THE EXCELLENCIE OF A FREE STATE

LONDON PRINTED FOR
A. MILLAR AND T. CADELL IN THE STRAND,
G. KEARSLY IN LUDGATE STREET, AND
H. PARKER IN CORNHILL
MDCCLXVII

PREFACE TO THIS EDIT.

On the subject of government, no country hath produced writings so numerous and valuable as our own. It hath been cultivated and adorned by men of greatest genius, and most comprehensive understanding, MILTON, HARRINGTON, SYDNEY, LOCKE, names famous to all ages.

But, beside their incomparable writings, many lesser treatises on the same argument, which are little known, and extremely scarce, deserve to be read and preserved: in which number may be reckoned the small volume I now give the public, written by MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, a man, in the judgment of some, inferior only to MILTON.

It was first inserted in the Mercurius Politicus, that celebrated state-paper, published "in defence of the Commonwealth, and for the information of the people;" and soon after re-printed in 12 mo, under the following title, "The Excellencie of a Free State. Or, The right constitution of a Commonwealth. Wherein all objections are answered, and the best way to secure the people's liberties discovered. With some errors of government, and rules of policie. Published by a well-wisher to posteritie. London, printed for Thomas Brewster, at the west end of Paul's, 1656."

An account of the author may be seen in A. Wood's Athenae Oxonienses, tho' drawn in bitterness of wrath and anger. If this volume shall be favorably received, the editor will go on to give other rare treatises on government in his possession, to the entertainment and benefit, as he hopes, of the public. Reader, farewel,

Richard Baron

Below Blackheath, Jan. 1, 1767

TO
THE READER.

TAKING notice of late with what impudence, and (the more is the pity) confidence, the enemies of this commonwealth in their public writings and discourses labour to undermine the dear-bought liberties and freedoms of the people, in their declared interest of a free-state; I thought it high time, by counter-working them, to crush the cockatrice in the egg, that so it might never grow to be a bird of prey: in order thereto, I have published this following discourse to the world; that so the eyes of the people being opened, they may see whether those high and ranting discourses of personal prerogative and unbounded monarchy, (especially one lately published by Mr. Howel, that struts abroad with a brazen face) or a due and orderly succession of the supreme authority in the hands of the people's representatives, will best secure the liberties and freedoms of the people from the incroachments and usurpations of tyranny, and answer the true ends of the late wars.

This treatise is not intended for a particular answer to Mr. Howel's said book, but yet may obviate that part thereof which he calls, "Some reflexes upon government:" for his main design is not so much, (though that be part) to asperse the Long Parliament, (and so through their sides to wound all their friends and adherents) as to lay a foundation for absolute tyranny, upon an unbounded monarchy: and in order thereunto, he advises his Highness to lay aside parliaments, (or at best, to make them cyphers) and to govern the nation vi & armis: not out of any honour or respect he bears to his person, "but to bring the old interest and family into more credit and esteem with the people."

His principles and precedents, they are purely his own: for I am confident, that the most considerate part of those that did engage for the late king, are so far from owning his tenets, that they would rather lay aside the family and interest of the Stuarts, and declare for a free-state, than endure to be yoked and enslaved by such an absolute tyranny as he pleads for. My reason is this: because most of the nobility and gentry of this nation have fair estates of their own, free, without any dependence upon the crown; and they would be as unwilling to fender up their estates and posterities in the paw of the lion, as the commoners themselves.

His precedents are as false as his principles are bad: for proof hereof, take one (and that a main one) for all: he saith, "That until the reign of Henry the First, the commons of England were not called to the parliament at all, or had so much as a consent in the making of laws."

To prove that this is false, there is extant an old Latin copy speaking of a parliament in the reign of king Ethelred; which telleth us, that in it were universi Anglorum optimates Ethelredi regis edicto: & convocata plebis multitudine collectæ regis edicto: A writ of summons for all the lords, and for choice of the commons: a full and clear parliament. My author saith, "The proofs of parliaments, in Canute's time, are so many, and so full, that they tire us altogether." His remarkable letter from Rome, recorded by the Monk of Malmsbury, runs thus: To the archbishops, bishops, &c. Primatibus & toti genti Anglorum, tam nobilibus, quam plebeis. Hoveden is full in this also; Cujus (Edmundi) post mortem, rex Canutus omnes episcopos, duces, nec non & principes, cunctosque optimates gentis Angliæ, Lundoniæ congregari jussit. A clear summons of parliament. And the very name of parliament is found (saith my author)^[1] in his time, in the old book of Edmund's-Bury. Rex Canutus, anno regni 5. cunctos regni sui prælatos, proceresque, ac magnates, ad suum convocans parliamentum. And that it was a full parliament, we may believe from the persons we find there, at the charter to that monastery; confirmed by Hardicanute, but granted by Canute, in suo publico parliamento, præsistentibus personaliter in eodem archi-episcopis, episcopis, suffraganeis, ducibus, comitibus, abbatibus, cum quam plurimis gregariis militibus (knights of shires it seems) & cum populi multitudine copiosa (other commons also) omnibus tum eodem parliamento personaliter existentibus. Edward the Confessor refers the repairing of Westminster to the parliament: at length, cum totius regni electione, (they are his own words)^[2] he sets upon the decayed minster.

But they that would know more of the customs and constitutions of this nation, let them repair to those large volumes, that are so frequent in print upon that subject; especially that excellent piece, "The Rights of the Kingdom." This may suffice to prove that the commons were called to parliament long before Henry the First.

I believe none will be offended with this following discourse, but those that are enemies to public welfare: let such be offended still: it is not for their sake that I publish this ensuing treatise; but for your sakes, that have been noble patriots, fellow-soldiers; and sufferers for the liberties and freedoms of your country, that posterity in after-ages may have something to say and shew to (if God shall permit any) succeeding tyrants, wherefore their fathers sacrificed their lives, and all that was dear to them: It was not to destroy magistracy, but to regulate it; nor to confound propriety, but to enlarge it: that the prince as well as the people might be governed by law; that justice might be impartially distributed without respect of persons; that England might become a quiet habitation for the lion and the lamb to lie down and feed together; and that none might make the people afraid: it was for these things they fought and died; and that not as private persons neither, but by the public command and conduct of the supreme power of the nation, viz. the people's representatives in parliament: and nothing will satisfy for all the blood and treasure that hath been spilt and spent, make England a glorious commonwealth, and stop the mouths of all gain-sayers, but a due and orderly succession of the supreme authority in the hands of the people's representatives.

[1 MN] Howel saith William the Conqueror first brought the word parliament.

[2 MN] Mr. Howel would have his Highness lay a sessment for the repairing of Paul's without consent of parliament.

AN
INTRODUCTION
TO THE
FOLLOWING DISCOURSE.

WHEN the senators of Rome, in their public decrees and orations, began to comply with and court the people, calling them "lords of the world," how easy a matter was it then for Gracchus to persuade them to un-lord the senate? In like manner, when Athens was quitted of kings, the power was no sooner declared to be in the people, but immediately they took it, and made sure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that excellent lawgiver: for, as Cicero saith, There is a natural desire of power and sovereignty in every man, so that if any have once an opportunity to seize, they seldom neglect it; and if they are told it is their due, they venture life and all to attain it.

If a people once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they free themselves. Their first care is to see, that their laws, their rights, their deputies, their officers, and all their dependents, be settled in a state of freedom. This becomes like the apple of the eye; the least grain, atom, or touch, will grieve it: it is an espoused virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.

Thus strangely affected were the Roman people, that if any one among them (though ne'er so deserving) were found to aspire, they presently fetched him down, as they did the gallant Mælius and Manlius; yea, their jealousy was so great, that they observed every man's looks, his very nods, his garb, and his gait, whether he walked, conversed, and lived as a friend of freedom among his neighbours. The supercilious eye, the lofty brow, and the grand paw, were accounted monsters, and no character of freedom; so that it was the special care of the wiser patriots, to keep themselves in a demure and humble posture, for the avoiding of suspicion. Hence it was that Collatinus, one of their freedom's founders, and of their first consuls, living in some more state than ordinary, and keeping at too great a distance from the people, soon taught them to forget his former merits: insomuch, that they not only turned him out of his consulship, but quite out of the city into banishment. But his colleague Brutus, and that wise man Valerius Publicola, by taking a contrary course, preserved themselves and their reputation. For, the one sacrificed his children, those living monuments of his house, to make the vulgar amends for an injury: the other courted them with the title of majesty, laid the fasces, the ensigns of authority, at their feet, fixt all appeals at their tribunals, and levelled the lofty walls of his own stately house, for fear they should mistake it for a castle. Thus also did Menenius Agrippa, Camillus, and other eminent men in that popular state: so that by these means they made themselves the darlings of the people, whilst many others of a more grandee-humour, soon lost their interest and reputation.

Thus you see, that when a people's right is once declared to them, it is almost impossible to keep it, or take it from them.

It is pity, that the people of England, being born as free as any people in the world, should be of such a supple humour and inclination, to bow under the ignoble pressures of an arbitrary tyranny, and so unapt to learn what true freedom is. It is an inestimable jewel, of more worth than your estates, or your lives; it consists not in a licence to do what you list, but in these few particulars: First, in having wholesome laws suited to every man's state and condition. Secondly, in a due and easy course of administration, as to law and justice, that the remedies of evil may be cheap and speedy. Thirdly, in a power of altering government and governors upon occasion. Fourthly, in an uninterrupted course of successive parliaments, or assemblies of the people. Fifthly, in a free election of members to sit in every parliament, when rules of election are once established. By enjoying these only, a people are said to enjoy their rights, and to be truly stated in a condition of safety and freedom.

Now if liberty is the most precious jewel under the sun, then when it is once in possession, it requires more than an ordinary art and industry to preserve it. But the great question is, Which is the safest way? whether by committing of it into the hands of a standing power, or by placing the guardianship in the hands of the people, in a constant succession of their supreme assemblies. The best way to determine this, is by observation out of Roman stories; whereby it plainly appears, that people never had any real liberty, till they were possessed of the power of calling and dissolving the supreme assemblies, changing governments, enacting and repealing laws, together with a power of chusing and deputing whom they pleased to this work, as often as they should judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the public. This power is said to be the first-born of that people's freedom: and many a shrewd fit, many a pang and throw the commonwealth had, before it could be brought forth in the world: which (Gracchus told them) was a sore affliction from the gods, that they should suffer so much for the ignorance or negligence of their ancestors, who when they drove out kings, forgot to drive out the mysteries and inconveniences of kingly power, which were all reserved within the hands of the senate. By this means the poor people missing the first opportunity of settling their freedom, soon lost it again: they were told they were a free-state; and why? Because (forsooth) they had no king, they had at length never a Tarquin to trouble them: but what was that to the purpose, as long as they had a Gaius, and an Appius Claudius, and the rest of that gang, who infected the senators with an humour of kinging it from generation to generation? Alas, when the Romans were at this pass, they were just such another free-state as was that of Sparta, in the days of yore, where they had a senate too, to pull down the pride of kings; but the people were left destitute of power and means to pull down the pride of the senate; by which means indeed they became free to do what they list, whilst the people were confined within straiter bounds than ever. Such another free-state in these days is that of Venice, where the people are free from the dominion of their prince or duke; but little better than slaves under the power of their senate. But now in the commonwealth of Athens, the case was far otherwise; where it was the care of Solon, that famous law-giver, to place both the exercise and interest of supremacy in the hands of the people, so that nothing of a public interest could be imposed, but what passed current by virtue of their consent and authority: he instituted that famous council called the Areopagus, for the managing of state-transactions; but left the power of legislation, or law-making, in a successive course of the people's assemblies; so that avoiding kingly tyranny on the one side, and senatical incroachments on the other, he is celebrated by all posterity, as the man that hath left the only pattern of a free-state fit for all the world to follow.

It is also to be observed, when kings were driven out of Rome, though they were declared and called a free-state, yet it was a long time ere they could be free indeed, in regard Brutus cheated them with a mere shadow and pretence of liberty: he had indeed an ambition high enough, and opportunity fair enough to have seized the crown into his own hands; but there were many considerations that deterred him from it; for he well perceived how odious the name of king was grown: Besides, had he sought to inthrone himself, men would have judged it was not love to his country made him take up arms, but desire of dominion; nor could he forget, that serene privacy is to be preferr'd before hazardous royalty: for what hope could he have to keep the seat long, who by his own example had taught the people both the theory and practice of opposing tyranny? It was necessary therefore that he should think of some other course more plausible, whereby to work his own ends, and yet preserve the love of the people; who not having been used to liberty, did very little understand it, and therefore were the more easily gulled out of the substance, and made content with the shadow.

For the carrying on this design, all the projecting grandees joined pates together; wherein, as one observes, Regnum quidem nomen, sed non regia potestas Româ fuit expulsa: Though the name of king were exploded with alacrity, yet the kingly power was retained with all art and subtilty, and shared under another notion among themselves, who were the great ones of the city. For all authority was confined within the walls of a standing senate, out of which, two consuls were chosen yearly; and so by turns they dubb'd one another with a new kind of regality; the people being no gainers at all by this alteration of government, save only, that (like asses) they were saddled with new paniers of slavery.

But what followed? The senate having got all power into their own hands, in short time degenerated from their first virtue and institution, to the practice of avarice, riot, and luxury: whereby the love of their country was changed into a study of ambition and faction: so that they fell into divisions among themselves, as well as oppressions over the people; by which divisions, some leading grandees, more potent than their fellows, took occasion to wipe their noses, and to assume the power into their own hands, to the number of ten persons. This form of government was known by the name of the Decemvirate; wherein these new usurpers, joining forces together, made themselves rich with the spoils of the people, not caring by what unlawful means they purchased either profit or pleasure, till that growing every day more insupportable, they were in the end by force cashiered of their tyranny.

But what then?^[3] The people being flush'd with this victory, and calling to mind how gallantly their ancestors had in like manner banished kings, began at last to know their own strength; and stomach'd it exceedingly, that themselves, on whose shoulders the frame of state was supported, (and for whose sakes all states are founded) should be so much vassalized at the will of others, that they who were lords abroad, should be slaves at home: so that they resolvcd to be ridden no longer under fair shews of liberty. They raised a tumult under the conduct of their tribune Canuteius; nor could they by any persuasion be induced to lay down arms, till they were put in possession of their rights and privileges. They were made capable of offices of the government, even to the dictatorship; had officers of their own, called tribunes, who were held sacred and inviolable, as protectors of the commons, and retained a power of meeting and acting with all freedom in their great assemblies. Now, and never till now, could they be called a free-state, and commonwealth, though long before declared so: for the way being open to all without exception, virtue, learning, and good parts, made as speedy a ladder to climb unto honours, as nobility of birth; and a good man as much respected as a great;^[4] which was a rare felicity of the times, not to be expected again, but upon the dawning of another golden age.

The main observation then arising out of this discourse, is this, That not only the name of king, but the thing king (whether in the hands of one or of many) was plucked up root and branch, before ever the Romans could attain to a full establishment in their rights and freedoms.

Now when Rome was thus declared a free-state, the next work was to establish their freedom in some sure and certain way: and in order to this,^[5] the first business they pitch'd upon, was, not only to engage the people by an oath against the return of Tarquin's family to the kingdom, but also against the admission of any such officer as a king, for ever; because those brave men, who glorified themselves in laying the foundation of a commonwealth, well knew that in a short revolution others of a less public spirit would arise in their places, and gape again after a kingdom. And therefore it was the special care of those worthy patriots, to imprint such principles in men's minds, as might actuate them with an irreconcilable enmity to the former power: insomuch, that the very name of king became odious to the Roman people; yea, and they were so zealous herein, that in process of time, when Cæsar took occasion by civil discords to assume the sovereignty into his single hands, he durst not entertain it under the fatal name of king, but clothed himself with the more plausible stile of emperor; which nevertheless could not secure him from the fatal stab that was given him by Brutus in revenge, on the behalf of the people. Our neighbours of Holland traced this example at the heels, when upon recovery of their freedom from Spain, they bind themselves by an oath to abjure the government,^[6] not only of king Philip, but of all kings for ever.

Kings being cashiered out of Rome, then the right of liberty, together with the government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the Patrician or Senatorian order of nobility; the people not being admitted into any share, till partly by mutinies and partly by importunities, they compell'd the senate to grant them an interest in offices of state, and in the legislative power, which were circumscribed before within the bounds of the senate. Hence arose those officers called tribunes, and those conventions called assemblies of the people, which were as bridles to restrain the power and ambition of the senate, or nobility. Before the erect[i]on of those, whilst all was in the hands of the senate, the nation was accounted free, because not subjected to the will of any single person: But afterwards^[7] they were free indeed, when no laws could be imposed upon them without a consent first had in the people's assemblies: so that the government in the end came to be settled in an equal mixture of both interests, patrician and popular; under which form, they attained to the height of all their glory and greatness. In this form of free-state, we now see the Venetian, where the patrician is predominant, and the people a little too much kept under. The same form is embraced also by our neighbours the United Provinces; but the best part of their interest lies deposited in the hands of the people. Rome kept up their senate as their standing council, for the managing of state-affairs, which require wisdom and experience: but as for making of laws, and the main acts of supremacy, they were reserved to the grand assemblies; so that the people gave rules whereby to govern, and the secrets of government were intrusted in the hands of the senate. And this commonwealth ever thriv'd best, when the people had most power, and used most moderation: and though they made use of it now and then to fly out into extravagant courses, yet they were no lasting fits, like those distempers that brake out through the ambition of the senators. Besides, we cannot but take notice, as long as the popular interest continued regular, and more predominant than the other, so long the people were secure of their liberties: which enjoyment, was a good allay and recompence, for many harsh inconveniences that brake out when they were unruly and irregular: whereas, when the senate afterwards worm'd the people out of power, as that design went on by degrees, so Rome lost her liberty;^[8] the senate domineering over the people, and particular factions over the senate, till those factions tearing one another to pieces, at length he that was head of the paramount surviving faction, by name Cæsar, took occasion to usurp over all, swallowing up the rights and liberties of the Romans, in the gulph of a single tyranny.

It was a noble saying, (though Machiavel's) "Not he that placeth a virtuous government in his own hands, or family; but he that establisheth a free and lasting form, for the people's constant security, is most to be commended." Whosoever hath this opportunity, may improve his actions to a greater height of glory, than ever followed the fame of any ambitious idol that hath grasp'd a monarchy: for, as Cato saith in Plutarch, "even the greatest kings or tyrants, are far inferior to those that are eminent in free-states and commonwealths:" Nor were those mighty monarchs of old, to be compared with "Epimanondas, Pericles, Themistocles, Marcus Curius, Amilcar, Fabius, and Scipio," and other excellent captains in free-states, which purchased themselves a fame, in defence of their liberties. And though the very name of liberty was for a time grown odious, or ridiculous among us, having been long a stranger in these and other parts; yet, in ancient time, nations were wont to reckon themselves so much the more noble, as they were free from the regal yoke: which was the cause why then there were so many free-states in all parts of the world.

Nor is it only a mere gallantry of spirit that excites men to the love of freedom; but experience assures it to be the most commodious and profitable way of government, conducing every way to the enlarging a people in wealth and dominion.^[9] "It is incredible to be spoken (saith Salust) how exceedingly the Roman commonwealth increased in a short time, after they had obtained liberty." And Guicciardine affirms, "That free-states must needs be more pleasing to God than any other form, because in them more regard is to be had to the common good, more care for the impartial distribution of justice, and the minds of men are more enflamed thereby to the love of glory and virtue, and become much more zealous in the love of religion, than in any other government whatever."

It is wonderful to consider, how mightily the Athenians were augmented in a few years, both in wealth and power, after they had freed themselves from the tyranny of Pistratus: but the Romans arrived to such a height, as was beyond all imagination, after the expulsion of their kings, and kingly government. Nor do these things happen without special reason; it being usual in free-states to be more tender of the public in all their decrees, than of particular interests: whereas the case is otherwise in a monarchy, because in this form the prince's pleasure weighs down all considerations of the common good. And hence it is, that a nation hath no sooner lost its liberty, and stoop'd under the yoke of a single tyrant, but it immediately loseth its former lustre, the body fills with ill humours, and may swell in titles; but cannot thrive either in power or riches, according to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed, because all new acquisitions are appropriated as the prince's peculiar, and in no wise conduce to the ease and benefit of the public.

It was the pride of Richard Nevil, the great Earl of Warwick, and he reckoned it the greatest of earthly glories, to be called, (as indeed he was) a king-maker, in that he made and unmade kings at his pleasure: for we read in our Chronicles, how that he first pull'd down the house of Lancaster, and brought king Henry the sixth from a crown to a prison; setting up the title of the house of York, in the person of king Edward the fourth: afterwards, he deposed this Edward, drave him out of England, and restored the same Henry to the crown, whom he had before depress'd. But the great query is, Wherefore, and how this was done? One would have thought, there had been no hope of reconciliation betwixt him and the house of Lancaster, having so highly disobliged them, in casting down and imprisoning the person of Henry: But yet it is very observable of this man, Warwick, being on a sudden discontented with the change that he had made, because he missed of thole ends which he aimed at, in bringing it about; and perceived other persons (whom he conceived his inferiors,) to partake of the interest and favour of Edward; therefore out of an emulous impatience of spirit, he presently cast about to undo all that before he had done; he supprest the new government, to advance the old.

From which piece of story, we may very well conclude, how unsafe it is in a new alteration, to trust any man with too great a share of government, or place of trust; for such persons stand ever ready (like that Warwick) upon any occasion of discontent, or of serving their own interests, to betray and alter the government; especially if they have Warwick's main guard, that is, if they can (as he did) bring the prince whom they formerly disobliged, to come in upon their own terms, and upon such conditions as may bridle him, and secure the power so in their own hands, that whilst he king it only in title, themselves may be kings de facto, and leave their old friends in the lurch, or yield them up at mercy (as Warwick did) to gratify the tyrant, and their own tyrannical ambition.

How much therefore doth it concern every commonwealth, in such a case, to see and beware that Warwick's Ghost be not conjur'd up again to act a part in some new tragedy.

[3 MN] How the Romans obtained their rights and privileges.

[4 MN] Goodness preferred before greatness.

[5 MN] What they did to preserve their freedom.

[6 MN] Oaths in those days were not like an old almanack.

[7 MN] No laws imposed, but with the people's consent in their assemblies.

[8 MN] The Romans lose their rights and liberties.

[9 MN] The Romans flourished most when they were a free-state.

THE
RIGHT CONSTITUTION
OF A
COMMONWEALTH.

THE Romans having justly and nobly freed themselves from the tyranny of kings, and being in time brought to understand that the interest of freedom consists in a due and orderly succession of the supreme assemblies; they then made it their care, by all good ways and means, to fortify the Commonwealth, and establish it in a free enjoyment of that interest, as the only bar to the return of kings, and their main security against the subtil mining of kingly humours and usurpations. The publick Rostra, or pulpits, sounded out the commendations of freedom; their augurs, or prophets, found freedom written in the entrails of beasts, and collected it from the flight of the auspicious bird, the sun-daring eagle, spreading her wings aloft over the Capitol: the common people also, in their common discourses, breathed nothing but freedom, and used the frequent mention of it as a charm against the return of tyranny.

Nor was it without reason, that this brave and active people were so studiously devoted to the preservation of their freedom, when they had once attained it, considering how easy and excellent it is above all other forms of government, if it be kept within due bounds and order. It is an undeniable rule,^[10] that the people (that is, such as shall be successively chosen to represent the people) are the best keepers of their own liberties; and that for these following reasons.

First,^[11] Because they never think of usurping over other mens rights, but mind which way to preserve their own: whereas, the case is far otherwise among kings and grandees, as all nations in the world have felt to some purpose; for they naturally move within the circle of domination, as in their proper center; and count it no less security than wisdom and policy, to brave it over the people. Thus Suetonius tells us, how Cæsar, Crassus, and another, Societatem iniere, nequid ageretur in repub. quod displicuisset ulli e tribus: "Made a bargain between themselves, that nothing should be done in the Commonwealth that displeased either of them three." Such another triumvirate of grandees was that of Augustus, Lepidus, and Antony, who agreed to share the world between themselves; and traced the same paths as the other did, to the top of worldly tyranny, over the ruins of their country's liberties: they saved and destroyed, depressed and advanced whom they pleased, with a wet finger. But whilst the government remained untouched in the people's hands, every particular man lived safe, (except the ambitious) and no man could be undone, unless a true and satisfactory reason were rendered to the world for his destruction.

Secondly,^[12] The people are best keepers of their own liberty, because it is ever the people's care to see, that authority be so constituted, that it shall be father a burthen than benefit to thole that under take it; and be qualified with such slender advantages of profit or pleasure, that men shall reap little by the enjoyment. The happy consequence whereof is this, that none but honest, generous, and public spirits, will then desire to be in authority, and that only for the common good. Hence it was, that in the infancy of the Roman liberty, there was no canvassing of voices; but single and plain hearted men were called, intreated, and in a manner forced with importunity to the helm of government, in regard of that great trouble and pains that followed the employment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch'd out of the field from his plow, and placed (much against his will) in the sublime dignity of dictator: so the noble Camillus, and Fabius, and Curius, were, with much ado, drawn from the recreation of gardening, to the trouble of governing: and the consul-year being over, they returned with much gladness again to their private employment.

A third reason^[13] why the people in their supreme assemblies successively chosen, are the best keepers of their liberty, is, because as motion in bodies natural, so succession in civil, is the grand preventive of corruption. The truth of this will appear very clearly, if we weigh the effects of every standing authority from first to last in the Roman state: for whilst they were governed by a continued power in one and the same hands, the people were ever in danger of losing their liberty; sometimes in danger of being swallowed up by kingly aspirers, witness the design of Mælius, Manlius, and others; sometimes in danger of a surprize by a grandee cabinet or junta, who by contracting a particular interest, distinct from that which they had in common with the people, so ordered the matter in time, that partly by their own strength, and partly by advantage of power, to gratify and curb whom they pleased, and to wind in other counsels and parties to their own, they still brought the lesser into such subjection, that in the end they were forced all, either to yield to the pleasure of the grandees, or be broken by them. By these practices, they produced that upstart tyranny of the Decemviri, when ten men made a shift to enslave the senate, as well as the people. Lastly, by continuing power too long in the hands of particular persons, they were swallowed up by two triumvirates of emperors by turns, who never left pecking at one another, till Julius and Augustus, having beaten all competitors out of the field, subjected all to the will of a single emperor. If this were so among the Romans, how happy then is any nation, and how much ought they to joy in the wisdom and justice of their trustees, where certain limits and bounds are fixed to the powers in being, by a declared succession of the supreme authority in the hands of the people?

A fourth reason is,^[14] Because a succession of supreme powers doth not only keep them from corruption, but it kills that grand cankerworm of a Commonwealth, to wit, faction: for, as faction is an adhering to, and a promoting of an interest, that is distinct from the true and declared interest of state; so it is a matter of necessity, that those that drive it on must have time to improve their slights and projects, in disguising their designs, drawing in instruments and parties, and in worming out of their opposites. The effecting of all this, requires some length of time: therefore the only prevention is a due succession and revolution of authority in the hands of the people.

That this is most true, appears not only by reason, but by example: if we observe the several turns of faction in the Roman government. What made their kings so bold, as to incroach and tyrannize over the people, but the very same course that heightened our kings heretofore in England, to wit, a continuation of power in their own persons and families? Then, after the Romans became a Commonwealth, was it not for the same reason, that the senate fell into such heats and fits among themselves? Did not Appius Claudius, and his junta, by the same means, lord it over the senate? Whence was it, that Sylla and Marius caused so many proscriptions, cruelties, and combustions in Rome, but by an extraordinary continuation of power in themselves? How came it to pass likewise, that Julius Cæsar aspired, and in the end attained the empire? and, that the people of Rome quite lost their liberty; was it not by the same means? For, had not the senate and people so long protracted the power of Pompey and Cæsar; had Pompey had less command in Asia, and Cæsar less in Gallia, Rome might have stood much longer in the possession of her liberty.

After the death of Cæsar, it was probable enough, they might then have recovered their liberty, but that they ran again into the same error, as before: for by a continuation of power in the hands of Octavius, Lepidus, and Antony, the Commonwealth came to be rent and divided into three several factions; two of which being worn out by each other, only Octavius remained; who considering, that the title of Perpetual Dictator was the ruin of his father Julius, continued the government only for a set time, and procured it to be settled upon himself but for ten years. But what was the effect of this continuation of power? Even this, that as the former protractings had been the occasions of faction, so this produced a tyranny: for, at the end of every ten years, he wanted no pretence to renew a lease of the government; and by this means so played his cards, that at length he easily and utterly extinguished the small remains of the Roman freedom.

The observation then arising from hence, is this, that the only way for a people to preserve themselves in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to avoid those fatal inconveniences of faction and tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly succession of power and persons. This was, and is, good Commonwealths language; and without this rule, it is impossible any nation should long subsist in a state of freedom. So that the wisdom, the piety, the justice, and the self-denial of those governors in free-states, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or shall at any time as willingly resign their trusts, as ever they took them up; and have so far denied themselves, as to prefix limits and bounds to their own authority. This was it that made Brutus so famous in the beginning of the Roman Commonwealth. For this also it was, that history hath left so reverend a remembrance of Scipio, Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewise of Pompey: whilst the ten grandee usurpers, with Sylla and Cæsar, and the names of others that practised the.contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman record, as the name of Richard the third will be in our modern chronicle, to all posterity.

A fifth reason^[15] to prove the life of liberty lies in succession of powers and persons, is, because it is the only remedy against self-seeking, with all the powerful temptations and charms of self-interest: for the attaining of particular ends requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting of a faction: both these designs must lie long in fermentation, or else they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The truth of this appears likewise in the story of the Roman state: for, as long as all authority was confined within the walls of a standing senate, they being more studious of their own, than the common good, in a short time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; insomuch, that the people became not only incapable of any honour and authority, but well-nigh reduced to flat beggary. Hence it was, that so many quarrels and combustions arose one after another: for, the great ones having made use of their time, in drawing all to themselves, the people were forced to live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general mutiny, and forsook the city: nor could they be pacified till all accounts were quitted; and then, with much ado, they were wrought upon with the eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent fable of a mutiny in a natural body, among the members against the belly.

Thus, as the first insurrection was occasioned by the usury and exactions of the great ones; who by their long continuance in power had drawn all unto themselves: so the second was occasioned by the lordliness of those ten persons, who being elected to do justice, according to the laws, made use of their time, only to confirm their power, and greaten themselves, by replenishing their own coffers, ingrossing of offices, and preferring their own kindred and alliances: and at length, improved self-interest so high, that they domineered, like absolute tyrants, advancing and depressing whom they pleased, without respect of merit or insufficiency, vice or virtue; so that having secured all in their own hands, they over-ruled their fellow-senators at pleasure, as well as the people.

Many more instances of after-times might be given; but these are sufficient whereupon to ground this observation, that as the first founders of the Roman liberty did well in driving out their kings; so on the other side, they did very ill in settling a standing authority within themselves: for, by this means, lying open to the temptations of honour and profit, (which are sails too big for any human bulk) they were immediately swallowed up of self; and taking their rise from the opportunity of a continued power, made use of the public only to advance their private, whereby they put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of discontent and sedition; which might all have been prevented, could they have denied themselves at first, and settled the state free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly succession of supreme authority in the hands of the people.

A sixth reason,^[16] why a free state is much more excellent than a government by grandees or kings; and, that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties, is, because, as the end of all government is (or ought to be) the good and ease of the people, in a secure enjoyment of their rights, without pressure and oppression: so questionless the people, who are most sensible of their own burthens, being once put into a capacity and freedom of acting, are the most likely to provide remedies for their own relief; they only know where the shoe wrings, what grievances are most heavy, and what future fences they stand in need of, to shelter them from the injurious assaults of those powers that are above them: and therefore it is but reason, they should see that none be interested in the supreme authority, but persons of their own election, and such as must in a short time return again into the same condition with themselves, to reap the same benefit or burthen, by the laws enacted, that befals the rest of the people. Then the issue of such a constitution must needs be this, that no load shall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common consent; not to serve the lusts of any, but only to supply the necessities of their country.

But when it happens, that a supreme power long continues in the hands of any person or persons; they, by greatness of place, being seated above the middle region of the people, sit secure from all winds and weathers, and from those storms of violence that nip and terrify the inferior part of the world: whereas, if by a successive revolution of authority, they come to be degraded of their earthly godheads, and return into the same condition with other mortals, they must needs be the more sensible and tender of what shall be laid upon them. The strongest obligation that can be laid upon any man in publick matters, is, to see that he engage in nothing but what must either offensively or beneficially reflect upon himself: for as, if any be never so good a patriot, yet if his, power be prolonged, he will find it hard to keep self from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to some extravagancies for his own private benefit; so, on the other side, if he be shortly to return to a condition common with the rest of his brethren, self-interest binds him to do nothing but what is just and equal; he himself being to reap the good or evil of what is done, as well as the meanest of the people.

This without controversy must needs be the most noble, the most just, and the most excellent way of government in free-states; without which, it is obvious to common sense, no nation can long continue in a state of freedom: as appears likewise by example out of the Roman story. For what more noble patriots were there ever in the world, than the Roman senators were, whilst they were kept under by their kings, and fell the same burthens of their fury, as did the rest of the people? but afterwards being freed from the kingly yoke, and having secured all power within the hands of themselves and, their posterity, they at length fell into the same absurdities that had been before committed by their kings; so that this new yoke became more intolerable than the former. Nor could the people find any remedy, until they procured that necessary office of the tribunes; who being invested with a temporary authority by the people's election, remained the more sensible of their condition, and were as moderators between the power of the great ones, and the rights of the people.

What more excellent patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by time and power? Who more noble, and courteous, and well-affected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at first? but afterwards, having obtained a continuation of the government in his own hands, he soon lost his primitive innocency and integrity, and devoted himself to all the practices of an absolute tyrant. Many others might be reckoned up. And therefore hence it was, that when the senate (for some reasons) thought to continue Lucius Quintius in the consulship longer than the usual time; that gallant man utterly refused it, and chose rather to deny himself, than that a precedent so prejudicial to the Roman freedom should be made for his sake, by a prerogative of authority in his hands, beyond the ordinary custom.

A seventh reason^[17] why a people qualified with a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, are the best keepers of their own liberties, is, because, as in other forms, those persons only have access to government, who are apt to serve the lust and will of the prince, or else are parties or compilers with some powerful faction: so in this form of government by the people, the door of dignity stands open to all (without exception) that ascend thither by the steps of worth and virtue: the consideration whereof hath this noble effect in free states, that it edges mens spirits with an active emulation, and raiseth them to a lofty pitch of design and action.

The truth of this is very observable in the Roman state; for, during the vassalage of that people under kings, we read not of any notable exploits, but find them confined within a narrow compass, oppressed at home, and ever and anon ready to be swallowed up by their enemies. After this government of kings was abolished, you know that of grandees in a standing senate was next erected; under which form they made shift to enlarge their bounds a little: but the most they could then do, was only to secure themselves from the attempts of the banished Tarquins, and those petty neighbours that envied the small increase of their dominion. But at length, when the state was made free indeed, and the people admitted into a share and interest in the government, as well as the great ones; then it was, and never till then, that their thoughts and power began to exceed the bounds of Italy, and aspire towards that prodigious empire. For, while the road of preferment lay plain to every man, no public work was done, nor any conquest made; but every man thought he did and conquered all for himself, as long as he remained valiant and virtuous: it was not alliance, nor friendship, nor faction, nor riches, that could advance men; but knowledge, valour, and virtuous poverty, was preferred above them all.

For the confirmation whereof, we find in the same story, how that many of their brave patriots and conquerors were men of the meanest fortune, and of so rare a temper of spirit, that they little cared to improve them, or enrich themselves by their public employment: so that when they died, they were fain to be buried at the public charge. We find Cincinnatus, a man of mean fortune, fetch'd from the plough, to the dignity of a dictator: for he had no more than four acres of land, which he tilled with his own hands. Yet so it happened, that when the Roman consul with his whole army was in great peril, being circumvented and straitned by the Equuns, and the city of Rome itself in a trembling condition; then, with one consent, they pitch'd upon Cincinatus, as the fittest man for their deliverance: and he behaved himself so well, with so much magnanimity, integrity, and wisdom, that he relieved the consul, routed and utterly subdued the enemy, and gave as it were a new life to his country's liberties: which work being over, he with all willingness quitted his authority, and returned to the condition of a painful private life.

This example might seem strange, but that we know it was ordinary in that state, till it grew corrupt again; for we read also, how Lucius Tarquin, (not of the tyrant's family) a man of mean fortune, yet of great worth, was chosen general of the horse, and drawn to it out of the country, in which place he surpassed all the Roman youth for gallant behaviour. Such another plain country-fellow was Attilius Regulus, the scourge of Carthage in his time; of whom many eminent points of bravery were recorded: as were also most of those heroic spirits that succeeded, down to the times of Lucius Paulus Emilius, by whose conquests, the first charms and inchantments of luxury were brought out of Asia to Rome, and there they soon swallowed up the remainders of primitive integrity and simplicity. And yet it is very observable also, that so much of the ancient severity was remaining still even in the time of this Paulus, the famous general, that a silver dish, that was part of the spoil, being given to a son in law of his, who had fought stoutly in that war, it was thought a great reward; and observed by the historian, to be the first piece of plate that was ever seen in the family.

This observation then arises from this discourse, that as Rome never thrived till it was settled in a freedom of the people; so that freedom was preserved, and that interest best advanced, when all places of honour and trust were exposed to men of merit, without distinction; which happiness could never be obtained, until the people were instated in a capacity of preferring whom they thought worthy, by a freedom of electing men successively into their supreme offices and assemblies. So long as this custom continued, and merit took place, the people made shift to keep and encrease their liberties: but when it lay neglected, and the stream of preferment began to run along with the favour and pleasure of particular powerful men, then vice and compliance making way for advancement, the people could- keep their liberties no longer; but both their liberties and themselves were made the price of every man's ambition and luxury.

The eighth reason,^[18] why the people in their assemblies are the best keepers of their liberty, is, because it is they only that are concerned in the point of liberty: for whereas in other forms the main interest and concernment both of kings and grandees, lies either in keeping the people in utter ignorance what liberty is, or else in allowing and pleasing them only with the name and shadow of liberty instead of the substance: so in free-states the people being sensible of their part condition in former times, under the power of great ones, and comparing it with the possibilities and enjoyments of the present, become immediately instructed, that their main interest and concernment consists in liberty; and are taught by common sense, that the only way to secure it from the reach of great ones, is, to place it in the people's hands, adorned with all the prerogatives and rights of supremacy. The truth of it is, the interest of freedom is a virgin that every one seeks to deflour; and like a virgin, it must be kept, from any other form, or else (so great is the lust of mankind after dominion) there follows a rape upon the first opportunity. This being considered, it will easily be granted, that liberty must needs lie more secure in the people's than in any other's hands, because they are most concerned in it: and the careful eyeing of this concernment, is that which makes them both jealous and zealous; so that nothing will satisfy, but the keeping of a constant guard against the attempts and incroachments of any powerful or crafty underminers.

Hence it is, that the people having once tasted the sweets of freedom, are so extreamly affected with it, that if they discover, or do but suspect the least design to incroach upon it, they count it a crime never to be forgiven for any consideration whatsoever. Thus it was in the Roman state, where one gave up his children, another his brother to death, to revenge an attempt against common liberty: divers also sacrificed their lives, to preserve it; and some their best friends, to vindicate it upon bare suspicion; as in the cases of Maelius, and Manlius, and others, after manifest violation, as in the case of Cæsar.

Nor was it thus only in Rome; but we find also as notable instances of revenge in the free-people of Greece, upon the same occasion. But the most notable of all, is that which happened in the island of Corcyra, during the war of Peloponnesus: where the people having been rook'd of liberty by the slights and power of the grandees, and afterwards by the assistance of the free-states of Athens recovering it again, took occasion thereupon to clap up all the grandees, and chopped off ten of their heads at one time, in part of satisfaction for the injury: but yet this would not serve the turn; for, some delay being made in executing of the rest, the people grew so inraged, that they ran, and pulled down the very walls, and buried them in the ruins and rubbish of the prison.

We see it also in the free state of Florence, where Cosmus the first founder of the Tuscan-tyranny, having made shipwreck of their liberty, and seized all into his own hands; though he enslaved their bodies, yet he could not subdue their hearts, nor wear their past liberty out of memory; for upon the first opportunity, they sought revenge, and a recovery; forcing him to fly for the safety of his life: and though afterwards he made way for his return and re-establishment by treachery, yet now after so long a time, the old freedom is fresh in memory, and would shew itself again upon a favourable occasion.

But of all modern instances, the most strange is that of the land of Holstein; which being deprived of liberty, and about seventy years since made a dutchy, and an appendix to the crown of Denmark; though the inhabitants be but a boorish, poor, silly generation, yet still they retain a sense of indignation at the loss of their liberty; and being given to drink, the usual compliment in the midst of their cups, is this, "Here is a health to the remembrance of our liberty."

Thus you see what an impression the love of freedom makes in the minds of the people: so that it will be easily concluded, they must be the best keepers of their own liberties; being more tender and more concerned in their security, than any powerful pretenders whatsoever.

The ninth reason^[19] to justify a free-state, is, because in free-states the people are less luxurious, than kings or grandees use to be. Now, this is most certain, that where luxury takes place, there is as natural a tendency to tyranny, as there is from the cause to the effect: for, you know the nature of luxury lies altogether in excess. It is a universal depravation of manners, without reason, without moderation; it is the canine appetite of a corrupt will and phantasy, which nothing can satisfy; but in every action, in every imagination, it flies beyond the bounds of honesty, just, and good, into all extremity: so that it will easily be granted, that form of government must needs be the most excellent, and the people's liberty most secured, where governors are least exposed to the baits and snares of luxury.

The evidence of this may be made out, not only by reason, but by examples old and new. And first, by reason, it is evident, that the people must needs be less luxurious than kings or the great ones, because they are bounded within a more lowly pitch of desire and imagination: give them but panem & circenses; bread, sport and ease, and they are abundantly satisfied. Besides, the people have less means and opportunities for luxury, than those pompous standing powers, whether in the hands of one or many: so that were they never so much inclined to vice or vanity, yet they are not able to run on to the same measure of excess and riot. Secondly, as it appears they are less luxurious; so, for this cause also, it is clear, they (that is, their successive representatives) must be the best governors; not only, because the current of succession keeps them the less corrupt and presumptuous; but also, because, being the more free from luxurious courses, they are likewise free from those oppressive and injurious practices, which kings and grandees are most commonly led and forced unto, to hold up the port and splendor of their tyranny, and to satisfy those natural appetites of covetousness, pride, ambition and ostentation, which are the perpetual attendants of great ones, and luxury. Thus much for reason.

Now, for example, we might produce a cloud of instances, to shew, that free-states, or the people duly qualified with the supreme authority, are less devoted to luxury, than the grandee or kingly powers: but we shall give you only a few.

The first that comes in our way is the state of Athens, which, whilst it remained free in the people's hands, was adorned with such governors as gave themselves up to a serious, abstemious, severe course of life; so that whilst Temperance and Liberty walked hand in hand, they improved the points of valour and prudence so high, that in a short time they became the only arbitrators of all affairs in Greece. But being at the height, then (after the common fate of all worldly powers,) they began to decline; for (contrary to the rules of a free-state) permitting some men to greaten themselves, by continuing long in power and authority, they soon lost their pure principles of severity and liberty: for, up started those thirty grandees, (commonly called the tyrants) who having usurped a standing authority unto themselves, presently quitted the old discipline and freedom, gave up themselves first to charms of luxury, and afterwards to all the practices of an absolute tyranny. Such also was the condition of that state, when at another time (as in the days of Pistratus) it was usurp'd in the hands of a single tyrant.

From Athens let us pass to Rome, where we find it in the days of Tarquin, dissolved into debauchery. Upon the change of government, their manners were somewhat mended, as were the governors in the senate: but that being a standing power, soon grew corrupt; and first let in luxury, then tyranny, till the people being interested in the government, established a good discipline and freedom both together; which was upheld with all severity, till the ten grandees came in play; after whose deposition, liberty and sobriety began to breathe again, till the days of Sylla, Marius, and other grandees that followed down to Cæsar, in whose time luxury and tyranny grew to such a height, that unless it were in the life and conversation of Cato, there was not so much as one spark, that could be raked out of the ashes, of the old Roman discipline and freedom; so that of all the world, only Cato remained as a monument of that temperance, virtue and freedom, which flourished under the government of the people.

Omitting many other examples, our conclusion upon these particulars shall be this, That since the grandee or kingly powers are ever more luxurious than the popular are, or can be; and since luxury ever brings on tyranny, as the only bane of liberty; certainly the rights and privileges of the people, placed and provided for, in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, must needs remain more secure in their own hands, than in any others whatsoever.

A tenth reason,^[20] to prove the excellency of a free-state or government by the people, above any other form of government, is, because under this government, the people are ever indued with a more magnanimous, active, and noble temper of spirit, than under the grandeur of any standing power whatsoever. And this arises from that apprehension which every particular man hath of his own immediate share in the public interest, as well as of that security which he possesses in the enjoyment of his private fortune, free from the reach of any arbitrary power, Hence it is, that whensoever any good success or happiness betides the public, everyone counts it his own: if the common wealth conquer, thrive in dominion, wealth or honour, he reckons all done for himself; if he sees distributions of honour, high offices, or great rewards, to valiant, virtuous, or learned persons, he esteems them as his own, as long as he hath a door left open to succeed in the same dignities and enjoyments, if he can attain unto the same measure of desert. This it is which makes men aspire unto great actions, when the reward depends not upon the will and pleasure of particular persons, as it doth under all standing powers; but is conferred upon men (without any consideration of birth or fortune) according to merit, as it ever is, and ought to be in free-states, that are rightly constituted.

The truth of this will appear much more evident, if you list a little to take a view of the condition of people, under various forms of government: for, the Romans of old, while under. kings, (as you heard before) remained a very inconsiderable people, either in dominion or reputation; and could never inlarge their command very far beyond the walls of their city. Afterwards, being reduced unto that standing power of the senate, they began to thrive a little better, and, for a little time: yet all they could do, was only to struggle for a subsistence among bad neighbours. But at length, when the people began to know, claim, and possess their liberties in being governed by a succession of their supreme officers and assemblies; then it was, and never till then, that they laid the foundation, and built the structure of that wondrous empire that over-shadowed the whole world. And truly the founding of it must needs be more wonderful, and a great argument of an extraordinary courage and magnanimity, wherewith the people was indued in recovery of liberty; because their first conquests were laid in the ruin of mighty nations, and such as were every jot as free as themselves: which made the difficulties so much the more, by how much the more free (and consequently, the more courageous) they were, against whom they made opposition: for as in those days the world abounded with free-states, more than any other form, as all over Italy, Gallia, Spain, and Africa, &c. so specially in Italy, where the Tuscans, the Samnites, and other emulators and competitors of the Roman freedom, approved themselves such magnanimous defenders of their liberty against Rome, that they endured wars so many years with utmost extremity, before ever they could be brought to bow under the Roman yoke. This magnanimous state of freedom was the cause also why Carthage was enabled so long, not only to oppose, but often to hazard the Roman fortune, and usurp the laurel. It brought Hannibal within view, and the Gauls within the walls of the city, to a besieging of the Capitol; to shew, that their freedom had given them the courage to rob her of her maiden-head, who afterwards became mistress of the whole world. But what serves all this for, but only to shew, that as nothing but a state of freedom could have enabled those nations with a courage sufficient so long to withstand the Roman power: so Rome herself also was beholden to this state of freedom, for those sons of courage which brought the necks of her sister-states and nations under her girdle? And it is observable also in after times, when tyranny took place against liberty, the Romans soon lost their ancient courage and magnanimity; first under usurping dictators, then under emperors, and in the end the empire itself.

Now, as on the one side, we feel a loss of courage and magnanimity, follow the loss of freedom: so, on the other side, the people ever grow magnanimous and courageous upon a recovery; witness at present, the valiant Swisses, the Hollanders, and not long since, our own nation, when declared a free-state, and a re-establishment of our freedom in the hands of the people procured, (though not secured) what noble designs were undertaken and prosecuted with success? The consideration whereof, must needs make highly for the honour of all governors in free-states, who have been, or shall be instrumental in redeeming and setting any people in a fulness of freedom, that is, in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies.

The eleventh reason is,^[21] because in this form no determinations being carried, but by consent of the people; therefore they must needs remain secure out of the reach of tyranny, and free from the arbitrary disposition of any commanding power. In this case, as the people know what laws they are to obey, and what penalties they are to undergo, in case of transgression; so having their share and interest in he making of laws, with the penalties annexed, they become the more inexcusable if they offend, and the more willingly submit unto punishment when they suffer for any offence. Now the case is usually far otherwise, under all standing powers: for, when government is managed in the hands of a particular person, or continued in the hands of a certain number of great men, the people then have no laws but what kings and great men please to give: nor do they know how to walk by those laws, or how to understand them, because the sense is oftentimes left at uncertainty; and it is reckoned a great mystery of state in those forms of government, that no laws shall be of any sense or force, but as the great ones please to expound them: so as by this means, the people many times are left as it were without law, because they bear no other construction, and meaning, but what suits with particular mens interests and phantasies; not with right reason, or the public liberty.

For the proof of this under kingly government, we might run all the world over; but our own nation affords instances enough in the practices of all our kings: yet this evil never came to such a height, as it did in the reign of Henry the seventh; who by usurping a prerogative of expounding the laws after his own pleasure, made them rather snares, than instruments of relief, (like a grand catch-pole) to pill, poll, and geld the purses of the people; as his son Harry did after him, to deprive many gallant men both of their lives and fortunes. For, the judges being reputed the oracles of the law, and the power of creating judges being usurp'd by kings, they had a care ever to create such, as would make the laws speak in favour of them, upon any occasion. The truth whereof hath abundantly appeared in the days of the late king, and his father James, whose usual language was this: "As long as I have power of making what judges and bishops I please, I am sure to have no law nor gospel but what shall please me."

This very providing for this inconvenience, was the great commendation of Lycurgus his institution in Sparta; who, though he cut out the Lacedemonian Commonwealth after the grandee fashion, confirming the supremacy within the walls of the senate, (for their king was but a cypher) yet he so ordered the matter, that he took away the grandeur; that as their king was of little more value than any one of the senators; so the senate was restrained by laws, walking in the same even pace of subjection with the people; having very few offices of dignity or profit allowed, which might make them swell with state and ambition; but were prescribed also the same rules of frugality, plainness, and moderation, as were the common people: by which means immoderate lusts and desires being prevented in the great ones, they were the less inclined to pride and oppression; and no great profit or pleasure being to be gotten by authority, very lew desired it; and such as were in it, sat free from envy, by which means they avoided that odium and emulation which uses to rage betwixt the great ones and the people in that form of government.

But now the case is far otherwise in the Commonwealth of Venice, where the people being excluded from all interest in government, the power of making and executing of laws, and bearing of offices, with all other immunities, lies only in the hands of a standing senate, and their kindred, which they call the Patrocian, or noble order. Their duke, or prince, is indeed retrained, and made just such another officer as were the Lacedemonian kings; differing from the rest of the senate, only in a corner of his cap, besides a little outward ceremony and splendor: but the senators, themselves have liberty at random, arbitrarily to ramble, and do what they please with the people: who excepting the city itself, are so extreamly oppressed in all their territories, living by no law but the arbitrary dictates of the senate, that it seems rather a junta, than a Commonwealth; and the subjects take so little content in it, that seeing more to be enjoyed under the Turk, they that are his borderers take all opportunities to revolt, and submit rather to the mercy of a pagan-tyranny. Which disposition if you consider, together with the little courage in their subjects, by reason they press them so hard; and how that they are forced, for this cause, to rely upon foreign mercenaries in all warlike expeditions, you might wonder how this state hath held up so long; but that we know the interest of Christendom, being concerned in her security, she hath been chiefly supported by the supplies and arms of others.

Therefore our conclusion shall be this, That since kings, and all standing powers, are so inclinable to act according to their own will and interests, in making, expounding, and executing of laws to the prejudice of the people's liberty and security: and seeing the only way to prevent arbitrariness, is, that no law or dominations whatsoever should be made, but by the people's consent and election: therefore it must of necessity be granted that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties, being settled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies.

A twelfth reason is,^[22] because this form is most suitable to the nature and reason of mankind: for, as Cicero saith, "Man is a noble creature, born with affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in every man a natural appetite or desire of principality." And therefore the reason why one man is content to submit to the government of another, is, not because he conceives himself to have less right than another to govern; but either because he finds himself less able, or else because he judgeth it will be more convenient for himself, and that community whereof he is a member, if he submits unto another's government. Nemini parere vult animus a natura bene informatus, nisi, &c. saith the same Cicero: that is to say, in honest English, "A mind well instructed by the light of nature, will pay obedience unto none but such as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit." From both which passages and expressions of that oracle of human wisdom, these three inferences do naturally arise: first, that by the light of nature people are taught to be their own carvers and contrivers, in the framing of that government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none ate to preside in government, or sit at the helm, but such as shall be judged fit, and chosen by the people. Thirdly, that the people are the only proper judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a government when it is erected, and of the behaviour of governors after they are chosen: which three deductions appear to be no more, but an explanation of this most excellent maxim, That the original and fountain of all just power and government is in the people.

This being so, that a free-state-government by the people, that is, by their successive representatives, or supreme assemblies, duly chosen, is most natural, and only suitable to the reason of mankind; then it follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a standing power in the hands of a particular person, as a king; or of a set number of great ones, as in a senate, are besides the dictates of nature, being meer artificial devices of great men, squared out only to serve the ends and interests of avarice, pride and ambition of a few, to a vassalizing of the community. The truth whereof appears so much the more, if we consider, that a consent and free election of the people, which is the most natural way and form of governing, hath no real effect in the other forms; but is either supplanted by craft and custom, or swallowed up by a pernicious pretence of right (in one or many) to govern, only by virtue of an hereditary succession. Now certainly, were there no other argument to prove the excellency of government by the people, &c. beyond the other forms; yet this one might suffice, that in the people's form, men have liberty to make use of that reason and understanding God hath given them, in chusing of governors, and providing for their own safety in government; but in the other forms of a standing power, all authority being entailed to certain persons and families, in a course of inheritance, men are always deprived of the use of their reason about choice of governors, and forced to receive them blindly, and at all adventure: which course being so destructive to the reason, common interest, and majesty of that noble creature, called man, that he should not in a matter of so high consequence as government, (wherein the good and safety of all is concerned) have a freedom of choice and judgment, must needs be the most irrational and brutish principle in the world, and fit only to be hissed out of the world, together with all forms of standing power (whether in kings, or others) which have served for no other end, but to transform men into beasts, and mortified mankind with misery through all generations.

The truth of this is evident all the world over; first, by sad examples of monarchy: for the kingly form having been retained in a course of inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a governor, whether it be male or female, a wise man or a fool, good or bad; so that the major part of hereditary princes have been tyrannous and wicked by nature, or made so by education and opportunity: the people have been for the most part bandied to and fro, with their lives and fortunes, at the will and pleasure of some one single unworthy fellow, who usually assumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, because he knows the people are tied in that form to him and his, though he practise all the injustice in the world. This was it that brought on tyranny in Rome, first under their kings, afterwards under emperors: for it is to be observed out of the story, that all those emperors which ruled by right of inheritance, proved most of them no better than savage beasts, and all of them wicked, except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, that a nation may have some respite, and recruit now and then, by the virtue and valour of a single prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth happen, it usually lasts no longer than for his life, because his son or successor (for the most part) proves more weak or vicious than himself was virtuous, as you may see in the several lists of kings throughout Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the world. But this is not all the inconvenience, that hereditary princes have been, and are for the most part wicked in their own persons: for, as great inconveniences happen by their being litigious in their titles; witness the bloody disputes between the princes of the blood in France, as also in England, between the two houses of York and Lancaster; to which many more might be reckoned out of all other kingdoms; which miseries the people might have avoided, had they not been tied to one particular line of succession. Therefore, if any kingly form be tolerable, it must be that which is by election, chosen by the people's representatives, and made an officer of trust by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And herein, as kings are only tolerable upon this account, as elective; so these elective kings are as intolerable upon another account, because their present greatness gives them opportunity ever to practise such slights, that in a short time, the government that they received only for their own lives, will become entailed upon their families; whereby the people's election will be made of no effect further, than for fashion, to mock the poor people, and adorn the triumphs of an aspiring tyranny; as it hath been seen in the elective kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Sweden, where the forms of election were, and are still retained; but the power swallowed up, and the kingdoms made hereditary; not only in Sweden, by the artifice of Gustavus Ericus; but also in Poland, and the Empire; where the people's right of election was soon eaten out by the cunning of the two families of Casimir and Austria.

Let this serve to manifest, that a government by a free election and consent of the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, is more consonant to the light of nature and reason; and consequently much more excellent than any hereditary standing power whatsoever. To take off all mis-constructions; when we mention the people, observe all along, that we do not mean the confused promiscuous body of the people, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their rights by delinquency, neutrality, or apostacy, &c. in relation to the divided state of any nation; for they are not to be reckoned within the lists of the people.

The thirteenth reason,^[23] to prove the excellency of a free-state above any other form, is, because in free-states there are fewer opportunities of oppression and tyranny, than in the other forms. And this appears, in that it is ever the care of free-commonwealths, for the most part, to preserve, not an equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an equability of condition among all the members; so that no particular man or men shall be permitted to grow over-great in power; nor any rank of men be allowed above the ordinary standard, to assume unto themselves the state and title of nobility.

The observation of the former secures the people's liberty from the reach of their own officers, such as being entrusted with the affairs of high trust and employment, either in camp and council, might perhaps take occasion thereby to aspire beyond reason, if not restrained and prevented.

The observation of the latter secures the people from the pressures and ambition of such petty tyrants, as would usurp and claim a prerogative, power, and greatness above others, by birth and inheritance. These are a sort of men not to be endured in any well-ordered commonwealth; for they always bear a natural and implacable hate towards the people, making it their interest to deprive them of their liberty; so that if at any time it happen, that any great man or men whatsoever, arrive to so much power and confidence, as to think of usurping, or to be in a condition to be tempted thereunto; these are the first that will set them on, mingle interests with them, and become the prime instruments in heaving them up into the seat of tyranny.

For the clearing of these truths; and first, to manifest the inconvenience of permitting any persons to be over-great in any state; and that free-states that have not avoided it, have soon lost their liberty, we shall produce a file of examples, In Greece we find, that the free-state of Athens lost its liberty upon that account once, when they suffered certain of the senators to overstep the rest in power; which occasioned that multiplied tyranny, made famous by the name of the thirty tyrants: at another time, when by the same error they were contained, through the power of Pistratus, to stoop unto his single tyranny.

Upon this score also, the people of Syracuse had the same misfortune under the tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily, under Dionysius and Agathocles.

In Rome also the case is the same too: for during the time that liberty was included within the senate, they gave both Mælius and Manlius an opportunity to aspire, by permitting them a growth of too much greatness: but by good fortune escaping their clutches, they afterwards fell as foolishly into the hands of ten of their fellow-senators, called the Decemviri, in giving them so much power as tempted them unto tyranny. Afterwards, when the people scuffled, and made a shift to recover their liberty out of the hands of the senate, they committed the same error too, by permitting of their servants to grow over-great; such as Sylla, who by power tyrannized and made himself dictator for five years, as Cæsar afterwards settled the dictatorship upon himself for ever; and after Cæsar's death, they might have recovered their liberty again, if they had taken care (as they might easily have done) to prevent the growing greatness of Augustus, who gaining power first, by the courtesy and good will of the senate and people, made use of it to establish himself in a tyranny, which could never after be extinguished, but in the ruin of the Roman empire, itself.

Thus also the free-state of Florence foolishly ruined itself by the greatning of Cosmus; first, permitting him to ingross the power, which gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; and then as foolishly forcing him to declare himself a tyrant, by an unseasonable demand of the power back out of his hands. Many more instances might be fetched out of Milan, Switzerland, and other places: but we have one nearer home, and of a later date, in Holland; whereby, permitting the family of Orange to greaten a little more than beseemed a member of a free state, they were insensibly reduced to the last cast, to run the hazard of the loss of their liberty.

Therefore one prime principle of state, is, to keep any man, though he have deferved never so well by good success or service, from being too great or popular: it is a notable means (and so esteemed by all free-states) to keep and preserve a commonwealth from the rapes of usurpation.

A fourteenth reason,^[24] (and though the last, yet not the least) to prove a free-state or government by the people, settled in a due and .orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, is much more excellent than any other form, is, because in this form, all powers are accountable for misdemeanors in government, in regard of the nimble returns and periods of the people's election: by which means, he that ere-while was a governor, being reduced to the condition of a subject, lies open to the force of the laws, and may with ease be brought to punishment for his offence; so that, after the observation of such a course, others which suceeed will become the less daring to offend, or to abuse their trust in authority, to an oppression of the people. Such a course as this, cuts the very throat of all tyranny; and doth not only root it up when at full growth, but crusheth the cockatrice in the egg, destroys it in the seed, in the principle, and in the very possibilities of its being for ever after. And as the safety of the people is the sovereign and supreme law; so an establishment of this nature is an impregnable bulwark of the people's safety, because without it, no certain benefit can be obtained by the ordinary laws; which if they should be dispensed by uncontroulable, unaccountable persons in power, shall never be interpreted but in their own sense; nor executed but after their own wills and pleasure.

Now this is most certain, that as in the government of the people, the successive revolution of authority by their consent hath ever been the only bank against inundations of arbitrary power and tyranny; so on the other side, it is as sure, that all standing powers have and ever do assume unto themselves an arbitrary exercise of their own dictates at pleasure, and make it their only interest to settle themselves in an unaccountable state of dominion: so that, though they commit all the injustice in the world, their custom hath been still to persuade men, partly by strong pretence of argument, and partly by force, that they may do what they list; and that they are not bound to give an account of their actions to any but to God himself. This doctrine of tyranny hath taken the deeper root in men's minds, because the greatest part was ever inclined to adore the golden idol of tyranny in every form: by which means the rabble of mankind being prejudicated in this particular, and having placed their corrupt humour or interest in base fawning, and the favour of present great ones, therefore if any resolute spirit happen to broach and maintain true principles of freedom, or do at any time arise to so much courage, as to perform a noble act of justice, in calling tyrants to an account, presently he draws all the enmity and fury of the world about him. But in commonwealth? it is and ought to be otherwise; for, in the monuments of the Grecian and Roman freedom, we find those nations were wont to heap all the honours they could invent, by public rewards, consecration of statues, and crowns of laurel, upon such worthy patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inrolled them in heaven among the deities. And all they they did out of a noble sense of commonweal-interest; knowing that the life of liberty consists in a strict hand, and zeal against tyrants and tyranny, and by keeping persons in power from all the occasions of it: which cannot be better done, than (according to the custom of all states that are really free) by leaving them liable to account: which happiness was never seen yet under the sun, by any law or custom established, save only in those states, where all men are brought to taste of subjection as well as rule, and the government settled by a due succession of authority, by consent of the people.

In Switzerland the people are free indeed, because all officers and governors in the cantons, are questionable by the people in their successive assemblies.

The inference from the foregoing particulars, is easy, That since freedom is to be preserved no other way in a commonwealth, but by keeping officers and governors in an accountable state; and since it appears no standing powers can ever be called to an account without much difficulty, or involving a nation in blood or misery. And since a revolution of government in the people's hands hath ever been the only means to make governors accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of tyranny, distraction, and misery; therefore for this, and those other reasons foregoing, we may conclude, that a free state, or government by the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, is far more excellent every way than any other form whatsoever.

[10 MN] The people the best keepers of their own liberties.

[11 MN] 1st reason. Because the people never think of usurping over other mens rights.

[12 MN] 2d reason. The people's care is, that public authority be constituted for public ends.

[13 MN] 3d reason. Succession in power is the grand preventive of corruption.

[14 MN] 4th reason A succession of supreme power kills that canker-worm of a Commonwealth, to wit, faction.

[15 MN] 5th reason A succession of powers and persons is the only remedy against self-seeking.

[16 MN] 6th reason. The end of all government being the good and ease of the people, they best know where the shoe pinches.

[17 MN] 7th reason. In this government the door of dignity stands open to all that descend thither by the steps of worth and virtue

[18 MN] 8th reason. The people are the best keepers of their liberty, because they only are concerned in the point of liberty.

[19 MN] 9th reason. The government of a free-state is less luxurious, than that of kings or grandees.

[20 MN] 10th reason. In a free-state, the people are evermore magnanimous and valiant.

[21 MN] 11th reason. No determinations are carried but by consent of the people.

[22 MN] 12th reason. A free-state is most suitable to the nature and reason of mankind.

[23 MN] 13th reason. In this government there are fewer opportunities of oppression and tyranny, than under any other form.

[24 MN] 14th reason. In this form all powers are accountable for misdemeanors in government.

ALL
OBJECTIONS
AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT of the PEOPLE
ANSWERED.

Considering, that in times past, the people of this nation were bred up and instructed in the brutish principles of monarchy, by which means they have been the more averse from entertaining notions of a more noble form: and remembring, that not long since we were put into a better course, upon the declared interest of a free-state, or commonwealth; I conceived nothing could more highly tend to the propagation of that good interest, and the honour of its founders, than to manifest the inconveniences and ill consequences of the other forms; and so to root up their principles, that the good people, who but the other day were inverted in the possession of a more excellent way, may (in order to their re-establishment) understand what commonwealth-principles are; and thereby become the more resolute to defend them against the common enemy; learn to be true commonwealth's-men, and zealous against monarchic-interest, in all its appearances and incroachments whatsoever. To this end we have set down our position, that a free-state, or government by the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, is the most excellent form of government; which (I humbly conceive) hath been sufficiently proved, both by reason and example: but because many pretences of objection are in being, and such as by many are taken for granted; therefore it falls in of course, that we may refute them: which being done with the same evidence of reason and example, I doubt not but it will stop all the mouths, not only of ignorance, but even of malice and flattery, which have presumed to prophane that pure way of a free-state, or government by the people.

That objection of royalists, and others, which we shall first^[25] take notice of, is this, that the erecting of such a government would be to set on levelling and confusion. For answer, if we take levelling in the common usage and application of the term in these days, it is of an odious signification, as if it levelled all men in point of estates, made all things common to all, destroyed propriety, introduced a community of enjoyments among men; which is a scandal fastened by the cunning of the common enemy upon this kind of government, which they hate above all others; because, were the people once put in possession of their liberty, and made sensible of the great benefits they may reap by its enjoyment, the hopes of all the royal sticklers would be utterly extinct, in regard it would be the likeliest means to prevent a return of the interest of monarchy; for no person or parties seeking or setting up a private interest of their own, distinct from the public, it will stop the mouths of all gainsayers. But the truth is, this way of free-state, or government by the people in their successive assemblies, is so far from introducing a community, that it is the only preservative of propriety in every particular: the reasons whereof are plain; for, as on the one side, it is not in reason to be imagined, that so choice a body, as the representative of a nation, should agree to destroy one another in their several rights and interests: on the other side, all determinations being carried in this form by common consent, every man's particular interest must needs be fairly provided for, against the arbitrary disposition of others; therefore, whatever is contrary to this, is levelling indeed; because it placeth every man's right under the will of another, and is no less than tyranny; which seating itself in an unlimited uncontroulable prerogative over others without their consent, becomes the very bane of propriety; and however disquieted, or in what form soever it appears, is indeed the very interest of monarchy.

Now that a free-state, or successive government of the people, &c. is the only preservative of propriety, appears by instances all the world over; yet we shall cite but a few.

Under monarchs, we shall find ever, that the subjects had nothing that they could call their own; neither lives, nor fortunes, nor wives, nor any thing else that the monarch pleased to command, because the poor people knew no remedy against the levelling will of an unbounded sovereignty; as may be seen in the records of all nations that have stooped under that wretched form: whereof we have also very sad examples in France, and other kingdoms, at this very day, where the people have nothing of propriety; but all depends upon the royal pleasure, as it did of late here in England. Moreover, it is very observable, that in kingdoms where the people have enjoyed any thing of liberty and propriety, they have been such kingdoms only, where the frame of government hath been so well tempered, as that the best share of it hath been retained in the people's hands; and by how much the greater influence the people have had therein, so much the more sure and certain they have been, in the enjoyment of their propriety.

To pass by many other instances, consider how firm the Arragonians were in their liberties and properties, so long as they held their hold over their kings in their supreme assemblies; and no sooner had Philip the Second deprived them of their share in the government, but themselves and their properties became a prey (and have been ever since) to the will and pleasure of their kings.

The like also may be said of France, where, as long as the people's interest bore sway in their supreme assemblies, they could call their lives and fortunes their own, and no longer: for, all that have succeeded since Lewis the Eleventh, followed his levelling pattern so far, that in short time they destroyed the people's property, and became the greatest levellers in Christendom. We were almost at the same pass here in England: for, as long as the people's interest was preserved by frequent and successive parliaments; so long we were in some measure secure of our properties: but as kings began to worm the people out of their share in government, by discontinuing of parliaments: so they carried on their levelling design, to the destroying of our properties; and had by this means brought it so high, that the oracles of the law and gospel spake it out with a good levelling grace, "That all was the king's, and that we had nothing we might call our own."

Thus you see how much levelling, and little of propriety, the people have had certain under monarchs; and if any at all, by what means, and upon what terms they have had it. Nor hath it been thus only under kings; but we find, the people have ever had as little of property secure, under all other forms of standing powers; which have produced as errant levellers in this particular, as any of the monarchies. In the free-state of Athens, as long as the people kept free indeed, in an enjoyment of their successive assemblies, so long they were secure in their properties, and no longer. For, to say nothing of their kings, whose history is very obscure, we find, after they were laid aside, they erected another form of standing power, in a single person, called a governor, for life; who was also accountable for misdemeanors: but yet a trial being made of nine of them, the people saw so little security by them, that they pitched upon another landing form of decimal government; and being oppressed by them too, they were cashier'd. The like miseries they tailed under the standing power of thirty, which were a sort of levellers more rank than all the rest; who put to death, banished, pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleased, without cause or exception; so that the poor people having been tormented under all the forms of standing power, were in the end forced (as their last remedy) to take sanctuary under the form of a free-state, in their successive assemblies.

And though it may be objected, that afterwards they fell into many divisions and miseries, even in that form: yet whoever observes the story, shall find, it was not the fault of the government, but of themselves, in swerving from the rules of a free-state, by permitting the continuance of power in particular hands; who having an opportunity thereby to create parties of their own among the people, did for their own ends, inveigle, engage, and entangle them in popular tumults and divisions. This was the true reason of their mis-carriages. And if ever any government of the people did miscarry, it was upon that account.

Thus also the Lacedemonians, after they had for some years tried the government of one king, then of two kings at once of two distinct families; afterwards came in the Ephori, as supervisors of their kings; after (I say) they had tried themselves through all the forms of a standing power, and found them all to be levellers of the people's interest and property, then necessity taught them to seek shelter in a free-state, under which they lived happily, till by a forementioned error of the Athenians, they were drawn into parties by powerful persons, and so made the instruments of division among themselves, for the bringing of new levellers into play; such as were Manchanidas and Nabis, who succeeded each other in a tyranny.

In old Rome, after the standing form of kings was extinct, and a new one established, the people found as little of safety and property as ever: for, the standing senate, and the Decemviri, proved as great levellers as kings: so that they were forced to settle the government of the people by a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies. Then they began again to recover their property, in having somewhat they might call their own; and they happily enjoyed it, till, as by the same error of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, swerving from the rules of a free-state, lengthning of power in particular hands, they were drawn and divided into parties, to serve the lusts of such powerful men as by craft became their leaders: so that by this means (through their own default) they were deprived of their liberty long before the days of imperial tyranny. Thus Cinna, Sylla, Marius, and the rest of that succeeding gang, down to Cæsar, used the people's favour, to obtain a continuation of power in their own hands; and then having saddled the people with a new standing form of their own, they immediately rooted up the people's liberty and property, by arbitrary sentences of death, proscriptions, fines, and confiscations: which strain of levelling, (more intolerable than the former) was maintained by the same arts of devilish policy down to Cæsar; who striking in a favourite of the people, and making use of their affections to lengthen power in his own hands; at length, by this error of the people, gained opportunity to introduce a new levelling form of standing power in himself, to an utter and irrecoverable ruin of the Roman liberty and property.

In Florence they have been in the same case there, under every form of standing power. It was so, when the great ones ruled: it was so under Goderino, it was so under Savanarola the monk. When they once began to lengthen power by the people's favour, they presently fell to levelling and domineering, as did Cosmus afterwards, that crafty founder of the present dukedom.

Upon the same terms, the republic of Pisa lost themselves, and became the prey of several usurpations.

Mantua was once a free city of the empire; but neglecting their successive assemblies, and permitting the great ones, and most wealthy, to form a standing power in themselves: the people were so vexed with them, that one Pafferimo getting power in his own hands, and then lengthening it by artifice, turned leveller too, subjecting all to his own will; so that the poor people, to rid their hands of him, were forced to pitch upon another, as bad, and translate their power into a petty dukedom, in the hands of the family of Gonzaga.

We may from hence safely conclude against all objecting monarchs and royalists, of what name and title soever, that a free-state or commonwealth by the people in their successive assemblies is so far from levelling or destroying property, that in all ages it hath been the only preservative of liberty and property, and the only remedy against the levellings and usurpations of standing powers: for, it is clear, that kings and all standing powers are the levellers.

A second objection^[26] in the mouths of many, is this, "that the erecting of such a form in the people's hands, were the ready way to cause confusion in government; when all persons (without distinction) are allowed aright to chuse and be chosen members of the supreme assemblies.

For answer to this, know, we must consider a commonwealth in a twofold condition: either in its settled state, when fully stablished and founded, and when all men were supposed friends to its establishment; or else when it is newly founding or founded, and that in the close of a civil war, upon the ruin of a former government, and those that stood for it; in which case it ever hath a great party within itself, that are enemies to its establishment.

As to the first, to wit, a commonwealth in its settled and composed state, when all men within it are presumed to be its friends, questionless, a right to chuse and to be chosen, is then to be allowed the people, (without distinction) in as great a latitude, as may stand with right reason and convenience, for managing a matter of so high consequence as their supreme assemblies; wherein somewhat must be left to human prudence; and therefore that latitude being to be admitted more or less, according to the nature, circumstances, and necessities of any nation, is not here to be determined.

But as to a commonwealth under the second consideration, when it is founding, or newly founded, in the close of a civil war, upon the ruin of a former government; in this case, (I say) to make no distinction betwixt men; but to allow the conquered part of the people an equal right to chuse and to be chosen, &c. were not only to take away all proportion in policy, but the ready way to destroy the commonwealth, and by a promiscuous mixture of opposite interests, to turn all into confusion.

Now, that the enemies of liberty, being subdued upon the close of a civil war, are not to be allowed sharers in the rights of the people, is evident, for divers reasons; not only because such an allowance would be a means to give them opportunity to sow the seeds of new broils and divisions, and bring a new hazard upon the liberties of the people, (which are reasons derived from convenience:) but there is a more special argument from the equity of the thing, according to the law and custom of nations, that such as have commenced war, to serve the lusts of tyrants against the people's interest, should not be received any longer a part of the people, but may be handled as slaves when subdued, if their subduers please so to use them; because by their treasons against the majesty of the people, (which they ought to have maintained) they have made forfeiture of all their rights and privileges, as members of the people; and therefore if it happens in this case at any time, that any immunities, properties, or enjoyments be indulged unto them, they must not take them as their own by right, but as boons bestowed upon them by the people's courtesy.

The old commonwealth of Greece was very severe in this particular: for, as they were wont to heap up all honours they could vent, upon such as did or suffered any thing for the maintenance of their liberty; so, on the other side they punished the underminers of it, or those that any ways appeared against it, with utmost extremity; persecuting them with forfeitures, both of life and fortune; and if they escaped with life, they usually became slaves; and many times they persecuted them, being dead, branding their memories with an eternal mark of infamy.

In old Rome they dealt more mildly with the greatest part of those that had sided with the Tarquins after their expulsion: but yet they were not restored to all their former privileges. In process of time, as oft as any conspired against the people's interest, in their successive assemblies; after they had once gotten them, themselves were banished, and their estates, confiscated, not excepting many of the senators, as well as others; and made for ever incapable of any trust in the commonwealth.

Afterwards, they took the same course with is many of Catiline's fellow-traitors and conspirators, as were worthy any thing; and had no doubt sufficiently paid Cæsar's abettors in the same coin, but that he wore out all opposites with his prosperous treason. Thus Milan, and the rest of those states, when they were free, as also the Swisses and Hollanders, in the infancy of the Helvetian and Belgic freedoms, who took the same course with all those unnatural parricides and apostates, that offered first to strangle their liberty in the birth, or afterwards in the cradle, by secret conspiracy, or open violence. Nor ought this to seem strange, since if a right of conquest may be used over a foreign, who only is to be accounted a fair, enemy: much more against such as, against the light of nature, shall engage themselves in so foul practices, as tend to ruin the liberty of their native country.

Seeing therefore that the people in their government, upon all occasions of civil war against their liberties, have been most zealous in vindicating those attempts upon the heads of the conspirators: seeing also, that upon the close of a civil war, they have a right; and not only a right, but usually a very great resolution to keep out those enemies of liberty, whom they conquer, from a participation of any right in government: therefore in this case also, as well as the former, we may conclude, that they in their successive assemblies, are so far from levelling the interest of government into all hands, without distinction, that their principal care is ever to preserve it in their own, to prevent the return of new wars, old interests, and confusion.

But there is a third objection^[27] against it, drawn from a pretended inconvenience of such a succession; alledging, "That the management of state-affairs requires judgment and experience; which is not to be expected from new members coming into those assemblies upon every election.

Now, because the very life of liberty lies in a succession of powers and persons; therefore it is meet I should be somewhat precise and punctual by way of answer to this particular, Observe then, that in government two things are to be considered: acta imperii, and arcana imperii: that is, acts of state, and secrets of state. By acts of state, we mean the laws and ordinances of the legislative power: these are the things that have most influence upon a commonwealth, to its ill or well-being; and are the only remedies for such bad customs, inconveniences, and incroachments as afflict and grieve it. Wherefore, matters of grievance being matters of common sense, and such are obvious to the people, who best know where the shoe pinches them; certainly, there is no need of any great skill or judgment in passing or applying a law for remedy, which is the proper work of the people in their supreme assemblies; and such, as every ordinary understanding is instructed in by the light of nature: so that, as to this, there can be no danger by instituting an orderly succession of the people.

But as for those things called arcana imperii, secrets of state, or the executive part of government, during the intervals of their supreme assemblies: these things being of a nature remote from ordinary apprehensions, and such as necessarily require prudence, time, and experience, to fit men for management: much in reason maybe said, and must be granted, for the continuation of such trusts in the same hands, as relate to matter of counsel, or administration of justice, more or less, according to their good or ill-behaviour. A prudential continuation of these, may (without question) and ought to be allowed upon discretion; because, if they do amiss, they are easily accountable to the people's assemblies. But now the case is otherwise, as to these supreme assemblies, where a few easy, necessary things, such as common sense and reason instruct men in, are the fittest things for them to apply themselves unto; and there the people's trustees are to continue, of right, no longer than meer necessity requires, for their own redress and safety; which being provided for, they are to return into a condition of subjection and obedience, with the rest of the people, to such laws and government as themselves have erected: by which means alone, they will be able to know whether they have done well or ill, when they feel the effects of what they have done. Otherwise, if any thing happen to be done amiss, what way can there be for remedy? since no appeal is to be had from the supreme body of the people, except a due course of succession be preserved from hand to hand, by the people's choice; and other persons thereupon admitted (upon the same terms) into the same authority.

This is the truth, as we have made manifest both by reason and example: therefore we shall add a little to our former discourse, by way of illustration. In Athens, when governed by the people, we find, it was their course to uphold constant returns, and periods of succession in their supreme assemblies, for remedy of grievances; and they had a standing council, called the Areopagus, to whom all the secrets of state were committed, together with the administration of government during the intervals of those assemblies, at whose return they were accountable; and warily continued, or excluded, as the people found cause.

In Sparta they had the like; as also in Rome, after the people had once got their successive assemblies, wherein they passed laws for government: and not knowing how to be rid of their hereditary senate, they permitted them and their families to continue a standing council; but yet controulable by, and accountable to their assemblies, who secluded and banished many of them for their misdemeanors: so that by this means the people had an opportunity to make use of their wisdom, and curb their ambition.

In Florence (when free) the government was after the same mode.

In Holland also, and Switzerland, they have their supreme assemblies frequent by election, with exceeding benefit, but no prejudice to affairs: for the frequency of those successive meetings, preserves their liberty, and provides laws; the execution whereof is committed to others, and affairs of state to a council of their own choice, accountable to themselves: where their state-concernments very seldom miscarry, because they place and displace their counsellors with extraordinary care and caution.

By these particulars, you may perceive the vanity of the aforesaid objection, and how slender a pretence it is against that excellent course of successive assemblies; since affairs of state are as well disposed (or rather better) under this form than any other.

A fourth objection^[28] commonly used against the constitution of a free-state, or government by the people in their successive assemblies, is this: "That such a government brings great damage to the public, by their frequent discontents, divisions, and tumults, that arise within it."

For answer to this, it is requisite that we take notice of those occasions which are the common causes of such humours in this form: which being once known, it will easily appear whence those inconveniences do arise, and not from any default in the nature of the government: they are commonly these three, First, when any of their fellow-citizens, or members of the commonweal shall arrogate any thing of power and privilege unto themselves, or their families, whereby to grandize or greaten themselves, beyond the ordinary size and standard of the people. We find this to be most true, by the course of affairs in the Roman state, as they are recorded by Livy; who plainly shews, that upon the expulsion of the Tarquins, though the senate introduced a new government, yet their retaining the power of the old within the hands of themselves and their families, was the occasion of all those after discontents and tumults that arose among the people. For, had Brutus made them free, when he declared them so; or had the senate a little after, followed the advice and example of Publicola, and some others as honest as he; all occasion of discontent had been taken away: but when the people saw the senators seated in a lofty posture over them; when they felt the weight of that state and dignity pressing upon shoulders that were promised to be at ease, and free; when they found themselves exempted from the enjoyment of the same common privileges, excluded from all offices, or alliance with the senators; their purses emptied of money, their bellies of meat, and their hearts of hope: then it was, that they began to grumble and mutiny; and never until they got a power to bridle the great ones, by an happy succession of their supreme assemblies.

A second occasion of the people's being inclined to discontent and tumult, under their free form of government, appears in story to be this: When they felt themselves not fairly dealt withal, by such as became their leader's and generals. Thus in Syracusa, Dionysius cloathing himself with a pretence of the people's liberties, and being by that means made their general, and then making use of that power to other ends than was pretended, became the fire-brand of that state, and put the people all into flames, for the expulsion of him, who had made a forfeiture of all his glorious pretences.

Thus in Sparta; the people were peaceable enough under their own government, till they found themselves over-reached, and their credulity abused by such as they trusted, whose designs were laid in the dark, for the converting of liberty into tyranny, under Manchanidas and Nabis. In old Rome, under the people's government, it is true, it was a sad sight oftentimes to see the people swarming in tumults, their shops shut up, and all trading given over throughout the city, and sometimes the city forsaken and left empty.

But here, as also in Athens, the occasion was the same: for, as the people naturally love peace and ease; so finding themselves often out-witted and abused by the slights and feats of the senate, they presently (as it is their nature upon such occasions) grew out of all patience. The case was the same also when any one of their senators, or of themselves, arrived to any height of power by insinuating into the people's favour, upon specious and popular pretences, and then made a forfeiture of those pretences, by taking a contrary course. Thus Sylla of the senatorian order, and Marius of the plebeian, both got power into their hands, upon pretence of the people's good, (as many others did before and after, not only in Rome, but in other free-states also) but forfeiting their pretences by taking arbitrary courses, they were the sole causes of all those tumults and slaughters among the Romans, the infamy whereof hath most injuriously been cast upon the people's government, by the profane pens of such as have been bold in pension or relation in the courts of princes.

Thus Cæsar also himself, striking as a favourite of the people upon fair pretences, and forfeiting them, when in power, was the only cause of all those succeeding civil broils and tragedies among the people.

A third occasion of the people's being inclined to discontent and tumult in a free-state, is this, when they are sensible of oppression. For, I say again, the people are naturally of a peaceable temper, minding nothing but a free enjoyment: but if once they find themselves circumvented, misled, or squeezed by such as they have intruded, then they swell like the sea, and over-run the bounds of just and honest, ruining all before them.

In a word, there is not one precedent of tumults or sedition can be cited out of all stories, by the enemies of freedom, against the people's government; but it will appear likewise thereby, that the people were not in fault, but either drawn in, or provoked thereto, by the craft or injustice of such fair pretenders as have had by-ends of their own, and by-designs upon the public liberty.

Nevertheless, admit that the people were tumultuous in their own nature; yet those tumults (when they happen) are more easily to be borne, than these inconveniences that arise from the tyranny of monarchs and great ones: for popular tumults have these three qualities.

First, the injury of them never extends further than some few persons; and those (for the most part) guilty enough; as were the thirty grandees in Athens, the ten in Rome, and those other state-mountebanks, that suffered for their practices by the people's fury.

Secondly, those tumults are not lasting, but (like fits) quickly over: for, an eloquent oration, or persuasion, (as we see in the example of Menenius Agrippa) or the reputation of some grave or honest man, (as in the example of Virginius, and afterwards of Cato) doth very easily reduce and pacify them.

Thirdly, the ending of those tumults, tho' they have ruined some particulars, yet it appears they have usually turned to the good of the public: for we see, that both in Athens and Rome, the great ones were by this means kept in awe from injustice; the spirits of the people were kept warm with high thoughts of themselves and their liberty, which turned much to the inlargement of their empire.

And lastly, by this means they came off always with good laws for their profit, (as in the case of the law of twelve tables, brought from Athens to Rome) or else with an augmentation of their immunities, and privileges (as in the case of procuring the tribunes, and their supreme assemblies) and afterwards in the frequent confirmation of them against the incroachments of the nobles.

Now the case is far other wise under the standing power of the great ones; they, in their counsels, projects, and designs, are fast and tenacious; so that the evils under those forms are more remediless. Besides, they reach to the whole body of a commonweal: and so the evils are more universal. And lastly, those tumults, quarrels, and inconveniencies that arise from among them, never tend nor end, but to the farther oppression and suppression of the people in their interest and propriety.

For conclusion then: by these particulars you may plainly see the vanity of this objection about tumults, how far they are from being natural effects of the people's government; insomuch, as by the records of history, it appears rather that they have been the necessary consequences of such tricks and cheats of great men, as in the days of yore have been put upon the people.

A fifth objection^[29] against the form of a free-state, or government by the people in their successive assemblies, and which we find most in the mouths of royalists and parasites, is this, "That little security is to be had therein for the more wealthy and powerful sort of men, in regard of that liberty which the people assume unto themselves, to accuse or calumniate whom they please upon any occasion."

For answer to this, know, that calumniation (which signifies ambitious slandering of men, by whisperings, reports, or false accusations) was never allowed or approved in this form of government. 'Tis true indeed, that such extravagances there have been (more or less) in all forms whatsoever; but in this, less than any: it being most in use under standing powers of great ones, who make it their grand engine to remove or ruin all persons that stand in the way of them and their designs: And for this purpose, it hath ever been their common custom to have instruments ready at hand; as we see in all the stories of kings and grandees from time to time; yea, and by Aristotle himself, together with the whole train of commentators, it is particularly marked out inter flagitia dominationis, to be one of the peculiar enormities that attend the lordly interest of dominion.

The Roman state, after it grew corrupt, is a sufficient instance; where we find, that not only the ten grandees, but all that succeeded them in that domineering humour over the people, ever kept a retinue well stock'd with calumniators and informers, (such as we call "Knights of the post") to snap those that in any wise appeared for the people's liberties. This was their constant trade, as it was afterwards also of their emperors. But all the while that the people kept their power entire in the supreme assemblies, we read not of its being brought into any constant practice. Sometimes indeed, those great commanders that had done them many eminent services, were, by reason of some after-actions, called to an account; and having, by an ingrossment of power, rendered themselves suspected, and burthensome to the commonwealth, were commanded to retire, as were both the Scipio's.

And in the stories of the Athenian commonwealth, we find that by their lofty and unwary carriage, they stirred up the people's fear and jealousy so far, as to question and send divers of them into banishment, notwithstanding all their former merits; as we read of Alcibiades, Themistocles, and others: whereas, if the rules of a free-state had been punctually observed, by preserving a discreet revolution of powers, and an equability, or moderate state of particular persons, there had been no occasion of incroachment on the one part, or of fear on the other; nor could the prying royalist have had the least pretence or shadow of invective against the people's government in this particular.

Thus much of calumniation, which is less frequent under the people's form, than any other.

Now as to the point of accusing, or liberty of accusation by the people, before their supreme assemblies; it is a thing so essentially necessary for the preservation of a commonwealth, that there is no possibility of having persons kept accountable without it; and, by con