The Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1787
JUNE 20, 1787. 1
Mr. William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1st. propos: 2 of the Report of Come.
of the whole
3 before the House.
Mr. ELSEWORTH 2ded. by Mr. GORHAM, moves to alter it so as to run "that the
Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative,
Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would drop the word
national, and retain the proper title "the United States." He
could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the federal articles could
dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous not to consider the
Confederation as still subsisting. He wished also the plan of the Convention to
go forth as an amendment to 4 the articles
of 5 Confederation, since under this idea
the authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the
people will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification
several succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did
not like these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to build
Mr. RANDOLPH, did not object to the
change of expression, but apprised the gentlemen 6
who wished for it that he did not admit it for the reasons assigned;
particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people for ratification.
The motion of Mr. Ellsewth. was acquiesced in nem: con:
The 2d. Resol: "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" 7 taken up, the word "national"
struck out as of course.
Mr. LANSING, observed that the true
question here was, whether the Convention would adhere to or depart from the
foundation of the present Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2d. Resolution,
"that the powers of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress."
He had already assigned two reasons agst. such an innovation as was proposed: 1
8 the want of competent powers in the
Convention. — 2. 8 the state of the
public mind. It had been observed by [Mr. Madison] in discussing the first
point, that in two States the Delegates to Congs. were chosen by the people.
Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, it had in fact no weight,
as the Delegates however chosen, did not represent the people merely as so many
individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State. [Mr. Randolph] put it, he said,
on its true footing namely that the public safety superseded the scruple arising
from the review of our powers. But in order to feel the force of this
consideration, the same impression must be had of the public danger. He had not
himself the same impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. [Mr.
Wilson] contended that as the Convention were only to recommend, they might
recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever of so
respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not succeed, will be
a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there was no certain criterion
of the public mind on the subject. He therefore recurred to the evidence of it
given by the opposition in the States to the scheme of an Impost. It could not
be expected that those possessing Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with
it. It was not to be expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He
proceeded to make some observations on the plan itself and the argumts. urged in
support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation from the
case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from their
comparative smallness: but from the actual fewness of the inhabitants, some of
them not having more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the Counties
of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the small ones had
not been made. It had been said that Congress represent the State prejudices:
will not any other body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the
States, also represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague
[Col. Hamilton] that there was no coincidence of interests among the large
States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it were true
that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States, there was equal
safety for all of them, whether the representation remained as heretofore, or
were proportioned as now proposed. It is proposed that the Genl. Legislature
shall have a negative on the laws of the States. Is it conceivable that there
will be leisure for such a task? there will on the most moderate calculation, be
as many Acts sent up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the
members of the general Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from
Georgia be a Judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N.
Hamshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great Britain
heretofore was. It is said that the National Govt. must have the influence
arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to render such a
Government effectual be believed such an influence to be necessary. But if the
States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the
proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the States must be entirely
abolished. Will any one say this would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any
Genl. Government equally beneficial to all can be attained. That now under
consideration he is sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another
objection. The system was too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its
operation will be either with respect to the Genl. Govt. or the State Govts. One
or other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.
Col. MASON, did not expect this point would have
been reagitated. The essential differences between the two plans, had been
clearly stated. The principal objections agst. that of Mr. R. were the want
of power & the want of practicability. There can be no weight in
the first as the fiat is not to be here, but in the people. He thought with his
colleague Mr. R. that there were besides certain crisises, in which all the
ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave as an example, the
eventual Treaty with G.B. in forming which the Comrs. of the U. S. had boldly
disregarded the improvident shackles of Congs. had given to their Country an
honorable & happy peace, and instead of being censured for the transgression
of their powers, had raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass.
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence he thought was still
more groundless. [Mr. Lansing] had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an
enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage of these
attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he [Mr. L] opposed. He thought a
very different inference ought to have been drawn; viz that the plan which [Mr.
L] espoused, and which proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never could
be expected to succeed. He meant not to throw any reflections on Congs. as a
body, much less on any particular members of it. He meant however to speak his
sentiments without reserve on this subject; it was a privilege of Age, and
perhaps the only compensation which nature had given for the privation of so
many other enjoyments: and he should not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to
be thought that the people of America, so watchful over their interests; so
jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will surrender both the
sword and the purse, to the same body, and that too not chosen immediately by
themselves? They never will. They never ought. Will they trust such a body, with
the regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their taxes; with all the
other great powers, which are in contemplation? Will they give unbounded
confidence to a secret Journal — to the intrigues — to the factions
which in the nature of things appertain to such an Assembly? If any man doubts
the existence of these characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals
for the years 78, 79, & 80. — It will be said, that if the people are
averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to a
National Legislature. The proper answer is that in this case they do not part
with power: they only transfer it from one sett of immediate Representatives to
another sett. — Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind of
the people, he believed the mind of the people of America, as elsewhere, was
unsettled as to some points; but settled as to others. In two points he was sure
it was well settled. 1. 9 in an attachment
to Republican Government. 2. 9 in an
attachment to more than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions
accord so generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have
been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have resulted from
the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the establishmt. of two
branches in the Legislatures are the State of Pa. & Congs. and the latter
the only single one not chosen by the people themselves. What has been the
consequence? The people have been constantly averse to giving that Body further
powers — It was acknowledged by [Mr. Patterson] that his plan could not be
enforced without military coertion. Does he consider the force of this
concession. The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves are
not more incompatible that 10 such a
mixture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the militia march from one
State to 11 another, in order to collect
the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they
maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the Citizens of the invaded State
assist one another till they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union
altogether. Rebellion is the only case, in which the military force of the State
can be properly exerted agst. its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck
with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the
non-payment of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism
itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military
collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination between
the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to repeat, that
notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national Government, he never
would agree to abolish the State Govts. or render them absolutely insignificant.
They were as necessary as the Genl. Govt. and he would be equally careful to
preserve them. He was aware of the difficulty of drawing the line between them,
but hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many
distinguished characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Govt. And he
would prefer trusting to posterity the amendment of its defects, rather than to
push the experiment too far.
Mr. LUTHER MARTIN
agreed with [Col Mason] as to the importance of the State Govts. he would
support them at the expence of the Genl. Govt. which was instituted for the
purpose of that support. He saw no necessity for two branches, and if it existed
Congress might be organized into two. He considered Congs as representing the
people, being chosen by the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At any
rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and it was the Legislatures not the
people who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule of voting have
been the ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States must always have been
ready, to place further confidence in Congs. The causes of repugnance must
therefore be looked for elsewhere. — At the separation from the British
Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into
thirteen separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one: to
these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties & properties:
to these they must look up. The federal Govt. they formed, to defend the whole
agst. foreign nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser States agst. the
ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting powers 12
unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the
powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States
which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being swallowed
up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the States having already
vested their powers in their respective Legislatures, could not resume them
without a dissolution of their governments. He was agst. Conventions in the
States: was not agst. assisting States agst. rebellious subjects; thought the
federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require coercion more than the
National one, as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its
revenues on requisitions & quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended
into the States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.
Mr. SHERMAN 2ded & supported Mr.
Lansings motion. He admitted two branches to be necessary in the State
Legislatures, but saw no necessity for them in a Confederacy of States. The
examples were all, of a single Council. Congs. carried us thro' the war, and
perhaps as well as any Govt. could have done. The complaints at present are not
that the views of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful; but that their powers are
insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt & the want
of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are the great matters
that press. All the States were sensible of the defect of power in Congs. He
thought much might be said in apology for the failure of the State Legislatures
to comply with the confederation. They were afraid of bearing too hard on the
people, by accumulating taxes; no constitutional rule had been or could
be observed in the quotas — the accounts also were unsettled & every
State supposed itself in advance, rather than in arrears. For want of a general
system, taxes to a due amount had not been drawn from trade which was the most
convenient resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation
of Congs. on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were
willing to trust Congs. with power to draw revenue from Trade. There is no
weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Congs. for money
matters being the most important of all, if the people will trust them with
power as to them, they will trust them with any other necessary powers. Congs.
indeed by the confederation have in fact the right of saying how much the people
shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be applied: and this right was granted
to them in the expectation that it would in all cases have its effect. If
another branch were to be added to Congs. to be chosen by the people, it would
serve to embarrass. The people would not much interest themselves in the
elections, a few designing men in the large districts would carry their points,
and the people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than
in Congs. He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should be unfriendly as
had been suggested, to Congs. If they appoint Congs. and approve of their
measures, they would be rather favorable and partial to them. The disparity of
the States in point of size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the large
States had not yet suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the small
ones. In all great and general points, the interests of all the States were the
same. The State of Virga. notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the
Confederation without, or 13 even
proposing, any alteration. Massts. also ratified without any material difficulty
&c. In none of the ratifications is the want of two branches noticed or
complained of. To consolidate the States as some had proposed would dissolve our
Treaties with foreign Nations, which had been formed with us, as confederated
States. He did not however suppose that the creation of two branches in the
Legislature would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two
branches, and a proportional representation in one of them; provided each State
had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure the rights of the
lesser States; otherwise three or four of the large States would rule the others
as they please. Each State like each individual had its peculiar habits usages
and manners, which constituted its happiness. It would not therefore give to
others a power over this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when
he could avoid it. Mr. WILSON, urged the
necessity of two branches; observed that if a proper model were 14
not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to be wondered at. The number
of them was small & the duration of some at least short. The Amphyctionic &
Achaean were formed in the infancy of political Science; and appear by their
History & fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic
Confederacies were held together not by any vital principle of energy but by the
incumbent pressure of formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its
continuance to the influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own
experience for the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in
15 the 12 since the commencement of the
Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed
to the recollection of others whether on many important occasions, the public
interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success
of the Revolution was owing to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress.
In many instances it went on even agst. the difficulties arising from Congs.
themselves. He admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to
the Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not of
choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same motive to the
unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a
little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State
Legislatures & the General Legislature: observing that the members of the
former would have views & feelings very distinct in this respect from their
constituents. A private Citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be
exercised by the Genl. or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for
his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the
body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the
eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congs. to the people
at large, had always been better received & produced greater effect, than
those made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take up Mr. Lansings proposition "to
vest the powers of Legislation in Congs."
Masst. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 16
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2d. Resolution
in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed till tomorrow.
1. The year "1787" is omitted in
2. The words "The first Resolution"
are substituted in the transcript for "1st. propos."
3. The word "being" is here
inserted in the transcript.
4. The word "of" is substituted
in the transcript for "to."
5. The word "the" is here
inserted in the transcript.
6. The word "gentlemen" is used
in the singular in the transcript.
7. The word "being" is here
inserted in the transcript.
8. The figures "1" and "2"
are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
9. The figures "1" and "2"
are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
10. The word "than" is
substituted in the transcript for "that."
11. The word "into" is
substituted in the transcript for "in."
12. The transcript uses the word "powers"
in the singular.
13. The word "or" is stricken
out in the transcript.
14. The word "was" is
substituted in the transcript for "were."
15. The word "of" is
substituted in the transcript for "in."
16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6; Maryland