There were few common elements in the militia organization to be found among the southern states. Virginia and South Carolina along the sea coast were heavily populated whereas in most of North Carolina the government had the greatest difficulty finding enough men within a day's ride to make up a militia company. The greatest problem for all the southern colonies came in organizing the militia on the frontier. The principal, if not exclusive, reason why the southern colonies created a militia was to combat the native Americans, with whom clashes occurred almost constantly from the earliest days forward. The second reason the southern militias were formed was to contain the growing slave populations, which, in some areas, outnumbered the slave-owning population. Virginia, and occasionally the other southern colonies, used the militia to contain the growing number of indentured servants and convict laborers.

While the northern and middle provinces had enlisted indentured servants, Amerindians and even black slaves in their militias, southern colonies were rarely prepared to admit any of these classes into their militias. These exclusions were generally enforced despite the fact that the pool of eligible white, free males was so greatly reduced that the southern militia system was unable to function well. The militia system in the southern states was able to provide protection because, for the most part, the aborigines were too weak and undivided to offer much of a challenge, and because several civilized tribes sided with the colonists. In Virginia and a part of Maryland, the Algonquin tribes, especially the Powhatan Confederation, fed and sustained the English settlers more frequently than they fought with them. In Georgia there were essentially no problems with the Amerindians until the English stirred them up at the time of the American War for Independence. The southern tribes, such as the Cherokee, Catawba, Yamasee and Creek were essentially agricultural peoples who were more settled than the northern tribes. The large body of Cherokee remained generally friendly until 1759. South Carolina's Catawba were removed far enough from the settlers on the coast that they did not believe that the whites were a threat until about the end of the eighteenth century. Because the Spanish settlers in Florida favored the local tribes, the great Creek nation, traditional enemies of the Florida tribes, sided with the English who hated the Spanish. The principal Indian problems came from the Yamasee, a displaced tribe from Florida who fought the Carolinians as early as 1715.

Also, there was essentially no rivalry in conquest from any other European power the way the northern colonies suffered from the rivalry between the French and the English for supremacy in North America. Occasionally, Georgia experienced incursions from the Spanish; and in the Seven Years' War the French presented a very few minor problems in Georgia, the Carolinas and Virginia. In that war Virginia, Maryland and to a far lesser degree, the Carolinas, did supply troops to fight against the French in western Pennsylvania.

With a substantial portion of the southern population being slaves the militias in the south took on a special duty that was inappropriate to the north: they ran slave patrols. Slaves generally could not carry or own firearms. On each plantation one slave could be licensed to carry a gun for the purpose of hunting down predators and otherwise protecting the master's property. For cause, additional trusted slaves might be entrusted with arms, usually shotguns. The slave patrols were always staffed with white militiamen.

Typical of laws enacted in response to real or imagined slave revolts was that resolved by the Norfolk, Virginia, city council, of 7 July 1741.⁽¹⁾

Resolved by the Common Council that for the future the inhabitants of this Borough shall, to prevent any invasion or insurrection, be armed at the Church upon Sundays, or other Days of Worship or Divine Service, upon the penalty of five shillings . . . . Josiah Smith, Mayor

Were these duties not tied to the militia by law and custom, one might imagine that slave patrols were logically tied more to the posse comitatus. This ancient Anglo-Saxon legal term refers to the power or force of the county. In medieval times a sheriff could summon all able-bodied men, 15 years of age or older, to assist in the enforcement of the law, maintenance of the peace and the pursuit and apprehension of felons and runaway slaves and servants. In the United States a sheriff may summon a posse to search for a criminal or assist in making an arrest.⁽²⁾ Southern militia constituted a standing posse, available at any time and often deployed on a regular schedule, whether there was suspicion of a crime or runaway slave or not. After regular forces and select militia units were created in the south, militia units often had no real function or duties save for slave patrols.

During the Revolution the southern militia served primarily as guerrillas to harass the British army, like forces to counter the tory militias and auxiliaries which occupied territory and prevented extensive British control of populations and land. Many southern political leaders, however, treated the militia as an alternative to, or substitute for, the regular standing army, rather than as an auxiliary.⁽³⁾

I should like to express my appreciation to the Marguerite Eyer Wilbur Foundation and the Second Amendment Foundation for their support. Much credit is also due to two devoted assistants, Damon Dale Weyant and Kevin Ray Spiker, Jr. Professor W. Reynold McLeon offered valuable suggestions as did my anonymous referees. My esteemed department chair, Allan Hammock supplied support for copying. I thank Mrs Mildred Moyers and Mrs Christine Chang of the West Virginia University Library system were most courteous and helpful in locating and gathering up materials for me.

The Virginia militia was of greatest significance in the seventeenth century, during which time the development passed through several stages. The first quarter of the seventeenth century was marked by improvisation and experimentation as the colonists attempted to develop a formula which would work in the colony's particular circumstances. In the second quarter of the century "this system was reorganized, refined, and repeatedly tested in combat." In the third quarter the colonial leaders excluded slaves and indentured servants, but dwelled on intensive training of specialized units, such as the frontier rangers. Virtually all adult, free, white males answered the muster call. Following Bacon's Rebellion, 1675-77, the base of recruitment was further reduced and a gentlemen's militia, similar to the militia found Stuart England, emerged. The bulk of the population after 1677 constituted an under-utilized, rarely mustered reserve, similar to the medieval great fyrd. After 1680 few poor men served in any militia capacity, although some might enlist in a crown regiment for the pay. The chronic economic crises had reduced much of the population to poverty, so most of the poor were delighted to discover that the militia law was not going to be universally enforced. To most poor reduction of military duty meant that they had more time to plow and harvest and could pocket the money they might otherwise have to lay out for militia arms, supplies, gunpowder and accoutrements. The government began to establish central armories and gunpowder magazines rather than depending on the populace to store individual supplies. Changes in the number and distribution of guns as Virginia approached the eighteenth century were functions of economic and social factors.⁽⁴⁾

In 1606 the English King provided a charter to the Virginia Company of London. It required the civil authority to recruit and train a militia and other prepare defenses to "encounter, repulse and resist" all the king's and the colony's enemies, suppress insurrection and treason and to enforce the law.⁽⁵⁾ The Virginia Charter of 1612 required the government to provide the citizenry with "Armour, Weapons, Ordnance, Munition, Powder [and] Shot" for its defense.⁽⁶⁾

The first settlers arrived on 24 May on the Sarah Constant, Goodspeed and Discovery, establishing Fort James, soon named Jamestown. The Company sent John Smith, a hardened military veteran, to establish a self-defense force. Upon his initial review of the men Smith observed that they were "for most part of such tender educations and small experience in martial accidents" as to be essentially useless. He immediately undertook to train them to "march, fight and skirmish" and to form an "order of battle" wherewith to provide some defense against the native aborigine. He exercised the company every Saturday night. Smith especially emphasized forming a proper battle order designed for the New World.⁽⁷⁾ Smith departed Virginia in 1609, but there was no change in the exercise of the martial arts since the new leaders sent by the Virginia Company were also veterans of many European battles. If anything the new military leaders intensified the militarization of the colony. Much of Smith's work had come unraveled because of famine, disease and deaths at the hands of the Indians. Understanding that development and maintenance of a militia was the primary necessity, the "excellent old soldiers" divided the colonists into "several Companies for war." They appointed an officer for each fifty men "to train them at convenient times and to teach them to use their arms and weapons."⁽⁸⁾

The primary problems with the defense of the colony were not military. The colonists had settled on one of the most inhospitable and undesirable pieces of land available and diseases of all kinds reduced the numbers of colonists. Famine was also a constant threat.

By 1610 the Virginia militia was sufficiently powerful to take the offensive against the natives. Beginning with small forays into Amerindian territory, the militia became emboldened with small victories its first campaign. In 1614 the militia captured Powhatan's daughter Pocahontas, and this brought the first Indian campaign to halt, with the militia having tasted victory for the first time. Initial successes and the removal of the immediate threat to the settlement brought a certain inertia and the militia ceased its frequent practices. Peace also brought an end the military dictatorship of the militia company and its professional officers.⁽⁹⁾

In 1613 Sir Thomas Dale concluded a treaty with the Chickahominies under Powhatan who were now closely allied because of the marriage of Pocahontas. Among other provisions, the tribe agreed that all members were now Englishmen, subject to the king, and that "every fighting man at gathering their Corn should bring two Bushel;s to the Store as Tribute, for which they should receive as many hatchets." They also agreed to supply 300 men to join the colonial militia to fight against the Spanish or any other enemy of the Crown.⁽¹⁰⁾

On the whole it must be said that Powhatan Confederation sustained the colonists more frequently than it made war upon them. The Powhatan Algonquins initially did not view the settlers as much of a threat. Reports came to Powhatan that the English had neither much corn nor many trees in England, and thus were extremely poor.

For their part, the English saw the Chickahominies as a potential threat, although within a sixty mile radius of Jamestown there were few villages of more than fifty inhabitants, and the entire Amerindian population was probably less than 5000, of which perhaps 1500 were warriors. Tribes allied with Powhatan could have raised fewer than 2500 warriors. The colonists could match these numbers, and they were armed with firearms and iron and steel weapons. Nonetheless, the governor published and edict that "no Indian should be taught to shoot with Guns, on Pain of Death to Teacher and Learner."⁽¹¹⁾

In 1618 the Virginia company reorganized, with a wholly civilian rule replacing the military one. No civil officer held military rank or was selected because of his military expertise or service. Another part of that reorganization brought about a change in the mission of the militia. Henceforth the militia was to be a defensive force, prepared only to keep the peace. The civil officers issued a stern warning against stirring up the Amerindians or violating any part of the negotiated peace. The new officers discouraged private ownership of martial arms and neglected the militia, essentially unilaterally disarming the colony.⁽¹²⁾

On 24 July 1621 Governor Francis Wyatt issued three important orders. First, he instructed masters and apprentices to remain loyal to their trades and not give them up to make quick and easy profits "planting tobacco or any such useless commodity." Second, he ordered that any servants condemned to punishment for "common offenses" be placed to work on public works projects for the benefit of the whole colony. Third, he ordered that guards be placed around public fields for the protection of farmers.⁽¹³⁾

During the first fifteen years of Virginia's existence as many as 10,000 English settlers and their slaves had come to the colony, but in 1622 perhaps only about 2200 remained. Many died and others returned to England. The temporary peace with the Amerindians did not last. In 1622 the Amerindians, angered at the rapid expansion of the colony made war against the whites along the James River On 22 March 1622 an Amerindian attack left 347 colonists dead, although the colony was saved because Christian Indians warned some men of the impending attack. Governor Francis Wyatt led the survivors into pallisaded towns where they took refuge against the marauders. As hunger, thirst and disease again ravished the colonists Wyatt ordered that available military stores be brought forth for whatever storage areas had been created when the colony demilitarized. With almost no training, save for the distant memories of a few of the earlier discipline, the militia sallied forth. With more luck than good management, Wyatt managed to win more skirmishes than he lost. Firearms and steel edged weapons proved decisive against the stone age weapons of the aborigine. The Amerindians had planned little for a campaign and had

laid up few supplies and were therefore as vulnerable in their own way as the undrilled colonial militia.

In March 1624 Wyatt recommended additional laws be enacted by the legislature to reduce the threat from the Amerindians. Article 23 required that all homes be pallisaded, article 24 required the people to go about armed at all times, and article 28 set a night watch for every community. Article 32 provided for state support of families of men killed, and for men disabled, in action against the Amerindians.⁽¹⁴⁾

The colonists appealed to England for assistance. On 17 July the colonists received a reply. "His majesty was so far sensible of the loss of his subjects and of the present estate of the Colony . . . he was graciously pleased to promise them assistance . . . . It [the petition] was answered [with] munition . . . whereby they might be enabled to take a just revenge of these treacherous Indians . . . . It pleased his Majesty to promise them some arms out of the Tower as was desired . . . ." The king sent 100 brigandines, also called plate coats; 40 jackets of mail; 400 jerkins or shirts of mail; 200 skull caps and an unspecified quantity of halberts and spears. This initial shipment was followed by a shipment of 20 barrels of gunpowder and 100 firearms of unspecified type.⁽¹⁵⁾

Wyatt decided that he would not be caught unprepared again. He also knew that the could not count on support from the financially troubled Virginia Company, so he had no choice but to revitalize the militia and revamp the militia law. Virginia statutes of 1622 provided death penalty for servants who ran away and traded or sold guns to the Amerindians;⁽¹⁶⁾ and statutes of 1623 provided that "no man go or send abroad without a sufficient will [well] armed" and that the work "men go not to worke in the ground without their arms." Furthere, "the commander of every Plantation [is] to take care that there be sufficient of powder and ammunition within their Plantation under his command and their pieces [of war equipment] fixed and their armes compleat."⁽¹⁷⁾ In 1624 the militia law provided that militiamen wounded or otherwise injured while in the public service would receive public support and the families of those killed while in service would be supported at the public expense. Survivors of the early years were exempted from further compulsory militia service. When a militiaman was impressed into duty his neighbors were required to spend one day a week assisting with his duties and chores at home.⁽¹⁸⁾ Shortly after the enactment of the new militia law Wyatt received word that the Virginia Company had failed and that hereafter the colony would be under the Crown.

The Stuart kings had provided no more assistance to the colony than had the Virginia Company. Defense remained a local obligation. All able-bodied males between 16 and 60 years of age, excepting only older veterans and certain newcomers, were enrolled in the militia. Those not serving in the militia were taxed for its support and were required to offer assistance on the farms of those who were in actual militia service. Gentlemen were to be placed in proper ranks, so that there was no social levelling and they were not reduced to serving as common soldiers. Regular drill was mandated by law. The law created officers whose duty it was to "exercise and drill them, whereby they may be made more fit for service upon any occasion." The legislature also ordered that a regular system of defensive shelters be built and maintained.⁽¹⁹⁾

In October 1629 the General Assembly enacted a new series of militia laws. Plantation overseers were to reorganize their militias in preparation for new wars against the native aborigine. Three expedition, to begin in November 1629 and March and July 1630, were designed to "doe all manner of spoile and offence to the Indians that may possibly bee effected." So successful was the first expedition that the legislature ordered that the war be prosecuted without the possibility of surrender or peace.⁽²⁰⁾ At this time the Virginia militia could muster no less than 2000 men. The second war with the Powhatan Indians continued until 1632, but the weight of numbers and superiority of equipment enabled the colonists to win. This time, following the Second Powhatan War, there was no disassembly of the militia.

On 21 February 1631 Governor Harvey recommended that the legislature place a tax upon ships entering and leaving Virginia harbors. This tax, Harvey wrote, will give the colony "a continuall supply of ammunition." The House of Burgesses agreed and enacted this dedicated tax.⁽²¹⁾

In 1632 the Virginia House of Burgesses ordered that every physically fit free white male bring his gun to church services so that, immediately following Sunday service, he might join his neighbors in exercising with it. No settler was even to speak to an Amerindian under penalty of the law. Militiamen were authorized to kill any Amerindian found "lurking" or thought to be stealing cattle. In 1633 the legislature set the new penalty for selling guns to the Amerindians as the loss of goods and chattles and imprisonment for life.⁽²²⁾

In 1634 the militia was reorganized following the lines of the eight existing counties. The governor appointed county lieutenants and other officers in each county. In 1639 the governor issued a call for select militiamen, fifteen from each county, to punish one or more bands of marauding natives. While each militiaman provided his own gun and edged weapon, his neighbors otherwise supplied him. His neighbors also looked after his farm and each provided one day's service to the militiaman.⁽²³⁾ Under the act of 6 January 1639, all able-bodied men were made liable for militia service and were to provide themselves with arms and ammunition "or be fined as the pleasure of the Governor and Council." Slaves were specifically exempted from the obligation, for the act contained the language, "all persons except negroes."⁽²⁴⁾ In 1633 the colony recognized the importance of musicians and appointed drummers, paying them 1000 pounds of tobacco and six barrels of corn per year.⁽²⁵⁾

In the earliest days Virginia struggled to provide enough food to ward off starvation. After the first few years the colony could afford to sustain a militia and, with basic food, clothing and shelter provided for, mandate attendance at militia musters without disrupting the colony. Sundays became the regular militia training days, combining religious, military and social functions. Forty years later the militia trained only three times a year. In that time span much of the threat from the native aborigine had been contained. But another development, the trained specialist, had emerged, usually in the guise of frontiersmen, who knew how to fight the Indians on their own terms. These specialists served at times for pay and at other times as volunteer militia.

There were also frontier forts to be garrisoned and this required a considerable number of men. Demands were so great that Virginia had to resort to paying some men. Since many volunteers had to be paid, there was a constant drain on the treasury. In the early eighteenth century was generally too impoverished to defend itself adequately so it had to rely primarily on retaliation.

Since the frontier, with its large plantations and farms, was but sparsely settled and the loss of a few men from a particular area usually meant disaster. The families of the settlers could not defend themselves and would often abandon the land and return to the east. There were few fortified places or garrison houses on the frontier wherein settlers or their families could take refuge except for the scattered forts. Neither were there sufficient resources on the frontier to sustain the militia when units were deployed there.

In 1642 the Lords of Trade sent a new set of orders to Governor Berkeley, including instructions concerning the militia.

11. To the end the country may be the better served against all Hostil Invasions it is requisite that all persons from the age of 16 to 60 be armed with arms, both offensive and defensive. And if any person be defective in this kind, wee strictly charge you to command them to provide themselves of sufficient arms within one year or sooner if possible it may be done, and if any shall fail to be armed at the end of the Term limited we will that you punish them severely.

12. And for that Arms without the Knowledge of the use of them are of no effect wee ordain that there be one Muster Master Generall, appointed by as for the Colony, who shall 4 times in the year and oftener (if cause be) not only view the arms, ammunition and furniture of every Person in the Colony, but also train and exercise the people, touching the use and order of arms and shall also certify the defects if any be either of appearance or otherwise to you the Governor and Councill. . . . And for his competent maintenance we will that you, the Governor and Councill, so order the business at a General Assembly that every Plantation be rated equally according to the number of persons, wherein you are to follow the course practised in the Realm of England.

13. That you cause likewise 10 Guarders to he maintained for the Port at Point Comfort. And that you take course that ye Capt of ye said Port have a competent allowance for his services there. Also that the said fort be well kept in Reparation and provided with ammunition.

14. That new Comers be exempted the 1st yeare from going in p'son or contributing to the wars Save only in defence of the place where they shall inhabit and that only when the enemies shall assail them, but all others in the Colony shall go or be rated to the maintenance of the war proportionately to their abilitys, neither shall any man be priviledged for going to the warr that is above 16 years old and under 60, respect being had to the quality of the person, that officers be not forced to go as private soldiers or in places inferior to their Degrees, unless in case of supreme necessity.⁽²⁶⁾

Virginia pursued a conscious plan of confrontation with the Amerindians between 1622 and 1644, a policy aimed at extermination or at least complete pacification. Initially Virginia's political authorities considered all Amerindians to be enemies and hostiles to be eliminated, adopting for perhaps the first time the maxim that the only good Indian was a dead one. There was almost constant warfare, although the number of real battles was few. In such a war of attrition, the demands on the militia were great and men groaned under the constant militia musters. An essential ingredient of the policy was constant and unremitting harassment of the enemy. The legislature again in 1643 ordered that no quarter be given to warring Amerindian tribes. This law essentially allowed militia to attack villages at will. Home county courts of the militia paid the expenses of the roving bands of terrorists.⁽²⁷⁾

On 17 April 1643, the Northampton County Court ordered that "no person or persons whatsoever within the County of Northampton except those of the Commission, shall from henceforth travel from house to house within said county without a sufficient fixed gun with powder and shot." Penalty for non-compliance was 100 pounds of tobacco, with the possibility of imprisonment for repeated failures to carry a gun.⁽²⁸⁾ Following the enactment of this local legislation, the Virginia legislature enacted a similar law. That law required that "every family shall bring with them to Church on Sundays, one fixed and serviceable gun . . . under penalty of ten pounds of tobacco." White male servants who were required otherwise to bear arms were to receive guns from their masters. If they failed to carry their guns to church they were subject to the penalty of "twenty lashes, well laid on."⁽²⁹⁾

In 1644 the Powhatan Indians again attacked the outlying and isolated farms along the James River. The governor ordered the militia, some 300 strong, into the field, where, for six weeks, they pursued the Indians, burned the crops and sacked their towns. This marked the end of the threat from the exhausted and depleted Powhatan tribes. Following the Third Powhatan War, the governor divided Virginia into two basic military districts, one north, and one south, of the James River. Each district made its own military policies and created its own strategy.⁽³⁰⁾

In 1651 the militia was again reorganized along county lines, following the model created by Massachusetts in 1643.⁽³¹⁾

In February 1645 the legislature authorized the association of its three principal counties to create the first regimental structure in the colony. The law also designated the militia as the official source for soldiers. For each fifteen militiamen the counties were to furnish one soldier.⁽³²⁾ The system of drafting one man among each 15 taxables proved to be quite unpopular, especially when the pool of 15 could not agree upon which man should serve. There was widespread resistance to the drafting of militia, forcing the legislature to pass an explanatory act in 1648.

The colony augmented force with some vague promises of scalp bounties, plunder, profits for sales of prisoners and land grants for service as an indispensable to sustaining support and morale. These laws were repealed only after peace had been established. In 1645 the legislature pursued a war against the Mansimum and their allies by "cutting up their corn and doing or performing any act of hostility against them" to such a degree that their towns were destroyed and the Amerindians reduced to hiding in the woods and ambushing whatever whites they might fall upon.⁽³³⁾

Although a populous and prosperous state Virginia could not sustain the costs of constant Indian wars that this policy promoted. The colony attempted to support those wounded in Indian wars, or their widows and offspring, or to at least remit taxes upon those injured or widowed.⁽³⁴⁾ By 1646 the colony adopted a kinder, more gentle policy toward the Amerindians. The colony made peace with the Mansimum in October 1646 on its own terms. The Indians ceded all land between the falls of the James River and the York River, acknowledged the sovereignty of the English king, surrendered all firearms, and return all runaway slaves, escaped prisoners, and indentured servants. Indians who returned to their former homes could be killed instantly.⁽³⁵⁾

The legislature considered several interesting ideas about "civilizing" and pacifying their former enemies. First, they would offer the chiefs a cow for every eight wolfs' heads turned in. When the men came to collect, the churchmen would attempt to convert them to Christianity. Amerindian children could be brought into settlers' homes provided they be instructed in Christianity. Indian traders would be controlled and licensed and would guide clergymen to the villages. As we have seen, Virginia had long attempted to contain the Amerindians by limiting their access to firearms and gunpowder, and this ban was to be continued.⁽³⁶⁾ On 25 November 1652, the colonial legislature passed a new law which provided,

Whereas divers of the Inhabitants of this [Northumberland] County doe employ Indians with guns & powder and shott, very frequently and usually to the great danger of a Massacre, the Court doth think fitt to declare and publish unto the whole county that if any person or persons who so ever shall with 10 days after the date hereof deliver either gun powder or shott to any Indian under what pretence so over shall be proceeded with all according to the Act of assembly in that case provided and after that manner of persons that have any guns out amongst the Indians after publication hereof shall get them in with all convenient speed and that no persons what so ever imploy any Indian at all nor supply them with powder and shott.⁽³⁷⁾

In 1658 the Virginia House of Burgesses created a rudimentary militia act which required that

a provident supplie be made of gunn powder and shott to our owne people, and this strictly to bee lookt to by the officers of the militia, vizt., That every man able to beare armes have in his house a fitt gunn, two pounds of powder and eight pound of shott at least which are to be provided by every man for his family before the last of March next, and whosoever shall faile of makeing such provision to be fined fiftie pounds of tobacco to bee laied out by the county courts for a common stock of amunition for the county.⁽³⁸⁾

In the same year, the legislature attempted to guarantee the natives' title to their land in the Shenandoah Valley and beyond, but still allowed, even authorized and financed, exploration of the area. The law still permitted the killing of an aborigine if he was suspected of "mischief." The legislature also permitted them to own guns, although there was no clear avenue for their sale or barter, or of supplying gunpowder, lead and flints.⁽³⁹⁾ It was simply a matter of time until additional land, especially in the fertile and beautiful Shenandoah Valley, was traded for trinkets, guns and supplies. Where title was obtained, the organization of a militia among the settlers was inevitable.

In 1660 John Powell carried a complaint to the legislature in which he alleged that Amerindians had encroached on his land, committing unspecified damages. The legislature authorized him to capture as many Amerindians as would satisfy his claim and sell them as slaves abroad. The local militia was authorized to assist him in rounding up the slaves. In other cases over the next few years, the legislature attempted to protect the Amerindians' land, even to the point of ordering the militia to burn houses built on illegally obtained land. The legislature voided some questionable land conveyances, protecting the natives in a way as if "the same had bin done to an Englishman."⁽⁴⁰⁾

With the increasing encroachment of settlers into the western areas of Virginia, tribes on the frontier came under increasing pressure. Additionally, the Iroquois made occasional raids as far south as Maryland and Virginia. A few tribes found support from some of their traditional enemies. It appears that the Amerindians were beginning to understand that the tribes must either stand united or be decimated piecemeal. As early as 1662 Virginia warned the western Amerindians that they must not encroach on settlements, raid villages or homesteads, or molest tributary Indians. The whites, fearing that an alliance was in the making, demanded that a number of children be surrendered from the Potomaks and allied northern tribes. In a white man was killed the Amerindians in the closest village were to be held responsible.⁽⁴¹⁾

In 1666 Thomas Ludwell wrote a travelogue of Virginia. He observed the militia and reported to the Lords of Trade,

Every county within ye said Province hath a regiment of ffoot under ye command of a colonel and other inferior officers and many of them a troop of horse under ye command of a captain . . . . Great care is taken that ye respective officers doe train them and see their Armes [are] well fixed and truly, my Lords, I believe all to be in so good order as an Enemy would gain little advantage by attempting anything upon them.⁽⁴²⁾

By 1675 Virginia was fighting the last of its great colonial Indian wars. The natives were in submission and most were nominally allied with the colony, which, in reality, meant that they were dependent upon Virginia for daily support and protection. The Senecas of the Five Nations stirred up the Susquehannocks and Piscataways along the Potomac and a large combined force attacked the settlers in Maryland and northern Virginia. Six chiefs attempted to reestablish the peace, but were treacherously murdered. This outrage roused the Amerindians who slew a hundred colonists in revenge. A second time the confederated tribes offered peace and a second time their offer was rejected. The colonists were bent on revenge for the merciless slayings and wanted to exterminate the Indians. Initially, Governor William Berkeley had sought to adopt a largely defensive posture which required a minimum number of troops. But the legislature supported the people who clamored for war and authorized the counties to call out their militias. It declared war and passed a number of laws designed to bring the militia units up to full strength. Taxes were increased to pay for the equipping and salaries of the militiamen.⁽⁴³⁾

Meanwhile, the colony was torn with contentions incident to the Restoration, and these troubles culminated in what is known as Bacon's Rebellion. The deprivations and outrages perpetrated by the Amerindians, and the stiffening Amerindian resistance, afforded the rebels their excuse for arming. In 1676 Nathaniel Bacon, Jr., led a group of settlers who applied great pressure on Berkeley to double the number of militia called for duty in order to launch a great all-out offensive against the Amerindians, designed to end the menace forever. In 1676 Sir William Berkeley, Governor of the colony, called for a standing army of 500 levies drafted out of the militia units, and paid for by the increase in public taxation. The planters who dominated the legislature objected, saying that the colony could not sustain the additional taxes.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Bacon, an articulate planter, made a counter-proposal, calling for a force of 1000 volunteers, funded by the spoils of war. The assembly was dominated by Bacon's followers and it authorized the creation of the full fore of one thousand militiamen by assigning quotas to each of the eighteen counties.

Berkeley correctly surmised that Bacon's mercenaries would plunder the wealthiest tribes, which were peaceful, and ignore the poorer ones that were warlike.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The uncivilized and more warlike aborigine had few desirable goods whereas the more peaceful "civilized" Indians had considerable goods.

Still, since Bacon was able to dominate the legislature, which became known as the Bacon Assembly, his legislation passed. His militia act attempted to distinguish between friendly and hostile Amerindians. The act declared that any Amerindian found outside his village was to be considered an enemy. All Amerindians had to surrender their arms, even guns that had been heretofore legally owned. They must agree not to hide, shelter, conceal, or even trade with, any warriors from other tribes, and had to deliver up any strangers who came among them. If the visitors were too strong for the hosts to capture, they must assist the militia in taking them. Each town must provide an accounting of its warriors, women and children. All Amerindians taken in battle were to be enslaved, with proceeds of their sale to be accounted as booty of war.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Following the massacre of the relatively unarmed and peaceful Occaneechee in May 1676, and just before the anticipated slaughter of the like Pamunkeys, Berkeley ordered Bacon to disband and relinquish his command. Bacon marched against Berkeley, burned James Town, and assumed political control of the colony.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Commands were given by trumpet for the first time in the Virginia colony.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The Bacon Assembly suspended all trade with the Amerindians, but this caused too great a loss to the traders so trade was permitted with those adjudged to be friendly. Natives wishing to trade had to come unarmed. Two forty day trading sessions were established north and south of the James River, with the governor and council receiving a percentage of the profits. At any point, whites might demand that any native approaching must lay down his arms.⁽⁴⁹⁾

Upon hearing that a British army was on its way from the Chesapeake area to restore order, Bacon was unshaken. He would merely adopt tactics learned in fighting the Amerindians. "Are we not acquainted with the country, so that we can lay ambuscades?" Bacon asked, "Can we not hide behind trees to render their discipline of no avail? Are we not as good or better shots than they?"⁽⁵⁰⁾ Bacon's position became gospel to the colonists and is something that might have been uttered by any of a large number of militiamen during the American Revolution.

In October 1676 Bacon died and Berkeley reestablished his authority. One thousand regular troops arrived, sent by the Stuarts from England, and a commission investigated Berkeley's alleged despotism. In May 1677 Berkeley returned to England, but died there on 9 July 1677, before the matter was settled. With Stuart troops firmly in charge the remainder of Bacon's militia disbanded and melted back into the frontier. Since both of the principals were now dead nothing more was done at court and, having received a pledge of renewed loyalty from the colonists, the troops were withdrawn.⁽⁵¹⁾ William Sherwood's account was hardly flattering of Bacon and his men, viewing them as seditious rebels. "Ye Rabble giveing out they will have their owne Lawes, demanding ye Militia to be settled in them with such like rebellious practices."⁽⁵²⁾

Some settlers complained that they were forced to leave their farms and neglect their occupations and stand seacoast watch and garrison duty in outlying frontier forts, but received no compensation for serving their militia duty and that impressment into the militia was a cause of the rebellion. Others complained of the burden the law imposed by requiring them to buy arms to stand the hated militia duty. Having armed themselves, they found themselves disarmed by the same government which imposed the purchase upon them. "Wee have been compelled to buy ourselves Guns, Pistols and other Armes . . . [and] have now had them taken away from us, the which wee desire to be restored to us again."⁽⁵³⁾

The destruction of the Amerindians was essentially complete. The poor remnants that remained were of no great consequence, with most reduced to tue most wretched poverty. Tribal distinctions all but disappeared as the survivors struggled merely to exist. Berkeley in 1680 claimed that "the Indians our neighbours are absolutely subjected, so that there is no fear of them." Amerindian country was clear for western expansion.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Soon after Bacon's Rebellion, the North Carolina's government was threatened by a second popular uprising, known as Culpeper's Rebellion. As a protest against the arbitrary rule of Governor John Jenkins, Thomas Miller, unpopular leader of the proprietary faction, combined the functions of governor with the lucrative post of customs collector. On 3 December 1677 the anti-proprietary faction arrested and imprisoned Miller. Miller escaped and fled to England and put his case before the Privy Council. The governor considered calling out the militia to restore order and the home government considered dispatching troops from England. John Culpeper of Virginia defended the leaders of the anti-proprietary party. Meanwhile, the Earl of Shaftsbury, having decided that Miller had exceeded his authority, mediated the dispute, and the uneasy peace was made permanent.

In 1679 the Assembly decided to construct four garrison-houses on the headwaters of the four great rivers, Potomac, Rappahannock, Mattapony and James, "and that every 40 tithables within this colony be assessed and be obliged to fitt out and sett forth one able and sufficient man and horse with furniture well and completely armed with a case of good pistols, carbine or short Gunn, and a sword." The settlers on the Rappahannock were to have "in readiness upon all occasions, at beate of drum, fifty able men well armed." Additionally, two hundred men were to be counted as reserves, to be called when needed. Major Lawrence Smith was to organize the militia and for this service was to receive 14,000 acres of land. William Bird was to have the same amount of land for organizing the militia near the fall on the James River.⁽⁵⁵⁾

In 1680 the assembly in Jamestown, Virginia, ordered that all persons of color be disarmed. Blacks were prohibited from carrying swords, clubs, guns or any other weapons for either offensive or defensive use. The assembly was likewise afraid of the black assemblies because "the frequent meetings of considerable numbers of negroe slaves, under pretence of feasts and burialls is judged [to be] of dangerous consequence."⁽⁵⁶⁾ In 1705 the law was mitigated by substituting the word slave for negro, and that "all and every such person or persons be exempted from serving either in horse or foot."⁽⁵⁷⁾

At this point Virginia reconsidered its militia policy. Few poor men could realistically afford to buy their firearms and other militia supplies so the colony undertook to finance many expenses for individual militiamen. The government could not afford to both maintain the militia and provide static fortifications. By recruiting only among gentlemen the colony was freed from having to make contributions to the support of the militiamen. No formal law or edict disarmed the poor. They were merely relegated to a position as inactive militia. Disarmament occurred by attrition. No one inspected arms or mustered the great militia and the poor neglected to maintain and update their arms.

In April 1684 Charles II approved a major change in the colony's militia law. The law is significant in several ways. It decreed the right, as well as the obligation, of colonists to own their weapons; and it protected the arms owned by the subjects from government confiscation.

For the encouragement of the inhabitants of this his majesties collony and dominion of Virginia, to provide themselves with arms and ammunition, for the defence of this his majesties country, and that they may appear well and compleatly furnished when commanded to musters and other the king's service which many persons have hitherto delayed to do; for that their arms have been imprest and taken from them. Be it (a) enacted by the governour, council and burgesses of this present general assembly, and the authority thereof, and it is hereby enacted, that all such swords, musketts, (b) pistolls, carbines, guns, and other armes and furniture, as the inhabitants of this country are already provided, or shall provide and furnish themselves with, for their necessary use and service, shall from henceforth be free and exempted from being imprest or taken from him or them, that already are provided or shall soe provide or furnish himselfe, neither shall the same be lyable to be taken by any distresse, seizure, attachment or execution. Any law, usage or custom to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.

And be it further enacted, That between this and the five and twentieth day of March, which shall be in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty six, every trooper of the respective counties of this country, shall furnish and supply himself with a good able horse, saddle, and all arms and (c) furniture, fitt and compleat for a trooper, and that every foot soldier, shall furnish and supply himselfe, with a sword, musquet and other furniture fitt for a soldier, and that each trooper and foot souldier, be provided with two pounds of powder, and eight pounds of shott, and shall continually keep their armes well fixt, cleane and fitt for the king's service.

And be it further enacted, That every trooper, failing to supply himselfe within the time aforesaid, with such arms and furniture, and not afterwards keeping the same well fixt, shall forfeite four hundred pounds of tobacco, to his majesty, for the use of the county in which the (a) delinquent shall live, towards the provideing of colours, drums and trumpetts therein, and every foot souldier soe failing to provide himselfe, within the time aforesaid, and not keeping the same well fixt, shall forfeit two hundred pounds of tobacco to his majesty, for the use aforesaid, and that all the militia officers of this country, take care to see the execution and due observation of this act, in their several and respective regiments, troops and companies.

And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That every collonell of a regiment within this country, shall once every yeare, upon the first Thursday in October, yearly, cause a generall muster, and exercise of the regiment under his command, or oftener if occasion shall require. And that every captain or commander of any troop of horse or foot company, within this country, shall once at the least in every three months, muster, traine and exercise, the troop or company under his command, to the end, they may be the better fitted and enabled, for his majesties and the countryes service when they shall be commanded thereunto.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Some thought that there were problems with he practice of the militia law, if not defects in the law itself. The governor was frequently remiss in appointing officers to take control over the colony's militia. On 4 July 1687 Lieutenant-colonel William Fitzhugh complained that in Stafford County, "I know not there being one Militia Officer in Commission in the whole County & consequently people best spared cannot be commanded into Service & appointed to guard the remotest, most suspected and dangerous places." He submitted a full list of men eligible for militia duty, but pointed out that a select militia would make more sense. At least on the frontier, where few musters could be readily scheduled, intensively training the few made more sense than half training the many. "A full number with a soldier like appearance," Fitzhugh wrote, "is far more suitable and commendable than a far greater number presenting themselves in the field with clubs and staves rather like a rabble rout than a well disciplined militia."⁽⁵⁹⁾ In this year the legislature appropriated tax money for the purchase of colors, drums and trumpets for the militia. It also agreed to purchase all musicians' instruments at public expense.⁽⁶⁰⁾

Those exempted from militia service in the 1690s included physicians, surgeons, readers, clerks, ferrymen and persons of color.⁽⁶¹⁾ By effectively disarming the poorer classes the authorities had less cause to worry about a popular uprising.⁽⁶²⁾

In 1691 the legislature repealed all former prohibitions to, and restrictions on, the Indian trade. This act also had the effect of protecting all Amerindians from being newly enslaved after that date. Neither could they be enlisted in the militia against their will.⁽⁶³⁾

Ranging companies were commonplace in the middle colonies by the time of the American Revolution, but were uncommon in the seventeenth century. Virginia had formed companies of rangers by 1690, for there is a notation in the British Public Records Office dated 23 April 1692 which refers to gunpowder and other supplies having been sent to the rangers of King & Queen County, Virginia.⁽⁶⁴⁾ By 1701 the militia of those two counties alone numbered 132 officers and non-commissioned officers; 152 horsemen; 222 dragoons; 415 foot soldiers. Among their arms were 575 swords, 141 pistols and 543 muskets.⁽⁶⁵⁾

A new military-Indian policy proved to be more reasonable. Virginia would ally with and materially support friendly, civilized tribes who would guarantee the provincial borders. The colony built a string of forts along the frontier and recruited mounted rangers to maintain order and peace. These militia-cavalry were the equivalent of the much vaunted New England minutemen. The system generally worked well.

On 9 December 1698 the king appointed a new executive, Lieutenant-governor Nicholson. He proved to be highly unpopular by exercising powers heretofore reserved to, or traditionally exercised by, council or legislature. Two usurpations of power were related to the militia. First, Nicholson assumed appointment of superior militia officers. Second, he was charged with "advancing men of inferior stations to the chief commands of the militia" while "all colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors and captains . . . are put in and turned out" arbitrarily."⁽⁶⁶⁾ So great were the protestations that the king removed Nicholson on 15 August 1705.

One of the unique functions of the militia in the late seventeenth, and early eighteenth, centuries was the enforcement of religious participation. The militia was charged with forcing all persons, whether religious or not, to attend services at the Church of England.

By the end of the seventeenth century Virginia's needs for militia were changing. The population of the colony increased, making training and recruitment easier and expediting the creation and maintenance of militia enrollment lists. Still, increasingly poorer emigrants swelled the ranks while failing because of poverty to arm themselves adequately. Her concern for Amerindian attacks was minimal since by 1700 the colony had subdued the stronger tribes. The Carolinas served as a successful barrier to the south and the Appalachian mountains, with a few frontier forts, guarded her western boundary. The French did not threaten Virginia's interests for another half century. What remained of the decimated Amerindian tribes received support from the colonial government. They frequently sold their services as scouts and even warriors. The colony had to provide only money, command and a few supplemental frontiersmen to serve as scouts. In the Tuscarora War of 1712 Virginia was able to rely on the Carolina militias and Governor Spotswood's diplomacy.⁽⁶⁷⁾ When Colonel John Barnwell took his troops into battle in the Tuscarora War he manipulated his mounted troops with trumpets and his foot soldiers with drums.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In 1710 the Assembly authorized the lieutenant-governor, as military commander of the colony, to form several bands of rangers. Each county lieutenant "shall choose out and list eleven able-bodied men, with horses and accouterments, arms and ammunition, resideing as near as conveniently may be to that frontier station." The lieutenant served simultaneously as county militia commander and commandant of the rangers.⁽⁶⁹⁾

With the coming of the war known as Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713, authorities thought that Virginia needed an adequate militia law. The militia law of 1705 was the first truly comprehensive enactment on the subject promulgated in the colony. The law created a general obligation to keep and bear arms in defense of country. There was a long list of exemptions to the requirement that men muster, including: millers with active mills; members of the House of Burgesses and the King's Council; slaves and imported servants; officers and men on active duty with the king's forces; the attorney general; justices of the peace; the clerks of parishes, council, counties and the general court; constables and sheriffs; ministers; schoolmasters; and overseers charged with the supervision of four or more slaves. Those exempted still had to supply their own arms and could be fined for failure to do so. Those exempted were charged with an obligation to "provide and keep at their respective places of abode a troopers horse, furniture, arms and ammunition, according to the directions of this act hereafter mentioned." They could be mustered in case of invasion or insurrection. "And in case of any rebellion or invasion[they] shall also be obliged to appear when thereunto required, and serve in such stations as are suitable for gentlemen, under the direction of the colonel or chief officer of the county where he or they shall reside, under the same penaltys as any other person or persons, who by this act are injoyned to be listed in the militia. . . ." Militiamen who failed to appear with the required arms, ammunition and accoutrements were fined 100 pounds of tobacco. The commander of each troop was required to appoint a clerk who was to record courts-martial and receive the company fines. The other major provisions of the law read as follows.

For the settling, arming and training a militia for her majestie's service, to be ready on all occasions for the defence and preservation of this her colony and dominion, be it enacted, by the governor, council, and burgesses, of this present general assembly . . . to list all male persons whatsoever, from sixteen to sixty years of age within his respective county, to serve in horse or foot, as in his discretion he shall see cause and think reasonable . . . . The colonell or chief officer of the militia of every county be required, and every of them is hereby required, as soon as conveniently may be, after the publication of this act, to make or cause to be made, a new list of all the male persons in his respective county capable by this act to serve in the militia, and to order and dispose them into troops or companys . . . . each trouper or ffoot soldier may be thereby guided to provide and furnish himself with such arms and ammunition and within such time as this act hereafter directs. . . . That every ffoot soldier be provided with a firelock, muskett or fusee well fixed, a good sword and cartouch box, and six charges of powder, and appear constantly with the same at time and place appointed for muster and exercise, and that besides those each foot soldier have at his place of abode two pounds of powder and eight pounds of shott, and bring the same into the field with him when thereunto specially required, and that every soldier belonging to the horse be provided with a good serviceable horse, a good saddle, holsters, brest plate and crouper, a case of good pistolls well fixed, sword and double cartouch box, and twelve charges of powder, and constantly appear with the same when and where appointed to muster and exercise, and that besides those each soldier belonging to the horse have at his usuall place of abode a well fixed carabine, with belt and swivel, two pounds of powder and eight pounds of shott, and bring the same into the ffield with him, when thereunto specially required. . . . eighteen months time [is] be given and allowed to each trouper and ffoot soldier . . . to furnish and provide himself with arms and ammunition . . . . for the encouragement of every soldier in horse or ffoot to provide and furnish himself according to this act and his security to keep his horse, arms and ammunition, when provided, . . . the musket or ffuzee, the sword, cartouch box and ammunition of every ffoot soldier, and time horse, saddle and furniture, the carbine, pistolls, sword, cartouch box and ammunition of every trooper provided and kept in pursuance of this act to appear and exercise withall be free and exempted at all times from being impressed upon any account whatsoever, and likewise from being seized or taken by any manner of distress, attachment, or writt of execution, and that every distress, seizure, attachment or execution made or served upon any of the premises, be unlawful and void . . . . the colonel or chief officer of the militia of every county once every year at least, [is to] cause a general muster and exercise of all the horse and ffoot in his county . . . [and] every captain both of horse and foot once in every three months, muster, train and exercise his troop or company, or oftener if occasion require. Provided, That no soldier in horse or foot, be fined above five times in one year for neglect in appearing. . . . all soldiers in horse and ffoot during the time they are in arms, shall observe amid obediently perform the commands of their officer relating to their exercising according to time best of their skill, and that the chief officers upon time place shall and may imprison mutineers and such soldiers as do not their dutys as soldiers at time day of their musters and training, and shall and may inflict for punishment for every such offence, any mulet not exceeding fifty pounds of tobacco, or the penalty of imprisonment without bail or main prise, not exceeding ten days.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The militia act did not yield the desired results. At the end of Queen Anne's War, Governor Alexander Spotswood thought "the Virginians to be capable of being made as good a militia as any in the World, yet I do take them to be at this time the worst in the King's Dominions."⁽⁷¹⁾ In 1713 Governor Spotswood called out the militia against a weak Amerindian enemy, but it failed to respond. He attempted to recruit, first by a call for volunteers, and then by offering substantial pay incentives, an army of frontiersmen. He found that those living inland shared little concern for the lives of the frontiersmen; and that in time of Amerindian threat the frontiersmen did not want to leave their homes, farms, crops and families.

In a long letter to the Board of Trade he argued that the rich had gotten off too easily in the past and that the poor had unfairly borne the burden. After a year filled with great frustration, Spotswood declared that "no Man of an Estate is under any Obligation to Muster . . . [while] even the Servants or Overseers of the Rich are likewise exempted," and thus "the whole burthen lyes upon the poorest sort of people," he thought to scrap the whole militia system. Disgusted, he proposed that the House of Burgesses rewrite the law, changing the general militia into a select one. What Spotswood proposed would constitute a radical change. A select force of skilled, trained and disciplined militiamen would be recruited, consisting of approximately one-third of the adult, free, male population. The remaining two-thirds would be taxed to support the select militia. The citizen-soldiers would be exempted from paying the militia tax. The militia would exercise ten times a year. He proposed extending the frontier mounted ranger principle to encompass the entire militia system. A select militia system would wholly replace the general militia and "Persons of Estates . . . would not come off so easily as they do now." ⁽⁷²⁾ Disillusioned by defeat of his plan in the legislature, Spotswood made peace with the Tuscarora who soon moved on to become the sixth tribe associated with the League of the Iroquois.

As in New England, militia training days, especially the annual regimental muster, had become important social events in Virginia. As 1737 the militia put on a public demonstration of its skills at a county fair, passing in review before those assembled and practicing the manual of arms and other drill exercises. The militia musicians played music for the entertainment of the spectators "and gave as great Satisfaction, in general, as could be possibly expected." Refreshments, games and general socializing followed the militia's performance. The most accomplished regimental trumpeter often displayed his skills in support of a horse race. Few events were more popular among the spectators than the culminating parade in which all militia units passed in formal review before the highest ranking militia officers and various political authorities.⁽⁷³⁾

The Lords of Trade inquired of Governor Spotswood as to the number of inhabitants and the state of the militia in 1712. Spotswood responded on 26 July 1712. "The number of freemen fit to bear arms . . . [is] 12,051 and I believe there cannot be less than an equal number of Negroes and other Servants, if it were fit to arm them upon any occasion."⁽⁷⁴⁾ On 16 February 1716 Governor Spotswood reported to the Lords of Trade on the numbers enrolled in the Virginia militia. "Ye number of Militia of this Colony . . . consists of about 14,000 horse and foot . . . The list of tythables . . . last year amounted to 31,658 . . . all male persons, white and black, above ye age of 16." He also reported that there were 300 firelocks in the public stores.⁽⁷⁵⁾ On 7 February 1716 Spotswood proposed the Commission of Trade and Plantations that Virginia form a "standing militia" of select membership. Membership would rotate on an annual basis, but those serving during a certain year would be in "permanent condition of muster." He called for 3000 foot and 1500 horsemen "at a yearly cost of 600,000 pounds of tobacco."⁽⁷⁶⁾ He argued his case in a letter to the Board of Trade,

What my Designs were, by the Scheme I laid before the Assembly regulating their Militia, will best appear from the Project it self, which, because it is not inserted in the Journals of the Assembly . . . I think it becomes me to employ my Thoughts in search of what may better conduce to the Welfare of the People committed to my charge, and do apprehend that I have the same Liberty of Recommending my notions to the Assembly, to be brought, (if they consent,) into a Bill, as they have of Proposing Their's to me to be pass'd, (if I assent,) into a Law; yet I offer'd no Scheme upon this Head 'till, after the House of Burgesses had Addressed,⁽⁷⁷⁾ expressing their Inclinations to have the Militia of this Colony under a better Regulation, and, at the same time, desiring me to propose a Method by which it might be rendered more usefull . . . my Project for the better Regulation of the Militia was no more than what is agreeable to the Constitution of Great Britain, I hope your Lordships will rather approve the same, and not judgde that I have endeavoured to destroy a profitable People by desiring them to imitate the Justice and Policy of their Mother Country, where no such unequal Burthen is laid upon the poor as that of defending the Estates of the Rich, while those contribute nothing themselves; For, according to the present constitution of the Militia here, no Man of an Estate is under any Obligation to Muster, and even ye Servants or Overseers of the Rich are likewise exempted; the whole Burthen lyes upon the poorest sort of people, who are to subsist by their Labour; these are Finable if they don't provide themselves with Arms, Ammunition and Accoutrements, and appear at Muster five times in a Year; but an officer may appear without Arms, who may absent himself from Duty as often as he pleases without being liable to any Fine at all; nay, and if it be his interest to ingratiate himself with the Men, he will not command them out, and then the Soldier, not being summoned to march, is not liable to be fined any more than the Officer. Besides, when the Poorer Inhabitants are diverted from their Labour to attend at Muster, it is to no manner of purpose, their being not one Officer in the Militia of this Government that has served in any Station in the Army, nor knows how to exercise his Men when he calls them together. This is the State of the Militia under the present Law, and therefore I could not imagine that my endeavouring a Reformation thereof would be imputed to me as a Crime; That 3,000 Foot and 1,500 Horse should be more a Standing Army or a greater means for me to govern Arbitrarily than 11,000 Foot and 4,000 Horse, of which the Militia now consists, is surprizing to every Body's understanding but the Querist's own. That these 15,000 men, mustering each five times in a year, should be less burthensome than 4,500 Men, mustering ten times in a year, is no less strange, unless the Querist has found out a new kind of Arithmetick, or that he looks upon the Labour of those People who are now obliged to Muster to be of no value. On the contrary, it is demonstrable by my Scheme that above two-thirds of the Inhabitants now listed in the Militia would have been eased from the trouble of Mustering, and consequently that the Man which stayed at home would not be charged with so much as half the pay of him that attended in the Field, which Exemption, costing less than Seven pounds of Tobacco per Muster, there is scarce one man serving in the Militia now who would not be content to pay more than Thrice as much for being to follow his own business instead of travelling 20 or 30 Miles to a Muster. And if, by one Man thus paying his poorer Neighbour for four or five days' Service in a Year, above 600,000 pounds of Tobacco, (as the Querist computes,) should be spent throughout the whole Colony; yet, far from granting that such a Charge must be to the entire Ruin of the Country, I apprehend yet it must be rather a benefit to the Publick by the Circulation of Money and Credit that would be increased thereby, and this circulation would be more just and beneficial, seeing ye Payments would generally happen to be made by the Richer to the Poorer sort. It is true, that by my Scheme Persons of Estates would not come off so easily as they do now, They must have contributed to the Arming as well as Paying the Men who were to be train'd up for the defence of their Estates; And I cannot but pitty the simplicity of the Vulgar here, who, at every offer of a Governor to make their Militia usefull, (tho' the Regulation be never so much in their favour,) are set on to cry out against him as if he was to introduce a Standing Army, Arbitrary Power, burthensome Taxes, &c. And as for their Abettors, who chose rather to risk their whole Country than to be brought to Club for its defence, I wish they or their Posterity may not have cause to Repent of their present Folly When an Enemy shall happen to be at their Doors. For, tho' I will allow the Virginians to be capable of being made as good a Militia as any in the World, Yet I do take them to be at this time the worst in the King's Dominions, and I do think it's not in the power of a Governor to make them Serviceable under the present constitution of the Law. It is, indeed, a Strange Inference. The Querist, upon the Proposal of Adjutants, that they were to huff and Bully the People, This, I am sure, was never intended as any part of their Office in my Scheme, nor am I apt to believe the House of Burgesses, to whom it was referred, would readily have given 'em such an authority. These Adjutants were proposed to be of the Inhabitants of the Country who were first to be exercised and instructed by me in Military Discipline, and afterwards to go into their respective Countys to teach the Officers and Soldiers. However, if, in the above mentioned Scheme there appeared any thing disagreeable to the Inclinations or Interest of the People, I was far from pressing them to it, Seeing it is evident from my Message to the House of Burgesses that I left it to them to adapt it to the Circumstances of the Country.⁽⁷⁸⁾

The Tuscarora War of 1711-12 in North Carolina, in which at least two hundred settlers were massacred, had been won only with the assistance of the militias of South Carolina and Virginia. As the remnants of the once mighty Tuscarora began to migrate northward, Virginia thought it wise policy to exclude these savage warriors from its lands. When two Germans, Lawson and deGraffeured, seeking land for a colony of their countrymen in western Virginia, were taken by Tuscarora in September 1711, the governor mustered frontier ranging militia and dispatched to the area of the New River. Alexander Spotswood attempted to forge a treaty with the Tuscarora, secured by Amerindian hostages, to guarantee the peace of his colony, but failed. Spotswood next tried to make a show of force by mustering six hundred of the best militia to be located, but the Tuscarora had seen militia in the Carolinas and were unimpressed. For his part, the governor genuinely sought an honest, just and equitable settlement and peace.

But the legislature entered the picture, thinking Governor Spotswood's response to be quite inadequate. The legislators feared the Tuscarora who would thought still to include as many as two thousand warriors, while the province could field 12,051 militiamen who were scattered all over the vast territory. So they created a special regiment of rangers, empowering it with the power to kill hostiles on sight. The legislative definition of hostiles included any Amerindian fleeing from a white man or refusing to respond to an order to halt. Fleeing braves could be killed without any fear of prosecution. Indians who were found in the forest and who could not "give a good account of themselves" might be killed, enslaved or imprisoned. Enemy Indians who were captured were enslaved and sold to the benefit of the militiaman. The law excluded these rangers from accountability and punishment for killing any presumed hostile Amerindian. When a company commander certified that a militiaman had killed an Amerindian who had previously attacked or killed any white man or woman, the man received a bonus of £20. As a bonus, those who served as rangers would be exempted for one year thereafter from serving in the militia or being subject to parish or county levies. The legislature denied the Tuscarora the right to live, gather firewood, hunt, or be servants within the provincial boundaries. It budgeted £20,000 to fund the militia. The act was given an effective period of only one year, but was extended at least twice.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Spotswood thought the measures to be far too harsh. In reporting the overreaction of the legislature to the Board of Trade, he wrote,

So violent an humour amongst them [the Assembly] for extirpating all the Indians without distinction of Friends or Enemys that even a project I laid before them for assisting the College to support the charge of those Hostages has been thrown aside without allowing it a debate in their House tho' it was proposed on such a foot as would not have cost the country one farthing.⁽⁸⁰⁾

The Tuscarora initially capitulated and accepted the legislature's conditions after learning of the extent of Virginia's response. They surrendered the hostages, children of their principal leaders, who were then to be converted to Christianity and educated. They released deGraffenreid.

The legislative enactment permitted only men of the Eastern Shore, Pamunkey and Chickahominy tribes to hunt in any area east of the Shenandoah Valley. These tribes became known as the Tributary Indians and the law afforded them certain protections and a few privileges. They alone could harvest seafish and shellfish, although they had to wait until the whites had taken all they wanted first. They were required to act as spies and report on any movements of foreign warriors on the frontier. They were expected to join the militia in wars against the hostile tribes to the west. In 1712 the legislature expanded the list of tributary Indians to include the Nansemond, Nottoway, Maherin, Sapon, Stukanocks, Occoneechee, and Tottero tribes. These Amerindians could trade for arms, ammunition and lead.⁽⁸¹⁾

However, the scope of the conflict widened. Southern tribes who were traditional enemies of the Tuscarora entered the conflict by offering their services to North Carolina. The Cherokee, Creek, Catawba and Yammassee tribes joined with South Carolina to eliminate the Tuscarora menace. The Iroquois Confederation, or at least the Seneca tribe, threatened to join with the Tuscarora, drawing all the northern colonies into the conflict. Spotswood, if not his legislature, thought Virginia to be too divided to wage war effectively, and he wished merely to preserve the peace. But the South Carolina militia, much emboldened by the Amerindian support, fell upon the villages that were supposedly protected by treaty. The Tuscarora and their allies retaliated by massacring both settlers and the tributary Indians. The Nottoways bore the brunt of the attacks.

The large combined force of Carolina militia, Virginia militia, and southern Indians engaged the Tuscarora at the Neuse River and soundly defeated them. Many captives were sold in the West Indies as slaves. The hostile remnant of the Tuscarora migrated for to the north, eventually allying with the Iroquois as the sixth confederated tribe.⁽⁸²⁾

With the Tuscarora War finally over, Virginia again turned its eyes westward. The next arena of military action would be in the rich trading area west of the Allegheny mountain range. The Virginia merchants competed with the French for control of the great Mississippi Valley. During the fifteen hundred mile trips, the traders were at great risk from the warring, often intoxicated, Indians who were allied with the French.⁽⁸³⁾ By treaty signed at Albany, New York, the Iroquois were not to make war, travel, or trade south of the Poyomac River or east of the Allegheny mountain range without a passport from the New York governor. Virginia's tributary Indians were to remain east of the Alleghenies and south of the Potomac River. By these means the colonists sought to establish peace, enlarge their domain, and increase their settlements.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Spotswood thought the frontier inhabitants to have been comprised of people "of the lowest sort." Most had been transported to the colony either as indentured or convict servants "and being out of their time they settle themselves where land is to be taken up and that will produce the necessarys of Life with little Labour. It is pretty well known what morals such people bring with them. . . ." They quickly learned that an enormous profit could be earned by selling liquor to the natives "and make no scruple of first making them drunk and then cheating them of their skins, and even beating them in the bargain." Spotswood thought them incapable of dealing honestly, serving in the militia faithfully, or supporting the government fully. Their misbehavior and cheating ways prompted Indian wars.⁽⁸⁵⁾

On 9 May 1723, the militia law was revised, requiring service of men between ages 21 and sixty. Regarding persons of color, the law was changed back to its original language, denying to any "free negro, mulatto or indian whatsoever," the right to "keep or carry any gun, powder or shot, or any club, or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive" under penalty of "whipping, not to exceed 39 lashes." However, "every free Negro, Mulatto or Indian . . . listed in the Militia may be permitted to keep one gun, powder and shot." Those not enlisted were given a few months in which to dispose of any arms they possessed. Slaves and free blacks could be required to serve as musicians. In time of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, persons of color "shall be obliged to attend and march with the militia, as to do the duty of pioneers, or such other servile labor as they shall be directed to perform."⁽⁸⁶⁾ In case of emergency free or enslaved blacks might be required to join the militia to do "the duty of pioneers, or other such servile labor as they shall be directed to perform."⁽⁸⁷⁾

Before 1713, Virginia demanded and received two hostages from each tributary Indian village. Governor Spotswood though that this was the best way to keep these Amerindians peaceful, while giving some of the most talented of their numbers an English style education. As early as 1713 there were seventeen of these students being educated by the College of William and Mary. Shortly thereafter, a special Indian school was erected at Christanna and some additional tributary Indians were brought from reservations to be educated there. A mathematics professor, Hugh Jones, left a memoir of his experience with them.

The young Indians, procured from the tributary Indians . . .with much difficulty were formerly boarded and lodged in town, where the abundance of them used to die, either through sickness, change of provision, and way of life, . . . often for want of proper necessaries and due care of them. Those of them that have escaped well, and have been taught to read and write, have, for the most part, returned to their home. . . . A few of them have lived as servants with the English. . . . But it is a pity more care is not taken of them after they are dismissed from school. They have admirable capacities when their humors and tempers are perfectly understood.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Virginia, like most colonies, used the militia as a reservoir from which troops could be recruited into select ranging forces and such regular military units as were populated by Americans. These units were not under the standard militia limitation of being confined to deployment within the colony. Virginia sought to recruit by advertising for recruits.

An Act for raising Levies and Recruits to serve in the present expedition against the French on the Ohio. Whereas his Majesty has been pleased to send Instructions to his Lieutenant-Governor of this Colony, to raise and levy Soldiers for carrying on the present Expedition against the French on the Ohio; and this present General Assembly being desirous, upon all Occasions, to testify their Loyalty and Duty; and taking into their Consideration that there in every County and Corporation within this Colony, able-bodied Persons, for to serve his Majesty . . . . The Justices of the Peace of every County and Corporation within this Colony . . . are appointed or impowered to solicit Men, to raise and levy such able bodied men . . . to serve his Majesty as Soldiers on the present Expedition . . . . Nothing in this Act contained shall extend to the taking or levying any Person to serve as a Soldier . . . who is, or shall be, an indented or bought Servant, or any person under the Age of 21 years or above the Age of 65 years.⁽⁸⁹⁾

Between 1727 and 1749 Governor William Gooch reported that the Virginia militia consisted of 8800 foot soldiers divided into 176 companies; and 5000 horsemen in 100 troops. The unenrolled militia consisted of all able bodied freemen between ages 21 and 60. The enrolled militia, Gooch ordered, "will be constantly kept under regular discipline and the common men [i.e., unenrolled militia] will be improved in their manner, which want not a little pushing."⁽⁹⁰⁾ In 1726 King and Queen County reported that the number of militia to include 221 horsemen and 607 foot-men.⁽⁹¹⁾

In 1728 William Byrd wrote on the recurrent problems with the Amerindians. He noted that nearly all Amerindian tribes with which Virginians came into contact were now armed with firearms, having completely abandoned their traditional weapons. Byrd wondered why they have given up their bows for a warrior could fire most of a quiver of arrows in the time it took to reload a gun. The Amerindians could make bows and arrows themselves and thus did not become dependent on whites for supplies. They were dependent upon traders and others to supply them with gunpowder, flints and lead balls. Time was on the side of the colonists because they Indians failed to maintain their arms and they could not themselves repair firearms or manufacture gunpowder. Control of the Indian trade was far more important than several companies of militia.⁽⁹²⁾

By act of 1738, the legislature mandated that the county militia officers "shall list all free male persons, above the age of one and twenty years" and train them as he saw fit. The men were to provide suitable arms at their own expense for service either as foot soldiers or cavalrymen. The law, reaffirmed by acts of 1755 and 1758, required free blacks, Indians and mulattoes to report at militia musters. Failure to appear invoked the fine of 100 pounds of tobacco. Blacks, whether enslaved or free, and Indians living within white settlements were still forbidden to own or carry firearms. They could serve as pioneers, sappers and miners, trumpeters and drummers.⁽⁹³⁾ Many blacks served as musicians in the Virginia, and other colonial, militia units.

England declared war on Spain on 19 October 1739 in what is commonly known as the War of Jenkins' Ear. Britain assigned a quota of men to be recruited in the thirteen colonies for service in the West Indies. Lord Cathcart commanded British troops and troops of the thirteen colonies came under the command of Governor Alexander Spotswood of Virginia who was to hold the rank of major-general, quartermaster-general, chief of colonial staff and second in command of the expedition. Colonel William Blakeney was to assist Spotswood in recruiting, drafting if necessary, troops from the colonial militias. Blakeney carried with him signed blank commissions for colonial officers and arms and supplies. Included in Blakeney's instructions was a provision that, if Spotswood could not command the colonial troops, Virginia's Lieutenant-governor William Gooch was to serve in his stead. Spotswood died of a chill on 7 June 1740, before Blakeney arrived with his commission. Thus, responsibility for filling both the Virginia and the entire colonial assessment of troops devolved on Gooch. The American recruits became popularly known as Gooch's American Foot.⁽⁹⁴⁾

The entire expedition soon devolved into a complicated mess. Gooch's commission was inspecific as to rank, so he served as a junior colonel, and was not included in the Council of War once the troops arrived in Jamiaica. When the men and officers left on 25 September 1741, money was not available for transportation of all troops, so the cost was borne through private subscription and the generosity of private ship owners. When the colonial troops arrived they found that no one had made provision for their rations or pay so officers pooled their funds and purchased rations at exorbitant prices from British merchants. Likewise, the colonial troops were not included in orders given to the medical staff and few, if any, physicians and surgeons had been recruited in the colonies. It was common practice for each regiment to guard its own medical facilities jealously and to refuse to treat the men of other regiments unless ordered to do so. Most colonials were impressed into sea service and were given the most degrading physical duties, such as manning bilge pumps. British naval officers moved colonial enlisted men around among the ships as they chose, often in open defiance of their officers, although this practice had long been prohibited to British soldiers. Two men were reportedly killed or maimed after being beaten or flogged according to British naval custom.

Had Spotswood lived he would have been a member of the Council of War, and as a major-general, would have been privy to the most intimate circles of command. As it was, Gooch was treated as a colonel of inferior standing, ignored and excluded from command decisions. He and other colonial officers wrote memorials to the senior British officers, but these had little effect. No records are available to account for colonial casualties, but all evidence points to their having been large. Disease took a heavy toll of lives. The American regiment was disbanded of 24 October 1742, on which date there were still 7 officers and 133 enlisted men hospitalized.

The experiences of militiamen in the War of Jenkins' Ear were, to say the least, bitter. Doubtless, many colonial volunteers were of the lower class, freebooters, adventurers and just plain scoundrels, but many others were unemployed laborers and frontiersmen seeking cash to support their families or to buy a piece of property. They came back with stinging tales of army brutality and of the open disdain in which both British officers and soldiers held them. They were much disgusted with the lack of planning for their arrival, their mis-deployment once they arrived and the failure of the Council of War to integrate them into the army once their presence was made known. The British soldiers and officers, for their part, were unimpressed with the Americans whom they saw only serving duties for which they were ill suited and for which they had not been recruited.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Yet another step had been taken down the road to independence.

By 1742 the frontiersmen had pushed west of the mountains, into what is now the state of West Virginia. The first recorded clash between the Virginia provincial militia and Indians west of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Virginia occurred on December 18-19, 1742. Colonel James Patton, commander of the Augusta County regiment, reported on the engagement which occurred near Balcony Falls in present-day Rockbridge County, Virginia to Virginia's Governor Gooch. Colonel Patton's first report was dated December 18. The second, dated December 23, contains a longer account but differed from the first in the number of men slain.

A parcel of Indians appear'd in an hostile manner amongst us Killing and carrying off Horses &c. Capt. John Buchanan and Capt. John McDowel came up with them this day, and sent a Man with a Signal of Peace to them, which Man they kill'd on the Spot and fir'd on our Men, which was return'd with Bravery, in about 45 Minutes the Indians fled, leaving eight or ten of their Men dead, and eleven of ours are dead, among whom is Capt. McDowel, we have also sundry wounded. Last night I had an Account of ye Behaviour of the Indians, and immediately travel'd towards them with a Party of Men, and came up within two or three hours after the Battle was over. I have summon'd all the Men in our County together in order to prevent their doing any further Damage, and to repel them force by force. We hear of many Indians on our Frontiers: the particulars of the Battle and Motions of the Enemy I have not time now to write. I am, Yr. Honor's most obedient Servt., James Patton

P.S. There are some white men (whom we believe to be French) among the Indians. Our People are uneasy but full of Spirits, and hope yr Behaviour will shew it for the future, they not being any way daunted at what has happen 'd.

Augusta County Xher 22 1742

Honrd Sr.: Thirty six Indians appear 'd in our County ye 5th Instant well equipp'd for War, pretending a Visit to the Catabaws, they had a Letter dated the 10th of Ober from James Silver near Harris's ferry in pensilvania directed to one Wm. Hogg a Justice o' Peace desiring him to give them a Pass to travel through Virginia to their Enemies, wch Letter they shew'd here, and I serv'd as a pass where Silver's hand was well known. Instead of going directly along the Road they visited moot of our Plantations, killing our Stock, and taking Provisions by force. The 14th Instant they got into Burden's Land about 20 miles from my house, the 15th Capt. McDowel by an Express inform'd me of their insolent Behaviour as also of the uneasiness of the Neighbours, and desird my Directions, on wch I wrote to him and Capt. John Buchanan that the Law of Nature and Nations obliged us to repel an Enemy force by force, but that they were to supply those Indians wth Provisions wch they shd be paid for at the Governments Charge, at the same time to attend yr Motions until they got fairly out of our County. The 16th 17th and 18th Instant they kill'd several valuable Horses, besides carrying off many for their Luggage, which so exasperated our Men that they upbraided our two Captains with Cowardice. Never the less our Captains to prevent mischief sent two men with a White Flag the 10th Instant, desiring Peace and Friendship, to which they answer'd, "O Friends are you there, have we found you, and on that fir d on our Flag, kill'd Capt. McDowel and six more of our Men, on which Capt. Buchanan gave the word of Command and bravely return 'd ye Compliment, and stood his Ground with a very few hands (for our Men were not all come up) in 45 Minutes the Indians fled, leaving 8 of yr Men dead on the spot, amongst whom were two of their Captains. Our Capt. pursued them with only 8 Men several hundred yards, the Enemy getting into a Thicket, he return'd to the Field which he cow'd not by any means prevail on his Men to keep, and stand by him. The Night before the Engagemt I heard of the Indians Behaviour, and march 'd up with 23 Men, and met our Capt. returning 14 Miles distance from where they had ingaged, to which place I went next Day and brought off our Dead being 8 in Number, Capt. Buchanan having taken off ye Wounded the Day before. I have order'd out Patrawlers on all our Frontiers well equipped, and drafted out a certain Number of Young Men out of each Company to be in readiness to reinforce any Party or Place that first needs help, have ordered the Captains to guard their own precincts, have appointed places of Rendez-vous where each Neighbourhood may draw to an Occasion, and have call'd in the stragling Families that lived at a Distance.⁽⁹⁶⁾

Under an act passed in October 1748, slaves living on plantations located on the frontier, and threatened by Amerindian attack, could obtain licensed firearms. The slaves' owners had to sign applications allowing the slave to own guns and they were made responsible for the slaves' use of the guns. While this act did not formally admit slaves to membership in the militias, it did have the effect of allowing them to act as a levees en masse in defense of their own lives and the property and safety of their owners.

On 25 October 1743 France signed a treaty known as the Second Family Compact with Spain and on 15 March 1744 joined Spain's war against England. The French made an unsuccessful assault on Annapolis Royal [Port Royal], Nova Scotia, in 1744. On 16 June 1745 Sir Peter Warren captured Fort Louisbourg. The press in New England was highly critical of Virginia for failing to support the expedition. Virginia had contributed no money and only 150 volunteer militiamen to the expedition, although Virginia was the most populous province and the richest.⁽⁹⁷⁾

In the early 1750s there were many reports that the French were stirring up the Amerindians in the western frontier of the Carolinas and Virginia. Reportedly the French were building forts as bases of supply for the coming war. The Ohio Company assisted the province of Virginia in recruiting and equipping volunteers who would serve in the militia.⁽⁹⁸⁾ The newspapers continued to report the alleged movements and actions of the French throughout 1753 and 1754 with great anxiety. The French were alleged to have issued orders to kill or take prisoner all whites, especially traders, caught within the territory they claimed, including Ohio.⁽⁹⁹⁾ The press paid no attention to provincial boundaries in reporting "trouble on the frontier" and one article might contain unsubstantiated reports of Indian attacks from the Carolinas to New England.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Governor Robert Dinwiddie, a man with essentially no experience in military affairs, was so anxious to enter the war and chase the French from the Ohio territory that he moved without authorization from his superiors or the legislature. He was unable to convince the House of Burgesses that Virginia had any interest in the war. He attempted to use his executive powers to order out a draft of the militia which was essentially a paper organization.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ The end result was unsatisfactory to everyone.

On 27 February 1752 the legislature passed a new militia act. Each county lieutenant was to enlist all able-bodied men between ages 18 and sixty, excepting indentured servants and slaves, Amerindians and free persons of color. Within two months of the passage of the law, the militia commanders were to muster and enumerate the men and report their names to the governor. Amerindians and free and enslaved black men could still be admitted to service as musicians, or be used in servile capacities as required in emergencies. Strangely, there was no mention of any militia obligation for indentured servants.⁽¹⁰²⁾

The French and Indian war opened with an engagement between the Virginia militia commanded by George Washington and the French in what is now western Pennsylvania, territory then claimed by Virginia. In the absence of any militia force from Pennsylvania, Virginia Governor Dinwiddie ordered his colonial militia to build fortifications at the Forks of Ohio [present day Pittsburgh]. The French had already erected Fort Duquesne and Washington's militia, which had constructed Fort Necessity, clashed with a force led by Coulon de Villiers at Great Meadows on 28 May 1754. Washington had about 150 militiamen and other recruits which brought his force to about 300. The French had about 900 men. In July 1754 Washington was forced to capitulate after losing 30 killed and 70 wounded. He optimistically reported that he had inflicted 300 casualties on the French force.⁽¹⁰³⁾ The news of the beginning of hostilities was widely reported.

On 14 February 1754 the Assembly appropriated £10,000 "for the encouragement and protection of western settlers." Five days later Governor Dinwiddie issued a proclamation granting land bounties, in addition to regular pay, to all militiamen who would volunteer "to expel the French and Indians and help to erect a fort at the Forks of the Monongahela." As it turned out, only about 90 men shared in grants that totaled 200,000 acres, most of it between the Kanawha and Great Sandy rivers.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ George Washington was ordered to go from Williamsburg to Fort Cumberland a few days later. He assumed command of some Virginia men and a company each from South Carolina and New York and on 20 March was promoted to lieutenant-colonel. Colonel Joshua Fry recruited the first Virginia volunteer regiment at Alexandria, consisting of 75 men, of which Fry had personally enlisted 50. The volunteers now numbered about 300. As his men marched westward Fry died at Patterson's Creek, probably on 31 May.

As we have seen, Colonel George Washington had assumed command of the Virginia volunteers upon the death of Colonel Fry. Washington's command was forced to seek terms from the French on 17 April 1754. On 3 July he returned to Mount Vernon and in October resigned his commission.

Colonels William Byrd and Adam Stephen joined the Virginia volunteers as officers. Colonel James Innes assumed command at Fort Cumberland, Maryland. In October 1754 the Assembly again authorized recruitment of volunteers, and the drafting of the unemployed, to serve against the French in the West. Justices of the peace, county lieutenants, and other officers were "to raise and levy such able-bodied men as do not follow or exercises any lawful calling or employment, or have not some other lawful and sufficient support and maintenance, to serve his Majesty as soldiers." Any soldier maimed would be supported afterward at the public expense, and families of those killed would also receive public support.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

By the first of September, Dinwiddie had received numerous petitions from the southwestern frontier reporting Amerindian incursions and massacres of isolated homesteads. He proposed building several forts on Holstein's and Green Brier's rivers. On 6 October 1754 Colonel Lewis led forty or fifty men on a punitive expedition into the Indian country. Lewis remained in West Augusta until February 1755.

In 1755 Dinwiddie reported to the Lords of Trade the number of militia and inhabitants in Virginia. There were 43,329 white heads of households and an estimated total white population of 173,316. He estimated that there were 60,078 black males of military age and a total population of 120,156 blacks in the province. That provided an estimated total population of 293,472 persons in Virginia. He numbered the militia at 36,000, with another 6000 potential militiamen exempted by various provisions of the militia law. Worse, Dinwiddie reported, "the Militia are not above one-half armed, and their Small Arms are of different Bores."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

On 19 February 1755 General Edward Braddock arrived at Hampton, Virginia. The next day Braddock assumed command of all the king's troops in North America. Washington accepted reappointment to his old rank and joined Braddock. Braddock formed two companies of artificers, principally skilled carpenters, to accompany his expedition to cut a road and build fortifications. He next selected a company of light horsemen and four companies of rangers to join his two Irish regiments.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Dinwiddie called a council of governors, which met on 14 April, at Alexandria, to discuss manning, equipping, supplying, and funding Braddock's expedition. Meanwhile, Braddock's army marched to Winchester and on to Cumberland, arriving there on 10 May. Like all southern colonies Virginia constantly feared a slave revolt and took legislative action designed to minimize the possibility of such an armed insurrection among a most numerous population. Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie, upon hearing of slave problems near Fort Cumberland, remarked that "The villainy of the Negroes on an emergency of government is what I always feared."⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ However, General Edward Braddock notified Dinwiddie that he intended to utilize a number of free blacks and mulattoes, although he would not necessarily arm them.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ On 27 June, Braddock's force was joined by Cherokee and Catawba warriors. On 9 July Braddock was surprised near Fort DuQuesne and his army decimated.

Before his defeat, Braddock had predicted that, if his army were to be destroyed, the savages would fall upon the frontier settlements with a vengeance. He also predicted that, as his army neared Fort DuQuesne, the Amerindians would circle around and attack along the frontier to the south. Dinwiddie agreed, and ordered his militia to increase the number serving watch duty. At least one-tenth of the militia was to be stationed at armed readiness at all times. Fast runners were to stationed at all vital spots to carry messages to various ranging stations, the militia, and the governor. Despite the many precautions, massacres occurred along the Holstein River. Dinwiddie summoned Colonel Lewis, asking him to increase the number of rangers and lookouts on the frontier.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

Dinwiddie's first recorded correspondence acknowledging Braddock's defeat was dated 16 July. Dinwiddie wrote to Colonel Patton in the Greenbrier area, asking that he strengthen the militia under his command and ordering him to do as much damage as possible to the marauding Amerindian forces. "I have ordered the whole militia of this dominion to be in arms," Dinwiddie wrote, "and your neighboring counties are directed to send men to your assistance." He dispatched Colonel Stewart and about fifty rangers to assist. In the New River area, between October 1754 and August 1755, 21 persons were killed, 7 wounded and nine taken prisoner. Among those killed were Colonel Patton and his deputy, Lieutenant Wright. The latter was killed just three days after Braddock's defeat by Amerindians whose courage had been bolstered by news of that event.

At about the same time the first reports of the terrible massacre were received along the New River. Reverend Hugh McAden, who kept a journal of his times, reported that settlers by the hundred were fleeing the frontier. Many came first to Bedford, and then moved to North Carolina. John Madison, clerk of Augusta County, reported families fleeing from the Roanoke area.⁽¹¹¹⁾

On 25 July Dinwiddie wrote to Washington, informing him that he had ordered three companies of rangers to patrol the frontier. To Colonel John Buchanan he wrote a letter urging him to stand firm and reporting that his ranging company would soon be augmented by the addition of fifty rangers from Lunenburg County under Captain Nathaniel Terry and companies of forty or more rangers led by Captains Lewis, Patton, and Smith. These, Dinwiddie thought, "will be sufficient for the Protection of the Frontiers, without calling out the militia, which is not to be done till a great Extremity." Dinwiddie requested Samuel Overton to raise a company of volunteers in Hanover County and Captain John Phelps to do the same in Bedford County. All ranging companies were to "proceed with all expedition to annoy and destroy the enemy." As an incentive to enlist men and to have them fight, Dinwiddie placed a bounty of £5 on Amerindian scalps. The governor thought the incursions would end by Christmas and that peace would come to the frontier by spring.⁽¹¹²⁾

Governor Dinwiddie expressed his hope that Colonel Dunbar would not take the remnants of Braddock's army into winter camp, leaving the frontier undefended. Dinwiddie decided to pursue a multi-faceted self-help plan for defense of the colony. He would equip and support the ranging companies, improve the militia, build a select militia, continue the bounty payments for Amerindian scalps, obtain adequate firearms for his troops, and enlist the aid of friendly natives. Most parts of the policy, with the notable exception of the creation of the select militia, had proven effective in years passed.

In 1755, in the wake of Braddock's defeat, and the subsequent Amerindian attacks all along the frontier, Virginia's legislature passed an act placing a bounty on the scalps of the hostiles, in effect confirming the governor's earlier executive order.

Whereas, divers cruel and barbarous murders have been lately committed in the upper parts of this colony, by Indians supposed to be in the interest of the French, without any provocation from us, and contrary to the laws of nature and nations, and they still continue in skulking parties to perpetrate their barbarous and savage cruelties, in the most base and treacherous manner, surprising, torturing, killing and scalping, not only our men, who live dispersedly in the frontiers, but also their helpless wives and children, sparing neither age nor sex; for prevention of which shocking inhumanities, and for repelling such malicious and detestable enemies, be it enacted by the lieutenant-governor, council and burgesses of this present General Assembly, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, that the sum of ten pounds shall be paid by the treasurer of this colony, out of the public money in his hands, to any person or persons, party or parties, either in the pay of this colony, or other the inhabitants thereof, for every male Indian enemy, above the age of twelve years, by him or them taken prisoner, killed or destroyed, within the limits of this colony, at any time within the space of two years after the end of this session of Assembly. [The act further provided that] the scalp of every Indian, so to be killed or destroyed, as aforesaid, shall be produced to the governor or commander-in-chief.⁽¹¹³⁾

On 14 July 1755 Dinwiddie commissioned William Preston captain of a ranging company, to serve until 24 June 1756. Preston had to recruit his own men and was nominally under the command of Colonel Patton. By the middle of August he had recruited only thirty men, few of whom were from Virginia.

On 14 August Dinwiddie promoted Washington to colonel of the Virginia Regiment and made him supreme commander of all provincial forces raised in defense of the frontier. Dinwiddie promised him sixteen regiments of his countrymen with command post to be established at Winchester and field offices at Alexandria and Fredericksburg. The office in Alexandria would be used primarily for recruitment. Meanwhile, Dinwiddie would obtain arms, ammunition, clothing, and other supplies.

Upon his arrival at Winchester, Washington found the recruits to be in "terrible bad order." No man followed orders unless the officers threatened physical punishment. When he ordered them drilled, it became immediately obvious that they had not been exercised in recent times. The distressed refugees from the frontier cowered in fear of the drunken behavior of most of the recruits.

Recruiting officers had obviously given thought only to the collection of bounties and not to the creation of a formidable fighting force. Provincial officers assigned to recruiting duty showed no interest in carrying out their assignment and returned after several weeks' work without signing a single man. Many recruits were persistent idlers, some criminals, others escaped bondsmen, and still others physically unsuited for service. Many men who had been drafted from militia units chafed at the thought of discipline and complained of their bad luck in having been selected. Few showed any aptitude for, or interest in, military life. Drill sergeants complained about the "insolence" of almost all recruits. Recruits ignored frontiersmen who attempted to explain some of the critical points of Indian fighting. Officers leading men on forced marches often encountered settlers fleeing from the frontier. These poor creatures detained the officers, telling them their tales of woe and beseeching them to return and liberate their homesteads.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

George Washington had a prejudice of long standing against the militia. That bias showed throughout the Revolution, but its origins were in the Seven Years War. Writing to his friend and rival Adam Stephen, later a general in the Revolutionary Army, on 18 November 1755, Washington observed that in the "life of Military Discipline" required that "we enforce obedience and obedience will be expected of us." He wished that militiamen be "be subject to death as in Military Law." He urged that bounties be placed on those who desert from the militia as was already the case for deserters from the army. But, he observed, "the Assembly will make no Alteration in the Militia Law."⁽¹¹⁵⁾ In reality, Washington made no greater progress with the governor that he had with the legislature. Writing from Fort Cumberland on 13 July 1756, he complained to Captain Thomas Waggener, that the "Governor has ordered the Militia to be discharged as soon as harvest."⁽¹¹⁶⁾ On 4 August 1756 he expressed his disdain for the militia to Governor Dinwiddie. Reporting on his experience in western Virginia he pointed put that when he was ambushed "near Fort Ashby" he received little militia support. He wrote of the "dastardly behavior of the Militia who ran off without half of them having discharged their pieces."⁽¹¹⁷⁾ He characterized the militia to Dinwiddie as "obstinate, self-willed, perverse, of little or no service to the people and very burthensome to the Country."⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Washington was much concerned about the sad condition of the Virginia militia well before Braddock's defeat. He first wrote to Dinwiddie on 21 August 1754, urging greater training of the colonial militia.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Following Braddock's defeat George Washington, on 2 August 1755, asked help from Colin Campbell to put the militia "in proper order" to meet the expected onslaught on the frontier.⁽¹²⁰⁾ He began correspondence in earnest with Governor Dinwiddie asking his assistance on the same subject. On 8 October 1755, writing from Fredericksburg, Washington told the governor that "I must again take the liberty of mentioning to your honor the necessity of putting the militia under better regulation than they are at present." He urged that Virginia revise its militia law.⁽¹²¹⁾ That letter was followed in rapid succession with another letter dated 11 October in which he threatened to resign his commission "unless the Assembly will enact a law to enforce military law in all its Parts."⁽¹²²⁾ He suggested to Dinwiddie that the militia law be so revised as to force deserters who were apprehended to be "immediately draughted as Soldiers into the Virginia Regiment."⁽¹²³⁾

Washington's views were shared by others, including Governor Dinwiddie, who thought that it lacked both organization and proper discipline. So great was the governor's distrust of the county militias that only under the most dire circumstances would he order it out, depending instead on ranging units. Dinwiddie asked the legislature to take the necessary and proper steps to place them in readiness. In the governor's mind, it was a simple problem requiring only an equally simple remedy. The militia "had not been properly disciplined, or under proper command" and those who neglected their duty were rarely, if ever, punished. A new militia law, requiring service under a more severe set of penalties, and mandating periodic training sessions, would do much to remedy the problem. Had the settlers responded immediately by banding together, they would never have had to leave their homes and crops and would have repelled the invasions. The great body of trained militia could have saved themselves great losses and misfortune.⁽¹²⁴⁾

The legislature responded by passing a new militia law, mandating service of all able-bodied men between ages 16 and sixty. Exemptions to this act included most political officials, millers, farm and slave overseers, and those engaged in mining and refining lead, brass and iron. Men were required to provide at their own expense a "well fixed firelock" with a bayonet, cutting sword, and cartridge box. Those who could afford to provide the appropriate equipment could join the companies of horse. However, this service was necessarily restricted to the wealthy and their sons because of the rather considerable equipment required: a horse, good saddle, breast-plate, crupper, curb-bridle, carbine with boot, brace of pistols with holsters, double cartridge box, and a sword. The law restricted use of militia to the province and no more than five miles beyond habitation on the frontier.⁽¹²⁵⁾

On 23 February 1756 Dinwiddie reported to the Lords of Trade on his progress with militia training. "On my arrival at my government [post] I found the militia in bad order." Although there was an enrollment reported of more than 36,000 men, far fewer men were armed and most were undisciplined or trained in militia tactics. "The militia are not above half-armed, and their small arms [are] of different bores, making them very inconvenient in time of action." The exemptions to the Militia Act were many. There were far too many classes which "are exempted by Act of Assembly from appearing under arms." Those exempted included judges, justices of the peace, plantation overseers, millers and most politicians and public officers. Additionally, many tradesmen were exempted by virtue of their trades. All together those exempted by law amounted, according to Dinwiddie's estimates, to an additional 6000 men who might have been serving in the militia. Dinwiddie then asked the legislature "to vote a general tax to purchase arms of one bore for the militia," but lamented that "I have not yet prevailed with them."⁽¹²⁶⁾ However, Dinwiddie, in an address to the legislature, referred most favorably to the militia. "Our militia, under God, is our chief dependence for the protection of our lives and fortunes."⁽¹²⁷⁾

The select militia were specially trained citizen-soldiers who had little frontier experience and whose service was to be primarily in urban areas. On 17 September 1755 Dinwiddie issued orders for the dress of the select militia. The officers of the regular militia were to be dressed in a "suit of regimentals of good blue cloath coat to be faced and faced with scarlet and trimmed with silver; a scarlet waist-coat, with silver lace; blue breeches with silver-laced hat." The officers sent into the woods were also to have one set "of common soldiers' dress."⁽¹²⁸⁾

Governor Dinwiddie valued George Washington's advice and the militia colonel convinced his superior that the enlistment of friendly Amerindians was crucial to the defense of the frontier. Washington knew that the governor could exploit the ancient tribal antagonisms. There were many advantages to be gained at little cost or inconvenience. Obviously, those natives who assisted the colonists would not be at war with them. Their contacts with other tribes would render many vital scouting and intelligence services. They were experienced trackers and woodsmen. Considerable numbers could be enlisted for trinkets worth only a few hundred pounds. Their considerable presence might act as a shield against other, more hostile, tribes.

Virginia Governor Dinwiddie joined the growing effort to take the offensive against the French. Responding in large measure to Washington's several letters,⁽¹²⁹⁾ he asked the House of Burgesses to appropriate money to support the British effort against the French at Crown Point, and to supply and arm the militia in the spring of 1756.⁽¹³⁰⁾ North Carolina Governor Arthur Dobbs offered aid and militia supplies to Virginia.⁽¹³¹⁾ The press throughout the American colonies reported Governor Dinwiddie's several calls for increased military preparedness.⁽¹³²⁾ In Williamsburg the House of Burgesses appropriated money for defense and ordered the militia to be trained and equipped.⁽¹³³⁾ New militia districts were drawn and training was to be improved.⁽¹³⁴⁾

Dinwiddie decided to take the offensive in February 1756. Major Lewis was to assume command assisted by two "old woodsmen," Captains Woodson and Smith. A supply of 150 small arms, along with gunpowder and lead, was accompanied by a much-needed surgeon, Lieutenant William Fleming. The Cherokees promised aid and Dinwiddie enthusiastically reported to Washington that he hoped to have about 350 men in Lewis' command. The individual companies marched through the Roanoke Valley and assembled at Dunkard's Bottom on the New River at a post optimistically called Fort Frederick. A local minister named Brown appeared to bless the troops, preach a military sermon, and invoke God's protection. Almost immediately word arrived that a Shawnee raiding party had caused mischief about a day's march to the west. Lewis had ordered a man "switched" for swearing and the sight of such physical punishment disgusted the Cherokees who deserted. Major Lewis and Captain Pearis followed them and persuaded them to return, but valuable time had been lost.

Scouts picked up signs of the Shawnee war party along with their prisoners, but the trail was difficult and food soon ran short. Lewis ordered the men to go on half-rations. The New River at many points ran through steep mountain passes with no level land to be found on either shore. The party had to cross the river almost every mile. The men obtained canoes, but most capsized, damaging and destroying supplies. Eight of Smith's men deserted and a part of Preston's company was compelled to continue on the their mission only under the threat of being shot. Unable to contain the spreading mutiny, Major Lewis delivered an impassioned speech urging the men to perform their duty. Only about thirty men and the officers agreed to continue, while the volunteers from the companies led by Smith, Dunlap, Preston and Montgomery deserted.

The remaining party pursued the natives without being able to engage them. Casualties were caused either by natural disaster or the ambush of deserters. Disgusted and frustrated, Lewis returned and delivered his report. On 24 April, Dinwiddie sent him to Cherokee country to construct a fort which was completed at a cost of £2000. Captain Dunlap constructed another fort at the mouth of Craig's Creek. Captain Preston continued to march his men through the woods along the Catawba and Buffalo creeks, after which he commanded a portion of the Augusta County militia that had been mustered to defend the frontier. Frontiersmen circulated a petition, asking that a chain of new forts be constructed along the entire frontier. Meanwhile, the House of Burgesses conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the officers assigned to the Shawnee expedition, finding them all innocent.⁽¹³⁵⁾

Dinwiddie proposed to the Lords of Trade that they authorize the construction of a string of forts along the Allegheny mountains, with emphasis on the mountain passes. The legislature took up the call, demanding that forts be erected from Great Capon in Hampshire County in the north and extending to the south fork of the Mayo River in Halifax County. Many frontiersmen, upon hearing of this policy consideration, supported it by sending memorials and petitions to both the chief executive and the House of Burgesses.⁽¹³⁶⁾

Washington entered the debate. His logic was impeccable. To have the desired effect, each fort would have to have a garrison of approximately eighty to one hundred men. At any time about forty to fifty men would have to be assigned to patrols. The chain of forts would have to be built at intervals not greater than one day's march. The state could not afford to maintain an adequate garrison at so many places