DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 1787

By James Madison



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PREFACE TO DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION [1]



A Sketch Never Finished nor Applied [2]



As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association of

individuals, under a common authority whereby each may have the

protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy in

safety within, the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of

the necessaries & comforts of life: in like manner feeble communities,

independent of each other, have resorted to a Union, less intimate, but

with common Councils, for the common safety agst powerful neighbors, and

for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient

history furnishes examples of these confederal [3] associations, tho'

with a very imperfect account, of their structure, and of the attributes

and functions of the presiding Authority. There are examples of modern

date also, some of them still existing, the modifications and

transactions of which are sufficiently known.



It remained for the British Colonies, now United States, of North

America, to add to those examples, one of a more interesting character

than any of them: which led to a system without a [4] example ancient or

modern, a system founded on popular rights, and so combing, a federal

form with the forms of individual Republics, as may enable each to

supply the defects of the other and obtain the advantages of both. [5]



Whilst the Colonies enjoyed the protection of the parent Country as it

was called, against foreign danger; and were secured by its

superintending controul, against conflicts among themselves, they

continued independent of each other, under a common, tho' limited

dependence, on the parental Authority. When however the growth of the

offspring in strength and in wealth, awakened the jealousy and tempted

the avidity of the parent, into schemes of usurpation & exaction, the

obligation was felt by the former of uniting their counsels and efforts

to avert the impending calamity.



As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a design in

the British Government to levy contributions on the Colonies, without

their consent; a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at Albany,

which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at

once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights from

violation. The attempt had no other effect, than by bringing these

rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attachment to

them, on [6] one side; and to nourish the haughty & encroaching spirit

on the other.



In 1774. The progress made by G. B. in the open assertion of her

pretensions and in [7] the apprehended purpose of otherwise maintaining

them than by Legislative enactments and declarations, had been such that

the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a

formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations

whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; without

however losing sight of an eventual reconciliation.



The dissuasive measures of that Congress, being without effect, another

Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about a change

in the views of the other party, being equally unavailing, and the

commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an end to all

hope of reconciliation; the Congress finding moreover that the popular

voice began to call for an entire & perpetual dissolution of the

political ties which had connected them with G. B., proceeded on the

memorable 4th of July, 1776 to declare the 13 Colonies, Independent

States. [8]



During the discussions of this solemn Act, a Committee consisting of a

member from each colony had been appointed to prepare & digest a form of

Confederation, for the future management of the common interests, which

had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided by the

exigences of the contest, and by the known intentions or occasional

instructions of the Colonial Legislatures.



It appears that as early as the 21st of July 1775, A plan entitled

"Articles of Confederation & perpetual Union of the Colonies" had been

sketched by Docr Franklin, the plan being on that day submitted by him

to Congress; and tho' not copied into their Journals remaining on their

files in his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term "perpetual"

observed in the title, the articles provided expressly for the event of

a return of the Colonies to a connection with G. Britain.



This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the Come on the 12

of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress, in the handwriting

of Mr Dickinson. The plan, tho' dated after the Declaration of

Independence, was probably drawn up before that event; since the name of

Colonies, not States is used throughout the draught. The plan reported,

was debated and amended from time to time, till the 17th of November

1777, when it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the

Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and recommendatory

letter. The ratifications of these by their Delegates in Congs duly

authorized took place at successive dates; but were not compleated till

March 1. [9] 1781, when Maryland who had made it a prerequisite that the

vacant lands acquired from the British Crown should be a Common fund,

yielded to the persuasion that a final & formal establishment of the

federal Union & Govt would make a favorable impression not only on other

foreign Nations, but on G. B. herself.



The great difficulty experienced in so framing the fedl system as to

obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred from

the long interval, and recurring discussions, between the commencement

and completion of the work; from the changes made during its progress;

from the language of Congs when proposing it to the States, wch dwelt on

the impracticability of devising a system acceptable to all of them;

from the reluctant assent given by some; and the various alterations

proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others again which produced a

special address to them from Congs enforcing the duty of sacrificing

local considerations and favorite opinions to to [68] the public safety,

and the necessary harmony: Nor was the assent of some of the States

finally yielded without strong protests against particular articles, and

a reliance on future amendments removing their objections.



It is to be recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned

in some degree, by an occupation of the public Councils both general &

local, with the deliberations and measures, essential to a Revolutionary

struggle; But there must have been a balance for these causes, in the

obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular and efficient

Govt; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and

pretensions, which might be inflexible in another state of things.



The principal difficulties which embarrassed the progress, and retarded

the completion of the plan of Confederation, may be traced to 1. [10]

the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of power: 2

[10] a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own: 3

[10] the rule of suffrage among parties unequal in size, but equal in

sovereignty. 4 the ratio of contributions in money and in troops, among

parties, [11] whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of

their wealth, or of their military or free population. 5 [12] the

selection and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal

head, and safe to the several members.



To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such

Confederacies, were added two others one of a temporary, the other of a

permanent nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands, so called

because they had been held by the British Crown, and being ungranted to

individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by the States

within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as devolving on them;

whilst it was contended by the others, that being wrested from the

dethroned authority, by the equal exertion of all, they resulted of

right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands being of vast

extent and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion &

heart-burning; & proved the most obstinate of the impediments to an

earlier consummation of the plan of federal Govt. The State of Maryland

the last that acceded to it held out as already noticed, till March 1,

[13] 1781, and then yielded only to the hope that by giving a stable &

authoritative character to the Confederation, a successful termination

of the Contest might be accelerated. The dispute was happily compromised

by successive surrenders of portions of the territory by the States

having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by Congress.



The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some

of the States, which having no convenient ports for foreign commerce,

were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro whose ports, their

commerce was carryed on. New Jersey, placed between Phila & N. York, was

likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and N. Carolina, between Virga &

S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both arms. The Articles Of

Confederation provided no remedy for the complaint: which produced a

strong protest on the part of N. Jersey: and never ceased to be a source

of dissatisfaction & discord until the new Constitution, superseded the

old.



But the radical infirmity of the "arts Of Confederation" was the

dependence of Congs on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with

its Requisitions, by so many independant Communities, each consulting

more or less its particular interests & convenience and distrusting the

compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congs continued

to circulate they were employed as a sinew of war, like gold & silver.

When that ceased to be the case, the fatal defect of the political

System was felt in its alarming force. The war was merely kept alive and

brought to a successful conclusion by such foreign aids and temporary

expedients as could be applied; a hope prevailing with many, and a wish

with all, that a state of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by

it, would give to the Confederacy in practice, the efficiency which had

been inferred from its theory.



The close of the war however brought no cure for the public

embarrassments. The States relieved from the pressure of foreign danger,

and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign power;

[instead of a diminished disposition to part with it,] persevered in

omissions and in measures incompatible with thier relations to the

Federal Govt and with those among themselves;



Having served as a member of Cons through the period between Mar. 1780 &

the arrival of peace in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted with

the public distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the

successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy by new grants

of power to Congs. I had found moreover that despair of success hung

over the compromising provision [14] of April 1783 for the public

necessities which had been so elaborately planned, and so impressively

recommended to the States.[*1] Sympathizing, under this aspect of

affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free Govt, at the threatened

danger of an abortive result to the great & perhaps last experiment in

its favour, I could not be insensible to the obligation to co-operate

[16] as far as I could in averting the calamity. With this view I

acceded to the desire of my fellow Citizens of the County that I should

be one of its representatives in the Legislature, hoping that I might

there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to which the

Revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a leading agency of

the State in bringing about a rescue of the Union and the blessings of

liberty a [17] staked on it, from an impending catastrophe.



It required but little time after taking my seat in the House of

Delegates in May 1784 to discover that, however favorable the general

disposition of the State might be towards the Confederacy the

Legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors to transfers of

power from the State to the Govt of the Union; notwithstanding the

urgent demands of the Federal Treasury; the glaring inadequacy of the

authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid growth of anarchy in the Fedl

System, and the animosity kindled among the States by their conflicting

regulations.



The temper of the Legislature & the wayward course of its proceedings

may be gathered from the Journals of its Sessions in the years 1784 &

1785.



The failure however of the varied propositions in the Legislature for

enlarging the powers of Congress, the continued failure of the efforts

of Cons to obtain from them the means of providing for the debts of

the Revolution; and of countervailing the commercial laws of G.B.,

a source of much irritation & agst which the separate efforts of the

States were found worse than abortive; these Considerations with the

lights thrown on the whole subject, by the free & full discussion it had

undergone led to an [18] general acquiescence in the Resoln passed, on the

21. of Jany 1786, which proposed & invited a meeting of Deputies from

all the States to "insert the Resol (See Journal.) I [19]



The resolution had been brought forward some weeks before on the failure

of a proposed grant of power to Congress to collect a revenue from

commerce, which had been abandoned by its friends in consequence of

material alterations made in the grant by a Committee of the whole. The

Resolution tho introduced by Mr Tyler an influencial member, who having

never served in Congress, had more the ear of the House than those whose

services there exposed them to an imputable bias, was so little

acceptable that it was not then persisted in. Being now revived by him,

on the last day of the Session, and being the alternative of adjourning

without any effort for the crisis in the affairs of the Union, it

obtained a general vote; less however with some of its friends from a

confidence in the success of the experiment than from a hope that it

might prove a step to a more comprehensive & adequate provision for the

wants of the Confederacy.



It happened also that Commissioners who had been [20] appointed by Virga

& Maryd to settle the jurisdiction on waters dividing the two States

had, apart from their official reports recommended a uniformity in the

regulations of the 2 States on several subjects & particularly on those

having relation to foreign trade. It apeared at the same time that Maryd

had deemed a concurrence of her neighbors Pena & Delaware indispensable

in such a case, who for like reasons would require that of their

neighbors. So apt and forceable an illustration of the necessity of a

uniformity throughout all the States could not but favour the passage of

a Resolution which proposed a Convention having that for its object.



The commissioners appointed by the Legisl: & who attended the Convention

were E. Randolph the Attorney of the State, St. Geo: Tucker & J. M. [21]

The designation of the time & place for its meeting to be proposed and

communicated to the States having been left to the Comrs they named for

the time early [22] September and for the place the City of Annapolis

avoiding the residence of Congs and large Commercial Cities as liable to

suspicions of an extraneous influence.



Altho the invited Meeting appeared to be generally favored, five States

only assembled; some failing to make appointments, and some of the

individuals appointed not hastening their attendance, the result in both

cases being ascribed mainly, to a belief that the time had not arrived

for such a political reform, as might be expected from a further

experience of its necessity.



But in the interval between the proposal of the Convention and the time

of its meeting, such had been the advance of public opinion in the

desired direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of the

contemplated object, of the meeting, in turning the genal attention to

the Critical State of things, and in calling forth the sentiments and

exertions of the most enlightened & influencial patriots, that the

Convention thin as it was did not scruple to decline the limited task

assigned to it and to recommend to the States a Convention with powers

adequate to the occasion. Nor was it [23] unnoticed that the commission

of the N. Jersey Deputation, had extended its object to a general

provision for the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for this

enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by a Come to whom the subject

had been referred. It was drafted by Col H. [24] and finally agreed to

unanimously [25] in the following form. Insert it. [26]



The recommendation was well recd by the Legislature of Virga which

happened to be the first that acted on it, and the example of her

compliance was made as conciliatory and impressive as possible. The

Legislature were unanimous or very nearly so on the occasion and [27] as

a proof of the magnitude & solemnity attached to it, they placed Genl W.

at the head of the Deputation from the State; and as a proof of the deep

interest he felt in the case he overstepped the obstacles to his

acceptance of the appointment.



The law complying with the recommendation from Annapolis was in the

terms following: [28]



A resort to a General Convention to remodel the Confederacy, was not a

new idea. It had entered at an early date into the conversations and

speculations of the most reflecting & foreseeing observers of the

inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress. In a pamphlet published in

May 81 at the seat of Congs Pelatiah Webster an able tho' not

conspicuous Citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of the U.

States, and suggesting among other remedial provisions [29] including a

national Bank remarks that "the Authority of Congs at present is very

inadequate to the performance of their duties; and this indicates the

necessity of their calling a Continental Convention for the express purpose

of ascertaining, defining, enlarging, and limiting, the duties & powers

of their Constitution," [30]



On the 1. day of Apl 1783, Col. Hamilton, in a debate in Congs observed

that [31]



He alluded probably to [see Life of Schuyler in Longacre. [32]



It does not appear however that his expectation had been fulfilled.]



In a letter to J. M. from R. H. Lee then President of Congs dated Novr

26, 1784 He says [33]



The answer of J. M. remarks [34]



[35] In 1785, Noah Webster whose pol. & other valuable writings had made

him known to the public, in one of his publications of American policy

brought into view the same resort for supplying the defects of the Fedl

System [see his life in Longacre].



The proposed & expected Convention at Annapolis the first of a general

character that appears to have been realized, & the state of the public

mind awakened by it had attracted the particular attention of Congs and

favored the idea there of a Convention with fuller powers for amending

the Confederacy. [36]



It does not appear that in any of these cases, the reformed system was

to be otherwise sanctioned than by the Legislative authy of the States;

nor whether or how far, a change was to be made in the structure of the

Depository of Federal powers.



The act of Virga providing for the Convention at Philada, was succeeded

by appointments from [37] other States as their Legislatures were

assembled, the appointments being selections from the most experienced &

highest standing Citizens. Rh. I. was the only exception to a compliance

with the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to have been swayed

by an obdurate adherence to an advantage which her position gave her of

taxing her neighbors thro' their consumption of imported supplies, an

advantage which it was foreseen would be taken from her by a revisal of

the "Articles of Confederation.



As the pub. mind had been ripened for a salutary Reform of the pol.

System, in the interval between the proposal & the meeting, of Comrs at

Annapolis, the interval between the last event, and the meeting of Deps

at Phila had continued to develop more & more the necessity & the extent

of a Systematic provision for the preservation and Govt of the Union;

among the ripening incidents was the Insurrection of Shays, [38] in

Massts against her Govt; which was with difficulty suppressed,

notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an apprehended

interposition of the Fedl troops.



At the date of the Convention, the aspect & retrospect of the pol:

condition of the U.S. could not but fill the pub. mind with a gloom

which was relieved only by a hope that so select a Body would devise an

adequate remedy for the existing and prospective evils so impressively

demanding it.



It was seen that the public debt rendered so sacred by the cause in

which it had been incurred remained without any provision for its

payment. The reiterated and elaborate efforts of Con. to procure from

the States a more adequate power to raise the means of payment had

failed. The effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only

displayed the inefficiency [39] of the authy making them: none of the

States having duly complied with them, some having failed altogether or

nearly so; and [40] in one instance, that of N. Jersey [41] a compliance

was expressly [42] refused; nor was more yielded to the expostulations

of members of Congs deputed to her Legislature, than a mere repeal of

the law, without a compliance. [see letter of Grayson to J. M. [43]



The want of authy in Congs to regulate Commerce had produced in Foreign

nations particularly G. B. a monopolizing policy injurious to the trade

of the U. S. and destructive to their navigation; the imbecilicity and

anticipated dissolution of the Confederacy extinguishg all apprehensions

of a Countervailing policy on the part of the U. States.



The same want of a general power over Commerce, led to an exercise of

the power separately, by the States, wch not only proved abortive, but

engendered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Besides the vain

attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which turned

their commerce into the neighbouring ports, and to coerce a relaxation

of the British monopoly of the W. Inds navigation, which was attempted

by Virga [see the Journal of ] [44] the States having ports for foreign

commerce, taxed & irritated the adjoining States, trading thro' them, as

N. Y. Pena Virga & S. Carolina. Some of the States, as Connecticut,

taxed imports [45] as from Massts higher than imports even from G. B. of

wch Massts complained to Virga and doubtless to other States. [See

letter of J. M. [46] In sundry instances as of N. Y. N. J. Pa & Maryd

[see ] [47] the navigation laws treated the Citizens [48] other States

as aliens.



In certain cases the authy of the Confederacy was disregarded, as in

violations not only of the Treaty of peace; but of Treaties with France

& Holland, which were complained of to Congs.



In other cases the Fedl Authy was violated by Treaties & wars with

Indians, as by Geo: by troops raised & kept up witht the consent of

Congs as by Massts by compacts witht the consent of Congs as between

Pena and N. Jersey, and between Virga & Maryd. From the Legisl: Journals

of Virga it appears, that a vote refusing to apply for a sanction of

Congs was followed by a vote agst the communication of the Compact to

Congs.



In the internal administration of the States a violation of Contracts

had become familiar in the form of depreciated paper made a legal

tender, of property substituted for money, of Instalment laws, and of

the occlusions of the Courts of Justice; although evident that all such

interferences affected the rights of other States, relatively creditor,

[49] as well as Citizens Creditors within the State.



Among the defects which had been severely felt was that of a uniformity

in cases requiring it, as laws of naturalization, [50] bankruptcy, a

Coercive authority operating on individuals and a guaranty of the

internal tranquillity of the States.



As natural consequences [51] of this distracted and disheartening

condition of the union, the Fedl Authy had ceased to be respected

abroad, and dispositions [52] shown there, particularly in G. B., to

take advantage of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching

downfall; at home it had lost all confidence & credit; the unstable and

unjust career of the States had also forfeited the respect & confidence

essential to order and good Govt, involving the general decay and

confidence & credit between man & man. It was found moreover, that those

least partial to popular Govt, or most distrustful of its efficacy were

yielding to anticipations, that from an increase of the confusion a Govt

might result more congenial with their taste or their opinions; whilst

those most devoted to the principles and forms of Republics, were

alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the American

Experiment, and anxious for a system that wd avoid the inefficacy of a

mere confederacy without passing into the opposite extreme of a

consolidated govt it was known that there were individuals who had

betrayed a bias toward Monarchy [see Knox to G W & him to Jay]

(Marshall's life [53]) and there had always been some not unfavorable to

a partition of the Union into several Confederacies; either from a

better chance of figuring on a Sectional Theatre, or that the Sections

would require stronger Govts, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a

monarchical consolidation. The idea of a [54] dismemberment had recently

made its appearance in the Newspapers.



Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous

prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which

ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the

Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided.



As a sketch on paper, the earliest perhaps of a Constitutional Govt for

the Union [organized into the regular Departments with physical means

operating on individuals] to be sanctioned by the people of the States,

acting in their original & sovereign character, was contained in [55] a

letter of Apl. 8. 1787 from J. M. to Govr Randolph, a copy of the letter

is here inserted.



The feature in the letter [56] which vested in the general Authy. a

negative on the laws of the States, was suggested by the negative in the

head of the British Empire, which prevented collisions between the parts

& the whole, and between the parts themselves. It was supposed that the

substitution, of an elective and responsible authority for an hereditary

and irresponsible one, would avoid the appearance even of a departure

from the principle of [57] Republicanism. But altho' the subject was so

viewed in the Convention, and the votes on it were more than once

equally divided, it was finally & justly abandoned see note for ___ for

this erasure substitute the amendt marked * for this page [58] [as,

apart from other objections, it was not practicable among so many

states, increasing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many laws

instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left as finally

provided for in the Constitution.] [59]



On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Phila it occurred to them

that from the early and prominent part taken by that State in bringing

about the Convention some initiative step might be expected from them.

The Resolutions introduced by Governor Randolph were the result of a

Consultation on the subject; with an understanding that they left all

the Deputies entirely open to the lights of discussion, and free to

concur in any alterations or modifications which their reflections and

judgments might approve. The Resolutions as the Journals shew became the

basis on which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the

developments, variations and modifications of which the plan of Govt

proposed by the Convention may be traced.



The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the History of the

most distinguished Confederacies, particularly those of antiquity, and

the deficiency I found in the means of satisfying it more especially in

what related to the process, the principles, the reasons, & the

anticipations, which prevailed in the formation of them, determined me

to preserve as far as I could an exact account of what might pass in the

Convention whilst executing its trust, with the magnitude of which I was

duly impressed, as I was with [60] the gratification promised to future

curiosity by an authentic exhibition of the objects, the opinions & the

reasonings from which the new System of Govt was to receive its peculiar

structure & organization. Nor was I unaware of the value of such a

contribution to the fund of of materials for the History of a

Constitution on which would be staked the happiness of a people great

even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of Liberty throught the

world.



In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of the

presiding member, with the other members on my right & left hands. In

this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms

legible & in abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was read

from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a moment

unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of the Convention I

was enabled to write out my daily notes [see page 18 - [61] during the

session or within a few finishing days after its close - see pa. 18 [62]

in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files.



In the labour & correctness of doing [63] this, I was not a little aided

by practice & by a familiarity with the style and the train of

observation & reasoning which characterized the principal speakers. It

happened, also that I was not absent a single day, nor more than a

cassual fraction of an hour in any day, so that I could not have lost a

single speech, unless a very short one. Insert the Remark on the _____

slip of paper marked A. [64]



[It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the

speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the

speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of my

recollections. A further remark may be proper, that views of the subject

might occasionally be presented in the speeches and proceedings, with a

latent reference to a compromise on some middle ground, by mutual

concessions. The exceptions alluded to were, -- first, the sketch

furnished by Mr. Randolph of his speech on the introduction of his

propositions, on the twenty-ninth day of May; secondly, the speech of

Mr. Hamilton, who happened to call on me when putting the last hand to

it, and who acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more than a

very few verbal alterations which were made; thirdly, the speech of

Gouverneur Morris on the second day of May, which was communicated to

him on a like occasion, and who acquiesced in it without even a verbal

change. The correctness of his language and the distinctness of his

enunciation were particularly favorable to a reporter. The speeches of

Doctor Franklin, excepting a few brief ones, were copied from the

written ones read to the Convention by his colleague, Mr. Wilson, it

being inconvenient to the Doctor to remain long on his feet.] [65]



Of the ability & intelligence of those who composed the Convention, the

debates & proceedings may be a test; as the character of the work which

was the offspring of their deliberations must be tested by the

experience of the future, added to that of the nearly half century which

has passed. [66]



But whatever may be the judgment pronounced on the competency of the

architects of the Constitution, or whatever may be the destiny, of the

edifice prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my profound &

solemn conviction, derived from my intimate opportunity of observing &

appreciating the views of the Convention, collectively & individually,

that there never was an assembly of men, charged with a great & arduous

trust, who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or

anxiously [devoted to the object committed to them, than were the

members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of devising and

proposing a constitutional system which would best supply the defects of

that which it was to replace, and best secure the permanent liberty and

happiness of their country.] [67]



----------------------------------------------------------------------



1. This Preface has been printed from Madison's original manuscript in

the Department of State. There is a transcript of the Preface in an

unknown hand in the Library of Congress which was sent to the printer

and from which Henry D. Gilpin printed The Papers of James Madison, 3

volumes (1840). The text of the Preface as here printed has been read

with the printer's copy thereof and important differences noted.



In the Preface, Madison referred in passing to documents which he

evidently intended to embody in a finished draft which, unfortunately,

he never completed. The matter referred to has been placed in footnotes

or reference has been made to other pages of the present document.



Footnotes bearing an asterisk before the numbers instead of just

numbers, to indicate their order, are Madison's own notes. The editor's

notes and indications of differences between the Madison manuscript and

the transcript of the Preface are not preceded by an asterisk.



2. These are the words which Madison wrote at the head of this document

after he had scratched out the phrase "Preface to Debates in the

Convention of 1787." It is a very rough and uneven draft, full of

insertions and deletions. The last few pages are in Mrs. Madison's hand,

having been written from her husband's dictation when his hands were

crippled with rheumatism. A few words in the draft were written by John

C. Payne (Mrs. Madison's brother) at Madison's direction. The date of

the draft was between 1830 and 1836.



3. The word "confederate" is substituted in the transcript for "confederal".



4. The word "an" is substituted in the transcript for "a".



5. In place of "the advantages of both" the transcript reads "that

advantage of both".



6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.



7. The word "in" is omitted in the transcript.



8. The words "Independent States" are italicized in the transcript.



9. The phrase "the first of March" is substituted in the transcript for

"March 1".



10. The figures 1, 2, and 3 are changed to "first," "secondly" and

"thirdly" in the transcript.



11. The phrase "unequal in size, but equal in sovereignty. 4 the ratio

of contributions in money and in troops, among parties" is erroneously

omitted in the transcript.



12. The figure 5 is changed to "fourthly" in the transcript.



13. In the transcript the date reads "the first of March, 1781".



14. The word "principle" is substituted for "provision" in the

transcript.



*1. See address of Congress. [15]



15. This footnote is omitted in the transcript.



16. The word "aid" is substituted in the transcript for "co-operate".



17. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.



18. The word "a" is substituted in the transcript for "an."



19. The phrase "to 'insert the Resol. (See Journal.) 1" is omitted in

the transcript which substitutes the words "as follows:" and inserts the

resolution which is printed in the Notes of June 1, 1787.



20. The phrase "who had been" is omitted in the transcript.



21. James Madison.



22. In place of the word "early" the transcript reads "the first Monday

in."



23. The words "had it been" are substituted in the transcript for the

words "was it."



24. Alexander Hamilton.



25. The word "unanimously" is omitted in the transcript.



26. Madison's direction "Insert it" is omitted in the transcript, and

there is inserted the text of the proceedings and recommendation of the

Annapolis Convention. The transcript text begins with the words "To the

Honorable", and concludes with the paragraph beginning "Through your

Commissioners", etc.



27. The word "and" is omitted in the transcript.



28. The text of this law of October 16, 1786 (printed ante pages 68-69)

is inserted in the transcript beginning with the words "Whereas, the

Commissioners", etc. and ending with the words " ... States in the

Union".



29. The word "one" is here inserted in the transcript.



30. Madison was in error. The pamphlet was written by William Barton.

See Gaillard Hunt, "Pelatiah Webster and the Constitution", in The

Nation, December 28, 1911.



31. The following is supplied in the transcript: "he wished instead of

them [partial Conventions] to see a general Convention take place; and

that he should soon, in pursuance of instructions, from his

constituents, propose to Congress a plan for that purpose, the object

[of which] would be to strengthen the Federal Constitution." -- See The

Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. I (1900), pp. 438, 439.



32. The phrase "[See Life of Schuyler in Longacre" is omitted in the

transcript and the following quoted matter is substituted: "the

resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in the Senate, and passed

unanimously by the Legislature of New York in the summer of 1782,

declaring, that the Confederation was defective, in not giving Congress

power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with

funds from established and productive sources; and that it would be

advisable for Congress to recommend to the States to call a general

Convention to revise and amend the Confederation."



The sketch is of Hamilton, not Schuyler, for which see The National

Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans, conducted by Longacre and

Herring, Vol. II (1835), p. 7.



33. The following sentence is supplied in the transcript: "It is by many

here suggested as very necessary step for Congress to take, the calling

on the States to form a Convention for the sole purpose of revising the

Confederation, so far as to enable Congress to execute with more energy,

effect and vigor the powers assigned to it, than it appears by

experience that they can do under the present state of things." The

letter referred to is among the Madison papers in the Manuscript

Division of the Library of Congress.



34. The transcript here inserts the following: "I hold it for a maxim,

that the Union of the States is essential to their safety against

foreign danger and internal contention and that the perpetuity and

efficacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The question,

therefore, is, in what mode, and at what moment, the experiment for

supplying the defects ought to be made." -- See, also, The Writings of

James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol II (1901), pp 99, 100.



35. The paragraph beginning "In 1785" reads as follows in the

transcript: "In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose political and

other valuable writings had made him known to the public, proposed, in

one of his publications, 'a new system of government which should act,

not on the States, but directly on individuals, and vest in Congress

full power to carry its laws into effect.'"



See, also, The National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans,

conducted by Longacre and Herring, Vol II (1835), p 4.



36. In the transcript after the word "Confederacy" the following

footnote is inserted: "The letters of Wm. Grayson, March 22nd, 1786, and

of James Monroe, of April 28th, 1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison,

state that a proposition for such a Convention has been made."



37. The word "the" is inserted in the transcript after "from".



38. The final "s" is crossed off the word "Shays" in the transcript.



39. The transcript substitutes the word "inefficacy" for the word

"inefficiency" but the Gilpin edition prints the word as in the original

notes.



40. In the transcript the word "and" is crossed out and the word "which"

written above it.



41. After the word "Jersey," reference is made in the transcript to the

following footnote: "A letter of Mr Grayson to Mr Madison of March 22d,

1786, relating the conduct of New Jersey states this fact. Editor."



43. The phrase "[see letter of Grayson to J. M." is omitted in the

transcript. An extract from the letter referred to reads as follows:

"The Antients were surely men of more candor than we are; they contended

openly for an abolition of debts in so many words, while we strive as

hard for the same thing under the decent & specious pretense of a

circulating medium.... There has been some serious thoughts in the minds

of some of the members of Congress to recommend to the States the

meeting of a general Convention, to consider, of an alteration of the

Confederation, & there is a motion to this effect now under

consideration it is contended that the present Confederation is utterly

inefficient, and that if it remains much longer in it's present state of

imbecility we shall be one of the most contemptible nations on the face

of the earth," -- Letter from William Grayson to James Madison, March

22, 1786. The Madison Papers (manuscript), Library of Congress.



44. In the transcript the footnote "See the Journal of her Legislature"

is substituted for the phrase in brackets. The allusion is to the act of

the Virginia Assembly passed January 21, 1786, imposing a tonnage tax

of 5s. on vessels of foreigners.



45. After the word "imports" down to the sentence beginning, "In sundry

instances," the transcript reads "from others, as from Mass., which

complained in a letter to the Executive of Virginia, and doubtless to

those of other States.



46. The facts are given in Madison's letter to Jefferson, January 22,

1786. The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), p.

218.



47. Madison's direction "[see    ]" is omitted in the transcript.



48. The word "of" is inserted in the transcript after "Citizens".



49. The word "creditor" is plural in the transcript.



50. The word "and" is inserted in the transcript after "naturalization".



51. The words "a natural consequence" are substituted in the transcript

for "natural consequences".



52. The word "were" is inserted in the transcript after "dispositions".



53. The direction in Madison's notes is omitted in the transcript. His

reference was to The Life of George Washington, by John Marshall, Vol.

V (1807), pp. 91 et seq. For the text of the correspondence in question,

see Appendix to Debates, I, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, pp. 585-588.



54. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.



55. The phrase beginning with the words "a letter" down to the end of the

paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: "the letters

of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nineteenth of March; to

Governor Randolph of the eighth of April; and to General Washington of

the sixteenth of April, 1787, for which see these respective dates."



For the material portions of these letters see Appendix to Debates, II,

Nos. 1, 2, and 3, pp. 589-595.



56. The words "the letter" have been changed to "these letters" in the

transcript.



57. The words "the principle of" are omitted in the transcript.



58. The words "see note for    for this erasure substitute the amendt

marked * for this page" are omitted in the transcript.



59. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript. The

original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.



60. The word "by" is substituted in the transcript for "with".



61. Madison's direction "[see page 18-" is omitted in the transcript.



62. Madison's direction "see pa. 18" is omitted in the transcript.



63. The word "doing" is omitted in the transcript.



64. Madison's direction "Insert the Remark", etc. is omitted in the

transcript.



65. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript.

The original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.



66. The phrase "of the nearly half century" is changed to "of nearly

half a century" in the transcript.



67. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript.

The original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.



68. The doubled "to" is not an error.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Madison's Notes

Introduction by Jon Roland



James Madison is usually credited with being the principal author of the

U.S. Constitution at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,

but, while he was an active participant in the debates and in the

drafting of the document, he also managed to take the most complete set

of notes on the debates in that convention, capturing the essence, if

not the exact words, of the participants, and giving us a definitive

insight into the intent of the Framers.



His were not the only notes taken, and several of the other participants

wrote of their recollections of the Convention, including the official

recording secretary, William Jackson, but none are nearly as complete,

nor do they differ from Madison's Notes, as they are often called, in

any significant details. Jackson's notes are mere recordings of the

resolutions and votes on them, with little on the content of the

debates.



Madison's Notes were not published until about 1840, perhaps to fulfill

an early decision by the original convention forbidding disclosure of

the proceedings, to which Madison may have felt himself bound while the

other participants lived, and it was after all the rest of them had died

that he did finally publish them. The original manuscript is in somewhat

rough form, evidently the original state in which he wrote it in haste

during or shortly after the Convention itself. One must suppose he intended

an editor to clean it up and expand on his many abbreviations, but scholars

have rather chosen to present editions that reflect that original rough

state, with misspellings, inconsistent abbreviations and numberings

preserved for our edification. That can cause some pause for people when

they first try to read it, until they figure out the abbreviations, but

it is worth the effort, for one gains an important sense of the energy,

the intensity, and sometimes the frustrations of the delegates to that

historic meeting as the hammered out a truly innovative experiment in

self-government.



To the best of my knowledge this is the first online edition of the Notes.

I have had the benefit of both an "official" 1900 edition and later

editions with the footnotes of editors. I have also included Madison's

Preface to the Notes, which provides additional insight into the Convention

and its role in history.



For persons interested in resolving issues of constitutional intent and

interpretation, this is an essential reference. It makes clear what some

of the terms mean that are used in the Constitution, words that are not

commonly heard today, or whose meanings have changed.



Any errors in this edition are my responsibility, and I ask that anyone

finding such errors communicate them to me for correction.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 [1]

by James Madison





MONDAY  MAY 14, FRIDAY  MAY 25



Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies

in Convention for revising the federal system of Government. On that day

a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till,



Friday 25 of May, when the following members [2] appeared to wit: see

Note A. [3] viz, [3] From Massachusetts Rufus King. N. York Robert

Yates, [4] Alexr. Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill

Houston, [4] William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas

Fitzsimmons, James Wilson, [4] Govurneur Morris. Delaware, George Read,

Richard Basset, [4] Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund

Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, [4]

James Mc.Clurg. N. Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie,

Richard Dobbs Spaight, [4] Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge,

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, [4] Pierce Butler.

Georgia, William Few.



Mr. ROBERT MORRIS informed the members assembled that by the instruction

& in behalf, of the deputation of Pena. he proposed George Washington

Esqr. late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. [5] Mr.

JNo. RUTLIDGE seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the

choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Genl.

Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might

otherwise be proper. General WASHINGTON was accordingly unanimously

elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by Mr. R. Morris and Mr.

Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention

for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of

the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of

better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards

the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion. [6] [The

nomination came with particular grace from Penna. as Docr. Franklin

alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Docr. was himself

to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the

weather and of his health confined him to his house.



Mr. WILSON moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated Mr. Temple

Franklin.



Col HAMILTON nominated Major Jackson.



On the ballot Majr. Jackson had 5 votes & Mr. Franklin 2 votes. On

reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from

Delaware were prohibited from changing the article in the Confederation

establishing an equality of votes among the States.



The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton &

C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. C. PINCKNEY, [7] to prepare standing

rules & orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.



___________



1. The original notes did not have a title, and Madison's Notes, as they

are sometimes called, have been published under various titles,

including Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention. We are

choosing the most popular title. Text is taken from several sources,

mainly from the third of the five-volume set Documentary History of the

Constitution of the United States of America, Department of State, 1900,

and from The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, edited by

Gailard Hunt and James Brown Scott (Washington, 1920), from which we

take most of the footnotes, with some minor modifications, but use a

sequential numbering system, indicating Madison's own footnotes by

preceding the number with an asterisk. Most of these footnotes cite

differences between Madison's original manuscript and the transcript in

the Library of Congress.



The word "Debates" is used as a heading in the transcript.



2. Madison is not uniform in the spelling of proper names, but the

correct form in each instance is to be found in the credentials of the

delegates.



3. The words "to wit: see Note A. viz," are omitted in the transcript.



4. The work "and" is here inserted in the transcript.



5. The paragraph in brackets beginning with the works "The nomination"

and ending with the work "house" is printed as a footnote in the

transcript with reference mark after the word "Convention."



6. See footnote. [5]



7. The phrase "on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting," etc.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



MONDAY  MAY 28 [1]



[2] From Massts. Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver

Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James McHenry.

From Penna. B. Franklin, George Clymer, Ths. Mifflin & Jared Ingersol

took their seats.



Mr. WYTHE from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which

employed the deliberations of this day. 



Mr. KING objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising any

member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes.

He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the

Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes;

and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of

the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions. 



Col. MASON seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the

opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on

conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish

handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting. The proposed

rule was rejected nem. contradicente. The standing rules [*3, 4] agreed

to were as follow: [see the Journal & copy here the printed rules] [5]

[viz. [6] A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not

less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the

greater number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less

number than seven may adjourn from day to day. Immediately after the

President shall have taken the chair, and the members their seats, the

minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary. Every

member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he

shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with

another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript-and of

two members rising [7] at the same time, the President shall name him

who shall be first heard. A member shall not speak oftener than twice,

without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time,

before every other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he

choose to speak upon the subject. A motion made and seconded, shall be

repeated, and if written, as it shall be when any member shall so

require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; and

may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it shall have been

declared. Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and

either discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be

introduced. When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other

than to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate

shall be received.] [A question which is complicated, shall, at the

request of any member, be divided, and put separately on [8] the

propositions, of which it is compounded. The determination of a

question, altho' fully debated, shall be postponed, if the deputies of

any State desire it until the next day. A writing which contains any

matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout for

information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and again, with the

amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards, the

question shall be put on [8] the whole, amended, or approved in its

original form, as the case shall be. 9 Committees shall be appointed by

ballot; and [9] the members who have the greatest number of ballots,

altho' not a majority of the votes present, shall [10] be the Committee.

When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member

standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots,

shall be preferred. A member may be called to order by any other member,

as well as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct

or expressions supposed to be reprehensible. -- And all questions of

order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate. Upon a

question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be

seconded, the question shall be put without a debate. When the House

shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place, until the

President pass him.] [11] A letter from sundry persons of the State of

Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable [12] The Chairman of the General

Convention was presented to the Chair by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, and being

read, was ordered to lie on the table for further consideration. [For

the letter see Note in the Appendix] [13]



Mr. BUTLER moved that the House provide agst. interruption of business

by absence of members, and against licentious publications of their

proceedings -- to which was added by -- Mr. SPAIGHT -- a motion to

provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote

upon any question, from revising the subject matter of it when they see

cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision,

which was the result of mature discussion. -- Whereupon it was ordered

that these motions be referred to [14] the consideration of the

Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee

make report thereon.



Adjd. till tomorrow [15] 10. OClock.



___________



1. The year " 1787" is here inserted in the transcript.



2. The words "In Convention" are here inserted in the transcript.



*3. Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by

which they ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of

conversation among the members present. It was pressed by Governeur

Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite

in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote, as unreasonable,

and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of

Government, which must in the nature of things, be founded on a

violation of that equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that

such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large & small

States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the

course of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of

an effective Government, than on taking the field of discussion to

disarm themselves of the right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy

of the large States, discountenanced & stifled the project.



4. Madison's footnote reference mark after the word "rules" is placed in

the transcript after the word "him" thus placing the footnote at the end

of the rules instead of at the beginning.



5. Madison's direction is omitted from the transcript and the work

"Rules" is inserted. 



6. The word "viz." is omitted in the transcript.



7. The words "to speak" are inserted in the transcript after "rising."



8. The word "upon" is substituted for "on" in the transcript.



9. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.



10. The word "shall" is omitted in the transcript.



11. See footnote 4.



12. The words "the Honorable" are omitted in the transcript.



13. The footnote in the transcript reads as follows: "For the letter,

see Appendix No. blank."



14. The word "for" is substituted in the transcript for the word "to".



15. The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



TUESDAY  MAY 29 [1]



John Dickenson, and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter

from Massts. took their seats. The following rules were added, on the

report of Mr. Wythe from the Committee [see the Journal] -- [2]



Additional rules. [see preceding page] [2] That no member be absent from

the House, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without

leave.



That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be,

sitting.



That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of

the House without leave of the House.



That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.



That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or

communicated without leave.



That a motion to reconsider a matter which had [3] been determined by a

majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day on

which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one day's previous

notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration,

some future day shall be assigned for the [4] purpose.



Mr. C. PINKNEY moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend the

Minutes.



Mr. Govr. MORRIS objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the

Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A

committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according

to their opinions and wishes.



The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.



Mr. RANDOLPH then opened the main business. [Here insert his speech [5]

including his resolutions.] [6] (Mr. R. Speech A. to be inserted Tuesday

May 29) [6] He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather

than those, who were of longer standing in life and political

experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the

convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed

that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task

on him. He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the

necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American

downfal. He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to

inquire 1. [7] into the properties, which such a government ought to

possess, 2. [7] the defects of the confederation, 3. [7] the danger of

our situation & 4. [7] the remedy.



1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. [7] against

foreign invasion: 2. [7] against dissentions between members of the

Union, or seditions in particular states: 3. [7] to procure to the

several States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was

incapable: 4. [7, 8] to be able to defend itself against incroachment: &

5. [7] to be paramount to the state constitutions.



2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high

respect for its authors, and considered them, as having done all that

patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions,

& of confederacies, -- when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown

-- no commercial discord had arisen among any states -- no rebellion had

appeared as in Massts. -- foreign debts had not become urgent -- the

havoc of paper money had not been foreseen -- treaties had not been

violated -- and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the

jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.



He then proceeded to enumerate the defects:



    1. [9] that the confederation produced no security against foreign

invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support

it by their own authority -- Of this he cited many examples; most of

which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties

or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might

by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia

nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, inlistments only

could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.



    2. [9] that the foederal government could not check the quarrels

between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power

nor means to interpose according to the exigency:



    3. [9] that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might

acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation -- such as a

productive impost -- counteraction of the commercial regulations of

other nations -- pushing of commerce ad libitum -- &c &c.



    4. [9] that the foederal government could not defend itself against

the [10] incroachments from the states.



    5. [9] that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions,

ratified, as it was in may of the states.



3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, [11] appealed to the

sense of the best friends of the U. S. -- the prospect of anarchy from

the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.



4. He the proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be

the republican principle.



He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which

he explained one by one [Here insert ye Resolutions annexed.] [12]



Resolutions proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787 [12]



1. Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected

& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;

namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."



2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National

Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or

to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem

best in different cases.



3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches. 



4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National

Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States

every _____ for the term of _____; to be of the age of _____ years at

least, to receive liberal stipends by with they may be compensated for

the devotion of their time to [13] public service; to be ineligible to

any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of

the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of

the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of _____

after its expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of

_____ after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject

to recall.



5. Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National

Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper

number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the

age of _____ years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient

to ensure their independency; [14] to receive liberal stipends, by which

they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to [15] public

service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular

State, or under the authority of the United States, except those

peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the

term of service, and for the space of _____ after the expiration

thereof.



6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating

Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the

Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to

legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or

in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the

exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the

several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature

the articles of Union; [16] and to call forth the force of the Union

agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the

articles thereof.



7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the

National Legislature for the term of _____ years, [17] to receive

punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services

rendered, in which no increase or [18] diminution shall be made so as to

affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution,

and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority

to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights

vested in Congress by the Confederation.



8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National

Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to

examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, &

every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be

final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a

rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed,

or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by _____ of the

members of each branch.



9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or

more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the

National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and

to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their

services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to

affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or

diminution. that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to

hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to

hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the

high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens

of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or

which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of

any National officers, and questions which may involve the national

peace and harmony.



10. Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States

lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a

voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the

consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the

whole.



11. Resd. that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,

except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government &

territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State



12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of

Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after

the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the

completion of all their engagements.



13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the

Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the

assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.



14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the

several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of

Union



15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the

Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after

the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies

of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be

expressly chosen by the people, to consider & decide thereon. [19]



He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity

of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U.

S. to pass away unimproved. [*20]



It was then Resolved -- That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into

a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American

Union. -- and that the propositions moved by Mr. Randolph be referred to

the said Committee.



Mr. CHARLES PINKNEY laid before the house the draught of a federal

Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and

independent States of America. [22] -- Mr. P. plan [23] ordered that the

same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the

state of the American Union.



adjourned.



___________



1. The words "In convention" are here inserted in the transcript.



2. Madison's directions "[see the Journal]" and "[see preceding page]"

are omitted in the transcript as are also the words "Additional rules."



3. The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."



4. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "the."



5. The speech is in Randolph's handwriting.



6. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.



7. The figures indicated are changed in the transcript to "first,"

"secondly," "thirdly," etc.



8. The words "it should" are here inserted in the transcript.



9. The figures indicated are changed in the transcript to "First,"

"Secondly," etc.



10. The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.



11. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.



12. This direction and the heading are omitted in the transcript.



13. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.



14. The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the transcript.



15. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.



16. The phrase "of any treaty subsisting under the authority of the

Union" is here added in the transcript.



17. The word "years" is omitted in the transcript.



18. The word "or" is changed to "nor" in the transcript.



19. The fifteen resolutions, constituting the "Virginia Plan," are in

Madison's handwriting.



*20. This Abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by Mr. Randolph

and is in his handwriting. [21] As a report of it from him had been

relied on, it was omitted by J. M.



21. This sentence is omitted on the transcript.



22. Robert Yates, a delegate from New York, gives the following account

of Pinckney's motion: "Mr. C. Pinkney, a member from South-Carolina,

then added, that he had reduced his ideas of a new government of to a

system, which he read, and confessed that it was grounded on the same

principle as of the above resolutions." (Secret Proceedings of the

Federal Convention (1821), p. 97.)



23. The words, "Mr. P. plan," are omitted in the transcript, and what

purports to be the plan itself is here inserted.



Madison himself did not take a copy of the draft nor did Pinckney

furnish him one, as he did a copy of his speech which he later delivered

in the Convention and which is printed as a part of the debates (session

of Monday, June 25). Many years later, in 1818, when John Quincy Adams,

then Secretary of State, was preparing the Journal of the Convention for

publication, he wrote to Pinckney, requesting a copy of his plan, and,

in compliance with this request, Pinckey sent him what purported to be

the draft, but which appears to have been a copy of the report of the

Committee of Detail of August 6, 1787, with certain alterations and

additions. The alleged draft and Pinckney's letter transmitting it were

written upon paper bearing the water-mark, "Russell & Co. 1797."



The Pinckney draft was not debated; it was neither used in the Committee

of the Whole nor in the Convention. It was however referred to the

Committee of Detail, which appears to have made some use of it, as

extracts from it have been identified by J. Franklin Jameson and an

outline of it discovered by Andrew C. McLaughlin, among the papers and

in the handwriting of James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania,

deposited with the Pennsylvania Historial Society.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



WEDNESDAY  MAY 30



Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.



The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.

Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.



The propositions of Mr. RANDOLPH which had been referred to the

Committee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris,

that the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of

Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the

objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security

of liberty & general welfare: [1] -- should be postponed, in order to

consider the 3 following:



1. that a Union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the

objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common

defence, security of liberty, & genl. welfare.



2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as

individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.



3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a

supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The motion for postponing

was seconded by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS and unanimously agreed to.



Some verbal criticisms were raised agst. the first proposition, and it

was agreed on motion of Mr. BUTLER seconded by Mr. RANDOLPH, to pass on

to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general

merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national &

supreme.



Mr. CHARLES PINKNEY wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to

abolish the State Governts. altogether. Mr. R. replied that he meant by

these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which

explained the outlines of the system he had in view.



Mr. BUTLER said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open

to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general

observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of

powers to Congs. heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one

body. The proposed distribution of the powers into [2] different bodies

changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.



Genl. PINKNEY expressed a doubt whether the act of Congs. recommending

the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it, could [3]

authorise a discussion of a System founded on different principles from

the federal Constitution.



Mr. GERRY seemed to entertain the same doubt.



Mr. GOVr. MORRIS explained the distinction between a federal and

national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a mere compact resting on the

good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive

operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one

supreme power, and one only. 



Mr. MASON observed that the present confederation was not only 4

deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent

States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature

of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that

such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and

would punish those only whose guilt required it.



Mr. SHERMAN who took his seat today, [5] admitted that the Confederation

had not given sufficient power to Congs. and that additional powers were

necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would

involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General &

particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed

however not [6] be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing

system; intimating as one reason that it would be wrong to lose every

amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States.



It was moved by Mr. READ [7] 2ded. by Mr. Chs. COTESWORTH PINKNEY, to

postpone the 3d. proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph viz that a

national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme

Legislative Executive and Judiciary," in order to take up the following

-- viz. "Resolved that in order to carry into execution the Design of

the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects

proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government consisting of

a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary ought to be established."



The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:



Yeas [8] Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina -- [8] 4

Nays. [9] N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina -- [9] 4.



On the question as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third proposition it was

resolved in Committee of the whole that a national governt. ought to be

established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary."

Massts. being ay -- Connect. -- no. N. York divided [Col. Hamilton ay

Mr. Yates no] Pena. ay. Delaware ay. Virga. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [10]



Resol: 2. of Mr. R's proposition to wit -- see May 29. [11] The

following Resolution being the 2d. of those proposed by Mr. Randolph was

taken up, viz -- "that the rights of suffrage in the National

Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or

to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem

best in different cases." [12]



Mr. MADISON observing that the words "or to the number of free

inhabitants," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee

from the general question whether the principle of representation should

be changed, moved that they might be struck out.



Mr. KING observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone

remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because

waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so

collected by the general Govt. that the sums respectively drawn from the

States would not appear; and would besides be continually varying.



Mr. MADISON admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some

better rule ought to be found.



Col. HAMILTON moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the

rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned

to the number of free inhabitants. Mr. SPAIGHT 2ded. the motion.



It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.



Mr. RANDOLPH and Mr. MADISON then moved the following resolution --

"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be

proportioned." It was moved and 2ded. to amend it by adding "and not

according to the present system" -- which was agreed to. It was then

moved and 2ded. to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights

of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the

present system." It was then moved & 2ded. to postpone the Resolution

moved by Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, which being agreed to:



Mr. MADISON, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following

resolution -- "that the equality of suffrage established by the articles

of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and

that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This

was 2ded. by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, and being generally relished, would have

been agreed to; when,



Mr. REED moved that the whole clause relating to the point of

Representation be postponed; reminding the Come. that the deputies from

Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any

change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be

fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.



Mr. GOVr. MORRIS observed that the valuable assistance of those members

could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of

discord in the Convention as a secession of a State, would add much to

the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an

article in a national Govt. that it could not be dispensed with.



Mr. MADISON observed that whatever reason might have existed for the

equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign

States, it must cease when a national Govermt. should be put into the

place. In the former case, the acts of Congs. depended so much for their

efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both

within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and

importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Genl. Govt. would

take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote

from a small State wd. have the same efficacy & importance as a vote

from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of

representatives from different States, as from Counties of different

extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at

once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the

Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken

in Committee, and the clause on report to the House be postponed without

a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. By

several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of

Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if

the resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the

Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be

postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of

representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty

being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.



The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,



The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House

having resolved to resume the subject in Committee tomorrow,



Adjourned to 10 OClock.



___________



1. The resolution is italicized in the transcript.



2. The word "with" is substituted in the transcript for "into."



3. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."



4. The words "not only" are transposed in the transcript, which reads as

follows: "Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation

was deficient," ...



5. The phrase "who took his seat today" is omitted in the transcript.



6. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.



7. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.



8. The word "Yeas" is omitted in the transcript and the word "aye"

inserted before the figure "4."



9. The word "Nays" is omitted in the transcript and word "no" inserted

before the figure "4."



10. In the transcript the vote reads: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,

Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina aye -- 6;

Connecticut, no -- 1; New York, divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr.

Yates, No)." [Note E] [11]



11. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript. 



12. The resolution is italicized in the transcript.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



THURSDAY  MAY 31 [1]



William Pierce from Georgia took his seat.



In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.



The 3d. Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of

two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of

Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was

understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.



Resol: 4. [2] first clause "that the members of the first branch of the

National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several

States" being taken up,



Mr. SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought

to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should

have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want

information and are constantly liable to be misled.



Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.

The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.

In Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily

misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports

circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute.

One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those

employed in the administration of Governmt. It would seem to be a maxim

of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular

clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on

that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the Constitution

itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still

however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the

levilling spirit.



Mr. MASON, argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the

people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of

the Govtt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons -- It ought

to know & sympathise with every part of the community; and ought

therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole

republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it,

which had in several instances particularly in Virga., different

interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c.

He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we sd.

incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the

rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the

indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of

humanity & policy; considering that however affluent their

circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a

few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their

posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive

therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of

policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness

of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.



Mr. WILSON contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of

the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the

federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished

to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long

subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government

this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to

increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the

electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the

general and local Governmts. should be obviated as much as possible. On

examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal

measures had proceded much more from the officers of the States, than

from the people at large.



Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the

National Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He

observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was

composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body

of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should

be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the

first -- the Executive by the second together with the first; and other

appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the

people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy

between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an

advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by

successive filtrations, but though it might be pushed too far. He wished

the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second

branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of

the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would

be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of

the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of

the Legislatures.



Mr. GERRY did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from

the British constitution were often fallacious when applied to our

situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn

that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not

always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an

election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor &

character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He

seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which

the State legislatures should be bound to choose.



Mr. BUTLER thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.



On the question for an election of the first branch of the national

Legislature by the people.



Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena. ay. Delawe.

divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga. ay.



The remaining Clauses of Resolution 4th. [3] relating to the

qualifications of members of the National Legislature, [3] being pospd.

nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions:



The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. [4] "that the second, [or

senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the

first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."



Mr. SPAIGHT contended that the 2d. branch ought to be chosen by the

State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect. Mr. BUTLER

apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the

States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security

of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and

called on Mr. Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the

extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to

assign to this second branch.



Mr. RAND observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions

stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required;

that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with

propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the

number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much

smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the

passionate proceedings to which numberous assemblies are liable. He

observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils

under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their

origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of

democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this

tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely

to answer the purpose.



Mr. KING reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as

proposed (by Mr. Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be

impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of

proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this

idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice

of one of them. -- Mr. SPAIGHT withdrew his motion.



Mr. WILSON opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an

election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the

second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought

both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the

people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested

the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several

election districts, for one branch, in chusing members for the other

branch, as a good model.



Mr. MADISON observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the

smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the

latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be

found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga. where large &

small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had

illustrated this consequence Local partiality, would often prefer a

resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit

residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known

throughout his own State.



Mr. SHERMAN favored an election of one member by each of the State

Legislatures.



Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out the "nomination by the State

Legislatures." On this question.



[*5] Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del divd. Va.

no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no. [6]



On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of

nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N.

Jersey. no. Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Ga. no.

[7]



So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan. 



[8] The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national

Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the

question whether each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous

affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the

Legislative powers of the existing Congs. to this Assembly, there was

also a silent affirmative nem. con.



On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which

the State Legislatures were individually incompetent."



Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLEDGE objected to the vagueness of the term

incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they

should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this

definition. 



Mr. BUTLER repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in

taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolp for the

extent of his meaning.



Mr. RANDOLPH disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the

national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an

inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any

considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion

was fixed on this point.



Mr. MADISON said that he had brought with him into the Convention a

strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers

necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also

brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained un

ltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might

ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing

which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide

for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the

end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it

must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.



On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not

competent, Massts. ay. Cont. divd. [Sharman no Elseworth ay] N. Y. ay.

N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga. ay.

[9]



The other clauses [10] giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among

the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the

Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or

any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added

after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion

of Dr. FRANKLIN) were agreed to witht. debate or dissent. The last

clause of Resolution 6. [11] authorizing an exertion of the force of the

whole agst. a delinquent State came next into consideration.



Mr. MADISON, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force,

the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of

it when applied to people collectively and not individually. -- A union

of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its

own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a

declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably

be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous

compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would

be framed as might render this recourse [12] unnecessary, and moved that

the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to nem. con.



The Committee then rose & the House



Adjourned



___________



1. The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.



2. The transcript changes "Resol: 4." to "The fourth Resolution."



3. In the transcript the words "Resolution 4th" are changed to "the

fourth Resolution" and the phrase "the qualifications of members of the

National Legislature" is italicized."



4. In the transcript the words "Resolution 5," are changed to "the fifth

Resolution" and the words of the resolution are italicized.



*5. This question [6] omitted in the printed Journal, & the votes applied

to the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated [this note to

be in the bottom margin]. [6]



6. In the transcript the vote reads: "*Massachusetts, Connecticut, New

York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9; Delaware divided"; and Madison's direction

concerning the footnote is omitted. The word "is" is inserted after the

word "question."



7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, South

Carolina, aye -- 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."



8. In this paragraph the transcript italicizes the following phrases:

"the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate,"

"whether each branch shd. originate laws," "for transferring all the

Legislative powers of the existing Cong. to this Assembly"; and the

phrase "a silent affirmative nem. con." is changed to "an unanimous

affirmative, without debate."



9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Connecticut divided (Sherman, no.

Ellsworth, aye)." 



10. The phrase, "giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the

States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the

Nat. Leg. the articles of union" is italicized in the transcript. 



11. The words "the sixth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript

for "resolution 6" and the phrase "authorizing and exertion of the force

of the whole agst. a delinquent State" is italicized.



12. The word "resource" is substituted in the transcript for "recourse."



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



FRIDAY  JUNE 1st 1787



William Houston from Georgia took his seat.



The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. [1] "that a

national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national

Legislature -- for the term of ______ years &c to be ineligible

thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress &c."



Mr. PINKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive

powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c., which

would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an

elective one.



Mr. WILSON moved that the Executive consist of a single person.



Mr. C PINKNEY seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to

consist of a single person, be instituted.



A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put

the question, DOCr. FRANKLIN observed that it was a point of great

importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments

on it before the question was put.



Mr. RUTLIDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other

subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by

having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them,

which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting

the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him

the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest

responsibility and administer the public affairs best.



Mr. SHERMAN said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more

than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into

effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and

accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depositary of the

supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the

business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and

consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he

wished the number might not be fixed but that the legislature should be

at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.



Mr. WILSON preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch

and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives

of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive

powers. Some of these prerogatives were of Legislative nature. Among

others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he conceived [2] strictly

Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not

appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.



Mr. GERRY favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in

order to give weight & inspire confidence. Mr. RANDOLPH strenuously

opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the

foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the

British Governmt. as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw

censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it

he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of

the people of America required a different form of Government. He could

not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor,

despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in

one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in

order to support its independence to consist of more than one.



Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus

of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated

that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to

the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the

manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic

would do for it. Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was

postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any

decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz -- "that

a National Executive be instituted."



Mr. MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice shd. be made

between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of

the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature

Executive, and must be given to that departmt. whether administered by

one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the

judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a

single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before

the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive shd. be struck

out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be

instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to

carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not

otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not

Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be

delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor

judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment in

consequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper powers might

otherwise be delegated.



Mr. WILSON seconded this motion -- 



Mr. PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member

of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor

Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He

said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the

"power [3] to carry into effect the national laws."



Mr. RANDOLPH seconded the motion.



Mr. MADISON did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or

even the preceding words -- "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being

perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not

however see any inconveniency [4] in retaining them, and cases might

happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.



In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question on Mr.

Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney

struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N. J. Pena. Del. N. C. &

Geo. [5] agst. Mass. Virga. & S. Carolina [5] the preceding part of the

motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided, all the other States

in the affirmative. The next clause in Resolution 7, [6] relating to the

mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under

consideration,



Mr. WILSON said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he

wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear

chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an

election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts.,

shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large,

was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such

cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.



Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making

him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which

was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme

Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was

any such thing.



Mr. WILSON moves that the blank for the term of duration should be

filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred

this short period, on the supposition that a reeligibility would be

provided for.



Mr. PINKNEY moves for seven years.



Mr. SHERMAN was for three years, and agst. the doctrine of rotation as

throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to execute its duties.



Mr. MASON was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a

re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a

false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit

characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue

with the Legislature for a re-appointment.



Mr. BEDFORD was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He

begged the committee to consider what the situation of the Country would

be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a

period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the

qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his

appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as

an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for

a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine

years.



On the question for seven years, [7] Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. Y. ay.

N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.

[8] There being 5ays, 4 noes, 1 divd., a question was asked whether a

majority had voted in the affirmative? The President decided that it was

an affirmative vote.



The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.



Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the

people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature

from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but

the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of

each other, as well as of the States;



Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes

however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.

-- the clause "to be chosen by the National Legislature" -- was

accordingly postponed. -- 



Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch

only of the national Legislature.



The Committee then rose and the House



Adjourned.



___________



1. The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript

for "Resolution 7' and the words of the resolution are italicized.



2. The transcript here substitutes the word "considered" for "conceived."



3. The transcript uses the word "power" in the plural.



4. The transcript changes the word "inconveniency" to "inconvenience."



5. In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the

States Georgia and South Carolina respectively.



6. The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript

for "Resolution 7."



7. The transcript italicizes the phrase "for seven years."



8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey,

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Massachusetts, divided."



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



SATURDAY  JUNE 2d [1]   IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE



*[Insert the words noted here] [2] *William Saml. Johnson from

Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer, from Maryd. & John Lansing

Jr. from N. York, took their seats.



It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr. Randolph respecting

the Executive, in order to take up the 2d. branch of the Legislature;

which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: [3] agst.

N. Y. Pena. Maryd. [3]



The mode of appointg ye Executive was resumed.



Mr. WILSON made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode

proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy

shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided

into ______ districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each

district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature

elect ______ members for their respective districts to be electors of

the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive

magistracy meet at ______ and they or any ______ of them so met shall

proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body ______ person

in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be

vested."



Mr. WILSON repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the

intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce

more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an

election by the national Legislature.



Mr. GERRY, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would

be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature &

the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would

be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter,

of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to [4]

their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears

it would alarm & give a handle to the State partisans, as tending to

supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not

yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might

not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till people

should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the

suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures

nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people

ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little

informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to

deceptions.



Mr. WILLIAMSON could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors

chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the

State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great

trouble and expence. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's

substitute, it was negatived: Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. [*5] Pa.

ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa. no. [6]



On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature

for the term of seven years, it was agreed to Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N.

Y. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.

ay. [7]



DOCr. FRANKLIN moved that what related to the compensation for the

services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute -- "whose

necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary,

stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services" -- He said that

being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been

unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support

his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the

permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them.



Mr. WILSON made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted -- The

following is a literal copy of the paper.



Sir.

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one

article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable

gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a

good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of

salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion

may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is

right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will

judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may

possibly change mine. -- I think I see inconveniences in the appointment

of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great

advantages.



Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the

affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and

the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting

men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in

many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men,

a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and

they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such

places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The

struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are

perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying

sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a

submission to dishonorable terms of peace. And of what kind are the men

that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the

bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of

parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the

wise and moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest

for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong

passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These

will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers. -- And

these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation:

For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same

motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their

administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the

people.



Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with

moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long

continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations.

And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the

rulers may be able in return to give more to them. -- Hence as all

history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant

kind of warfare between the governing & governed: the one striving to

obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has

alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in

dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed

the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly

increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want

of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of

taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his

partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and

enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred

who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all

the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their

children servants for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to

establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in

mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from

Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five

hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and

that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive,

that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a

Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our

proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult,

by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that

tho' we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number

will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a King, as

the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a

King will the sooner be set over us.



It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can

never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying

them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some

existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary

opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office,

but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not

sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by

some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France, the office of

Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable.

It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the

law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not

amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place.

Therefore as legal interest is there at five per Ct. they in fact pay

two per Ct. for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the

Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of

paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to

recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only

bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving

their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are

sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their

time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary

satisfaction.



Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the

experiment, and practised it with success more than an [8] hundred

years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that

they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to

their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit

with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing

their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty,

and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,

but it was [9] never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites.

And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the

greater the honor.



To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most

important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for

eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I

will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and

distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends &

Companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And

shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with

public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an

equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our

laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I

think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men

to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.



Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an

object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I

apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not

seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having

delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.



The motion was seconded by Col. HAMILTON with the view he said merely of

bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which

was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight.

No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the

consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but

rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its

expediency or practicability.



Mr. DICKENSON moved "that the Executive be made removeable by the

National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of

individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of

removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great

officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for

removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had

no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed

inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required

considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.



Mr. BEDFORD seconded the motion.



Mr. SHERMAN contended that the National Legislature should have power to

remove the Executive at pleasure.



Mr. MASON. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered

indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the

corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the

Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the

fundamental principle of good Government.



Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILSON observed that it would leave an equality of

agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a

minority of the people to prevent ye. removal of an officer who had

rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it

would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his

administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay

court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or

wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to

introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency

could be otherwise supplied.



Mr. DICKENSON considered the business as so important that no man ought

to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the

sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary

departments ought to be made as independent. as possible; but that such

an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent

with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited

monarchy. In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive arises

from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from

the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must

look out for something else. One source of stability is the double

branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct

States formed the other principal source of stability. This division

ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left

with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future

fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the

States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of

smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best

Governments in the world. It