The Federalist No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Wednesday, November 14, 1787
To the People of the State of New York:
last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers
to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of
foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and,
perhaps, still more alarming kind -- those which will in all probability flow
from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and
convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but
they deserve a more particular and more full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can
seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only
united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a
want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would
be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a
continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected
sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable.
There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the
desire of pre-eminence and dominion -- the jealousy of power, or the desire of
equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed though an
equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and
competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not
less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in
private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of
leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this
class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many
instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some
public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to
personal advantage or personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment
of a prostitute,1
at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked,
vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened
as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or to get rid of the
accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the
state in the purchase of popularity,4
or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that
famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the
Peloponnesian war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and
renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry
VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5 entertained hopes of succeeding in the
acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To
secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates
of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the
kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if
there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal
monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once
the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,6 the petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a third,8 had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are
topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal
considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or
domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they
are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who
have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights
to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps,
however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays
had not been a
desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would
have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of
experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or
designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace
between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius
of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to
soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have
so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will
be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the
true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic
spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it
not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and
immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct
than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have
republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the
former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not
aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that
affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject
to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular
and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are
often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of
course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals?
Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not
the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or
glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since
that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by
the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for
the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be
appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics;
two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the
same times. Sparta was little better than a well-regulated camp; and Rome was
never sated of carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor
in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms
into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave
him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till,
becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means to
accomplish that formidable league,9
which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,
took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious
contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most
persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the
people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for
ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have
been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been
engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many
popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war,
or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary
to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority
between the rival houses of Austria and
Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the
antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather
the avarice, of a favorite leader,10
protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a
considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a
great measure grown out of commercial considerations, -- the desire of
supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of
traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even
the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without
The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from
the attempts of the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the
Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on
the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not
more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and
were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken
on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual
progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were, after a while, confounded
with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants
kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the
House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters
of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its consequences overthrew
all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine
expectations of the most beneficial fruits.
From this summary of what has taken place in other
countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what
reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the
fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with
promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident
to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a
golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political
conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote
from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national
dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax
and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of
North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual
insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare --!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding
with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has
from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in
politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural
enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
"NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally
enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents
the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy
which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and
suggests the REMEDY.
1. Aspasia, vide Plutarch's Life
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to
have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the
embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray, comprehending
the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian
princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide Principes des Negociations
par l'Abbé de Mably.