A Da Capo Press Reprint Series

THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

GENERAL EDITOR : LEONARD W. LEVY

Claremont Graduate School

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS

An Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects, and Abuses

Calculated to Draw the Timely Attention of

Government and People to a Due Consideration

of the Necessity, and the Means, of Reforming

Those Errors, Defects, and Abuses; of Restoring

the Constitution, and Saving the State

By James Burgh

VOLUME II

DA CAPO PRESS • NEW YORK • 1971

POLITICAL

DISQUISITIONS, &c.

Meta ton peri qewn logon, k. t. l. After treating of our duty to the Gods, it is proper to teach that which we owe to our Country, For our Country is, as it were, a secondary God, and the first and greatest Parent. — It it to be preferred to Parents, Wives, Children, Friends, and all things, the Gods only excepted, — And if our Country perishes, it is as impossible to save an Individual, as to preserve one of the fingers of a mortified hand. HIEROCL.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS:

OR,

An INQUIRY into public ERRORS, DEFECTS, and ABUSES. Illustrated by, and established upon FACTS and REMARKS, extracted from a Variety of AUTHORS, ancient and modern.

CALCULATED

To draw the timely ATTENTION of GOVERNMENT and PEOPLE to a due Consideration of the Necessity, and the Means, of REFORMING those ERRORS, DEFECTS, and ABUSES; of RESTORING the CONSTITUTION, and SAVING the STATE.

VOLUME II.

LONDON:

Printed for EDWARD and CHARLES DILLY. MDCCLXXIV.

PREFACE

TO VOLUME II.

I SHALL, perhaps, be accused of deviating towards superstition, if I observe, that the favourable reception given by the public to the former volume of these collections has the appearance of a good omen, that the people will at last direct their attention to the important subjects treated in them, and to the fearful and alarming Condition, into which the villainous arts of a succession of wicked ministers have brought this great empire; and that they will be no longer abused by thole at the helm; but will insist upon such a change of measures as may save our country, if our sins have not unchangeably pointed against us the vengeance of the supreme Governor of states and kingdoms.

I am afraid, the public has found in the former volume, and will find in this, many inaccuracies, as well as other deficiencies, not such as the great Roman critic comprehends under his phrase, maculæ, quas incuria fudit; for indeed I cannot accuse myself of carelessness in preparing these collections for the public, excepting only that I have not pretended to bestow much

time in polishing and working up the style of those parts which are written by me; because indeed, as I have hinted in the general preface, I should have thought such labour supererogatory and impertinent in a work of this kind. The inaccuracies I am anxious about, are those, which Horace understands by the words immediately following the above-quoted, quas humana parum cavit natura, those faults, to which the weakness of human nature, or of such poor abilities as mine at least, exposes a writer, as a less advantageous disposition of the matter, a seeming repetition of the same thoughts, and the like. My apology for these deformities must be drawn from the vastness of the variety of the matter I had to dispose of, which made it difficult to remember every thought and fact I had set down, and made it almost impossible to avoid repeating some of the same thoughts and arguments, as they occur repeatedly in the different quotations I have collected, and I could not always leave out the part, which was a repetition, without disfiguring the speeches in such a manner, as would have made them incoherent, and displeasing to the reader.

The public will, I hope, agree, that it was better to insert a weighty argument twice, than to run the hazard of leaving it out, through suspicion of its being already inserted.

I hope it will be acknowledged, that far the greatest part of the matter I have collected from authors and speakers in parliament, is weighty, forcible, pertinent to the purpose for which I advance it, and decisive upon the great political points proposed to be determined.

I beg leave just to mention, that the IId book, which treats of the COLONIES, differs from the others, both in the former volume and this, in that there is a great deal of the matter in it, not written by me, and yet not referred to the respective authors, from whom I extracted it, particularly what I have transcribed from a collection in 6 or 8 volumes 8vo. being a set of all the best pamphlets and tracts written since the beginning of the contest between Britain and the colonies. When I collected from those volumes, the passages, which are inserted in the IId book of this volume, I neglected quoting the pages of the authors, and could not afterwards, without more labour than the matter was worth, because the authority of those pamphlets and tracts is not of great consequence, unless readers will make farther enquiry, or happen, which is generally the case, to know that what is affirmed in them is true.

BOOKS quoted, or referred to, in this Second Volume.

A

ARlSTOTELIS POLITICA. Anderson's HISTORY of COMMERCE. ANTIENT UNIVERSAL HISTORY, 21 Volumes. ACTA REGIA, 4 Volumes. AMERICAN TRACTS, in 6 or 8 Volumes.

B BIBLE.

Bernard's (Governor) LETTERS.

Bacon's (Nathan.) DISCOURSES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND.

Blackstone's (Judge) COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

Burnet's HISTORY OF HIS OWN TIMES.

Brady's HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

Bolingbroke's (Lord) WORKS.

Bacon's (Lord) LETTERS.

Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

C

Clarendon's HISTORY.

Camden's BRITANNIA. Cato's LETTERS. Ciceronis (Tullii) OPERA.

Cole's MEMOIRS.

D

DEBATES (Chandler's) OF THE LORDS, 8 Vol. 8vo.

— — — — — OF THE COMMONS, 14. Vol. 8vo.

— — — — — (Almon's) OF LORDS AND COMMONS.

Davenant's (Dr.) WORKS.

DIVINE LEGATION (Warburton's). DISSERTATION ON PARTIES, by Bolingbroke. Dalrymple's MEMOIRS.

E

Elfynge's ANTIENT METHOD OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS.

Epernon (Duke d') LIFE OF. Emmii (Ubbonis) RESPUBLICA ATHENIENSIS.

F

FACTION DETECTED BY FACTS. Fletcher's WORKS. Franklin's (Dr.) LETTERS. Ferguson's HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

G

Guthrie's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. Gordon's TRACTS.

GRANDEUR ET DECADENCE DES ROMAINS. Gee, ON TRADE AND PLANTATIONS.

H

Horatii OPERA.

Hume's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. HUDIBRAS (Butler's). Harrington's OCEANA.

I

Janiçon, ETAT PRESENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DES

PROVINCES UNIES. Johnson's ENGLISH DICTIONARY,

L

Ludlow's MEMOIRS.

Livii HISTORIA ROMANA.

Lipsii (Justi.) DE MAGNITUDINE ROMANA LIBER. Laet (De) PERSIÆ DESCRIPTIO. Lyttelton's (Lord) HISTORY OF HEN. II.

M

Milton's PARADISE LOST, and POLITICAL WORKS. Macaulay's HISTORY OF ENGLAND. MAGAZINES.

Montalbani RERUM TURCICARUM COMMENTARIUS. MAGNI MOGOLI (COMMENTARIUS DE IMPERIO). Montesquieu L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, 3 Tom. 8vo. Mountague ON ANTIENT REPUBLICS. MODERN UNIVERSAL HISTORY, 44 Vol. 8vo.

N

Nepas (Corn.) VITÆ, &c.

P

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, 24 Vol. 8vo.

POLITICAL REGISTER.

Pierre (St.) OUVRAGES DE.

Pope's WORKS.

Plutarch APOPHTHEGMATA, &c.

Polybius (PREFACE TO A FRAGMENT OF).

Petyt's RIGHTS OF THE COMMONS.

R

Rapin's HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 2 Vol. Fol. Richelieu's TESTAMENT POLITIQUE. Robertson's HISTORY OF CH. V. Rushworth's COLLECTIONS.

S

STATE TRACTS in the time of k. William, 3 Vol. Fol. STATUTES AT LARGE.

Schooch, DE REPUBLICA ACHÆORUM LIBER.

Suetonii CÆSARES.

T

Thurloe's STATE PAPERS.

Tindal's CONTINUATION OF Rapin's HISTORY,

2 Vol. Fol.

Temple's (Sir Will.) WORKS. Thysii (Antonii) DE REPUBLICA ATHENIENSE LIBER, Trenchard's HISTORY OF STANDING ARMIES,

U V W

UNIVERSAL HISTORY (ANTIENT) 21 Vol.

— — — — — MODERN, 44 Vol.

Valerii Maximi HISTORIÆ. Virgilii ÆNEID.

Voltaire's ESSAIS SUR L'HISTOIRE, WHITEHALL EVENING POST. Whitelocke's MEMOIRS.

CONTENTS

OF VOLUME II.

BOOK I.

Of Places and Pensions.

CHAP. I. Page 1.

Idea of a Parliament uninfluenced by Places and Pensions; taken from the best historical and political Writers, &c.

CHAP. II. Page 37.

Placemen and Pensioners unfit for Members of Parliament, because not likely to be uninfluenced.

CHAP. III. Page 75.

That Placemen often hold a Plurality of Employments, incompatible with one another.

CHAP. IV. Page 80. Places and Pensions not given according to Merit.

CHAP. V. Page 91. Profusion in Places and Pensions.

CHAP. VI. Page 131.

That Places, Pensions, Bribes, and all the Arts of Corruption, are but false Policy, being endless and insufficient.

CHAP. VII. Page 168.

Bills, Statutes, Resolutions, &c. shewing the Sense of Mankind on the Evil of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.

CHAP. VIII. Page 195.

Speeches on the Danger of Placemen and Pensioners in Parliament.

CHAP. IX. Page 269. Of Qualifications for Members of Parliament.

BOOK II.

Of taxing the Colonies.

CHAP. I. Page 274.

That the Object, our Ministers have had in view in taxing the Colonies, was, enlarging the Power of the Court, by increasing the Number of Places and Pensions for their Dependents.

CHAP. II. Page 281.

Our Colonies of great Advantage, and therefore deserved better Treatment.

CHAP. III. Page 291.

The Colonies, though so valuable to Britain, have been greatly oppressed by the Mother Country.

CHAP. IV. Page 299. Precedents respecting Colonies.

CHAP. V. Page 302. Of Taxation without Representation.

BOOK III.

Of the Army.

CHAP. I. Page 341.

General Reflections on standing Armies in free Countries in Times of Peace.

CHAP. II. Page 361. Facts relating to the Army.

CHAP. III. Page 389.

A Militia, with the Navy, the only proper Security of a free People in an insular Situation, both against foreign Invasion and domestic Tyranny.

CHAP. IV. Page 426.

Parliamentary Transactions, Speeches, &c. relating to the Army.

ERRATA.

Page 2, Line 10 from the Bottom, for parliament,

read parliaments.

— — 39, — — 10 from the Bottom, for have wrote, read have written.

— — 73, — — 8, for a year? read a year.

— — 122, — — 70, for government, read governments, — — 168, — — 9, dele Speeches.

— — 275, — — 12 from the Bottom, for have their

all, read have but their all. — — 360, — — 5, for A.D. read A.D. 1718.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS, &c.

BOOK I. Of Places and Pensions.

CHAP. I.

Idea of a Parliament uninfluenced by Places and Pensions; taken from the best historical and political Writers, &c.

AFTER wading so long in the Serbonian bog of corruption, after having Escap'd the Stygian pool, tho' long detain'd In that obscure sojourn, whilst in our flight Through utter and thro' middle darkness borne, With other notes, than to th' Orphean lyre We sung of Chaos and eternal night; MILTON.

[ministerial influence in parliament will soon bring chaos and eternal night upon England, if not dissipated by the exertion of the spirit of a brave people] to speak plain prose; after tracing out such a multitude of foul and shameful instances of the ascendancy ob-

tained by flagitious courts over parliament, it may be some relief (it will certainly be some instruction) to the reader, to observe the difference between the conduit of corrupt^ and that of uninfluenced parliaments.

What a parliament compleatly independent would be; and what parliaments accordingly have sometimes been, may, in some measure, be conceived from this chapter, which he who can read, comparing the idea here given of incorrupt parliaments with what we have seen in our debauched times; the Englishman, I say, who can read what follows without grief and indignation, must either be incapable of forming any judgment, wherein the interest of his country lies, and ignorant of what intimately concerns every subject of the British empire; or he must be void of all regard for his country, and confequently of every virtuous attachment ; or he must be attached to an interest contrary to that of his country, by the sordid love of money, as being himself a dealer in rank bribery and corruption.

Every free Briten has reason to wish that darkness may overihadow the anniversary of his birth, who first introduced places and pensions into parliament. When I have made a few observations on the complexion of parliament in those times, in which it is certain that the court did not, because it could not influence them by emolumentary means, every reader who recollects any thing of the politics of modern times (the present always excepted) will, on making a comparison, join me in saying

Hoc fonte derivata clades

In patriam populamque fluxit. HOR.

From this impure fountain flows the stream, which is likely to poiibn our country and posterity.

In ancient times, when the parliaments of England were unpensioned, we find them, even in spite of Popish darkness, and of the extravagant notions of prerogative which were the disgrace of those ages, ever faithfully labouring for the public good, and especially seizing all opportunities far obtaining an enlargement of liberty.

So early as 1290, we find a set of unjust judges mulcted by parliament, to the amount of 100,000 marks. The parliament obtained of Edw. I. a promise, that he would (contrary to the usage of former times) quit all pretension to the right of levying taxes by his own authority, and would raise none but with confent of the " archbishops, bishops, and other prelates, earls, barons, knights (of ihires), burgefles, and other freemen of this realm." The numerous confirmations of Magna Charta were obtained by parliaments, and always with reluctance on the part of the kings, as the first grant was extorted by the barons (which, by the bye, shews the justness of the observation,

that parliaments are as naturally friends to liberty as kings are to prerogative.) So high was the reputation of the commons, in the same reign, for integrity and judgment, that the barons proposed tq the king, that they should have the choice of the chancellor, chief justice, and other great officers of state, To which that prince answered them by aflc-; ing, Why they did not demand his crown ? That they chose their own servants: Why might not he enjoy the same privilege ? [not considering that the people are deeply concerned in the choice of the king's servants;

whereas nobody has any thing to do with those of a duke or an earl.] In Edw. IIId's time, we find the commons refusing to grant an aid, till they had ronfujted their constituents. [In those days they con-

sidered themselves as responsible not to the ministry, but the people.]- In the same reign we find it recorded 1>)r hiftoriaris, ** ThaJ since the aids given in the last parliament were not duly answefed to the king by those who had the care thereof, certain persons were appointed to take the accounts of William de la Poll, and others, who had received the money, wool, [taxes were, in those days, often paid in wool] &c. and they had a day assigned them to produce their accounts, and in the mean time several noblemen and gentlemen of fortune became bound, &c." [This was the true way of preventing complaints against defaulters of millions.] In the same reign (about four hundred years ago) we find the commons refusing to grant supplies till grievances were redrefled; fixing by law what shall be deemed treason; propofmg regulations. for preventing the subjects being compelled to mak« loans to the king, for that it was " against reason, and the franchife of the land ;" making an aft for holding annual parliaments [no ministerial schemes to be gained by rewarding, with places and pensions, those who v6ted fevert years together as they were bid] limiting the power of the clergy and the lawyers ; preventing the union, in the same persons, of legislative power and of court emoluments, by a law prohibiting any collector of taxes to represent any place in parliament; [fb early were our ancestors aware of the usefulness of a place-bill, repeatedly rejected in our degenerate times.} In Ri<b. lid's days, we find the commons requesting that he would inform them how the public money was laid out, and who were to be his counsellors and great officers; to which requests they insisted on, and obtained an anfvitr. In the same reign the commons refuse to lay any taxes on the people, because they were disgusted, as had just before appeared by

Wat Tyler's infurre&ion. [In those days some regard was shewn to the sense of even the lowest of the. people.] The commons fequest the removal of Michael de la Pole. The king gives them an answer in chara&er, that is, a silly one. But they insist on compliance, and after some struggles, not only overthrow the minister, but at last dethrone the king himself. The parliament appoints a commission of enquiry to try the favourites. They impeach them of engaging the king to stand by them, right or wrong;

of excluding all persons without the circle of the junto; of embezzling the public money ; of laws

dispensed with ; of unjust punishments and pardons > of bribes taken of both parties, &c. In consequence, the archbishop and others are declared guilty of high treason, Michael de la Pole is impeached, the high treasurer, Trejilian, Brembre, and many others, are hanged. [Thus in the heat of their honest zeal for the public good, overleaping their due boundaries, as a third part only of the legislature, and breaking. into the fphere of the executive. See vol. i. p. 205, ei feq.] Yet this very parliament, in the inidft of feverity, remembers decency. They make an exprefs fesolution for exempting the king, and laying the whole blame on his ministers. Happy had he flopped while his ruin might have been prevented ! They oblige him to renew his coronation oath. [Kings often want to have their memories refrefhed on this subjecl.] He shews a mighty defire of holding tKe reins of government in his own hand. He no sooner gets power, than he shews his incapacity for being trusted with it. He displaces all the faithful servants of the state, to make room for his worthless favourites. He seizes the charters of London, imprifo'ns the mayor and flieriffs, fines the city, and

lofing the ineftimable affe&ions of the inhabitants of the capital, haftens his own destru&ion. He tries to pack parliaments, to influence returning officers, to force elections, to raise money without parliament; obtains, by unfair means, the opinions of his servile judges in favour of his wicked measures; the very proceedings which afterwards brought Charles I. to the block. [If the old saying be true, experientia docttjlu/tos, it is plain, that kings are not fools; for experience does not teach some of them.] The parliament impeaches him for unwarrantable liberality to worthless favourites ; encouraging a junto to take upon them parliamentary power ; caufing the parliament roll to be altered and blotted at his pleasure; forbidding his subjeits to petition him ; fending into the house men not elected by the people, but nominated by himself; biafllng members by threats and promises; refusing the faithful advice of his subjects, and threatening those who offered it, &c. The parliament formally dethrones him, as is known to cvety reader.

Uninfluenced parliaments, inftead of giving, as we have seen, the people's money by millions upon every call of the miniftcr, have been remarkably delicate upon that point.

Hen. III. A. D. 1255, demands an aid. Parliament requires two conditions, viz, i. Observance of the twocharteis; and 2. That parliament have the appointing of the juiUciary, trcafurcr, and chancellor. Henry, inftead of complying, prorogues the parliament ".

The struggle between Cl\ I. and his brave and free parliament is one of the most finking instances in the hiftory of the world, of the glorious cffecls produced

' Rai>m, i. 3-9-

duced by the love of liberty and their country in the uninfluenced minds of a set of honcft and courageous representatives. Let us contemplate a few instances of what is so much to the honour of human nature.

When that prince begun to demand money of parliament, there was great opposition made. Pym, and the other patriots, said, the war was entered into raftily, and therefore the nation was not obliged to support it. He demanded an account of the money raised by Janus I. by refumption of crown-lands, and fale of titles and places. The commons .accordingly) inftead of supplies, proceeded to the consideration of grievances^a. The king diflblves the parliament, because they would grant nothing^b. When he fent repeated meflages to the commons, preffing them to go upon supplies, and let grievances alone, Sir Robert Philips proposed to addrefs the king, and let him know what they intended to do, if he would not interrupt them. If the king would not fuffer them to go on with the publick bufmefs, they must then depart in peace, and every man betake himself to prayer, that the confufions to be apprehended might be averted. The speaker, by the king's order, interrupts Sir J. Elliot in his remarks on the conduct of the ministry. Upon this, Sir Dudley Digges said, " If we must not speak of these things in parliament, let us be gone.^u A mournful filence, for some time, enfued. Then Sir Nathaniel Rich observed, " That it was neceflary they should take care of those, who fent them to parliament ;" and proposed to go to the lords, and,' with them, wait on the king. The commons refolve, that neither Sir J. Elliot (who was interrupted by the flavifh speaker) nor any other member, had fpoken any

* PARL. HIST. vi. 40*.

^k Ibid. 403.

thing undutiful during that parliament. A committee is ordered to consider what may be done for the safety of the kingdom, and that no member leave the house, on pain of being fent to the Tower. The speaker defired to go out for half an hour. Mr. Kirton observed, that this was unprecedented and ominous. It was observed by Mr. Kirton (with too much goodnature) that the king was a good prince; but perfuaded by enemies to him and the nation. * Let us try to difcover them,' says he, * and I doubt not, but God will tend us hearts, hands, and swords, to cut all his and our enemies throats.' Sir Edw. Cote observed, ' That greater moderation never was known, than theirs had been, considering, that their liberties had'been so shamefully violated. That former parliaments had boldly pointed out evil counsellors about the kings.' [He mentions several initances; but, as they occur in other parts of tbefe collections, I shall not enumerate them here.] « How {lull we answer to God and men,' says he, ' if we do not make proper enquiry into the abuses of our times ? Nothing grows to abuse, but this house hath power to treat of it. All men agree, that the duke of Buckingham is the cause of all the evil,' &c. The flavifh speaker, who had ftolen to the king (which was what he meant by aflcing to go out for half an hour) returned, and brought a meffage from the king, adjourning the house, and all committees, till next morning*. The speaker, by the king's command, adds, That he did not mean to restrain them in their just privileges; but only, that they should avoid reflections [no matter how just'] on himself and his ministers^b. What would have been, ac-

³ PARI, HUT. vin. 191, 192, J9⁶- " ^Ibidl '97-

cording to this monarch'* idea, ntfraitaig, if it pas not restraining, to -ftop the common* from enquiring into the conduct of bad ministers? A power, w.kteh, as Sir Edw. Ctke thews, had been fa wt/iantly aflumed by parliament. Which thews the common apology for Charles I. viz. That he did not abridge liberty; but only refused to grant new privileges; to be greatly too indulgent to the violences of . that defperate tyrant.

The commons instru&ed their speaker to answer to one of his threatening meflages, That it is the ancient right of parliament to debate in their own method, without interruption from the foveraine. That it is their ancient cuftom to consider of grievances first, and supplies afterwards. That they thought it abfolutely neceflary to join with the supplies a due care of the eflentials of liberty, without which there is no government, nor any thing great or valuable that can be done either in peace or war^a.

In one of their remonftrances to the king, A. D. 1626, they exprefs themselves in these words: — * Your faithful commons, who can have no private end, no object, but your majefty's service, and the good of our country⁶.' [Had there been in that house of commons two or three hundred placemen, they would not have dared to say, * We tan have no private end.'] It hath been the ancient, conftant, and undoubted right and usage of parliaments to question, and complain of all persons, of what degree foever, who have been found grievances to the commonwealth in abufing the power committed to them by their foveraine — without which liberty in parliament, the

* PARL. HIST. vn. 441. ^b Ibid. vi. 467.

commonwealth might languish under the preffure [of those grievances] without redrefs.' The intractableness of his parliaments (an honest parliament will always be intradable, because a court will always be making exorbitant demands^ made him determine to govern without them. When he could no longer put it off, he called one i but, says Voltaire^ 'C'etait affembler des citoyens irritez;' this was calling together a set of enraged subjects, and giving them an opportunity of confuting about the-destruction of his tyranny. For the court had not then, as now, millions to dole away, by which to put a grumbling house of commons in good humour.

The fafiiion was not in those days, as we have seen it fmce, to nine all enquiries into the dispofal of the public money. Therefore it was « ordered, A. D. 1648, by the house of commons, That the committee of Goldfmith'i Hall do print all their receipts for compositions, and how the moneys have been difbutfed, that afperfions upon parliament may be

cleared".'

In those tyrannical times, the tnjlruments of the tyranny were the grandees of the court, who were gainers by it; and the vindicators of the public liberty were the commons of England, who had no fhare in the fpoils, but were lofers, and had nothing to make up their lofles. Had the commons of those days had a fellow-feeling wth the court; had there been two or three hundred placemen in the house of commons, would they have flood up so boldly for the interest of their country ? It was the court that imposed ship-money, that condemned Prynne, Ba/iwick, Burton,

» fait. Ess. SUR L'HIST. iv. 147. * WbiteL MEM. 308.

Leigkton, &c. It was the brave commons that reverfed the cruel fentences, and caft their enemies in damages for unjust imprifonment, tyrannical seizure of papers, exorbitant fines, cruel pilloryings and mutilations, {tar-chamber, court of York, &c.

« Refolved, (A. D. 1647) That no member fhall receive any profit of any office, grant, or fequestration from parliament: That whatever any members have received shall be repaid for public use, and the estates of members liable for their debts*.' A day was appointed for hearing complaints against members, and no member to receive any reparation for lofles, till the public debts be paid. [Our gamblers are wallowing in the public money, while the nation is in debt 130 millions.] And tho' the self-denying ordinance was not ttrictly kept; (for Ireton, Fleetwood, Harris, and others, were elected into the house) a few corrupt men could carry no point; and the ordinance itself shews the sense of the times, and of all times, and all men, who pretend to have any regard for their country, concerning placemen in the house. And the many regulations made since for the pretended purpose of making parliament free, though ineffectual, and perhaps not always intended to be effectual, yet have a decent appearance, as coinciding with the general sense of mankind on this point.

The commons under Ch. I. were almost always unanimous. No wonder: they had no indirect ijiterest to divide them ; no places,, no pensions, &c. to put them upon oppofing what was plainly for the public good. Therefore we do not find in those times any abandoned fpcechifiers in the house, like our Jf'alpclcs and our Pelhants, supporting the ufcful-

* PARL HIST. xv. 422.

jiefs of court-Influence in parliament, in direct oppofitkm to common sense and common decency.

« Refolved, (A. D. 1640) That no monopolift or patentee shall At in the house.' Many were expelled, and new writs iffued». Parliament} A. D. 1645, publimes a declaration, * That it would be an acceptable service, if any person would inform of any members taking bribes for any matter depending in the houseV The brave commons under Ch. I. brought the lord keeper Finch upon his knees before them, and proving inexorable, obliged him to make his escape^c. They prosecuted Strafford and Laud to death, they forced IVindtltankt to fly. They struck with terror all the tools of the tyrant, and punished all their proceedings, however supported by precedent, which were not warranted by some exprefs law^a. They condemned the monopolies restored by Charles after their being, by a former parliament, folemnly declared illegal; and punched those concerned in them, expelling some members of their own house on that account. They changed, in less than a month, the face of affairs in England^ from the most abfolute monarchy to a democracy, without other difturbance than a fcuffle between the king's army and the Scotch at patting the Tynt\ and roused that spirit in the nation, which brought the bloody tyrant, commonly called the blefled martyr, to his merited end".

Sir Harbottle Grimftone thus describes a parliament answering the design and exhibiting the true spirit of a parliament. • Of such awful 'predominancy is the

* PARL. HIST. ix. 14.8.

^b PARL. HIST. xiv. 140.

^c Humt, HIST. STUARTS, i. 244.

^dlLbiJ. 246. ^e Ibid. 247.

very name of a parliament to the nation, that it ftrikes with terror and defpair all rail doers, and enriches and tomforts the spirits of many groaning under the burden of oppreflion, • inflicted on them unjustly and malicloufly by unmerciful and wicked men, who have usurped to themselves places and offices of power and authority in church and state. It is not only the powerful left of all courts, but the iviftjl. made and compacted not only of men found in religion, and well learned, but ripe in their judgments, feledled from all parts of the kingdom, chosen with the free confent of the whole body politic of the kingdom.' [A man mu.ft be out of his wits to

describe parliaments in our times in this manner.] This great and high council is not only of such power and wisdom, but endowed with the greatest privileges, that not only the meaneft of his majefty's subjects, but the greatest persons of the kingdom are in danger, if infringers of the same, to be called in question, and puniOied.' Gripiftone'i speech on

occafion of Charles's demanding the five members*.

He then mentions the privileges of parliament: viz. To speak or debate, vote, impeach, condemn, acquit, protest, or remonftrate according to evidence, and the state of things,' [in spite of minifte-

rial, or regal interpoution.] * No member to be prosecuted but by the house for things said in the house, nor to be apprehended, his ftudy broke open, or his papers seized, but by order of the house. To make or unmake laws, raise taxes, do what business they please first, without superior compulfun or influence; nor to be diflblved capricioufly when they are redreffing wrongs and framing good laws,

^a PARL. HI«T. x. 180.

* or prosecuting delinquents.' To Grim/lane's Jpeech may be added the answer of the commons in their declaration, A. D. 1642. The king pretended, that the measures he purfued, were more for the good of the kingdom, than those, which they proposed, on which account he rejected all their wife and pacific propofals, and was not to be fatisned, 'till he made his country a fea of blood.

* Is it likely, say they, that those, who are especially chosen' [electors were then unbribed, and unterrified by ministers or by grandees] ' and introduced for the purpose, and who themselves must needs have so great a {hare in all grievances of the subje<5ts' [no member had then any idea of indemnifying himself, by a place, or a pension, of the burden he brought upon his country by voting according to the minister's direction] « ihould wholly caft oft" all care of the public good, and the king only take it up ?' ' Heretofore, says Mr. Holies, in his speech before the lords, A. D, 1641, parliaments were the catholicon, the balm of Gilead which healed our wounds, restored our spirits, and made up all breaches of the land. Of late years they have been without fruit, &c.' Parliaments were then become ineffectual because diflblved by the tyrant. Now we often wifli them diflblved *.

Sir jyiHiam Jones answered Ch, II's proclamation, and apology for diflblving his parliament at Oxford in a pet, and says, inter alia, ' The court never diflblved a parliament abruptly and in a heat, but they found the next parliament more averfe, and to insist on the same things with greater eagerness, than the former. — A parliament always participates of the

" PARL. HI$T. ix. 298.

p.refent temper of the people*' Thofe times differed from ours (the present always excepted) for we have Teen the times, wheji the true account of the matter would have been, that parliament is what the court (net the people) would have it to be.

When Mr. Holies impeached the nine peers before the lords^k, in his speech he {hewed the importance of parliaments, and that the enemies of the public tranquillity, have always fought the destru&ion or diminution of the power of parliaments. ' Parliament, says he, is the foundation of government; it creates and prcserves law; watches over religion* [the members in those days had some religion,] ⁽ prevents licentioufness of manners; preserves the rights and liberties of the subjecl; provides for common neceffities; prevents public fears; the kingdom can rest on no other foundation, than that of parliament.' It is remarkable, that, when he mentions the arts of enemies for defeating the use of parliaments, as refusing to call them, diverting, obstructing, interrupting, or abruptly diflblving them ; he never mentions corrupting them by places, pensions, &c. the moil effectual pf all means for deftroying their usefulnefc. What had been done in that way before those times, had answered little purpose. Ch. lid's pension parliament was the first fuccefsful.experiment of that black art, so fatally improved since. «When Ch. I. (says lord Lyttelton, in his speech on the Sptmijb convention') ' told the commons, who were preparing complaints against Buckingham, that he would not allow any of his servants to be questioned in

* DEB. LORDS, i. 264. ^b PARL. HIST. xi. 200. " DEB. COM. xi. 312.

parliament, he fpoke the language of defpetic power, and such as this house would never endure. But if inftead of speaking so openly, helifld a little foftened his style; confeffed their right to question his servants, but at the Came time denied them the means: if Buckingham himself had challenged them to examine hibconduft, or the conduit of those who a£ted by his instrudhons and under his orders; and then rcfused them the fight of these instrustions, and the regular methods according to the usage of parliament of examining into these orders ; the appearance indeed woujd have been fairer, but the proceeding itself would have been equally dangeious, equally fatal to the rights of this house. Sir, that parliament would not have borne it; for it was composed of such men as had no influence upon them to abate the spirit and zeal with which they proceeded to enquire into and punish mal-adminiftration : such men at their first meeting, before they would give one penny of money to support the king in a war with Spain which had been begun at the defire of parliament, appointed a committee to consider of fecret affairs, and another for grievances. They refolved to enquire into the mifemployment of the public treafure, and dishonour brought upon the nation, before they voted any supply, without apprehending any reproach of want of zeal for the king or the war; but that they might know the true state of the nation, and carry on the war with more chearfulness when judice was done upon those who had involved them in so many difficulties, the same parliament declared, and it stands uncontroverted yet upon your journals, That common fame is a good ground of proceeding for this house either by enquiry, or if the

bouie find cause, by impeachment. Accordingly queries were drawn up to enquire into the conduct of BufklngbaHh which were afterwards turned into articles of impeachment against him; and the king to fave his minister.bad no other way than diflblving that parliament; for the art of foftening them by corruption was not in use in those days. Sir, 1 hope I have not mifpent your time in calling back to your memory the proceedings of a former house of commons which deserve, I think, the greatest re,, fpedlt, and are mentioned with reverence by the most impartial historians. How hiftory will mention ours, J wi/h we may think worth our concern > but how the nation will judge of them now, I am fure we ought to consider, Sir, if a king has loft the efteetn and the hearts of his people, the interposition of parliament may awaken him to a sense of his error, and by healing counsels reconcile and restore them again; but if parliaments themselves act so as to lofe their own dignity and by consequence the efteem and love of the people, who fliall then interpose or what mediator is left ? It is such an evil as admits of no remedy: it is the worft misfortune that can ever befal a free government. To have approved the convention, to have rejected a motion for laying before parliament the instru&ions of the minister who concluded and figned that convention, and then to deny -the means of examining into these negotiations upon which S/w'^-grourids these very pretensions, which we are now fighting to deftroy — these measures will certainly do us great honour in the opinion of those who are this year to pay four millions for supporting the war. What they will think of all this I do not know; but I am apt to

believe tkey will never think about it, without having at the same time in their thoughts that the same house of commons has three times rejected the place bill.'

In the fliort, the too {hort period of the republic (for how happy had it been for England if fhe had been governed by the republican parliament during the period of her disgraces under Charles II. and James II.) in that (hort period we fee what may be expected from a set of un-bribed, un-biafled men assembled together to confult for the public good, without fears, and without hopes, from a bribing court* and free from the incumbrances of filch kings, or houses of peers, to negative, or at least to entangle and impede their measures for the general advantage. How unfriendly to liberty kings and lords have been, will too plainly appear on perufing the articles Kings and Lords in the fequel. I write in this seemingly republican ftrain, not that I have the least thought of fuggefting the neceflity, or propriety, of changing the form of government in Britain, from regal to republican, though the latter is undoubtedly preferable to the former, fuppofing a state to be fettling its form of government; but to caution kings and lords, not to bring on, as they have formerly done by their misbehaviour, their owa exclufton. But let us hear our incomparable femals historian.

* On the subject ofjlhe glory acquired by the Engltfi republic in this infant state, we shall observe the following incautious testimonies of its inveterate enemies. Heatbt on entering into the subjed of the parliament's forced diflblution, and the ruin of the republic, breaks out in the following exclamation. " Now to the reproach of Fortune and her

glorious pageant of an Englijb commonwealth, which (he had set up for another wonder of the world, to brave the pyramids of (tone, and coloflus of brafs, as to the defiance of time's injury, having subdued all likelihood of danger from without; all princes being ready to entertain their friend(hip." — Clarendon, who with a heart replete with selfifh malice, In prospective faw and fighed over the future grandeur of his country, on speaking of the political conduct of cardinal Mazarine, makes the following observation: " After the battle of Nafeby was loft, and the king seemed so totally defeated, that he had very little hope of appearing at the head of an army which might be able to resist the enemy, the cardinal was awakened to new apprehensions, and faw more cause to fear the monftrous power of the parliament, after they had totally subdued the king, than ever he had to apprehend the excefs of greatness in the crown." Treating of the Dutch war he observes: " The United Provinces now difcerned, that they had helped to raise an enemy which was too powerful for them, and which would not be treated as the crown had been." Guthrie, an historian of monarchical principles, makes the following observation : " Mazarine imagined, and that not without good grounds, that the natural interest of France led her to wish Cromwell to be at the head of the Englijb, rather than it (hould be formed into a republic of brave and wife patriots."

On this aft of violence,' [Cromweirs turning out the republican parliament] * Cake (an enemy) exclaims, " Thus fell the victorious parliament, whofe mighty actions will fcarcely find belief in future generations; and to say the truth, they were a set of

men mod indefatigable and induftrious in bufmefs, always feeking for men fit for it, and never preferring any from favour and importunity: As they excelled thus in civil affairs, so it must be owned they exercifed in matters ecclefiaftic no such feverity as others before them, upon such as dhTented from them." Guthrie, an anti-republican, expreffes the following favourable opinion of this parliament: " The English republicans by their vigor and spirit, struck. Europe with confirmation; and the English flag was such a protection to commerce, that the trade of the world seemed now to center in Europe. Had this vast expence been drained from the fweat of the people, the furnifhing it would not have so much alarmed the Dutch: but there had been a great reduction in taxes, the cuftoms alone furnifhed 250,0007. clear of all deductions ; the people fcarce felt their burthens; and even the greatest enemies the government had, were pleased with the figure which England made abroad. Hiftorians in general, eftimating things by events and prejudices, have represented the late parliament in a pitiful light, despised and difregarded by the people, which gave Cromwell the boldness to aft as he did. But the reverfe of this is true ; for Cromwell diflblved them because he knew they must in time win upon the people; that the spirit with which they proceeded would soon render him and his army useless; and that they were pointing towards an establishment which must check the carreer of all inordinate ambition." " This parliament (hysTrenchard, in the Hiftory of standing armies in England) made their name famous through the whole earth, conquered their enemies in England, Scotland and .Ireland; reduced the kingdom of Portu-

gal to their own terms, recovered our reputation at fea, overcame the Dutch in several famous battles; fecured our trade, and managed the public expencts with so much frugality, that no estates were gained by private men upon the public miseries, and at last were paffing an aft for their own diflblution and fettling the nation in a free and impartial commonwealth." Ludlow on the praises of this renowned afTembly writes. " It will appear to unprejudiced posterity that they were a difmterested and impartial parliament, who though they had the fovereign power of the three nations in their hands for the space of ten or twelve years, yet did not in all that time give away amongft themselves so much as they fpent for the public in three months." In a Difcourfe of tbt national excellency of England, here is the following honourable character given of the Englijb government during the (hort time it remained a republic. " If you refpeft its infancy and beginning, it outwent in warlike atchievement all other common-wealths. I lay before me the exploits of Sparta, Athens, Carthage, and Venice; and know that the Venetians, Switzers, and United Provinces at this day, being contemptible for territory, are those only that appear fittest matches for the greatest empires, I know alfo, that Rome, the only miftrefs of the world, was justly celebrated for large conquests ; and yet none of these states gave such ftarts, and made such acquests at their rife as our English common-weakhf Certainly so many advantages conduced to its greatness and increase, and at its first appearing fn large were its territories, that it may well be affirmed, never was a commonwealth in that refpeft laid on so large a foundation ; and if in our conceit we should give it an answerable growth, we could not aflign it

less that) the whole globe at last for its portion. At first, if you will judge by the affections of the people, it had not the hundredth part of England itself, and was to go through difficulties which would have confounded any but a free state; yet how quickly had it brought the nation to somewhat a better understanding and a fair way of fettlement: so that there are some who question whether any natural prince of England had ever been aflifted on any occafion with such great forces so fuddenly and with such alacrity raised, as they were at Worcefter; and on the other side, how few went over to the king of Scats, though generally looked on as a rightful prince, deserves consideration. It lived not out a luftre; yet conquered Scotland, (introducing more liberty and greater privileges than they had before) Inland, and several other (mailer iflands; made other nations feel its force, as the French and Portuguefe; and was going on in such a carreer of action as was not to be flopped by human power. This government began a war with the Dutch, which it would have ended with abfolute conquest, or fallen in the attempt; and after this probably, it would have entered on more honourable enterprizes, and not fuffered the nation to grow effeminate by eafe and vice. In a word, it had brought in an irfitant the nation to a full glory, and such a fplendour as caft a darkness, as it is affirmed by some, on the greatest actions of former times. This is certain, that the neighbouring states trembled at its fudden and prodigious greatness, and remote potentates did court and feek a good understanding from its hands; and its diflblution brought no ordinary content to those who had cause to fear it." " The agent from the Stewarts (as a late \vriter reports) at

the first appearance of this commonwealth urged the United Provinces, that if England were free, it would be formidable to them not only by interrupting their fifhing, and all other maritime advantages, but by robbing them of traffic, as they had done the Volitions \ and not only fo, but give law to all Cbrifttndim by reason of the commodioufness of its harbours and the number of its flaps." To the juA and high elogiums which have been made on the government of the parliament it is to be remembered, that to them'is due the fingular praise of having purfued the true interest of their country, in attending particularly to its maritime strength, and carrying on its foreign wars by its naval powers. This example, which raised Eng~ land to so great an height of glory and prosperity, has never yet been followed, and in all probability never will, by the fucceeding monarchs. The aim of princes is to make conquests on their subjeds, not to enlarge the empire of a free people. A standing army is a never-failing instrument of domestic triumph ; and it is very doubtful whether a naval force could be rendered useful in any capacity, but that of extending the power and prosperity of the country ».'

* If the very rump of a parliament' (says a writer in. STATE TRACTS, time of king William) ' even in the midft of domestic difcontents, and befet on all sides with foreign aflaults, and invafions at home; if that small and broken number without any head, and under so many difadvantages, could by this only means fecure our peace, and so widely extend the repute and honour of the Englijb name; what country or what region could ever give limits to the un~

* Macaul. HIST. ENGL. v. 107.

bounded reputation of a full and legal parliament so nobly qualified ? What nation could there be so powerful as to resist our forces, or so politick as to infatuate our counsels ? There is nothing within the compafs of human wifties of which we might not allure ourselves, from the wisdom and virtue of such a difmterested aflembly \'

Fairfax's plan shews what an idea people had in those times, (viz. before parliamentary corruption prevailed) of the safety of confiding in them. He proposes that the two houses have the supreme judgment of offenders, with power of exposition and application of law without appeal. No state-criminal to be pardonable by the king, without their confent. The house of peers no longer to be alone the supreme court, grand juries to be nominated, not by the under-flieriff, but by the people of the counties mutually. Militia to be under power of parliament for ten years, and not under the king alone. The public treafure the same. Regulations for the militia or army to be made in parliament. Great offices of state to be disposed of by parliament for ten years. Afterwards parliament to give in to the king three names, and he to appoint one. No new-made peer to fit without leave of parliament. All declarations against parliament to be void. In modern times, it is altogether the same to the people, -whether the command of the army, treafury, state-offices, &c. be in the court, the lords, or the commons. For these three are one.

When a reward was proposed for Mrs. Lane, for faving that blefled faint Charles II. some of the members said, the house had no right to give away in this manner the people's money to any but the king for

¹ STATE TRACTS, time of King William, II. 644.

public use *. On the contrary, in modern times we fee our parliaments so motherly to our ministers, they know not how to refuse them any thing they aflc; at one time our kjngs are to have their civil lift (formerly granted annually) fettled on them for life; at another 500,000/. voted to pay the civil lift debts; at another an account of 250,000 /. of 60,000 /. of 35,oco/. pafied unexamined, because the court gave their word of honour the money was all fpent in the public service; of which more elfewhere.

Clarendon says, Charles II. defpaired of his restoration, when he heard of the rcfurrecYion of parliament after Richard Cromwell's refignation. An incorrupt parliament is never very courtly, and contrariwife, a corrupt one can deny nothing to kings and courts. But if Charles had recollected, that his friend Jkfonihzi an army at his command, he would not have defpaired. Armies and kings have a great tenderness for one another, and are particularly ufcful to one another. Both depend more upon power, than upon juflice; both love to rule without controul; kings love armies, because an army can support them in tyrannical measures without the trouble offatisfying the subje£rs; and armies love kings, because they are indulged by kings (on account of their usefulness) in a different manner from what they experience under republican government. But of this I fhall have occafion to treat fully in the article Army.

« There is nothing of greater importance to the safety and good of the kingdom, (says Mr. Pymme, A. D. 1641) than that this high court of parliament, which is the fountain of judice and government, should be kept pure, uncorrupt, and free from

* PARL. HIST. xxm.

partiality and. bye-refpe&s. This would not only add luftre and reputation, but strength and authority to all our ads. la, this the lords are specially interested, as being a third estate by inheritance and birthright. The commons are publickly interested by representation of the whole body of the commons of this kingdom, whofe lives, fortunes, and liberties are deposited under the cuftody and trust of the parliament '.'

— * Leaft of all will it be fwallowed by a parliament? says Thurloe, in one of his letters, speaking of certain schemes proposed for keeping Cromwel in power ^b. In our times we never hear of any body afraid of parliament, but writers on the side of the opposition.

There were not wanting court-fycophants in the time of Charles II. who celebrated hini to the sides, and justified all his ruinous proceedings. But his parliaments did not always eccho back, as in our times, the falfe panegyric.

* Long, loqg, may that royal tree live and flourifli, upon which those fruits do grow !' says Shaftejbury, in his speech to parliament, A. D. 1673, with a great deal more to the same beflobbering purpose, to blind the eyes of both parliament and people, and to incline them to be contented with the proceedings of the times. Shafte/bury in this rhetorical flourifli hits off pne undoubted property of Charles. He was so very fruitful of baftards, that the wags of the times observed, that he might be said almost literally, as well as figuratively, to deserve the ancient most honourable title of pater patria, the father of his people. Both lords and commons however shewed themselves very

much

" PARL. HIST. x. 13. > Macaul. HIST. v. 199.

much difcontented at the continuance of the Dutch war, the exorbitant power of France, prevalence of popifli counsels, &c. which they take care to flgnify to the king in an addrefs for a fad ». And the commons feeing at lad his worthleflhefs in joining France against Holland, and that the design of his five villainous tools, whofe initials form the famous word CABAL, was to make him abfolute, oppose him openly. They refolve, that Lauderdale, and the French alliance, are grievances. The king prorogues them immediately. On their meeting again, they addrefs him against his guards ; and impeach Buckingham and Arlington. Charles finding that they were too honest to grant him further supplies for an odious war, makes peace with ihe Dutch ^b.

* Were the house of commons' (says a writer in the STATE TRACTS, time of king William) * a true representative, and free from external force and private bribery, nothing could pafs there, but what they thought was for the publick advantage. For their awn interest is so interwoven, with the people's, that if they act for tbemselves (which every one of them will do as near as he can) they must ad for the common interest of England. And if a few among them should find it their interest to abuse their power, it will be the interest of all the rest to punilh them for it: and then our government would act mechanically, and a rogue would as naturally be hanged as a clock ftrikes twelve when the hour is come. This is the fountain head from whence the people expect all their happiness, and the redrefs of their grievances; and if we can preserve thepi [-viz. parliaments] free from corruption, they will take care to keep every

^a DEB. COM. i. 191.

^k Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 236.

body elfe fo. Our constitution seems to have provided for it by never fuffering the king (till Charles Ift's reign) to have a mercenary army to frighten them into a compliance, nor places nor revenues great enough to bribe them into it. The places in the king's gift were but few, and most of them patent places for life, and the rest great offices of state enjoyed by fmgle persons, which feldom fell to the fhaie of the commons, such as the office of a lord chancellor, loid trcafurer, privy feal, lord high admiral, &c. and when these offices were poffeffed by the lords, the commons were fevcre inquifitors into their actions. Thus the government of England continued from the time that the Romans quitted the ifland to the time of Ch. I. who was the first I have read of that made an opposition to himself in the house of commons the road to preferment, of which the earls of Strafford and Noy were the most remarkable instances; who from great patriots became the chief affertors of defpotick power. But this served only to exafperate the rest ; for he had not places enough for all that expefted them, nor money enough to bribe them. It is true, he raiftd great fums of money upon the people ; but it being without authority of parliament, and having no army to back him, it met with such difficulties in the raifing, that it did him but little good, and ended at last in his ruin ; though by the means of a long and miserable war which brought us from one tyranny to another : for the army had got all things into their power, and governed the nation by a council of war, which made all parties join in calling in Ch. II. so that he came In with the general applause of the people, who in a kind fit gave him a vast revenue for life. By this he was enabled to wife an army,

« and.

and bribe the parliament, which he did to the purpose: but being a luxurious prince, he could not part with great fums at once. He only fed them from hand to mouth : so that they found it neceflary to keep him in a conftant dependance upon them, as they were upon him. They knew he would give them ready money no longer than he had an abfolutc necessity for them, and that he had not places enough in his dispofal to fecure a majority in the house : for in those early days the art was not found out of fplitting and multiplying places ; as inftead of a lord treasurer, to have five lords of the trcafury ; inftcad of a lord admiral, to have feven lords of the admiralty ; to have feven commiflioners of the cuftoms ; nine of the excife; fourteen of the navy office; ten of the ftamp-office; eight of the prize-office; fixteen commissioners of trade; two of the poft-office ; four of the tranfports ; four for hackney-coaches; four for wine-licences ; four for the victualling-office, and multitudes of other offices which are endless to enumerate. I believe the gentlemen, who have the good fortune to be in someof those-employments, will think I compliment them, if I say, they have not been better executed since they were in so many hands than when in fewer: and I must confefs, I fee no reason why they may not be made twice as many, and so on ad infinitum (unless the number be afcertained by parliament) and what danger this may be to our constitution I think of with horror. For if in ages to come they should be all given to parliament-men, what will become of our so much boafted liberty ? What fhall be done, when the criminal becomes the judge, and the malefactors are left to try one another * ?'

¹ STATE TRACTS, time of king William, n. 654.

The commons, A. D. 1673, vote in a grand committee that no more supplies ought to be granted during a certain period, unless they fee necessity, on account of the Dutch war, and till the kingdom be fecured against popery, and grievances redrefled *.

The commons, A. D. 1678, vote supplies, but with Ariel limitations ^b.

The commons, A. D. 1678, give a direct denial to the king's request in his speech for an additional revenue of 300,000 /. a year^e.

A supply was granted, A. D. 1679, but with an appropriation to certain purposes only, and penalty in case of mifapplication ^d.

The commons complained of unaccounted millions, A. D. 1701^e. Now the people complain, not the commons. Why, indeed, should the commons complain ? The court and they divide the fpoil between-them.

It is remarkable, how directly in the teeth of the court, the commons often proceeded in former incorrupt, or Icfs corrupt, times. In former times the court and commons were generally oppofite; in ours the constituents and representatives. There was much corruption in king Iff Hi am's time; but we sometimes fee the stream of parliamentary proceedings in those days run very clear. King William had given away immense grants of forfeited estates in Inland. The commons refolved, A.D, 1699, that a bill be brought in for reverfing every one of those grants, and * applying all the forfeited estates and interests in ' Ireland, to the use of the public, and that a judi-

• Rafin, ii. 672.

» DEB. COM. i. 276. « Ibid. 286.

• DEB. COM. i. 344.

• 'find. CONTIIC. i. 479.

catory be creeled for determining claims, and that they [the commons] will receive no petition* concerning grants.' The courtiers in the house moved, That some part of the forfeited estates might be left in the king's dispofal. It pafled in the negative} and they made a resolution condemning the advifing and procuring those grants to be pafled *. The commons addrefled the king on these resolutions. The king answered, that his intention in giving those grants was to reward those, who had behaved well, particularly in the reduction of Ireland, which he thought himself in justice obliged to do. The uncourtly commons thought he was more justly bound to pay the just debts contracted in the late war; and they thought the forfeited estates a very proper fund for the purpose. How did the Romans, in their best times, reward their heroes ? With a wifp of hay round their heads, or a ride through the town, and up to the capitol. The commons, provoked at this answer, refolved, That whoever advifed it, intended to create a mifunderstanding between the king and people ^b. All the proceedings were ordered to be printed, and it was refolved, ' That the procuring, orpaffing exorbitant grants by any member of the privy council, to his own private use, is a high crime and mifdemeanor'.' Thofe brave men were jealous even of our great deliverer, and would not bear mif-government even by him. The lords (generally on the wrong side) oppose these brave and wife measures. Conferences followed, and warm disputes between the houses. At last the good king defires the lords to yield the point. Lord Summers was found to be at the bottom of all this opposition. The commons put

^a DEB. COM. in. 123. ^k Ibid. 124. ' Ibid. 126.

the question, that the king be defired to remove him This was not carried; but a resolution was made, that no foreigner (except the prince of Denmark) be admitted to his majefty's counsels in England, or Ireland. The king, to avoid this addrefs, prorogues, and afterwards diflblves the parliament.

The commons, A. D. 1700, went upon a scheme for applying the value of forfeited estates, granted away since 1688, to the payment of the public debts. The value of them was thought to be almost two millions. The commons refolve, That these grants were against the king's honour and the public good. This resolution was presented to the king in form of an addrefs; to which the king gives an answer, justifying the grants, as given to deserving persons. The commons, enraged, make a resolution against the king's advifers. They proceeded to a bill of refumption. Thirteen trustees are appointed to hear claims, &c. None to be trusted, who had any dependence oil the king. An addrefs proposed to the king that he would remove jord S:n:mers from his councils and prefence, bccaufc he had opposed the bill of refumption. The king, provoked, wants to overfct the bill. But many of the king's friends were for pailinj it to prevent mischief, the commons being set upon, it. The commons in those days were too mighty Cor the court. It is true, that, according to Tindal^y it was found afterwards, that the bill was not well contrived, and was therefore fpontaneoufly dropt by the commons. But the bold opposition of the commons to the court, 10 different from what we ue in our times, is what I mean to point out.

Incorrupt parliaments, inftead of being flaves to ministers, have kept ministers in conftant fear of

* CONTIN. I. 399, 400.

being called to an account by them. ' In former times, parliaments were every moment upon the wing, and kept this noble band [the privy councilj in awe, by taking them into their cognizance, placing, or mifplacing some, or all of them, directing, or binding them by oath, as they faw occafion \ of which the records are full *.' It is observed by Mr. Kirtan ^b, in his speech in the time of Ch. I. that * former parliaments had boldly pointed out evil counsellors about the kings, as 30 Edw. III. John of Gaunt, the king's fon, lord Latimer, and lord Neville, who were fent to the Tower. 7 Hen. IV. and n Hen. IV. parliament Complained of the king's council, and obtained their removal, for befetting the king and difluading him from the public good. 4 Hen. III. 27 Edw. III. and 13 Rich. II. parliament moderated the king's prerogative.' Lord Middlefex was accused, in the time of Jam. I. and convicted of grofs and sordid griping, and of procuring good regulations to be altered, as those concerning the court of wards, &c. of extortion in creating new places, and enhancing the perquifites of the old, &c. All the commons to a man joined in the impeachment. Not one to stand by a public robber ^c. Hereby was fulfilled the prediction of lord Bacon, A. D. 1624, who, meeting Middlefex soon after his advancement to the head of the treafury, congratulated him, and wished him, and all great itate-officers, always to remember, that a parliament will come ^d. [ In our times, you may as well tell ministers of the day of judgment, as of parliament.]

» N. Bacon's Disc. Gov. ENGL. P. 11. p. 18.

^b PARL. HIST. vin. 191.

^c Jbid. vi. 132, tt /cj. * Ibid. vi. 309.

To the same purpose was the saying of lord Coke* That no subjeft, however potent, or subtiJe, ever joftled with the law, but k broke his neck. But, in our times, it may be {aid, as Remus remarked to his brother Romulus, « Laws serve only as cobwebs, to catch the small flies : the great ones break through

them.'

The worthy and fagacious Daveaanf*, in the end of last century, wrote concerning parliamentary corruption, as if his pen had been guided by a prophetic infpiration. « Our wealth and greatness, says he, depend abfolutely upon keeping the legijlathe power to future ages untainted, vigilant for the public safety, jealous of the people's rights, watchful over ministers, unawed by armies, vnfeduced by preferments, bribes, or pensions. That we are safe at present; that this important poft is well fecured, is granted,' [some honest hearts, on reading this, and comparing the state of things in latter times, will, perhaps, bleed for their degenerate country] but writing for posterity, to which these papers may, peradventure, be tranfmitted, I think it needful to give these cautions.'

* Let the injured refort to the courts of law, and if there they fail of justice, in parliament they may be consident to receive it.' Smith's speech on the state of the nation, 1641. ^b

Sir Robert Naunton ascribes the happiness in Elizabeth's days, to the wisdom and patriotifm of the members of the house of commons. There was nothing then to give them. Therefore they had nothing to draw them from the good of their country ^c.

* ii. 308. ^b PARL. HIST. x. 16. feq.

' Rap. II. 155.

' Members of parliament' (says the learned judge Black/tone *) ^c are not thus honourably diftinguifhed from the rest of their fellow subjects, merely that they may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics; that they may lift under party banners; may grant or with-hold supplies; may vote with or against a popular or unpopular adminiftration ; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution, delegated to watch, to check, and to avert, every dangerous innovation; to propose, to adopt and to cherifli any folid and well weighed improvement. Bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to tranfmit that constitution, and those laws to their posterity, amended if pofsible, but at least without derogation.' Camden observes, that no tax disgusts the English which has the fan&ion of parliament. This is true in general. In former times, parliaments had the considence of the people. Have parliaments the considence of the people in our times? « The nation naturally loves parliamentary cures : but is jealous of all others V If, therefore, at any time, the nation is jealous of parliament, it is to be fupposed there is reason ; because the prejudice of the people is m favour of parliament.

Colonel Lundy (though excepted out of the indemnity by the commons, A. D. 1689) dejires to be examined by the commons^c. The commons had then the considence of the people; as juries, or arbitrators, have now. We have seen the times, when an honest,

^a COMMENT, i. 9.

^b Burn. HIST. OWN TIMES, u. 113,

^c DEB. COM. 11. 355.

and consequeotly obnoxious, man, who would have feared nothing, if to be tried by a jury, give his cause for loft, if ordered to appear before parliament. G. GrenviUe, a few years ago, told the house of commons, their manner of deciding contested elections was so grofs, that not one of them would chuse to have any part of his property at the mercy of the house, if a jury of porters or carmen could be had.

' While the commons were raifing money, [//. D. 1695] * they wifely enquired into the dispofal of former taxes, and difcovered so much corruption, that they thought it was high time to punish, and pVevent farther ".' King William celebrates this parliament for forming the national revolution-afTociation; for remedying the debasement of the coin; for restoring credit; for giving supplies for the war; for paying off debts; and for fettling the civil lift^b. A great deal of bufmefs done in one parliament. We too have seen a great deal dispatched in one parliament, but bufmefs of another fort. We have seen in one parliament the power of election of members taken from the people, and usurped by the commons; the colonies irritated by taxing them without representation; the mother country so diflatisfied, that 60,000 petitioned to have parliament diflblved ; 600,000 /. of the people's money given, forely against their will, to pay debts, which none, but the ministry, knew to be real, or if real, how contracted; the Eaji India company deprived of her rights and privileges, without pretence of tranfgreffion against government; religious liberty refused to two different fcts of petitioners humbly

* DEB. COM. 11. 446.

^b Ibid. in. 90.

requesting what all mankind have an unalienable right to enjoy, &c. of all which more fully elfewhere.

From these few pages may be formed such an idea of what parliaments ought to be, of what they have been, and of what, it is to be feared, we fliall not quickly fee them restored to, as may incline us to adopt the antient prophet's complaint;

.' How is the gold become dim ! How is the most fine gold changed ! The precious fons of Zion, comparable to veflels of fine gold, how are they efteemed as earthen pitchers, the work of the hand of the potter ^a!' The true value is only to be restored to our debased parliaments by putting them into the refining furnace, and purging them of the grofs alloy of places and pensions, which have so long debauched and disgraced them.

CHAP. II.

Placemen and Penficners unfit for Members of Parliament, lecause not likely to be uninfluenced,

ONE of the oldeft, if not abfolutely the oldeft, writer in the world, threatens « a fire to confume the tabernacles of bribery V A parliament filled with placemen and pensioners is. literally a tabernacle of bribery. For it is impoflible to give an bone/I reason for any number of placemen's or pensioners havingyZ^r^ in parliament. The house of commons ought to be the people in one room. And why must the people be bribed to confult their own interest ? If indeed the

* LAMENT, iv. i.

^b JOB xv. 34.

court has schemes to carry, dire&ly oppofite to the people's interest, it may he convenient for the court, that many placemen croud the house of commons.

It is not eafy to imagine, even ftretching charity till it cracks, that any one ever ferioufly thought the admiffion of place-men, pensioners, and officers, into the house of commons, safe, or decent; that any man of common sense can think of it otherwife, than as an open and impudent defiance of the sense of the whole independent people of England.

Our court advocates, however, sometimes divert themselves (on a too fatally ferious subje£t) by treating the independent people like children, when they tell us, it is good policy to drop fotne douceurs among the members of both houses, to attach them more clofely to their country's good. As if it were neceflary to bribe mankind to confult their own interest. Take away your douceurs, and every member's interest will be the same with the public. Suppose I give out, that I will not eat, or drink, unless the court bribes me. Would the court think it necessary to fettle an annual pension on me, to make me eat a dinner every day ? or would it be thought proper to give me a place — any where, but in Bedlam ? The court knows full well, that the direct contrary of their scandalous pretence is the truth; and that the members of the legislature would naturally confult but too well for their iniquitous purposes, their own interest, in confulting that of their country, did not they byafs them by throwing another interest and advantage in their way ; which for that reason they accordingly do, at an immense expence to the nation.

He knew human nature well, who said, The love of money is the root of all evil. He. who can refill

the love of money, may be said to be tried as gold in the fire.

Quifquis ingentes oculo irretorto

Special acervos. Her.

But as we know, the number of men capable of standing this fiery trial, is very small, we ought to be the more cautious of laying temptations in the way of those, whofe failure is to be apprehended, and whofe failure may be of such ruinous consequence to the public. To trust our all, without account, to a set of frail men, and then put those men in such circumstances as are likely to lead them to betray us — what can be imagined more contrary to wisdom ? Several millions a year laid out in supportjng the power of the court ! And this not sufficient; of such a growing nature is corruption ! Nothing of this boundless unaccountable wafte could have place in a republic. I do not mention this as any reflection on our kings. It is but a small part pf this immense fum, that is confumed by them in their propria persona, or that is laid out on their families. But in a republic, judge Blackjiont* would not have wrote as follows ; «It is impoflible to support that dignity^ which a king of Great Sritaiif should maintain, with an income in any dtgree iefs, than what is now established by parliament.' According to the learned judge, whatever is, is right. But, furely, with all due lubmiflion, the dignity of a British monarch does not consist in his fptitding large fums of his pqor people's money; but rather in his /paring their purses, and fetting them an example of frugality. With the learned judge's good

¹ COMM. i. 333.

leave, it is the dignity (if dignity it may be called) of the mint/try, and their crew, much more than the king's, that devours the civil lift. So that the plain English of what the learned judge has written, will be what follows; * It is impofsible to support that influence which a Britijb ministry Jhould maintain, with an income in any degree less than several millions per annum :' Than which I cannot conceive a more ruinous political do&rine.

When Sir W. "Temple difluaded Ch. II. from a]l thoughts of making himself abfolute, he observed to him, among other things, that it would be impracticable : for that England was quite a different fort of country from France, where abfolute government was established. That in the land of flavery there was no such independent body as our middling gentry; and that, on the contrary, that country was full of priefts, of needy noblefie, military officers, and revenue-men, all naturally devoted to the support of arbitrary power, as beino- all interested in it themselves; that Charles had but few places and pensions to give, and no army of considerable force ^a. [We have innumerable places and pensions to allure, and a formidable army to threaten our members into court-measures.] Accordingly the pension parliament was very compliant to the court at firit; but grew more patriotic afterwards, most probably disappointed in their voracious expectations.

Ch. I. A. D. 1628, gave out, that it belongs only to the judges to declare the meaning of the laws ^b. But Rapin justly remarks, That this Was making those men the interpreters of the laws, who depended

¹ Hume, HIST. STUARTS, n. 240. ^k Rapin, n. 276.

on him ; for the king could then make or unmake the judges, as he pleased; which was throwing the liberties, properties, and lives of the subjects into the hands of the king or ministry. Is not the reasoning the same with regard to members of parliament ? If they hold places, and expect preferments from the ministry, are they not the dependents on the ministry as much as Charles's judges were on him? And is it not as much to be expected, that they should be /laves to the ministry ?

Ifhitelecke, in oppofmg the self-denying ordinance, observes, That the Greeks and Romani gave the greatest employments to their fenators. But there is always a great difference between a monarchy and a republic. The latter has checks for overgrown power, which the former knows nothing of. And it is the peculiar evil of monarchy, that ministers fcreen themselves behind the throne; and, as kings are facred characters, as our kings can do no evil, and parliaments are bribed, ministerial crimes go unpunilhed. Again ; JWitelocke says, the English have always given great places to the members of both houses. But in those times, the number of places was so small, they could feldom produce any great effect. Accordingly we fee how ftaunch parliaments were in Ch. Ift's time.

The propofals for more effectually putting the self-denying ordinance in force A. D. 1648, were at that time over-ruled, because many of the members held very profitable places. Yet it is certain there were not in those days places for a majority of the house, and all depends on the majority -¹. How then came the minority to sain such a point ?

* PARL. HIST. xvii. 386.

This shews, that the effeft of places and pensions given to parliatnentMijen. extends muph wider than thP places and pensions themselves reach tq. There are Always in parliament a multitude of gapers, who hope to catch a fop by and by, and are therefore ready to £iirry court-favour by {hewing themselves to be on the court side. It is to be fupposed, that was then the case,

Theauthpr of faffion detected by Faftst says, a pension-bill is impofiible, because members may take the money, and conceal their crime, Birt why may not things be put on such a foot, that a minister should not know how to find money enough to bribe 300 men of fortune every time he has an unconstitutional jx>int to carry ? Beftdes, were a double penalty set upon both giver and receiver, the frequency o.f detection, in consequence of party-altercation, would render bribing ve"ry dangerous. And were parliaments annual, with exclufion pf a certain number by rotation for three years, as the law requires in the case of {heriffs, it could be worth no minister's while to bribe.

Qur house of commons pretends to have an abfolute controul over elections, to determine who fhall fit in, their house, and who {hall not. Why then have they Heyer determined, that no member {hall fit, who has given victuals, or drink, or money, to be elected? Why do they not determine that no man fliall fit in their house, who has a dependence of any kind upon the court ? The answer is plain, This would only be for the advantage of the people, and would ruin the trade of parliamentecring; for ' courtiers and king's

servants (says Wbitlocke) fit in parliament rather to

promote their matter's ends [and their own] than,

their country's rights *'

* PAUL. HIST. xix. 231.

On this grievous subject, cruel is the fneer of the courtiers upon us, when we complain of placemen in. the house, viz, ' That the people themselves are in fault; Why do they re-elect them ?' — Ah, ye traitors, who ' grin horrible a ghaftly fmile,' while ye are ftabbing liberty to the heart! full well do ye, know (at the very time ye are mocking us with this xmjust and wicked recrimination of a fault, which owns youiselves only for its authors) that the wretched people re-eleft upon the same principle as they eleff, A handful of beggars either tempted by a bribe, or awed by the threats of a man in power, elect and re-elect as they are bid. And so the house comes to be filled with the tools of a minister. Nothing can therefore be imagined more farcical, than our pretending to make a law rendering it neceflary to re-ele£i every member, who has accepted a place. The only law, that could, to any purpose, have been made, was utter dlfqualification.

One would imagine, there could not be much room for accufmg the republican parliament of places and pensions. Yet it appears, that reflections were even then made upon that account, which shews the delicacy of those times. « What does the enemy say, nay what do many say, who were friends at the beginning of the parliament ? even this. That the members of both houses have got great places and commands, and the sword into their hands, and what by interest in parliament, what by power in the army, will purposely continue themselves in grandeur, and not permit the war fpeeciily to end, left their own profit and power {hould determine with it. This 1 speak to our own faces. It is but what others do utter abroad behind our backs. I hope we ha', c fticli true English hearts and zealous affections toward the

general weal of our mother country, that no membei of either house will fcruple to deny himself and his private interest for the public good, nor account a diihonour done to him, whatever the parliament fliall refolve upon in this weighty matter.' Cromwell's speech, (the only fensible one he ever made) which }ed to the self-denying ordinance».

It was reckoned, there were 232 members of the first parliament of Geo. I. who had places, pensions, or titles, besides a great many brothers, and heirs apparent, of the nobility, or persons otherwife likely to be under undue influence; the number of which was not below 50, which added to the 232 makes 282^b. A frightful majority on the side of the court. And there is no reason to fuppose the jtugean {table is generally cleaner now than it was then.

' Had our new barrier been well fortified,' [that is, the independency of parliament fecured at the revolution] * had the representativc of the people been contrived to answer to the name, all our kings had been queen Elizabeths. But our elections in inconsiderable boroughs, and our members being qualified to serve two mafters, were such mi flakes in our fundamentals, that, as they have produced our paft misfortunes, they must produce the like under bad princes,, or evil projecting ministers. With a house of commons chosen truly by the people incapable of pensions and places, the king and kingdom had been incapable of misfortune : they had been out of the reach of all human power, and with due submiflion, above fate; since such a government would have made us the proper objects of divine protection, and not only

» PARL. HIST. xin. 376. ^k DEB. COM. vm. 210.

have fecured our greatness and glory, but our religion and morals too, which I fear are all going together'.' A parliament is not neceflarily a fccurity more than a court, (as the French king's court) against flavery. James II. A. D. 1689, assembled a parliament in Inland. But what fort of parliament ? Let Tindaf* answer. Slaves to the king, packed by him, bigotted to popery, and furious against the protestants, king William^ and the revolution. Suppose a parliament thoroughly attached to the court by bribery, the effect would be the same as if attached by a falfe principle. * We have seen and heard,' says lord Beiingbreit, ' in a nation hitherto free, such maxims avowed and pleaded for, as are inconsistent with all the notions of liberty. Corruption hath been defended, nay recommended as a proper, a neceflary, and therefore a reasonable expedient of government; than which there is not perhaps, any one proposition more repugnant to the common sense of mankind and to univerfal experience. Both of thefc demonftrate corruption to be the last deadly fymptom of agonizing liberty. Both of them declare that a people abandoned to it are abandoned to a reprobate sense, and are loft to all hopes of political falvation. The dependence of the legislature on the executive power hath been contended for by the same persons, under the same direction, and yet nothing furely can be more evident than this; that in a constitution like ours, the safety of the whole depends upon the ballance of the parts, and the ballance of the parts on their mutual independency on one another; agreeably to which, Tbuanus makes Ftrdinandlvj in answer to the Cajlilianst who prefs'd him to take away the independency of the

• STATE TRACTS, time of king William, u. 645. ^k CONTINUATION, i. 8j.

dates of Arragtn; That the public safety depends on the equal ballance of the power of the king, and of the power of the kingdom, and that if ever it should happen that one outweigh'd the other, the ruin of one, or of both, must undoubtedly follow *.' * It is pleasant to observe a fct of writers charging others with forming republican schemes, when they themselves are the persons who in efFedt, and by the neceflary consequence of their way of reasoning, have been placing our excellent constitution in a most ridiculous and contemptible light. According to them it is no better than a jumble of incompatible powers, which would feparate and fall to pieces of themselves, unless retrained and upheld by such honourable methods as those of bribery and corruption; for how is it poflible for any man under any other notion, to plead for the necessity or for the fitness of places and pennons, or any pecuniary influence among the members of the house of commons ? If any dependence or biafs created by such motives were really neceflary, it would prove that the form of our government itself was defective to a degree of ridiculoufness; that it was a constitution having a representative of the people which must be engaged not to represent them, nor to vote and aft if uninfluenced by private interest or corrupt motives. Now if such an influence or dependence was univerfal and unlimited throughout the whole house, the monarchy would be abfolute; and whenever this influence prevails in any degree, it tends to arbitrary power. For this reason the true friends of liberty must perpetually guard against such influences, which

* Bahnglr. REM. HIST. ENGL. 29.

is not fetting up a new form of governmenf, but prefer ving the old».' That placemen in parliament, are in our times a

ferious evil, appears from this, that * the minister, before he introduces a bill, can foretell, almost with certainty, its fate in the house; and by means of the influence which he has over the members, can command, in most cases, a majority of votes. Nor will this influence appear in the least furprizing, if we consider the great number of lucrative places which the fovereign, that is, the minister, has to dispose of. For though the property of the subjects be much larger than that of the fovereign, yet is the property of this last by no means inconsiderable ; and it is well known, that much less property, in a (Ingle hand, will counterbalance a greater in several hands. According to the most exaft computation, there are near three millions at the dispofal of the crown. The" civil lift amounts to near a million, the collection of all taxes to another, and the employments in the army and navy, along with ecclefiaftical preferments, to above a third million : an enormous fum, and what cannot fail to attach to the court an immense number of dependants; and as few placemen are excluded from feats in parliament, the fovereign'

[say rather the minister] « must have a mighty influence upon all the deliberations of that auguft aflembly. It ought alfo to be observed, that the great increase of our dominions, and the consequent necessity for the proportionable increase in our military establishment,' [there is no need of a military eftablifli-

ment, a militia is every way preferable] * are both of them pernic.ous to liberty; for feldom or never has it

» Bolinglr. POLIT. TRACTS, 251.

been known, that any nation has preserved its liberty, after having greatly extended its conquests, and (till less after having established a large standing army. And though the increase of commerce, which is likewife the consequence of extenfive dominions, be favourable in some measure to the cause of liberty, by introducing among the people a greater degree of equality, and by drawing them into large towns, which always breathe a republican Spirit; yet does it alfo by this very circumstance of drawing them into large towns, tend evidently to corrupt their minds, and to enervate their bodies, and thus to prepare them for the reception of that flavery, which a variety of other causes is likely to bring upon them. With regard to tho people's jealousy of the crown, which is said to be inherent in the Britijb constitution; this jealousy, however great, may yet by an artful minister be laid asleep. The power of the crown is certainly upon the increase, but it advances, at the same time, with such flow and imperceptible fteps, as not to awaken the jealousy of the public; and before this jealousy be effectually awakened, the power of the crown may have become so great, as to be altogether irresistible. Every new tax that is imposed upon the people, every foot of ground that is added to our dominions, every increase that is made in our military eftablimment, all confpire by their united influence to increase the power of the crown; and if things be fuffered to proceed in their present courfe, and no extraordinary convulfion happens in the state, the Britijh liberties must at last be fwal lowed up in abfolute monarchy. Might I prefume, amidft these oppofite arguments, to deliver my own sentiments, I would affirm, that the Britijb government tends immediately neither to a republic, nor an abfo-

lute monarchy, but to an ariftocraey; thougfc this last will in alj probability only pave tha way for die i$trodu&iofi of monarchy. The very effence of out liberty consists in the people's having tho right: *ad the fovef to dmfe Adt jrque&atatwcr in parliament) that k in other words, in being their own kgiflators. But ftould wee ever come to havt a goaat number of hereditary legislatars, or those who are fitch independent of the people's choke, and ftouid theft hereditary legislators be pofle£ed of the whole, or of the gceatcft part of tiw national property, qpd should they, by means of that property, be able to influence the elediong, and to controul the proceeding* of the members of the lower house, though we may be ftill amufod with the pleastng found of liberty, and though the lower house may be permitted to firbiift in its present form, the national liberties are from that moment ruined. For it is wdi known, that the forms of a constitution may long remain, after its spirit has been entirely extinguished. How far this is our case at present, or how far it is likely to be our case, in some not very diftant -period, any one may eafily determine, by considering the great number of wealthy commoners, who within this half century paft have been advanced to the peerage, and the fpiric which ftill prevails of advancing others to the same, dignity. The moment a commoner becomes troublesome in the lower house, if he is poflefled of a competent fortune, he is immediately tranfplanted to the upper, where he at once strengthens the ariftocratic, and proportionably weakens the democratic part of our government. And how g-reat an influence the members of the upper, have upon the elections, and consequently upon the proceedings of those of the lower

house, may be eafily collected from perufing A court calendar, where we shall fee, that almost all the. noblemens fons .in England* who are of a proper age, are members of the lower house, and that many commoners have obtained their feats-there, by the interest and countenance of some powerful nobleman. In a word, we seem to be .in a fair way of becoming in a shorttime, a nation of .great, lords, and of needy vaflals ; the consequence of .which must infallibly be, that the. people, harrafled by the oppreffions of the great, confciqus that their liberties are already ravifhed from them, and chuftng rather to submit to one mild mafter, than to two or three hundred petty tyrants, will petition the fovereign, as the last favour he can grant them, that he will be gracioufly pleased to establish an abfolute monarchy. This was very lately the case in Denmark^ and if nothing extraordinary happens, it will in all probability be very soon the case in Great-Britain. How to prevent the impending calamity, or if it cannot be prevented, how it may at least be for some time warded off, I will not take upon me to say. A peerage bill was some years ago attempted, or an ad to confine within certain limits the number of peers. Perhaps such a scheme may again be revived, but there feeras very little likelihood in the present disposition of parties, that it would meet with fuccefsV No one ever knew human nature better than He, who said, ' No man can serve two matters.' It is a romantic expectation, and unfuitable to what we know of the frailty of our species, to think of a placeman's or pensioner's being altogether unbiafled in favour of the ministry, to which he owes his emolument, and

• POLIT. RECIST. qudfed LOND. MAG. 1787, p. 406.

consequently of those gentlemen's confultirig in their speeches and votes the good of their-country, with the same impartiality as they might be expefted to do, if wholly independent. « The wife of Carfar ought to be not only innocent, but unfujpefled.' Why must the wife of Cafar be more unfufpe&ed, than a Britijb kgiflator ? Could the Britijh. legislators think of pafling unfufpeded, if there were in-the house of commons' more than two hundred notorious dependents on the Court ? As we go on, this {hocking fight may soon be seen.

The courtiers argue, that excluding placemen and pensioners from parliament, would seem to establish an opposition between the crown and people; as if those, who were employed by the one, could not be entrusted by the other. But indeed there seems to be no occafion for mincing the matte'r. Let us fairly own, that We do not think'the same persons, who have the* laying out, ought likewife to have the laying an of taxes. Since it is eafy to imagine, th'at a member, who has a place, will be under little concern how heavily the people are taxed, as his income indemnifies him, and the heavier the taxes, the more money there will be for the court blood-fuckers.

Ch. 1. fairly declares his expectation of indirect service from his convention parliament at tixford, A. D, 1643; I think most of you, says he, are in my service, either in a civil or a martial way*.' To what purpose does he mention this, but to put them in mind, that they ought to exprefs their gratitude, by promoting his wicked schemes at any rate ?

* PARL'. HIST. xui. no.

en&tlfttt toll* u« S tfcrt Cfcw/«, being flfcppoinlttJ ia his fchw«% * took auolbtr courfe to gain eminent paslianjwtf m«n, M?ho wer« against Ww, to tecoine of few party.* aad to do hifn servu;?. He took Si* «T*fl. Weatwortk an4 Sir 7«v &KW& into- favour, a«d nwrfe item p* ivy-cwjnfeUor%, §ir Dudley Big&t wa* made mafter «|f the roll?; #iyf, king** attorney^ an4 Litikta* ftiicitor.' Hi? dependent judg*a decked* fcjp-money lawful. On which, occafon the pious and virtuous lady of judge Crtke (whofe feme be immortal!) said to her hufoand, * fee hoped he would dor nothing againff his honour, for fear of danger or Iqfs, and that (he would be content tofuffer want or misery with him, ra.ther than 6e ait occafion for him to do, or say, any thing against his judgment or conference ^b.' Lotd Digfy, in his speech, A, D. 1640, for frequent ek&icms, mentions A'^v as once a great patriot, and promoter of the petition of right. Afterwards, when inade attorney general, he proved the very inventor ef fliip-money. He likevvife c.aHs Wentworlh a shameful apastate^e,

St. Jfkni one of the patriots- in the time pf Ch. 1^ was made folicitor general, and others were to be taken into places; but refused them, and flood by the parliament. It was afterwards faspected,, that some, if they ha4 accepted places, would have done the king's cause qiore harm than goodj by betraying^ the cou[S-schemes-to the people *. JJesides, the king had not then places enough, to bribe a majority of the commons. This, however, fhews what the court then thought* as well as now, the true means for making members-

» MEM. 13. ^b 1M<!. *4-

^c PARL. HIST- ix. 197.

^d Hum, HIST. STUARTS, i. z6o.

knaves. And it was to toko off the kfcputatiebs* under which the republican fftritaiMfct (tAlt OH BCtouM of placemen being in the house, that tk« self'doa^ing ordinance wu first breached \

Scripture dirwfts to fliwt At *pp&fi*# «f eVil And wfeeever does not f«r the appearance, it fl« ft* front the*vn&>. On this princifdett»t BMVK dom*W*i4 -cf the republica* paflianwnt write «S Mtews t* thd South commtfiooers.

« We know your lordfljips can and will wl&ietk with us, that finc« Dkr 6OV«fl»ht and thttty, we Have not received any dignitStt «r »ftce« flbm the kftjg V When metabers of pafliataent are placemen, thai is, when the same mea ha^e both legirtative and executive power, how ard we to expect that offenders in adminiftratioft Ihottld be punilhed, the criminals being {he judges ? CaA wfe think any let of ipen will be public spirited enough to hang ihemselves for their offences agajnft their country * ?

* ffalfey's ambition (says Eifynge) first brought the privy counsellors, and others of the king's iervants, ijito the hOuse of commoos; from whence they were anciently exempted. The effects are, th« commons baye l9ft their f tyef jewel* fteedom rf speech*.'

It is a mafim in RJclfEtir's ¥tfla*u PtKt. That c jjcing, that js, a minister? flimild never part with a tax he has once got eftabliOied, even though he has no use for the money > because »/ giving up the tax, he

* Xtyff, II. 515.

* PA&L. flpr- xv. lya. ^c Card. TRACTS, i. 61.

* £H?»&t'* ANT. MEttt. ttbto. PARL. 17$.

lofes the officers employed in collecting it. And these pfficers in parliament are fure cards.

Hen. IV. of France gave the marfhal A'Ornant a ftaff to turn papift, and afterwards afked him which' of the two religions he thought the best. « The protestant, undoubtedly, replies the marfhal; elfe your majefty would not have given me a marfhal's ftaff to boot, to engage me to quit it.' I have-forgot to set down the original writer of this anecdote. It is told in Cato's letters, &c,

A Britijb minister gives places and pcnfions to those who vote for him. Suppose one of those members were afked, Whether the service of his country, or voting always with the court, is best; if he were as honest a knave as the marfhal, what could he answer, but, * That certainly voting for the country's good was preferable to flavery under a minister; elfe the minister had no occafton to give him a place or penfton. to booty to engage him to quit his country's service for the minifjer's.' And is not this giving up the point ?

The Emperor, and bloody Mary gave public penlions to fhe members pf parliament. — \Vith what view ? To engage them to vote for the good of their country > No. To establish popery; To vote the queen's marr riage with a papift, Philip II. of Spain; which that venal parliament did accordingly; thereby manifeftjy shewing how foundly Philip and Mary judged of the effect of bribing parliament^a. What difference does jt make to me, as a subjeft, whether I am voted into flavery for gold fent from the continent to bribe parliament, or for gold drawn out of the exchequer of

* Rafiti) ii. 38,

England t Of the two, m'odefn bribery is t&e most-disgraceful. It is making us pay for the rod, which is* to beat us, and the chain, that is to bind us.

Sir Ch. Wagtr^ first lord of the admiralty, Fgx, furveyor general of. the works, and PeJbam (I do not recoiled what place he held at that time) were the speakers against lord Limerick's motion, A. D. 1741* for an enquiry into the conduct of affairs during Waip»U*s 20 years adminiftration, which was carried in the negative 244 against 242 *. And it is, in general, the same in all debates of the kind. The placemen always speak and vote in one tone; so that before you begin their speeches, you are certain, by only reading the name of the speaker, and knowing, that he held a place, what the ftrain of his speech will be,

< An unpensioned subject will always give the most faithful counsel to his prince. And it is the true interest of the prince to have about him those, who' will not flatter him, or be the flaves of his paffions for the fake of his money V When Mr. Pultenty refigned his place, A. D. 1720, he said in the house, * He might now a& with the * freedom which became an Englijbman;' which implied, that a place was incompatible with freedom«. The same gentleman was struck out of the lift of privy counsellors by Gio. II. with his own hand, for his uncourtly behaviour. The duke of Argylet the earl of Stair, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Ltgge, and many more, have been disgraced and displaced on the same account; which fhews what courts expect of placemen. And are placemen then fit to be members of parliament ?

* DEB. COM. xui. 147.

^k Bolingbr, POLIT. TRACTS, 283,

« PEB. COM. vi. 120,

An omraft of S&no Jifoa's army having ptefotMtf to fit in his prefence, the prince deprived him et hi* command. The di%raced office* went <$ the palace next day! and fat down ift the preience chamber. Upon fhe Shah's reproving him, be answered boHly,

Now I am not in your majefty's ^sy, I may vie the

freedom, which belongs to every independent man.' The emperor approve^ and restored him %

ffV^y moved, ^. Z>. 1721* for tire mutiny bill, which is net cpmriioflly brought in till the end of a feffion. y*>iy/ wa