



14. See Perry, p. 447.



15. As it often happens in a military aristocracy.



16. Ricaut on the Ottoman Empire. I, ii.



17. See the history of this revolution by Father du Cerceau.



18. Suetonius, Life of Domitian, viii. His was a military constitution,

which is one of the species of despotic government.



19. See Sir John Chardin.



20. Ibid.



------------------------------------------------------------------------





Book IV. That the Laws of Education Ought to Be in Relation to the

Principles of Government



1. Of the Laws of Education. The laws of education are the first

impressions we receive; and as they prepare us for civil life, every

private family ought to be governed by the plan of that great household

which comprehends them all.



If the people in general have a principle, their constituent parts, that

is, the several families, will have one also. The laws of education will

be therefore different in each species of government: in monarchies they

will have honour for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic

governments, fear.



2. Of Education in Monarchies. In monarchies the principal branch of

education is not taught in colleges or academies. It commences, in some

measure, at our setting out in the world; for this is the school of what

we call honour, that universal preceptor which ought everywhere to be

our guide.



Here it is that we constantly hear three rules or maxims, viz., that we

should have a certain nobleness in our virtues, a kind of frankness in

our morals, and a particular politeness in our behaviour.



The virtues we are here taught are less what we owe to others than to

ourselves; they are not so much what draws us towards society, as what

distinguishes us from our fellow-citizens. Here the actions of men are

judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not

as reasonable, but as extraordinary. When honour here meets with

anything noble in our actions, it is either a judge that approves them,

or sophist by whom they are excused.



It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection,

or with that of conquest; this is the reason why we never meet with so

strict a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican governments.



It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the notion of greatness

of soul or importance of affairs; as, for instance, in politics, with

finesses of which it is far from being offended.



It does not forbid adulation, save when separated from the idea of a

large fortune, and connected only with the sense of our mean condition.



With regard to morals, I have observed that the education of monarchies

ought to admit of a certain frankness and open carriage. Truth,

therefore, in conversation is here a necessary point. But is it for the

sake of truth? By no means. Truth is requisite only because a person

habituated to veracity has an air of boldness and freedom. And indeed a

man of this stamp seems to lay a stress only on the things themselves,

not on the manner in which they are received.



Hence it is that in proportion as this kind of frankness is commended,

that of the common people is despised, which has nothing but truth and

simplicity for its object.



In fine, the education of monarchies requires a certain politeness of

behaviour. Man, a sociable animal, is formed to please in society; and a

person that would break through the rules of decency, so as to shock

those he conversed with, would lose the public esteem, and become

incapable of doing any good.



But politeness, generally speaking, does not derive its origin from so

pure a source. It arises from a desire of distinguishing ourselves. It

is pride that renders us polite; we are flattered with being taken

notice of for behaviour that shows we are not of a mean condition, and

that we have not been bred with those who in all ages are considered the

scum of the people.



Politeness, in monarchies, is naturalised at court. One man excessively

great renders everybody else little. Hence that regard which is paid to

our fellow-subjects; hence that politeness, equally pleasing to those by

whom, as to those towards whom, it is practised, because it gives people

to understand that a person actually belongs, or at least deserves to

belong, to the court.



A courtly air consists in quitting a real for a borrowed greatness. The

latter pleases the courtier more than the former. It inspires him with a

certain disdainful modesty, which shows itself externally, but whose

pride insensibly diminishes in proportion to its distance from the

source of this greatness.



At court we find a delicacy of taste in everything -- a delicacy arising

from the constant use of the superfluities of life, from the variety,

and especially the satiety, of pleasures, from the multiplicity and even

confusion of fancies, which, if they are but agreeable, are sure of

being well received.



These are the things which properly fall within the province of

education, in order to form what we call a man of honour, a man

possessed of all the qualities and virtues requisite in this kind of

government.



Here it is that honour interferes with everything, mixing even with

people's manner of thinking, and directing their very principles.



To this whimsical honour it is owing that the virtues are only just what

it pleases; it adds rules of its own invention to everything prescribed

to us; it extends or limits our duties according to its own fancy,

whether they proceed from religion, politics, or morality.



There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the laws, by

religion and honour, as submission to the prince's will; but this very

honour tells us that the prince never ought to command a dishonourable

action, because this would render us incapable of serving him.



Crillon refused to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but offered to fight

him. After the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX, having sent

orders to the governors in the several provinces for the Huguenots to be

murdered, Viscount Dorte, who commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the

king:[1] "Sire, among the inhabitants of this town, and your majesty's

troops, I could not find so much as one executioner; they are honest

citizens and brave soldiers. We jointly, therefore, beseech your majesty

to command our arms and lives in things that are practicable." This

great and generous soul looked upon a base action as a thing impossible.



There is noth