PLEASURES AND PAINS, THEIR KINDS.
I. Having represented what belongs to all sorts of
pleasures and pains alike, we come now to exhibit, each by itself, the several
sorts of pains and pleasures. Pains and pleasures may be called by one general
word, interesting perceptions. Interesting perceptions are either simple or
complex. The simple ones are those which cannot any one of them be resolved
into more: complex are those which are resolvable into divers simple ones. A
complex interesting perception may accordingly be composed either, 1. Of
pleasures alone: 2. Of pains alone: or, 3. Of a pleasure or pleasures, and a
pain or pains together. What determines a lot of pleasure, for example, to be
regarded as one complex pleasure, rather than as divers simple ones, is the
nature of the exciting cause. Whatever pleasures are excited all at once by the
action of the same cause, are apt to be looked upon as constituting all
together but one pleasure.
II. The several simple pleasures of which human nature
is susceptible, seem to be as follows: 1. The pleasures of sense. 2. The
pleasures of wealth. 3. The pleasures of skill. 4. The pleasures of amity. 5.
The pleasures of a good name. 6. The pleasures of power. 7. The pleasures of
piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of malevolence. 10.
The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of imagination. 12. The pleasures of
expectation. 13. The pleasures dependent on association. 14. The pleasures of
III. The several simple pains seem to be as follows: 1.
The pains of privation. 2. The pains of the senses. 3. The pains of
awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The pains of an ill name. 6. The pains
of piety. 7. The pains of benevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The
pains of the memory. 10. The pains of the imagination. 11. The pains of
expectation. 12. The pains dependent on association.
IV. 1. The pleasures of sense seem to be as follows: 1.
The pleasures of the taste or palate; including whatever pleasures are
experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst. 2. The pleasure
of intoxication. 3. The pleasures of the organ of smelling. 4. The pleasures of
the touch. 5. The simple pleasures of the ear; independent of association. 6.
The simple pleasures of the eye; independent of association. 7. The pleasure of
the sexual sense. 8. The pleasure of health: or, the internal pleasureable
feeling or flow of spirits (as it is called), which accompanies a state of full
health and vigour; especially at times of moderate bodily exertion. 9. The
pleasures of novelty: or, the pleasures derived from the gratification of the
appetite of curiosity, by the application of new objects to any of the
V. 2. By the pleasures of wealth may be meant those
pleasures which a man is apt to derive from the consciousness of possessing any
article or articles which stand in the list of instruments of enjoyment or
security, and more particularly at the time of his first acquiring them; at
which time the pleasure may be styled a pleasure of gain or a pleasure of
acquisition: at other times a pleasure of possession.
3. The pleasures of skill, as exercised upon particular objects, are those
which accompany the application of such particular instruments of enjoyment to
their uses, as cannot be so applied without a greater or less share of
difficulty or exertion.
VI. 4. The pleasures of amity, or self-recommendation,
are the pleasures that may accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the
acquisition or the possession of the good-will of such or such assignable
person or persons in particular: or, as the phrase is, of being upon good terms
with him or them: and as a fruit of it, of his being in a way to have the
benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services.
VII. 5. The pleasures of a good name are the pleasures
that accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the acquisition or the
possession of the good-will of the world about him; that is, of such members of
society as he is likely to have concerns with; and as a means of it, either
their love or their esteem, or both: and as a fruit of it, of his being in the
way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services. These may
likewise be called the pleasures of good repute, the pleasures of honour, or
the pleasures of the moral sanction.
VIII. 6. The pleasures of power are the pleasures that
accompany the persuasion of a man's being in a condition to dispose people, by
means of their hopes and fears, to give him the benefit of their services: that
is, by the hope of some service, or by the fear of some disservice, that he may
be in the way to render them.
IX. 7. The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that
accompany the belief of a man's being in the acquisition or in possession of
the good-will or favour of the Supreme Being: and as a fruit of it, of his
being in a way of enjoying pleasures to be received by God's special
appointment, either in this life, or in a life to come. These may also be
called the pleasures of religion, the pleasures of a religious disposition, or
the pleasures of the religious sanction.
X. 8. The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures
resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings
who may be the objects of benevolence; to wit, the sensitive beings we are
acquainted with; under which are commonly included, 1. The Supreme Being. 2.
Human beings. 3. Other animals. These may also be called the pleasures of
good-will, the pleasures of sympathy, or the pleasures of the benevolent or
XI. 9. The pleasures of malevolence are the pleasures
resulting from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who
may become the objects of malevolence: to wit, 1. Human beings. 2. Other
animals. These may also be styled the pleasures of ill-will, the pleasures of
the irascible appetite, the pleasures of antipathy, or the pleasures of the
malevolent or dissocial affections.
XII. 10. The pleasures of the memory are the pleasures
which, after having enjoyed such and such pleasures, or even in some case after
having suffered such and such pains, a man will now and then experience, at
recollecting them exactly in the order and in the circumstances in which they
were actually enjoyed or suffered. These derivative pleasures may of course be
distinguished into as many species as there are of original perceptions, from
whence they may be copied. They may also be styled pleasures of simple
XIII. 11. The pleasures of the imagination are the
pleasures which may be derived from the contemplation of any such pleasures as
may happen to be suggested by the memory, but in a different order, and
accompanied by different groups of circumstances. These may accordingly be
referred to any one of the three cardinal points of time, present, past, or
future. It is evident they may admit of as many distinctions as those of the
XIV. 12. The pleasures of expectation are the pleasures
that result from the contemplation of any sort of pleasure, referred to time
future, and accompanied with the sentiment of belief. These also
may admit of the same distinctions.
XV. 13. The pleasures of association are the pleasures
which certain objects or incidents may happen to afford, not of themselves, but
merely in virtue of some association they have contracted in the mind with
certain objects or incidents which are in themselves pleasurable. Such is the
case, for instance, with the pleasure of skill, when afforded by such a set of
incidents as compose a game of chess. This derives its pleasurable quality from
its association partly with the pleasures of skill, as exercised in the
production of incidents pleasurable of themselves: partly from its association
with the pleasures of power. Such is the case also with the pleasure of good
luck, when afforded by such incidents as compose the game of hazard, or any
other game of chance, when played at for nothing. This derives its pleasurable
quality from its association with one of the pleasures of wealth; to wit, with
the pleasure of acquiring it.
XVI. 14. Farther on we shall see pains grounded upon
pleasures; in like manner may we now see pleasures grounded upon pains. To the
catalogue of pleasures may accordingly be added the pleasures of relief:
or, the pleasures which a man experiences when, after he has been enduring a
pain of any kind for a certain time, it comes to cease, or to abate. These may
of course be distinguished into as many species as there are of pains: and may
give rise to so many pleasures of memory, of imagination, and of expectation.
XVII. 1. Pains of privation are the pains that may
results from the thought of not possessing in the time present any of the
several kinds of pleasures. Pains of privation may accordingly be resolved into
as many kinds as there are of pleasures to which they may correspond, and from
the absence whereof they may be derived.
XVIII. There are three sorts of pains which are only so
many modifications of the several pains of privation. When the enjoyment of any
particular pleasure happens to be particularly desired, but without any
expectation approaching to assurance, the pain of privation which thereupon
results takes a particular name, and is called the pain of desire, or of
XIX. Where the enjoyment happens to have been looked
for with a degree of expectation approaching to assurance, and that expectation
is made suddenly to cease, it is called a pain of disappointment.
XX. A pain of privation takes the name of a pain of
regret in two cases: 1. Where it is grounded on the memory of a pleasure, which
having been once enjoyed, appears not likely to be enjoyed again: 2. Where it
is grounded on the idea of a pleasure, which was never actually enjoyed, nor
perhaps so much as expected, but which might have been enjoyed (it is
supposed,) had such or such a contingency happened, which, in fact, did not
XXI. 2. The several pains of the senses seem to be as
follows: 1. The pains of hunger and thirst: or the disagreeable sensations
produced by the want of suitable substances which need at times to be applied
to the alimentary canal. 2. The pains of the taste: or the disagreeable
sensations produced by the application of various substances to the palate, and
other superior parts of the same canal. 3. The pains of the organ of smell: or
the disagreeable sensations produced by the effluvia of various substances when
applied to that organ. 4. The pains of the touch: or the disagreeable
sensations produced by the application of various substances to the skin. 5.
The simple pains of the hearing: or the disagreeable sensations excited in the
organ of that sense by various kinds of sounds: independently (as before,) of
association. 6. The simple pains of the sight: or the disagreeable sensations
if any such there be, that may be excited in the organ of that sense by visible
images, independent of the principle of association. 7. The pains resulting from excessive heat or
cold, unless these be referable to the touch. 8. The pains of disease: or the
acute and uneasy sensations resulting from the several diseases and
indispositions to which human nature is liable. 9. The pain of exertion,
whether bodily or mental: or the uneasy sensation which is apt to accompany any
intense effort, whether of mind or body.
XXII. 3. The pains of awkwardness are the pains which
sometimes result from the unsuccessful endeavour to apply any particular
instruments of enjoyment or security to their uses, or from the difficulty a
man experiences in applying them.
XXIII. 4. The pains of enmity are the pains that may
accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious to the ill-will of such or
such an assignable person or persons in particular: or, as the phrase is, of
being upon ill terms with him or them: and, in consequence, of being obnoxious
to certain pains of some sort or other, of which he may be the cause.
XXIV. 5. The pains of an ill-name, are the pains that
accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious, or in a way to be
obnoxious to the ill-will of the world about him. These may likewise be called
the pains of ill-repute, the pains of dishonour, or the pains of the moral
XXV. 6. The pains of piety are the pains that accompany
the belief of a man's being obnoxious to the displeasure of the Supreme Being:
and in consequence to certain pains to be inflicted by his especial
appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may also be called
the pains of religion; the pains of a religious disposition; or the pains of
the religious sanction. When the belief is looked upon as well-grounded, these
pains are commonly called religious terrors; when looked upon as ill-grounded,
XXVI. 7. The pains of benevolence are the pains
resulting from the view of any pains supposed to be endured by other beings.
These may also be called the pains of good-will, of sympathy, or the pains of
the benevolent or social affections.
XXVII. 8. The pains of malevolence are the pains
resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be enjoyed by any beings
who happen to be the objects of a man's displeasure. These may also be styled
the pains of ill-will, of antipathy, or the pains of the malevolent or
XXVIII. 9. The pains of the memory may be grounded on
every one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of positive
pains. These correspond exactly to the pleasures of the memory.
XXIX. 10. The pains of the imagination may also be
grounded on any one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of
positive pains: in other respects they correspond exactly to the pleasures of
XXX. 11. The pains of expectation may be grounded on
each one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of positive
pains. These may be also termed pains of apprehension.
XXXI. 12. The pains of association correspond exactly
to the pleasures of association.
XXXII. Of the above list there are certain pleasures
and pains which suppose the existence of some pleasure or pain, of some other
person, to which the pleasure or pain of the person in question has regard:
such pleasures and pains may be termed extra-regarding. Others do not
suppose any such thing: these may be termed self-regarding. The only pleasures and pains of the
extra-regarding class are those of benevolence and those of malevolence: all
the rest are self-regarding.
XXXIII. Of all these several sorts of pleasures and
pains, there is scarce any one which is not liable, on more accounts than one,
to come under the consideration of the law. Is an offense committed? It is the
tendency which it has to destroy, in such or such persons, some of these
pleasures, or to produce some of these pains, that constitutes the mischief of
it, and the ground for punishing it. It is the prospect of some of these
pleasures, or of security from some of these pains, that constitutes the motive
or temptation, it is the attainment of them that constitutes the profit of the
offense. Is the offender to be punished? It can be only by the production of
one or more of these pains, that the punishment can be inflicted.
1. The catalogue here given, is what seemed to be a
complete list of the several simple pleasures and pains of which human nature
is susceptible: insomuch, that if, upon any occasion whatsoever, a man feels
pleasure or pain, it is either referable at once to some one or other of these
kinds, or resolvable into such as are. It might perhaps have been a
satisfaction to the reader, to have seen an analytical view of the subject,
taken upon an exhaustive plan, for the purpose of demonstrating the catalogue
to be what it purports to be, a complete one. The catalogue is in fact the
result of such an analysis which, however, I thought it better to discard at
present as being of too metaphysical a cast, and not strictly within the limits
of this design. See ch. xiii. [Cases unmeet], par. 2. Note.
2. There are also pleasures of novelty, excited by the
appearance of new ideas: these are pleasures of the imagination.
3. For instance, the pleasure of being able to gratify
the sense of hearing, by singing, or performing upon any musical instrument.
The pleasure thus obtained, is a thing superadded to, and perfectly
distinguishable from, that which a man enjoys from hearing another person
perform in the same manner.
4. See ch. iii. [Sanctions].
5. See ch. iii. [Sanctions].
6. In contradistinction to these, all other pleasures
may be termed pleasures of enjoyment.
7. The pleasure of the sexual sense seems to have no
positive pain to correspond to it: it has only a pain of privation, or pain of
the mental class, the pain of unsatisfied desire. If any positive pain of body
result from the want of such indulgence, it belongs to the head of pains of
8. The pleasures of novelty
have no positive pains corresponding to them. The pain which a man experiences
when he is in the condition of not knowing what to do with himself, that pain,
which in French is expressed by a single word ennui, is a pain of
privation: a pain resulting from the absence, not only of all the pleasures of
novelty, but of all kinds of pleasure whatsoever.
The pleasures of wealth have also no positive pains
corresponding to them: the only pains opposed to them are pains of privation.
If any positive pains result from the want of wealth, they are referable to
some other class of positive pains; principally to those of the senses. From
the want of food, for instance, result the pains of hunger; from the want of
clothing, the pains of cold; and so forth.
9. It may be a question, perhaps, whether this be a
positive pain of itself, or whether it be nothing more than a pain of
privation, resulting from the consciousness of a want of skill. It is, however,
but a question of words, nor does it matter which way it be determined.
10. In as far as a man's fellow-creatures are supposed
to be determined by any event not to regard him with any degree of esteem or
good will, or to regard him with a less degree of esteem or good
will than they would otherwise; not to do him any sorts of good offices,
or not to do him so many good offices as they would otherwise; the pain
resulting from such consideration may be reckoned a pain of privation: as far
as they are supposed to regard him with such a degree of aversion or disesteem
as to be disposed to do him positive ill offices, it may be reckoned a
positive pain. The pain of privation, and the positive pain, in this case run
one into another indistinguishably.
11. There seem to be no positive pains to correspond to
the pleasures of power. The pains that a man may feel from the want or the loss
of power in as far as power is distinguished from all other sources of
pleasure, seem to be nothing more than pains of privation.
12. The positive pains of piety, and the pains of
privation, opposed to the pleasures of piety, run one into another in the same
manner as the positive pains of enmity, or of an ill name, do with respect to
the pains of privation, opposed to the pleasures of amity, and those of a good
name. If what is apprehended at the hands of God is barely the not receiving
pleasure, the pain is of the privative class if, moreover, actual pain be
apprehended, it is of the class of positive pains.
13. In contradistinction to these, all other pains may
be termed pains of sufferance.
14. See chap. x. [Motives].
15. By thus means the pleasures and pains of amity may
be the more clearly distinguished from those of benevolence: and on the other
hand, those of enmity from those of malevolence. The pleasures and pains of
amity and enmity are of the self-regarding cast: those of benevolence and
malevolence of the extra-regarding.
16. It would be a matter not
only of curiosity, but of some use, to exhibit a catalogue of the several
complex pleasures and pains, analyzing them at the same time into the several
simple ones, of which they are respectively composed. But such a disquisition
would take up too much room to be admitted here. A short specimen, however, for
the purpose of illustration, can hardly be dispensed with.
The pleasures taken in at the eye and ear are
generally very complex. The pleasures of a country scene, for instance, consist
commonly, amongst others, of the following pleasures:
I. Pleasures of the senses.
- The simple pleasures of sight, excited by the perception of agreeable
colours and figures, green fields, waving foliage, glistening water, and the
- The simple pleasures of the ear, excited by the perceptions of the chirping
of birds, the murmuring of waters, the rustling of the wind among the trees.
- The pleasures of the smell, excited by the perceptions of the fragrance of
flowers, of new-mown hay, or other vegetable substances, in the first stages of
- The agreeable inward sensation, produced by a brisk circulation of the
blood, and the ventilation of it in the lungs by a pure air, such as that in
the country frequently is in comparison of that which is breathed in towns.
II. Pleasures of the imagination produced by association.
- The idea of the plenty, resulting from the possession of the objects that
are in view, and of the happiness arising from it.
- The idea of the innocence and happiness of the birds, sheep, cattle dogs,
and other gentle or domestic animals.
- The idea of the constant flow of health;, supposed to be enjoyed by all
these creatures: a notion which is apt to result from the occasional flow of
health enjoyed by the supposed spectator.
- The idea of gratitude, excited by the contemplation of the all-powerful and
beneficent Being, who is looked up to as the author of these blessings.
These four last are all of them, in some measure at least, pleasures of
The depriving a man of this group of pleasures is one of the evils apt to
result from imprisonment; whether produced by illegal violence, or in the way
of punishment, by appointment of the laws.
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