A
BRIEF SURVEY
OF
EQUITY JURISDICTION

BEING A SERIES OF ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW
BY
C. C. LANGDELL, LL.D.
DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS

SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED

CAMBRIDGE
THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 1908

COPYRIGHT, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1892, BY THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW PUBLISHING ASSOCIATION.

COPYRIGHT, 1896, 1900, BY THE TRUSTEES OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

COPYRIGHT, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1908, BY THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION.

PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

PROFESSOR LANGDELL'S articles upon Equity Jurisdiction, which have appeared from time to time in the "Harvard Law Review," have formed, for several years, part of the course in Equity at the Law School of the University of New York. To make these essays more accessible to his students, Dean Ashley of that School suggested that they be brought together in a volume. In complying with this suggestion, in 1904, the publishers were confident that they would gratify, also, the unexpressed wish of those who had the good fortune to begin their study of Equity under the personal guidance of Professor Langdell, and of many other lawyers as well.

The book in its present form contains five articles written in the last years of the author's life, and a carefully prepared index.

The reader will find in this volume the same power of historical research, of critical analysis, and of illuminating generalization that distinguished Professor Langdell's "Summary of Equity Pleading," a book recognized at once as the work of a great master of the law.

CAMBRIDGE, October 1, 1908.

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.


CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES..............vii

A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION

ARTICLE PAGE

I. CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS......... 1

II. CLASSIFICATION OF WRONGS........ 19

III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.......... 40

IV. BILLS FOR AN ACCOUNT.......... 73

V. BILLS OF EQUITABLE ASSUMPSIT....... 99

VI. CREDITORS' BILLS............ 125

VII. CREDITORS' BILLS (continued)........ 154

VIII. REAL OBLIGATIONS............ 192

IX. CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS AND WRONGS ... 219

X. CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS AND WRONGS (continued) 239

XI. EQUITABLE CONVERSION.......... 260

XII. EQUITABLE CONVERSION (continued)...... 282

XIII. " " " ...... 304

XIV. " " " ...... 330

XV. " " " ...... 359

XVI. " " " ...... 377

XVII. " " " ...... 394

INDEX................... 409


PAGE

ABBIS v. Winter 174

Abell v. Screech 181

Ackroyd v. Smithson 264, 300, 330, 333, 334, 335-358, 359

Adams and the Kensington Vestry,

In re 270, 271

Alleyn v. Alleyn 311

Allfrey v. Allfrey 120

Ambler v. Lindsay 186

Amphlett v. Parke 288, 292

Angell v. Haddon 160

Angus v. Dalton 246, 247

Anonymous (1 Leon. 266) 80

(Keilw. 77a, 77b, pl. 25) 85

(II Mod. 92) 87

(Gary (ed. of 1820), 29) 95

(Dyer, 264b) 98

(Dyer, 271a, pl. 25) 151

(1 Atk. 491) 156

(3 Atk. 572) 168

(12 Ves. 4) 178

v. Marsh 383

Apsden v. Seddon 209

Arnold v. Chapman 190, 286, 287

Ashby v. Palmer 373

v. Pocock 174

v. White 225

Atcherley v. Vernon 385

Atherley v. Evans 124

Attorney General v, Holford 349, 351,

356, 357

v. Lomas 280, 348, 351

Austerberry v. Oldham 255

BACKWELL'S Case 180 Bagster v. Fackerell 342, 348, 358

Baker v. Hall 290

Baldwin v. Society 72

Bank of England v, Morice 136, 142

Banks v. Scott 266

Barker v. May 98

v. Rogers 182

v. Thorold 75

Barrett v. Blagrave 71

Barrington v. Hereford 290

Barry v. Stevens 92

Basset v. Basset 156

Batteste v. Maunsell 390

Baxter v. Hozier 96

Bayley v. Adams 109

Baynton v. Cheek 98

Beauclerk v. Mead 330, 350

Bective v. Hodgson 339

Bedford v. Bedford 342

v. Leigh 185, 187

Benson v. Baldwyn 213

v. Benson 384, 399

Berkeley v. Salisbury 213

Berry v. Usher 342, 349

Biddulph v. Biddulph 386, 390, 403

Biggs v. Andrews 369, 370, 391

Bishop of Winchester v. Knight 39

Bissell v. Axtell 156 Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal

Co. 37

Bonomi v. Backhouse 245

Boreman v. Yeat 213

Bourne v. Bourne 266

Bowen v. Hall 3, 6, 241

Bradish v. Gee 403

Brandlin v. Millbank 146

Brett v. Shipping Co. 70, 71

Briggs v. B. & L. R. Co. 197

Brooks v. Reynolds 175, 176

Broome v. Monck 310, 311, 314

Brown v. Brown 403

v. Lake 160

Buccle v. Atleo 179

Bunnett v. Foster 350

Burgh v. Wentworth 82

Burley v. Evelyn 288

Burney v. Morgan 183

Busby v. Earl of Salisbury 213

Busfield v. Wheeler 197

Byam v. Munton 297

CALLANDER v. Howard 113, 124

Calthrope v. Gough 399

Carter v. Haswell 279

Catchside v. Ovington 139

Catt v. Tourle 69, 72

Crabtree v. Bramble 403

Croft v. Slee 289

Cruse v. Barley 286, 334, 342, 346

Champernoon v. Gubbs 213, 214

Chandler v. Pocock 372, 374, 387 Chaplin v. Horner 324, 382, 383, 398, 399 Chelsea Water Works Co. v. Cowper 162

Chitty v. Parker 279

Christian v, Foster 342 Clark v. Glasgow Assurance Co. 66, 209

Clarke v. Earl of Ormonde 176, 177

v. Franklin 329, 358, 371, 395

v. Price 72

Cleverley v. Cleverley 176

Cocket v. Robston 81

Cocks v. Foley 213

Cogan v. Stephens 334

v. Stevens 355

Coleman v. Mellersh 120

Collet v. Jaques 213

Collett v. Collett 399

Collingwood v. Row 269

Collins v. Wakeman 288, 333

Collinson v. Ballard 169

Colwall v. Shadwell 382, 399

Commonwealth v. Berry 79

v. Foster 92, 93

v. Stearns 92

Cook v. Duckenfield 279

v. Stationer's Co. 283, 290

Cooke v. Dealey 302

Coombes v. Mansfield 64

Cooper v. Jarman 315

Cooper's Trusts, In re 290 Coppin v. Coppin 311

Cory v. Thames Iron Works & Shipbuilding Co. 43, 45

Couch v. Steel 235, 240

Counter v. Macpherson 60

Court v. Buckland 298, 300

Coventry v. Coventry . 390

Cowper v. Blissett 185

Coysgarne v. Jones 178

Cunningham v. Moody 382, 398

Cupit v. Jackson 214

Curre v. Bowyer 176, 312

Curteis v. Wormald 275, 355

DALE v. Sollet 89

Darby v. Darby 364

Davenhill v, Fletcher 190

Daveson, In re 281, 393

Davie v. Beardsham 385

Davies v. Ashford 403

v. Churchman 152

v. Nicolson 161

v. Topp 150

Davis v. Combermere 179

v. Johnston 95

Davy v. Davy 213

v. Pepys 146, 152

Day, In re 315

Dawson v. Dawson 120

Dean & Chapter of Exeter v. Trewinnard 138

Deeth v. Hale 327

Demandray v. Metcalf 198

Dent v. Dent 98

Devaynes v. Noble 115

Dietrichsen v. Cabburn 69, 70, 71

Digby v. Legard 334, 336, 340, 369

Dinwiddie v. Bailey 90, 94, 108

Dixon v. Dawson 265

v. Gayfere 403

Doane v. Russell 197

Dollond v. Johnson 174

Donnell v. Bennett 70, 71

Dorchester v. Webb 136

Doughty v. Bull 354, 390

Douglas v. Clay 175

Dowdeswell v. Dowdeswell 186

Drant v. Vause 270

Duke of Bridge-water v.

Edwards 213 Duke of Cleveland's Settled Estates,

In re 372, 375, 386

Duke of Leeds v. New Radnor 213

v. Powell 213

Duncuft v. Albrecht 48

Duppa v. Mayo 203

Durour v. Motteux 296, 300, 333, 336

Dyer v. Dyer 302

v. Kearsley 177

EARL OF COVENTRY v. Coventry 390

Eason v. Henderson 95

Edwards v. Countess of Warwick 322, 323, 400

v. West 270

Elliott v. Fisher 395

Emblyn v. Freeman 286, 334

Emuss v. Smith 270, 271

Erving v. Peters 130

Eyre v. Marsden 342

Eyre's Case 402

FARLEY v. Craig 205

Farnham v. Burroughs 186

Farrell v. Smith 160

Farrington v. Lee 87

Ferrers v. Tanner 212

Ferris v. Newby 212

Field v. Brown 301

Fielden v. Fielden 179

Finch v. Winchelsea 166

Fitch v. Weber 342, 347

Fitzpatrick v. Mahoney 121

Fladong v. Winter 159

Flamang's Case 31

Flanagan v. Flanagan 264

Fletcher v. Ashburner 374

v. Chapman 333, 355, 356

Flint v. Warren 342, 348, 356, 369

Foley v. Hill 92, 94, 108

Fothergill v. Rowland 70, 71, 72

Fryer v. Royle 185

Fulham v. Jones 360

GARDNER v. Railway Co. 236

Gardner's Trusts, In re 266

Garnett v. Acton 309, 311

Gaunt v. Taylor 174

Gawton v. Lord Dacres 85

Gibbs v. Ougier 189, 360

v. Rumsey 342

Gibson v. Lord Montfort 309, 378, 385

Gillespie v. Alexander 161

Gilpin v. Lady Southampton 171, 176

Godfrey v. Saunders 76

Goodall, In re 273

Goodwyn v. Lister 379

Gordon v. Atkinson 342

Gordon, In re 403, 405;

Graves's Minors 273

Greaves's Settlement Trusts, In re 372,

375. 386

Green v. Farmer 111

v. Jackson 292, 339

v. Smith 310

Greenhill v. Greenhill 385

Greenwood v. Taylor 187

Greig v. Somerville 161

Griesbach v. Freemantle 403

Griffith v. Ricketts 369, 370, 395

Griffiths v. Anthony 139

v. Pruen 297

Golder v. Colder 184

Guidot v. Guidot 304, 386, 390

HACKWELL v. Eastman 96

Hamilton v. Foote 342, 348, 357, 369

Hamond v. Ward 123

Hancocke v. Prowd 135

Hanson v. Gardiner 31

v. Stubbs 174

Harcourt v. Seymour 403

Hardcastle v. Chettle 177

Hardey v. Hawkbhaw 364

Hardy, Ex parte 354

Harrison v. Beecles 137

Hart v. Herwig 49

Hartley v. Pendarves 301

Harvey v. Harvey 181

Haslewood v. Pope 189, 190

Hatfield v. Prime 329, 342, 348, 356

Hawkes v. Barrett 172

Hawkins v. Parker 75

Haynes v. Haynes 225

Hayward v. Constable 172

Haywood v. Brunswick Building Soc. 209, 255

Henchman v. Attorney-General 286, 287

Henderson v. French 139

Henley v. Webb 382, 383, 384

Henningham's Case 146

Heptinstall v. Gott 290

Hereford v. Ravenhill 390

Hewitt v. Wright 287

Hill v. Cock 339, 342, 355, 369

Hills v. Croll 69, 70, 71

Hinde v. Lyon 146, 147

Hinton v. Parker 139

Holstcomb v. Rivers 82, 90

Holt v. Holt 314

Hood v. Hood 311

Hooper v. Brodrick 71, 72

v. Goodwin 345, 349, 350, 362

Hopkins v. Hopkins 339

Horner's Estate 266

Horrell v. Waldron 156

Howard v. Howard 156

Hudson v. Cook 311

Hughes v. Morris 62

Humphries v. Brogden 221, 246

Hutcheson v. Hammond 287, 291

Hyett v. Mekin 354, 366

INGERSOLL v. Sergeant 209

Irby v. Irby 175

Isaacs, In re 270

JACKSON v. Harrison 203

v. Hurlock 290

v. Leaf 178

Jaques v. Miller 43

Jemott v. Cawley 203

Jennings v. Rigby 174

Jermy v. Preston 267

Jessopp v. Watson 329, 342, 346, 348, 356, 369

Johnson v. Compton 185

v. Woods 342, 347

Jones v. Davies 266

v. Jukes 175

v. Mitchell 288, 291

v. Newhall 50

KEMBLE v. Kean 69, 71

Kemp v. Westbrook 198

Kennell v. Abbott 291, 296

Kennington v. Houghton 108

Kenyon v. Worthington 176

Kimberley v. Jennings 69, 71

King v. Rossett 92, 108

v. Smith 187

King, Ex parte 402

Kinsman v. Barker 121

Kirkham v. Peel 92

Kirkman v. Miles 390, 403

Knight v. Knight 152

LADY FOHANE'S Case 385

Lamine v. Dorrell 85

Lane v. Newdigate 37

Langford v. Pitt 311

Lashley v. Hogg 160

Law v. Rigley 178

Lawes v. Bennett 269, 270

Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle 322, 323, 390, 405

Lee v. Bowler 82

Leonard v. Simpson 130

Lincoln v. Parr 87 Lingen v.

Souroy 321, 323, 383, 403

Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner 64

Livingstone v. Whiting 113

Lockhart v. Hardy 159

London & Great Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm 255

Lord Castlemaine v. Lord Craven 66

Lord Dacres' Case 85

Lumley v. Gye 3, 6, 241

v. Wagner 69, 70, 71

Lytton v. Railway Co. 47

MACKENZIE v. Johnston 92

Makepeace v. Rogers 91, 112

Mallabar v. Mallabar 296, 300, 333, 336

Mara v. Quin 139

Martin v. Martin 185, 186

Mary Shipley's Case 135

Mary Smith's Mortgage Account, In re 266

Mason v. Bogg 187

v. Hill 245

Matthews v. Newby 156

Maugham v. Mason 279, 296, 342, 356,

369, 390

May v. King 124

v, Selby 185

McCalmont v. Rankin 64

McKellar v. Wallace 119

M'Mahon v. Burchell 95

Meek v. Devenish 403

Meredith v. Vick 403

Michael Dent's Case 96

Mills v. Haywood 53

Milner v. Mills 309, 311

Milnes v. Branh 209

Milward v. Ingram 124

Mitchell v. Dors 31

Mitchelson v. Piper 175

Morrice v. Bank of England 173, 180

Morris v. Colman 71

Moxon v. Bright 94, 108

Mutlow v. Bigg 403

NEALE v. Gripps 33

Neve v. Weston 182

Newberry's Trusts, In re 290

Newman v. Norris 179

Nicholas v. Nicholas 156

Nicolls v. Crisp 369

Noel v. Lord Henley 291

Noell v. Nelson 135

Norman v. Baldry 158

North v. Strafford 213

N. E. Railway Co. v. Martin 109

OGLE v. Cook 333

Onslow's Case 402

Owston v. Ogle 75

PADWICK v. Stanley 108, 112

Page v. Denton 142

v. Leapingwell 284, 291, 296

Paine v. Meller 60, 62

Palmer v. Waller 130

Pamplin v. Green 155

Parker v. Dee 142, 143, 144

Paschall v. Keterich 81, 98

Paxton v. Douglas 171, 172, 176, 177

Pearson v. Lane 382, 391

Pedder's Settlement, In re 268

Pembroke v. Bowden 360

Perry v. Attwood 117, 119, 122

v. Phelips 175, 176

Peto v. Railway Co. 70

Phillips v. Homfrey 39

v. Phillips 108, 112, 342, 356

Pickering v. Lord Stamford 279

Pierce v. Clark 84

Pigot v. Cubley 196

Pigott v. Nower 142, 143, 144

Pilton, Ex parte 206

Pitt v. Cholmondeley 120, 121

Plunket v. Penson 152, 186

Ponsford v. Hartley 185

Poole v. Adams 60

Pott v. Gallini 178, 189

Potter v. Potter 385

Poulter v. Cornwall 87

Powell v. Wallworth 172

Powlett v. Duchess of Bolton 302

Pratt v. Tuttle 94

Prideux v. Gibben 385

Pulteney v. Warren 39

Pultney v. Darlington 405

QUARLES v. Capell 152

Queen & Painter's Case 81

RADCLIFFE, Matter of 178

Raikes v. Hall 187

Ramsden v. Jackson 130

Randall v. Bookey 278

Rayner v. Preston 60, 64

v. Stone 315

Raw, In re 354

Reeve v. Goodwin 170

Reeves v. Ward 136

Reynolds v. Godlee 275, 355

Richerson, In re 329, 342, 348, 357

Ripley v. Waterworth 269

Roades v. Barnes 124

Roberts v. Eberhardt 97

Robinson v. Bell 152

v. London Hospital 342

v. Lord Byron 37

v. Taylor 265, 342, 344, 355

Robsert v. Andrews 84

Rock v. Leighton 130

Rolfe v. Rolfe 69, 71

Rolt v. Somerville 37

Rook v. Worth 314

Roper v. Radcliffe 368

Rowbotham v. Wilson 246

Rowsell v. Morris 186

Rush v. Higgs 179

Rushleigh v. Master 385

SALISBURY v. Cecil 91

Salt v. Chattaway 290

Schomberg v. Humfrey 150

Scott v. Surman 92

Searle, In re 390

Seeley v. Jago 327

Shallcross v. Wright 342, 356, 369

Sheddon v. Goodrich 262, 345, 349, 350

Shewen v. Vanderhorst 159

Short v. Wood 382, 391, 399, 402

Shute v. Mallory 212

Simmons v. Pitt 289

Sims v. Ridge 172

Singleton v. Tomlinson 298

Sir Paul Neal's Case 87

Sir Wm. Harbert's Case 144, 148, 151

Sir W. Pelham's Case 81

Sisson v. Giles 403

Skey v. Bennett 183, 187

Smith v. Angel 146, 147

v. Birch 174

v. Claxton 329, 342, 345, 355, 358

v. Collyer 31

v. Fromont 72

v. Haskins Stiles Eyles 174

v. Leveaux 97, 108

S. E. Railway Co. v. Brogden 109

Speake v. Richards 98

Spencer v. Wilson 297

Spode v. Smith 172

Spurraway v. Rogers 75, 82

Stamper v. Millar 354

Stent v. Bailis 60

Stileman v. Ashdown 151, 152

Stocker v. Wedderburn 70

Stokes v. City Offices Co. 34

Stokes, In re 364

Stonehouse v. Evelyn 278

Storer v. Railway Co. 47

Stratford v. Ritson 150

Sumner v. Kelly 186

Sutcliffe v. Cole 290

Button v. Lord Montfort 248

Swallow v. Wallingford 69

Sweetapple v. Bindon 360, 361

TAFF VALE Railway Co. v. Nixon 108

Taylor v. Taylor 342, 348

Taylor's Settlement, In re 342, 348, 354,

358

Teed v. Beere 182

Telford v. Morison 139

Thames Iron Works & S. Co., Lt. v.

P. D. Co., Lt. 198

Thomas v. Griffith 182

v. Heathorn 124

v. Oakley 31, 39

v. Thomas 88, 95

Thomas, In re 310

Thorndike v. Allington 213

Thornton v. Hawley 390

Tooker v. Annesley 301

Topham v. Braddick 75

Tottenham v. Bedingfield 80, 81

Townley v. Bedwell 269

Trafford v. Boehm 304, 400

Trower v. Knightley 327

Tucker v. Kayess 290

Tulk v. Moxhay 255

VANBROUGH v. Cock 156

Vandergee v. Willis 198

Vane v. Lord Barnard 37

Van Rennselaer v. Hays 202

Vere v. Smith 75, 84

Vernon v. Vawdry 120

WAITE v. Waite 181

Walker, Ex parte 270

Wall v. Colshead 351, 357

Walrond v. Rosslyn 321, 323, 372, 374

Walter v. Maunde 263

Waring v. Danvers 178

Watson v. Arundel 298, 300

v. Hayes 288

Webb v. Webb 212

Wedderburn v. Wedderburn 120

Weeding v. Weeding 270, 271

Wells v. Ross 93

Wheatley v. Lane 131

Wheeler v. Home 96

White v. Hillacre 183, 185, 187

v. Smith 342, 348, 351, 357

Whittaker v. Howe 69

v. Whittaker 311

Whitwick v. Jermin 360

Wildes v. Davies 299

Wilkin v. Wilkin 75

Wilkyns v. Wilkyns 83

William Banes' Case 130

Williams v. Williams 69, 174, 342

Wilson v. Coles 265, 342, 348, 356

v. Fielding 189

v. Paul 179

Wiseman v. Roper 52

Wolverhampton & Walsall Ry. Co. v.

L. & N. W. Ry. Co. 71, 72

Woodgate v. Field 170

Worraker v. Pryer 185

Wright v. Howard 245

v. Rose 266

v. Row 289

v. Wright 349, 355

Wrightson v. Macauley 390


A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION.

I.[1]

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS.

EQUITY jurisdiction is a branch of the law of remedies; and as it affects, or is affected by, nearly the whole of that law, it is impossible to obtain an intelligent view of it as a whole without first taking a brief view of the law of remedies as a whole. Moreover, as all remedies are founded upon rights, and have for their objects the enforcement and protection of rights, it is impossible to obtain an intelligent view of remedies as a whole, without first considering the rights upon which they are founded.

Rights are either absolute or relative. Absolute rights are such as do not imply any correlative duties. Relative rights are such as do imply correlative duties.

Absolute rights are of two kinds or classes: First, those rights of property which constitute ownership or dominion, as distinguished from rights in the property of another, — jura in re aliena; secondly, personal rights; i.e., those rights which belong to every person as such.

Relative rights, as well as their correlative duties, are called obligations; i.e., we have but one word for both the right and its correlative duty. The creation of every obligation, therefore, is the creation of both a right and a duty, the right being vested in the obligee, and the duty being imposed upon the obligor. Undoubtedly the word "obligation" properly expresses the duty,

[1] 1 HARV. L. REV. 55.

and the use of the same word to express the right is a defect of nomenclature which is unfortunate, as it has given rise to much confusion of ideas.

Obligations are either personal or real, according as the duty is imposed upon a person or a thing. An obligation may be imposed upon a person either by his own act, namely, by a contract, or by act of law.[1]

An obligation may be imposed upon a thing either by the will of its owner, manifested by such act or acts as the particular system of law requires, or by act of law. It is in such obligations that those rights of property originate which are called rights in the property of another, — jura in re aliena. Instances of real obligations will be found in servitudes or easements, in which the law regards the servient tenement as owing the service; also in the Roman pignus and hypotheca, in which the res, pignorated or hypothecated to secure the payment of a debt, was regarded as a surety for the debt. The pignus has been adopted into our law under the name of pawn or pledge. The hypotheca has been rejected by our common law,[2] though it has been adopted by the admiralty law. A lien is another instance of a real obligation in our law, the very words "lien" and "obligation," having the same meaning and the same derivation. A familiar instance of a real obligation created by law will be found in the lien of a judgment or recognizance.[3]

[1] Strictly, every obligation is created by the law. When it is said that a contract creates an obligation, it is only meant that the law annexes an obligation to every contract. A contract may be well enough defined as an agreement to which the law annexes an obligation.

Strictly, also, a tort gives rise to an obligation as much as a contract; namely, an obligation to repair the tort or to make satisfaction for it; but this is an obligation which the law imposes upon a tort-feasor merely by way of giving a remedy for the tort. In the same way the breach of a contract gives rise to a new obligation to repair or make satisfaction for the breach.

[2] It would, however, be more correct to say that our law does not permit the owner of property to hypothecate it at his own will and pleasure; for hypothecations created by law do exist with us, as will presently be seen.

[3] Such a lien is an hypothecation created by law. It is what civilians call a general hypothecation, because it attaches to all the land of the judgment debtor or recognizer, whether then owned by him or afterwards acquired.

Instances of hypothecations of goods created by law will be found in the lien given to a landlord on the goods of his tenant to secure the payment of rent, and in the lien on beasts damage feasant, given to the person injured to secure satisfaction for the injury done. These liens are enforced by distress. The former is in a sense general; i.e., it attaches on all the goods which are on the demised premises when the rent becomes due.

Relative rights differ from absolute rights in this, that the former add nothing to the sum or aggregate of human rights; for what an obligation confers upon the obligee is precisely commensurate with what it takes from the obligor. Absolute rights, therefore, make up the entire sum of human rights.

Every violation of a right is either a tort or a breach of obligation. Every violation of an absolute right is, therefore, a tort. So is every violation of a right arising from an obligation (i.e., of a relative right) which does not consist of a breach of the obligation. Hence every act committed by any person in violation of a right created by a real obligation is a tort; for such an act cannot be a breach of the obligation.

Whether a right created by a personal obligation can be violated by an act which constitutes a tort, i.e., by an act which does not consist of a breach of the obligation, is a question involved in much doubt and difficulty. In Lumley v. Gye,[1] and in Bowen v. Hall,[2] this question was decided broadly in the affirmative; for it was held in each of those cases that it was a tort maliciously to procure an obligor to break his obligation. In each of them, however, the Court was divided; in Lumley v. Gye there was a very powerful dissenting opinion, which was fully adopted by one of the judges in Bowen v. Hall; and, though the writer is not at present prepared to say that the decisions were wrong, yet neither is he prepared to admit that they were right.[3]

An obligation may, however, be so framed as to make it possible for the obligor or a third person to destroy the obligation before the time for its performance arrives. For example, if the performance of an obligation be made conditional upon the happening of an event which is subject to human control, any act which prevents the happening of that event will destroy the obligation; and there can be no doubt that such an act, if done for the purpose of destroying the obligation, will constitute a

[1] 2 El. & Bl. 216. [2] 6 Q. B. D. 333.

[3] "N. B. Any prevention of the completion of an obligation (stricto sensu) caused by a third party would be no violation of a right in the obligee, or, if it would, would be a violation of a distinct right. A stranger who employs a builder to undertake an extensive work, or wounds or maims him (thereby, in either case, preventing him from completing a previous contract with myself) violates no right in me; and my remedy is against the builder for the breach of contract with myself. A stranger who inveigles my servant violates, not my jus ad rem under the contract, but my jus in re. The servant himself, indeed, does; and for this breach of his obligation (stricto sensu) I may sue him on the contract." — Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 402, note

tort. Nor does the writer see any reason to doubt that it would also be a tort maliciously to procure another person to destroy an obligation, even though the person committing the act of destruction were the obligor.[1]

For most practical purposes, however, it may be said with sufficient correctness that a right created by a personal obligation is subject to violation only by a breach of the obligation, and hence only by the obligor; for it will very seldom happen that any question will arise as to the violation of such a right by any person other than the obligor, or in any way other than by a breach of the obligation.

What has thus far been said of rights and their violation has in it no element of equity. The rights which have been described may be defined as original and independent rights, and equity has no voice either in the creation of such rights or in deciding in whom they are vested. Equity cannot, therefore, create personal rights which are unknown to the law; nor can it say that a res, which by law has no owner, is a subject of ownership, nor that a res belongs to A which by law belongs to B; nor can it impose upon a person or a thing an obligation which by law does not exist; nor can it declare that a right arising from an obligation is assignable, if by law it is not assignable. To say that equity can do any of these things would be to say that equity is a separate and independent system of law, or that it is superior to law.

If there is no element of equity in a right, neither is there in the violation of that right; for what is a violation of a right depends entirely upon the extent of the right. If, therefore, equity could declare that a right has been violated when by law it has not, it could thus enlarge the right of one man and curtail that of another.

When, however, it is said that equity has no voice in a given question, it must not be inferred that a judge sitting in equity has no such voice. An equity judge administers the same system of law that a common-law judge does; and he is therefore constantly called upon to decide legal questions. It, therefore, sometimes happens that courts of equity and courts of common law declare the law differently; and a consequence of this may be that courts of equity will recognize a certain right which courts of common

[1] See the observations of Professor Ames, 1 HARV. L. REV. 10.

law refuse to recognize; but it does not follow that the right thus recognized is properly an equitable right. So courts of equity may treat an act as a violation of a legal right, which courts of common law treat as rightful; but it does not follow that such an act is properly an equitable tort. A well-known instance of such an act is found in what is commonly called equitable waste. For example, if a tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, cut down ornamental trees, or pull down houses, a court of equity says he has committed waste, while a court of common law says he has not. Either court may be wrong, and one of them must be; for the question depends entirely upon the legal effect to be given to the words "without impeachment of waste," and that cannot depend upon the kind of court in which the question happens to arise. Yet the practical consequence of this diversity of view is, that there is a remedy in equity against the tenant in the case supposed, while there is none at law; and this gives to the act of the tenant the semblance of being an equitable tort. In truth, however, the act is a legal tort, if the view taken by courts of equity is correct, while it is a rightful act, if the view taken by courts of common law is correct.

There are, however, true equitable rights, and also true equitable wrongs, the latter being violations of equitable rights. A true equitable right is always derivative and dependent, i.e., it is derived from, and dependent upon, a legal right. A true equitable right exists when a legal right is held by its owner for the benefit of another person, either wholly or in part. Such a right may be defined as an equitable personal obligation. It is an obligation because it is not ownership;[l] and because it is relative, i.e., it cannot exist without a correlative duty; and it is personal because the duty is imposed upon the person of the owner of the res (i.e., of the legal right), and not upon the res itself. And yet courts of equity frequently act as if such rights were real obligations, and even as if they were ownership. Indeed, it may be said that they always so act when they can thereby render the equitable right more secure and valuable, and yet act consistently with the fact

That is, it is not ownership of the thing which is the subject of the obligation. For example, when land is held by one person for the benefit of another, the latter is not properly owner of the land even in equity. Of course the equitable obligation itself is as much the subject of ownership as is a legal obligation; and the only reason why such ownership is not recognized by courts of common law is that the thing itself which is the subject of the ownership (i.e., the equitable obligation), is not recognized by them.

that such right is in truth only a personal obligation. For example, a personal obligation can be enforced only against the obligor and his representatives; but an equitable obligation will follow the res which is the subject of the obligation, and be enforced against any person into whose hands the res may come, until it reaches a purchaser for value and without notice. In other words, equity imposes the obligation, not only upon the person who owned the res when the obligation arose, but upon all persons into whose hands it afterward comes, subject to the qualification just stated. But the moment it reaches a purchaser for value and without notice, equity stops short; for otherwise it would convert the personal obligation into a real obligation, or into ownership. Why is it, then, that equity admits as an absolute limitation upon its jurisdiction a principle or rule which it yet seems always to be struggling against, namely, that equity acts only against the person, — ęquitas agit in personam ? One reason is (as has already appeared) that equity has no choice or option as to admitting this limitation upon its jurisdiction. Another reason is that if equitable rights were rights in rem, they would follow the res into the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice; a result which would not only be intolerable to those for whose benefit equity exists, but would be especially abhorrent to equity itself. Upon the whole, it may be said that equity could not create rights in rem[1] if it would, and that it would not if it could.

The Roman pignus and kypotheca were rights in rem. The pignus was admitted into our law because it affected chattels only, and because it could not be effected without delivery of possession; but the hypotheca was rejected because it affected

[1] Here again, when it is said that equity cannot create rights in rem, reference is had to the res, which is the subject of the equitable obligation. Regarding the equitable obligation itself as the res, there can be no doubt that an equitable obligation, like a legal obligation, always creates a right in rem (i.e., an absolute right), as between the obligee and all the rest of the world except the obligor; for it can create a right in personam (i.e., a relative right) only as between the obligee and the obligor. To say, therefore, that an obligation can create a relative right only, is to say that it can create no right whatever, except as between the obligee and the obligor. Moreover, if an obligation does not create an absolute right, it is impossible to support Lumley v. Gye and Bowen v. Hall, though the converse does not necessarily follow.

As an equitable obligation creates a right which (in one of its aspects) is absolute, of course it follows that such a right may be the subject of a purchase and sale, or of a new equitable obligation. If, then, the owner of such a right first incur an obligation to hold it for the benefit of A, and afterward sell it to B, who has no notice of the previous obligation to A, will B be bound by the obligation to A? Prof. Ames has clearly

land, and did not require any change of possession.[1] Equity introduced the hypotheca without any violation of law, and with the most beneficial effects. Why ? Because equity introduced it as a right in personam only.

Legal personal obligations may be created without limitation, either in respect to the persons between whom, or the purposes for which, they are created, provided the latter be not illegal. But it is otherwise with equitable obligations; for, as they must be founded originally upon legal rights, so they can be imposed originally only upon persons in whom legal rights are vested, and only in respect of such legal rights; i.e., only for the purpose of imposing upon the obligors in favor of the obligees some duty in respect to such legal rights. But the original creation of equitable obligations is subject to still further limitations, for it is not all legal rights that can be the subjects of equitable obligations. Only those can be so which are alienable in their nature. Of absolute rights, therefore, none of those which are personal can ever be the subjects of equitable obligations, while nearly all rights which consist in ownership can be the subjects of such obligations. Relative rights can generally be the subjects of equitable obligations, but not always. For example, some rights arising from real obligations, are inseparably annexed to the ownership of certain land, and, therefore, are not alienable by themselves. So, also, some rights arising from personal obligations are so purely personal to the obligee as to be obviously inalienable. It is only necessary to mention, as an extreme case, the right arising from a promise to marry.

What has thus far been said applies to equitable rights as originally created, i.e., to equitable rights which are derived immediately from legal rights; but there are equitable rights which are derived from legal rights only mediately. For, when an

shown, as the writer thinks, that he will not. 1 HARV. L. REV. 9-11. To hold otherwise would be to hold that equity will not afford the same protection to property of its own creation that it does to property not of its own creation; which would be not only absurd in itself, but contrary to the principle that equitable property is governed by the same rules as legal property.

If Prof. Ames's doctrine is correct, it proves the statement in the text, namely, that equity will not create a true, real obligation (i.e., one which will follow the res into the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice), even when it has the power to do so; for of course, as between conflicting rights of its own creation, equity may do whatever justice is supposed to require.

[1] See supra, page 2, note 3.

equitable right has once been created it may in its turn become the subject of a new equitable right, i.e., its owner may incur an equitable obligation to hold his equitable right for the benefit of some other person; and this process may go on ad infinitum, each new equitable right becoming in its turn the subject of still another equitable right, and all the equitable rights being derived from the same legal right, the first immediately, the others mediately. It is to be observed that these equitable rights are created without any alienation or diminution of the rights from which they are derived. For it is not the nature of an obligation, real or personal, legal or equitable, while it remains an obligation merely (that is, while it remains unperformed) to alienate or diminish in any way any right vested in the obligor. In the case, therefore, of a succession of equitable rights derived from one legal right, the legal right remains undiminished in its original owner, and so does each equitable right, and yet the equitable rights add nothing to the sum of human rights,[1] the aggregate of the legal right and all the equitable rights only equalling the legal right. So if the legal right be destroyed (e.g., by the act of God), all the equitable rights will fall to the ground. It is to be further observed that the legal owner is bound only to the original equitable owner, and the latter to the second equitable owner, and so on. If the legal owner and the equitable owners be conceived of as standing in a line, one behind the other, in the reverse order of the time of the creation of their rights, it will be seen that each one in the line is equitably bound to the one immediately before him, and to no one else, and hence that there are as many equitable bonds as there are persons in the line, less one, — the one standing in front being, of course, subject to no bond.

The foregoing method of deriving an indefinite succession of equitable rights from one legal right may be termed the method by sub-obligation.

Another method is for the first equitable obligee to assign his equitable right, at the same time receiving from the assignee a new equitable obligation. He may then assign his new equitable right to a new assignee, at the same time receiving from the latter still another equitable obligation; and this operation may be repeated indefinitely. This method takes place in the common case where

[1] See supra, page 3.

land is mortgaged in the ordinary way to several persons in succession; for in that case each successive mortgage has a twofold operation, namely, that of an assignment or transfer to the mortgagee, and that of imposing an equitable obligation on the mortgagee in favor of the mortgagor. For example, the first mortgage has the twofold operation of assigning or transferring the land to the mortgagee, and of creating an equitable obligation in the latter to reconvey the land to the mortgagor on payment of the mortgage debt; and in this way the first or original equitable right is created. Then a second mortgage has the twofold operation of assigning this original equitable right, and of creating in the assignee an equitable obligation to reassign it to the mortgagor on payment of the second mortgage debt. In this way a second equitable right is created, which in its turn may be assigned by a third mortgage, the third mortgagee incurring an equitable obligation to reassign it to the mortgagor on payment of the third mortgage 'debt; and this operation will be repeated as often as a new mortgage is given.

If, upon the making of the first mortgage, the mortgagor and the first mortgagee be conceived of as standing one behind the other, the effect of a second mortgage will be to place the second mortgagee between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, and thus to separate the two latter; for the second mortgagee, as assignee of the mortgagor, steps into the shoes of the latter as to the first mortgagee, becoming in effect the mortagor as to the latter, just as if he had purchased the equitable right of the mortgagor (i.e., his equity of redemption), absolutely. As the mortgagor thus ceases to have any relations, for the time being, with the first mortgagee, of course he must give up his place to his successor, the second mortgagee. Still the mortgagor does not stand aside as a mere stranger, as he would do if he had simply sold his equity of redemption; but he takes his place next to the second mortgagee by virtue of the new equitable obligation (i.e., equity of redemption) running from the latter to him. For the same reasons a third mortgagee will take his place between the mortgagor and the second mortgagee, and so on. Therefore, the mortgagor will always be at one end of the line, and the first mortgagee at the other end, the latter always remaining stationary, but the former moving, as often as a new mortgage is given, to make room for the new mortgagee.

A question, however, still remains, namely, is the first mortgagee to be placed in front, with the several other mortgagees, and the mortgagor behind him in the order of time, or is the mortgagor to be placed in front with the several mortgagees behind him in the reverse order of time ? The answer depends upon whether the mortgagees and the mortgagor are to be placed with reference to the operations of the mortgages as transfers or assignments, or with reference to their operation as creating equitable obligations. If the former, the first mortgagee should stand in front; if the latter, the mortgagor should stand in front. And, as we are now considering mortgages, with reference to their operation in creating equitable obligations, it is clear that the mortgagor and the mortgagees should be placed with reference to that operation. Thus, we have the same final result, whether a succession of equitable obligations be created by successive mortgages, or by successive sub-obligations, though this result is produced by different machinery. In both cases there are as many equitable obligations as there are persons in the line, less one. In both cases every person in the line, except the first and the last, is both an equitable obligor and an equitable obligee, the first being an equitable obligee only, and the last an equitable obligor only. The only differences are, first, that, in the case of successive mortgages, each successive equitable obligation is made the subject of a new equitable obligation (i.e., of a sub-obligation), not by the original obligee, but by his assignee; and, secondly, that all the successive equitable obligations are made in favor of the same person, namely, the mortgagor, the latter always acquiring a new equitable obligation the moment that he relinquishes an old one.

There are still other modes in which an indefinite number of equitable rights may be derived from one legal right, namely: first, the owner of the legal right, instead of incurring one equitable obligation as to the whole of the legal right, may incur an indefinite number of equitable obligations, each as to some aliquot part of the legal right; secondly, the owner of the original equitable right may assign that right to an indefinite number of persons by assigning some aliquot part of it to each.

With respect to the modes in which they are created, equitable obligations differ widely from legal obligations. Most legal obligations are created by means of contracts; i.e., a person promises (expressly or by implication), or covenants to do or not to do

something, and the law annexes to the promise or covenant an obligation to do, or refrain from doing, according to the terms of the promise or covenant. But a purely equitable obligation cannot be made in that way. I say "a purely equitable obligation," because an obligation is frequently annexed to a promise or covenant both by law and by equity, i. e., the law annexes a legal obligation, and equity annexes an equitable obligation. But equity cannot annex an obligation to a promise or covenant to which the law refuses to annex any obligation.[1] In a word, there is properly no such thing as an equitable promise or covenant, and no such thing as an equitable contract. The reason, therefore, why a contract cannot result in creating a purely equitable obligation is, that a contract always results in creating a legal obligation.

How, then, are purely equitable obligations created ? For the most part, either by the acts of third persons or by equity alone. But how can one person impose an obligation upon another. By giving property to the latter on the terms of his assuming an obligation in respect to it. At law there are only two means by which the object of the donor could be at all accomplished, consistently with the entire ownership of the property passing to the donee, namely: first, by imposing a real obligation upon the property; secondly, by subjecting the title of the donee to a condition subsequent. The first of these the law does not permit; the second is entirely inadequate. Equity, however, can secure most of the objects of the donor, and yet avoid the mischiefs of real obligations, by imposing upon the donee (and upon all persons to whom the property shall afterwards come without value or with notice) a personal obligation with respect to the property; and accordingly this is what equity does. It is in this way that all trusts are created, and all equitable charges made (i. e., equitable hypothecations or liens created) by testators in their wills. In this way, also, most trusts are created by acts inter vivos, except in those cases in which the trustee incurs a legal as well as an equitable obligation. In short, as property is the subject of every equitable obligation, so the owner of property is the only person whose act or acts can be the means of creating an obligation in respect to that property. Moreover, the owner of property can

[1] See supra, page 4.

create an obligation in respect to it in only two ways: first, by incurring the obligation himself, in which case he commonly also incurs a legal obligation; secondly, by imposing the obligation upon some third person; and this he does in the way just explained.

But suppose a person, to whom property is given on the terms of his incurring an equitable obligation in respect to it, is unwilling to incur such obligation, shall it be imposed upon him against his will ? Certainly not, if he employs the proper means for preventing it; but the only sure means of preventing it is by refusing to accept the property, i. e., to become the owner of it; for no person can be compelled to become the owner of property even by way of gift. If he once accept the property, the equitable obligation necessarily arises, and he can get rid of the latter only by procuring some one else to accept the property with the obligation; and even this he cannot do without the sanction of a court of equity.

An owner of property may, however, incur an equitable obligation in respect to it, founded upon his own act and intention, and yet make no contract, nor incur any legal obligation. For example, if an owner of property do an act with the intention of transferring the property, but which fails to accomplish its object because some other act is omitted to be done which the law makes necessary, equity will give effect to the intention by imposing an equitable obligation to do the further act which is necessary to effect the transfer, provided a valuable consideration was paid for the act already done, so that the transfer, when made, will be a transfer for value, and not a voluntary transfer. So, if an owner of property, thinking that he has the power to hypothecate it merely by declaring his will to that effect, declare, for a valuable consideration, that such property shall be a security to a creditor for the payment of his debt, though he will not create a legal hypothecation, nor incur any legal obligation, yet he will create an equitable hypothecation or an equitable lien; i. e., equity will give effect to the intention by creating an equitable obligation to hold the property as if it were legally bound for the payment of the debt. In both the cases just put, equity proceeds upon the principle that the act already done would be effective for the accomplishment of its object in the absence of any positive rule of law to the contrary; and in both cases equity gives effect to the inten-

tion without any violation of law; for, in the first case, equity compels a performance of every act which the law requires, while, in the second case, equity merely creates a personal obligation which violates no law, in lieu of a real obligation, which the law refuses to create.

Many equitable obligations are created and imposed by equity alone; and this is done upon the principle that justice can thereby be best promoted. For example, it is by force of equity alone that an equitable obligation follows the property which is the subject of the obligation until such property reaches a purchaser for value and without notice. The obligation may have been created originally through the act or acts of the owner of the property; but it is by force of equity alone that this obligation is imposed upon subsequent owners of the property who had no part in its original creation. So also all that large class of equitable obligations commonly known as constructive trusts are created by equity alone. For example, where property is obtained by fraud, unless (as seldom happens) the fraud be of such a nature as to prevent the legal title from passing, the only legal remedy will be an action for damages against the party committing the fraud; but equity, by creating an equitable obligation, can and will follow the property itself (until it comes into the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice), and compel a specific restoration of it. If it be asked why a legal obligation to restore the property is not created, and how equity can go beyond the law, the answer is that the right is created in such a case merely for the sake of the remedy, and that the common law never contemplates any remedies other than those which the common law itself affords. The common law does not, therefore, create an obligation to restore the property, because it would regard such an obligation as useless. It could only give damages for a breach of the obligation; and it can equally well give damages for the fraud itself. Moreover, the equitable obligation is generally conditional upon the restoration by the person defrauded of the consideration received by him, and courts of common law have no adequate machinery for dealing with conditions of such a nature.

Another large class of equitable obligations created by equity alone are those (already referred to) imposed upon mortgagees in favor of mortgagors. A mortgage is a transfer of property, either defeasible by a condition subsequent, namely, by the payment of

the mortgage debt on a day named, or accompanied by an agreement to reconvey the property upon a condition precedent, namely, the payment of the mortgage debt on a day named. In either case, if the mortgagor suffer the day to pass without performing the condition, his right to have the property restored to him is entirely and absolutely gone at law; and it is at the very moment that the mortgagor loses his legal right that his equitable right arises, namely, to have the property reconveyed to him (notwithstanding his failure to perform the condition agreed upon), on payment of the mortgage debt, interest, and costs. But how is it that equity can create such an obligation, it being not only without any warrant in law, but directly against the express agreement of the parties ? Because, while the mortgagor has lost his right to the land, the mortgage debt remains wholly unpaid; and consequently the mortgagee can at law keep the land, and yet compel the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt. In a word, the mortgagor loses (i.e., forfeits) his land merely by way of penalty for not performing the condition; and though this is by the express agreement of the parties, yet equity says the only legitimate object of the penalty was to secure performance of the condition; and, therefore, it is unconscionable for the mortgagee to enforce the penalty, provided he can be fully indemnified for the breach of the condition; and, the condition being merely for the payment of money, the mortgagee will, in legal contemplation, be fully indemnified for its breach by the payment of the mortgage debt (though after the day agreed upon) with interest and costs. In short, equity creates the equitable obligation in question upon the ancient and acknowledged principle of relieving against penalties and forfeitures.

Still another important class of equitable obligations created by equity alone are those commonly known as rights of subrogation. For example, a debtor becomes personally bound to his creditor for the payment of the debt, and also pledges his property to the creditor for the same purpose. A third person also becomes personally bound to the creditor for the payment of the same debt as surety for the debtor, and pledges his property to the creditor for the same purpose. In this state of things justice clearly requires that the debt be thrown upon the debtor, or upon the pledge belonging to him, and that the surety and the pledge belonging to him be exonerated from the debt, provided this can

be done without interfering with the rights of the creditor. The latter, however, has the right to enforce payment of his debt in whatever way he thinks easiest and best, i. e., in whatever way he chooses; and equity cannot prevent the exercise of that right without a violation of law. If, then, the surety or his property should be compelled to pay the debt, the legal consequences would be, first, that the debt would be gone, and the debtor's personal obligation to the creditor extinguished, for payment by the surety or by his property has the same legal effect as payment by the debtor or by his property; secondly, that, the personal obligation of the debtor being extinguished, the real obligation of his property would be extinguished also, for the latter is only accessory to the former, and hence it cannot exist without it. Moreover, other legal consequences to the surety would be, first, that the surety would lose the benefit of any legal priority that the creditor might have had over other creditors of the same debtor; secondly, that the surety would have no means of obtaining indemnity from the debtor unless he could prove a contract by the latter (either express or implied in fact) to indemnify him. But here equity employs a useful fiction in aid of the surety; for it treats the latter as having (not paid, but) purchased the debt. Hence, it treats the debt as still subsisting in equity until it is paid by the debtor or by his property. In other words, payment by the surety or by his property does not extinguish any of the rights of the creditor in equity, though it does at law; and yet, after payment by the surety or by his property, the creditor holds his rights, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the surety. This, therefore, is an instance in which equity creates one equitable right (namely, in the creditor), in order to make it the subject of another equitable right (namely, in favor of the surety).

There are other cases in which the object of subrogation is to obtain not exoneration, but contribution, namely, where there are several persons who ought in justice to contribute equally towards the discharge of a debt or other burden. Such is the case when there are several co-sureties for an insolvent debtor, or when several persons incur a debt jointly.

There is a class of cases in which the doctrine of subrogation seems to have been unwarrantably extended under the name of marshalling. For example, if the owner of houses A and B

(worth, respectively, $10,000 and $5,000) mortgage them both to C for $5,000, and then mortgage A to D for $10,000, and then become insolvent, it is said that D may throw the whole of C's mortgage on B, and thus obtain payment in full of his own mortgage out of A, though the consequence be that unsecured creditors of the insolvent will receive nothing; and the principle upon which this is held is generalized by saying that when one of two creditors has the security of two funds, and the other has the security of only one of those funds, the latter creditor may throw the debt of the former creditor wholly upon the fund which is not common to both (provided, of course, that fund be sufficient to pay it), in order that he may obtain payment of his own debt out of the fund which is common to both. This doctrine had its origin in efforts of courts of equity to prevent the harsh and unjust discriminations which the law formerly made between creditors of persons deceased, whose claims were in equity and justice equal; and it seems that the doctrine, as a general one, cannot be sustained upon any principle. For example, in the case just supposed, the doctrine of marshalling assumes that, in equity and justice, house B ought to exonerate house A from the first mortgage, whereas, in truth, they ought to bear the burden of the first mortgage equally. As between secured and unsecured creditors, equity clearly ought to favor the latter class, if either.

Lastly, still another instance of an equitable obligation created by equity alone, is the equitable hypothecation or lien given to a vendor, upon land which he has sold and conveyed, to secure the payment of the purchase-money.

Reference has been already made to cases in which a contract results in an equitable as well as a legal obligation. Why is this ? Because the legal obligation is not sufficient for all the purposes of justice. In what contracts, then, do the purposes of justice require an equitable as well as a legal obligation ? Chiefly in those which consist in giving (dando) instead of doing (faciendo). What are the defects in the legal obligation annexed to such contracts ? Chiefly these: First, although an obligation to give a thing is said to confer on the obligee a right to the thing, a jus ad rem, yet this right can be enforced only against the obligor personally. A consequence of this is, that, if the obligor become insolvent after receiving the price of the thing, but before the thing

is actually given to the obligee, both the thing itself and its price will go to the creditors of the insolvent. Of course justice requires that, the obligor having obtained the price of the thing, the obligee should obtain the thing itself; and this an equitable obligation enables him to do. Secondly, a legal obligation can never be enforced against any person other than the obligor or his personal representative. If, therefore, the owner of a res who has incurred a legal obligation to give it to A, choose to give it to B, or if he die, and the res, being land, descends to his heir, it will be impossible for A to obtain any relief except damages, however inadequate such relief may be. But if an equitable obligation has also been incurred, it will be possible for A to obtain the res itself, notwithstanding the death of the obligor, and also notwithstanding the transfer of the res to B, unless the latter be a purchaser for value and without notice. Thirdly, a legal obligation creates a right (i.e., a relative right) in the obligee alone, and this right must remain in the obligee until his death, unless it be previously assigned either by his own act or by act of law; and upon the death of the obligee, the right must vest in his personal representative. When, therefore, a contract is made with A to give a thing to B, it seems impossible to enforce the contract effectively by virtue of the legal obligation annexed to it; for it can be enforced by A alone, and he can recover no more than nominal damages. Equity will, however, annex to such a contract an obligation directly to B; and hence the latter can obtain in equity without difficulty, the benefit intended to be secured to him by the contract. So, if a legal obligation be incurred to convey land to the obligee, and the latter die before the land is conveyed, the sole right to enforce the obligation will go to the personal representative of the obligee; and yet, clearly the heir ought to have the land, though the personal representative ought to pay for it; for such would have been the effect of the performance of the obligation but for the accident of the death of the obligee. To meet this difficulty, therefore, equity will create an equitable right in the obligee, which, upon the death of the latter, will go to his heir.

Having thus treated with sufficient fulness of equitable rights, it remains to speak briefly of the violation of such rights. In respect to their violation, equitable obligations are subject to nearly the same observations as legal obligations. Equitable obligations are, however, more subject to violation by tortious

acts than are legal obligations; for, as an equitable obligation always has some legal or equitable right for its subject, any tortious injury to, or destruction of, this latter right, or any wrongful transfer of it, will, it seems, be a tort to the equitable obligee. Thus, a trespass committed upon land or upon a chattel which is the subject of an equitable obligation, is, it seems, a tort to the equitable obligee, though, as it is also a tort to the legal owner, and as the equitable obligee can, as a rule, obtain redress only through the legal owner, the tort to the equitable obligee seldom attracts attention. So it seems that any wrongful extinguishment by the obligee of an obligation which is itself the subject of an equitable obligation, though it is a breach of the equitable obligation, is also a tort to the equitable obligee. So it seems that the alienation by its owner of any right which is the subject of an equitable obligation, in disregard of such obligation, is a tort to the equitable obligee.

This completes what it was proposed to say upon the subject of rights and their violation, and the way is thus prepared to treat of remedies.

ARTICLE II.[1]

II.

CLASSIFICATION OF WRONGS.

IT is because rights exist and because they are sometimes violated that remedies are necessary. The object of all remedies is the protection of rights. Rights are protected by means of actions or suits. The term "remedy" is applied either to the action or suit by means of which a right is protected, or to the protection which the action or suit affords. An action may protect a right in three ways, namely, by preventing the violation of it, by compelling a specific reparation of it when it has been violated, and by compelling a compensation in money for a violation of it. The term "remedy" is strictly applicable only to the second and third of these modes of protecting rights; for remedy literally means a cure, — not a prevention. As commonly used in law, however, it means prevention as well as cure; and it will be so used in this paper. In equity the term "relief" is commonly used instead of "remedy;" and, though relief is a much more technical term than remedy, it has the advantage of being equally applicable to all the different modes of protecting rights.

Though remedies, like rights, are either legal or equitable, yet the division of remedies into legal and equitable is not co-ordinate with the corresponding division of rights; for, though the reme-

[1] 1 HARV. L. REV. 111.

dies afforded for the protection of equitable rights are all equitable, the remedies afforded for the protection of legal rights may be either legal or equitable, or both.

Actions are either in personam or in rem. Actions in personam are founded upon torts, actual or threatened, or upon breaches of personal obligations, actual or threatened. They are called in personam because they give relief only against the defendant personally, i, e., the plaintiff has no claim to or against any res. Actions in rem are founded upon breaches of real obligations, or upon the ownership of corporeal things, movable or immovable. Actions founded upon breaches of real obligations are called in rem, because they give relief only against a res. Actions founded upon the ownership of corporeal things are called in rem, because the only relief given in such actions is the possession of the things themselves. Actions in rem, as well as actions in personam, are (except in admiralty) in form against a person. The person, however, against whom an action in personam is brought, is fixed and determined by law; namely, the person who incurred (and consequently the person who broke or threatened to break) the obligation, or the person who committed or threatened to commit the tort, while the person against whom an action in rem is brought is any person who happens to be in possession of the res, and who resists the plaintiff's claim. The relief given in actions in personam may be either the prevention or the specific reparation of the tort or of the breach of obligation, or a compensation in money for the tort or for the breach of obligation. The relief given in an action in rem, founded on the breach of a real obligation, is properly the sale of the res, and the discharge of the obligation out of the proceeds of the sale. The relief given in an action in rem, founded on the ownership of a corporeal res, is the recovery of the possession of the res itself by the plaintiff.

Actions in rem founded upon ownership are anomalous. As every violation of a right is either a tort or a breach of obligation, it would naturally be supposed that every action would be founded upon a tort or breach of obligation, actual or threatened; and if this were so, the only actions in rem would be those founded upon breaches of real obligations. But when a right consists in the ownership of a corporeal thing, a violation of that right may consist in depriving the owner of the possession (and consequently of the use and enjoyment) of the thing. If such a tort had the

effect of destroying the owner's right, as the physical destruction of the thing would, it would not differ from other torts in respect to its remedy; for the tort-feasor would then become the owner of the thing, and its former owner would recover its value in money as a compensation for the tort. And by our law, in case of movable things, the tort often has the effect practically of destroying the owner's right, sometimes at his own election, sometimes at the election of the tort-feasor. But, subject to that exception, the tort leaves the right of the owner untouched, the thing still belonging to him. He can, indeed, bring an action for the tort, and recover a compensation in money for the injury that he has suffered down to the time of bringing the action;[1] but the compensation will not include the value of the thing, as the thing has not, in legal contemplation, been lost. If, therefore, an action for the tort were the owner's only remedy, he must be permitted to bring successive actions ad infinitum, or as long as the thing continued to exist; for in that way alone could he obtain full compensation for the injury which he would eventually suffer. But, as the law abhors a multiplicity of actions, it always enables the owner to obtain complete justice by a single action, or at most by two actions. Thus, it either enables him to recover the value of the thing in an action for the tort, by making the tort-feasor a purchaser of the thing at such a price as a jury shall assess, or it enables him to recover the possession of the thing itself in an action in rem. He is, however, further entitled to recover the value of the use and enjoyment of the thing during the time that the defendant has deprived him of its possession, together with compensation for any injury which the thing itself may have suffered while in the defendant's possession; and this he recovers, sometimes in the same action in which he recovers the thing itself or its value, and sometimes in a separate action.

[1] The reader should be reminded, however, that by our law an owner of immovable property who has been dispossessed (i.e., disseised) of it, can recover damages in an action of tort only for the original dispossession; he cannot recover damages for the subsequent detention of the property until he has recovered its possession. The reason is, that a loss of the possession or seisin of immovable property is technically a loss of the ownership, and the acquisition of possession or seisin is an acquisition of ownership, though it may be wrongful. Hence, a disseisor ceases to be a trespasser the moment his disseisin is completed. When, however, the original owner recovers back his lost seisin, his recovered seisin relates back to the time of the disseisin, the law treating him as having been in possession all the time. Hence, he can then recover damages for the wrongful detention of the property.

It seems, therefore, that an action in rem, founded upon ownership, may be regarded as a substitute for an infinite or an indefinite number of actions founded upon the tort of depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the res, which is the subject of the action; and that such an action may, therefore, be regarded as in a large sense founded upon the tort just referred to, and the recovery of the thing itself as a specific reparation of that tort.

Thus far, in speaking of actions and remedies, it has been assumed that the law of any given country is a unit; i. e., that there is but one system of law in force by which rights are created and governed, and also but one system of administering justice. Whenever, therefore, any given country has several systems, whether of substantive or remedial law, what has been thus far said is intended to apply to them all in the aggregate, — not to each separately. Thus, in English-speaking countries there are no less than three systems of substantive law in force, each of which has a remedial system of its own; namely, the common law, the canon law, and admiralty law. There is also a fourth system of remedial law, namely, equity. What has been said, therefore, of actions and remedies applies to all of these systems in the aggregate.

It follows, therefore, that in English-speaking countries civil jurisdiction is parcelled out among the four systems just referred to; and it is the chief object of this paper to ascertain what portion of this jurisdiction belongs to equity, and for what reasons.

But here an important question arises as to the nature of equity jurisdiction. If we have three systems of substantive law, each exercising jurisdiction over those rights which are of its own creation, and if equity is a system of remedial law only, how does it happen that equity has any jurisdiction ? Do not the other three systems divide among themselves the entire field of jurisdiction, and how then is there any room for equity ? The answer is that the term "jurisdiction," as applied to equity, has a very different meaning from what it has as applied to courts of law; and the failure to recognize that fact has caused much confusion of ideas. As applied to courts of law, the term is used in its primary and proper sense; as applied to equity, it is used in a secondary and improper sense. For example, when two courts of law, created by the same sovereign, are independent of each other, the jurisdiction of each is either exclusive of the other, or concurrent with it, or it

is partly exclusive and partly concurrent. If one invades a province which belongs exclusively to the other, it acts without right (if not without power), and ought to be restrained by the common sovereign. If a particular province belongs to them both (i.e., if they have concurrent jurisdiction over it), each is entitled to enter it, while neither is entitled to interfere with the other; and hence questions of priority are liable to arise between them, i. e., questions as to which of them first obtained jurisdiction over given controversies. But the terms "concurrent" and "exclusive" have no proper application to equity, or rather they do not correctly describe the relations between equity and the other three systems. On the one hand, equity never excludes either of the other systems. It is true that equity alone exercises jurisdiction over equitable rights; but that is not because equity claims any monopoly of such jurisdiction, — it is because the other systems decline to exercise it, they not recognizing equitable rights. On the other hand, equity is never excluded by either of the other systems; and hence equity exercises jurisdiction over legal rights (as well as over equitable rights) without any external restraint. Since, however, one or more of the other systems has jurisdiction over every legal right, the jurisdiction of equity over legal rights is in a certain sense concurrent, but never in any proper sense; and not unfrequently it is in fact exclusive in the sense of being the only jurisdiction that is actually exercised. It is not properly concurrent, because there is no competition between the two jurisdictions. Courts of law act just as they would act if equity had no existence, just as in fact they did act before equity had any existence. Nor does equity ever complain of their so acting, or seek to put any restraint upon their action, or question the validity and legality of their acts; and yet equity acts with the same freedom from restraint, even when dealing with legal rights, that courts of law do when dealing with rights of their own creation.

What has thus far been said, however, is calculated rather to stimulate than to satisfy inquiry. How is it that equity has the power to invade at will the provinces of other courts ? What object has equity in assuming jurisdiction over rights which it is the special province of other courts to protect ? What is the extent of that jurisdiction ? The answer to the first of these questions will be found in the fact that the jurisdiction of equity is a prerogative jurisdiction; i. e., it is exercised in legal contemplation by

the sovereign, who is the fountain from which all justice flows, and from whom, therefore, all courts derive their jurisdiction. The answer to the second question is that the object of equity, in assuming jurisdiction over legal rights, is to promote justice by supplying defects in the remedies which the courts of law afford. The answer to the third question is that the jurisdiction is coextensive with its object; that is, equity assumes jurisdiction over legal rights so far, and so far only, as justice can be thereby promoted. But then the question arises, How does it happen that the protection afforded by courts of law to legal rights is insufficient and inadequate, and how is it that equity is able to supply their short-comings ? The answer to these questions, so far as regards the largest and most important part of the jurisdiction exercised by equity over legal rights (namely, that exercised over common law rights), will be found chiefly in the different methods of protecting rights employed by courts of common law and courts of equity respectively, i. e., in the different methods of compulsion or coercion employed by them.

A court of common law never lays a command upon a litigant, nor seeks to secure obedience from him. It issues its commands to the sheriff (its executive officer); and it is through the physical power of the latter, coupled with the legal operation of his acts and the acts of the court, that rights are protected by the common law. Thus, when a common-law court renders a judgment in an action that the plaintiff recover of the defendant a certain sum of money as a compensation for a tort or for a breach of obligation, it follows up the judgment by issuing a writ to the sheriff, under which the latter seizes the defendant's property, and either delivers it to the plaintiff at an appraised value in satisfaction of the judgment, or sells it, and pays the judgment out of the proceeds of the sale. Here, it will be seen, satisfaction of the judgment is obtained partly through the physical acts of the sheriff, and partly through the operation of law. By the former, the property is seized and delivered to the plaintiff, or seized and sold, and the proceeds paid to the plaintiff. By the latter, the defendant's title to the property seized is transferred to the plaintiff, or his title to the property is transferred to the purchaser, and his title to its proceeds to the plaintiff. So if a judgment be rendered that the plaintiff recover certain property in the defendant's possession, on the ground that the property belongs to the plaintiff,

and that the defendant wrongfully detains it from him, the judgment is followed up by a writ issued to the sheriff under which the latter dispossesses the defendant, and puts the plaintiff in possession. This is an instance, therefore, in which a judgment is enforced through the physical power of the sheriff alone. If, however, the property be movable, and the defendant remove or conceal it so that the sheriff cannot find it, the court is powerless. So, under a judgment for the recovery of money, the court is powerless, if the defendant (not being subject to arrest) have no property which is capable of seizure, or none which the sheriff can find; and it matters not how much property incapable of seizure he may have. Even when the defendant is subject to arrest, his arrest and imprisonment are not regarded by the law as a means of compelling him to pay the judgment; but his body is taken (as his property is) in satisfaction of the judgment.

Nor is our common law peculiar in its method of protecting rights; for the same method substantially is and always has been employed in most other systems of law with which we are acquainted. Nemo potest pręcise cogi ad factum was a maxim of the Roman law, and it has been adhered to in those countries whose systems of law are founded upon the Roman law.

Equity, however, has always employed, almost exclusively, the very method of compulsion and coercion which the common law, like most other legal systems, has wholly rejected; for when a person is complained of to a court of equity, the court first ascertains and decides what, if anything, the person complained of ought to do or refrain from doing; then, by its order or decree, it commands him to do or refrain from doing what it has decided he ought to do or refrain from doing; and finally, if he refuses or neglects to obey the order or decree, it punishes him by imprisonment for his disobedience. Even when common law and equity give the same relief, each adopts its own method of giving it. Thus, if a court of equity decides that the defendant in a suit ought to pay money or deliver property to the plaintiff, it does not render a judgment that the plaintiff recover the money or the property, and then issue a writ to its executive officer commanding him to enforce the judgment; but it commands the defendant personally to pay the money or to deliver possession of the property, and punishes him by imprisonment if he refuse or neglect to do it.

This method was borrowed by the early English chancellors from the canon law, and their reasons for borrowing it were much the same as those which caused its original adoption by the canonists. The canon-law courts had power only over the souls of litigants; they could not touch their bodies nor their property. In short, their power was spiritual, not physical, and hence the only way in which they could enforce their sentences was by putting them into the shape of commands to the persons against whom they were pronounced, and inflicting upon the latter the punishments of the church (ending with excommunication) in case of disobedience. If these punishments proved insufficient to secure obedience, the civil power (in England) came to the aid of the spiritual power, a writ issued out of chancery (de excommutticato capiendo), and the defendant was arrested and imprisoned.

When the English chancellor began to assume jurisdiction in equity he found himself in a situation very similar to that of the spiritual courts. As their power was entirely spiritual, so his was entirely physical. Through his physical power he could imprison men's bodies and control the possession of their property; but neither his orders and decrees, nor any acts as such done in pursuance of them, had any legal effect or operation; and hence he could not affect the title to property, except through the acts of its owners. Moreover, his physical power over property had no perceptible influence upon his method of giving relief. Even when he made a decree for changing the possession of property, it took the shape, as we have seen, of a command to the defendant in possession to deliver possession to the plaintiff; and it was only as a last resort that the chancellor issued a writ to his executive officer, commanding him to dispossess the defendant and put the plaintiff in possession.

Such, then, being the two methods of giving relief, it is easy to understand why that of equity has supplemented that of the common law; for the former is strong at the very points where the latter is weak.

It has been said that the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by equity over common-law rights is measured by the requirements of justice. But what are the requirements of justice ? In order to answer that question we must first know definitely in what particulars the common law fails to give to common-law rights all the protection which it is possible to give, and which, therefore, ought

to be given; and we shall have taken an important step in that direction if we classify all the remedies furnished by the common law, and compare them with the classification before made of judicial remedies generally.

Common-law actions, like actions generally, are either in personam or in rem. Common-law actions in personam are founded upon the actual commission of a common-law tort or the actual breach of a common-law personal obligation. Common-law actions in rem are founded upon the ownership of corporeal things, movable or immovable. The relief given in a common-law action in personam is always the same; namely, a compensation in money for the tort or the breach of obligation, the amount of which is ascertained or assessed by a jury under the name of damages.[1] The relief given in common-law actions in rem is also always the same, namely, the recovery of the res; but, then, it is to be borne in mind that the only action strictly in rem that lies for a movable res is the very peculiar action of replevin; and, when that action cannot be brought, the only available actions are trover, in which the value of the res in money can alone be recovered, and detinue, in which either the res itself or its value in money is recovered, at the option of the defendant. Indeed, as has been already seen, the common law has not generally the means of enabling a plaintiff to recover the possession of a movable res against the will of the defendant. In replevin that object is accomplished by dispossessing the defendant of the res, and placing the same in the plaintiff's possession, at the very commencement of the action; but that would be obviously improper except when the defendant has acquired the possession of the res by dispossessing the plaintiff of it. The obstacle in the way of recovering possession of the res itself in an action of detinue does not arise from the nature of the action, but from the common-law mode of

[1] Our law regards a debt as a specific thing belonging to the creditor and in possession of the debtor; and hence the remedy specially provided for the breach of an obligation to pay a debt, namely, the action of debt, is technically an action in rem. Sometimes this is the only remedy; but in most cases the creditor has an election between an action of debt, founded upon the debt itself, and an action of assumpsit or covenant, founded upon the contract by which the debt was created. In the former action, the judgment is that the plaintiff recover the debt itself as a specific thing; in the two latter, the judgment is that the plaintiff recover damages for the detention of the debt. Still, this is only a technical distinction, for the same amount is recovered either way, and the mode of enforcing the judgment is the same.

enforcing a judgment. Detinue is in its nature an action purely in rem; and it only ceased to be so in practice because a judgment in rem was found to be wholly ineffective; and consequently a judgment was rendered in the alternative, namely, for the recovery of the res itself or its value in money.

If, now, we compare the foregoing common-law remedies with the scheme of remedies generally, as previously given, we find that the common law does not attempt (as indeed it could not) to prevent either the commission of a tort or the breach of an obligation; nor does it attempt to give a specific reparation for either, except so far as the recovery of the res in an action in rem may be so considered; nor does it give any action whatever for the breach of a real obligation; nor does it enable the owner of movable things to recover the possession of them when wrongfully detained from him, except in those cases in which replevin will lie. Of these four defects in common-law remedies, the first two are the most conspicuous; and it is chiefly for the purpose of supplying those two defects that equity has assumed jurisdiction over torts (i.e., legal torts) and over contracts, — the two largest and most important branches of the jurisdiction exercised by equity over legal rights. The jurisdiction over torts has been assumed chiefly for the purpose of supplying a remedy by way of prevention; that over contracts for the purpose of supplying a remedy by way of specific reparation. The former is commonly treated of under the head of Injunction; the latter, under the head of Specific Performance.

The mode of giving relief in equity is not only peculiarly adapted to the purpose of preventing the commission of wrongful acts, but it is the only mode in which such a remedy is possible. No mode of giving relief is, however, alone sufficient to make such a remedy effective; for relief cannot be given until the end of a suit, i.e., until the question of the plaintiff's right to relief has been tried and decided in the plaintiff's favor; and, long before that time can arrive, the wrongful act may be committed, and so prevention made impossible. If, therefore, a court would prevent the doing of an act, it is indispensable that it interpose its authority, not only before any trial of the question of the defendant's right to do the act, but at the very commencement of the suit, and frequently without any previous notice to the defendant; and accordingly equity does so interpose its authority by granting an

injunction against the doing of the act until the question is tried and decided. Such an injunction is called a temporary injunction, and is not technically relief. If the question is finally decided in the plaintiff's favor, the injunction is then made perpetual, and becomes relief.

Upon the whole, therefore, the equitable remedy by way of prevention is as effective as such a remedy can possibly be made; and it is also as effective and as easily administered as any remedy in equity is. Moreover, the remedy by way of prevention, if it does not come too late, is always the easiest, as well as the best, remedy that equity can give in case of a tort; and, therefore, it, is never an answer to a bill for an injunction to prevent the commission of a tort, that the tort, if committed, can be specifically repaired by the defendant; and the only question of jurisdiction that such a bill can ever raise is this: Will more perfect justice be done by preventing the tort than by leaving the plaintiff to his remedy at law ? This, however, is a very complex question, depending partly upon the nature of the tort, and partly upon other considerations. In respect to the nature of the tort, also, there are several distinctions to be taken. For example, some torts cause no specific injury; others cause injury which, though it is specific, can be specifically repaired by the person injured; others cause injury which, though specific and incapable of specific reparation, can be fully paid for in money. On the other hand, a tort may cause an injury which is specific, and which cannot be specifically repaired (or can be specifically repaired only by the tort-feasor), and which cannot be fully paid for in money. So, too, the injury caused by a tort, though not specific, or though capable of being specifically repaired by the person injured, or though capable of being fully paid for in money, yet is of such a nature that it is impossible to ascertain or estimate its extent with any accuracy. Whenever, therefore, a tort will cause an injury which is specific, and which the person injured cannot specifically repair, and which cannot be paid for in money, or an injury the extent of which it is impossible to ascertain or estimate with any accuracy, there is a prima facie case for the interference of equity to prevent the commission of the tort; otherwise the remedy at law is adequate so far as regards the nature of the tort. If a plaintiff make out a prima facie case in one of the two ways just indicated, he will be entitled to the interference of equity unless the defendant can show

that the damage which will be caused to him by the prevention of the act will so much exceed the damage which will be caused to the plaintiff by the doing of the act that the interference of equity will not be promotive of justice. If the defendant can show that, the plaintiff should, it seems, be left to his remedy at law. One objection to the interference of equity under such circumstances is that it is not likely to have any other effect than that of compelling the defendant to purchase the plaintiff's acquiescence at an exorbitant price.

It must be confessed, however, that the foregoing distinctions, though, it is conceived, they will throw much light upon the jurisdiction actually exercised, will not fully account for it, either affirmatively or negatively, even when it depends wholly upon the nature of the tort. Questions of jurisdiction do not receive the same careful and constant attention which is bestowed upon questions of substantive right; and therefore, in dealing with such questions, the elements of haste, accident, caprice, the habits of lawyers, the leanings of individual judges, and the ever-changing temper of public opinion, have been factors of no inconsiderable importance. The jurisdiction of equity over torts in particular has grown up by slow, almost imperceptible degrees; and the jurisdiction exercised over one class of torts has often had little influence upon the exercise of jurisdiction over other and analogous classes of torts.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire briefly into the jurisdiction actually exercised by equity over different classes of torts. There are two large and important classes of torts over which equity practically assumes no jurisdiction whatever, namely, torts to the person and to movable property. Its jurisdiction, therefore, is substantially limited to torts, to immovable property, and to incorporeal property. Torts to immovable property are waste, trespass, and nuisance. Torts to incorporeal property may, it seems, all be classed as nuisances, though it is usual to treat torts to certain lawful monopolies, not relating to land (e.g., patent-rights and copy-rights), as constituting a class by themselves under the name of infringements of the rights violated.

Waste is a tort committed by the owner of a particular estate in land, the person injured being the remainder-man or reversioner. It is, therefore, a tort to the land, committed by a person in possession of the land, and whose possession is rightful, against a

person who has neither the possession nor the right of possession. Hence, it is not a trespass, the essence of which is always a wrongful entry, and which is always an injury to the possession. It always consists in injuring or destroying something upon the land which belongs to the owner of the fee.

A nuisance to land is any injury to it which is committed without making an entry upon the land, and which, for that reason, is not a trespass. Any injury to incorporeal property is a nuisance, as a trespass can be committed only against corporeal things. Therefore, an act which would be a trespass to a corporeal thing will be only a nuisance to an incorporeal thing. For example, an obstruction by A of a right of way which B has over the land of C, is a trespass to C, but only a nuisance to B.

Over all the foregoing torts, namely, waste, trespass to land, and nuisance either to land or to incorporeal property (including infringements of such lawful monopolies as patents and copyrights), equity exercises a jurisdiction of greater or less extent; and it may be stated as a general rule, that, whenever the injury caused by a tort belonging to either of these classes will be of a serious and permanent character, equity will interfere to prevent it; but that for injuries which are only technical, or slight, or temporary, or occasional, the person injured will be left to his remedy at law. Thus, the injury caused by waste is necessarily permanent, being an injury to the inheritance; and in the great majority of cases the injury is of a substantial character. Accordingly, equity interferes to prevent waste almost as of course. If, however, the acts complained of, though technically waste, do not in fact injure the land, — still more, if they actually improve it, — the remainderman or reversioner will be left to his remedy at law.

Acts which will constitute waste when committed by the owner of a particular estate, will, of course, be (not waste, but) trespass when committed by a stranger; but such acts clearly ought to be prevented equally in either case. Accordingly, the rule now is, that equity will interfere to prevent destructive trespass to land, or trespass in the nature of waste; but it will not interfere to prevent trespasses which injure only the present possession; and, indeed, the first instance in which equity interfered to prevent destructive trespass was in the time of Lord Thurlow.[1]

[1] Flamang's case, cited in Mitchell v. Dors, 6 Ves. 147, in Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 305, 308, in Smith v. Collyer, 8 Ves. 89, and in Thomas v. Oakley, 18 Ves. 184, 186.

In cases of waste there is seldom any controversy about the title to the land. Acts in the nature of waste, however, frequently raise questions of title; for such acts may be committed by a person who claims to own the land, but whose title is denied by another person who also claims to own the land; and in such a case either of the adverse claimants may be in possession. If the acts be committed by the one out of possession, he can always successfully defend an action of trespass by showing that the land is his. If the acts be committed by the one who is in possession, the one out of possession has no remedy at law, except an action of ejectment to recover the land itself. If he succeed in ejectment, and recover possession of the land, the other's acts will then (but not till then) become trespasses by relation, and damages may be recovered for them. How, then, will equity deal with such a case, if applied to by either of the claimants to prevent acts of the other in the nature of waste ? The chief difficulty arises from the fact that the trial of the title does not belong to equity. Each claimant has a right to have the title tried at law and by a jury. Equity will not, therefore, interfere with the trial of the title. What will it do ? If the plaintiff in equity is in possession there is no serious difficulty. Equity will entertain a bill, as in other cases, and will grant a temporary injunction; but the injunction will not be made perpetual until the plaintiff has recovered in an action of trespass; and if the plaintiff fail to bring such an action promptly, or to prosecute it with diligence, the injunction will be dissolved on the defendant's application. So, if the action be defended successfully, the bill in equity will be dismissed. If a temporary injunction be obtained before any trespass has been committed, of course the plaintiff in equity cannot maintain trespass upon the actual facts; but equity will get over that difficulty by directing the plaintiff to bring his action, and to declare in the usual form, and by directing the defendant not to traverse the declaration, but to plead only his affirmative defence of title.

When the plaintiff in equity is out of possession the difficulty is much greater. The acts of the defendant are not then trespasses, or torts of any kind, until made so by fictitious relation. How, then, can equity grant an injunction against acts which confessedly, upon the facts before the court, are not wrongful ? Our law may be open to criticism for making no provision (except such as is made by the statutes against forcible entry and detainer) for

trying questions of possession in a summary way; but equity is not a lawgiver. Moreover, if equity is to interfere in such a case, it must, it seems, either strictly limit its interference to the granting of an injunction during the pendency of an ejectment, or it must take the entire litigation into its own hands, assuming control of the action of ejectment, if one has been already brought, or directing one to be brought and prosecuted under its control; and either of these courses is open to serious objection. In point of authority courts of equity have almost invariably refused to interfere in such cases, though several judges have expressed surprise and regret that the jurisdiction had not been exercised; and intimations have been thrown out that it would be exercised whenever a sufficiently strong case should be presented. In one case, also, a temporary injunction was granted; but the facts sworn to were very strong, and the defendant, though served with notice, did not appear to oppose the motion.[1]

As nuisances consist, for the most part, in so using one's own land as to injure the land or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor, it follows that the injuries caused by nuisances are generally more or less permanent; and, hence, they not unfrequently call for the interference of equity to prevent them. Yet such interference has been found to be attended with great difficulties. An act which is wrongful in itself may be adjudged wrongful before it is committed as well as afterwards; nor is there any question as to the extent of the wrongfulness, for the entire act is wrongful. But an act which is in itself rightful, and which is wrongful only because of some effect which it produces, or some consequence which follows from it, can seldom be proved to be wrongful by a priori reasoning, or otherwise than by actual experience; and even when it does sufficiently appear that a given act done in a given way will be wrongful, it does not follow that some part of it may not be rightfully done, or even that the entire act may not be done in such a way as to be rightful. For these and similar reasons a court of equity frequently finds it impossible to interfere in case of a nuisance until the act which constitutes the nuisance is either fully completed, or at least far advanced towards completion; and, in either of the latter events, it will often be found that the damage to the defendant which the interference of the court

[1] Neale v. Gripps, 4 K. & John. 472.

will cause will be out of all proportion to the damage to the plaintiff which it will prevent.

A distinction must be taken, however, between things erected or constructed on one's own land which are in themselves a nuisance to one's neighbor, and those which are so only because of the uses to which they are put; for, in cases belonging to the latter class, there may be no occasion for equity to interfere until injury is actually caused, nor is it ever too late to prevent a nuisance for the future without causing anything to be undone.

So, too, when a nuisance is caused by the carrying on of an offensive trade, equity finds no especial difficulty in interfering, unless expensive works have been constructed for the express purpose of carrying on that trade, and which the abandonment or removal of the trade will render wholly or nearly worthless.

The most difficult of all nuisances for a court of equity to deal with are those caused by the erection of massive and costly buildings in large cities. In such cases, if there is danger of a wrong being done, and yet the court does not see its way to granting an injunction, a convenient course is for the court to require the building to be constructed under its own supervision, by directing the defendant to lay his plans before the court, and obtain its approval of them before proceeding.[1]

The interference of equity to prevent the infringement of patents and copyrights is attended with none of the peculiar difficulties which so often occur in cases of ordinary nuisance; and, though a single infringement does not of itself produce any permanent injury, yet the example of successful infringement is contagious and pernicious; and, as it is extremely difficult to prove the extent of the infringement, and so the remedy at law is very inadequate, equity interferes by way of prevention as a matter of course.

Such are the cases in which equity will interfere for the prevention of a tort on account of the nature of the tort, or of the injury caused by it; but there are other cases in which it interferes for a wholly different reason, namely, to prevent the necessity of bringing a great or indefinite number of actions. Thus, if A commit a tort against B, which is capable of indefinite repetition, and B bring an action and recover damages, and A persist notwithstanding in committing the tort, a court of equity will entertain a

[1] Stokes v. City Offices Co., 2 H. & M. 650.

bill for an injunction; for otherwise B might have to bring an indefinite number of actions. If, indeed, there be a question of right involved between A and B, equity will not necessarily interfere after a single trial at law, but it will interfere as soon as it thinks the right has been sufficiently tried. So if many persons are severally committing, or threatening to commit, similar torts against one, and each tort involves the same questions, both of fact and law, as every other, the one may file a bill against the many (or against a few of them on behalf of themselves and all the others), and obtain an injunction; for otherwise he would have to bring a separate action at law against each. So, too, if one person is committing, or threatening to commit, torts against each of many others, each tort involving the same questions of fact and law as every other, the many (or a few of them representing themselves and all the others) may file a bill against the one, and obtain an injunction; for other wise each of them would have to bring an action against him. In such cases the bill is commonly called a bill of peace.

When a court of equity is applied to for a remedy by way of prevention, the defendant may have already begun the commission of the acts of which a prevention is sought, or the plaintiff's case may be merely that the defendant will commit them unless prevented by an injunction. In the latter event the plaintiff may encounter a difficulty in the way of proof; for a court of equity cannot interfere to prevent the commission of an act, however wrongful, merely because the defendant is liable to commit it, nor even because other people think he will commit it; it must be satisfied that he intends to commit it. And yet an intention to commit a wrongful act is apt to be one of the most difficult things to prove, as a person who has such an intention is not likely to proclaim it beforehand by words or deeds; and yet these are the only means by which the intention can be proved.

If the remedy by way of prevention is not made effective until the commission of the acts sought to be prevented has been begun, the plaintiff, of course, needs a double remedy; namely, prevention as to the future, and specific reparation or a compensation in money for the past. If it is a case in which equity can and will compel specific reparation, of course the plaintiff will obtain complete relief in equity, both as to the past and as to the future. But how will it be if (as commonly happens) the plaintiff can have

only a compensation in money for the past? On the one hand, equity will not entertain a bill for the mere purpose of giving a compensation in money for a past tort; and this for two reasons, — namely, first, the remedy at law is perfectly effective; secondly, equity cannot assess damages. On the other hand, if equity does not give relief for the past tort in the case supposed, the burden of two suits will be imposed upon the parties. To avoid this evil, therefore, equity will give relief for the past tort if the plaintiff will accept such relief as equity can give. It is, indeed, possible for equity to give relief for a past tort by way of damages; but it can only do so by sending the case to a court of law for an assessment of damages, and that is quite as objectionable as a separate action. If, however, the tort be one by which the defendant obtains a direct and immediate profit, equity can and will compel him to account with the plaintiff for such profit; and this relief is commonly preferred to an action for damages. Accordingly, in cases of waste, destructive trespass, and infringement of patents and copyrights, it is the constant practice for the plaintiff to pray for an account as well as an injunction. In cases of nuisance, however, an account is seldom asked for, as there are seldom any profits sufficiently direct and immediate to be accounted for.

The next question is, In what cases will equity compel the specific reparation of torts already committed ? This question can arise, of course, only in reference to such torts as are in their nature capable of being specifically repaired; and it does not often arise, except in reference to torts committed by the defendant on his own land (i.e., nuisances); for in other cases the plaintiff may generally as well recover damages of the defendant, and then repair the tort himself.

It must be confessed that the ordinary mode of giving relief in equity is not as well adapted to specific reparation as it is to prevention. It is scarcely possible, in the nature of things, for a court successfully to compel the performance of specific affirmative acts, unless they be of a very precise and definite character, such, for example, as paying money, producing documents, delivering possession of property, and executing conveyances of property; and clearly a court ought to be very cautious about attempting what it cannot successfully carry out. It is singular, therefore, that courts of equity have confined themselves so exclusively to their favorite mode of giving relief. In cases where

the title to property is to be affected, no other mode is open to them; but, in cases which involve only the exercise of physical power, courts of equity have all the resources which it is possible for any court to have. When, therefore, justice requires that a tort should be specifically repaired, it would seem to be much more feasible for a court of equity itself to undertake the repair of it, at the expense of the tort-feasor, than to attempt to compel the latter to repair it. For example, specific reparation in the case of a nuisance is an abatement of the nuisance; and there seems to be no good reason why a court of equity should not abate a nuisance, if justice require its abatement. The ancient common law regarded abatement as the proper remedy for a nuisance; and though damages alone can be recovered at law at the present day, that may be only because the actions anciently provided have been superseded by the action on the case.

Courts of equity have shown little disposition, however, to try new modes of giving relief; and hence they seldom attempt to give a remedy for a tort by way of specific reparation. There is believed to be but one instance (and that an ancient one) in cases of waste,[1] no instance in cases of trespass, and but few instances in cases of nuisance,[2] in which an English court of equity has attempted to give such a remedy.

Moreover, notwithstanding what has been said in favor of the abatement of nuisances, it is undoubtedly true that such a jurisdiction should be exercised in modern times with great caution. In many cases of nuisance there is no reason for imputing any intentional wrong to the defendant; and it must not be forgotten that the rights of the latter are as sacred as those of the plaintiff; and, if courts of equity find insuperable difficulties in the way of arresting an expensive work when near completion, much more will they find insuperable difficulties in the way of pulling it down when completed. The mere cost of abating such a nuisance may

[1] Vane v. Lord Barnard, 2 Vern. 738; S. C. nom. Lord Barnard's case, Ch. Prec., 454 (the case of Raby Castle). According to the report in Vernon the decree directed the master to see the castle repaired at the defendant's expense. Whether the decree was ever performed or not does not appear. It is said not to have been performed during the defendant's life. See Rolt v. Lord Somerville, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 759.

[2] The first instance was in the case of Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro. C.C. (Belt's ed.) 588, 2 Cox, 4, Dickens, 703. Then followed Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192, and Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co. I M. & K. 154. In very recent times instances of such relief have been much more common.

easily exceed in amount the damage which will be caused to the person injured by its being suffered to remain. Upon the whole, therefore, it cannot be expected that a court of equity will ever make a decree that a costly building, which has been completed, be pulled down; and, if such a decree shall ever be made, there is little likelihood that it will be executed.

There is, however, an obstacle in the way of obtaining a remedy at law for a permanent nuisance, which has not yet been adverted to. Such a nuisance is a continuing tort, i. e., it is a new tort every moment; and the only damages that can be recovered for such a tort are such as have been already suffered; and hence the person injured, if he would obtain full indemnity, must sue periodically so long as the tort continues. Moreover, if he lets too long a time elapse without suing, the tort-feasor may acquire a prescriptive right to continue what was at first a tort. If, therefore, a permanent nuisance has been erected, and it cannot be abated, justice would seem to require that the person injured by it should at least recover at once, and by a single action, a full compensation in money for the injury, and this measure of justice equity may, it seems, grant; for, though equity cannot itself assess damages, yet it may have the full amount of the damages which will be caused by the nuisance assessed by means of a feigned issue, and it may then make a decree that the defendant pay the damages so assessed; and if the defendant, having paid these damages, shall be afterwards sued at law, he may obtain an injunction against the prosecution of the action.

It is well known that every tort as such dies with the person committing it; and therefore no action at law founded strictly upon a tort ever lies against an executor or administrator as such, or against an heir as such. If, however, the deceased tort-feasor has been enriched by his tort, and his ill-gotten gains have gone to his representatives, justice clearly requires that the latter should restore them to the person injured; and accordingly they may be recovered by an action at law, if there be an action, not founded upon the tort, which is adapted to the circumstances of the case. Thus, if a tort-feasor have converted the fruits of his tort into money, an action for money had and received will lie against his executor or administrator. So if the tort consisted in wrongfully taking or detaining property, and the property so wrongfully taken or detained has gone to the executor or administrator, or to the

heir (as the case may be) of the tort-feasor, an action will, of course, lie to recover it back. Frequently, however, there will be no action at law which will be adapted to the circumstances of the case; and in all such cases it seems that equity ought to interfere by compelling a restoration to the person injured of any fruits of the tort which can be found in the possession of the representatives of the tort-feasor. This, however, is not entirely clear upon authority.[1]

It has been assumed hitherto that every tort consists in misfeasance. In fact, however, some torts consist in nonfeasance merely; for whenever the law imposes a duty upon a person, which does not amount technically to an obligation, any failure to perform that duty by which another person is injured (as it is not a breach of obligation) is a tort. It is generally true that a misfeasance is a tort, and a wrongful nonfeasance a breach of obligation; but the converse is also sometimes true; for, as a nonfeasance may be a tort, so a misfeasance may be a breach of obligation. There is, however, a broad distinction, in respect to equity jurisdiction, between misfeasance and nonfeasance; and this fact may suggest the propriety of dividing the jurisdiction over torts and contracts into cases of misfeasance and cases of nonfeasance. It certainly is not convenient to consider those torts which consist in nonfeasance, until those nonfeasances are considered which consist of breaches of contract; but neither is it convenient to consider those breaches of contract which consist in misfeasance until those breaches of contract which consist in nonfeasance are considered. Therefore, both classes of cases will be postponed until the jurisdiction over affirmative contracts is disposed of, i. e., those contracts the breaches of which consist in nonfeasances.

1 See Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 406; Thomas v. Oakley, 18 Ves. 184, 186, per Lord Eldon; Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. 72; Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439.

crops have been severed from the soil, but still remain in the field where they grew; and it is not practicable for any court to compel the doing of anything at any precise time. Secondly, for the same reason, specific reparation is out of the question. Thirdly, the setting out of tithe consists of so many particulars, and involves so much exercise of judgment, care, and honesty, that it would be very injudicious for any court to attempt to enforce it specifically.

The conclusion therefore is that a compensation in money seems to be the only remedy practicable for a refusal or neglect to set out tithe, without a radical change in the nature of the obligation itself.

ARTICLE IX.[1]

VIII.

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS AND WRONGS.

MORE than twelve years ago, the writer published in this REVIEW,[2] by way of introduction to a series of articles on equity jurisdiction, a classification of those rights which it is the duty of courts of justice to protect and enforce, and also of the wrongs by which such rights may be infringed. The views then stated, having only recently been adopted by the writer, were comparatively crude and undeveloped. Since that date, however, he has given considerable attention to the classification of rights and wrongs, and has made his views upon that subject the basis of an elementary course of instruction on equity jurisdiction; and the result has been that his views of twelve years ago have undergone some modification and much development. It has occurred to him, therefore, that a re-statement of the views now held by him might not be out of place, especially as some of his former pupils, now engaged in teaching, have done him the honor to make some use of his former observations in their own teaching.

As those rights which it is the duty of courts of justice to protect and enforce include equitable as well as legal rights, and as each of these classes of rights requires separate treatment, it will be convenient to begin with legal rights.

Legal rights are either absolute or relative. An absolute right is one which does not imply any correlative obligation or duty. A

[1] 13 HARV. L. REV. 537.

[2] See supra, pp. 1-39.

relative right is one which does imply a correlative obligation or duty.[1]

Absolute rights are either personal rights or rights of property. A personal right is one which belongs to every natural person as such. A right of property is one which consists of ownership or dominion {dominium}.

Every personal right is born with the person to whom it belongs, and dies with him. Personal rights, therefore, can neither be acquired nor parted with, and hence they are never the subjects of commerce, nor have they any pecuniary value. For the same reasons, courts of justice never have occasion to take cognizance of them except when complaints are made of their infringement; and even then the only question of law that can be raised respecting them is whether or not they have been infringed. It follows, therefore, that all the knowledge that we have of personal rights relates to the one question, what acts will constitute an infringement of them. We can neither number them nor define them, and any attempt to do either will be profitless. There is, however, one personal right which differs so widely from most others that it deserves to be mentioned, namely, the equal right of all persons to use public highways, navigable waters, and the high seas.

In all the foregoing particulars, rights of property are the very converse of personal rights. All such rights are acquired, and they may all be alienated. They are all, therefore, the subjects of commerce, and they all have, or are supposed to have, a pecuniary value. For the same reasons, courts of justice take cognizance of them for a great variety of purposes, and they are all capable of being enumerated and defined.

Rights of property are said to be either corporeal or incorporeal. In truth, however, all rights are incorporeal; and what is meant is that the subjects of rights of property (i.e., things owned) are either corporeal or incorporeal. A thing owned is corporeal when it consists of some portion of the material world, and incorporeal when it does not.

A single material thing may be owned by several persons, and

[1] Writers upon jurisprudence generally use the terms in rem and in personam to mark the primary division of legal rights, and it is, therefore, proper for me to explain why I use the terms "absolute" and "relative" instead. It will, however, be more convenient to do this after treating of the different classes of legal rights. See infra, p. 229, n. 1.

that too without any division of it, either actual or supposed, each person owning an undivided share of it; and in that case each owner has a right of property just as absolute as if he were the sole owner of the thing. In case of land also, the ownership, instead of being divided into shares, may be divided among several persons in respect to the time of their enjoyment, one of them having the right of immediate enjoyment, and the others having respectively successive rights of future enjoyment. This peculiarity in the ownership of land comes from the feudal system. Land itself is also peculiar in this, namely, that a physical division of it among different owners is impossible; and hence the land of A, for example, is separated from the adjoining land only by a mathematical line described upon the surface, A's ownership extending to the centre of the earth in one direction, and indefinitely in the other direction. By our law, land is also capable of an imaginary division, for the purposes of ownership, laterally as well as vertically; for one person may own the surface of the land, and another may own all the minerals which the land contains. Such a mode of dividing the ownership of land certainly creates many legal difficulties, but it seems to be persisted in notwithstanding, at least in England.[1] In like manner, by our law, a building is capable of an imaginary division, for purposes of ownership, both lateral and vertical.[2]

Relative rights are either obligations or duties. Strictly, indeed, "obligation" or "duty" is the name of the thing with which a relative right correlates; but such is the poverty of language that we have to use the same word also to express the right itself.

An obligation is either personal or real, according as the obligor is a person or a thing. An obligation may be imposed upon a person either by his own act, i. e., by contract (pbligatio ex contractu), or by act of law (obligatio ex lege, or obligatio quasi ex contractu).

An obligation may be imposed upon a thing either by the law alone, or by the law acting concurrently with the will of the owner of the thing. In the latter case, the will of the owner must be manifested in such manner as the law requires or sanctions. By our law, it is sometimes sufficient for the owner of a thing to impose an obligation upon himself, the law treating that as sufficient evidence of an intention to impose it upon the thing also, — when, for example, the owner of land enters into a covenant respecting

[1] Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739, 755.

2 Ibid., 756-757.

it, and the covenant is said to run with the land. The most common way, however, in which an owner of land manifests his will to impose an obligation upon it is by making a grant to the intended obligee of the right against the land which he wishes to confer, i. e., he adopts the same form as when he wishes to transfer the title to the land. If, however, an owner of land, upon transferring the title to it, wishes to impose upon it an obligation in his own favor, he does this by means of a reservation, i. e., by inserting in the instrument of transfer a clause by which he reserves to himself the right which he wishes to retain against the land. An owner of a movable thing imposes an obligation upon it by delivering the possession of it to the intended obligee, declaring the purpose for which he does it, as when a debtor delivers securities to his creditor by way of pledge to secure the payment of the debt. A real obligation is undoubtedly a legal fiction, but it is a very useful one. It was invented by the Romans, from whom it has been inherited by the nations of modern Europe. That it would ever have been invented by the latter is very unlikely, partly because they have needed it less than did the ancients, and partly because they have not, like the ancients, the habit of personifying inanimate things. The invention was used by the Romans for the accomplishment of several important legal objects, some of which no longer exist,[1] but others still remain in full force. It was by means of this that one person acquired rights in things belonging to others (jura in rebus alienis). Such rights were called servitutes (i. e., states of slavery) in respect to the thing upon which the obligation was imposed, and they included every right which one could have in a thing, short of owning it. These servitudes were divided into real and personal servitudes, being called real when the obligee as well as the obligor, i. e., the master (dominus) as well as the slave (servus), was a thing, and personal when the obligee was a person. The former, which may be termed servitudes proper, have passed into our law under the names of easements and profits ą prendre. The latter included the pignus and the hypotheca, i.e., the Roman mortgage, — which was called pignus when the thing mortgaged was delivered to the creditor, and hypotheca when it was constituted by a mere agreement, the thing mortgaged remaining in the possession of its owner. Originally, possession by the creditor of the thing mortgaged was indispensable, and so the pignus alone existed; but, at

[1] See supra, p. 193.

a later period, the parties to the transaction were permitted to choose between a pignus and a hypotheca. So long as the pignus was alone in use, it is obvious that the obligation could be created only by the act of the parties, as they alone could change the possession of the property. But when the step had been taken of permitting the mere agreement of the parties to be substituted for a change of possession, it was another easy step for the law, whenever it saw fit, to substitute its own will for the agreement of the parties; and hence hypothecations came to be divisible into such as were created by the acts of the parties (conventional hypothecations), and such as were created by the act of the law (legal or tacit hypothecations). Again, so long as a change of possession was indispensable, it is plain that the obligation could attach only upon property which was perfectly identified, and that there could be no change in the property subject to the obligation, except by a new change of possession. But when a change of possession had been dispensed with, and particularly when legal or tacit hypothecations had been introduced, it became perfectly feasible to make the obligation attach upon all property, or all property of a certain description, either then belonging to the debtor or afterward acquired by him, or upon all property, or all property of a certain description, belonging to the debtor for the time being; and hence hypothecations came to be divided into those which were special and those which were general.

The pignus has passed into our law under the name of pawn, or pledge, as to things movable, but has been wholly rejected as to land. The conventional hypotheca has been wholly rejected by our common law, though it has passed into our admiralty law. The legal or tacit hypothecation, on the other hand, has been admitted into our common law to some extent, though under the name of lien (a word which has the same meaning and the same derivation as "obligation"). Thus, by the early statute of 13 E. I. c. 18, a judgment and a recognizance (the latter being an acknowledgment of a debt in a court of record, of which acknowledgment a record is made) are a general lien on all the land of the judgment debtor and recognizer respectively, whether then owned by them or afterwards acquired. So also, in many cases, the law gives to a creditor a similar lien on the debtor's movable property, already in the creditor's possession when the debt accrues, though, in respect to the creditor's possession, this lien has the features of a pignus rather than of a hypotheca.

There are also in our law other instances of what the Romans would have called personal servitudes, if they had existed in their law; for example, easements and profits in gross,[1]i.e., easements and profits which exist for the benefit of their owner generally, — not for the exclusive benefit of some particular estate belonging to him. Rents and tithes seem also to fall into the same category.[2]

Passing from obligations to duties, the first thing to be observed is that the latter are either public or private, according as they are imposed for the benefit of individuals as such, or for the benefit of the public, or of some portion of the public.

Duties have attracted very little notice either from courts or from legal writers. There has, indeed, been a general failure, as well in our law as in the Roman law,[3] and also among writers on jurisprudence,[4] to discriminate between obligations and duties; and yet the distinctions between them are many and important. All duties originate in commands of the State; while all obligations originate either in a contract between the parties, or in something which has been done or has happened to the gain of the one and the loss of the other, and under such circumstances as make it unjust for the one to retain the gain or the other to suffer the loss. It is true that every obligation (being a vinculum juris) has in it a legal element, and that those obligations which do not originate in contract are pure creatures of the law: yet, in creating obligations, the only object of the State is to see that all persons within its jurisdiction act justly towards others, while, in imposing duties, it acts from motives of policy, or at least it imposes them as a part of the system of law which it adopts, and without reference to any particular case or any particular persons. Moreover, in creating obligations, the State acts in each particular case, and only after the events have happened which render its action necessary, and in each case its action has reference solely to the parties between whom the obligation is created, while, in

[1] See Gale on Easements, Part 1, c. 1, s. 4 (Part 1, c. 2, s. 4 of the 6th and 7th eds.).

[2] See supra, p. 199.

[3] Thus, in Justinian's Institutes, L. 3, Tit. 27, six instances are given of what are called