ÿWPCÍ  ;æÀ1‡¹W'æ¥5×=4Ö 6ßÏÞs§¹Èù˜oÛ}«&û}¸·¿ðgôTàì,¹N~zÙ“Ï*»ëððrˆ¿Ù¼å1Jåľâȃ8Gòl<‰9¦Y°¤®)­Y“»¯²Áùm¶ü¶ívIx!íèYª¸8éÈÛ|çcIxØÄ)Gíiµß.ÑïW\Ϭ”qËvà@«O¶²@º¼ÿ9PN¦E6r¡+18¡±šŸ/4™AéuáDç€Úo ²è”Éœ÷¶±¬(8ãâì@ Ö”1Éï"]„yÝîœ\‹5‘ cEÍø­xÓy”í…f@8”Í„–&"yýÈÿ”fÅj½_Dè/Ì©Ô* a ª§ž9êÓÒM…œë6‘³k‘Ë)ÆÎ£t”±ÿãic¨êWÍ]Înóv&mûùm÷‡²†?œžÌÉôÊ î¶áå'   È–x®R!õ~Q¦ž “ jì‡=äÐK.SÞÅÿacÈ»6œ[A¯’ÈdIL•C5›2êxÖ>çê÷&ò¡ƒÖÕ„ %D>%þîd^nÆiÓ¼àhÔVy곡[“D€'w;ä¥B3¤þôðÈÜ©+=vÜ„ÂÃié¡òêà †7UIpa†D1}н³†¤é#ÁlU N- %{ 0:^ »wÇ4Ëßî mðN’ › 0N£XñXI T¡ Zõ NO Z J÷ \A z p F‡ ˜HP LaserJet 4P/4MP PostScriptÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,Ô6·0 § /Ü 3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ó ' Jon Roland0Jon Roland .    (ÍO$——ÔÿÔòòóóÔÿÔhttp://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/dh/origcont.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc_0000.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/elliot.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/fed/federa00.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/dhbr.htmhttp://www.constitution.org/cmt/belz/lcfl.htmhttp://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3Contents.htmlhttp://www.constitution.org/pd/gunning/votehtm/cont.htmhttp://www.candidateshandbook.com/Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ MXXÔUnited€Ô_ÔStatesÔ_Ô€ConstitutionÔ#†XïX M=#ÔÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓÌA€òòwritten€constitutionóó€of€government€such€as€the€U.S.€Constitution€presents€a€characteristic€set€ofÐ Ö& Ðproblems€for€leadership:€meeting€the€demands€of€the€people€for€the€functions€government€canÐ Â Ðprovide,€while€protecting€the€rights€of€every€person,€not€only€from€private,€natural€or€external€threats,Ð ®þ Ðbut€from€government€itself€and€from€tyrannical€majorities.Ð š ê ÐÌA€written€constitution,€unlike€an€unwritten€òòparliamentaryóó€system€of€government,€is€a€supreme€lawÐ r  Ðthat€supersedes€later€laws€that€conflict€with€it,€unless€they€are€adopted€as€amendments€according€toÐ ^ ® Ðthe€procedures€prescribed€in€the€original€constitution.€It€derives€its€primary€òòlegitimacyóó€not€fromÐ J š  Ðcurrent€assent€but€from€an€original€historical€òòconstituent€actóó€of€ratification,€and€no€official€act,€noÐ 6†  Ðmatter€how€popular,€can€be€considered€legitimate€unless€it€is€logically€derived€from€an€authorizationÐ "r  Ðcontained€in€the€written€constitution€as€amended,€and€as€originally€understood.Ð ^  ÐÌThe€political€theory€on€which€the€U.S.€Constitution€is€based€is€that€a€society€is€created€by€aòò€socialÐ æ6  Ðcontractóó,€or€òòcompactóó.€The€main€proponent€of€this€theory€was€John€Locke,€who€developed€it€in€hisÐ Ò" ÐòòSecond€Treatise€on€Government,óó€published€in€1690.€Although€it€is€possible€for€a€new€society€to€beÐ ¾ Ðcreated€by€adults€coming€together€and€explicitly€agreeing€to€form€a€new€society,€people€are€initiallyÐ ªú Ðinducted€into€an€existing€society€by€their€parents€or€guardians,€beginning€with€a€òòfilial€óócontractÐ –æ Ðbetween€parent€and€child,€which€is€gradually€transformed€into€a€òòsocialóó€contract€between€the€childÐ ‚Ò Ðand€the€other€members€of€the€society,€through€a€process€of€òòsocializationóó,€through€which€the€childÐ n¾ Ðmakes€the€transition€from€being€a€good€child€to€being€a€good€citizen.€The€essential€terms€of€theÐ Zª Ðsocial€contract€are€that€its€members€will€mutually€defend€the€exercise€of€one€anotherððs€rights,€fromÐ F– Ðwhatever€might€impair€such€exercise.Ð 2‚ ÐÌEvery€òòconstitutional€rightóó€is€a€claim€against€an€affirmative€action€of€government,€and€òòcomplementaryóóÐ  Z Ðto€the€exercise€of€a€òòdelegation€of€poweróó€to€that€government.€A€constitutional€provision€that€protectsÐ öF Ða€right€restricts€€powers,€and€a€delegation€of€a€power€restricts€rights.€A€challenge€for€leadership€isÐ â2 Ðto€define€the€line€separating€the€two€spheres€of€action,€and€to€separate€and€confine€the€actions€ofÐ Î Ðcivilians€and€officials€within€their€proper€spheres.Ð º  ÐÌThe€written€constitution€ratified€in€1789,€and€the€subsequent€Bill€of€Rights,€the€first€ten€amendments,Ð ’!â Ðdeclared€various€rights,€with€the€Ninth€Amendment€providing€for€unenumerated€rights€thatÐ ~"Î  Ðcomplement€delegated€powers,€but€the€Founders€did€not€have€confidence€in€the€effectiveness€of€suchÐ j#º! Ðòòdeclaratoryóó€provisions,€which€might€be€easily€subverted€by€interpretation.€They€rather€relied€onÐ V$¦" Ðòòstructuralóó€and€òòproceduralóó€provisions,€which€divided€the€powers€of€government,€allowed€theÐ B%’ # Ðdivisions€to€check€the€actions€of€one€another,€and€defined€procedures€by€which€departures€fromÐ .&~!$ Ðconstitutional€compliance€might€be€corrected.€Some€procedures€were€permissive,€allowing€for€theÐ 'j"% Ðexercise€of€discretion,€and€others€were€mandatory,€constrained€by€defined€duties.Ð (V#& ÐÌIn€the€U.S.€model,€there€are€actually€two€separate€constitutions:€an€unwritten€constitution€of€theÐ Þ).%( Ðòòsocietyóó,€and€a€written€constitution€of€the€òògovernmentóó.€The€terms€of€the€social€constitution€are€thatÐ Ê*&) Ðdecisions€be€made€by€òòconventionsóó,€or€deliberative€assemblies,€called€by€proper€òònoticeóó,€and€conductedÐ ¶+'* Ðby€established€rules€of€procedure€that€comprise€òòdue€processóó.€A€convention€may€consist€of€suchÐ ¢,ò'+ Ðthings€as€a€general€election€or€referendum,€in€which€the€voting€members€of€the€society€function€asÐ Ž-Þ(, Ða€convention€of€the€whole,€a€constitutional€convention€which€may€draft€or€ratify€a€writtenÐ ° Ðconstitution€of€government,€a€legislature€called€under€the€terms€of€a€written€constitution,€a€town€hallÐ œì Ðmeeting,€a€judicial€court,€a€grand€jury€to€conduct€an€investigation€and€make€a€report€of€its€findings,Ð ˆØ Ða€trial€jury€to€render€a€verdict,€or€a€militia€called€to€conduct€defensive€operations.Ð tÄ ÐÌThe€U.S.€model€was€a€reaction€to€the€British€parliamentary€model,€which€had€no€written€constitutionÐ L œ Ðof€government€except€statutes€adopted€by€majority€vote€of€the€House€of€Commons,€royal€decrees,Ð 8 ˆ Ðor€key€court€decisions€ð"ð€precedents€that€might€be€sustained€by€tradition,€but€which€can€beÐ $ t Ðoverturned€at€any€time€by€the€House€of€Commons,€sitting€as€a€kind€of€ongoing€constitutionalÐ  ` Ðconvention€ð"ð€one€that€can€make€its€own€rules€for€who€may€be€elected€to€it€and€how.€The€result€isÐ ü L  Ðthe€consolidation€of€power€within€a€single€legislative€body€and€a€bureaucratic€civil€service€that€canÐ è 8  Ðeasily€impair€public€rights€and€leave€abused€persons€without€the€means€to€seek€adequate€redress.Ð Ô$  ÐÌÔ‡ MXXïÔDistributed€PowersÔ#†XïX MT#ÔÐ ¬ü  ÐÌThe€problem€for€leadership€is€further€complicated€by€the€fact€that€the€powers€of€government€are€notÐ Ò" Ðdelegated€to€a€single€unitary€hierarchy,€but€are€òòdistributedóó,€or€separated.€A€key€design€objective€ofÐ ¾ Ðconstitutional€government€is€toòò€avoid€excessive€or€unbalanced€concentrations€of€poweróó,€mainly€byÐ ªú Ðdividing€it€among€many€branches€and€individuals,€so€that€abuses€by€any€can€be€blocked€or€correctedÐ –æ Ðby€the€combined€action€of€others.€The€main€separation€of€powers€was€between€the€centralÐ ‚Ò Ðgovernment€and€the€several€states,€a€system€called€òòfederalismóó.€Within€the€central€government,Ð n¾ Ðpowers€were€divided€between€the€òòexecutiveóó,€òòjudicialóó,€and€òòlegislativeóó€branches,€and€the€Congress€ð"ðÐ Zª Ðthe€legislative€branch€ð"ð€was€divided€into€two€houses,€the€Senate€and€House€of€Representatives.€ByÐ F– Ðlegislation,€the€executive€branch€was€further€divided€and€subdivided€into€departments,€the€judicialÐ 2‚ Ðbranch€into€a€system€of€general€and€specialized€trial€and€appellate€courts€with€various€geographicÐ n Ðand€subject€jurisdictions,€and€the€houses€of€Congress€into€committees€and€subcommittees,€each€withÐ  Z Ðtheir€own€staff€agencies.€The€constitutions€of€each€of€the€states€followed€a€similar€design,€with€theÐ öF Ðexception€of€Nebraska,€which€has€a€unicameral,€or€one„house,€legislature.€Similar€separations€ofÐ â2 Ðpowers€were€done€in€the€territorial€governments€set€up€for€incorporated€territories€destined€toÐ Î Ðbecome€states.Ð º  ÐÌIn€a€constitutional€republic€such€as€the€United€States,€the€òòpeopleóó,€acting€collectively€through€election,Ð ’!â Ðreferendum€or€convention,€rather€than€a€monarch€or€dictator,€is€the€òòsovereignóó,€or€supreme€authority,Ð ~"Î  Ðand€as€such€all€officials€must€be€òòaccountableóó€to€the€people€by€a€chain€of€command€that€leads€backÐ j#º! Ðeither€to€officials€elected€by€the€people€or€to€bodies,€like€juries,€selected€by€lot,€a€process€calledÐ V$¦" Ðòòsortitionóó,€from€among€the€people.€The€appointment,€supervision,€promotion,€discipline,€and€removalÐ B%’ # Ðof€every€official€is€supposed€to€be€based€on€how€well€he€or€she€performs€his€or€her€duties€under€theÐ .&~!$ Ðauthority€of€the€Constitution,€more€than€on€how€well€such€performance€might€please€the€policyÐ 'j"% Ðpreferences€of€transient€majorities.Ð (V#& ÐÌAlthough€a€constitutional€republic€is€democratic€in€being€accountable€to€the€people,€it€is€not€usuallyÐ Þ).%( Ða€òòmajoritarian€democracyóó,€in€that€decisionmaking€is€moderated€by€procedures€and€structuresÐ Ê*&) Ðdesigned€to€require€òòdeliberationóó,€and€sometimes€by€rules€requiring€approval€not€just€by€simpleÐ ¶+'* Ðmajorities,€but€by€supermajorities,€or€by€majorities€in€a€majority€or€supermajority€of€levels€orÐ ¢,ò'+ Ðbranches€to€which€power€is€distributed.€Thus,€amendments€to€the€Constitution€require€either€proposalÐ Ž-Þ(, Ðby€a€two„thirds€vote€in€each€house€of€Congress,€or€application€by€majorities€of€two„thirds€of€the€stateÐ ° Ðlegislatures€for€a€convention€to€draft€amendments,€followed€by€ratification€by€the€majorities€of€theÐ œì Ðlegislatures€of,€or€of€conventions€in,€three„fourths€of€the€states.Ð ˆØ ÐÌSuch€procedures€and€structures€confer€on€certain€officials€or€groups€the€power€to€òòvetoóó,€or€block,Ð `° Ðaction€of€various€kinds,€so€that€to€get€action,€it€is€necessary€to€convince€all€of€the€elements€whoseÐ L œ Ðapproval€is€required.€Thus,€the€President€can€veto€any€act€of€Congress,€although€that€veto€can€beÐ 8 ˆ Ðoverridden€by€a€two„thirds€vote€of€both€houses.€However,€he€can€also€refuse€to€enforce€an€act€ofÐ $ t ÐCongress,€or€sequester€the€funds€for€its€implementation,€a€controversial€move€that€can€be€overcomeÐ  ` Ðonly€by€impeachment€and€removal€of€the€President€from€office,€or€by€withholding€other€legislationÐ ü L  Ðhe€might€want€passed,€or€appointments€he€might€want€approved.Ð è 8  ÐÌAny€federal€court€can€declare€or€find€a€statute€or€other€official€act€òòunconstitutionalóó,€and€refuse€toÐ À  Ðgive€it€effect€by€not€sustaining€it.€If€the€decision€is€made€by€an€appellate€court,€the€practice€is€to€treatÐ ¬ü  Ðthat€decision€as€a€precedent€which€effectively€òònullifiesóó€that€act€not€only€in€that€particular€case€but€forÐ ˜è  Ðsimilar€cases€in€that€courtððs€jurisdiction.€If€the€declaration€or€finding€is€sustained€on€appeal€to€theÐ „Ô  Ðhighest€court,€the€Supreme€Court,€the€act€is€effectively€nullified€for€similar€cases€nationwide.Ð pÀ ÐAlthough€such€a€decision€does€not€remove€a€statute€from€the€records,€by€the€doctrine€of€òòstare€decisisóóÐ \¬ Ðjudges€feel€bound€to€follow€the€precedent,€making€further€enforcement€of€that€act€infeasible.Ð H˜ ÐÌVeto€groups€can€also€operate€in€the€Legislative€branch.€The€Senate€can€block€appointments€by€theÐ  p ÐPresident€by€such€procedures€as€refusing€to€hold€committee€hearings€on€nominations.€CommitteesÐ  \ Ðcan€refuse€to€pass€nominees€to€the€full€Senate,€and€in€the€full€Senate,€members€may€block€action€byÐ øH Ðuse€of€a€òòfilibusteróó,€or€extended€debate€intended€to€prevent€business€from€proceeding,€which€requiresÐ ä4 Ða€60€percent€supermajority€to€terminate.Ð Ð  ÐÌA€winner„take„all€system€of€electing€legislators€by€majority€votes€from€states€or€single„memberÐ ¨ø Ðdistricts,€together€with€a€nationwide€presidential€election€in€which€each€presidential€candidates€seeksÐ ”ä Ðto€also€win€the€election€of€members€of€his€party€to€Congress,€tends€to€result€in€a€two„party€system,Ð €Ð Ðas€each€main€party€adjusts€its€messages€to€win€enough€swing€voters€to€exceed€50€percent.€One€effectÐ l¼ Ðof€this,€however,€is€that€dedicated€single„issue€constituency€groups€can€become€ð ðveto€blocksðð€thatÐ X ¨ Ðmay€not€be€able€to€gather€enough€support€to€get€their€legislation€passed,€but€can€block€legislationÐ D!” Ðthey€donððt€like€and€defeat€candidates€who€donððt€at€least€keep€their€causes€alive.€They€can€also€oftenÐ 0"€  Ðnegotiate€the€appointment€of€their€partisans€to€key€positions.Ð #l! ÐÌThe€proliferation€of€single„issue€groups€means€that€assembling€governing€coalitions€and€placingÐ ô$D # Ðpeople€in€key€positions€to€achieve€needed€action€can€be€difficult,€but€this€was€intended€by€theÐ à%0!$ ÐFramers€of€the€Constitution.€It€was€expected€that€most€of€the€situations€requiring€rapid€responseÐ Ì&"% Ðcould€be€handled€through€general€legislation€and€appointees€with€a€certain€amount€of€legislatedÐ ¸'#& Ðdiscretion,€and€that€most€new€situations€that€such€general€legislation€did€not€anticipate€would€allowÐ ¤(ô#' Ðenough€time€to€build€the€kind€of€consensus€needed€to€adopt€new€legislation.€This€has€led€to€someÐ )à$( Ðtension€between€advocates€of€immediate€response€to€ð ðemergenciesðð€and€advocates€of€deliberationÐ |*Ì%) Ðwithin€constitutional€structures€and€procedures,€and€some€of€that€tension€has€resulted€in€departuresÐ h+¸&* Ðfrom€constitutional€compliance.Ð T,¤'+ ÐÐ @-(, ÐSome€of€those€departures€have€become€entrenched,€and€supported€by€politically€powerfulÐ ° Ðconstituencies,€who€often€attempt€to€conceal€the€noncompliance€with€assertions€that€the€establishedÐ œì Ðpractices€amount€to€ð ðinformal€amendmentsðð€to€the€ð ðlivingðð€Constitution,€even€though€they€are€notÐ ˆØ Ðformal€amendments€to€the€text.€The€problem€with€this€elevation€of€practices€to€constitutional€status,Ð tÄ Ðof€course,€is€that€once€begun€there€is€no€end€to€it,€and€if€allowed€to€continue€would€render€the€writtenÐ `° ÐConstitution€a€dead€letter€and€reduce€all€law€to€politics€or€force.Ð L œ ÐÌThis€displacement€of€the€written€Constitution€with€practice€is€sometimes€discussed€as€the€doctrineÐ $ t Ðof€ð ðlegal€realismðð,€which€defines€ð ðlawðð€as€ð ðwhat€judges€doðð€or€can€be€expected€to€do,€even€if€whatÐ  ` Ðthey€do€is€inconsistent€with€the€written€Constitution€as€originally€understood.€Although€it€is€acceptedÐ ü L  Ðthat€everyone€has€the€duty€to€resolve€conflicts€of€law,€including€conflicts€with€the€Constitution,€inÐ è 8  Ðany€enforcement€of€law,€and€that€everyone€has€the€duty€to€help€enforce€the€law€and€not€just€to€obeyÐ Ô$  Ðit,€the€fact€that€judges€get€cases€last€puts€them€in€a€position€that€is€sometimes€attacked€as€judicialÐ À  Ðsupremacy€by€those€who€think€that€judicial€practice€is€inconsistent€with€or€unauthorized€by€theÐ ¬ü  Ðwritten€Constitution.€This€has€been€an€ongoing€tension€since€the€country€was€founded.Ð ˜è  ÐÌÔ‡ MXXïÔPersuasionÔ#†XïX M‹<#ÔÐ pÀ ÐÌIn€any€political€or€legal€system,€leadership€ultimately€comes€to€either€educating€and€persuadingÐ –æ Ðdecisionmakers€to€adopt€oneððs€proposals,€or€replacing€them€with€other€decisionmakers€who€will.€InÐ ‚Ò Ða€constitutional€system€like€the€United€States,€with€powers€and€duties€distributed€among€multipleÐ n¾ Ðofficials,€that€means€persuading€or€replacing€multiple€officials,€which€may€require€persuading€orÐ Zª Ðreplacing€the€constituencies€of€those€decisionmakers,€the€networks€of€lower„level€decisionmakersÐ F– Ðwhose€own€decisions€persuade€or€replace€higher„level€decisionmakers.€Ultimately,€that€may€comeÐ 2‚ Ðdown€to€the€level€of€the€individual€voter.Ð n ÐÌAlthough€persuading€a€few€higher„level€decisionmakers€may€be€done€through€personalÐ öF Ðcommunications,€one€may€not€have€access€except€through€chains€of€lower„level€decisionmakers,Ð â2 Ðmany€of€whom€may€have€agendas€of€their€own€that€conflict€with€the€program€of€the€reformer.Ð Î ÐPersuading€many€individual€voters,€however,€may€not€be€feasible€through€direct€communications,Ð º  Ðand€may€require€marketing€methods€with€high€costs€and€limited€effectiveness,€competing€as€theyÐ ¦ ö Ðmust€with€demands€from€work€and€family,€and€tastes€for€entertainment.Ð ’!â ÐÌWhen€the€country€was€founded,€a€person€could€get€elected€to€office€without€having€to€raise€or€spendÐ j#º! Ðmuch€money€to€market€his€candidacy.€There€was€sufficient€demand€for€political€information€that€itÐ V$¦" Ðwas€profitable€for€newspapers€to€publish€entire€speeches€of€candidates,€with€the€expectation€thisÐ B%’ # Ðwould€sell€more€copies.€However,€the€political€culture€has€changed€so€that€too€many€people€nowÐ .&~!$ Ðresist€political€information,€compelling€candidates€to€resort€to€expensive€marketing€campaigns€thatÐ 'j"% Ðcan€break€through€the€barriers€and€at€least€achieve€name€recognition€and€a€positive€image.Ð (V#& ÐÌThe€Framers€designed€the€Constitution€with€the€expectation€that€officials€would€be€essentiallyÐ Þ).%( Ðindependent€of€one€another,€unduly€influenced,€if€at€all,€mainly€by€things€like€salaries€and€prospectsÐ Ê*&) Ðfor€reappointment€or€re„election.€They€perhaps€failed€to€fully€anticipate€that,€to€achieve€any€resultÐ ¶+'* Ðin€a€divided€governmental€system,€people€had€to€put€together€prevailing€coalitions€which€would€tendÐ ¢,ò'+ Ðto€persist€from€one€issue€to€another€and€emerge€into€parties€or,€as€the€Founders€feared,€òòfactionsóó,€thatÐ Ž-Þ(, Ðwould€come€to€exert€continuing€control€over€offices€and€officials€in€ways€that€would€defeat€theÐ ° Ðseparation€of€powers.€The€Founders€feared€too€much€power€being€gathered€into€the€same€hands,€butÐ œì Ðthe€same€hands€can€be€a€faction€as€well€as€an€individual,€and€a€single€faction€can€dominate€all€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðlevels€and€branches€of€government€to€the€exclusion€of€the€others.Ð tÄ ÐÌThe€problem€the€Framers€confronted,€and€perhaps€inadequately€solved,€was€what€came€to€be€studiedÐ L œ Ðby€the€20òòthóó€century€as€the€òòpublic€choiceóó€problem,€beginning€with€the€work€of€James€M.€BuchananÐ 8 ˆ Ðand€Gordon€Tullock,€set€out€in€òòThe€Calculus€of€Consent:€Logical€Foundations€of€ConstitutionalÐ $ t ÐDemocracyóó.€They€approached€politics€through€game€theory,€and€showed€how€people€in€a€societyÐ  ` Ðwould€tend,€over€time,€to€involve€themselves€in€the€public€decisionmaking€process€in€such€ways,€andÐ ü L  Ðto€such€degrees,€as€seemed€likely€to€them€to€pay€off,€less€in€the€satisfaction€that€comes€fromÐ è 8  Ðexercising€civic€duty,€than€in€the€material€benefits€of€the€public€decisions€that€they€could€expect€toÐ Ô$  Ðgain€for€themselves€or€their€friends.€Persons€would€tend€not€to€invest€their€time€and€money€in€theÐ À  Ðpolitical€process€unless€they€expected€to€profit€from€that€investment.€Decisions€that€had€largeÐ ¬ü  Ðbenefits€or€costs€for€some€persons€would€cause€those€persons€to€become€involved€in€influencingÐ ˜è  Ðthose€decisions,€while€those€for€whom€the€benefits€or€costs€were€small€would€not€have€a€sufficientÐ „Ô  Ðincentive€to€invest€their€influence€in€ways€that€would€affect€such€decisions.€Therefore,€a€smallÐ pÀ Ðfaction€could€gain€a€large€benefit€by€contriving€decisions€that€did€so€by€imposing€only€small€costsÐ \¬ Ðon€the€general€population,€at€a€level€below€the€threshold€that€would€trigger€their€involvement.€ThisÐ H˜ Ðmade€the€political€process€as€a€channel€for€what€is€called€òòrent„seekingóó€behavior,€which€is€theÐ 4„ Ðdiversion€of€wealth€from€producers€to€persons€who€invest€not€in€production€but€in€the€processes€ofÐ  p Ðpolitics€and€government.Ð  \ ÐÌIn€seeking€to€avoid€excessive€or€unbalanced€concentrations€of€power€in€the€public€sector,€theÐ ä4 ÐFounders€neglected€to€provide€for€€the€emergence€in€the€private€sector€of€giant€corporate€entities€thatÐ Ð  Ðcould€accrue€power€that€could€challenge€that€of€governments,€and€come€to€exercise€undue€influenceÐ ¼  Ðover€government.€This€has€emerged€to€take€many€forms:€Banks€and€financial€institutions,€especiallyÐ ¨ø Ðthose€that€loan€money€to€government€to€support€its€operations.€Contractors,€especially€in€the€defenseÐ ”ä Ðindustry.€Labor€unions.€Trade€associations.€Eleemosynary€institutions.€Political€party€organizations.Ð €Ð ÐLobbying€groups.€Large€media€organizations.€These€tend€to€seek€to€exercise€control€by€either€gettingÐ l¼ Ðtheir€people€appointed€or€elected€to€key€positions€at€all€levels€of€key€departments,€or€having€handlersÐ X ¨ Ðfor€every€key€position€who€may€assume€a€position€of€influence€in€which€their€official€canððt€or€wonððtÐ D!” Ðmake€a€decision€contrary€to€the€handlerððs€wishes,€so€that€the€handler€comes€to€function€as€the€realÐ 0"€  Ðdecisionmaker,€in€a€kind€of€shadow€government€that€is€parallel€to€the€legal€government.Ð #l! ÐÌThis€pattern€can€be€more€clearly€seen€in€a€parliamentary€system€like€that€of€Britain,€where€theÐ ô$D # Ðmajority€party€appoints€the€official€ministers€of€government,€but€where€the€party€out€of€powerÐ à%0!$ Ðdesignates€shadow€ministers€for€every€department,€who€may€exercise€more€real€influence€than€theÐ Ì&"% Ðofficial€minister€over€the€lower€level€civil€servants€of€the€ministry,€who€may€have€been€appointedÐ ¸'#& Ðby€that€party€out€of€power,€and€might€expect€to€be€promoted€if€it€regains€power.€Thus€a€party€thatÐ ¤(ô#' Ðhas€appointed€most€of€the€bureaucrats€might€expect€to€continue€in€real€power€even€if€it€loses€anÐ )à$( Ðelection.€The€same€applies€to€special€interests€that€function€as€parties€unto€themselves.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÌSince€the€adoption€of€a€civil€service€system,€the€United€States€has€had€a€similar€problem€withÐ T,¤'+ Ðshadow€governance,€for€while€the€reform€was€intended€to€replace€political€appointees€lacking€meritÐ @-(, Ðwith€nonpartisan€professionals,€what€has€actually€happened€is€only€to€make€it€more€difficult€for€aÐ ° Ðparty€that€wins€elections€after€a€period€of€dominance€by€another€party€to€actually€govern€andÐ œì Ðimplement€its€policies.€The€civil€service€protections€have€also€allowed€bureaucracies€to€becomeÐ ˆØ Ðpower€centers€themselves,€a€constituency€often€uniquely€situated€to€protect€its€own€interests.€TheÐ tÄ Ðinternal€politics€of€organizations€is€just€as€contentious€as€the€external€politics€we€see€in€elections€andÐ `° Ðreferenda,€and€much€more€difficult€to€expose€and€hold€accountable.Ð L œ ÐÌThe€problem€for€leadership€in€a€constitutional€republic€is€to€assemble€and€sustain€a€winning€coalitionÐ $ t Ðon€an€issue,€while€avoiding€opposition€from€veto€blocks.Ð  ` ÐÌÔ‡ MXXïÔFurther€reading:Ô#†XïX M¤]#ÔÐ è 8  ÐÌòòóóErnest€Barker,€ed.,€òòSocial€Contractóó,€London:€Oxford€U.€Press,€1960.€Contains€essays:€John€Locke,Ð ^  ÐòòAn€Essay€Concerning€the€True€Original,€Extent,€and€End€of€Civil€Governmentóó;€David€Hume,€òòOf€theÐ úJ  ÐOriginal€Contractóó;€Jean-Jacques€Rousseau,€òòThe€Social€Contractóó.Ð æ6  ÐÌLockeòò€óóretrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý ÜÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htmÔ6‘_ÔÝ‚ÍO¥_ƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý bÓ_Ô€.Ð ¾ ÐHume€retrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý ÖÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/dh/origcont.htmÔ6œ`ÔÝ‚ÍO°`ƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ¾Þ`Ô€.Ð ªú ÐRousseau€retrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý ìÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htmÔ6«aÔÝ‚ÍO¿aƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý øíaÔ€.Ð –æ ÐÌJames€Madison,€òòNotes€of€Debates€in€the€Federal€Conventionóó,€1840.€New€York:€Ô_ÔW.W.Ô_Ô€Norton€&€Co.,Ð n¾ Ð1987.€Retrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý *ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc_0000.htmÔ6NcÔÝ‚ÍObcƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ¢cÔ€.€Vol.€5€ofÐ Zª ÐJonathan€Elliot,€òòThe€Debates€in€the€Several€Conventions€on€the€Adoption€of€the€FederalÐ F– ÐConstitutionóó,€retrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/elliot.htmÔ6ÞdÔÝ‚ÍOòdƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ì eÔ€.Ð 2‚ ÐÌJames€Madison,€Alexander€Hamilton,€John€Jay,€òòThe€Federalistóó,€1787„88.€New€York:€Bantam,€1989.Ð  Z ÐRetrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/fed/federa00.htmÔ6XfÔÝ‚ÍOlfƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý >šfÔ€.Ð öF ÐÌBernard€Schwartz,€òòThe€Roots€of€the€Bill€of€Rightsóó,€New€York:€Chelsea€House,€1980.€See€also€theÐ Î ÐòòDocumentary€History€of€the€Bill€of€Rightsóó€at€Ô4‚Ý ´ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/dhbr.htmÔ6ígÔÝ‚ÍOhƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý r/hÔ€.Ð º  ÐÌLeonard€W.€Levy,€òòOriginal€Intent€and€the€Framers'€Constitutionóó,€New€York:€Macmillan,€1988.Ð ’!â ÐÌHerman€Ô_ÔBelzÔ_Ô,€òòA€living€constitution€or€fundamental€law?óó,€New€York:€Roman€&€Ô_ÔLittlefieldÔ_Ô,€1998,Ð j#º! Ðretrieved€August€18,€2003€from€€Ô4‚Ý îÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/cmt/belz/lcfl.htmÔ6jÔÝ‚ÍO/jƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý 2]jÔ€.Ð V$¦" ÐÌJames€M.€Buchanan€and€Gordon€Ô_ÔTullockÔ_Ô,òò€The€Calculus€of€Consent:€Logical€Foundations€ofÐ .&~!$ ÐConstitutional€Democracyóó,€Library€of€Economics€and€Liberty.€Retrieved€August€18,€2003€fromÐ 'j"% ÐÔ4‚Ý °ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3Contents.htmlÔ6lÔÝ‚ÍOlƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý FlÔ€.Ð (V#& ÐÌJ.€Patrick€Gunning,€òòUnderstanding€Democracy:€An€Introduction€to€Public€Choiceóó,€ConstitutionÐ Þ).%( ÐSociety.€Retrieved€August€18,€2003€from€Ô4‚Ý <ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.constitution.org/pd/gunning/votehtm/cont.htmÔ6›mÔÝ‚ÍO¯mƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý '#ÝmÔÐ Ê*&) Ð.Ð ¶+'* ÐÌEverett€Rogers,€òòDiffusion€of€Innovationsóó,€New€York:€Free€Press,€2003.Ð Ž-Þ(, ЇM.€J.€C.€Vile,€òòConstitutionalism€and€the€Separation€of€Powersóó,€Indianapolis:€Liberty€Fund,€1998.Ð ° ÐÌSamuel€H.€Beer,€òòTo€Make€a€Nation:€The€Rediscovery€of€American€Federalismóó,€New€York:€Ô_ÔBelknapÔ_Ô,Ð ˆØ Ð1998.Ð tÄ ÐÌJ.€Roland€Ô_ÔPennockÔ_Ô,€ed.,€òòDue€Processóó,€New€York€U.€Pr.,€1977.Ð L œ ÐÌGodfrey€Lehman,òò€We€the€Jury:€The€Impact€of€Jurors€on€Our€Basic€Freedoms:€Great€Jury€Trials€ofÐ $ t ÐHistoryóó,€New€York:€Prometheus,€1997.Ð  ` ÐÌKevin€W.€Hula,€òòLobbying€Together:€Interest€Group€Coalitions€in€Legislative€Politicsóó,€Washington,Ð è 8  ÐDC:€Georgetown€University€Press.€1999.Ð Ô$  ÐÌHarvey€Ô_ÔYorkeÔ_Ô,€òòThe€Candidateððs€Handbook€For€Winning€State€and€Local€Electionsóó.€Revised€by€CarlÐ ¬ü  ÐÔ_ÔYorkeÔ_Ô,€2002.€Available€from€Ô4‚Ý ê ÔÝ‚ÍOÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ôhttp://www.candidateshandbook.comÔ6érÔÝ‚ÍOýrƒÝóóÔÿÔÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ”+sÔ€.Ð ˜è  ÐÌHarry€Helms,€òòInside€the€Shadow€Government:€National€Emergencies€and€the€Cult€of€Secrecyóó,€LosÐ pÀ ÐAngeles:€Feral€House,€2003.Ð \¬ Ð