Of the Manner of Composing Laws
1. Of the Spirit of a Legislator. I say it,
and methinks I have undertaken this work with no other view than to prove
it, the spirit of a legislator ought to be that of moderation; political,
like moral good, lying always between two extremes.1
Let us produce an example.
The set forms of justice are necessary to liberty, but the number of
them might be so great as to be contrary to the end of the very laws that
established them; processes would have no end; property would be
uncertain; the goods of one of the parties would be adjudged to the other
without examining, or they would both be ruined by examining too much.
The citizens would lose their liberty and security, the accusers would
no longer have any means to convict, nor the accused to justify
2. The same Subject continued. Cecilius, in
Aulus Gellius,2 speaking of the law
of the Twelve Tables which permitted the creditor to cut the insolvent
debtor into pieces, justifies it even by its cruelty, which hindered
people from borrowing beyond their ability of paying.3
Shall then the cruellest laws be the best? Shall goodness consist in
excess, and all the relations of things be destroyed?
3. That the Laws which seem to deviate from the
Views of the Legislator are frequently agreeable to them. The law of
Solon which declared those persons infamous who espoused no side in an
insurrection seemed very extraordinary; but we ought to consider the
circumstances in which Greece was at that time. It was divided into very
small states; and there was reason to apprehend lest in a republic torn by
intestine divisions the soberest part should keep retired, in consequence
of which things might be carried to extremity.
In the seditions raised in those petty states the bulk of the citizens
either made or engaged in the quarrel. In our large monarchies parties are
formed by a few, and the people choose to live quietly, In the latter case
it is natural to call back the seditious to the bulk of the citizens, and
not these to the seditious; in the other it is necessary to oblige the
small number of prudent people to enter among the seditious; it is thus
the fermentation of one liquor may be stopped by a single drop of another.
4. Of the Laws contrary to the Views of the
Legislator. There are laws so little understood by the legislator as
to be contrary to the very end he proposed. Those who made this regulation
among the French, that when one of the two competitors died the benefice
should devolve to the survivor, had in view, without doubt, the extinction
of quarrels; but the very reverse falls out; we see the clergy at variance
every day, and like English mastiffs worrying one another to death.
5. The same Subject continued. The law I am
going to speak of is to be found in this oath preserved by Æschines:4
"I swear that I will never destroy a town of the Amphictyones, and
that I will not divert the course of its running waters; if any nation
shall presume to do such a thing, I will declare war against them and will
destroy their towns." The last article of this law, which seems to
confirm the first, is really contrary to it. Amphictyon is willing that
the Greek towns should never be destroyed, and yet his law paves the way
for their destruction. In order to establish a proper law of nations among
the Greeks, they ought to have been accustomed early to think it a
barbarous thing to destroy a Greek town; consequently they ought not even
to ruin the destroyers. Amphictyon's law was just, but it was not prudent;
this appears even from the abuse made of it. Did not Philip assume the
power of demolishing towns, under the pretence of their having infringed
the laws of the Greeks? Amphictyon might have inflicted other punishments;
he might have ordained, for example, that a certain number of the
magistrates of the destroying town, or of the chiefs of the infringing
army, should be punished with death; that the destroying nation should
cease for a while to enjoy the privileges of the Greeks; that they should
pay a fine till the town was rebuilt. The law ought, above all things, to
aim at the reparation of damages.
6. The Laws which appear the same have not always
the same Effect. Cæsar made a law to prohibit people from
keeping above sixty sesterces in their houses.5
This law was considered at Rome as extremely proper for reconciling the
debtors to their creditors, because, by obliging the rich to lend to the
poor, they enabled the latter to pay their debts. A law of the same nature
made in France at the time of the System proved extremely fatal, because
it was enacted under a most frightful situation. After depriving people of
all possible means of laying out their money, they stripped them even of
the last resource of keeping it at home, which was the same as taking it
from them by open violence. Cæsar's law was intended to make the
money circulate; the French minister's design was to draw all the money
into one hand. The former gave either lands or mortgages on private people
for the money; the latter proposed in lieu of money nothing but effects
which were of no value, and could have none by their very nature, because
the law compelled people to accept of them.
7. The same Subject continued. Necessity of
composing Laws in a proper Manner. The law of ostracism was
established at Athens, at Argos,6
and at Syracuse. At Syracuse it was productive of a thousand mischiefs,
because it was imprudently enacted. The principal citizens banished one
another by holding the leaf of a fig-tree in their hands, so that those
who had any kind of merit withdrew from public affairs.7
At Athens, where the legislator was sensible of the proper extent and
limits of his law, ostracism proved an admirable regulation. They never
condemned more than one person at a time; and such a number of suffrages
were requisite for passing this sentence that it was extremely difficult
for them to banish aperson whose absence was not necessary to the state.8
The power of banishing was exercised only every fifth year: and indeed,
as the ostracism was designed against none but great personages who
threatened the state with danger, it ought not to have been the
transaction of every day.
8. That Laws which appear the same were not
always made through the same Motive. In France they have received most
of the Roman laws on substitutions, but through quite a different motive
from the Romans. Among the latter the inheritance was accompanied with
certain sacrifices9 which were to
be performed by the inheritor and were regulated by the pontifical law;
hence it was that they reckoned it a dishonour to die without heirs, that
they made slaves their heirs, and that they devised substitutions. Of this
we have a very strong proof in the vulgar substitution, which was the
first invented, and took place only when the heir appointed did not accept
of the inheritance. Its view was not to perpetuate the estate in a family
of the same name, but to find somebody that would accept of it.
9. That the Greek and Roman Laws punished
Suicide, but not through the same Motive. A man, says Plato, who has
killed one nearly related to him, that is, himself, not by an order of the
magistrate, not to avoid ignominy, but through pusillanimity shall be
punished.10 The Roman law punished
this action when it was not committed through pusillanimity, through
weariness of life, through impatience in pain, but from a criminal
despair. The Roman law acquitted where the Greek condemned, and condemned
where the other acquitted.
Plato's law was formed upon the Lacedæmonian institutions, where
the orders of the magistrate were absolute, where shame was the greatest
of miseries, and pusillanimity the greatest of crimes. The Romans had no
longer those refined ideas; theirs was only a fiscal law.
During the time of the republic, there was no law at Rome against
suicides; this action is always considered by their historians in a
favourable light, and we never meet with any punishment inflicted upon
those who committed it.
Under the first emperors, the great families of Rome were continually
destroyed by criminal prosecutions. The custom was then introduced of
preventing judgment by a voluntary death. In this they found a great
advantage: they had an honourable interment, and their wills were
executed, because there was no law against suicides.11
But when the emperors became as avaricious as cruel, they deprived those
who destroyed themselves of the means of preserving their estates by
rendering it criminal for a person to make away with himself through a
What I have been saying of the motive of the emperors is so true, that
they consented that the estates of suicides should not be confiscated when
the crime for which they killed themselves was not punished with
10. That Laws which seem contrary proceed
sometimes from the same Spirit. In our time we give summons to people
in their own houses; but this was not permitted among the Romans.13
A summons was a violent action,14
and a kind of warrant for seizing the body;15
hence it was no more allowed to summon a person in his own house than it
is now allowed to arrest a person in his own house for debt.
Both the Roman and our laws admit of this principle alike, that every
man ought to have his own house for an asylum, where he should suffer no
11. How to compare two different Systems of Laws.
In France the punishment for false witnesses is capital; in England it is
not. Now, to be able to judge which of these two laws is the best, we must
add that in France the rack is used for criminals, but not in England;
that in France the accused is not allowed to produce his witnesses, and
that they very seldom admit of what are called justifying circumstances in
favour of the prisoner; in England they allow of witnesses on both sides.
These three French laws form a close and well-connected system; and so do
the three English laws. The law of England, which does not allow of the
racking of criminals, has but very little hope of drawing from the accused
a confession of his crime; for this reason it invites witnesses from all
parts, and does not venture to discourage them by the fear of a capital
punishment. The French law, which has one resource more, is not afraid of
intimidating the witnesses; on the contrary, reason requires they should
be intimidated; it listens only to the witnesses on one side, which are
those produced by the attorney-general, and the fate of the accused
depends entirely on their testimony.17
But in England they admit of witnesses on both sides, and the affair is
discussed in some measure between them; consequently false witness is
there less dangerous, the accused having a remedy against the false
witness which he has not in France. Wherefore, to determine which of those
systems is most agreeable to reason, we must take them each as a whole and
compare them in their entirety.
12. That Laws which appear the same are sometimes
really different. The Greek and Roman laws inflicted the same
punishment on the receiver as on the thief;18
the French law does the same. The former acted rationally, but the latter
does not. Among the Greeks and Romans the thief was condemned to a
pecuniary punishment, which ought also to be inflicted on the receiver;
for every man that contributes in what shape soever to a damage is obliged
to repair it. But as the punishment of theft is capital with us, the
receiver cannot be punished like the thief without carrying things to
excess. A receiver may act innocently on a thousand occasions: the thief
is always culpable; one hinders the conviction of a crime, the other
commits it; in one the whole is passive, the other is active; the thief
must surmount more obstacles, and his soul must be more hardened against
The civilians have gone further; they look upon the receiver as more
odious than the thief,19 for were
it not for the receiver the theft, say they, could not be long concealed.
But this again might be right when there was only a pecuniary punishment;
the affair in question was a damage done, and the receiver was generally
better able to repair it; but when the punishment became capital, they
ought to have been directed by other principles.
13. That we must not separate Laws from the End
for which they were made: of the Roman Laws on Theft. When a thief was
caught in the act, this was called by the Romans a manifest theft; when he
was not detected till some time afterwards, it was a non-manifest theft.
The law of the Twelve Tables ordained that a manifest thief should be
whipped with rods and condemned to slavery if he had attained the age of
puberty; or only whipped if he was not of ripe age; but as for the
nonmanifest thief, he was only condemned to a fine of double the value of
what he had stolen.
When the Porcian laws abolished the custom of whipping the citizens with
rods, and of reducing them to slavery, the manifest thief was condemned to
a payment of fourfold, and they still continued to condemn the
non-manifest thief to a payment of double.20
It seems very odd that these laws should make such a difference in the
quality of those two crimes, and in the punishments they inflicted. And,
indeed, whether the thief was detected either before or after he had
carried the stolen goods to the place intended, this was a circumstance
which did not alter the nature of the crime. I do not at all question that
the whole theory of the Roman laws in relation to theft was borrowed from
the Lacedæmonian institutions. Lycurgus, with a view of rendering
the citizens dextrous and cunning, ordained that children should be
practised in thieving, and that those who were caught in the act should be
severely whipped. This occasioned among the Greeks, and afterwards among
the Romans, a great difference between a manifest and a non-manifest
Among the Romans, a slave who had been guilty of stealing was thrown
from the Tarpeian rock. Here the Lacedæmonian institutions were out
of the question; the laws of Lycurgus in relation to theft were not made
for slaves; to deviate from them in this respect was in reality conforming
At Rome, when a person of unripe age happened to be caught in the act,
the prætor ordered him to be whipped with rods according to his
pleasure, as was practised at Sparta. All this had a more remote origin.
The Lacedæmonians had derived these usages from the Cretans; and
Plato,22 who wants to prove that
the Cretan institutions were designed for war, cites the following,
namely, the power of bearing pain in individual combats, and in thefts
which have to be concealed.
As the civil laws depend on the political institutions, because they are
made for the same society, whenever there is a design of adopting the
civil law of another nation, it would be proper to examine beforehand
whether they have both the same institutions and the same political law.
Thus when the Cretan laws on theft were adopted by the Lacedæmonians,
as their constitution and government were adopted at the same time, these
laws were equally reasonable in both nations. But when they were carried
from Lacedæmon to Rome, as they did not find there the same
constitution, they were always thought strange, and had no manner of
connection with the other civil laws of the Romans.
14. That we must not separate the Laws from the
Circumstances in which they were made. It was decreed by a law at
Athens that when the city was besieged, all the useless people should be
put to death.23 This was an
abominable political law, in consequence of an abominable law of nations.
Among the Greeks, the inhabitants of a town taken lost their civil liberty
and were sold as slaves. The taking of a town implied its entire
destruction, which is the source not only of those obstinate defences, and
of those unnatural actions, but likewise of those shocking laws which they
The Roman laws ordained that physicians should be punished for neglect
or unskilfulness.24 In those cases,
if the physician was a person of any fortune or rank, he was only
condemned to deportation, but if he was of a low condition he was put to
death. By our institutions it is otherwise. The Roman laws were not made
under the same circumstances as ours: at Rome every ignorant pretender
intermeddled with physic; but among us, physicians are obliged to go
through a regular course of study, and to take their degrees, for which
reason they are supposed to understand their profession.
15. That sometimes it is proper the Law should
amend itself. The law of the Twelve Tables allowed people to kill a
night-thief as well as a day-thief,25
if upon being pursued he attempted to make a defence; but it required that
the person who killed the thief should cry out and call his
fellow-citizens. This is indeed what those laws, which permit people to do
justice to themselves, ought always to require. It is the cry of innocence
which in the very moment of the action calls in witnesses and appeals to
judges. The people ought to take cognizance of the action, and at the very
instant of its being done; an instant when everything speaks, even air,
countenance, passions, silence; and when every word either condemns or
absolves. A law which may become so opposed to the security and liberty of
the citizens ought to be executed in their presence.26
16. Things to be observed in the composing of
Laws. They who have a genius sufficient to enable them to give laws to
their own, or to another nation, ought to be particularly attentive to the
manner of forming them.
The style ought to be concise. The laws of the Twelve Tables are a model
of conciseness; the very children used to learn them by heart.27
Justinian's Novellæ were so very diffuse that they were
obliged to abridge them.28
The style should also be plain and simple, a direct expression being
better understood than an indirect one. There is no majesty at all in the
laws of the lower empire; princes are made to speak like rhetoricians.
When the style of laws is inflated, they are looked upon only as a work of
parade and ostentation.
It is an essential article that the words of the laws should excite in
everybody the same ideas. Cardinal Richelieu29
agreed that a minister might be accused before the king, but he would have
the accuser punished if the facts he proved were not matters of moment.
This was enough to hinder people from telling any truth whatsoever against
the minister, because a matter of moment is entirely relative, and what
may be of moment to one is not so to another.
The law of Honorius punished with death any person that purchased a
freedman as a slave, or that gave him molestation.30
He should not have made use of so vague an expression; the molestation
given a man depends entirely on the degree of his sensibility.
When the law has to impose a penalty, it should avoid as much as
possible the estimating it in money. The value of money changes from a
thousand causes, and the same denomination continues without the same
thing. Every one knows the story of that impudent fellow at Rome31
who used to give those he met a box on the ear, and afterwards tendered
them the five-and-twenty pence of the law of the Twelve Tables.
When the law has once fixed the idea of things, it should never return
to vague expressions. The ordinance of Louis XIV32
concerning criminal matters, after an exact enumeration of the causes in
which the king is immediately concerned, adds these words, "and those
which in all times have been subject to the determination of the king's
judges"; this again renders arbitrary what had just been fixed.
Charles VII says33 he has been
informed that the parties appeal three, four, and six months after
judgment, contrary to the custom of the kingdom in a country where custom
prevailed; he therefore ordains that they shall appeal forthwith, unless
there happens to be some fraud or deceit on the part of the attorney,34
or unless there be a great or evident cause to discharge the appeal. The
end of this law destroys the beginning, and it destroys it so effectually,
that they used afterwards to appeal during the space of thirty years.35
The law of the Lombards does not allow a woman that has taken a
religious habit,36 though she has
made no vow, to marry; because, says this law, "if a spouse who has
been contracted to a woman only by a ring cannot without guilt be married
to another, for a much stronger reason the spouse of God or of the blessed
Virgin." Now, I say, that in laws the arguments should be drawn from
one reality to another, and not from reality to figure, or from figure to
A law enacted by Constantine37
ordains that the single testimony of a bishop should be sufficient without
listening to any other witnesses. This prince took a very short method; he
judged of affairs by persons, and of persons by dignities.
The laws ought not to be subtle; they are designed for people of common
understanding, not as an art of logic, but as the plain reason of a father
of a family.
When there is no necessity for exceptions and limitations in a law, it
is much better to omit them: details of that kind throw people into new
No alteration should be made in a law without sufficient reason.
Justinian ordained that a husband might be repudiated and yet the wife not
lose her portion, if for the space of two years he had been incapable of
consummating the marriage.38 He
altered his law afterwards, and allowed the poor wretch three years.39
But in a case of that nature two years are as good as three, and three are
not worth more than two.
When a legislator condescends to give the reason of his law it ought to
be worthy of its majesty. A Roman law decrees that a blind man is
incapable to plead, because he cannot see the ornaments of the magistracy.40
So bad a reason must have been given on purpose, when such a number of
good reasons were at hand.
Paul, the jurist, says41 that a
child grows perfect in the seventh month, and that the ratio of
Pythagoras' numbers seems to prove it. It is very extraordinary that they
should judge of those things by the ratio of Pythagoras' numbers.
Some French lawyers have asserted that when the king made an acquisition
of a new country, the churches became subject to the Regale,
because the king's crown is round. I shall not examine here into the
king's rights, or whether in this case the reason of the civil or
ecclesiastic law ought to submit to that of the law of politics; I shall
only say that those august rights ought to be defended by grave maxims.
Was there ever such a thing known as the real rights of a dignity founded
on the figure of that dignity's sign?
Davila says42 that Charles IX was
declared of age in the parliament of Rouen at the commencement of his
fourteenth year, because the laws require every moment of the time to be
reckoned, in cases relating to the restitution and administration of a
ward's estate; whereas it considers the year commenced as a year complete,
when the case is concerning the acquisition of honours. I am very far from
censuring a regulation which has been hitherto attended with no
inconvenience; I shall only notice that the reason alleged is not the true
one; it is false, that the government of a nation is only an honour.
In point of presumption, that of the law is far preferable to that of
the man. The French law considers every act of a merchant during the ten
days preceding his bankruptcy as fraudulent:43
this is the presumption of the law. The Roman law inflicted punishments on
the husband who kept his wife after she had been guilty of adultery,
unless he was induced to do it through fear of the event of a lawsuit, or
through contempt of his own shame; this is the presumption of the man. The
judge must have presumed the motives of the husband's conduct, and must
have determined a very obscure and ambiguous point; when the law presumes,
it gives a fixed rule to the judge.
Plato's law,44 as I have observed
already, required that a punishment should be inflicted on the person who
killed himself not with a design of avoiding shame, but through
pusillanimity. This law was so far defective that in the only case in
which it was impossible to draw from the criminal an acknowledgment of the
motive upon which he had acted, it required the judge to determine
concerning these motives.
As useless laws debilitate such as are necessary, so those that may be
easily eluded weaken the legislation. Every law ought to have its effect,
and no one should be suffered to deviate from it by a particular
The Falcidian law ordained among the Romans, that the heir should always
have the fourth part of the inheritance; another law suffered the testator
to prohibit the heir from retaining this fourth part.45
This is making a jest of the laws. The Falcidian law became useless: for
if the testator had a mind to favour his heir, the latter had no need of
the Falcidian law; and if he did not intend to favour him, he forbad him
to make use of it.
Care should be taken that the laws be worded in such a manner as not to
be contrary to the very nature of things. In the proscription of the
Prince of Orange, Philip II promises to any man that will kill the prince
to give him, or his heirs, five-and-twenty thousand crowns, together with
the title of nobility; and this upon the word of a king, and as a servant
of God. To promise nobility for such an action! to ordain such an action
in the quality of a servant of God! This is equally subversive of the
ideas of honour, morality, and religion.
There very seldom happens to be a necessity of prohibiting a thing which
is not bad under pretence of some imaginary perfection.
There ought to be a certain simplicity and candour in the laws; made to
punish the iniquity of men, they themselves should be clad with the robes
of innocence. We find in the law of the Visigoths46
that ridiculous request, by which the Jews were obliged to eat everything
dressed with pork, provided they did not eat the pork itself. This was a
very great cruelty: they were obliged to submit to a law contrary to their
own; and they were obliged to retain nothing more of their own than what
might serve as a mark to distinguish them.
17. A bad Method of giving Laws. The Roman
Emperors manifested their will, like our princes, by decrees and edicts;
but they permitted, which our princes do not, both the judges and private
people to interrogate them by letters in their several differences; and
their answers were called rescripts. The decretals of the popes are
rescripts, strictly speaking. It is plain that this is a bad method of
legislation. Those who thus apply for laws are improper guides to the
legislator; the facts are always wrongly stated. Julius Capitolinus says47
that Trajan often refused to give this kind of rescripts, lest a single
decision, and frequently a particular favour, should be extended to all
cases. Macrinus had resolved to abolish all those rescripts;48
he could not bear that the answers of Commodus, Caracalla, and all those
other ignorant princes, should be considered as laws. Justinian thought
otherwise, and he filled his compilation with them.
I would advise those who read the Roman laws to distinguish carefully
between this sort of hypothesis, and the Senatus Consulta, the
Plebiscita, the general constitutions of the emperors, and all the
laws founded on the nature of things, on the frailty of women, the
weakness of minors, and the public utility.
18. Of the Ideas of Uniformity. There are
certain ideas of uniformity, which sometimes strike great geniuses (for
they even affected Charlemagne), but infallibly make an impression on
little souls. They discover therein a kind of perfection, which they
recognize because it is impossible for them not to see it; the same
authorized weights, the same measures in trade, the same laws in the
state, the same religion in all its parts. But is this always right and
without exception? Is the evil of changing constantly less than that of
suffering? And does not a greatness of genius consist rather in
distinguishing between those cases in which uniformity is requisite, and
those in which there is a necessity for differences? In China the Chinese
are governed by the Chinese ceremonial and the Tartars by theirs; and yet
there is no nation in the world that aims so much at tranquillity. If the
people observe the laws, what signifies it whether these laws are the
19. Of Legislators. Aristotle wanted to
indulge sometimes his jealousy against Plato, and sometimes his passion
for Alexander. Plato was incensed against the tyranny of the people of
Athens. Machiavel was full of his idol, the Duke of Valentinois. Sir
Thomas More, who spoke rather of what he had read than of what he thought,
wanted to govern all states with the simplicity of a Greek city.49
Harrington was full of the idea of his favourite republic of England,
while a crowd of writers saw nothing but confusion where monarchy is
abolished. The laws always conform to the passions and prejudices of the
legislator; sometimes the latter pass through, and only tincture them;
sometimes they remain, and are incorporated with them.
1. Aristotle, Politics, iv.
2. Book xx. 1.
3. Cecilius says that he never saw
nor read of an instance in which this punishment had been inflicted; but
it is likely that no such punishment was ever established: the opinion of
some civilians, that the law of the Twelve Tables meant only the division
of the money arising from the sale of the debtor, seems very probable.
4. De Falsa legatione.
5. Dio, xli.
6. Aristotle, Politics, v.
7. Plutarch, Dionysius.
8. See xxvi. 17, p. 223, above.
9. When the inheritance was too much
encumbered they eluded the pontifical law by certain sales, whence come
the words sine sacris hæreditas.
10. Laws ix.
11. Tacitus, Annals, vi. 29.
12. Rescript of the Emperor Pius in
Leg. 3, §§ 1, 2, ff. de bonis eorum qui ante sententiam
mortem sibi consciverunt.
13. Leg. 18, ff. de in
14. See the Law of the Twelve Tables.
15. Rapit in jus. —
Horace, Sat., i. 9. Hence they could not summon those to whom a particular
respect was due.
16. See Leg. 18, ff. de
in jus vocando.
17. By the ancient French law,
witnesses were heard on both sides; hence we find in the Institutions
of St. Louis, i. 7, that there was only a pecuniary punishment against
18. Leg. 1, ff. de
20. See what Favorinus says in Aulus
Gellius, xx. 1.
21. Compare what Plutarch says in the
Lycurgus with the laws of the Digest, title De furtis;
and the Institutes, iv, tit. 1, §§ 1, 2, 3.
22. Laws, i.
23. Syrian., in Hermog.
24. The Cornelian law De Sicariis,
Institutes, iv, tit. 3, de lege Aquilia, § 7.
25. See Leg. 4, ff. ad
26. Ibid.; see the decree of
Tassillon added to the law of the Bavarians, de popularib. Legib.
27. Ut carmen necessarium. —
Cicero, De Leg. ii, 23.
28. It is the work of Irnerius.
29. Testament. Polit.
30. Appendix to the Theodosian code
in the first volume of Father Sirmond's works, p. 737.
31. Aulus Gellius, xx. 1.
32. We find in the verbal process of
this ordinance the motives that determined him.
33. In his ordinance of
Montel-les-Tours, in the year 1453.
34. They might punish the attorney,
without there being any necessity of disturbing the public order.
35. The ordinance of the year 1667
has made some regulations upon this head.
36. Book ii, tit. 37.
37. In Father Sirmond's appendix to
the Theodosian code, i.
38. Leg. 1, Cod. de
39. See the authentic sed hodie,
in the Cod. de repudiis.
40. Leg. 1, ff. de
41. Sentences, iv. 9.
42. Della guerra civile di
Francia, p. 96.
43. It was made on November 18, 1702.
44. Laws, ix.
45. It is the authentic sed cum
46. Book xii, tit. 2, § 16.
47. See Julius Capitolinus, in
49. In his Utopia.
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