DISCOURSES



         Upon The First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy



                          To



                  ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI

                        AND TO

                    COSIMO RUCELLAI







                  NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

                          TO

                  ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI

                        AND TO

                    COSIMO RUCELLAI





                       GREETINGS. 



I send you a present which if it is not equal to the obligations that I have 

toward you, it is one which without doubt the best that Niccolo Machiavelli 

has been able to offer you. Because in it I have expressed what I know and 

what I have learned through a long experience and a continuing study of the 

things of the world. And neither you nor others being able to desire more of 

me, I have not offered you more. You may well complain of the poverty of my 

endeavor since these narrations of mine are poor, and of the fallacy of (my) 

judgement when I deceive myself in many parts of my discussion. Which being 

so, I do not know which of us should be less obligated to the other, either 

I to you who have forced me to write that which by myself I would not have 

written, or you to me that having written I have not satisfied you. Accept 

this, therefore, in that manner that all things are taken from friends, 

where always the intention of the sender is more than the quality of the 

thing that is sent. And believe me I obtain satisfaction from this when I 

think that even if I should have been deceived on many occasions, I know I 

have not erred on this one in having selected you, to whom above all other 

of my friends I address (dedicate) these Discourses; as much because in 

doing this it appears to me I have shown some gratitude for the benefits I 

have received, as well because it appears to me I have departed from the 

common usage of those writers, who usually (always) address (dedicate) their 

works to some Prince, and blinded by ambition and avarice laud him for all 

his virtuous qualities when they should be censuring him for all his 

shameful parts. Whence I, so as not to incur this error, have selected, not 

those who are Princes, but those who by their infinite good qualities would 

merit to be such; (and) not to those who could load me with rank, honors, 

and riches, but to those who although unable to would want to do so. For 

men, when they want to judge rightly, should esteem those who are generous, 

not those who are able to be so; and likewise those who govern a Kingdom, 

not those who can but have not the knowledge. And writers lauded more Hiero 

of Syracuse when he was a private citizen than Perseus the Macedonian when he 

was King, for to Hiero nothing was lacking to be a Prince than the 

Principality, and the other did not possess any part of the King than the 

Kingdom. Enjoy this, therefore, whether good or bad, that you yourselves 

have wanted; and if you should continue in this error that these thoughts of 

mine are acceptable, I shall not fail to continue the rest of the history 

according as I promised you in the beginning. Farewell.







                DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

            ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS

           TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI



                           FIRST BOOK



When I consider how much honor is attributed to antiquity, and how many 

times, not to mention many other examples, a fragment of an antique statue 

has been bought at a great price in order to have it near to one, honoring 

his house, being able to have it imitated by those who delight in those 

arts, and how they then strive with all industry to present them in all 

their work: and when I see, on the other hand, the works of greatest virtu 

which Historians indicate have been accomplished by ancient Kingdoms and 

Republics, by Kings, Captains, Citizens, Lawgivers, and others who have 

worked themselves hard for their country, to be more readily admired than 

imitated, or rather so much neglected by everyone in every respect that no 

sign of that ancient virtu remains, I cannot otherwise than wonder and at 

the same time be sad: and so much more when I see in the civil differences 

that arise between Citizens, or in the maladies which men incur, they always 

have recourses to those judgments or to those remedies that have been judged 

or instituted by the ancients. For the civil laws are nothing else but the 

decisions given by the ancient Jurisconsults, which reduced to a system 

presently teach our Jurisconsults to judge and also what is medicine if not 

the experience had by the ancient Doctors, (and) on which the present 

Doctors base their judgments? None the less in the instituting of Republics, 

in maintaining of States, in the governing of Kingdoms, in organizing an army 

and conducting a war, in (giving) judgment for Subjects, in expanding the 

Empire, there will not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain, or 

Citizen, who has recourse to the examples of the ancients. Which I am 

persuaded arises not so much from the weakness to which the present 

education has brought the world, or from that evil which an ambitious 

indolence has created in many Christian Provinces and Cities, than from not 

having a real understanding of history, and from not drawing that (real) 

sense from its reading, or benefiting from the spirit which is contained in 

it. whence it arises that they who read take infinitely more pleasure in 

knowing the variety of incidents that are contained in them, without ever 

thinking of imitating them, believing the imitation not only difficult, but 

impossible: as if heaven, the sun, the elements, and men should have changed 

the order of their motions and power, from what they were anciently. 

Wanting, therefore, to draw men from this error, I have judged it necessary 

to write upon all those books of Titus Livy which, because of the malignity 

of the times, have been prevented (from coming to us), in order that I might 

judge by comparing ancient and modern events what is necessary for their 

better understanding, so that those who may read these Discourses of mine 

may be able to derive that usefulness for which the understanding of History 

ought to be sought. And although this enterprise may be difficult, none the 

less, aided by those who have advised me to begin carrying this load, I 

believe I can carry it so that there will remain for others a short way to 

bring it to its destined place (end).



                     CHAPTER I



WHAT HAVE GENERALLY BEEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME CITIES, AND WHAT WAS THAT OF 

ROME



Those who read what the beginning of the City of Rome was, and of her 

Law-givers and how it was organized, do not wonder that so much virtu had 

been maintained for so many centuries in that City, and that afterward there 

should have been born that Empire to which that Republic was joined. And 

wanting first to discuss its birth, I say that all Cities are built either 

by men born in the place where they build it or by foreigners. The first 

case occurs when it appears to the inhabitants that they do not live 

securely when dispersed into many and small parties, each unable by himself 

both because of the location and the small number to resist attacks of those 

who should assault them, and they are not in time ((the enemy coming)) in 

waiting for their defense: or if they should be, they must abandon many of 

their refuges, and thus they would quickly become the prey of their enemies: 

so much that in order to avoid these dangers, moved either by themselves or 

by some one among them of greater authority, they restrict themselves to 

live together in a place selected by them, more convenient to live in and 

more easy to defend. Of these, among others, have been Athens and Venice: 

the first under the authority of Theseus was built by the dispersed 

inhabitants for like reasons: the other built by many people (who) had come 

to certain small islands situated at the head of the Adriatic Sea, in order 

to escape those wars which every day were arising in Italy because of the 

coming of new barbarians after the decline of that Roman Empire, began among 

themselves, without any particular Prince who should organize them, to live 

under those laws which appeared to them best suited in maintaining it (their 

new state). In this they succeeded happily because of the long peace which 

the site gave to them (for) that sea not having issue, where those people 

who were afflicting Italy, not having ships with which they could invest 

them; so that from a small beginning they were enabled to come to that 

greatness which they now have.



The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces, is caused by free 

men and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies sent either by a 

Republic or by a Prince to relieve their towns of (excessive) inhabitants or 

for the defense of that country which they have newly acquired (and) want to 

maintain securely and without expense; (thy Roman people built many cities, 

throughout all their Empire) or they are built by a Prince, not to live 

there but for his own glory, as was the City of Alexandria built by 

Alexander. And because these cities at their origin do not have their 

freedom, it rarely happens that they make great progress and are able to be 

numbered among the chief Kingdoms. Such was the building of Florence, for 

(it was built either by the soldiers of Sulla, or perhaps by the inhabitants 

of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in that long peace which prevailed 

in the world under Octavian were led to live in the plain along the Arno) it 

was built under the Roman Empire, and could not in its beginning have any 

other growth that those which were conceded to her through the courtesy of 

the Prince.



The builders of Cities are free when any people either under a Prince or by 

themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine or by war to 

abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either inhabit the 

cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses did, or they 

build new ones, as Eneas did. This is a case where the virtu and fortune of 

the builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater or less wonder 

according as that man who was the beginner was of greater or less virtu. The 

virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: the first is in the selection of 

the site, the other in the establishment of the laws. And because men work 

either from necessity or from choice: and because it is seen here that virtu 

is greater where choice has less authority (results from necessity), it is 

(something) to be considered whether it would be better for the building of 

a city to select sterile places, so that men constrained to be industrious 

and less occupied with idleness, should live more united, where, because of 

the poverty of the site, they should have less cause for discord, as 

happened at Ragusa and in many other cities built in similar places; which 

selection would without doubt be more wise and more useful if men would be 

content to live of their own (possessions), and not want to seek to command 

that of others.



However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except through power, 

it is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and locate it in very 

fertile places, where because of the fertility of the site, it can grow, can 

defend itself from whoever should assault it, and suppress whoever should 

oppose its aggrandizement. And as to that idleness which the site should 

encourage, it ought to be arranged that in that necessity the laws should 

constrain them (to work) where the site does not constrain them (does not do 

so), and to imitate those who have been wise and have lived in most amenable 

and most fertile countries, which are apt to making men idle and unable to 

exercise any virtu: that to obviate those which the amenity of the country 

may cause through idleness, they imposed the necessity of exercise on those 

who were to be soldiers: of a kind that, because of such orders, they became 

better soldiers than (men) in those countries where nature has been harsh 

and sterile: among which was the Kingdom of Egypt, which notwithstanding 

that the country was most amenable, that necessity ordained by the laws was 

so great, that most excellent men resulted therefrom: and if their names had 

not been extinguished by antiquity, it would be seen that they would have 

merited more praise than Alexander the Great, and many others of whom memory 

is still fresh. And whoever had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the 

order of the Mamelukes, and of their military (organization) before it was 

destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, would have seen there how much the 

soldiers exercised, and in fact would have known how much they feared that 

idleness to which the benignity of the country could lead them if they had 

not obviated it by the strongest laws. I say therefore that the selection of 

a fertile location in establishing (a city) is more prudent when (the 

results) of that fertility can be restricted within given limits by laws.



Alexander the Great, wishing to build a city for his glory, Dinocrates, the 

Architect came to him and showed him how he could do so upon the mountain 

Athos, which place in addition to being strong, could be arranged in a way 

that the City would be given human form, which would be a marvelous and rare 

thing and worthy of his greatness: and Alexander asking him on what the 

inhabitants would live, he replied that he had not thought of it: at which 

he laughed, and leaving that mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where 

the inhabitants would stay willingly because of the richness of the country 

and the convenience to the sea and of the Nile.



Whoever should examine, therefore, the building of Rome if he should take 

Eneas for its first ancestor, will know that that City was built by 

foreigners: (but) if Romulus, it would have been built by men native to the 

place, and in any case it would be seen to have been free from the beginning 

without depending on anyone: it will also be seen (as it will be said below) 

to what necessity the laws made by Romulus, Numa, and the others had 

constrained them; so much so that the fertility of the site, the convenience 

of the sea, the frequent victories, the greatness of the Empire, could not 

corrupt her for many centuries, and they maintained her full of so much 

virtu than any other republic has ever been adorned. And because the things 

achieved by them and that are made notable by Titus Livius, have taken place 

either through public Councils or private (individuals) either inside or 

outside the City, I shall begin to discourse upon those things which occured 

inside; and as for the public Council, which is worthy of greater 

annotation, I shall judge, adding all that is dependent on them; with which 

discourses this fast book, or rather this fast part will be ended.



                    CHAPTER II



OF THE KINDS OF REPUBLICS THERE ARE, AND OF WHICH WAS THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 



I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that had their 

beginning subject to others, and I will talk of those which have had their 

beginning far removed from any external servitude, but which (were) 

initially governed themselves through their own will, either as Republics or 

as Principalities; which have had (as diverse origins) diverse laws and 

institutions. For to some, at the beginning or very soon after, their laws 

were given to them by one (man) and all at one time, as those which were 

given to the Spartans by Lycurgus: Some have received them by chance, and at 

several times, according to events, as Rome did. So that a Republic can be 

called fortunate which by chance has a man so prudent, who gives her laws so 

ordered that without having need of correcting them, she can live securely 

under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed hers (laws) for more than 

eight hundred years without changing them and without any dangerous 

disturbance: and on the contrary that City has some degree of unhappiness 

which (not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker) is compelled to reorganize 

her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy which has diverged more 

from her institutions; and that (Republic) is even further from them whose 

laws lead her away from perfect and true ends entirely outside of the right 

path; for to those who are in that condition it is almost impossible that by 

some incident they be set aright. Those others which do not have a perfect 

constitution, but had made a good beginning, are capable of becoming better, 

and can become perfect through the occurrence of events. It is very true, 

however, that they have never been reformed without danger, for the greater 

number of men never agree to a new law which contemplates a new order for 

the City, unless the necessity that needs be accomplished is shown to them: 

and as this necessity cannot arise without some peril, it is an easy thing 

for the Republic to be ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect 

constitution. The Republic of Florence gives a proof of this, which because 

of the incident of Arezzo in (the year) one thousand five hundred and two 

(1502) was reorganized, (and) it was disorganized by that of Prato in (the 

year) one thousand five hundred and twelve (1512).



Wanting therefore to discourse on what were the institutions of the City of 

Rome and what events brought her to her perfection, I say, that some who 

have written of Republics say there are (one of) three States (governments) 

in them called by them Principality (Monarchy), of the Best (Aristocracy), 

and Popular (Democracy), and that those men who institute (laws) in a City 

ought to turn to one of these, according as it seems fit to them. Some 

others (and wiser according to the opinion of many) believe there are six 

kinds of Governments, of which those are very bad, and those are good in 

themselves, but may be so easily corrupted that they also become pernicious. 

Those that are good are three mentioned above: those that are bad, are three 

others which derive from those (first three), and each is so similar to them 

that they easily jump from one to the other, for the Principality easily 

becomes a tyranny, autocracy easily become State of the Few (oligarchies), 

and the Popular (Democracy) without difficulty is converted into a 

licentious one (anarchy). So much so that an organizer of a Republic 

institutes one of those three States (governments) in a City, he institutes 

it for only a short time, because there is no remedy which can prevent them 

from degenerating into their opposite kind, because of the resemblance that 

virtu and vice have in this instance.



These variations in government among men are born by chance, for at the 

beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, (and) lived for a time 

dispersed and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied they gathered 

together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves they began to 

seek among themselves the one who was most robust and of greater courage, 

and made him their head and obeyed him. From this there arose the knowledge 

of honest and good things; differentiating them from the pernicious and 

evil; for seeing one man harm his benefactor there arose hate and compassion 

between men, censuring the ingrates and honoring those who were grateful, 

and believing also that these same injuries could be done to them, to avoid 

like evils they were led to make laws, and institute punishments for those 

who should contravene them; whence came the cognition of justice. Which 

thing later caused them to select a Prince, not seeking the most stalwart 

but he who was more prudent and more just. But afterwards when they began to 

make the Prince by succession and not by election, the heirs quickly 

degenerated from their fathers, and leaving off from works of virtu they 

believed that Princes should have nothing else to do than surpass others in 

sumptuousness and lasciviousness and in every other kind of delight. So that 

the Prince began to be hated, and because of this hate he began to fear, and 

passing therefore from fear to injury, a tyranny quickly arose. From this 

there arose the beginnings of the ruin and conspiracies; and these 

conspiracies against the Prince were not made by weak and timid men, but by 

those who because of their generosity, greatness of spirit, riches, and 

nobility above the others, could not endure the dishonest life of that 

prince. 



The multitude therefore following the authority of these powerful ones armed 

itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him, they obeyed them as 

their liberators. And these holding the name of chief in hatred, constituted 

a government by themselves, and in the beginning (having in mind the past 

tyranny) governed themselves according to the laws instituted by them, 

preferring every common usefulness to their conveniences, and governed and 

preserved private and public affairs with the greatest diligence. This 

administration later was handed down to their children, who not knowing the 

changeability of fortune (for) never having experienced bad (fortune), and 

not wanting to remain content with civil equality, they turned to avarice, 

ambition, violation of women, caused that aristocratic government (of the 

Best) to become an oligarchic government (of the Few) regardless of all 

civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing happened to them as it 

did to the Tyrant, for the multitude disgusted with their government, placed 

itself under the orders of whoever would in any way plan to attack those 

Governors, and thus there arose some one who, with the aid of the multitude, 

destroyed them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries received from 

him being yet fresh (and) having destroyed the oligarchic state (of the 

Few), and not wanting to restore that of the Prince, the (people) turned to 

the Popular state (Democracy) and they organized that in such a way, that 

neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority. And because 

all States in the beginning receive some reverence, this Popular State 

maintained itself for a short time, but not for long, especially when that 

generation that had organized it was extinguished, for they quickly came to 

that license where neither private men or public men were feared: this was 

such that every one living in his own way, a thousand injuries were 

inflicted every day: so that constrained by necessity either through the 

suggestion of some good man, or to escape from such license, they once again 

turn to a Principality; and from this step by step they return to that 

license both in the manner and for the causes mentioned (previously).



And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed and will 

eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same (original) 

governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life as to be able 

often to pass through these changes and remain on its feet. But it may well 

happen that in the troubles besetting a Republic always lacking counsel and 

strength, it will become subject to a neighboring state which may be better 

organized than itself: but assuming this does not happen, a Republic would 

be apt to revolve indefinitely among these governments. I say therefore that 

all the (previously) mentioned forms are inferior because of the brevity of 

the existence of those three that are good, and of the malignity of those 

three that are bad. So that those who make laws prudently having recognized 

the defects of each, (and) avoiding every one of these forms by itself 

alone, they selected one (form) that should partake of all, they judging it 

to be more firm and stable, because when there is in the same City 

(government) a Principality, an Aristocracy, and a Popular Government 

(Democracy), one watches the other.[1]



Among those who have merited more praise for having similar constitutions is 

Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that in giving parts to the 

King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state that endured more than 

eight hundred years, with great praise to himself and tranquillity to that 

City. The contrary happened to Solon who established the laws in Athens, 

(and) who by establishing only the Popular (Democratic) state, he gave it 

such a brief existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of 

Pisistratus: and although after forty years his (the tyrants) heirs were 

driven out and liberty returned to Athens, for the Popular state was 

restored according to the ordinances of Solon, it did not last more than a 

hundred years, yet in order that it be maintained many conventions were made 

by which the insolence of the nobles and the general licentiousness were 

suppressed, which had not been considered by Solon: none the less because he 

did not mix it (Popular state) with the power of the Principate and with 

that of the Aristocracy, Athens lived a very short time as compared to 

Sparta.



But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it did not have a 

Lycurgus who so established it in the beginning that she was not able to 

exist free for a long time, none the less so many were the incidents that 

arose in that City because of the disunion that existed between the Plebs 

and the Senate, so that what the legislator did not do, chance did. For, if 

Rome did not attain top fortune, it attained the second; if the first 

institutions were defective, none the less they did not deviate from the 

straight path which would lead them to perfection, for Romulus and all the 

other Kings made many and good laws, all conforming to a free existence. But 

because their objective was to found a Kingdom and not a Republic, when that 

City became free she lacked many things that were necessary to be 

established in favor of liberty, which had not been established by those 

Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire for the reasons and in the 

manner discussed, none the less those who drove them out quickly instituted 

two Consuls who should be in the place of the King, (and) so it happened 

that while the name (of King) was driven from Rome, the royal power was not; 

so that the Consuls and the Senate existed in forms mentioned above, that is 

the Principate and the Aristocracy. There remained only to make a place for 

Popular government for the reasons to be mentioned below, the people rose 

against them: so that in order not to lose everything, (the Nobility) was 

constrained to concede a part of its power to them, and on the other hand 

the Senate and the Consuls remained with so much authority that they were 

able to keep their rank in that Republic. And thus was born (the creation) of 

the Tribunes of the plebs,[2] after which creation the government of that 

Republic came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of 

government. And so favorable was fortune to them that although they passed 

from a Monarchial government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People 

(Democracy), by those same degrees and for the same reasons that were 

discussed above, none the less the Royal form was never entirely taken away 

to give authority to the Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the 

Aristocrats diminished in order to give it to the People, but it remained 

shared (between the three) it made the Republic perfect: which perfection 

resulted from the disunion of the Plebs and the Senate, as we shall discuss 

at length in the next following chapters.



                    CHAPTER III



WHAT EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS IN ROME, WHICH 

MADE THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT



As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions, and as every 

history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever arranges to found a 

Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that all men are bad and 

that they will use their malignity of mind every time they have the 

opportunity; and if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds from 

the unknown reason that would not be known because the experience of the 

contrary had not been seen, but time, which is said to be the father of 

every truth, will cause it to be discovered. It seemed that in Rome there 

was a very great harmony between the Plebs and the Senate (the Tarquins 

having been driven out), and that the nobles had laid aside their 

haughtiness and had become of a popular spirit, and supportable to everyone 

even to the lowest. This deception was hidden, nor was the cause seen while 

the Tarquins lived, whom the nobility feared, and having fear that the 

maltreated plebs might not side with them (the nobles) they behaved 

themselves humanely toward them: but as soon as the Tarquins were dead, and 

that fear left the Nobles, they begun to vent upon the plebs that poison 

which they had kept within their breasts, and in every way they could they 

offended them: which thing gives testimony to that which was said above that 

men never act well except through necessity: but where choice abounds and 

where license may be used, everything is quickly filled with confusion and 

disorder. It is said therefore that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious, 

and Laws make them good. And where something by itself works well without 

law, the law is not necessary: but when that good custom is lacking, the law 

immediately becomes necessary. Thus the Tarquins being dead through fear of 

whom the Nobles were kept in restraint, it behooved them (the Nobles) to 

think of a new order, which would cause the same effect which the Tarquins 

had caused when they were alive. And therefore after many confusions, 

tumults, and dangers of troubles, which arose between the Plebs and the 

Nobility, they came for the security of the Plebs to the creation of the 

Tribunes, and they were given so much preeminence and so much reputation, 

that they then should always be able to be in the middle between the Plebs 

and the Senate, and obviate the insolence of the Nobles.



                    CHAPTER IV



THAT DISUNION OF THE PLEBS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT REPUBLIC FREE AND 

POWERFUL



I do not want to miss discoursing on these tumults that occurred in Rome 

from the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the Tribunes; and 

afterwards I will discourse on some things contrary to the opinions of many 

who say that Rome was a tumultuous Republic and full of so much confusion, 

that if good fortune and military virtu had not supplied her defects, she 

would have been inferior to every other Republic.



I cannot deny that fortune and the military were the causes of the Roman 

Empire; but it indeed seems to me that this would not happen except when 

military discipline is good, it happens that where order is good, (and) only 

rarely there may not be good fortune accompanying. But let us come to the 

other particulars of that City. I say that those who condemn the tumults 

between the nobles and the plebs, appear to me to blame those things that 

were the chief causes for keeping Rome free, and that they paid more 

attention to the noises and shouts that arose in those tumults than to the 

good effects they brought forth, and that they did not consider that in 

every Republic there are two different viewpoints, that of the People and 

that of the Nobles; and that all the laws that are made in favor of liberty 

result from their disunion, as may easily be seen to have happened in Rome, 

for from Tarquin to the Gracchi which was more than three hundred years, the 

tumults of Rome rarely brought forth exiles, and more rarely blood. Nor is 

it possible therefore to judge these tumults harmful, nor divisive to a 

Republic, which in so great a time sent into exile no more than eight or ten 

of its citizens because of its differences, and put to death only a few, and 

condemned in money (fined) not very many: nor can a Republic in any way with 

reason be called disordered where there are so many examples of virtu, for 

good examples result from good education, good education from good laws, and 

good laws from those tumults which many inconsiderately condemn; for he who 

examines well the result of these, will not find that they have brought 

forth any exile or violence prejudicial to the common good, but laws and 

institutions in benefit of public liberty. And if anyone should say the 

means were extraordinary and almost savage, he will see the People together 

shouting against the Senate, The Senate against the People, running 

tumultuously throughout the streets, locking their stores, all the Plebs 

departing from Rome, all of which (things) alarm only those who read of 

them; I say, that every City ought to have their own means with which its 

People can give vent to their ambitions, and especially those Cities which 

in important matters, want to avail themselves of the People; among which 

the City of Rome had this method, that when those people wanted to obtain a 

law, either they did some of the things mentioned before or they would not 

enroll their names to go to war, so that to placate them it was necessary 

(for the Senate) in some part to satisfy them: and the desires of a free 

people rarely are pernicious to liberty, because they arise either from 

being oppressed or from the suspicion of going to be oppressed. And it these 

opinions should be false, there is the remedy of haranguing (public 

assembly), where some upright man springs up who through oratory shows them 

that they deceive themselves; and the people (as Tullius Cicero says) 

although they are ignorant, are capable of (appreciating) the truth, and 

easily give in when the truth is given to them by a trustworthy man.



One ought therefore to be more sparing in blaming the Roman government, and 

to consider that so many good effects which came from that Republic, were 

not caused except for the best of reasons: And if the tumults were the cause 

of creation of Tribunes, they merit the highest praise, for in addition to 

giving the people a part in administration, they were established for 

guarding Roman liberty, as will be shown in the next chapter.



                    CHAPTER V



WHERE THE GUARDING OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURELY PLACED, EITHER IN THE PEOPLE 

OR IN THE NOBLES; AND WHICH HAVE THE GREATER REASON TO BECOME TUMULTUOUS 

EITHER HE WHO WANTS TO ACQUIRE OR HE WHO WANTS TO MAINTAIN



Among the more necessary things instituted by those who have prudently 

established a Republic, was to establish a guard to liberty, and according 

as this was well or badly place, that freedom endured a greater or less 

(period of time). And because in every Republic there exists the Nobles and 

the Populace, it may be a matter of doubt in whose hands the guard is better 

placed. And the Lacedemonians, and in our times the Venetians, placed it in 

the hands of the Nobles, but that of Rome was placed in the hands of the 

Plebs. It is necessary therefore to examine which of the Republics had made 

the better selection. And if we go past the causes and examine every part, 

and if their results should be examined, the side of the Nobles would be 

preferred since the liberty of Sparta and Venice had a much longer life than 

that of Rome: And to come to the reasons, I say (taking up first the part of 

the Romans) that thing (liberty) which is to be guarded ought to be done by 

those who have the least desire of usurping it. And without doubt, if the 

object of the Nobles and of the Ignobles (populace) is considered, it will 

be seen that the former have a great desire to dominate, and the latter a 

desire not to be dominated and consequently a greater desire to live free, 

being less hopeful of usurping it (liberty) than are the Nobles: so that the 

People placed in charge to guard the liberty of anyone, reasonably will take 

better care of it; for not being able to take it away themselves, they do 

not permit others to take it away.



On the other hand, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian arrangement, says 

that those who placed that guardianship in the hands of the Powerful 

(Nobles), made two good points: The one, that they satisfy more the 

ambitions of those who playing a greater part in the Republic, (and) having 

this club in their hands, have more reason to be content; the other, that 

they take away a kind of authority from the restless spirit of the People 

which is the cause of infinite discussions and troubles in a Republic, and 

apt to bring the Nobility to some (act of) desperation which in times may 

result in some bad effects. And they give for an example this selfsame Rome, 

where the Tribunes of the Plebs having this authority in their hands, (and) 

the having of one Consul from the Plebs was not enough for them (the People), 

but that they wanted to have both (the Consuls from the Plebs). From this 

they afterward wanted the Censure, the Praetorship, and all the other ranks 

of the Empire (Government) of the Republic. Nor was this enough for them, 

but urged on by the same fury they began in time to idolize those men whom 

they saw adept at beating down the Nobility: whence arose the power of 

Marius and the ruin of Rome.



And truly whoever should discuss well both of these things could be in doubt 

as to what kind of men may be more harmful to the Republic, either those who 

desire to acquire that which they do not have, or those who desire to 

maintain the honors already acquired. And in the end whoever examines 

everything skillfully will come to this conclusion: The discussion is either 

of a Republic which wants to create an Empire, as Rome, or of one which is 

satisfied to maintain itself. In the first case it is necessary for it to do 

everything as Rome did; in the second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for 

those reasons why and how as will be described in the succeeding chapter.



But to return to the discussion as to which men are more harmful in a 

Republic, either those who desire to acquire, or those who fear to lose that 

which they have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius had been made 

Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the cavalry, both plebeians, in order 

to investigate certain conspiracies that had been formed in Capua against 

Rome, they were also given authority by the people to be able to search out 

who in Rome from ambition and by extraordinary means should endeavor to 

attain the Consulate and other houses (offices) of the City. And it 

appearing to the Nobility that such authority given to the Dictator was 

directed against them, they spread the word throughout Rome that it was not 

the Nobles who were seeking the honors for ambition, or by extraordinary 

means, but the Ignobles (Plebeians) who, trusting neither to their blood 

(birth) nor in their own virtu, sought to attain those dignities, and they 

particularly accused the Dictator: And so powerful was this accusation, that 

Menenius having made a harangue (speech) and complaining of the calumnies 

spread against him by the Nobles, he deposed the Dictatorship, and submitted 

himself to that judgement (of himself) which should be made by the People: 

And then the cause having been pleaded, he was absolved; at which time there 

was much discussion as to who was the more ambitious, he who wanted to 

maintain (his power) or he who wanted to acquire it, since the desires of 

either the one or the other could be the cause of the greatest tumults. But 

none the less more frequently they are caused by those who possess (power), 

for the fear of losing it generates in them the same desires that are in 

those who want to acquire it, because it does not seem to men to possess 

securely that which they have, unless they acquire more from others. And, 

moreover, those who possess much, can make changes with greater power and 

facility. And what is yet worse, is that their breaking out and ambitious 

conduct arouses in the breasts of those who do not possess (power) the 

desire to possess it, either to avenge themselves against them (the former) 

by despoiling them, or in order to make it possible also for them to partake 

of those riches and honors which they see are so badly used by the others.



                    CHAPTER VI



WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN ROME WHICH COULD 

ELIMINATE THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE SENATE



We have discussed above the effects which were caused by the controversies 

between the People and the Senate. Now these having continued up to the time 

of the Gracchi, where they were the cause of the loss of liberty, some might 

wish that Rome had done the great things that she did without there being 

that enmity within her. It seems to me therefore a thing worthy of 

consideration to see whether in Rome there could have been a government 

(state) established that could have eliminated the aforementioned 

controversies. And to desire to examine this it is necessary to have 

recourse to those Republics which have had their liberty for a long time 

without such enmities and tumults, and to see what (form) of government 

theirs was, and if it could have been introduced in Rome.



For example, there is Sparta among the ancients, Venice among the modern, 

(both) having been previously mentioned by me. Sparta created a King with a 

small Senate which should govern her. Venice did not divide its government 

by these distinctions, but gave all those who could have a part in the 

administration (of its government) the name of Gentlemen: In this manner, 

chance more than prudence gave them (the Venetians) the laws (form of 

Government), for having taken refuge on those rocks where the City now is, 

for the reasons mentioned above many of the inhabitants, as they had 

increased to so great a number, with the desire to live together, so that 

needing to make laws for themselves, they established a government, (and) 

came together often in councils to discuss the affairs of the City; when it 

appeared to them that they had become numerous enough for existing as a 

commonwealth, they closed the path to all the others who should newly come 

to live there to take part in their government: And in time finding in that 

place many inhabitants outside the government, in order to give reputation 

to those who were governing, they called them Gentlemen, and the others 

Popolari. This form (of Government) could establish and maintain itself 

without tumult, because when it was born, whoever then lived in Venice 

participated in that government, with which no one could complain: Those who 

came to live there later, finding the State firm and established did not 

have cause or opportunity to create a tumult. The cause was not there 

because nothing had been taken from them. The opportunity was not there 

because those who ruled kept them in check and did not employ them in 

affairs where they could pick up authority. In addition to this, those who 

came to inhabit Venice later were not very many, or of such a great number 

that these would be a disproportion between those who governed and those who 

were governed, for the number of Gentlemen were either equal to or greater 

than the others: so that for these reasons Venice could establish that State 

and maintain it united.



Sparta, as I have said, being governed by a King and limited Senate could 

thus maintain itself for a long time because there being few inhabitants in 

Sparta, and the path having been closed to those who should want to live 

there, and the laws of Lycurgus having acquired such reputation that their 

observance removed all the causes for tumults. They were able to live united 

for a long time, for Lycurgus had established in Sparta more equality of 

substance and less equality in rank, because equal poverty existed here and 

the Plebs were lacking ambitious men, as the offices of the City were 

extended to few Citizens, and were kept distant from the Plebs, nor did the 

Nobles by not treating them badly ever create in them the desire to want 

them. This resulted from the Spartan Kings, who, being placed in that 

Principate and living in the midst of that Nobility, did not have may better 

means of maintaining their office, than to keep the Plebs defended from 

every injury: which caused the Plebs neither to fear nor to desire 

authority, and not having the dominion, nor fear of it, there was eliminated 

the competition which they might have had with the Nobility, and the cause 

of tumults, and thus they could live united for a long time. But two things 

principally caused this union: The one, the inhabitants of Sparta were few, 

and because of this were able to be governed by a few: The other, that not 

accepting outsiders in their Republic, they did not have the opportunity 

either of becoming corrupt or of increasing so much that they should become 

unsupportable to those few who governed her.



Considering all these things, therefore, it is seen that it was necessary 

that the legislators of Rome do one of two things in desiring that Rome be 

as quiet as the above mentioned Republic, either not to employ the Plebs in 

war like the Venetians, or not to open the door to outsiders like the 

Spartans, But they did the one and the other, which gave the Plebs strength 

and increased power and infinite opportunities for tumults. And if the Roman 

State had come to be more tranquil, it would have resulted that she would 

have become even more feeble, because there would have been cut off from her 

the means of being able to attain that greatness which she achieved. So that 

Rome wanting to remove the causes for tumults, would also take away the 

causes for expansion. And as in all human affairs, those who examine them 

will indeed see that it is never possible to avoid one inconvenience but 

that another one will spring up. If therefore, you want to make a people 

numerous and armed in order to create a great Empire, you will make it of a 

kind that you are not able afterward to manage it in your own way: if you 

keep them either small or disarmed in order to be able to manage them, 

(and), if you acquire other dominion, you will not be able to hold them, or 

you will become so mean that you will become prey to whoever assaults you. 

And therefore, in every one of our decisions, there ought to be considered 

where the inconveniences are less, and then take up the better proceeding, 

for there will never be formed anything entirely clear of suspicion. Rome 

could therefore, like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and 

established a limited Senate; but desiring to build a great Empire, she 

could not, like Sparta, limit the number of her Citizens: which, in creating 

a King for life and a small number in the Senate, would have been of little 

benefit in connection with her unity. If anyone therefore should want to 

establish a new Republic, he should have to consider if he should want it to 

expand in dominion and power as did Rome, or whether it should remain within 

narrow limits. In the first case, it is necessary to establish it as Rome, 

and to give place to tumults and general dissensions as best he can; for 

without a great number of men, and (those) well armed, no Republic can ever 

increase, or if it did increase, to maintain itself. In thy second case he 

may establish her as Sparta and Venice: but because expansion is the poison 

of such Republics, he ought in every way he can prevent her from making 

acquisitions, for such acquisitions, based on a weak Republic, are entirely 

their ruin, as happened to Sparta and Venice, the first of which having 

subjected almost all of Greece, showed the weakness of its foundation with 

the slightest accident; for when there ensued the rebellion of Thebes caused 

by Pelopidas, the other cities also rebelling, ruined that Republic 

entirely.



Similarly Venice having occupied a great part of Italy, and the greater part 

(obtained) not by war but by money and astuteness, when it came to make a 

test of her strength everything was lost in one engagement. I believe then 

that to create a Republic which should endure a long time, the better way 

would be to organize internally like Sparta, or like Venice locate it in a 

strong place, and of such power that no one should believe he could quickly 

oppress her: and on the other hand, it should not be so powerful that she 

should be formidable to her neighbors, and thus she could enjoy its state 

(independence) for a long time. For there are two reasons why war is made 

against a Republic: The one, to become lord over her: the other, the fear of 

being occupied by her. These two means in the above mentioned manner almost 

entirely removed (the reasons for war), for it is difficult to destroy her, 

being well organized for her defense, as I presuppose, it will rarely or 

never happen that one can design to conquer her. If she remains within her 

limits, and from experience it is seen that there is no ambition in her, it 

will never happen that someone for fear of her will make war against her: 

and this would be so much more so if there should be in her constitution or 

laws (restrictions) that should prohibit her expansion. And without doubt I 

believe that things could be kept balanced in this way, that there would be 

the best political existence, and real tranquillity to a City. But all 

affairs of men being (continually) in motion and never being able to remain 

stable, it happens that (States) either remain stable or decline: and 

necessity leads you to do many things which reason will not lead you to do; 

so that having established a Republic adept at maintaining itself without 

expanding, and necessity should induce her to expand, her foundations would 

be taken away and her ruin accomplished more readily. Thus, on the other 

hand, if Heaven should be so kind that she would never have to make war, the 

languidness that should arise would make her either effeminate or divided: 

which two together, or each one by itself, would be cause of her ruin. Not 

being able, therefore, (as I believe) to balance these things, and to 

maintain this middle course, it is necessary in organizing a Republic to 

think of the more honorable side, and organize her in a way that if 

necessity should induce her to expand, she may be able to preserve that 

which she should have acquired. And to return to the first discussion, I 

believe it is necessary to follow the Roman order and not that of any other 

Republic (because I do not believe it is possible to find a middle way 

between one and the other) and to tolerate that enmity that should arise 

between the People and the Senate, accepting it as an inconvenient necessity 

in attaining the Roman greatness. Because in addition to the other reasons 

alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is shown to be necessary for 

the guarding of liberty, it is easy to consider the benefit that will come 

to the Republic from this authority of accusing (judiciary), which among 

others was committed to the Tribunes, as will be discussed in the following 

chapter. 



                   CHAPTER VII



HOW MUCH THE FACULTY OF ACCUSING (JUDICIARY) IS NECESSARY FOR A REPUBLIC FOR 

THE MAINTENANCE OF LIBERTY



No more useful and necessary authority can be given to those who are 

appointed in a City to guard its liberty, as is that of being able to accuse 

the citizen to the People or to any Magistrate or Council, if he should in 

any way transgress against the free state. This arrangement makes for two 

most useful effects for a Republic. The first is, that for fear of being 

accused, the citizens do not attempt anything against the state, and if they 

should (make an) attempt they are punished immediately and without regard 

(to person). The other is, that it provides a way for giving vent to those 

moods which in whatever way and against whatever citizens may arise in the 

City. And when these moods do not provide a means by which they may be 

vented, they ordinarily have recourse to extra ordinary means that cause the 

complete ruin of a Republic. And there is nothing which makes a Republic so 

stable and firm, as organizing it in such a way that changes in the moods 

which may agitate it have a way prescribed by law for venting themselves. 

This can be demonstrated by many examples, and especially by that of 

Coriolanus, which Titus Livius refers to, where he says that the Roman 

Nobility being irritated against the Plebs, because it seemed to them the 

Plebs had too much authority concerning the creation of the Tribunes who 

defended them, and Rome (as happened) experiencing a great scarcity of 

provisions, and the Senate having sent to Sicily for grain, Coriolanus, 

enemy of the popular faction, counselled that the time had come (to be able) 

to castigate the Plebs and take away authority which they had acquired and 

assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them famished and not 

distributing the grain: which proposition coming to the ears of the people, 

caused so great an indignation against Coriolanus, that on coming out of the 

Senate he would have been killed in a tumultuary way if the Tribunes had not 

summoned him to appear and defend his cause. From this incident there is to 

be noted that which was mentioned above, that it is useful and necessary for 

a Republic with its laws to provide a means of venting that ire which is 

generally conceived against a citizen, for if these ordinary means do not 

exist, they will have recourse to extraordinary ones, and without doubt 

these produce much worse effects that do the others. For ordinarily when a 

citizen is oppressed, even if he has received an injustice, little or no 

disorder ensues in the Republic, because its execution is done by neither 

private nor foreign forces which are those that ruin public liberty, but is 

done by public force and arrangement which have their own particular limits, 

and do not transcend to things that ruin the Republic.



And to corroborate this opinion with examples, among the ancient ones I want 

this one of Coriolanus to be enough, on which anyone should consider how 

much evil would have resulted to the Roman Republic if he had been killed in 

the tumults, for there would have arisen an offense by a private (citizen) 

against a private (citizen); which offense generates fear, fear seeks 

defense, for this defense partisans are procured, from the partisans 

factions arise in the City, (and) the factions cause their ruin. But the 

matter being controlled by those who had authority, all those evils which 

could arise if it were governed by private authority were avoided. We have 

seen in our time that troubles happened to the Republic of Florence because 

the multitude was able to give vent to their spirit in an ordinary way 

against one of her citizens, as befell in the time of Francesco Valori, who 

was as a Prince in that City (and) who being judged ambitious by many, and a 

man who wanted by his audacity and animosity to transcend the civil 

authority, and there being no way in the Republic of being able to resist 

him except by a faction contrary to his, there resulted that he (Valori) 

having no fear except from some extraordinary happening, began to enlist 

supporters who should defend him: On the other hand, those who opposed him 

not having any regular way or repressing him, thought of extraordinary ways, 

so that it came to arms. And where (if it were possible to oppose him, 

Valori, by regular means) his authority would have been extinguished with 

injury to himself only, but having to extinguish it by extraordinary means, 

there ensued harm not only to himself, but to many other noble citizens. We 

could also city in support of the above mentioned conclusion the incident 

which ensued in Florence in connection with Piero Soderini, which resulted 

entirely because there was not in that Republic (means of making) 

accusations against the ambitions of powerful citizens: for the accusing of 

a powerful one before eight judges in a Republic is not enough; it is 

necessary that the judges be many because the few always judge in favor of 

the few. So that if such a means had been in existence, they would have 

accused him (Soderini) of evil while yet alive, and through such means 

without having the Spanish army (called) to come in, they would have given 

vent to their feelings; or if he had not done evil they would not have had 

the audacity to move against him, for fear that they would be accused by 

him: and thus both sides would have ceased having that desire which was the 

cause of the trouble.



So that this can be concluded, that whenever it is seen that external forces 

are called in by a party of men who live in a City, it can be judged to 

result from its bad organization because there did not exist within that 

circle of arrangements, a way to be able without extraordinary means to give 

vent to the malignant moods that arise in men, which can be completely 

provided by instituting accusations before many judges and giving them 

reputation (authority). These things were so well organized in Rome that in 

so many discussions between the Plebs and the Senate, neither the Senate nor 

the Plebs nor any particular citizen, ever attempted to avail (himself) of 

external force, for having the remedy at home it was not necessary to go 

outside for it. And although the above examples are amply sufficient to 

prove this, none the less I want to refer to another recital by Titus Livius 

in his history, which refers to there having been in Chiusi (Clusium), at 

that time a most noble City of Tuscany, one Lucumones who had violated a 

sister of Aruntes, and Aruntes not being able to avenge himself because of 

the power of the violator, went to seek out the French (Gauls) who then 

ruled in that place which today is called Lombardy, and urged them to come 

to Chiusi with arms in hand, pointing out to them how they could avenge the 

injury he had received with advantage to themselves: but if Aruntes could 

have seen how he could have avenged himself by the provisions of the City, 

he would not have sought the barbarian forces. But just as these accusations 

are useful in a Republic, so also are calumnies useless and harmful, as we 

shall discuss in the next chapter.



                   CHAPTER VIII



AS MUCH AS ACCUSATIONS ARE USEFUL TO A REPUBLIC, SO MUCH SO ARE CALUMNIES 

PERNICIOUS



Notwithstanding that the virtu of Furius Camillus when he was liberating 

(Rome) from the oppression of the French (Gauls) had caused the Roman 

citizens to yield him (top honors) without appearing to them to have lost 

reputation or rank, none the less Manlius Capitolinus was not able to endure 

that so much honor and glory should be bestowed on him; for it seemed to him 

he had done as much for the welfare of Rome by having saved the Campidoglio 

(Capitol), he had merited as much as Camillus, and as for other warlike 

praises he was not inferior to him. So that filled with envy, he was not 

able to sow discord among the Fathers (Senators) he turned to the Plebs, 

sowing various sinister opinions among them. And among other things he said 

was, that the treasure which had been collected (together) to be given to 

the French (Gauls), and then was not given to them, had been usurped by 

private citizens: and if its should be recovered it could be converted to 

public usefulness, alleviating the plebs from tribute or from some private 

debt. These words greatly impressed the Plebs, so that Manlius begun to have 

concourse with them and at his instigation (created) many tumults in the 

City: This thing displeased the Senate and they deeming it of moment and 

perilous, created a Dictator who should take cognizance of the case and 

restrain the rashness of (Manlius); whereupon the Dictator had him summoned, 

and they met face to face in public, the Dictator in the midst of the Nobles 

and Manlius in the midst of the Plebs. Manlius was asked what he had to say 

concerning who obtained the treasure that he spoke about, for the Senate was 

as desirous of knowing about it as the Plebs: to which Manlius made no 

particular reply, but going on in an evasive manner he said, that it was not 

necessary to tell them that which they already knew, so that the Dictator 

had him put in prison. And it is to be noted by this text how detestable 

calumnies are in free Cities and in every other form of government, and that 

in order to repress them no arrangement made for such a proposition ought to 

be neglected. Nor can there be a better arrangement to putting an end to 

these (calumnies) than to open the way for accusations, for accusations are 

as beneficial to Republics as calumnies are harmful: and on the other hand 

there is this difference, that calumnies do not need witnesses nor any other 

particular confrontation to prove them so that anyone can be calumniated by 

anyone else, but cannot now be accused, as the accuser has need of positive 

proof and circumstances that would show the truth of the accusation. Men 

must make the accusations before the Magistrates, the People, or the 

Councils: calumnies (are spread) throughout the plaza and lodgings (private 

dwellings). These calumnies are practiced more where accusations are used 

less and where Cities are less constituted to receive them. An establisher 

of a Republic therefore ought so to organize it that it is possible to 

accuse every citizen without any fear and without any suspicion: and this 

being done, and well carried out, he should severely punish the calumniators, 

who cannot complain if they are punished, they having places open to them to 

hear the accusations of those who had caluminated them in private. And where 

this part is not well organized great disorders always follow, for calumnies 

irritate but do not castigate citizens, and those who have been irritated 

think of strengthening themselves, easily hating more than fearing the 

things that are said against them.



¶ This part (as has been said) was well organized in Rome, and has always 

been poorly organized in our City of Florence. And as in Rome this 

institution did much good, at Florence this poor order did much evil. And 

whoever reads the history of this City, will see how many calumnies have 

been perpetrated in every time against those citizens who occupied 

themselves in its important affairs. Of one, they said he had robbed money 

from the Community; of another, that he had not succeeded in an enterprise 

because of having been corrupted; and of yet another, because of his 

ambitions had caused such and such inconvenience. Of the things that 

resulted there sprung up hate on every side, whence it came to divisions, 

from divisions to Factions (Sects), (and), from Factions to ruin. If in 

Florence there had been some arrangement for the accusation of citizens and 

punishment of calumniators, there would not have occurred the infinite 

troubles that have ensued, for those Citizens who had been either condemned 

or absolved, could not have harmed the City, and there would have been a much 

less number accused than there had been calumniated, as it could not have 

been (as I have said) as easy to accuse as to calumniate any one. And among 

the other things that some citizens might employ to achieve greatness have 

been these calumnies, which employed against powerful citizens who opposed 

his ambition, did much for them; for by taking up the past of the people, 

and confirming them the opinion which they had of them (the nobles), he made 

them his friends.



And although we could refer to many examples, I want to be content with only 

one. The Florentine army which was besieging Lucca was commanded by Messer 

Giovanni Guicciardini, their Commissioner. It was due either to his bad 

management or his bad fortune, that the fall of that City did not ensue. But 

whatever the case may have been, Messer Giovanni was blamed, alleging he had 

been corrupted by the Lucchesi: which calumny, being favored by his enemies, 

brought Messer Giovanni almost to the last desperation. And although, to 

justify himself because there was no way in that Republic of being able to 

do so. From which there arose great indignation among the friends of Messer 

Giovanni, who constituted the greater part of the nobility, and (also) among 

those who desired to make changes in Florence. This affair, both for this 

and other similar reasons, grew so, that there resulted the ruin of the 

Republic. 



Manlius Capitolinus was therefore a calumniator and not an accuser; and the 

Romans showed in this case in point how the calumniators ought to be 

punished. For they ought to be made to become accusers, and if the 

accusation proves true either to reward them or not punish them; but if it 

does not prove true, to punish them as Manlius was punished.



                    CHAPTER IX



HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE MAN ALONE IN DESIRING TO ORGANIZE A NEW REPUBLIC 

TO REFORM ITS INSTITUTIONS ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE ANCIENT ONES



And it may appear perhaps to some that I have gone too far into Roman 

history, not having yet made any mention of the organizers of this Republic, 

or of (having regard for) her institutions, her religion, and her military 

establishment. And therefore, not wanting to keep in suspense the minds of 

those who want to understand these matters, I say, that many perhaps should 

judge it a bad example that the founder of a civil society, as Romulus was, 

should first have killed his brother, then have consented to the death of 

Titus Tatius, a Sabine, who had been chosen by him to share the Kingdom; 

because of which it might be judged that the citizens could, from ambition 

and the desire to rule, with the authority of their Prince, attack those who 

should be opposed to their authority. Which opinion would be correct, if the 

object he had in mind in causing that homicide should be considered. But 

this must be assumed, as a general rule, that it never or rarely occurs that 

some Republic or Kingdom is well organized from the beginning, or its 

institutions entirely reformed a new, unless it is arranged by one 

(individual only): rather it is necessary that the only one who carries it 

out should be he who on whose mind such an organization depends. A prudent 

Organizer of a Republic, therefore, who has in mind to want to promote, not 

himself, but the common good, and not his own succession but his (common) 

country, ought to endeavor to have the authority alone: and a wise planner 

will never reprimand anyone for any extraordinary activity that he should 

employ either in the establishment of a Kingdom or in constituting a 

Republic. It is well then, when the deed accuses him, the result should 

excuse him; and when it is good, as that of Romulus, he will always be 

excused; for he ought to be reprehended who is violent in order to destroy, 

and not he who does so for beneficial reasons. He ought, however, to be so 

prudent and wise that the authority which he has assumed, he will not leave 

to his heirs (or) any other: for men being more prone to evil than to good, 

his successor could employ for reasons of ambition that which should be 

employed for virtuous reasons by him. In addition to this, even if one is 

adept at organizing, the thing organized will not endure long if its 

(administration) remains only on the shoulders of one individual, but it is 

good when it remains in the care of many, and thus there will be many to 

sustain it. As the organization of anything cannot be made by many because 

of the diverse opinions that exist among them, yet having once understood 

this, they will not agree to forego it. And that Romulus merited to be 

excused for the death of his brother and that of his companion, and that 

what he had done he did for the common good and not for his own ambition, is 

shown by his immediate institution of a Senate with which he should consult, 

and according to the opinions of which he would make his decision. And 

whoever considers well the authority which Romulus reserved for himself, 

will see that he did not reserve anything else other than the command of the 

army when war was decided upon, and of convening the Senate. This was seen 

at that time when Rome became free after the driving out of the Tarquins, 

where there was no other innovation made on the ancient institutions except 

that in place of an hereditary King there should be two Consuls (elected) 

each year. Which gives testimony that all the institutions at the origin of 

that City were more in conformity with a free and civil society than with an 

absolute and tyrannical one.



Infinite examples could be given in corroboration of the things mentioned 

above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of Kingdoms and 

Republics, who were able to formulate laws for the common good (only) by 

assigning the (necessary) authority to themselves: but I want to omit these 

as they are already well known. I will refer only to one not so well known, 

but which should be given consideration by those who desire to be 

institutors of good laws, (and), this is that of Agis, King of Sparta, who 

desiring to bring the Spartans back to those limits which the laws of 

Lycurgus had delimited for them, (and), it seeming to him that by deviating 

in part from them his City had lost much of that ancient virtu, and 

consequently her power and dominion, was at once killed by Spartan Ephors as 

a man who wanted to become a Tyrant. But Cleomenes succeeding him in the 

Kingdom, there arose in him the same desire from (reading) the records and 

writings of Agis that he found, in which his thoughts and intentions were 

seen, (and) he recognized that he could not render this good to his country, 

unless he should become alone in authority, as it seemed to him he would not 

be able because of the ambitions of men to provide the good for the many 

against the desires of the few: and seizing a convenient opportunity had all 

the Ephors killed and those who could oppose him: after which he completely 

restored the laws of Lycurgus. This decision helped to revive Sparta and 

give to Cleomene that reputation which was (equal) to that of Lycurgus, if 

it had not been for the power of Macedonia and the weakness of the other 

Greek Republics. For after this establishment (of the laws) he was soon 

assaulted by the Macedonians, and finding that by herself (Sparta) was 

inferior in strength, and not having anyone to whom he could have recourse, 

he was defeated, and his plans (no matter how just and laudable) remained 

incompleted. Considering all these things, therefore, I conclude that to 

establish a Republic it is necessary that one must be alone, and Romulus 

merits to be excused and not censured for the death of Remus and of Tatius.



                    CHAPTER X



AS MUCH AS THE FOUNDERS OF REPUBLICS AND KINGDOMS ARE LAUDABLE, SO MUCH ARE 

THOSE OF A TYRANNY SHAMEFUL



Among all men who have been praised, the most lauded are those who are heads 

and establishers of Religion. Next after them are those who have founded 

Republics or Kingdoms. After these are celebrated those who have commanded 

armies, (and) who have enlarged the (territory) of their Kingdom of those of 

their country. To these should be added men of letters, and because these 

are of many fields, they are celebrated according to their degree (of 

excellence). To other men, the number of whom is infinite, some degree of 

praise is given to them as pertain to their art and profession. On the other 

hand, those men are infamous and destroyers of Religion, dissipators of 

Kingdoms and Republics, enemies of virtu, of letters, and of every other art 

which brings usefulness and honor to human generations (mankind), such as 

are the impious and violent, the ignorant, the idle, the vile and degraded. 

And no one will ever be so mad or so wise, so wicked or so good, that 

selecting between these two kinds of men, does not laud what is laudable, 

and censure what is censurable. None the less, however, nearly all men 

deceived by a false good or a false glory allow themselves to drift either 

voluntarily or ignorantly into the ranks of those who merit more censure 

that praise. And being able to establish either a Kingdom or a Republic with 

eternal honor to themselves, they turn to Tyranny, nor do they see because 

of this action how much fame, how much glory, how much honor, security, and 

tranquil satisfaction of the mind, they lose; and how much infamy, disgrace, 

censure, danger, and disquiet, they incur. And it is impossible that those 

who live as private individuals in a Republic, or who by fortune or virtu 

become Princes, if they read the history and the records of ancient events, 

would do well living as private citizens in their country to live rather as 

a Scipio than a Caesar; and those who are Princes, rather as Agesilaus, 

Timoleon, and Dion, than as Nabis, Phalaris, and Dionysius, because they 

will see these (latter) to be thoroughly disgraced and those (former) most 

highly praised. They will also see that Timoleon and the others had no less 

authority in their country than had Dionysius and Phalaris, but they will 

see that they had had greater security for a longer time. Nor is there 

anyone who deceives himself by the glory of Caesar, he being especially 

celebrated by writers, for those who praised him were corrupted by his 

fortune and frightened by the long duration of the Empire which, ruling 

under his name did not permit that writers should talk of him freely. But 

whoever wants to know what the writers would have said of him freely, let 

him observe what they say of Cataline. And so much more is Caesar to be 

detested, as how much more is he to be censured for that which he did, than 

he who (just) intends to do evil. He will also see how Brutus was extolled 

with so many praises; so that not being able to censure him (Caesar) because 

of his power they extolled his enemy. Let he who has become a Prince in a 

Republic also consider how much more praise those Emperors merited who, after 

Rome became an Empire, lived under the laws (and) as good Princes, than 

those who lived an in a contrary manner; and he will also see that it was 

not necessary for the praetorian soldiers or the multitudes of the legions 

to defend Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrai Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and 

Marcus (Aurelius), because their customs, the good will of the people, and 

the love of the Senate would defend them. He will also see that the Eastern 

and Western armies were not sufficient to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, 

and so many other wicked emperors, from those enemies which their bad customs 

and evil lives had raised up against them.



And if the history of those men should be well considered, it would be very 

instructive to any Prince in pointing out to him the way to glory or 

censure, to security or fear. For of the twenty-six who were Emperors from 

Caesar to Maximinius, sixteen were murdered. Ten died in a natural way; and 

if among those who were murdered there may have been some good men, such as 

Galba and Pertinax, they were killed by that corruption that his 

predecessors had left among the soldiers. And if among those who died in a 

natural way there were some wicked, such as Severns, it resulted from their 

very great good fortune and virtu, which two things are found together in 

few men. He will also learn from this lesson of history how a good Kingdom 

can be organized, for all, except Titus, were bad: (and) those who succeeded 

by adoption were all good, such as were those five from Nero to Marcus 

(Aurelius). And when the Empire became hereditary, it came to ruin. Let a 

Prince therefore place himself in the times of Nero and Marcus, and let him 

compare them with those which preceded and followed (that period) and 

afterward let him select in which (of the two) he would want to be born and 

in which he would want to reign. For in those times governed by good 

(Emperors), he will see a Prince secure in thy midst of secure citizens, he 

will see the world full of peace and justice, he will see the Senate with 

its authority, the Magistrates with their honor, rich citizens enjoying 

their wealth, nobility and virtu exalted, he will see every quiet and good; 

and on the other hand (he will see) every rancor, every license, corruption, 

and ambition extinct; he will see that golden era where everyone can hold and 

defend whatever opinion he wishes: In the end, he will see the triumph of 

the world, the Prince full of reverence and glory, the people full of love 

and security. Then if he will consider the sorrowful times of the other 

Emperors, he will see the atrocities from war, discords from seditions, 

cruelty in peace and war, so many Princes slain by the sword, so many civil 

wars, so many foreign wars, Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes, her 

Cities ruined and sacked: He will see Rome burned, the Capitol of its 

citizens destroyed, the ancient temples desolate, ceremonies corrupted, the 

City full of adulterers: he will see the sea full of exiles, the shores full 

of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties take place in Rome, and 

nobility, riches, honors, and above all virtu, accounted capital crimes. He 

will see informers rewarded, servants corrupted against the masters, freemen 

against their patrons, and those who should lack enemies, oppressed by 

friends. And he will also recognize very well what obligations Rome, Italy, 

and the world owed to Caesar. And without doubt (if he was born of man), he 

would be dismayed at every imitation of those evil times, and burning with 

an immense desire to follow the good. And truly, a Prince seeking the glory 

of the world ought to desire to possess a corrupt City, not to spoil it 

entirely like Caesar, but to reorganize it like Romulus. And truly the 

heavens cannot give man a greater opportunity for glory, nor could man 

desire a better one. And if to want to organize a City well, it should be 

necessary to abolish the Principate, he who had failed to (give her good 

laws) should merit some excuse. But he does not merit any excuse who can 

hold the Principate and organize it. And in sum, let he to whom the heavens 

gives the opportunity consider that there are two ways: The one which will 

make him live securely and render him glorious after his death, the other 

which will make him live in continual anxiety and after death leave of 

himself an eternal infamy.



                    CHAPTER XI



OF THE RELIGIONS OF THE ROMANS



Although Rome had Romulus as its original organizer and, like a daughter, 

owed her birth and education to him, none the less the heavens, judging that 

the institutions of Romulus were not sufficient for so great an Empire, put 

it into the breasts of the Roman Senate to elect Numa Pompilius as successor 

to Romulus, so that those things that he had omitted, would be instituted by 

Numa. Who, finding a very ferocious people and wanting to reduce them to 

civil obedience by the acts of peace, turned to religion as something 

completely necessary in wanting to maintain a civilization, and he 

established it in such a manner that for many centuries there never was more 

fear of God than in that Republic, which facilitated any enterprise which 

the Senate or those of great Roman men should plan to do. And whoever should 

discuss the infinite actions of the people of Rome (taken) all together, and 

of many Romans (individually) by themselves, will see that those citizens 

feared much more the breaking of an oath than the laws, like those men who 

esteem more the power of God than that of man, as is manifestly seen in the 

examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus, for after the defeat that 

Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans at Cannae, many citizens had gathered 

together (and) frightened and fearful (and) had agreed to abandon Italy and 

take themselves to Sicily: when Scipio heard of this, he went to meet them, 

and with bared sword in hand he constrained them to swear not to abandon 

their country. Lucius Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called 

Torquatus, had been accused by Marcus Pomponius, a Tribune of the Plebs: and 

before the day of judgment arrived, Titus went to meet Marcus, and 

threatening to kill him if he did not swear to withdraw the accusation 

against his father, constrained him to swear, and he (Marcus) from fear of 

having sworn withdrew the accusation from him (Lucius). And thus those 

citizens whom (neither) the love of their country and of its laws could keep 

in Italy, were kept there by an oath that they were forced to take, and the 

Tribune put aside the hatred that he had for his father, the injury that his 

son had done him, and his honor, in order to obey the oath taken; which did 

not result from anything else than from that religion which Numa had 

introduced in that City. And whoever considers well Roman history will see 

how much Religion served in commanding the armies, in reuniting the plebs, 

both in keeping men good, and in making the wicked ashamed. So that if it 

were discussed as to which Prince Rome should be more obligated, Romulus or 

Numa, I believe that Numa would (rather) attain the higher rank; for where 

Religion exists it is easily possible to introduce arms, but where there are 

arms and not religion, it (religion) can only be introduced there with 

difficulty. And it is seen that for Romulus to institute the Senate and to 

make the other civil and military arrangements, the authority of God was not 

necessary, but it was very necessary for Numa, who pretended he had met with 

a Nymph who advised him of that which he should counsel the people; and all 

this resulted because he wanted to introduce new ordinances and institutions 

in that City, and was apprehensive that his authority was not enough. And 

truly there never was any extraordinary institutor of laws among a people 

who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise he would not have been 

accepted; for they (these laws) are very well known by prudent men, but 

which by themselves do not contain evident reasons capable of persuading 

others. Wise men who want to remove this difficulty, therefore, have 

recourse to God. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, thus many others who had the 

same aims as they.



¶ The Roman people, therefore, admiring his (Numa's) goodness and prudence, 

yielded to his every decision. It is indeed true that those times were full 

of Religion, and those men with whom he (Numa) had to work were coarse 

(which) gave him great facility to pursue his designs, being able easily to 

impress upon them any new form. And without doubt whoever should want to 

establish a Republic in the present era, would find it more easy to do so 

among men of the mountains where there is no civilization, than among those 

who are used to living in the City, where civilization is corrupt, as a 

sculptor more easily extracts a beautiful statue from crude marble than of 

one badly sketched out by others. Considering all this I conclude therefore, 

that the Religion introduced by Numa was among the chief reasons for the 

felicity of that City, for it caused good ordinances, good ordinances make 

good fortune, and from good fortune there arises the happy successes of the 

enterprises. And as the observance of divine institutions is the cause of 

the greatness of Republics, so the contempt of it is the cause of their 

ruin, for where the fear of God is lacking it will happen that that kingdom 

will be ruined or that it will be sustained through fear of a Prince, which 

may supply the want of Religion. And because Princes are short lived, it 

will happen that that Kingdom will easily fall as he (Prince) fails in 

virtu. Whence it results that Kingdoms which depend solely on the virtu of 

one man, are not durable for long, because that virtu fails with the life of 

that man, and it rarely happens that it is renewed in (his) successor, as 

Dante prudently says:



     Rarely there descends from the branches (father to son)

     Human probity, and this is the will (of the one) who gives it, 

     because it is asked alone from him.



The welfare of a Republic or a Kingdom, therefore, is not in having a Prince 

who governs prudently while he lives, but one who organizes it in a way 

that, if he should die, it will still maintain itself. And although crude 

men are more easily persuaded by new ordinances and opinions, yet it is not 

impossible because of this to persuade civilized men, (and) who presume 

themselves not to be crude. The people of Florence did not seem either crude 

or ignorant, none the less Brother Girolamo Savonarola was persuaded that he 

talked with God. I do not want to judge whether that was true or not, 

because one ought not to talk of so great a man except with reverence. But I 

may well say that an infinite (number) believed him without they having seen 

anything extraordinary which would make them believe, because his life, the 

doctrine, the subjects he took up were sufficient to make them have faith. 

Let no one be dismayed, therefore, if he is not able to attain that which 

had been attained by others, for men (as was said in our preface) are born, 

live, and die, always in the same way.



                   CHAPTER XII



OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN RELIGION; AND HOW ITALY, BECAUSE THE 

MEDIUM OF THE ROMAN CHURCH WAS LACKING, WAS RUINED



Those Princes or those Republics that want to maintain themselves 

uncorrupted, have above everything else to maintain uncorrupted the 

servances of Religion, and hold them always in veneration. For no one can 

have a better indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine 

institutions held in contempt. This is easy to understand, when it is known 

upon what the Religion of the fatherland is founded; for every Religion has 

the foundation of its existence on some one of its principal institutions. 

The life of the Gentile Religion was founded upon the responses of the 

Oracles and upon the tenets of the Augurs and Aruspices; all their other 

ceremonies, sacrifices, rites, depended on these. For they readily believed 

that that God who could predict your future good or evil, should also be 

able to concede it to you. From this arose their temples, their sacrifices, 

their supplication, and all the other ceremonies venerating him; for the 

Oracle of Delphi, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated Oracles 

kept the world in admiration and devotion. As soon as these began to speak 

in the manner of the Potentates, and this falsity was discovered by the 

people, men became incredulous and disposed to disturb every good 

institution. The Princes of a Republic or a Kingdom ought therefore to 

maintain their Republic's religions, and in consequence well and united. And 

therefore they ought in all things which arise to foster it (even if they 

should judge them false) to favor and encourage it: and the more prudent 

they are, and the more they understand natural things, so much more ought 

they to do this. And because this practice has been observed by wise men, 

there has arisen the beliefs in the miracles that are celebrated in 

Religion, however false; for the prudent ones have increased (their 

importance) from whatever origin they may have derived and their authority 

gives them credence with the people. There were many of these miracles in 

Rome, and among others was that (which occurred) when the Roman soldiers 

were sacking the City of Veienti, some of whom entered the Temple of Juno, 

and, standing in front of her statue, and saying "WILL YOU COME TO ROME?", it 

appeared to some that she had made a sign (of assent), and to others that 

she had said yes. For these men, being full of Religion, (which T. Livius 

demonstrated) when they entered the Temple went in without tumult and 

completely devoted and full of reverence, seemed to hear that response to 

their question which perhaps they had presupposed: which opinion and belief 

was favored and magnified by Camillus and by the other Princes of the City.



If the Princes of the Republic had maintained this Christian religion 

according as it had been established by the founder, the Christian States 

and Republics would have been more united and much more happy than they are. 

Nor can any greater conjecture be made of its decline, than to see that 

those people who are nearer to the Church of Rome, the head of our Religion, 

have less Religion. And whoever should give consideration to its 

foundations, and observe how much different present usage is from them, 

should judge that without doubt her ruin or flagellation (chastisement) is 

near. And because some are of the opinion that the well-being of Italian 

affairs depend on the Church of Rome, I want to discuss those reasons 

against them that occur to me, and I will present two most powerful ones, 

which according to me are not controvertible. The first is, that by the evil 

example of that court, this province has lost all devotion and all Religion: 

so that it brings (with it) infinite troubles and infinite disorders; for 

where there is Religion every good is presupposed, so too where it is 

lacking the contrary is presupposed. We Italians therefore have this 

obligation with the Church and with the Priests of having become bad and 

without Religion; but we also have a greater one, which is the cause of our 

ruin. This is that the Church has kept and still keeps this province 

(country) of ours divided: and Truly any country never was united or happy, 

except when it gave its obedience entirely to one Republic or one Prince, as 

has happened to France and Spain. And the reason that Italy is not in the 

same condition, and is not also governed by one Republic or one Prince, is 

solely the Church, for having acquired and held temporal Empire, she has not 

been so powerful or of such virtu that she was able to occupy the rest of 

Italy and make herself its Prince. And on the other hand, she has not been 

so weak that the fear of losing her dominion of temporal things has made her 

unable to call in a power that could defend her against those who had become 

too powerful in Italy, as was seen anciently by many experiences, when 

through the medium of Charles the Great she drove out the Lombards who 

already were the kings of almost all Italy, and when in our times she took 

away the power of Venetians with the aid of France; afterwards she drove out 

the French with the aid of the Swiss. The church therefore not being 

powerful (enough) to occupy Italy, and not having permitted that another 

should occupy her, has been the cause why she (Italy) has not been able to be 

united under one head, but has been under so many Princes and Lords, from 

which there has resulted so much disunion and so much weakness, that she 

became prey not only to the powerful Barbarians, but to anyone who should 

assault her. This we other Italians owe to the Church of Rome, and to none 

others. And anyone who should want to observe the truth of this more readily 

through experience, should need to be of such great power that he should be 

sent to live at the Roman Court, with all the power it has in Italy, over 

the towns of the Swiss, who today are the only People who live accordingly 

to ancient customs both as far as Religion and military institutions (are 

concerned) and he would see that in a little time the evil customs of that 

Court would cause more disorders in that province (country) than could 

spring up from any other incident in any other time.



                   CHAPTER XIII



HOW THE ROMANS SERVED THEMSELVES OF RELIGION TO ESTABLISH THE CITY AND TO 

CARRY OUT THEIR ENTERPRISES AND STOP TUMULTS



And it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer to some examples 

where the Romans served themselves of Religion in order to reorganize the 

City and to further their enterprises. And although there are many in (the 

writings of) Titus Livius, none the less I want to content myself with 

these. The Roman people having created the Tribunes with Consular Power, and 

all but one (selected from the) Plebs, and pestilence and famine having 

occurred there that year, and certain prodigies coming to pass, the Nobles 

used this occasion of the creation of the new Tribunes, saying that the Gods 

were angered because Rome had ill-used the majesty of its Empire, and that 

there was no other remedy to placate the Gods than by returning the election 

of the Tribunes to its own (original) place; from which there resulted that 

the Plebs frightened by this Religion created all the Tribunes from the 

(class of the) Nobles.



¶ It was also seen at the capture of the City of the Veienti, that the 

Captains of the armies availed themselves of Religion to keep them disposed 

to an enterprise, when lake Albano had risen astonishingly that year, and 

the soldiers being weary from the long siege (and) wanted to return to Rome, 

the Romans insinuated that Apollo and certain other (oracles) had given 

replies that that year the City of the Veienti should be captured when Lake 

Albano should overflow: which event made the soldiers endure the weariness 

of the war and the siege, being taken by this hope of capturing the town, 

and they remained content to pursue the enterprise so much that Camillus who 

had been made Dictator captured that City after it had been besieged for ten 

years. And thus Religion well used was helpful both in the capture of that 

City and for the restoration of the Tribuneships to the Nobility, that 

without the said means either would have been accomplished only with 

difficulty.



¶ I do not want to miss referring to another example to this purpose. Many 

tumults had arisen in Rome caused by Terentillus the Tribune, (because of) 

his wanting to promulgate a certain law for the reasons which will be given 

in their place below: and among the first remedies that were used by the 

Nobility was Religion, of which they served themselves in two ways. In the 

first, they caused the sibylline books to be exhibited, and to give a reply 

to the City, that through the medium of civil sedition, there was impending 

that year the danger of (the City) losing its liberty; which thing (although 

it was discovered by the Tribunes) none the less put so much terror into the 

breasts of the Plebs that it cooled (their desire) to follow them. The other 

mode was when one Appius Erdonius with a multitude of bandits and servants 

numbering four thousand men occupied the Campidoglio (Capitol) by night, so 

that it was feared that the Equians and Volscians, perpetual enemies of the 

Roman name, should have come to Rome and attacked her; and the Tribunes 

because of this did not cease insisting in their pertinacity of promulgating 

the Terentillan law, saying that that fear was fictitious and not true; 

(and) one Publius Rubetius, a grave citizen of authority, went out from the 

Senate, (and) with words partly lovingly and partly menacing, showed them 

(the people) the danger to the City and the unreasonableness of their 

demands, so that he constrained the Plebs to swear not to depart from the 

wishes of the Consul. Whence the Plebs, forced to obey, reoccupied the 

Campidoglio: but the Consul Publius Valerius being killed in that attack, 

Titus Quintius was quickly made Consul, who in order not to allow the Plebs 

to rest, or to give them time to think again of the Terentillan law, 

commanded them to go out from Rome and go against the Volscians, saying that 

because of that oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul they were 

obligated to follow him: to which the Tribunes opposed themselves saying 

that that oath was given to the dead Consul and not to him. None the less 

Titus Livius shows that the Plebs for fear of Religion wanted more readily 

to obey the Consul than believe the Tribunes, saying in favor of the ancient 

Religion these words: "He feared that the age had not yet come, when the 

Gods were to be neglected, nor to make interpretations of their oaths and 

laws to suit themselves." Because of which thing, the Tribunes, apprehensive 

of their losing all their liberty, made an accord with the Consul to remain 

in obedience to him and that for one year there should be no discussion of 

the Terentillan law and the Consuls, on the other hand, should not draw on 

the Plebs for war outside (of Rome). And thus Religion enabled the Senate to 

overcome that difficulty which without it, they could never overcome.



                   CHAPTER XIV



THE ROMANS INTERPRETED THE AUSPICES ACCORDING TO NECESSITY, AND WITH THEIR 

PRUDENCE MADE A SHOW OF OBSERVING RELIGION, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE FORCED NOT 

TO OBSERVE IT, AND IF ANYONE RECKLESSLY DISPARAGED IT THEY PUNISHED HIM



The Auguries not only ((as was discussed above)) were the foundation in good 

part of the ancient Religion of the Gentiles, but they were also the causes 

of the well-being of the Roman Republic. Whence the Romans cared more for 

this than any other institution, and used it in their Consular Comitii, in 

starting their enterprises, in sending out their armies, in fighting 

engagements, and in every important activity of theirs, whether civil or 

military: and they never would go on an expedition unless they had persuaded 

the soldiers that the Gods promised them the victory. And among the 

Aruspices there were in the armies certain orders of Aruspices which they 

called Pollari (guardians of the Sacred Fowls). And anytime they were ordered 

to fight an engagement with the enemy they desired these Pollari make their 

Aruspices; and if the fowls pecked away, they fought with a good augury: if 

they did not peck away, they abstained from battle. None the less, when 

reason showed them that a thing ought to be done, not withstanding the 

Aruspices should be adverse, they did it anyway: but then they turned these 

(aruspices) with conditions and in such a manner so adeptly, that it should 

not appear they were doing so with disparagement to their Religion: which 

method was used by Consul Papirus in a most important battle which he waged 

against the Samnites, which afterward left them entirely weak and afflicted. 

For Papirus being in the field encountered the Samnites, and as victory in 

battle appeared certain to him, and because of this wanting to come to an 

engagement, he commanded the Pollari that they make their Aruspices: but the 

fowls did not peck away, and the Prince of the Pollari seeing the great 

disposition of the army to fight and the thoughts to win which were in the 

Captain and all the soldiers, and in order not to take away this opportunity 

from the army of doing well, reported to the Consul that the Aruspices were 

proceeding well, so that Papirus ordered out his squadrons; but some of the 

Pollari having told certain soldiers that the fowls had not pecked away, 

they in turn told it to Spurius Papirus nephew of the Consul; and when he 

reported this to the Consul, he (the Consul) quickly replied that he should 

attend to doing his duty well, and that as to himself and the army the 

Aruspices were correct, and if the Pollarius had told a lie, it would come 

back on him to his prejudice. And so that the result should correspond to 

the prognostication, he commanded his legates that they should place the 

Pollari in the front ranks of the battle. Whence it resulted that in going 

against the enemy, a Roman soldier drawing a dart by chance killed the 

Prince of the Pollari: which thing becoming known, the Consul said that 

every thing was proceeding well and with the favor of the Gods, for the army 

through the death of that liar was purged of every blame and of whatever 

anger (the Gods) should have had against him. And thus by knowing well how 

to accommodate his designs to the Aruspices, he (Papirus) took steps to give 

battle without his army perceiving that he had in any part neglected the 

institutions of their Religion.



Appius Pulcher acted in a contrary fashion in Sicily in the first Punic war; 

for wanting to give battle to the Carthaginian army, he caused the Pollari 

to make Aruspices, and when they reported to him that those fowl did not 

peck away, he said "Let us see if they would drink," and had them thrown 

into the sea: whence that giving battle he lost the engagement; for which he 

was condemned at Rome, and Papirus honored, not so much for the one having 

lost and the other having won, but because the one had gone against the 

Aruspices in a prudent manner, and the other fearfully. Nor did this method 

of making Aurispices have any other object than to have the soldiers go into 

battle with confidence, from which confidence almost always victory 

resulted. Which institution was not only used by the Romans, but by those 

outsiders; of which it seems to me proper to adduce an example in the 

following chapter.



                   CHAPTER XV



HOW THE SAMNITES HAD RECOURSE TO RELIGION AS AN EXTREME REMEDY FOR THE 

THINGS AFFLICTING THEM



The Samnites having been routed many times by the Romans, and having lastly 

been defeated in Tuscany, and their armies destroyed and Captains killed, 

and their allies such as the Tuscans, French (Gauls), and Umbrians having 

also been defeated, so that "They were not able to continue any longer with 

their own men or with those from outside, yet would not abstain from the 

war, and instead of giving up the unsuccessful defense of liberty, they 

would undertake one more attempt at victory before being overcome". Whence 

they decided to make one last try: and since they knew that to want to win 

it was necessary to induce obstinacy into the courage of the soldiers, and 

that to induce it there was no better means than Religion, they decided to 

repeat their ancient sacrifices through the medium of Ovius Paccius their 

Priest, who arranged it in this form: that a solemn sacrifice being made, 

(and), in the midst of the slain victims and burning altars make all the 

heads of the army swear never to abandon the fight; then they summoned the 

soldiers one by one and in the midst of those altars and surrounded by many 

centurions with bared swords in their hands, they made them first swear that 

they would not reveal the things they saw or heard, then with execrable 

phrases and words full of terror they made them swear and promise the Gods 

that they would go readily wherever the Emperor should command them, and 

never to flee in battle, and to kill whomever they should see fleeing; which 

oath if not observed would be visited on the head of his family and on his 

descendants. And some of them being frightened, (and) not wanting to swear, 

were quickly put to death by the centurions: so that the others who 

followed, terrified by the ferocity of the spectacle, all swore. And in 

order to make this gathering of theirs more imposing, there being forty 

thousand men there, they dressed half of them in white clothes with crests 

and plumes on the helmets, and thus arrayed they took position at Aquilonia: 

Papirius came against them, who in encouraging his soldiers said, "Those 

crests cannot inflict wounds, and paint and gilding keep Roman javelins from 

transfixing shields". And to weaken the opinion that his soldiers had of the 

enemy because of the oath they had taken, he said that it (the oath) was to 

inspire fear, and not courage, in those (who had taken it), for it made them 

at the same time fear their own Citizens, their Gods, and their enemies. And 

coming to the fight, the Samnites were defeated; for the virtu of the 

Romans, and the fear conceived from the past routs overcame whatever 

obstinacy they were able to assume by virtu of their Religion and by the 

oath they had taken. None the less it is seen that they (the Samnites) did 

not appear to have any other refuge, nor try other remedies to be able to 

revive hope and reestablish their lost virtu. Which fully testifies how much 

confidence can be obtained by means of Religion well used. And although this 

part might perhaps be rather placed among affairs of outside (peoples), none 

the less as this refers to one of the most important institutions of the 

Republic of Rome, it has appeared to me proper to commit this in this place 

so as not to divide this material and have to return to it many times.



                   CHAPTER XVI



A PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, IF BY SOME ACCIDENT BECOMES 

FREE, MAINTAINS ITS LIBERTY WITH DIFFICULTY



Many examples derived from the records of ancient history will show how 

difficult it is for a people used to living under a Prince to preserve their 

liberty after they had by some accident acquired it, as Rome acquired it 

after driving out the Tarquins. And such difficulty is reasonable; because 

that people is nothing else other than a brute animal, which ((although by 

nature ferocious and wild)) has always been brought up in prison and 

servitude, (and) which later being left by chance free in a field, (and) not 

being accustomed to (obtain) food or not knowing where to find shelter for 

refuge, becomes prey to the first one who seeks to enchain it again. This 

same thing happens to a people, who being accustomed to living under 

governments of others, not knowing to reason either on public defense or 

offense, not knowing the Princes or being known by them, return readily 

under a yoke, which often times is more heavy than that which a short time 

before had been taken from their necks: and they find themselves in this 

difficulty, even though the people is not wholly corrupt; for a people where 

corruption has not entirely taken over, cannot but live at all free even for 

a very brief time, as will be discussed below: and therefore our discussions 

concern those people where corruption has not expanded greatly, and where 

there is more of the good than of the bad (spoiled). To the above should be 

added another difficulty, which is that the state which becomes free makes 

enemy partisans, and not friendly partisans. All those men become its enemy 

partisans who avail themselves of the tyrannical state, feeding on the 

riches of the Prince, (and) who when they are deprived of the faculty of 

thus availing themselves, cannot live content, and some are forced to 

attempt to reestablish the tyrancy so as to recover their authority. It does 

not ((as I have said)) acquire friendly partisans, for a free society 

bestows honors and rewards through the medium of honest and predetermined 

rules, and outside of which does not honor or reward anyone; and when one 

receives those honors and rewards as appears to them he merits, he does not 

consider he has any obligation to repay them: in addition to this that 

common usefulness which free society brings with it, is not known by anyone 

((while he yet possesses it)), which is to be able to enjoy his own 

possessions freely without any suspicion, not being apprehensive of the 

honor of his womenfolk, or that of his children, and not to fear offer 

himself; for no one will ever confess himself to have an obligation to one 

who only does not offend him.



Thus ((as was said above)) a free state that has newly sprung up comes to 

have enemy partisans and not friendly partisans. And wanting to remedy this 

inconvenience and these disorders which the above mentioned difficulties 

bring with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, healthy, 

and necessary than (was) the killing of the sons of Brutus, who, as history 

shows, together with other Roman youths were induced to conspire against 

their country for no other reason than because they could not obtain 

extraordinary advantages for themselves under the Consuls as under the 

Kings; so that the liberty of that people appeared to have become their 

servitude. And whoever undertakes to govern a multitude either by the way of 

liberty (Republic) or by the way of a Principate, and does not make sure of 

those who are enemies of that new institution, establishes a short lived 

state. It is true that I judge those Princes unfelicitous who, to assure 

their state when the multitude is hostile, have to take extraordinary means; 

for he who has only a few enemies can easily and without great scandals make 

sure of them, but he who has the general public hostile to him can never 

make sure of them, and the more cruelty he uses, so much more weak becomes 

his Principate; so that the best remedy he has is to seek to make the People 

friendly. And although this discussion departs from that written above, in 

speaking of a Prince here and of a Republic there, none the less in order 

not to have to return again to this matter I want to speak a little more.



A Prince, therefore, wanting to gain over to himself a people who are 

hostile to him ((speaking of those Princes who have become Tyrants in their 

country)), I say that they ought first to look into that which the people 

desire, and he will find they always desire two things: the one, to avenge 

themselves against those who are the cause of their slavery: the other, to 

regain their liberty. The first desire the Prince is able to satisfy 

entirely, the second in part. As to the first, there is an example in point. 

When Clearchus, Tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile, a controversy arose 

between the people and the Nobles of Heraclea, (and) the Nobles seeing 

themselves inferior, turned to favor Clearchus, and conspiring with him they 

placed him in opposition to the disposition of the people of Heraclea, and 

(thus) took away the liberty from the people. So that Clearchus finding 

himself between the insolence of the Nobles, whom he could not in any way 

either content or correct, and the rage of the People who could not endure 

having lost their liberty, he decided suddenly to free himself from the 

nuisance of the Nobles, and to win the people over to himself. And on this, 

taking a convenient opportunity, he cut to pieces all the Nobles, to the 

extreme satisfaction of the People. And thus, in this way, he satisfied one 

of the desires people had, that is, to avenge themselves. But as to the 

desire of the people to regain their liberty, the Prince, not being able to 

satisfy it, ought to examine what are the reasons that make them desire to 

be free, and he will find that a small part of them desire to be free in 

order to command, but all the others, who are an infinite number, desire 

liberty also as to live in security. For in all Republics in whatever manner 

organized, there are never more than forty or fifty Citizens of a rank to 

command, and because this number is small, it is an easy matter to assure 

oneself of them, either by taking them out of the way, or by giving them a 

part of so many honors as, according to their condition, ought in good part 

to content them. The others, to whom it is enough to live in security, are 

easily satisfied by creating institutions and laws which, together with his 

power, gives realization to the general security of the people. And when a 

Prince does this, and the people see that no one breaks such laws by 

accident, they will begin in a very short time to live in security and 

contentment. In example for this, there is the Kingdom of France, which 

lives in security from nothing else other than those Kings being bound by an 

infinite number of laws in which the security of his people is realized. And 

whoever organized that state wanted that those Kings should do ((in their 

own way)) with the arms and the money as they wanted, but should not be able 

to dispose of any other thing otherwise than by the laws that were ordained. 

That Prince, therefore, or that Republic, that does not secure itself at the 

beginning of its state, should assure itself at the first opportunity, as 

the Romans did. And he who should allow this to pass will repent too late of 

not doing that which he ought to have done. The Roman people, therefore, 

being not yet corrupted when they recovered their liberty, were able to 

maintain it, after the sons of Brutus were put to death and the Tarquins 

destroyed, with all those remedies and institutions which have been 

discussed at another time. But if that people had been corrupted, there 

never would have been found valid remedies, in Rome or elsewhere, to 

maintain it (their liberty), as we shall show in the next chapter.



                   CHAPTER XVII



A CORRUPT PEOPLE COMING INTO THEIR LIBERTY CAN MAINTAIN ITSELF FREE ONLY 

WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY



I judge that it was necessary that Kings should be eliminated in Rome, or 

(else) that Rome would in a very short time become weak and of no valor; for 

considering to what (degree of) corruption those Kings had come, if it 

should have continued so for two or three successions, (and) that that 

corruption which was in them had begun to spread through its members; (and) 

as the members had been corrupted it was impossible ever again to reform her 

(the state). But losing the head while the torso was sound, they were able 

easily to return to a free and ordered society. And it ought to be 

presupposed as a very true matter that a corrupted City which exists under a 

Prince, even though that Prince with all his lives (family) may be 

extinguished, can never become free; and that rather it should happen that 

one Prince destroy the other, for (these people) will never be settled 

without the creation of a new Lord, who by his goodness together with his 

virtu will then keep them free: but that liberty will last only during his 

life time, as happened at different times in Syracuse to Dion and Timoleon, 

whose virtu while they lived, kept that City free: but when they died, it 

returned to the ancient Tyranny. But there is no more striking example to be 

seen than that of Rome, which after the Tarquins had been driven out, was 

able quickly to resume and maintain that liberty; but after the death of 

Caesar, Caligula, and Nero, and after the extinction of all the line of 

Caesar, she could not only never maintain her liberty, but was unable to 

reestablish it. And so great a difference in events in the same City did not 

result from anything else other than (the fact that) the Roman People in the 

time of Tarquin was not yet corrupt, and in the latter time (Caesar's) it 

became very corrupt. For to keep her sound and disposed to keep away from 

Kings at that time, it was enough to make them swear that they should never 

consent that any of them should ever reign in Rome; but in the time of the 

other (Caesar) the authority of Brutus with all the Eastern legions was not 

enough to keep her disposed to want to maintain that liberty which he, in 

imitation of the first Brutus, had restored to her. Which resulted from that 

corruption which the party of Marius had spread among the people, at the 

head of which was Caesar, who was able so to blind the multitude that they 

did not recognize the yoke which they themselves were placing on their 

necks.



And although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example, 

none the less on this proposition I want to refer to people known before our 

times. I say, therefore, that no incident ((although grave and violent)) can 

ever restore Milan or Naples to freedom, because those people are entirely 

corrupt. Which was seen after the death of Filippo Visconti, who, wanting to 

restore liberty to Milan, did not know how and could not maintain it. It was 

therefore a great good fortune for Rome that no sooner had these Kings 

become corrupt than they were driven out, and that before their corruption 

should pass into the vitals of that City; which corruption was the cause of 

the infinite tumults which took place in Rome ((men having good intentions)) 

(and which) did no harm, but rather benefited the Republic. And this 

conclusion can be drawn, that where the people is not corrupted, tumults and 

other troubles do no harm; but where corruption exists, well ordered laws 

are of no benefit, unless they are administered by one who, with extreme 

strength, will make them be observed until the people become good (cured); I 

do not know if this ever happened, or whether it be possible that it could 

happen; for it is seen ((as I have said a little above)) that a City coming 

to decadence because of the corruption of its people, if it ever happens 

that she is raised up again, it happens through the virtu of one man who is 

then living, and not by the virtu of the general public, that the good 

institutions are sustained: and as soon as such a one is dead, they will 

return to their pristine habits, as happened at Thebes, which by the virtu 

of Epaminondas, while he was alive, was able to maintain the form of a 

Republic and Empire, but after his death returned to its first disorders: 

the reason is this, that one man cannot live so long that the time will be 

enough to bring a City back to good habits which for a long time has had 

evil habits. And if one of very long life or two continuous successors of 

virtu do not restore it (the state), so one which lacks them ((as was said 

above)) is quickly ruined, unless it should be made to be restored through 

many dangers and much bloodshed. For such corruption and little inclination 

for a free society result from an inequality that exists in that City; and 

wanting to bring them to equality, it is necessary to use the most 

extraordinary means, which few know or want to use, as will be described in 

more detail in another place.



                  CHAPTER XVIII



IN WHAT WAY IN A CORRUPT CITY A FREE STATE CAN BE MAINTAINED, IF THERE IS 

ONE THERE, OR IF NOT, HOW TO ESTABLISH IT



I believe it is not outside the purpose of this discussion, nor too distant 

from that written above, to consider whether a free State can be maintained 

in a City that is corrupted, or, if there had not been one, to be able to 

establish one. On this matter I say that it is very difficult to do either 

one or the other: and although it is almost impossible to give rules 

((because it will be necessary to proceed according to the degrees of 

corruption)), none the less, as it is well to discuss every thing, I do not 

want to omit this. And I will presuppose a City very corrupt, where such 

difficulties come to rise very fast, as there are found there neither laws 

or institutions that should be enough to check a general corruption. For as 

good customs have need of laws for maintaining themselves, so the laws, to 

be observed, have need of good customs. In addition to this, the 

institutions and laws made in a Republic at its origin when men were good, 

are not afterward more suitable, when they (men) have become evil. And if 

laws vary according to circumstances and events in a City, its institutions 

rarely or never vary: which results in the fact that new laws are not 

enough, for the institutions that remain firm will corrupt it. And in order 

to make this part better understood, I will tell how the Government was 

established in Rome, or rather the State, and the laws with which afterwards 

the Magistrates restrained the Citizens. The institution of the State 

included the authority of the People, the Senate, thy Tribunes, the Consuls, 

method of seeking and creating Magistrates, and the method of making laws. 

These institutions were rarely or never varied by events. The laws that 

restrained the Citizens varied, such as was the law of the Adulterers, the 

Sumptuary, that of Ambition, and many others, according as the Citizens from 

day to day became corrupt. But the institutions of the State becoming firm, 

although no longer good for the corrupt (people), those laws that were 

changed were not enough to keep men good, but would have been of benefit if 

with the changes of the law the institutions should have been modified.



And that it is true that such institutions in a City that had become corrupt 

were not good, is expressly seen in these two principal points. As to the 

creation of the Magistracies and the laws, the Roman People did not give the 

Consulship and other high offices of the City, except to those who asked for 

them. In the beginning these institutions were good because no one asked for 

these (offices) except those Citizens who judged themselves worthy, and 

having a refusal was ignominious: so that in order to judge himself worthy 

every one worked well. However, this system became pernicious in a corrupt 

City, for it was not those who had more virtu, but those who had more power, 

who asked for the Magistracies, and the less powerful ((no matter of how 

much virtu)) abstained from asking from fear. This evil did not come on 

suddenly, but by degrees, as happens with all other evils: for the Romans 

having subjugated Africa and Asia, and reduced almost all of Greece to their 

obedience, had become assured of their liberty, nor did they seem to have 

more enemies who should give them fear. This security, and this weakness of 

her enemies, caused the Roman people no longer to regard virtu in bestowing 

the Consulship, but graciousness, drawing to that dignity those who knew 

better how to handle men, not to those who knew better how to conquer their 

enemies: afterwards they descended from those who had more graciousness to 

give it to those who had more power. So that because of the defects of such 

institutions, the good were entirely excluded from everything. A Tribune or 

some other Citizen could propose a law to the people on which every Citizen 

could speak in favor or against it before it should be adopted. This 

institution was good when the Citizens were good, for it was always well 

that anyone who intended some good for the public was able to propose it, 

and it was well that everyone could speak his thoughts on it, so that the 

people, having listened to all sides, could then select the best. But when 

the Citizens had become bad such institutions became the worst, for only the 

powerful proposed laws, (and) not for the common liberty, but for their own 

power, and everyone for fear of them was not able to speak against them: so 

that the people came to be deceived or forced into deciding their own ruin.



It was necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to maintain herself free in her 

corruption, that she should have made new institutions, just as she had made 

new laws in the process of her existence, for other institutions and modes 

of living ought to be established in a bad people as well as in a good one, 

nor can the form be the same in a people entirely different. But because 

these institutions when they are suddenly discovered no longer to be good 

have to be changed either completely, or little by little as each (defect) 

is known, I say that both of these two courses are almost impossible. For in 

the case of wanting to change little by little a prudent man is required who 

sees this evil from a distance and at its beginning. It is easily probable 

that no one such as these springs up in a City: and even if one should 

spring up he is never able to persuade others of that which he intends; for 

men living in one manner, do not want to change, and the more so as they do 

not see the evil face to face, but being shown to them as (mere) conjecture.



As to changing these institutions all at once when everyone recognizes they 

are not good, I say that the defect which is easily recognized is difficult 

to correct, for to do this it is not enough to use ordinary means, as 

ordinary means are bad, but it is necessary to come to the extraordinary, 

such as violence and arms, and before anything else to become Prince of that 

City, and to be able to dispose of it as he pleases. And as the 

re-organization of the political life of a City presupposes a good man, and 

the becoming of a Prince of a Republic by violence presupposes a bad man; 

for because of this it will be found that it rarely happens that a (good) 

men wants to become Prince through bad means, even though his objectives be 

good; or that a bad one, having become Prince, wants to work for good and 

that it should enter his mind to use for good that authority which he had 

acquired by evil means. From all the things written above, arises the 

difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a Republic in a City that has 

become corrupted, or to establish it there anew. And even if it should have 

to be created or maintained, it would be necessary to reduce it more to a 

Royal State (Monarchy) than to a Popular State (Republic), so that those men 

who because of their insolence cannot be controlled by laws, should be 

restrained by a Power almost Regal. And to want to make them become good by 

other means would be either a most cruel enterprise or entirely impossible; 

as I said above this is what Cleomenes did, who for wanting to be alone (in 

the Government) killed the Ephors, and if Romulus for the same reasons killed 

his brother and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, and afterwards they used their 

authority well, none the less, it ought to be noted that one and the other 

of these men did not have their subjects stained with that corruption of 

which we have discussed in this chapter, and therefore they could desire 

(good), and desiring it, conform their designs accordingly.



                   CHAPTER XIX



A WEAK PRINCE WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE CAN BE MAINTAINED, BUT ANY 

KINGDOM CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IF A WEAK ONE IS SUCCEEDED BY ANOTHER WEAK ONE 



In considering the virtu and the mode of proceeding of Romulus, of Numa, and 

of Tullus, the first three Kings of Rome, it will be seen that Rome was 

favored by the greatest good fortune, having the first King most ferocious 

and warlike, the next quiet and religious, the third similar in ferocity to 

Romulus, and a greater lover of war than of peace. For it was necessary in 

Rome that in the beginning there should spring up an Organizer of civil 

institutions, but it then indeed was necessary that the other Kings should 

reassume the virtu of Romulus, otherwise that City would have become 

effeminate and prey to her neighbors. Whence it can be noted that a 

successor not having as much virtu as the first, is able to maintain a State 

which was erected by that man before him and can enjoy his labors; but if it 

happens either that his life is a long one, or that after him there should 

not spring up another who should reassume the virtu of the first one, that 

Kingdom of necessity will be ruined. And so, on the contrary, if two, one 

after the other, are of great virtu, it will often be seen that they achieve 

most great things and that they will rise with their fame to the heavens. 

David without doubt was a man most excellent in arms, in doctrine, and in 

judgment, and so great was his virtu, that having conquered and beaten down 

all his neighbors, he left a peaceful Kingdom to this son Solomon, which he 

was able to preserve with the arts of peace and of war, and he was able 

happily to enjoy the virtu of his father. But he could not thus leave it to 

his son Rehoboam, who not being like his grandfather in virtu, or like his 

father in fortune, remained heir to the sixth part of the Kingdom only with 

great effort. Bajazet, Sultan of the Turks, although he was more a lover of 

peace than of war, was able to enjoy the efforts of his father Mahomet, who 

having like David beaten his neighbors, left him a firm Kingdom and capable 

of being preserved easily with the arts of peace. But if his own son 

Soliman, the present lord, had been like his father and not his grandfather, 

that Kingdom would have been ruined: but it was seen that this man was to 

surpass the glory of his grandfather.



I say, therefore, through these examples, that it is possible for a weak 

Prince succeeding an excellent one to preserve any Kingdom, even if it 

should not be as that of France, which is maintained by its ancient 

institutions: and those Princes are weak who are not able to endure war. I 

conclude, therefore, with this discussion that the virtu of Romulus was so 

great, that it was able to give time to Numa Pompilius to be able to rule 

Rome with the arts of peace; but he was succeeded by Tullus, who by his 

ferocity reassumed the reputation of Romulus; after whom there followed 

Ancus, so gifted by nature that he was able to use peace and endure war. And 

first he addressed himself to want to hold the ways of peace, but he soon 

knew that his neighbors judging him effeminate esteemed him little, so that 

he decided that if he wanted to maintain Rome he needed to turn to war and 

imitate Romulus, and not Numa. Let all the Princes who have a State take 

example from this, that he who imitates Numa may keep it (the State) or not 

keep it, according as the times and fortune may turn his way; but he who 

imitates Romulus, and is like him armed with prudence and weapons, will keep 

it in any case, unless it is taken from him by an obstinate (and) excessive 

force. And certainly it can be though that, if Rome had not by chance had as 

her third King a man who had not known how to recover with arms her 

reputation, she would never then have been able, except with the greatest 

difficulty, to gain a foothold, nor to achieve the results that she did. And 

thus as long as she lived under Kings, she was subject to these dangers of 

being ruined under a weak or bad King.



                    CHAPTER XX



TWO CONTINUOUS SUCCESSIONS OF PRINCES OF VIRTU ACHIEVE GREAT RESULTS; AND 

THAT WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS OF NECESSITY HAVE SUCCESSIONS OF VIRTU; 

THEREFORE THEIR ACQUISITIONS AND EXPANSIONS ARE GREAT



After Rome had driven out her Kings, she was no longer exposed to those 

perils which were mentioned above, resulting from a succession of weak or 

bad Kings; for the highest (authority) was vested in the Consuls, who came 

to that Empire not by heredity or deceit or violent ambition, but by free 

suffrage, and were always most excellent men, from whose virtu and fortune 

Rome had benefited from time to time, (and) was able to arrive at her 

ultimate greatness in as many years as she had existed under her Kings. For 

it is seen that two continuous successions of Princes of virtu are 

sufficient to acquire the world, as was (the case of) Philip of Macedonia 

and Alexander the Great. A Republic ought to be able to do so much more, 

having the means of electing not only two successions, but an infinite 

number of Princes of great virtu who are successors one after the other: 

which succession of virtu is always well established in every Republic.



                   CHAPTER XXI



HOW MUCH BLAME THAT PRINCE AND REPUBLIC MERIT WHO LACK THEIR OWN ARMS



Present Princes and modern Republics, who lack their own soldiers in regard 

to defense and offense, ought to be ashamed of themselves and to think from 

the example of Tullus that such a defect exists not because of the lack of 

men suitable for the military, but that by their own fault they have not 

known how to make soldiers of their men.[3] For Tullus, after Rome had been 

at peace forty years, did not find a man ((when he succeeded to the 

Kingdom)) who had ever been in war. None the less, planning to make war, he 

did not think of availing himself of the Samnites, or of the Tuscans, or of 

others who were accustomed to bear arms, but as a most prudent man decided 

to avail himself of his own people: And such was his virtu that he was able 

quickly to make excellent soldiers under his own government. And there is 

nothing more true than that (truth), if there are no soldiers where there 

are men, this results from the defect of the Prince, and not from any local 

or natural defect: of which there is a very recent example: For everyone 

knows that in recent times the King of England assaulted the kingdom of 

France, and did not take as soldiers any other than his own people: and 

because that Kingdom had been for more than thirty years without making war, 

he did not have either soldiers or a Captain who had ever fought: none the 

less, he did not hesitate with them to assault a Kingdom full of Captains 

and good armies, which had been continually under arms in the wars in Italy. 

All of which resulted from that King being a prudent man and that Kingdom 

well organized, that in time of peace did not neglect the arrangements of 

war. The Thebans, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, after having liberated Thebes, 

and rescued her from the servitude of the Spartan Empire, finding themselves 

in a City accustomed to servitude, and in the midst of an effeminate people, 

did not hesitate ((so great was their virtu)) to put them under arms and 

with them go to meet the Spartan armies in the field and conquered them: and 

whoever writes says, that these two in a short time showed that men of war 

were born not only in Lacedemonia, but in every other place where men are 

born, as long as there was to be found one man who should know how to train 

them in military service, as is seen (in the case) of Tullus who knew how to 

train the Romans. And Virgil could not express this thought better, and with 

other words shows how he adhered to that, when he said: "And Tullus made of 

These men soldiers".



                   CHAPTER XXII



WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN THE CASE OF THE THREE ROMAN HORATII AND OF THE THREE 

ALBAN CURATII



Tullus, King of Rome, and Metius, King of Alba, agreed that that people 

should be lord of those whose above mentioned three men should overcome 

(those of) the others. All the Alban Curatii were killed, (and) there 

remained only one of the Roman Horatii alive, and because of this Metius, 

King of the Albans, with his subjects, remained subject to the Romans. And 

when that Horatius returned as conqueror to Rome, meeting his sister who was 

married to one of the three dead Curatii, and who was weeping over the death 

of her husband, he killed her. Whence that Horatius, because of this crime, 

was placed on trial and after much deliberation was freed, more because of 

thy prayers of his father than because of his own merits. Here three things 

are to be noted. One, that one should never risk all his fortune with only 

part of his forces. Next, that in a well organized City, the demerits 

(crimes) are never rewarded with merits. The third, that proceedings are 

never wise where one ought to be doubtful of their observance. For being in 

servitude means much to a City, that it ought never to be believed that any 

of those Kings or of those People should be content that three of their 

Citizens should make them subject, as is seen Metius wanted to do, who 

although immediately after the victory of the Romans confessed himself 

conquered and promised obedience to Tullus, none the less, in the first 

expedition in which they were to come against the Veienti, it is seen that 

he sought to deceive them, as one who sees too late the imprudence of the 

proceeding undertaken by him. And because this third point has been talked 

about much, we will talk only of the other two in the following two 

chapters.



                  CHAPTER XXIII



THAT ONE OUGHT NOT TO PUT IN PERIL ALL HIS FORTUNE AND ALL HIS FORCES; AND 

BECAUSE OF THIS THE GUARDING OF PASSES IS OFTEN HARMFUL



It was never judged (to be) a wise proceeding to put into peril all of one's 

fortune or all of one's forces. This may be done in many ways. One is to do 

as Tullus and Metius did when they committed all the fortune of their 

country and the virtu of so many men, as both of these had in their armies, 

to the virtu and fortune of three of their Citizens, which came to be only a 

minimum part of the forces of each of them. Nor did they see that because of 

this proceeding all the labors that their ancestors had endured in the 

establishment of the Republic in order to have it exist free a long time, 

and to make her Citizens defenders of their liberty, were as it were made in 

vain, it being in the power of so few to lose it. Which action (on the part) 

of those Kings could not be considered worse. This error is also almost 

always committed by those who ((seeing the enemy)) plan to hold different 

places and guard the passes. For almost always this decision will be 

damaging unless you can thus conveniently keep all your forces (there) in 

that difficult place. In this case such a procedure is to be taken: but 

being in a rugged place and not being able to keep all your forces there, 

the procedure is damaging. I am made to think thusly by the example of those 

who, when they are assaulted by a powerful enemy, and their country being 

surrounded by mountains and rugged places, never tried to combat the enemy 

in the passes and in the mountains, but have gone out to meet them in front 

of these, or when they did not wish to do that, have awaited him behind 

these mountains in easy and not-rugged places. And the reason was, as it 

were, as alleged before; for many men cannot be brought to the guarding of 

rugged places, not only because it is not possible to live there a long 

time, but also because being in narrow places capable of (admitting) only a 

few, it is not possible to sustain an enemy who comes in a large body to 

hurl himself at you: And it is easy for the enemy to come in large numbers, 

because his intention is to pass and not stop, while to him who awaits him 

(the enemy) it is impossible to wait with large numbers, having to quarter 

himself for a longer time ((not knowing when the enemy may attempt to pass)) 

in narrow and sterile places, as I have said. Having therefore lost that 

pass that you had presupposed to hold, and in which your people and the army 

had trusted, there will very often enter in the people and the rest of the 

forces so much terror that, without being able to test the virtu of those 

remaining, they are lost; and thus you have lost all your fortune with only 

part of your forces.



Everyone knows with how much difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps which 

divide Lombardy from France, and with how much difficulty he crossed those 

which divide Lombardy from Tuscany; none the less, the Romans awaited him 

first on the Ticino and afterwards on the plains of Arezzo; and they wanted 

rather that their army should be consumed by the enemy in places where they 

themselves could conquer, than to lead it over the Alps to be destroyed by 

the malignity of the site. And whoever reads all the histories attentively 

will find very few Captians of virtu to have held similar passes and for the 

reasons mentioned, and because they cannot close them all, the mountains 

being like the fields and having roads not only well known and frequented, 

but many other which, if not known to outsiders, are well known to the 

people of the country, with whose aid you will always be brought to any 

place against the wishes of whoever opposes you. Of this a most recent 

example in the year one thousand five hundred fifteen (1515) can be cited. 

When Francis King of France planned to cross into Italy in order to recover 

the State of Lombardy, the greater foundation of those who opposed his 

enterprise was that the Swiss would stop him in the mountain passes. And as 

was seen from this experience, that foundation of theirs was vain, for that 

King, leaving aside two or three places guarded by them (Swiss), came by 

another unknown road, and was already in Italy before they were aware of it. 

So that, frightened, they retreated to Milan, and all the people of Lombardy 

adhered to the French forces, having been proved wrong in their opinion that 

the French would be held in the mountains.



                  CHAPTER XXIV



WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS ESTABLISH REWARDS AND PENALTIES FOR THEIR CITIZENS, 

BUT NEVER COMPENSATE ONE (AT THE EXPENSE) OF THE OTHER



The merits of Horatius had been very great, having by his virtu conquered 

the Curatii. None the less such a homicide displeased the Romans so much, 

that he was brought to trial for his life, notwithstanding that his merits 

were so great and so recent. Which thing, to whoever should consider it only 

superficially, would seem to be an example of the ingratitude of the people. 

None the less, whoever should examine it closer, and with better 

consideration will look for what the orders of the Republic ought to be, 

will blame that people rather for having absolved him than for having wanted 

to condemn him: and the reason is this, that no well-ordered Republic ever 

cancels the misbehavior of its citizens by their merits; and having rewarded 

one for having acted well, if that same one afterwards acts badly, it 

castigates him without having regard to any of his good actions. And if 

these orders are well observed, a City will exist free for a long time; if 

otherwise, it will quickly be ruined. For if to a citizen who has done some 

eminent work for the City, there is added to his reputation of that which he 

acquired, and audacity and confidence of being able to do some wrong without 

fear of punishment, he will in a short time become so insolent as to put an 

end to all civil law. But wanting that the punishment for evil actions be 

feared, it is very necessary to observe rewarding good, as is seen was done 

by Rome. And although a Republic may be poor and can give only a little, it 

ought not to abstain from giving that little, because every little gift 

given to someone in recompense for a good deed, no matter how big (the deed), 

will always be esteemed very greatly by whoever receives it as an honorable 

thing. And the history of Horatius Codes and that of Mutius Scaevola are 

well known; how one held back the enemy on a bridge until it was cut, (and) 

the other burned his hand having erred in wanting to murder Porsenna, King 

of the Tuscans. For these two eminent deeds two measures of land were given 

to each of those men by the public. The history of Manlius Capitolinus is 

also well known. For having saved the Campidoglio from the Gauls who were 

besieging it, this man was given a small measure of flour by those who had 

been besieged inside with him, which reward ((according to the value that was 

then current in Rome)) was great and of quality; (but) when Manlius 

afterward, either from envy or from his evil nature, moved to raise up 

sedition in Rome, and seeking to gain over the People to himself, he was, 

without regard to any of his merits, thrown precipituously from that 

Campidoglio which he had previously with so much glory saved.



                   CHAPTER XXV



WHOEVER WANTS TO REFORM AN ANCIENT STATE INTO A FREE CITY, SHOULD RETAIN AT 

LEAST A SHADOW OF THE ANCIENT FORMS



He who desires or wants to reform the State (Government) of a City, and 

wishes that it may be accepted and capable of maintaining itself to 

everyone's satisfaction, it is necessary for him at least to retain the 

shadow of ancient forms, so that it does not appear to the people that the 

institutions have been changed, even though in fact the new institutions 

should be entirely different from the past ones: for the general mass of men 

are satisfied with appearances, as if it exists, and many times are moved by 

the things which appear to be rather than by the things that are. The Romans 

knew this necessity in the beginning of their free existence, (and) for this 

reason, had in place of one King created two Consuls, (and) did not want 

them to have more than twelve Lictors so as not to exceed the number that 

ministered to the Kings. In addition to this, an annual sacrifice was made 

in Rome, which could not be done except by the King in person, and as the 

Romans wishing that the People should not desire any of the ancient things 

because of the absence of the King, created a chief for the said sacrifice, 

whom they called the King of sacrifice, and placed him under the high 

priest. So that the people through this means came to be satisfied with that 

sacrifice and never to have reason, for lack of them, to desire the return 

of the King. And this ought to be observed by all those who want to abolish 

an ancient (system of) living in a City and bring it to a new and more 

liberal (system of) living. For as new things disturb the minds of men, you 

ought to endeavor that these changes retain as much as possible of the 

ancient (forms); and if the magistrates change both in number and in 

authority and in duration (of term) from the ancients, the names at least 

ought to be retained. And this ((as I have said)) ought to be preserved by 

whoever wants to organize an absolute power into a Republic or a Kingdom; 

but he who wants to establish an absolute power, which by authors is called a 

Tyranny, ought to change everything, as will be mentioned in the following 

chapter.



                  CHAPTER XXVI



A NEW PRINCE IN A CITY OR PROVINCE TAKEN BY HIM OUGHT TO ORGANIZE EVERYTHING 

ANEW



Whoever becomes Prince either of a City or a State, and more so if his 

foundations are weak, and does not want to establish a civil system either 

in the form of a Kingdom or a Republic, (will find) the best remedy he has 

to hold that Principality is ((he being a new Prince)) to do everything anew 

in that State; such as in the City to make new Governors with new titles, 

with new authority, with new men, (and) make the poor rich, as David did 

when he became King, who piled good upon the needy, and dismissed the 

wealthy empty-handed. In addition to this he should build new Cities, 

destroy old ones, transfer the inhabitants from one place to another, and in 

sum, not to leave anything unchanged in that Province, (and) so that there 

should be no rank, nor order, nor status, nor riches, that he who obtains it 

does not recognize it as coming from him; he should take as his model Philip 

of Macedonia, father of Alexander, who, by these methods, from a petty King 

became Prince of Greece. And those who write of him tell how be transferred 

men from Province to Province, as the Mandrians (Shepherds) move their 

sheep. These methods are most cruel and hostile to every system of living, 

not only Christian, but human, and should be avoided by every man; and he 

should want rather to live as a private individual than as a King at the 

(expense of the) ruin of men. None the less, he who does not want to take up 

the first path of good, must, if he wants to maintain himself, follow the 

latter path of evil. But men take up certain middle paths which are most 

harmful, for they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as 

the following chapter will show by example.



                  CHAPTER XXVII



VERY RARELY DO MEN KNOW HOW TO BE ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY BAD



When Pope Julius II in the year one thousand five hundred and five (1505) 

went to Bologna to drive the house of Bentivogli out of that State, of which 

they had held the Principate (of that State) for a hundred years, he wanted 

also to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was Tyrant, 

(and) to be the one who planned to eliminate all the Tyrants who were 

occupying the lands of the Church. And having arrived at Perugia with this 

purpose and decision known to everyone, he did not wait to enter in that 

City with his army that was protecting him, but entered unarmed, 

notwithstanding that Giovanpagolo was inside with large forces that he had 

gathered for defense. And thus, brought by that fury which governed all his 

actions, with only his simple guard he placed himself in the hands of the 

enemy, whom he then carried off with him, leaving a governor in that City 

who should administer it for the Church. The temerity of the Pope and the 

cowardice of Giovanpagolo were noted by the prudent men who were with the 

Pope, nor could they understand whence it happened that he (Baglioni) did 

not with his perpetual fame attack his enemy at once and enrich himself with 

booty, there being with the Pope all the Cardinals with their valuables. Nor 

could it be believed that he abstained either from goodness or that his 

conscience restrained him; for no regard of piety could enter in the heart 

of a riotous man, who had kept his sister, and had put to death his cousins 

and nephews in order that he could reign there: but it is concluded that men 

do not know how to be entirely bad or perfectly good, and that when an evil 

has some greatness in it or is generous in any part, they do not know how to 

attempt it. Thus Giovanpagolo, who did not mind being publicly (called) 

incestuous and a parricide, did not know how, or to say more correctly, did 

not dare ((even having a justifiable opportunity)) to make an enterprise 

where everyone would have admired his courage and which would have left an 

eternal memory of himself, being the first who would have shown the Prelates 

how little esteemed are they who live and reign as they do, and would have 

done an act, the greatness of which would have overcome every infamy and 

every danger that could have resulted from it.



                 CHAPTER XXVIII



FOR WHAT REASONS THE ROMANS WERE LESS UNGRATEFUL TO THEIR CITIZENS THAN THE 

ATHENIANS



Whoever reads of the things done by Republics will find in all of them some 

species of ingratitude against their citizens, but he will find less in Rome 

than in Athens, and perhaps in any other Republic. And in seeking the 

reasons for this, speaking of Rome and Athens, I believe it was because the 

Romans had less reason to suspect their citizens than did the Athenians. For 

in Rome ((discussing the time from the expulsion of the Kings up to Sulla 

and Marius)) liberty was never taken away from any of its citizens, so that 

in that (City) there was no great reason to be suspicious of them, and 

consequently (no cause) to offend them inconsiderately. The very contrary 

happened in Athens, for her liberty having been taken away by Pisistratus in 

her most florid time and under the deception of goodness, so soon then as 

she became free, remembering the injuries received and her past servitude, 

she became a harsh avenger not only of the errors of her citizens, but even 

the shadow of them. From which resulted the exile and death of so many 

excellent men: From this came the practice of ostracism and every other 

violence which that City at various times took up against her Nobility. And 

it is very true what these writers say of that Civil Society, that when they 

have recovered their liberty, they sting their people more severely than 

when they have preserved it. Whoever would consider, therefore, what has 

been said, will not blame Athens for this, nor praise Rome, but he will 

blame only the necessity resulting from the difference of events which 

occurred in those Cities. For whoever will consider things carefully, will 

see that if Rome had had her liberty taken away as it was in Athens, Rome 

would not have been any more merciful toward her citizens than was the 

latter. From which a very real conjecture can be made of that which occurred 

after the expulsion of the Kings against Collatinus and Publius Valerius, of 

whom the first ((although he was found in liberating Rome)) was sent into 

exile for no other reason than for having the name of the Tarquins, and the 

other having only given suspicion by building a house on Mount Celius, was 

also made to be an exile. So that it can be judged ((seeing how severe Rome 

was in these two suspicions)) that she would have been ungrateful as Athens 

was, if she had been offended by her citizens as she was in her early times 

and before her expansion. And so as not to have to return again to this 

matter of ingratitude, I shall say that which will occur in the following 

chapter.



                  CHAPTER XXIX



WHICH IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A PEOPLE OR A PRINCE



It appears to me apropos of the above written matter to discuss with example 

who practiced this ingratitude more, a People or a Prince. And to discuss 

this part further, I say that this vice of ingratitude arises either from 

avarice or from suspicion: For when a People or a Prince has sent out one of 

its Captains on an important expedition, where that Captain ((having won)) 

has acquired great glory, that People or that Prince is bound in turn to 

reward him: and if in place of a reward they, moved by avarice, either 

dishonor or offend him, not wanting ((held back by this cupidity)) to take 

the trouble, they make an error that has no excuse, but will leave behind 

for them an eternal infamy. Yet many Princes are found who err in this way. 

And Cornelius Tacitus tells the reason in this sentence; An injury is more 

apt to be repaid than a benefit, where gratitude is onerous and exultation is 

had in revenge. But when they do not reward one; or ((to say it better)) 

they offend one, moved not by avarice, but by suspicion, then both the 

People and Prince merit some excuse. And much is read of this ingratitude 

shown for such reasons, for that Captain who by his virtu has conquered an 

Empire for his Lord, overcoming the enemy and filling himself with glory and 

his soldiers with riches, of necessity acquires so much reputation with his 

soldiers, with his enemies, and with the Prince's very own subjects, that 

that victory can be distasteful to that Lord who had sent him. And because 

the nature of men is ambitious and suspicious, and puts no limits on the 

fortune of anyone, it is not impossible that the suspicion which is suddenly 

aroused in the Prince after the victory of his captain, may not by itself 

have been increased by some of his actions or expressions made insolently. 

So that the Prince cannot think otherwise than to secure himself: and to do 

this thinks of either having him die or taking away from him that reputation 

which he gained among his army and the people, and with all industry show 

that the victory was not due to the virtu of that (Captain), but by chance 

and cowardice of the enemy, or by the wisdom of other Captains who had been 

with him in that action.



After Vespasian, while in Judea, was declared Emperor by his army, Antonius 

Primus, who was to be found with another army in Illyria, took his side, and 

came into Italy against Vitellius who reigned in Rome, and with the greatest 

virtu routed two armies of Vitellius and occupied Rome, so that through the 

virtu of Antonius, Mutianus, who had been sent by Vespasian, found 

everything achieved and all difficulties overcome. The reward which Antonius 

received was that Mutianus took away from him the command of the army, and 

little by little reduced his authority in Rome to nothing: so that Antonius 

went to find Vespasian who was yet in Asia, by whom he was received in such a 

fashion, that in a brief time, having been reduced to no rank, died almost 

in despair. And histories are full of such examples.



In our own times anyone now living knows with what industry and virtu 

Gonsalvo Ferrante, fighting in the Kingdom of Naples for Ferrando King of 

Aragon against the French, had conquered and won that Kingdom, and was 

rewarded for his victory by Ferrando, who departed from Aragon and came to 

Naples, where he first took away from him the command of the armed forces, 

then took away from him the fortresses, and then took him with him to Spain, 

where in a short time he died unhonored.



And this suspicion, therefore, is so natural in Princes that they cannot 

defend themselves against them, and it is impossible for them to show 

gratitude toward those who, by victory under their ensigns, have made great 

conquest. And if a Prince cannot defend himself from them, is it not a 

miracle or something worthy of greater consideration, that a people does not 

also defend itself; for a City which exists free has two objectives, one 

conquering, the other maintaining itself free, and it happens that because 

of excessive love for both of these it makes errors. As to the errors made 

in conquering, they will be spoken of in their proper place. As to the 

errors made in maintaining itself free, among others they are those of 

offending those Citizens whom it ought to reward, and of having suspicion of 

those in whom it ought to have confidence. And although these things in a 

Republic already corrupted cause great evils, and which many times rather 

leads to tyranny, as happened in Rome under Caesar who took by force that 

which ingratitude denied him, none the less in a Republic not yet corrupted 

they are the cause of great good, and make for a longer free existence, 

maintaining itself because the fear of punishment makes men better and less 

ambitious.



It is true that among all the people who ever had an Empire for reasons 

discussed above, Rome was the least ungrateful, for it can be said there is 

no other example of her ingratitude than that of Scipio; for Coriolanus and 

Camillus were both made exiles because of the injuries that the one and the 

other had inflicted on the Plebs: But he one was never pardoned for having 

always preserved a hostile spirit against the People: the other was not only 

recalled (from exile), but for the rest of his life was adored as a Prince. 

But the ingratitude shown to Scipio arose from a suspicion that the Citizens 

begun to have of him that was never had of others, which (suspicion) arose 

from the greatness of the enemy that Scipio conquered, from the reputation 

which that victory in such a long and perilous war had given him, from the 

rapidity of it, from the favor which his youth, his prudence, and his other 

memorable virtues had acquired for him. These were so many, that for no 

other reason, the Magistrates of Rome feared his authority, which displeased 

intelligent men as something unheard of in Rome. And his manner of living 

appeared so extraordinary that Cato the elder, reputed a saint, was the 

first to go against him, and to say that a City could not be called free 

where there was a Citizen who was feared by the Magistrates. So that if the 

people of Rome in this case followed the opinion of Cato, they merit the 

excuse that I said above was merited by those People and those Princes who, 

because of suspicion, are ungrateful. Concluding this discourse, therefore, 

I say that using this vice of ingratitude for either avarice or suspicion, 

it will be seen that the People never use it from avarice, and from 

suspicion much less than do Princes, having less reason for suspicion, as 

will be told below.



                   CHAPTER XXX



WHAT MEANS A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC OUGHT TO USE TO AVOID THIS VICE OF 

INGRATITUDE, AND WHAT THAT CAPTAIN OR THAT CITIZEN OUGHT TO DO SO AS NOT TO 

BE TOUCHED BY IT



A Prince, to avoid the necessity of having to live with suspicion or to be 

ungrateful, ought to go on his expeditions in person, as those Roman 

Emperors did in the beginning, as does the Turk in our times, and as those 

of virtu have done and still do. For winning, the glory and the conquests 

are all theirs: and when they do not ((the glory belonging to others)) it 

does not appear to them to be able to use that conquest unless they 

extinguish that glory in others which they have not known how to gain for 

themselves, and to become ungrateful and unjust is without doubt more to 

their loss than to their gain. But when either through negligence or little 

prudence they remain idle at home and send a Captain, I have no precept to 

give them, then, other than that which they know by themselves. But I will 

say to that Captain, judging that he will not be able to escape the stings 

of ingratitude, that he must do one of two things: either immediately after 

the victory he must leave the army and place himself in the hands of the 

Prince, guarding himself from any insolent and ambitious act, so that he 

(the Prince) despoiled of every suspicion has reason either to reward him or 

not to offend him, or if he does not please to do this, to take boldly the 

contrary side, and take all those means through which he believed that that 

conquest is his very own and not of his Prince, obtaining for himself the 

good will of his soldiers and of the subjects, and must make new friendships 

with his neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, corrupt the Princes 

(Leaders) of his army, and assure himself of those he cannot corrupt, and by 

these means seek to punish his Lord for that ingratitude that he showed 

toward him. There are no other ways: but ((as was said above)) men do not 

know how to be all bad, or all good. And it always happens that immediately 

after a victory, he (a Captain) does not want to leave his army, is not able 

to conduct himself modestly, does not know how to use forceful ends (and) 

which have in themselves something honorable. So that being undecided, 

between the delays and indecision, he is destroyed.



As to a Republic wishing to avoid this vice of ingratitude, the same remedy 

cannot be given as that of a Prince; that is, that it cannot go and not send 

others on its expeditions, being necessitated to send one of its Citizens. 

It happens, therefore, that as a remedy, I would tell them to keep to the 

same means that the Roman Republic used in being less ungrateful than 

others: which resulted from the methods of its government, for as all the 

City, both the Nobles and Ignobles (Plebeians) devoted themselves to war, 

there always sprung up in Rome in every age so many men of virtu and adorned 

with various victories, that the People did not have cause for being 

apprehensive of any of them, there being so many and one guarding another. 

And thus they maintained themselves wholesome and careful not to show any 

shadow of ambition, nor give reason to the People to harm them as ambitious 

men; and if they came to the Dictatorship, that greater glory derived rather 

from their laying it down. And thus, not being able by such methods to 

generate suspicion, they did not generate ingratitude. So that a Republic 

that does not want to have cause to be ungrateful ought to govern as Rome 

did, and a Citizen who wants to avoid its sting ought to observe the limits 

observed the limits observed by the Roman Citizens.



                  CHAPTER XXXI



THAT ROMAN CAPTAINS WERE NEVER EXTRAORDINARILY PUNISHED FOR ERRORS COMMITTED; 

NOR WERE THEY YET PUNISHED WHEN, BY THEIR IGNORANCE OR BAD PROCEEDINGS 

UNDERTAKEN BY THEM, HARM ENSUED TO THE REPUBLIC



The Romans were ((as we discussed above)) not only less ungrateful than 

other Republics, but were even more merciful and considerate in punishing 

their Captains of the armies than any other. For if their error had been 

from malice, they castigated them humanely: if it was through ignorance, 

they did not punish them but rewarded and honored them. This manner of 

proceeding was well considered by them, for they judged that it was of great 

importance to those who commanded their armies to have their minds free and 

prompt and without any outside regard as to how they took up their duties, 

that they did not want to add anything, which in itself was difficult and 

dangerous, believing that if these were added no one would be able to 

operate with virtu. For instance, they sent an army into Greece against 

Philip of Macedonia, and into Italy against those people who first overcame 

them. This Captain who was placed in charge of such an expedition would be 

deeply concerned of all the cares that go on behind those activities, which 

are grave and very important. Now, if to such cares should be added the many 

examples of the Romans who had been crucified or otherwise put to death for 

having lost the engagement, it would be impossible for that Captain, among 

such suspicions, to be able to proceed vigorously. Judging, therefore, that 

the ignominy of having lost would be a great punishment for such a one, they 

did not want to frighten him with other greater penalties.



As to errors committed through ignorance, here is an example. Sergius and 

Virginius were besieging Veii, each in charge of part of the army, of which 

Sergius was on the side whence the Tuscans could come, and Virginius on the 

other side. It happened that Sergius being assaulted by the Faliscans among 

other people, preferred being routed and put to flight before sending to 

Virginius for help: And on the other hand, Virginius waiting for him 

(Sergius) to be humiliated, would rather see the dishonor of his country and 

the ruin of the army, than to succor him. A truly bad case, and worthy to be 

noted, and of creating a poor conjecture of the Roman Republic, if both of 

them had not been castigated. It is true that where another Republic would 

have punished them with a capital penalty, it (Rome) punished them with a 

monetary fine. Which was done, not because their errors merited greater 

punishment, but because the Romans wanted in this case, for the reasons 

already mentioned, to maintain their ancient customs.



As to errors (committed) through ignorance, there is no more striking 

example than that of Varro, through whose temerity the Romans were routed at 

Cannae by Hannibal, where that Republic was brought in danger of its 

liberty, none the less because it was ignorance and not malice, they not 

only did not castigate him, but honored him, and on his return to Rome, the 

whole Senatorial order went to meet him, (and) not being able to thank him 

for the battle, they thanked him for returning to Rome and for not having 

despaired of Roman affairs.



When Papirus Cursor wanted to have Fabius put to death for having, against 

his command, combatted with the Samnites, among the other reasons which were 

assigned by the father of Fabius against the obstinacy of the Dictator was 

this, that in any defeat of its Captains, the Roman People never did that 

which Papirus in victory wanted to do.



                  CHAPTER XXXII



A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT NOT TO DEFER BENEFITING MEN IN THEIR NECESSITY 



Although the Romans succeeded happily in being liberal to people, yet when 

danger came upon them from Porsenna coming to assault Rome in order to 

restore thy Tarquins, the Senate apprehensive of the plebs who might want to 

accept the Kings than to sustain a war, in order to assure themselves (of 

the plebs), relieved them of the salt gabelle and all other taxes, saying 

that the poor did much for the public benefit if they reared their children, 

and that because of this benefice that people should submit itself to endure 

siege, famine, and war: let no one who trusts in this example defer in 

gaming the people over to himself until the time of danger, for it will not 

succeed for him as it succeeded for the Romans; for the people in general 

will judge not to have gotten that benefit from you, but from your 

adversaries, and becoming afraid that once the necessity is past, you would 

take back from them that which by force you gave them, they will have no 

obligation to you. And the reason why this proceeding turned out well for 

the Romans was because the State was new, and not yet firm, and that the 

people had seen that other laws had been made before for their benefit, such 

as that of the appeal to the Plebs: so that they could persuade themselves 

that that good which was done, was not caused so much by the coming of the 

enemy as much as the disposition of the Senate to benefit them: In addition 

to this the memory of the Kings, by whom they had been ill-used and injured 

in many ways, was fresh. And as similar occasions rarely occur, so it rarely 

occurs that similar remedies do good. Therefore Republics as well as Princes 

ought to think ahead what adversities may befall them, and of which men in 

adverse times they may have need of, and then act toward them as they might 

judge necessary ((supposing some case)) to live. And he who governs himself 

otherwise, whether Prince or Republic, and especially a Prince, and then on 

this fact believes that if danger comes upon him, he may regain the people 

for himself by benefits, deceives himself, because he not only does not 

assure himself, but accelerates his ruin.



                 CHAPTER XXXIII



WHEN AN EVIL HAS SPRUNG UP EITHER WITHIN A STATE OR AGAINST A STATE, IT IS A 

MORE SALUTARY PROCEEDING TO TEMPORIZE WITH IT THAN TO ATTACK IT RASHLY



The Roman Republic growing in reputation, strength, and empire, its 

neighbors which at first had not thought how much harm that new Republic 

would be able to bring to them, commenced ((but too late)) to recognize 

their error, and wanting to remedy that which at first they had not 

remedied, they (arranged) for forty peoples (tribes) to conspire against 

Rome: whence the Romans among the usual remedies made by them in urgent 

perils, wanted to create a Dictator, that is, to give power to one man who, 

without any consultation, should be able to decide, and without any appeal 

should be able to execute his decisions: This remedy which formerly was 

useful and a means of overcoming imminent perils, was also always most 

useful in all those incidents which sprung up at any time against the 

Republic in the expansion of the Empire. On which subject it will first be 

discussed, that when an evil springs up either within a Republic or against 

a Republic, whether from intrinsic or extrinsic causes, and has become so 

great that it begins to make (everyone) afraid, it is a much more safe 

procedure to temporize with it than to try to extinguish it. For almost 

always those who try to crush it, make its force greater, and make that evil 

which is suspected from it to be accelerated. And incidents similar to these 

arise more frequently in a Republic from intrinsic and extrinsic causes, as 

it often occurs that it allows a Citizen more power than is reasonable, or 

the corrupting of a law is begun which is the nerve and life of a free 

society: and this error is allowed to run so far, that it is a more harmful 

procedure to want to remedy it than to let it go on. And it is so much more 

difficult to recognize these evils when they first arise, as it seems more 

natural to men always to favor the beginning of things: And such favors are 

accorded more to those accomplishments which have in them some virtu or are 

done by young men, than to any other thing: for if some young noble is seen 

to spring up in a Republic who has in him some extraordinary virtu, the eyes 

of all the Citizens begin to turn toward him, and they agree without regard 

(to consequences) to honor him: so that if there is any stitch of ambition 

in him, the assemblage of favors which nature and these incidents give him, 

he will soon come to a place that when the Citizens see their error, they 

will have few remedies to stop him, and they wanting so much to employ that 

which they have, do nothing other than to accelerate his power.



Of this many examples can be cited, but I want to give only one of our City 

(of Florence). Cosimo De'Medici, from whom the house of Medici in our City 

owed the beginning of its greatness, came into such reputation by the favor 

which his prudence and the ignorance of the other Citizens gave him, that he 

begun to bring fear to the State, so that the other Citizens judged it 

dangerous to offend him and still more dangerous to allow him to go on. But 

Niccolo Da Uzzano living in those times, who was held to be a man most 

expert in civil affairs, and having made the first error in not recognizing 

the dangers that could arise from the reputation of Cosimo, never permitted 

while he lived that a second (error) be made, that is, that it should be 

attempted (to want) to destroy him, judging that such an attempt would be 

the ruin of their State, as in fact was seen after his death; for those 

Citizens (who remained) not observing these counsels of his, made themselves 

strong against Cosimo and drove him out of Florence. Whence there resulted 

that, his party resentful of this injury, a little later called him back and 

made him Prince of the Republic, to which rank he could never have ascended 

without that manifest opposition. This same thing happened in Rome to Caesar 

who was favored by Pompey and the others for his virtu; which favor a little 

while later was converted to fear: to which Cicero gives testimony, saying 

that Pompey had too late begun to fear Caesar. Which fear caused them to 

think of remedies, and the remedies they took accelerated the ruin of the 

Republic.



I say, therefore, that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when 

they spring up, this difficulty caused by the deception which things give in 

the beginning, it is the wiser proceeding to temporize with them when they 

are recognized than to oppose them. For by temporizing with them, they will 

either extinguish themselves, or the evil will at least be deferred for a 

longer time. And Princes ought to open their eyes to all these things which 

they plan to do away with, and be careful by their strength and drive not to 

increase them instead of decreasing them, and not believe that by blowing at 

a thing, it can be done away with, or rather to suffocate the plant by 

blowing on it. But the force of the evil ought to be well considered, and 

when they see themselves sufficient to oppose it, to attack it without 

regard (to consequences), otherwise they should let it be, and in no way 

attempt it. For it will happen as was discussed above, and as it did happen 

to the neighbors of Rome, to whom after Rome had grown so much in power, it 

was more salutary to seek to placate her and hold her back with methods of 

peace, than with methods of war to make her think of new institutions and 

new defenses. For their conspiracy did nothing other than to make them 

united, more stalwart, and to think of new ways by which in a short time 

they expanded their power: Among which was the creation of a Dictator, by 

which new institution they not only overcame the imminent dangers, but was 

the cause of obviating infinite evils in which, without that remedy, that 

Republic would have been involved.



                  CHAPTER XXXIV



THE DICTATORIAL AUTHORITY DID GOOD AND NOT HARM TO THE ROMAN REPUBLIC; AND 

THAT THE AUTHORITY WHICH CITIZENS TAKE AWAY, NOT THOSE ARE GIVEN THEM BY FREE 

SUFFRAGE, ARE PERNICIOUS TO CIVIL SOCIETY



Those Romans who introduced into that City the method of creating a Dictator 

have been condemned by some writers, as something that was in time the cause 

of tyranny in Rome; alleging that the first tyrant who existed in that City 

commanded her under this title of Dictator, saying if it had not been for 

this, Caesar could not under any public (title) have imposed his tyranny. 

Which thing was not well examined by those who held this opinion and was 

believed beyond all reason. For it was not the name or the rank of Dictator 

that placed Rome in servitude, but it was the authority taken by the 

Citizens to perpetuate themselves in the Empire (government): and if the 

title of Dictator did not exist in Rome, they would have taken another; for 

it is power that easily acquires a name, not a name power. And it is seen 

that the Dictatorship while it was given according to public orders and not 

by individual authority, always did good to the City. For it is the 

Magistrates who are made and the authority that is given by irregular means 

that do injury to Republics, not those that come in the regular way. As is 

seen ensued in Rome where in so much passage of time no Dictator did 

anything that was not good for the Republic. For which there are very 

evident reasons: First, because if a Citizen would want to (offend and ) 

take up authority in an irregular manner, it must happen that he have many 

qualities which he can never have in an uncorrupted Republic, for he needs 

to be very rich and to have many adherents and partisans, which he cannot 

have where the laws are observed: and even if he should have them, such men 

are so formidable that free suffrage would not support them. In addition to 

this, a Dictator was made for a (limited) time and not in perpetuity, and 

only to remove the cause for which he was created; and his authority 

extended only in being able to decide by himself the ways of meeting that 

urgent peril, (and) to do things without consultation, and to punish anyone 

without appeal; but he could do nothing to diminish (the power) of the 

State, such as would have been the taking away of authority from the Senate 

or the people, to destroy the ancient institutions of the City and the 

making of new ones. So that taking together the short time of the 

Dictatorship and the limited authority that he had, and the Roman People 

uncorrupted, it was impossible that he should exceed his limits and harm the 

City: but from experience it is seen that it (City) always benefited by him.



And truly, among the other Roman institutions, this is one that merits to be 

considered and counted among those which were the cause of the greatness of 

so great an Empire: For without a similar institution, the Cities would have 

avoided such extraordinary hazards only with difficulty; for the customary 

orders of the Republic move to slowly ((no council or Magistrate being able 

by himself to do anything, but in many cases having to act together)) that 

the assembling together of opinions takes so much time; and remedies are 

most dangerous when they have to apply to some situation which cannot await 

time. And therefore Republics ought to have a similar method among their 

institutions. And the Venetian Republic ((which among modern Republics is 

excellent)) has reserved authority to a small group (few) of citizens so 

that in urgent necessities they can decide on all matters without wider 

consultation. For when a similar method is lacking in a Republic, either 

observing the institutions (strictly) will ruin her, or in order not to ruin 

her, it will be necessary to break them. And in a Republic, it should never 

happen that it be governed by extraordinary methods. For although the 

extraordinary method would do well at that time, none the less the example 

does evil, for if a usage is established of breaking institutions for good 

objectives, then under that pretext they will be broken for evil ones. So 

that no Republic will be perfect, unless it has provided for everything with 

laws, and provided a remedy for every incident, and fixed the method of 

governing it. And therefore concluding I say, that those Republics which in 

urgent perils do not have resort either to a Dictatorship or a similar 

authority, will always be ruined in grave incidents. And it is to be noted 

in this new institution how the method of electing him was wisely provided 

by the Romans. For the creation of a Dictator being of some discredit to the 

Consuls, as the Chiefs of the City had to come to the same obedience as 

others, (and) wanting that the authority for such election should remain in 

the consuls, believing that if an incident should arise that Rome would have 

need of this Regal power, by doing this voluntarily by themselves (Consuls), 

it would reflect on them less. For the wounds and every other evil that men 

inflict on themselves spontaneously and by choice, pain less in the long run 

than do those that are inflicted by others. In later times, however, the 

Romans, in place of a Dictator, used to give such authority to the Consul, 

in these words: Let the Consuls see that the Republic suffers no detriment. 

But to return to our subject, I conclude, that the neighbors of Rome seeking 

to oppress her, caused her to institute methods not only enabling her to 

defend herself, but enabling her with more strength, better counsels, and 

greater authority to attack them.



                  CHAPTER XXXV



THE REASON WHY THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRS IN ROME WAS HARMFUL TO THE 

LIBERTY OF THAT REPUBLIC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS CREATED BY PUBLIC AND 

FREE SUFFRAGE



The election of the Ten citizens (Decemvirs) created by the Roman people to 

make the laws in Rome, who in time became Tyrants, and without any regard 

took away her liberty, appears to be contrary to what was discussed above, 

that that authority which is taken by violence, not that which is given by 

suffrage, harms the Republics. Here, however, the methods of giving 

authority and the time for which it is given, ought to be considered. For 

when free authority is given for a long time ((calling a long time a year or 

more)) it is always dangerous and will produce effects either good or bad, 

according as those upon whom it is conferred are good or bad. And if the 

authority given to the Ten and that which the Dictators have are considered, 

it will be seen beyond comparison that that of the Ten is greater. For when a 

Dictator was created there remained the Tribunes, Consuls, (and) the Senate, 

with all their authority, and the Dictator could not take it away from them; 

and even if he should have been able to remove anyone from the Consulship, 

or from the Senate, he could not suppress the Senatorial order and make new 

laws. So that the Senate, the Consuls, and the Tribunes, remaining with 

their authority, came to be as his guard to prevent him form going off from 

the right road. But in the creation of the Ten all the contrary occurred, 

for they annulled the Consuls and the Tribunes, and they were given 

authority to make laws and do every other thing as the Roman People had. So 

that, finding themselves alone, without Consuls, without Tribunes, without 

the appeal to the People, and because of this not having anyone to observe 

them, moved by the ambitions of Appius, they were able in the second year to 

become insolent. And because of this, it ought to be noted that when (we 

said) an authority given by free suffrage never harmed any Republic, it 

presupposed that a People is never led to give it except with limited powers 

and for limited times: but when either from having been deceived or for some 

other reason it happens that they are induced to give it imprudently and in 

the way in which the Roman people gave it to the Ten, it will always happen 

as it did to them (Romans). This is easily proven, considering the reasons 

that kept the Dictators good and that made the Ten bad: and considering also 

how those Republics which have been kept well ordered have done in giving 

authority for a long (period of) time, as the Spartans gave to their King, 

and how the Venetians give to their Doges; for it will be seen in both these 

methods, guardians were appointed who watched that the Kings (and the Doges) 

could not ill use that authority. Nor is it of any benefit in this case that 

the people are not corrupted, for an absolute authority in a very brief time 

corrupts the people, and makes friends and partisans for itself. Nor is it 

harmful either to be poor or not to have relatives, for riches and every 

other favor quickly will run after power, as we will discuss in detail in 

the creation of the said Ten. 



                  CHAPTER XXXVI



CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE HIGHER HONORS OUGHT NOT TO DISDAIN THE 

LESSER



The Romans had made Marcus Fabius and C. Manlius Consuls, and had won a 

glorious engagement against the Veienti and the Etruscans, in which, 

however, Quintus Fabius brother of the Consul, who the previous year had 

himself been Consul, was killed. Here, then, ought to be considered how much 

the institutions of that City were adept at making her great, and how much 

the other Republics deceived themselves in deviating (themselves) from her 

methods. For although the Romans were great lovers of glory, none the less 

they did not esteem it a dishonorable thing to obey presently those whom at 

another time they had commanded, and to serve in that army of which they had 

been Princes. Which custom is contrary to the opinion, orders, and practices 

of the Citizen of our times: and in Venice this error still holds that a 

Citizen having had a high rank would be ashamed to accept a lesser, and the 

City consents to them what she cannot change. Which thing, however honorable 

it should be for a private (citizen) is entirely useless for the public. For 

a Republic ought to have more hope, and more confidence in a Citizen who 

descends from a high rank to govern a lesser, than in one who rises from a 

lower rank to govern a higher one. For the latter cannot reasonably be 

relied upon unless he is surrounded by men, who are of such respectability 

or of such virtu, that his inexperience can be moderated by their counsel 

and authority. And if in Rome there had been the same customs as are in 

Venice, and other modern Republics and Kingdoms, where he who had at one 

time been Consul should never want to enter the army except as Consul, there 

would have arisen infinite things prejudicial to a free society, both 

because of the errors that new men would make, and because of their ambition 

which they could have indulged in more freely, not having men around them in 

whose presence they should be afraid to err, and thus they would have come 

to be more unrestrained, which would have resulted entirely to the detriment 

of the public.



                 CHAPTER XXXVII



WHAT TROUBLES THE AGRARIAN LAW BROUGHT FORTH IN ROME; AND HOW TROUBLESOME IT 

IS TO MAKE A LAW IN A REPUBLIC WHICH GREATLY REGARDS THE PAST BUT CONTRARY TO 

THE ANCIENT CUSTOMS OF THE CITY



It was the verdict of ancient writers that men afflict themselves in evil 

and weary themselves in the good, and that the same effects result from both 

of these passions. For whenever men are not obliged to fight from necessity, 

they fight from ambition; which is so powerful in human breasts, that it 

never leaves them no matter to what rank they rise. The reason is that 

nature has so created men that they are able to desire everything but are 

not able to attain everything: so that the desire being always greater than 

the acquisition, there results discontent with the possession and little 

satisfaction to themselves from it. From this arises the changes in their 

fortunes; for as men desire, some to have more, some in fear of losing their 

acquisition, there ensues enmity and war, from which results the ruin of 

that province and the elevation of another. I have made this discussion 

because it was not enough for the Roman Plebs to secure themselves from the 

Nobles through the creation of the Tribunes, to which (desire) they were 

constrained by necessity, that they soon ((having obtained that)) begun to 

fight from ambition and to want to divide with the Nobles their honors and 

possessions, as things more esteemed by men. From this there arose the 

plague that brought forth the contentions about the Agrarian law, and in the 

end was the cause of the destruction of the Roman Republic. And because 

well-ordered Republics have to keep the public (State) rich and its Citizens 

poor, it was apparent that there was some defect in that law in the City of 

Rome, which either was now drawn in the beginning in such a way that it 

required to be redrawn every day, or that it was so long deferred in the 

making that it became troublesome in regard to the past, or if it had been 

well ordered in the beginning, it had become corrupted in its application. 

So that whatever way it may have been, this law could never be spoken of in 

Rome without that City going upside down (from turmoil). This law had two 

principal articles. Through the first it provided that each Citizen could 

not possess more than so many jugeri of land, through the other that the 

fields which were taken from the enemy should be divided among the Roman 

people. This, therefore, came to make two strong offenses against the 

Nobles, for those who possessed more land than the law permitted ((of whom 

the Nobles were the greater part)) had to be deprived of it, and by dividing 

the possessions of the enemy among the Plebs, it deprived them (Nobles) that 

means of enriching themselves. Since this offense came to be against the 

powerful men, and who thought that by going against it they were defending 

the public, whenever ((as I have said)) this was brought up, that City would 

go upside-down, and the Nobles with patience and industry temporized, either 

by calling out the army, or by having that Tribune who proposed it opposed 

by another Tribune, or sometimes by yielding in part, or even by sending a 

Colony to that place that was to be distributed, as happened in the 

countryside of Antium, about which a dispute spring up from this law; a 

Colony drawn from Rome was sent to that place, to whom the said countryside 

was assigned. Concerning which Titus Livius used a notable remark, saying 

that it was difficult to find in Rome one who would give his name to go to 

the said Colony; so much more ready were the Plebs to defend the things in 

Rome than to possess them in Antium.



This mood concerning this law thus troubled them for a time, so that the 

Romans begun to conduct their armies to the extreme parts of Italy, or 

outside of Italy, after which time it appeared that things settled down. 

This resulted because the fields that the enemies of Rome possessed being 

far removed from the eyes of the Plebs, and in a place where it was not easy 

to cultivate them, became less desirable; and also the Romans were less 

disposed to punish their enemies in such a way, and even when they deprived 

them of some land from their countryside, they distributed Colonies there. 

So that for these reasons this law remained, as it were, dormant up to the 

time of the Gracchi, by whom it being revived, wholly ruined the liberty of 

Rome; for it found the power of its adversaries redoubled, and because of 

this (revival) so much hate developed between the Plebs and the Senate, that 

it came to arms and bloodshed beyond every civil limit and custom. So that 

the public Magistrates not being able to remedy them, nor either faction 

having further confidence in them, recourse was had to private remedies, and 

each of thy factions decided to appoint a chief (for themselves) who would 

defend them. In these troubles and disorders the Plebs came and turned to 

Marius with his reputations, so that they made him Consul four times; and 

with few intervening intervals that his Consulship continued so that he was 

able by himself to make himself Consul another three times. Against which 

plague thy Nobility, not having any remedy, turned their favor to Sulla, and 

having made him Head of their party, arrived at civil war, and after much 

bloodshed and changes of fortune, the Nobility remained superior. Later, in 

the time of Caesar and Pompey, these moods were revived, for Caesar making 

himself Head of the party of Marius, and Pompey of that of Sulla; (and) 

coming to arms Caesar remained superior, who became the first Tyrant in 

Rome, so that City was never again free.



Such, therefore, was the beginning and the end of the Agrarian law. And 

although elsewhere we showed that the enmity in Rome between the Senate and 

the Plebs should maintain Rome free, because it gave rise to those laws 

which favored liberty, and therefore the result of this Agrarian law may 

seem different from such a conclusion, I say that I do not on that account 

change my opinion, for so great is the ambition of the Nobles, that if it is 

not beaten down in various ways and means in a City, it will soon bring that 

City to ruin. So that if the contentions about the Agrarian law took three 

hundred years in bringing Rome to servitude, she would perhaps have been 

brought to servitude much sooner if the Plebs with this law and their other 

desires had not always restrained the ambitions of the Nobles. It is also to 

be seen from this how much more men esteem property than honors, for the 

Roman Nobility, always yielded without extraordinary trouble to the Plebs in 

the matter of honors, but when it came to property, so great was its 

obstinacy in defending it, that the Plebs in order to give vent to their 

appetites had recourse to those extraordinary proceedings which were 

discussed above. The movers of these disorders were the Gracchi, whose 

intentions should be praised more than their prudence. For to want to remove 

an abuse that has grown up in a Republic, and enact a retrospective law for 

this, is a badly considered proceeding, and ((as was discussed above at 

length)) does nothing else than to accelerate that evil which leads to that 

abuse; but by temporizing with it, either the evil comes much later, or by 

itself in time ((before its end comes)) it will extinguish itself.



                 CHAPTER XXXVIII



WEAK REPUBLICS ARE IRRESOLUTE AND DO NOT KNOW HOW TO DECIDE; AND IF THEY 

TAKE UP ANY PROCEEDING, IT RESULTS MORE FROM NECESSITY THAN FROM ELECTION



Because of a very great pestilence occurring in Rome, it appeared to the 

Volscians and the Equeans that the time had come for them to be able to 

attack Rome, these two people raised a large army and assaulted the Latins 

and the Ernicians, and their country being laid waste, the Latins and 

Ernicians were constrained to make it (to be) known to Rome, and pray that 

they might be defended by the Romans, but the Romans being afflicted by the 

pestilence, answered them that they should take up the proceeding of 

defending themselves with arms, for they were not able to defend them. In 

which is recognized the generosity and prudence of that Senate, that in 

every circumstance they always wanted to be the one that should be Prince of 

(make) the decisions which her subjects had to take; nor were they ever 

ashamed to decide something contrary to their mode of living or to other 

decisions previously made by them, whenever necessity should compel them. I 

say this, because at other times the same them, whenever necessity should 

compel them. I say this, because at other times the same Senate had 

forbidden the said people to arm and defend themselves, so that to a less 

prudent Senate it would then have seemed to them a falling from their 

dignity to concede to them this defense. But that (Senate) always judged 

things as they ought to be judged, and always took the less objectionable 

proceeding as the better; for they knew the evil of not being able to defend 

their subjects, and they knew also the evil of letting them arm themselves 

without them (the Romans), for the reasons given and many others that are 

understood: none the less knowing that they (thy Latins and Ernicians) had 

in any case armed themselves from necessity, having the enemy upon them, 

they took the honorable course and decided to let them do what had to be 

done with their permission, so that having once disobeyed from necessity, 

they might not accustom themselves to disobeying from choice.



And although this would appear to be a proceeding that every Republic ought 

to have taken, none the less weak and ill-advised Republics do not know how 

to assume it, nor how to gain honor in a similar necessity. The Duke of 

Valentino had taken Faenza and made Bologna submit to his terms. Afterwards 

wanting to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, he sent one of his men to 

Florence to ask passage for himself and his army. In Florence they consulted 

how this thing should be managed, but everyone counselled that it not be 

conceded to them. The Roman way was not followed in this, for the Duke being 

very well armed, and the Florentines disarmed so that they could not 

prohibit the passage, it was much more to their honor that it should appear 

that he (the Duke) passed with their permission than by force; for as it was 

they had nothing but shame, which would have in part been less if they had 

managed otherwise. But the worst part that weak Republics have, is to be 

irresolute; so that all the proceedings they take are taken by force, and if 

anything good should be done by them, they do it by force and not by their 

prudence. I want to give two other examples of this which occurred in our 

times in the State (Government) of our City in the year one thousand five 

hundred (1500).



King Louis XII of France having retaken Milan, wanting to restore Pisa in 

order to obtain the fifty thousand ducats that had been promised him by the 

Florentines after such restitution, he sent his armies toward Pisa captained 

by Monsignor De Beaumont, who, although French, was none the less a man in 

whom the Florentines had great confidence. This Captain placed himself and 

his army between Cascina and Pisa in order (to go) to assail the walls, 

where delaying several days to organize themselves for the capture, Pisan 

Orators (Ambassadors) came to Beaumont and offered to give up the City to 

the French army, with terms that under the pledge of the King he promise not 

to put them into the hands of the Florentines until four months after (the 

surrender). This proceeding was completely refused by the Florentines, so 

that after beginning the siege, it followed that (he had to raise it and) he 

had to retire in shame. Nor was the proceeding refused for any other reason 

than the mistrust of the faith of the King, into whose hands they had been 

forced to place themselves because of their weak counsel; and on the other 

hand, while they did not trust him, neither were they able to see that it 

would have been easier for the King to restore Pisa to them after he had gone 

inside the City, and if he did not restore it to expose his mind (perfidy); 

but not having (the City) he could promise it to them and they would be 

forced to buy that promise: So that it would have been much more useful to 

them to have consented that Beaumont should have taken it (Pisa) under any 

promise, as was seen in the subsequent experience in the year MDII (1502) 

when Arezzo having rebelled, Monsignor Imbault was sent by the King of 

France to the succor of the Florentines with French forces, who, arriving 

near Arezzo, soon began to negotiate an accord with the Arentines who were 

(willing) to give up the town under certain pledges similar to those (asked) 

by the Pisans. This proposal was rejected in Florence: when Monsignor Imbault 

learned of this, and it appeared to him that the Florentines little 

understood him, he began to hold negotiations for the treaty (of surrender) 

on his own without the participation of the Commissioners so that he could 

conclude it in his own way; and under it, he entered with his forces into 

Arezzo, making the Florentines understand that they were fools and did not 

understand the things of the world: that if they wanted Arezzo, they should 

let the King know, who was much better able to give it to them with his 

forces inside that City rather than (with them) outside. In Florence they 

did not cease abusing and censuring the said Imbault, nor did they stop 

until they realized that if Beaumont had been like Imbault, they would have 

had Pisa as (they had) Arezzo.



And so to return to the subject, irresolute Republics never take up good 

proceedings except by force; for their weakness never allows them to decide 

where there is any doubt, and if that doubt is not dispelled by some 

violence which pushes the, they always remain in suspense.



                  CHAPTER XXXIX



THE SAME INCIDENTS OFTEN HAPPEN TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE



And it is easily recognized by those who consider present and ancient 

affairs that the same desires and passions exist in all Cities and people, 

and that they always existed. So that to whoever with diligence examines 

past events, it is an easy thing to foresee the future in any Republic, and 

to apply those remedies which had been used by the ancients, or, not finding 

any of those used, to think of new ones from the similarity of events. But 

as these considerations are neglected or not understood by those who govern, 

it follows that the same troubles will exist in every time.



The City of Florence, having after the year XCIV (1494) lost part of her 

Empire, such as Pisa and other lands, was obliged to make war against those 

who occupied them: and because he who occupied them was powerful, there 

followed that they spent much in the war without any fruit: from the great 

spending there resulted great taxes, from the taxes infinite complaints from 

the people: and as this war was managed by a Magistracy of Ten Citizens who 

were called the "Ten of the War", the general public begun to hold them in 

aversion as those who were the cause of the war, and its expenses, and began 

to persuade themselves that if the said Magistracy were remoted, the path 

for war would be removed: so that if they had to do it (reappoint the Ten) 

again, they would allow their (terms) to expire without making changes and 

commit their functions to the Signoria. Which decision was so pernicious 

that it not only did not end the war as the general public had persuaded 

itself it would, but removed those who were managing it with prudence, and 

there followed so great disorders that in addition to Pisa, Arezzo, and many 

other places were lost: so that the people perceiving their error, (and) 

that the cause of the malady was the fever and not the doctor, 

re-established the Magistracy of the Ten.



This same mood had arisen in Rome against the (name of the) Consuls; for 

that people, seeing one war arise from another, and not ever being able to 

have any repose, where they should have believed it had arisen from the 

ambition of neighbors who wanted to oppress them, they thought it had arisen 

form the ambition of the Nobles, who, being unable to castigate the Plebs 

within Rome where they were defended by the power of Tribunate, wanted to 

lead them outside Rome (where they were) under the Consuls in order to 

oppress them, (and) where they would not have any aid: And because of this, 

they thought that it was necessary either to remove the Consuls or somehow to 

regulate their power, so that they should not have authority over the People 

either at home or abroad. The first who tried (to introduce) this law was 

one Terentillus, a Tribune, who proposed that there ought to be created (a 

Council of) five men who should examine the power of the Consuls and to 

limit it. This greatly excited the Nobility, as it appeared to them the 

majesty of the Empire would decline completely, so that no rank in that 

Republic would remain to the Nobility. None the less, so great was the 

obstinacy of the Tribunes that the dignity of the Consuls was extinguished: 

and after some other regulations they were finally content rather to create 

Tribunes with Consular power than to continue the Consuls, holding so much 

more in hatred their dignity than their authority. And thus they continued 

for a long time, until they recognized their error and returned to the Ten 

as the Florentines (did), (and) also re-established the Consuls.



                    CHAPTER XL



THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRATE IN ROME, AND WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN IT; AND 

WHERE IT WILL BE CONSIDERED AMONG MANY OTHER THINGS HOW A REPUBLIC CAN BE 

SAVED OR RUINED BECAUSE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS



As I want to discuss in detail the incidents that arose in Rome because of 

the creation of the Decemvirate, it does not appear to me superfluous to 

narrate first all that ensued because of such creations, and then to discuss 

those parts which are notable (actions) in it, which are many and (worthy) 

of much consideration, both by those who want to maintain a Republic free as 

well as by those who should plan to subjugate her. For in such a discussion 

will be seen the many errors made by the Senate and the Plebs prejudicial to 

liberty, and the many errors made by Appius, Chief of the Decemvirate, 

prejudicial to that Tyranny which he had intended to have established in 

Rome. After much discussion between the People and the Nobility concerning 

the adoption of new laws in Rome through which the liberty of that State 

should be firmly established, by agreement they sent Spurius Posthumus with 

two other Citizens to Athens for copies of those laws that Solon gave to 

that City, so as to be able to base the (new) Roman laws upon them. These 

men having gone and returned, they arrived at the appointing of the men who 

should examine and establish the said laws, and they created the Decemvir 

(Ten Citizens) for a year, among whom Appius Claudius, a sagacious but 

turbulent man, was appointed. And in order that they might create such laws 

without any regard (to authority), they removed all the other Magistracies 

from Rome, and particularly the Tribunes and the Consuls, and also took away 

the appeal to the people: so that this new Magistracy (of the Ten) became 

absolute Princes (Masters) of Rome. Next Appius took over to himself all the 

authority of his other colleagues because of the favor he exercised toward 

the Plebs; for he had made himself so popular with his demonstrations, that 

it seemed a wonder that he should have so readily taken on a new nature and 

new genius, having before that time been held to be a cruel persecutor of 

the Plebs. These Ten conducted themselves civilly, not having more than ten 

Lictors who walked before the one who had been placed in charge over them. 

And although they had absolute authority, none the less, having to punish a 

Roman Citizen for homicide, they cited him before (the sight of) the People 

and made them judge him.



They (The Ten) wrote the laws on ten tablet, and before confirming them 

exposed them to the public, so that all could read and discuss them, and so 

that they might know if there was any defect in order to be able to amend 

them before confirming them. Upon this Appius caused a rumor (to be spread) 

throughout Rome, that, if to these ten tablets there were to be added two 

others, perfection would be given to them, so that this opinion gave the 

People the opportunity to reappoint the Ten for another year: to which the 

People willingly agreed, as much so as not to reappoint the Consuls, as also 

because they hoped to remain without Tribunes, who were the judges of their 

causes, as was said above. Proceedings being taken, therefore, to 

re-establish it (The Ten), all the Nobility moved to seek these honors, and 

among the first was Appius: and he showed so much humanity toward the Plebs 

in asking for it, that he begun to be suspected by his companions: For they 

could not believe so much graciousness could exist with so much haughtiness. 

And being apprehensive of opposing him openly, they decided to do it by 

artifice: and although he was the youngest of them all, they gave him the 

authority to propose the future Ten to the People, believing that he would 

observe the limitations of the others of not proposing himself, it being an 

unaccustomed and ignominious thing in Rome. He in truth changed the 

impediment into an opportunity, and nominated himself among the first, to 

the astonishment and displeasure of all the Nobles. He then nominated nine 

others to his liking. Which new appointments made for another year, begun to 

show their error to the People and to the Nobility. For Appius quickly put 

an end to his alien character, and begun to show his innate haughtiness, and 

in a few days he filled his colleagues with his own spirits. And in order to 

frighten the people and the Senate, in place of the twelve Lictors, they 

created one hundred and twenty. For some days the fear was equal (on both 

sides), but then they begun to disregard the Senate and beat the Plebs, and 

if any beaten by one (Decemvir) appealed to another, he was treated worse in 

the appeal than he had in the first instance. So that the Plebs recognizing 

their error began, full of affliction, to look to the Nobles, And to capture 

the aura of liberty, where they had feared servitude, to which condition 

they had brought the Republic. And this affliction was welcome to the 

Nobility, That likewise weary of the present, they desired the Consuls. The 

days that ended the year had come: the two tables of the laws were made, but 

not published. From this, the Ten took the opportunity to continue their 

Magistracy, and begun to retain the State through violence and make 

satellites of the Noble youth, to whom they gave the possessions of those 

they had condemned: By which gifts these youths were corrupted, and 

preferred their license to their complete liberty.



It happened at this time that the Sabines and Volscians moved war against 

the Romans, from the fear of which the Ten Began to discuss the weakness of 

their State, for without the Senate they could not wage war, and to assemble 

the Senate seemed to them they would lose their State. But being compelled 

to they took up this last proceeding, and assembling the Senate, many of the 

Senators spoke against the haughtiness of the Ten, and in particular 

Valerius and Horatius: and their authority would have been entirely 

extinguished except that the Senate, because of envy of the Plebs, was 

unwilling to show its authority, thinking that if the Ten resigned the 

magistracy voluntarily, it would be possible that the Tribune of the Plebs 

might be re-established. Deciding on war, therefore, they sent out two 

armies, led in part by the said Ten. Appius remained to govern the City: 

whereupon it happened that he became enamorated of Virginia, and wanting to 

take her off by force, her father Virginius killed her in order to save her 

from him: whence tumults ensued in Rome and in the armies, which, having 

come together with the remnants of the Roman Plebs, went to Mount Sacer, 

where they stayed until the Ten resigned the Magistracy and the Tribunes and 

Consuls were re-established, and Rome restored to the form of its ancient 

liberty.



It is to be noted from this text, therefore, that the evil of creating this 

Tyranny first arose in Rome for the same reasons that give rise to the 

greater part of Tyrannies in Cities: and this (results) from the too great 

desire of the people to be free, and from the too great desire of the Nobles 

to dominate. And if they do not agree to make a law in favor of liberty, but 

one of the parties throws its (influence) in favor of one man, then a 

Tyranny quickly springs up. The People and the Nobles of Rome agreed to 

create the Ten, and create them with such authority, from the desire which 

each of the parties had, one to extinguish to Consular office, the other (to 

extinguish that of) the Tribunate. The Ten having been created, it seemed to 

the Plebs that Appius had come to (the side of) the People and should beat 

down the Nobles, (and) the People turned to favor him. And when a People is 

led to commit this error of giving reputation to one man because he beats 

down those whom he hates, and if this man is wise, it will always happen 

that he will become Tyrant of that City. For (together) with the favor of 

the People he will attend to extinguishing the Nobility, and after they are 

extinguished he will turn to the oppression of the People until they are 

also extinguished; and by the time the People recognize they have become 

enslaved, they will not have any place to seek refuge. This is the path all 

those have taken who established Tyrannies in Republics: and if Appius had 

taken this path, his tyranny would have taken on more vitality and would not 

have been overthrown so readily. But he did everything to the contrary, nor 

could he have governed more imprudently, that in order to hold the tyranny 

he made enemies of those who had given it to him and who could maintain it 

for him, and made friends of those who were not in accord to give it to him 

and could not maintain it for him; and he lost those who were his friends, 

and sought to have as friends those who could not be his friends; for 

although the Nobles desired to tyrannize, yet that part of the Nobility 

which finds itself outside of the Tyrancy is always hostile to the Tyrant; 

nor can he ever win them all over to him because of the great ambition and 

avarice that exists in them, the Tyrant not having riches and honors enough 

to be able to satisfy them all. And thus Appius in leaving the People and 

attaching himself to the Nobles, made a most obvious error, both for the 

reasons mentioned above, and because, in wanting to hold a thing 

(government) by force, the one who does the forcing needs to be more 

powerful than he who is forced. Whence it arises that those Tyrants who have 

the general public as friends and the Nobles as enemies, are more secure, 

because their violence is sustained by a greater force than that of those 

men who have the People as an enemy and the Nobility as a friend. For with 

that favor (of the people) the internal forces are enough to sustain him, as 

they were enough for Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta, when Greece and the Roman 

People assaulted him; who, making sure of a few Nobles, and having the 

People as a friend, he defended himself with them; which he could not do if 

he had them as an enemy. But the internal forces of the other rank not being 

enough because there are few friends within it, he must seek (aid) outside. 

And this may be of three kinds; the one, foreigners as satellites who would 

guard your person; another, to arm the countryside (and) have them perform 

the duty that the Plebs should do; the third, to ally oneself with powerful 

neighbors who would defend you. Whoever has these means and observes them 

well, although he has the People as his enemy, is able in some way to save 

himself. But Appius could not accomplish this winning of the countryside 

over to himself, the countryside and Rome being one and the same thing, and 

he did not know how to do what he might have done; so that he was ruined at 

the outset. The Senate and the People made very great errors in this 

creation of the Decemvirs; for although in that discussion made above of the 

Dictator, that those Magistrates that are self-constituted, not those whom 

the People create, are harmful to liberty; none the less the People ought, 

when they create the Magistrates, do it in such a way that they should have 

some regard to becoming bad (abusing their power). But where they should 

have proposed safeguards for maintaining them good, the Romans removed them, 

(and) only created the Magistracy (of Ten) in Rome and annulled all the 

others because of the excessive desire ((as we said above)) that the Senate 

had to extinguish the Tribunes, and the Plebs to extinguish the Consuls; 

this blinded them so that they both contributed to such disorders. For men, 

as King Ferrando said, often act like certain smaller birds of prey, in whom 

there is so much desire to pursue their prey to which nature incites them, 

that they do not observe another larger bird which is above them about to 

kill them.



It is to be recognized through this discussion, therefore, as we proposed in 

the beginning, the error which the Roman people made in wanting to save 

their liberty, and the errors of Appius in wanting to seize the Tyrancy.



                   CHAPTER XLI



TO JUMP FROM HUMILITY TO PRIDE AND FROM MERCY TO CRUELTY WITHOUT PROFITABLE 

MEANS, IS AN IMPRUDENT AND USELESS THING



In addition to other means ill-used by Appius in order to maintain his 

tyranny, that of jumping from one quality to another was of no little 

moment. For his astuteness in deceiving the Plebs by simulating to be a man 

of the People was well used: those means were also well used in which he 

caused the Ten to be reappointed: that audacity in nominating himself 

against the expectation of the Nobility was also well used: the naming of 

colleagues suitable to him was also well used: but in doing this ((according 

as was said above)) what he did was not well used in changing his nature so 

quickly, and from being a friend showing himself to be the enemy of the 

Plebs, from being humane to being haughty, from easy (of access) to 

difficult; and to do this so very readily, that without any excuse everyone 

should know the falseness of his spirit. For whoever at one time has 

appeared to be good and wants for purposes of his own to become bad, ought 

to do it by proper means (gradually), and in a way that they should be 

conducive to the opportunities, so that before his changed nature takes away 

old favors from him, it may give him some new ones that his authority may not 

be diminished; otherwise, finding himself discovered and without friends, he 

will be ruined.



                   CHAPTER XLII



HOW EASILY MAN MAY BE CORRUPTED



It should be noted also in the matter of the Decemvirate how easily men are 

corrupted and make themselves become of a contrary nature, even though (they 

are) good and well educated; (and), considering how those youths whom Appius 

had chosen to surround him begun, for the little advantages that followed 

from it, to be friendly to that tyranny, and that Quintus Fabius, one of the 

number of the second Ten, being a very good man, (but) blinded by a little 

ambition and persuaded by the malignity of Appius, changed his good habits 

into the worst, and became like, him. Which, if well examined, the 

Legislators of Republics or Kingdoms will more promptly restrain human 

appetites and take away from them the hope of being able to err with 

impunity.



                  CHAPTER XLIII



THOSE WHO COMBAT FOR THEIR OWN GLORY ARE GOOD AND FAITHFUL SOLDIERS



From the above written treatise it also is to be considered what a 

difference there is between a contented army which combats for its own 

glory, and that which is ill disposed and which combats for the ambitions of 

others. For where the Roman armies were usually victorious under the 

Consuls, they always lost under the Decemvirs. From this example there can 

be recognized part of the reasons of the uselessness of mercenary soldiers, 

who have no other reason which keeps them firm but a small stipend which you 

give to them. Which reason is not, and can never be, enough to make them 

faithful, nor so much your friends that they be willing to die for you. For 

in those armies where there is not that affection toward the man for whom 

they combat which makes them become his partisans, there can never be so much 

virtu which would be enough to resist even an enemy of little virtu. And 

because this love cannot arise in any contest except from his own subjects, 

it is necessary in wanting to keep a State, or to want to maintain a 

Republic or a Kingdom, that he arm himself with his own subjects, as is seen 

to have been done by all those others who, with their armies, have made 

great advances. The Roman armies under the Ten had the same virtu as before: 

but because there was not in them the same disposition, they did not achieve 

their usual results. But as soon as the Magistracy of the Ten was 

extinguished and they begun to fight as free men, that same spirit returned 

in them, and consequently their enterprises had their happy endings 

according to their ancient custom.



                  CHAPTER XLIV



A MULTITUDE WITHOUT A HEAD IS USELESS, AND ONE OUGHT NOT TO THREATEN FIRST, 

AND THEN SEEK AUTHORITY



Because of the incident of Virginia the Roman Pleb was led armed to the 

sacred mountain (Mons Sacer). The Senate sent its Ambassadors to ask by what 

authority they had abandoned their Captains and retired to the Mountains. 

And so much was the authority of the Senate esteemed that, the Plebs not 

having their chiefs among them, no one dared to reply. And T. Livius says 

that they did not lack material to reply, but they did lack someone who 

should make the reply. Which thing demonstrates in point the uselessness of 

a multitude without a head. This disorder was recognized by Virginius, and 

by his order twenty military Tribunes were created who would be their chiefs 

to reply to and convene with the Senate. And having requested that (the 

Senators) Valerius and Horatius should be sent to them, to whom they would 

tell their wants, they (the Senators) would not turn to go unless the Ten 

first had resigned their Magistracy: and having arrived on the mountain 

where the Pleb was, these things were demanded of them, that they wanted the 

re-establishment of the Tribunes of the Plebs, (and) that an appeal to the 

people from every Magistracy should be allowed, and that all of the Ten 

should be given up to them as they wanted to burn them alive. Valerius and 

Horatius lauded the first of their demands: they censured the last as 

impious, saying; You condone cruelty, yet fall yourselves into cruelty, and 

counselled them to leave off making mention of the Ten, and to attend to 

taking from them their authority and power, and that afterwards there would 

not be lacking the means of satisfying them (their vengeance). From which it 

is recognized openly how foolish and little prudent it is to ask for a 

thing, and to say at first, I want to do evil with it: for one ought not to 

show his mind, but to want in every way to seek to obtain that which he 

desires. For it is enough to ask from one his arms, without saying I want to 

kill you with them; for when you have the arms in your hands then you will 

be able to satisfy your appetite.



                   CHAPTER XLV



IT IS A BAD EXAMPLE NOT TO OBSERVE A LAW THAT HAS BEEN MADE, AND ESPECIALLY 

BY THE AUTHOR OF IT; AND IT IS MOST HARMFUL TO RENEW EVERY DAY NEW INJURIES 

IN A CITY AND TO THE ONE WHO GOVERNS IT



The accord having taken place and Rome restored to its ancient form, 

Virginius cited Appius before the People to defend his cause. He complied 

accompanied by many Nobles. Virginius commanded that he be put in prison. 

Appius begun to shout and appeal to the People. Virginius said that he was 

not worthy of having that (right of) appeal which he had destroyed, nor to 

have as defender that People whom he had offended. Appius replied that they 

(the People) had no (right) to violate that appeal which they had 

established with so much desire. He was incarcerated, however, and before 

the day of judgment (came) he killed himself. And although the wicked life 

of Appius should merit every punishment, none the less it was little 

consistent to violate the laws, and more so one recently made. For I do not 

believe there is a worse example in a Republic than to make a law and not to 

observe it, and much more when it is not observed by those who made it.



Florence, after ninety four (1494), having had its State (Government) 

reorganized with the aid of Brother Girolamo Savonarola ((whose writings 

show the doctrine, prudence, and the virtu of his spirit)) and among other 

provisions for the security of the Citizens having had a law enacted which 

enabled an appeal to the People from the verdicts which the (Council of) 

Eight and the Signoria should give in cases affecting the State ((which 

passage took more time and was attained with the greatest difficulty)); it 

happened that a little after the confirmation of this (law), five Citizens 

were condemned to death by the Signoria on account of (acts against) the 

State, and when they wanted to appeal, they were not permitted to do so and 

the law was not observed. Which took away from the Brother more reputation 

than any other incident; for if that (right of) appeal was useful, he should 

have had it observed: if it was not useful, he ought not to have had it 

passed. And so much more was this incident noted, inasmuch as the Brother, 

in so many preachings that he made after that law was broken, never 

condemned those who broke it, or excused them, as one who did not want to 

condemn a thing that suited his purpose, yet was not able to excuse it. 

This, having uncovered his ambitions and partisan spirit, took away his 

reputation and caused him many troubles.



A State also offends greatly when every day it renews in the minds of its 

Citizens new moods because of new injuries which it inflicts on this one and 

that one, as happened in Rome after the Decemvirate. For all of the Ten and 

other Citizens were accused and condemned at different times, so that a 

great fright existed in the Nobility, judging that there would never be an 

end to such condemnations until all the Nobility was destroyed. And great 

evils would have been generated in that City, if it had not been foreseen by 

the Tribune Marcus Duellius, who issued an edict that for one year it would 

not be licit to cite anyone or to accuse any Roman Citizen; this reassured 

all the Nobility. Here it is seen how harmful it is to a Republic or to a 

Prince to keep the minds of their subjects in a state of fear by continuing 

penalties and suspended offenses. And without doubt no more pernicious order 

can be held; for men who begin to be apprehensive of having done a capital 

evil, will secure themselves from perils in every way, and become more 

audacious and have less regard in attempting new things. It is necessary, 

therefore, either never to offend any one or to make the offense at a 

stroke, and afterwards to reassure men and give them cause to quiet and firm 

the spirit.



                  CHAPTER XLVI



MEN JUMP FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND FIRST THEY SEEK NOT TO BE 

OFFENDED, THEN TO OFFEND OTHERS



The Roman People having recovered their liberty, (and) having returned to 

their original rank, and having obtained even greater reputation from the 

many new laws made in corroboration of their power, it appeared reasonable 

that Rome would for some time become quiet. None the less from experience 

the contrary was seen, for every day new tumults and new disorders sprung 

up. And as Titus Livius most prudently renders the cause whence this arose, 

it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer in point to his words, 

where he says that the People or the Nobility always increased their 

haughtiness when the other was humiliated; and the Plebs remaining quiet 

within bounds, the young Nobles began to offend them; and the Tribunes were 

able to make few remedies, because they too were violated. The Nobility, on 

the other hand, although it seemed to them that their young men were too 

ferocious, none the less took care to see that if (the law) should be 

transgressed, it should be transgressed by their own and not by the Plebs. 

And thus the desire of defending liberty caused each to prevail (raise 

itself) in proportion as they oppressed the other. And the course of such 

incidents is, that while men sought not to fear, they begun to make others 

fear, and that injury which they ward off from themselves, they inflict on 

another, as if it should be necessary either to offend or to be offended. 

From this may be seen one way among others in which Republics ruin 

themselves, and in what way men jump from one ambition to another, and how 

very true is that sentence which Sallust placed in the mouth of Caesar, That 

all evil examples have their origin in good beginnings. Those ambitious 

Citizens ((as was said before)) who live in a Republic seek in the first 

instance not to be able to be harmed, not only by private (citizens), but 

even by the Magistrates: in order to do this, they seek friendships, and to 

acquire them either by apparently honest means, or by supplying them money 

or defending them from the powerful: and as this seems virtuous, everyone is 

easily deceived and no one takes any remedy against this, until he, 

persevering without hindrance, becomes of a kind whom the Citizen fear, and 

the Magistrates treat with consideration. And when he has risen to that rank, 

and his greatness not having been obviated at the beginning, it finally 

comes to be most dangerous in attempting to pit oneself against him, for the 

reasons which I mentioned above concerning the dangers involved in abating 

an evil which has already grown much in a City; so that the matter in the 

end is reduced to this, that you need either to seek to extinguish it with 

the hazard of sudden ruin, or by allowing it to go on, enter into manifest 

servitude, unless death or some accident frees you from him. For when the 

Citizens and the Magistrates come to the above mentioned limits and become 

afraid to offend him and his friends, it will not take much effort 

afterwards to make them judge and offend according to his will. Whence a 

Republic, among its institutions, ought to have these, to see that its 

Citizens under an aura of good are not able to do evil, and that they should 

acquire that reputation which does good and not harm to liberty, as will be 

discussed by us in its proper place.



                  CHAPTER XLVII



MEN, ALTHOUGH THEY DECEIVE THEMSELVES IN GENERAL MATTERS DO NOT DECEIVE 

THEMSELVES IN THE PARTICULARS



The Roman People ((as was said above)) having become annoyed with the 

Consular name, and wanting to be able either to choose as Consuls men of the 

Plebs, or to limit their authority, the Nobility in order not to discredit 

the Consular authority by either change, took the middle course, and were 

content that four Tribunes with Consular power be created, who could come 

from the Plebs as well as from the Nobles. The Plebs were content with this, 

as it seemed to them to destroy the Consulship and give them a part in the 

highest ranks. From this a notable case arose, that when it came to the 

creation of these Tribunes, and they could have selected all Plebs, the 

Roman people chose all Nobles. Whence Titus Livius says these words: The 

results of this election show how different minds are when in contention for 

liberty and for honors, differing according to certain standards when they 

(have to) make impartial judgments. And in examining whence this can happen, 

I believe it proceeds from men deceiving themselves in general matters, 

(and) not so much in particular matters. As a general thing, it appeared to 

the Roman Pleb that it merited the Consulship because they were the majority 

in the City, because they bore more of the danger in war, (and) because they 

were the ones who with their arms maintained Rome free and made it powerful: 

and this desire seeming to them to be reasonable ((as has been said)), they 

turned to obtain this authority by whatever means. But when they had to make 

a judgment of their particular men, recognized their weaknesses, and judged 

that none of them should merit that which all together it seemed to them 

they merited. So that ashamed of them (their own), they had recourse to 

those who merited it. Of which decision Titus Livius, deservingly admiring 

it, said these words: Where is there now this modesty and equity, and this 

loftiness of spirit, which once pervaded all the people?



In corroboration of this there can be cited another notable example which 

ensued in Capua after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at Cannae: while all 

Italy was aroused by this defeat, Capua was still in a state of tumult 

because of the hatred that existed between the People and the Senate: and 

Pacovius Calanus finding himself at that time in the supreme Magistracy, and 

recognizing the peril to which that City was exposed because of the tumults, 

endeavored through his rank to reconcile the Plebs with the Nobility: and 

having come to this decision, he had the Senate assemble, and narrated to 

them the hatred which the People had against them, and the dangers to which 

they were exposed of being killed by them, if the City was given up to 

Hannibal, as the power of the Romans was afflicted: afterwards he added that 

if they wanted to leave the managing of this matter to him, he would do so in 

a way that they would be united together; but, as he wanted to do so, he 

would lock them inside the palace, and by seemingly giving the people the 

power to castigate them he would save them. The Senate yielded to this 

thought, and he called the people to talk to them; and having shut up the 

Senate in the palace, (and) said to them that the time had come to be able 

to subdue the haughtiness of the Nobility and avenge themselves for the 

injuries received from them (the Senate), having them all shut up under his 

custody: but because he believed they would not want their City to remain 

without a government, it would be necessary ((if they wanted to kill the old 

Senators)) to create new ones. And, therefore, he had put all the names of 

the Senators into a bourse and would begin to draw them in their presence, 

and that one after another of those drawn would die after they should find 

his successor. And beginning to draw one, at his name, there was raised a 

very great noise, calling him haughty, cruel and arrogant: but when Pacovius 

requested that they make the exchange, the haranguing completely stopped: 

and after some time one of the Plebs was nominated, at whose name some begun 

to whistle, some to laugh, some to speak ill in one way and some in another: 

and thus there followed one after the other, that all those who were named 

were judged by them unworthy of the Senatorial rank: so that Pacovius taking 

this occasion said: Since you judge that this City would be badly off 

without a Senate, and you cannot agree to make the exchange of Senators, I 

think it would be well if you reconciled together, because the fear in which 

the Senators have been has so humbled them that you will now find in them 

that humanity which you seek for elsewhere. And they agreeing to this, there 

ensued the union of these orders, and they discovered, when they were 

constrained to come to the particulars, the deception.



After one thousand four hundred fourteen (1414) when the Princes of the City 

had been driven from Florence, and no other government having been 

instituted, but rather a certain ambitious license, and public affairs going 

from bad to worse, many of the populari seeing the ruin of the City and not 

understanding the cause, they blamed the ambitions of some powerful one who 

would feed the disorders in order to be able to make a State to his own 

liking and take away their liberty: and there were those who went through 

the loggias and the plazas speaking ill of many Citizens, and threatening 

them that if they should ever find themselves (members) of the Signoria, 

they would uncover this deceit of theirs and would castigate them. It often 

happened that ones like these did ascend to the supreme Magistracy, and when 

they had risen to that position and saw things more closely, they recognized 

whence disorders arose, and the dangers that hung over them, and the 

difficulty of remedying them. And seeing that the times and not the men were 

causing the disorders, they quickly were of another mind and acted 

otherwise, because the knowledge of things in particular had taken away that 

deception which, in the general consideration, they had presupposed. So that 

those who at first ((when he was a private citizen)) heard him speak, and 

afterwards saw them remain quiet in the supreme Magistracy, believed that 

this resulted not by the more real knowledge of things, but from their 

having been perverted and corrupted by the Nobles. And as this happened to 

many men and many times, there arose among them a proverb, which said: These 

men have one mind in the plaza and another in the palace. Considering, 

therefore, all that has been discussed, it is seen that the quickest 

possible way to open the eyes of the People, is by finding a way ((seeing 

that a generality deceives them)) in which they should have to descend to 

particulars, as did Pacovius in Capua and the Senate in Rome. I believe also 

that it can be concluded that no prudent man ought ever to disregard popular 

judgment in particular matters, (such as) the distribution of dignities and 

honors, for in this only the People do not deceive themselves, and if they 

do some times, it will be rare when they deceive themselves more often than 

do the few men who have to make such distributions. Nor does it seem to me 

to be superfluous to show in the following chapter the order which the 

Senate held in order to deceive the People in its distributions.



                 CHAPTER XLVIII



WHOEVER WANTS A MAGISTRACY NOT TO BE GIVEN TO A VILE OR WICKED ONE, WILL 

HAVE IT ASKED BY A MAN MORE VILE AND MORE WICKED, OR BY ONE MORE NOBLE AND 

MORE GOOD



When the (Roman) Senate became apprehensive that the Tribunes with Consular 

power should be created from plebeian men, they took one of two courses: 

either they caused the more reputable men of Rome to be designated, or by 

suitable means they (surely) corrupted some sordid and most ignoble 

Plebeians, who mixed with the plebeians of better quality who usually asked 

for these offices, so that even they should ask for them. This latter course 

caused the Plebs to be ashamed of themselves to give it to the latter, and 

the first (course) made them ashamed to take it away from the former. All of 

which confirms the proposition of the preceding discussion, where it is shown 

that the people deceive themselves in general matters, but they do not 

deceive themselves in particular matters.



                  CHAPTER XLIX



IF THOSE CITIES WHICH HAD THEIR BEGINNING FREE AS ROME, HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY 

IN FINDING LAWS THAT WOULD MAINTAIN THEM, THOSE THAT HAD THEIR BEGINNING IN 

SERVITUDE HAVE ALMOST AN IMPOSSIBILITY



How difficult it is in establishing a Republic to provide all those laws 

that should maintain her free, is very well shown by the progress of the 

Roman Republic, which notwithstanding that it was established with many 

laws, first by Romulus, and afterwards by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius, and by 

Servius, and lastly by the Ten Citizens created for such a purpose, none the 

less in managing that City new needs were always discovered and it was 

necessary to create new ordinances; as happened when they created the 

Censors, who were one of those provisions that aided in keeping Rome free 

during the time she existed in liberty. For having become arbiters of the 

customs of Rome, they were the most potent cause why the Romans had retarded 

the further corruption of themselves. In the creation of this Magistracy 

they indeed made one error at the start, creating them for five years: but a 

short time later it was corrected by the prudence of the Dictator Mamercus, 

who, through new laws, reduced the said Magistracy to eighteen months: which 

the Censors who were then (aging) in office took so badly, that they 

deprived Mamercus from (treating with) the Senate: which thing was greatly 

censured both by the Plebs and the Fathers: and as history does not show 

whether Mamercus was able to defend himself against this, it must be assumed 

either that history is defective, or that the institutions of Rome in this 

part were good; for it is not well that a Republic should be so constituted 

that a Citizen in order to promulgate a law conforming to a free society 

could be oppressed without any remedy.



But returning to the beginning of this discussion I say, that for creating 

such a new Magistracy it ought to be considered that, if those Cities which 

had their beginnings in liberty but become corrupt by themselves, like Rome, 

have great difficulty in finding good laws for maintaining themselves free, 

it is not to be wondered at if those which had their beginnings in servitude 

find it, not difficult, but impossible ever to organize themselves so that 

they are able to live securely and quietly; this, as is seen, happened to 

the City of Florence which, for having had its beginnings subject to the 

Roman Empire, and having always existed under the government of others, 

remained subject for a long time and without any thought to (freeing) 

itself: afterward when the opportunity arrived for her to breathe free, she 

began to make her institutions, which being mixed with ancient ones that 

were bad, could not be good: and thus she had gone on managing herself for 

two hundred years of which there exists a true record, without ever having a 

State (Government) by which she could truly be called a Republic. And these 

difficulties which existed in her, have always existed in those Cities that 

have had beginnings similar to hers. And although many times ample authority 

was given by public and free suffrage to a few Citizens to be able to reform 

her, yet they have never organized her for the common good, but always in 

favor of their own party: which made not for order, but for major disorders 

in that City. And to come to some particular example I say, that among other 

things that have to be considered by an establisher of a Republic is to 

examine into whose hands he places the authority of blood (death) over its 

own Citizens. This was well constituted in Rome, for there one could 

ordinarily appeal to the People; and even if an important event should occur 

where the deferring of an execution through the medium of an appeal should 

be dangerous, they had recourse to the Dictator, who executed it 

immediately: to which refuge they never had recourse except in necessity. 

But Florence and other Cities born as she was ((in servitude)) had this 

authority placed in a foreigner, who, sent by a Prince performed such an 

office. When they afterwards came into liberty, they kept this authority in 

a foreigner, whom they called Captain. Which ((because he was able easily to 

be corrupted by powerful Citizens)) was a pernicious thing. But afterwards 

changing itself through the changes of governments which they organized, 

they created the Eight Citizens who should perform the office of that 

Captain. Which arrangement from bad became worse, for the reasons mentioned 

at other times, that the few were always ministers of the few and more 

powerful (citizens).



The City of Venice is guarded from that (abuse), which has (a Council) of 

Ten Citizens who are able to punish any Citizen without appeal. And as this 

was not enough to punish the powerful even though they had the authority, 

they established (the Council) of Forty: And in addition the Council of the 

Pregadi ((which is the highest council)) had the power to castigate them. So 

that lacking an accuser, there was not lacking a judge to keep powerful men 

in check. It is no wonder, therefore, seeing that in Rome (laws) were made 

by herself with many prudent men, new causes sprung up every day for which 

she had to make new laws to maintain her free existence, which, if, in other 

Cities which had disordered beginnings, such difficulties sprung up, they 

could never reorganize themselves.



                    CHAPTER L



A COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE OUGHT NOT TO BE ABLE TO STOP THE ACTIVITIES OF A 

CITY



When T. Quintus Cincinnatus and Gnaius Julius Mentus were Consuls in Rome, 

being disunited, they stopped all the activities of that Republic. When the 

Senate saw this, they advised the creation of a Dictator, in order that he 

do that which, because of their (Consuls) discords, they could not do. But 

the Consuls disagreeing on every other thing, were in accord only on this: 

not to want to create a Dictator. So that the Senate not having any other 

remedy had recourse to the aid of the Tribunes, who, with the authority of 

the Senate, forced the Consuls to obey. Here first is to be noted the 

usefulness of the Tribunes, who were not only useful in restraining the 

ambitions which the powerful had against the Plebs, but also that which they 

employed among themselves. The other, that there ought never to be 

established in a City the ability of a few to interrupt any of its decisions 

which are ordinarily necessary in maintaining the Republic. For instance, if 

you give authority to a Council to make a distribution of honors and 

offices, or to a Magistracy the administration of a business, it is proper 

either to impose on them the necessity that they must do it in any case, or 

to arrange that if they did not want to do it themselves, that another can 

and ought to do it: otherwise this constitution would be defective and 

dangerous, as was seen it was in Rome, if the authority of the Tribunes 

could not have been opposed to the obstinacy of those Consuls.



In the Venetian Republic, the grand Council distributes the honors and 

offices. It sometimes happened that the general public, either from contempt 

or from some false suggestions, did not create the successors to the 

Magistrates of the City and to those who administered their outside Empire. 

This resulted in a very great disorder, because suddenly both the subject 

lands and the City itself lacked their legitimate judges, nor could they 

obtain anything if the majority of that council were not satisfied or 

deceived. And this inconvenience would have brought that City to a bad end 

if it had not been foreseen by the prudent Citizens, who taking a convenient 

opportunity made a law that all the Magistrates who are or should be inside 

or outside the City should never vacate their offices until exchanges with 

their successors were made. And thus was removed from that council the evil 

of being able with peril to the Republic to stop public activities.



                    CHAPTER LI



A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT TO FEIGN TO DO THROUGH LIBERALITY, THAT WHICH 

NECESSITY CONSTRAINS THEM



Prudent men always make the best of things in their actions, although 

necessity should constrain them to do them in any case. This prudence was 

well employed by the Roman Senate when they decided that a public stipend be 

given to the fighting men, it having been the military custom of they 

maintaining their own selves. But the Senate seeing that war could not be 

made for any length of time in this manner, and, because of this, they could 

neither besiege towns nor lead armies to a distance, and judging it to be 

necessary to be able to do the one and the other, decided that the said 

stipends be given: but they did it in such a way that they made the best of 

that which necessity constrained them to do; and this present was so 

accepted by the Plebs, that Rome went upside down with joy; for it seemed to 

them to be a great benefit which they never hoped to have, and which they 

would never have sought by themselves. And although the Tribunes endeavored 

to cancel this decree, showing that it was something that aggravated and not 

lightened the burden ((it being necessary to impose tributes to pay this 

stipend)), none the less they could not do much to keep the Plebs from 

accepting it: which was further increased by the Senate by the method by 

which they assigned the tributes, for those that were imposed on the Nobles 

were more serious and larger, and the first (required) to be paid.



                   CHAPTER LII



TO REPRIMAND THE INSOLENCE OF A POWERFUL ONE WHO SPRINGS UP IN A REPUBLIC, 

THERE IS NO MORE SECURE AND LESS TROUBLESOME WAY THAN TO FORESTALL HIM THOSE 

WAYS BY WHICH HE COMES TO POWER



It will be seen from the above written discourse, how much credit the 

Nobility had acquired with the Plebs because of the demonstrations made to 

their benefit, both by the stipends ordered, as well also as the method of 

imposing the tributes. If the Nobility had maintained themselves in this 

order they would have removed every cause for tumult in that City, and this 

would have taken away from the Tribunes that credit which they had with the 

Plebs, and consequently their authority. And, truly, there cannot exist in a 

Republic, and especially in those that are corrupt, a better method, less 

troublesome and more easily opposed to the ambitions of any Citizen, than to 

forestall him those ways by which he observes to be the paths to attain the 

rank he designates. Which method, if it had been employed against Cosimo 

De'Medici, would have been a much better procedure for his adversaries than 

to have driven him out of Florence: for if those Citizens who were competing 

against him had taken his style of favoring the People, they would have 

succeeded without tumult and without violence in drawing from his hands the 

arms which he availed himself of most.



Piero Soderini had made a reputation for himself in the City of Florence 

alone by favoring the General Public; this among the People gave him the 

reputation as a lover of liberty in the City. And certainly it would have 

been an easier and more honest thing for those Citizens who envied him for 

his greatness, (and) less dangerous and less harmful to the Republic, for 

them to have forestalled him in the ways by which he made himself great, 

than to want to oppose him in such a way that with his ruin, all the rest of 

the Republic should be ruined; for if they had taken away from his hands 

those arms which made him strong ((which they could have done easily)) they 

could have opposed him in all the councils and all the public deliberations 

boldly and without suspicion. And if anyone should reply that if those 

Citizens who hated Piero made an error in not forestalling him the ways with 

which he gained reputation for himself among the People, Piero also made an 

error in not forestalling him those ways by which his adversaries made him 

be feared: for which Piero merits to be excused, as much because it was 

difficult for him to have done so, as also because it was not honest for 

him: For the means with which he was attacked were to favor the Medici, with 

which favors they beat him and, in the end, ruined him. Piero, therefore, 

could not honestly take up this part in order that he could destroy that 

liberty by his good name, to which he had been put in charge to guard: 

Moreover, these favors not being able to be done suddenly and secretly, 

would have been most dangerous for Piero; for whenever he should be 

discovered to be a friend of the Medici, he would have become suspect and 

hated by the People: whence there arose more opportunities to his enemies to 

attack him than they had before.



In every proceeding, therefore, men ought to consider the defects and perils 

which it (presents), and not to undertake it if it should be more dangerous 

than useful, notwithstanding the result should conform to their decision: 

for to do otherwise in this case it would happen to them as it happened to 

Tullius (Cicero), who, wanting to take away the favors from Marcantonio, 

increased them for him: for Marcantonio having been judged an enemy of the 

Senate, and having gathered together that great army in good part from the 

soldiers who had been followers of Caesar's party, Tullius, in order to 

deprive him of those soldiers advised the Senate to give authority to 

Octavian and send him with the army and the Consuls against him (Antony) and 

join the latter (Octavian), and thus Marcantonio remaining bereft of favor, 

would easily be destroyed. Which (thing) turned out to the contrary, for 

Marcantonio won over Octavian to himself, who, leaving Tullius and the 

Senate, joined him. Which (thing) brought about the complete destruction of 

the party of the Aristocracy (Patricians). Which was easy to foresee, and 

that which Tullius advised should not have been believed, but should have 

kept account always that name which, with so much glory, had destroyed his 

enemies and acquired for him the Principality of Rome, and they ought never 

to have believed they could expect anything from his supporters favorable to 

liberty.



                   CHAPTER LIII



THE PEOPLE MANY TIMES DESIRE THEIR RUIN, DECEIVED BY A FALSE SPECIES OF 

GOOD: AND HOW GREAT HOPES AND STRONG PROMISES EASILY MOVE THEM



After conquering the City of the Veienti, there entered into the Roman 

People the idea that it would be a useful thing for the City of Rome if one 

half of the Romans should go and live at Veii, arguing that because that 

City was rich in countryside, full of buildings, and near to Rome, it could 

enrich the half of the Roman Citizens and not disturb any civil activities 

because of the nearness of the location. Which thing appeared to the Senate 

and the wiser Romans so useless and so harmful, that they said freely they 

would rather suffer death than consent to such a decision. So that this 

subject coming up for debate, the Plebs were so excited against the Senate 

that it would have come to arms and bloodshed if the Senate had not made 

itself a shield of some old and esteemed Citizens, reverence for whom 

restrained the Plebs so that they did not proceed any further with their 

insolence. Here, two things are to be noted. The first, that many times, 

deceived by a false illusion of good, the People desire their own ruin, and 

unless they are made aware of what is bad and what is good by someone in whom 

they have faith, the Republic is subjected to infinite dangers and damage. 

And if chance causes People not to have faith in anyone ((as occurs 

sometimes, having been deceived before either by events or by men)), their 

ruin comes of necessity. And Dante says of his proposition in the discussion 

he makes in De Monarchia (On Monarchy), that the People many times shout, 

Life to their death and death to their life. From this unbelief it sometimes 

happens in Republics that good proceedings are not undertaken, as was said 

above of the Venetians who, when assaulted by so many enemies could not 

undertake a procedure of gaining some of them over to themselves by giving 

to them things taken from others; because of this war was moved against them 

and a conspiracy of (other) Princes made against them, before their ruin had 

come.



Considering therefore what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a 

People to, this distinction can be made: either that which you have to 

persuade them to represents at first sight a gain or a loss, or truly it 

appears a courageous or cowardly proceeding: and if, in the things that are 

placed in front of the people, there is seen a gain even though it is 

concealed under a loss, and if it appears courageous even though it is 

hidden beneath the ruin of the Republic, it will always be easy to persuade 

the multitude to it: and thus it will always be difficult to persuade them 

of those proceedings where either some usefulness or loss is apparent, even 

though the welfare and benefit (of the Republic) were hidden under it. This 

that I have said is confirmed by infinite examples, Roman and foreign, 

modern and ancient.



For, from this, there arose the evil opinion that sprung up in Rome of 

Fabius Maximus, who could not persuade the Roman people that it was useless 

to that Republic to proceed slowly in that war, and to sustain the attack of 

Hannibal without engaging in battle, because that people judged this 

proceeding cowardly, and did not see what usefulness there should be in 

that, and Fabius did not have sufficient cause to demonstrate it to them: 

and the People are so blinded on these ideas of bravery, that although the 

Roman People had made that error of giving authority to the Master of the 

horse of Fabius to enable him to engage in battle, even though Fabius did 

not want to, and that because of this authority the Roman camp would have 

been broken up except for the prudence of Fabius which remedied it; this 

experience was not enough for them, for they afterwards made Varro Consul, 

not for any of his merits but for having promised throughout all the plazas 

and public places of Rome to rout Hannibal anytime he should be given the 

authority. From this came the battle and defeat of Cannae, and almost caused 

the ruin of Rome. I want to cite on this proposition another Roman example. 

Hannibal had been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled this province with 

killings of Romans, when M. Centenius Penula came to the Senate, a very base 

man ((none the less he had some rank in the military)), and offered them 

that if they gave him authority to be able to raise an army of volunteers in 

any place in Italy he wished, he would in a very short time give them 

Hannibal, either taken or dead. The demands of this man appeared foolish to 

the Senate: none the less thinking that if they should deny him this, his 

request would be later known by the People, that there might arise some 

tumult, envy, and ill will against the Senatorial order, they conceded it to 

him; desiring rather to put in danger all those who followed him than to 

cause new indignation to spring up among the People, knowing how much a like 

proceeding would be accepted and how difficult it would be to dissuade them. 

This man, therefore, with an unorganized and undisciplined multitude went to 

meet Hannibal, and he no sooner had come to the encounter than he, with all 

his followers, were routed and killed.



In Greece in the City of Athens, Nicias, a most serious and prudent man, 

never could persuade that people that it would not be good to go and assault 

Sicily, so that this decision taken against the will of the wise caused the 

complete ruin of Athens. When Scipio was made Consul and desired the 

province of Africa, he promised to everyone the ruin of Carthage; when the 

Senate did not agree to this because of the verdict of Fabius Maximus, he 

threatened to bring it before the People, as he very well knew that such 

decisions were liked by the People.



On this proposition an example can be given of our own City, as it was when 

Messer Ercole Bentivogli, commander of the Florentine forces, together with 

Antonio Giacomini, after having defeated Bartolomeo D'Alvino at San 

Vincenti, went to besiege Pisa: which enterprise was decided upon by the 

People on the brave promises of Messer Ercole, although many of the wise 

Citizens censured it: none the less there was no remedy, being pushed by 

that desire of the general public which was based on the brave promises of 

the commander.



I say, therefore, that there is no easier way to ruin a Republic where the 

People have authority, than to involve them in a brave enterprise: because 

where the People are of any importance, they will always accept them, nor 

will there be anyone of contrary opinion who will know any remedy. But if 

the ruin of the City results from this, there also and more often results 

the ruin of the particular Citizens who are in charge of such enterprises: 

for the People having expected victory, if defeat comes, they do not blame 

fortune or the impotence of those who commanded, but their wickedness and 

ignorance, but most of the times they either kill or imprison them, or exile 

them, as happened to infinite Carthaginian Captains and to many Athenians. 

Nor do any victories that they might have had in the past benefit them, 

because they are all cancelled by the present defeat, as happened to our 

Antonio Giacomini, who, not having conquered Pisa as he promised and the 

People expected, fell into such popular disgrace that, notwithstanding his 

past infinite good works, he (was allowed to) live more because of the 

humanity of those who had authority who defended him from the People than 

for any other reason.



                   CHAPTER LIV



HOW MUCH AUTHORITY A GREAT MAN HAS IN RESTRAINING AN EXCITED MULTITUDE (MOB) 



The second notable item mentioned in the text of the above chapter is, that 

nothing is so apt to restrain an excited multitude (mob) as the reverence 

(inspired) by some man of gravity and authority who encounters them; and not 

without reason Virgil says:



     When they saw a man of grave aspect and strong with merit 

     They became silent, and stood with eager ears.



Therefore, he who is in charge of an army, or he who finds himself in a City 

where a tumult has arisen, ought to present himself there with as much grace 

and as honorably as he can, attiring himself with the insignia of his rank 

which he holds in order to make himself more revered. A few years ago 

Florence was divided into two factions, who called themselves, thusly, the 

Frateschi (Brotherly) and Arrabiati (Angered); and coming to arms, the 

Frateschi were defeated, among whom was Pagolantonio Soderini, a Citizen 

greatly reputed in those times; and during those tumults the People went 

armed to his house to sack it, Messer Francesco, his brother, then Bishop of 

Volterra and today Cardinal, by chance found himself in the house; who, as 

soon as he heard the noise and saw the disturbance, dressed himself in his 

most dignified clothes and over them put on his Episcopal surplice, and went 

to meet those armed ones, and with his person and his words stopped them: 

which (thing) was talked about and celebrated throughout the City for many 

days.



I conclude, therefore, that there is no sounder or more necessary remedy to 

restrain an excited multitude than the presence of a man who by his presence 

appears and is revered. It is seen, therefore, ((to return to the preceding 

text)) with how much obstinacy the Roman Plebs accepted that proceeding of 

going to Veii because they judged it useful, but did not recognize the 

danger that existed underneath this; and that the many tumults which arose 

there would cause troubles, if the Senate with serious men (and) full of 

reverence had not restrained their fury.



                   CHAPTER LV



HOW EASILY THINGS ARE MANAGED IN THAT CITY WHERE THE MULTITUDE IS NOT 

CORRUPT, AND THAT WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY A PRINCIPALITY CANNOT BE 

ESTABLISHED, AND WHERE THERE IS NONE A REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED



Although above there has been much discussed that which is to be feared or 

to be hoped for in corrupt Cities, none the less it does not seem to me 

outside this subject to consider a decision of the Senate concerning the vow 

that Camillus had made to give the tenth part of the plunder of the Veienti 

to Apollo: which plunder having come into the hands of the Roman Pleb, and 

being unable otherwise to review the account of it, the Senate made and 

edict that everyone should present to the Republic the tenth part of that 

which they had plundered. And although such a decision was not put into 

effect, the Senate afterwards having taken other ways and means for 

satisfying Apollo in fulfillment for the Pleb, none the less from such 

decisions it is seen how much the Senate confided in them (the People), and 

how they judged that no one would not present exactly all that which was 

commanded of them by the edict. And on the other hand, it is seen how the 

Pleb did not think of evading the edict in any part by giving less than they 

ought, but to relieve themselves of this by showing open indignation. This 

example, together with many others that have been recited above, show how 

much goodness and religion there was in that People, and how much good there 

was to be hoped for from them. And, truly, when this goodness does not 

exist, no good is to be hoped for, as can be hoped for in those provinces 

which, in these times, are seen to be corrupt, as is Italy above all others, 

even though France and Spain have their part of such corruption. And, if in 

those provinces, there are not seen as many disorders as arise in Italy 

every day, it derives not so much from the goodness of the people ((which in 

good part is lacking)) as from having a King who keeps them united, not only 

by his virtu, but by the institutions of those Kingdoms which are yet 

unspoiled.



In the province of Germany this goodness and this religion is seen to exist 

in great (measure) in those People, which makes for the existence of many 

Republics in freedom, and they so observe the laws that no one from inside 

or outside dares to attack them. And that this is true that in their kingdom 

there yet exists a good part of that ancient goodness, I would like to give 

an example similar to that given above of the Senate and the Roman Pleb. 

When it occurred in those Republics that they had to spend any quantity of 

money for public account, those Magistrates or Councils who had the 

authority imposed on all the inhabitants of the City (a tax) of one or two 

percent of what each one had of value. And such decision being made in 

accordance with the laws of the land everyone presented himself before the 

collectors of this impost, and first taking an oath to pay the right sum, he 

threw into a box provided for that purpose that which it appeared to him 

according to his conscience he ought to pay: to which payment there was no 

witness other than he who paid. From which it can be conjectured how much 

goodness and how much religion still exists in those people. And it ought to 

be noted that every one paid the true amount, for if it had not been paid, 

the impost would not have yielded that amount which they had planned in 

accordance with previous ones that had been taken, and if they had not 

yielded (this amount), the fraud would be recognized, and if it had been 

recognized other means than this would have been taken. Which goodness is 

much more to be admired in these times as it is very rare; rather, it is 

seen to be remaining only in that province: which result from two things; 

the one, that they do not have great commerce with their neighbors, for 

others have not come to their homes nor have they gone to the homes of 

others, but have been content with those goods, live on those foods, clothe 

themselves with the wool which the country provides, which has taken away 

any reason for intercourse and (consequently) the beginning of any 

corruption: hence they have not been able to take up the customs of the 

French, of the Spanish, or of the Italians, which nations all together are 

the corrupters of the world. The other cause, is that that Republic, whose 

political existence is maintained uncorrupted, does not permit that any of 

its Citizens to be or live in the manner of a Gentleman, instead maintain 

among themselves a perfect equality, and are the greatest enemies of those 

Lords and Gentlemen who are in that province: and if, by chance, any should 

come into their hands, they kill them as being Princes of corruption and the 

cause of every trouble.



And to clarify what is (meant by) this name of Gentleman, I say that those 

are called Gentlemen who live idly on the provisions of their abundant 

possessions, without having any care either to cultivate or to do any other 

work in order to live. Such as these are pernicious to every Republic and to 

every Province: but more pernicious are those who, in addition to the above 

mentioned fortune, also command castles, and have subjects who obey them. Of 

these two sorts of men, the Kingdom of Naples, the Lands of Rome, the 

Romagna, and Lombardy, are full. From which it happens that there never has 

been a Republic in those provinces, nor any political existence (system), 

because such kinds of men are all enemies of every civil society. And in 

provinces so constituted, to want to introduce a Republic would be 

impossible. But only an arbiter (monarch) would recognize it, and he would 

have no other means but to establish a Kingdom: the reason is this, that 

when the body of people is so corrupted that the laws are not sufficient to 

restrain it, there needs to be established there that superior force, which 

is the Royal hand that, with absolute and full power, places a restraint to 

the excessive ambitions and corruption of the Powerful. This (cause) is 

verified by the example of Tuscany, where one sees in a small extent of land 

there have existed for a long time three Republics, Florence, Siena, and 

Lucca; and although the other Cities of that Province are in a way subject 

to these, yet, by their spirit and their institutions, it is seen that they 

maintain, or attempt to maintain, their liberty: all of which arises from 

there not being any lords of castles in that province, and few or no 

Gentlemen: but there exists so much equality, that it would be easy for a 

prudent man who had knowledge of ancient civilizations, to introduce a civil 

government there. But its misfortunes have been so great, that up to these 

times not any one has come forth who has been able to or known how to do it.



From this discussion, therefore, this conclusion is drawn, that he who would 

want to establish a Republic where there are many Gentlemen, cannot do so 

unless first he extinguishes them all; and that he who would want to 

establish a Kingdom or a Principality where there is great equality, will 

never be able to do so unless he withdraws from that equality many of the 

ambitious and unquiet spirits, and makes them Gentlemen in fact and not in 

name, giving them castles and possessions, as well as giving them aid of men 

and money, so that surrounded by these he can through them maintain his 

power, and they through his support can maintain their ambitions, and the 

others constrained to endure that yoke which force and nothing else could 

make them endure. And, because of this, there being a proportion of those 

who force and those who are forced, each man will remain firm in his rank. 

And as the establishing of a Republic in a province better adapted to being 

a Kingdom, or to establishing a Kingdom in one better adapted to being a 

Republic, is a matter for one who in brains and authority is rare, there 

have been many who have wanted to do so, but few only who have known how to 

bring it about. For the greatness of the undertaking in part frightens them 

and in part stops them, so that they fail in the very beginning. I believe 

that this opinion of mine, that a Republic cannot be established where there 

are Gentlemen, appears contrary to the experience of the Venetian Republic, 

in which none could have any rank except those who were Gentlemen. To which 

it is answered that this example does not oppose it, for the Gentlemen in 

that Republic are more so in name than in fact, as they do not have great 

incomes from possessions, their riches being founded on commerce and movable 

property: and, in addition, none of them have castles or any jurisdiction 

over men; but in them that name of Gentleman is a name of dignity and 

reputation, without being based on those things on which men are called 

Gentlemen in other Cities. And as other Republics have all their divisions 

(of classes) under various names, so Venice is divided into Gentlemen and 

Popolari, and wants that the former can have all the honors, from which all 

others are entirely excluded. This does not cause disorders in those towns 

for the reasons mentioned at other times. Republics, therefore, can be 

established where a great equality exists or can be established, and, on the 

contrary, a Principality can be established where a great inequality exists; 

otherwise they will lack proportion and have little durability.



                   CHAPTER LVI



BEFORE GREAT EVENTS OCCUR IN A CITY OR A PROVINCE, SIGNS COME WHICH FORETELL 

THEM, OR MEN WHO PREDICT THEM



Whence it arises I do not know, but from ancient and modern examples it is 

seen that no great event ever takes place in a City or a Province that has 

not been predicted either by fortune tellers, by revelations, by prodigies, 

or by other celestial signs. And in order for me not to go distant from home 

in proving this, everyone knows how the coming of King Charles VIII of 

France into Italy was predicted by Brother Girolamo Savonarola, and how in 

addition to this it was said throughout Italy that at Arezzo there had been 

seen in the air men-at-arms battling together. In addition to this, everyone 

knows how, before the death of Lorenzo De'Medici the elder, the Duomo was hit 

in its highest part by a bolt from the skies which very greatly damaged that 

edifice. Also everyone knows how, a little while before Piero Soderini, who 

had been made Gonfalonier for life by the Florentine people, had been driven 

out and deprived of his rank, the palace was struck in the same manner by a 

(lightning) stroke. I could cite other examples in addition to these, which 

I will omit to avoid tedium. I shall narrate only that which T. Livius tells 

of before the coming of the French (Gauls) to Rome, that is, how one Marcus 

Creditus, a Pleb, reported to the Senate that, passing at midnight through 

the Via Nova (New Road), he had heard a voice louder than human which 

admonished him that he should report to the Magistrates that the Gauls were 

coming to Rome. The cause of this I believe should be discussed and 

interpreted by a man who has knowledge of natural and supernatural things, 

which I have not. But it could be, as some Philosophers hold, that this air 

being so full of spirits, having an intelligence which by natural virtu 

foresee future events, and having compassion for men, so that they can warn 

them by such signs to prepare for defense. But, however it may be, such is 

the truth, (and) that always after such incidents there follows things 

extraordinary and new in the provinces.



                   CHAPTER LVII



TOGETHER THE PLEBS ARE STRONG, DISPERSED THEY ARE WEAK



There were many Romans ((after the ruin of their country had ensued because 

of the passage of the Gauls)) who had gone to live at Veii contrary to the 

constitution and orders of the Senate, which, in order to remedy this 

disorder, commanded through its public edicts that everyone within a certain 

time and under certain penalties should return to inhabit Rome. Which edict 

at first was made light of by those against whom it was made, but afterwards 

when the time came for obeying it, they all obeyed. And Titus Livius said 

these words, From being ferocious when together, fear made them individually 

obedient. And truly this part of the nature of the multitude cannot be 

better shown than by this sentence. For the multitude many times is 

audacious in speaking against the decision of their Prince: but afterwards, 

when they see the penalty in sight, not trusting one another, they run to 

obey. So that it is certainly to be seen that whatever may be said of a 

People about their good or bad disposition, ought not to be held of great 

account, if you are well prepared to be able to maintain your authority if 

they are well disposed, and if they are ill-disposed, to be able to provide 

that they do not attack you. This refers to those evil dispositions which 

the People have from causes other than their having lost either their 

liberty or their Prince much loved by them, but who is still living: for the 

evil dispositions that arise from these causes are formidable above every 

thing, and have need of great remedies to restrain them: their 

indispositions from other (causes) are easily managed if they do not have 

Chiefs to whom they have recourse, for, on the one hand, there is nothing 

more formidable than a multitude loose and without a Head, and on the other 

hand, there is nothing weaker, because whenever they have arms in their 

hands it is easy to subdue them, if you have a shelter which enables you to 

avoid their first attack: for when their spirits are cooled down a little, 

and each one sees that he has to return to his house, they begin to be 

distrustful of themselves, and to think of their individual safety either by 

fleeing or surrendering themselves. A multitude so excited, therefore, in 

wanting to escape these perils, has promptly to make a Head among 

themselves, who would control it, keep it united, and think of its defense, 

as the Roman plebs did when, after the death of Virginius, they departed 

from Rome, and to save themselves created twenty Tribunes from among 

themselves: and if they do not do this, it will always happen as T. Livius 

said in the above written words, that all together they are strong, but when 

each one then begins to think of his own peril, they become vile and weak.



                  CHAPTER LVIII



THE MULTITUDE IS WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN A PRINCE



Nothing is more vain and more inconstant than the multitude, so our T. 

Livius and all other Historians affirm. For it often occurs in narrating the 

actions of men to observe the multitude to have condemned some one to death, 

and that same (multitude) afterwards weeping and very much wishing him back; 

as is seen the Roman people did in the case of Manlius Capitolinus, who, 

having condemned him to death, afterwards most earnestly desired him back. 

And the words of the author are these: As soon as they knew there was no 

peril from, they desired to have him back. And elsewhere, where he tells of 

the incidents which arose in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, nephew 

of Hiero, says: It is the nature of multitude, either to serve humbly, or to 

dominate haughtily. I do not know, in wanting to defend a thing which ((as I 

have said)) is accused by all writers, if I were to undertake a cause so 

hard and full of difficulty, that I would have either to abandon it in 

shame, or to go on with it burdensomely. But however it may be, I do not 

judge, or will ever judge, it to be a defect to defend any opinion with 

arguments, without wanting to employ either authority or force.



I say, therefore, the individual men, and especially Princes, can be accused 

of that defect which the writers accuse the multitudes; for anyone who is 

not controlled by the laws, will make the same errors as a loose multitude. 

And this can be easily observed, for there are and there have been many 

Princes, but of the good and wise ones there have been only a few, I say, of 

those Princes who have been able to break that restraint which could control 

them; among whom are not those Kings who arose in Egypt in that ancient 

period when that province was governed by laws, nor those who arose in 

Sparta, nor those who have risen in France in our times, which Kingdom is 

more regulated by laws than any other Kingdom of our times of which there is 

knowledge. And these Kingdoms which arise under such constitutions are not 

to be placed in that number whence the nature of each man individually has 

to be considered, and to see if he is like the multitude; for alongside them 

there ought to be placed a multitude controlled by laws in the same way as 

they (the Kings) were, and the same goodness will be found in them as we see 

in (the Kings), and we will see that they serve neither haughtily nor 

humbly; as was the Roman People, who while the Republic remained incorrupt, 

never served humbly or ruled insolently, but rather with its institutions 

and Magistracies held its rank honorably. And when it was necessary to spring 

up against a powerful one who was harming them, they did so, as was seen 

with Manlius and the Ten, and others who sought to oppress them; and so also 

when it was necessary for the public safety to obey the Dictators and 

Consuls. And if the Roman People desired Manlius Capitolinus after his 

death, it is not to be wondered at, for they desired his virtu, which had 

been such that the memory of them brought compassion to everyone, and would 

have had the power to cause that same result in any Prince, for it is the 

verdict of all writers that virtu is lauded and admired even in ones 

enemies: and if so much desire could have restored him, the Roman people 

would have given him the same judgment as they did when they took him from 

prison, a little before they condemned him to death: and as was also seen of 

Princes held to be wise, who have had some persons put to death and then 

greatly regretted it, as Alexander with Clitus and his other friends, and 

Herod with Mariamne: But that which our Historian says of the nature of the 

multitude, he does not say of those who were regulated by laws, such as were 

the Romans, but of an unbridled multitude, as was that of Syracuse, which 

made those errors which infuriated and unbridled men make, and as Alexander 

and Herod did in the abovementioned cases.



The nature of the multitude, therefore, is not to be blamed any more than 

that of Princes, for they all err equally when they all are able to err 

without control. Of which, in addition to what I have said, there are many 

examples, both from among the Roman Emperors and from among other Tyrants 

and Princes, where so much inconstancy and recklessness of life is observed, 

as is ever found in any multitude. I conclude therefore, contrary to the 

common opinion which says that the People, when they are Princes, are 

changeable and ungrateful, affirming that there are no more of these defects 

in them than there are in particular Princes: And to accuse the People and 

the Princes together can be the truth; but to except the Princes would be a 

deception: For a People that commands and is well organized will be stable, 

prudent, grateful, and not otherwise than a Prince, or even better than a 

Prince, although he be esteemed wise. And on the other hand, a Prince 

loosened from the (control) of the laws, will be ungrateful, inconstant, and 

more imprudent than a people. And that difference in their proceedings 

arises, not from the different nature, ((for it is the same in everyone, and 

if there is an advantage for good, it is in the People)) but from the more 

or less respect they have for the laws under which one and the other live. 

And whoever considers the Roman people will see that for four hundred years 

they have been enemies of the name of Royalty and lovers of glory and of the 

common good of their country: He will see so many examples employed by them 

which testify to the one thing and the other. And if anyone should allege to 

me the ingratitude that they (the Roman people) showed against Scipio, I 

will reply that which was discussed above at length on this subject, where 

it has been shown that people are less ungrateful than Princes. But as to 

prudence and stability, I say, that a people is more prudent, more stable, 

and of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason is the voice of 

the people like that of God, for a universal opinion is seen causes marvelous 

effects in its prognostication, so that it would seem that by some hidden 

virtu, evil or good is foreseen. As to the judging of things, it is rarely 

seen that when they hear two speakers who hold opposite views, if they are 

of equal virtu, they do not take up the the better opinion, and they are 

capable of seeing the truth in what they hear. And if ((as has been said 

above)) they err in things concerning bravery, or which appear useful, a 

Prince also errs many times in his own passions, which are much greater than 

those of the people. It will also be seen that in the election of their 

magistrates, they make by far a better selection than a Prince, but a people 

will never be persuaded that it is better to bring to that dignity a man of 

infamous and corrupt habits: to which a Prince may be persuaded easily and 

in a thousand ways. It will be seen that when a people begin to hold a thing 

in horror, they remain in that opinion for many centuries, which is not seen 

in a Prince. And on both of these two things, the testimony of the Roman 

people will suffice for me, who, in so many hundreds of years, in so many 

elections of Consuls and Tribunes, they did not make four elections of which 

they had to repent. And ((as I have said)) they held the name of Royalty in 

so much hatred, that no obligation to any of its Citizens who should seize 

that title would enable him to escape the merited penalty. In addition to 

this, it will be seen that the Cities where the people are Princes, make the 

greatest progress in the shortest time and much greater than those who have 

always been under a Prince, as Rome did after the driving out of the Kings, 

and Athens did after they were free of Pisistratus. Which cannot arise 

except that those governments of the people are better than those of the 

Princes.



Nor do I want that there should be opposed to my opinion all that which our 

Historian has said in the aforementioned text and in any other; for if there 

should be discussed all the disorders of the People, all the disorders of 

the Princes, all the glories of the People, all those of the Princes, it 

will be seen that the People are far superior in goodness and in glory. And 

if Princes are superior to the people in instituting laws, forming civil 

governments, make new statutes and ordinances, the People are so much 

superior in maintaining the institutions which will add to the glory of 

those who established them.



And in sum to epilogue this material, I say that the States of the Princes 

have lasted a long time, the States of the Republics have lasted a long 

time, and both have had need to be regulated by laws; for a Prince who can 

do what he wants is a madman, and a People which can do as it wants to is 

not wise. If, therefore, discussion is to be had of a Prince obligated by 

laws, and of a People unobligated by them, more virtu will be observed in 

the People than in Princes: if the discussion is to be had of both loosened 

(from such control), fewer errors will be observed in the People than in the 

Princes, and those that are fewer have the greater remedies: For a 

licentious and tumultuous People can be talked to by a good man, and can 

easily be returned to the good path: (but) there is no one who can talk to a 

Prince, nor is there any other remedy but steel (sword). From which the 

conjecture can be made of the maladies of the one and the other: that if 

words are enough to cure the malady of the People, and that of the Prince 

needs the sword, there will never be anyone who will not judge that where 

the greater cure is required, they are where the greater errors exist. When 

a People is indeed unbridled, the foolishness that they do is not to be 

feared, nor is fear to be had of the present malady, but of that which can 

arise, a Tyrant being able to rise up amidst so much confusion. But the 

contrary happens in the case of bad Princes, where the present evil is 

feared, and there is hope for the future, men persuading themselves that the 

(termination) of their lives can make liberty spring up. Thus the difference 

between the one and the other is seen, that one concerns things that are, 

the other of things that will be. The cruelties of the multitude are 

(directed) against those whom they fear will oppose the common good, those 

of a Prince are (directed) against those whom he fears will oppose his own 

good. But the opinion against the People arises because everyone speaks evil 

of the people freely and without fear even while they reign; of the Princes 

they talk with a thousand fears and a thousand apprehensions. And it does 

not appear to me to be outside this subject ((for this matter draws me 

there)) to discuss in the following chapter whether alliances made with a 

Republic, or those made with a Prince, can be trusted.



                   CHAPTER LIX



WHICH ALLIANCES OR LEAGUES CAN BE TRUSTED, WHETHER THOSE MADE WITH A 

REPUBLIC OR THOSE MADE WITH A PRINCE



As there occurs every day that Princes or Republics make leagues and 

friendships between themselves, and also similarly alliances and accords are 

drawn between a Republic and a Prince, it appears to me proper to examine 

whose faith is more stable, and which ought to be held more in account, that 

of a Republic or that of a Prince. In examining everything, I believe that 

in many cases they are the same, and in some there is a difference. I 

believe, therefore, that accords made by force will not be observed either 

by a Prince or by a Republic: I believe that when fear of (losing) the State 

comes to pass, both will break the faith in order not to lose it, and will 

serve you ingratitude. Demetrius, who was called Conqueror of Cities, had 

given infinite benefits to the Athenians: it happened that later, having 

been routed by his enemies and taking refuge in Athens as a City friendly and 

obligated to him, was not received by her: which saddened him much more than 

had the loss of his forces and his army; Pompey, having been routed by 

Caesar in Thessaly, took refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy, who, in the past he 

had reinstated in his Kingdom, but was put to death by him. Which instances, 

it is seen, have the same reasons; none the less it was more humanely 

employed by a Republic and with less injury, than by the Prince. Where there 

is fear, therefore, there will be found in each the same (loss of) faith. 

And if in either a Republic or a Prince it is found that they observe the 

faith even if ruin may be expected, this also may arise from similar 

reasons. For it can very well occur that a Prince, who is a friend of a 

powerful Prince (and) who may not then have the opportunity to defend him, 

can hope that with time he (the latter) will restore his Principality to 

him; or believe he will find either faith or accords with his enemies. Of 

this kind have been the Princes of the Kingdom of Naples who have followed 

the French side. And as for Republics, Saguntum in Spain was of this kind, 

which hazarded her own ruin in order to follow the Roman side, and with 

Florence in MDXII (1512) in order to follow the French side. And I believe, 

taking everything into account, that in such cases where danger is imminent, 

there will be found greater stability in the Republics than in Princes: For 

even if the Republics had the same spirit and the same wants as Princes, 

their movements being slower will always make them take longer to form 

resolutions than Princes, and because of this they will be less prompt in 

breaking their faith.



Alliances are broken for usefulness. In this, Republics are more careful in 

the observance of accords than Princes. And it is possible to cite examples 

where a minimum of usefulness has caused a Prince to break his faith, and 

where a great usefulness has not caused faith to be broken by a Republic; as 

was that proceeding which Themosticles proposed to the Athenians, to whom in 

his speech he said he had a counsel that would be of great usefulness to 

their country, but could not tell it so as not to disclose it for 

discovering it would take away the opportunity of doing it. Whence the 

people of Athens elected Aristedes to whom he should confide the matter, and 

according to which they would later decide as it might appear to them: 

whereupon Themosticles showed that the fleet of all Greece, although they 

were under their faith, was in such a position that they could easily win it 

for themselves or destroy it, which would make the Athenians the arbiters of 

that Province. Whence Aristedes reported back to the people that the 

proposal of Themosticles was most useful, but most dishonest: for which 

reason the people rejected it entirely, which would not have been done by 

Philip the Macedonian and the other Princes who had looked for more 

usefulness, and who had gained more by breaking the faith than by any other 

means.



Of the breaking of pacts because of some cause for non-observance, I will 

not speak, as it is an ordinary thing: but I will talk of those that are 

broken for extraordinary reasons, where I believe, from the things said, 

that the people make fewer errors than Princes, and because of this, they 

can be trusted more than Princes.



                    CHAPTER LX



HOW THE CONSULSHIP AND EVERY OTHER MAGISTRACY IN ROME OUGHT TO BE (BESTOWED) 

WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO AGE



And it is to be seen from the course of History that the Roman Republic, 

after the Consulship came to the Pleb, admitted all its Citizens (to this 

dignity) without regard to age or blood (birth), even though the regard to 

age never existed in Rome as they always went to find virtu, whether it was 

in young men or old. This is seen from the testimony of Valerius Corvinus 

who was made Consul at twenty three years (of age); and Valerius said, 

talking to his soldiers, that the Consulship was the reward of virtu, not of 

blood. Which thing can be much discussed, whether or not it is well 

considered. As to blood (birth), this was conceded because of necessity, and 

this same necessity which existed in Rome would also be found in every City 

that wanted to have the same success as Rome had, as has been said at 

another time; for hardships cannot be given to men without reward, nor can 

the hope of obtaining the reward be taken away without peril. And it was 

proper, therefore, that the plebs should have the hope of obtaining the 

Consulship, and that they should nourish this hope for a time, without 

attaining it: When afterward the hope was not enough, they had to arrive at 

that result (the Consulship). The City that does not admit its Plebs to any 

of its glory, can treat them in their own way, as has been discussed 

elsewhere; but that City which wants to accomplish that which Rome did, 

cannot make this distinction.



And given that it is so (as regards birth), the question of age needs no 

reply, rather it is necessarily disposed of; for in electing a young man to 

a rank which has need of the prudence of an old man, it happens ((the 

multitude having to elect him)) that he should come to that rank through 

some noble action that he should make. And when a young man is of such great 

virtu as to have made himself known by some notable thing, it would be a 

very harmful thing if that City should not then be able to avail itself of 

him, and that it should have to wait until he should have aged (and) that 

age deprive him of that vigor of spirit and activity of which (at that age) 

his country should avail itself, as Rome availed itself of Valerius 

Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many other who triumphed when very 

young.







1. That is, an Executive, a House of Lords or Senate (originally sitting as 

a Judiciary), and a Commons or House of Representatives or Legislature each 

acting to check and balance the other.



2. A judiciary.



3. Establish a National Army or Militia, rather than rely on Mercenaries.







                DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

            ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS

           TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI



                          SECOND BOOK



Men always praise ((but not always reasonably)) the ancient times and find 

fault with the present; and they are such partisans of things past, that 

they celebrate not only that age which has been recalled to their memory by 

known writers, but those also ((being now old)) which they remember having 

seen in their youth. And when this opinion of theirs is false ((as it is 

most of the times)) I am persuaded the reasons by which they are led to such 

deception are various. And the first I believe is that the whole truth which 

would bring out the infamy of those times, and they amplify and magnify 

those others that could bring forth their glory. Moreover, the greater 

number of writers so obey the fortune of the winners that, in order to make 

their victories glorious, they not only exaggerate that which is gotten by 

their own virtu, but they also exaggerate the actions of the enemies; so 

that whoever afterwards is born in either of the two provinces, both the 

victorious and the defeated ones, has cause to marvel at those men and 

times, and is forced summarily to praise and love them. In addition to this, 

men hating things either from fear or envy, these two reasons for hating 

past events come to be extinguished, as they are not able to offend or give 

cause for envy of them. But the contrary happens with those things that are 

(presently) in operation and are seen, which because you have a complete 

knowledge of them as they are not in any way hidden from you; and knowing 

the good together with the many other things which are displeasing to you, 

you are constrained to judge the present more inferior than the past, 

although in truth the present might merit much more of that glory and fame; 

I do not discuss matters pertaining to the arts, which shine so much by 

themselves, which time cannot take away or add a little more glory which 

they merit by themselves; but I speak of those matters pertinent to the 

lives and customs of men, of which such clear evidences are not seen.



I repeat, therefore, that the custom of praising and blaming as mentioned 

above is true, but it is not true that you err in doing it. For sometimes of 

necessity our judgment is the truth, as human affairs are always in motion, 

either ascending or descending. And we see a City or a Province 

well-organized in its government by some excellent man, and for a time 

always progressing toward the better through the virtu of that organizer. He 

who is born in that state, and praises the past more than the present, 

deceives himself; and his deception is caused by those things mentioned 

above. But if they are born in that City or province after the time when it 

has begun to descend to its bad times, then he does not deceive himself. And 

in thinking of how these things go on, I judge that the world has always 

been in the same condition, and that there is as much good as there is bad 

in it; but this bad and good vary from province to province, as is seen by 

the historian of those ancient Kingdoms which varied from one another because 

of the variations in customs, while the world remained the same: the only 

difference was, that where virtu first found a place in Assyria, it then 

(moved) to Media, afterwards to Persia, and from there came to Italy and 

Rome: and if after the Roman Empire no other Empire followed which endured, 

and where the world kept together all its virtu, none the less it is seen to 

be scattered in many nations where people lived with virtu, as it was in the 

Kingdom of the Franks, the Kingdom of the Turks, that of the Soldan (of 

Egypt), and today the people of Germany, and before then that Saracen Sect 

which accomplished such great things and occupied so much of the world after 

having destroyed the Eastern Roman Empire. In all these provinces, 

therefore, after the Romans fell, the Sects possessed, and yet possess in 

part, that virtu which is desired and lauded with true praise. And whoever 

is born in them and praises the times past more than the present, may 

deceive himself: but whoever is born in Italy and Greece, and has not become 

either an Ultramontane in Italy or a Turk in Greece, has reason to find 

fault with his times and to praise the others, for in the past there are 

many things that make him marvel, but now there is not anything that will 

compensate for the extreme misery, infamy, and disgrace in these times where 

there is no observance of religion, of laws, or of military discipline, but 

are stained by every brutish reasoning. And these vices are even more 

detestable as they exist more in those who sit in the tribunals, commanding 

everyone, and desiring to be adored.



But returning to our argument, I say that, if the judgment of men is corrupt 

in deciding whether the present or the ancient age is better, in those 

things where because of their antiquity they cannot have a perfect knowledge 

as they have of their own times, the old men ought not to corrupt themselves 

in judging the times of their youth and their old age, they having known and 

seen the latter and the former equally. Which thing would be true if men 

throughout all the periods of their lives had the same judgment and the same 

appetites. But as these vary ((although the times do not vary)), things 

cannot appear the same to those men who have other appetites, other 

delights, and other considerations in their old age than in their youth. For 

as men wane ((when they age)) in strength but grow in judgment and prudence, 

so it is that those things which in their youth appeared supportable and 

good, will turn out ((as they grow old)) unsupportable and bad, and where 

they ought to blame their judgment, they blame the times. In addition to 

this, human appetites being insatiable ((because by nature they have to be 

able to and want to desire everything, and to be able to effect little for 

themselves because of fortune)), there arises a continuous discontent in the 

human mind, and a weariness of the things they possess; which makes them 

find fault with the present times, praise the past, and desire the future, 

although in doing this they are not moved by any reasonable cause. I do not 

know, therefore, whether I merit to be numbered among those who deceive 

themselves, if in these Discourses of mine I shall laud too much the times 

of the ancient Romans and censure ours. And truly, if the virtu that then 

reigned and the vice that now reigns should not be as clear as the Sun, I 

would be more restrained in talking, being apprehensive of falling into that 

deception of which I accuse others. But the matter being so manifest that 

everyone sees it, I shall be bold in saying openly that which I learned of 

those times and these, so that the minds of the young men who may read my 

writings can avoid the latter (evils) and imitate the (virtu) of the former, 

whenever fortune should give them the opportunity. For it is the office of a 

good man to show others that good which because of the malignity of the 

times and of fortune, he has not been able to accomplish, so that ((many 

being capable)) some of those more loved by Heaven can accomplish them.



And having in the discourses of the preceding book talked of the decisions 

made by the Romans pertinent to the internal affairs of the City, in this 

(book) we shall talk of that which the Roman people did pertinent to the 

aggrandizement of their Empire.



                     CHAPTER I



WHETHER VIRTU OR FORTUNE WAS THE GREATER CAUSE FOR THE EMPIRE WHICH THE 

ROMANS ACQUIRED



Many (authors), among whom is that most serious writer Plutarch, have had 

the opinion that the Roman people in acquiring the Empire were favored more 

by Fortune than by Virtu. And among other reasons which he cities, he says 

that, by the admission of that people, it can be shown that they ascribed 

all their victories to Fortune, as they had built more temples to Fortune 

than to any other God. And it seems that Livius joined in this opinion, for 

he rarely makes any Roman speak where he recounts (of) Virtu, without adding 

Fortune. Which thing I do not in any way agree with, nor do I believe also 

that it can be sustained. For if no other Republic will ever be found which 

has made the progress that Rome had, then I note that no Republic will ever 

be found which has been organized to be able to make such conquests as Rome. 

For it was the virtu of the armies that enabled her to acquire that Empire; 

and the order of proceeding and her own institutions founded by her first 

Legislator that enabled her to maintain the acquisitions, as will be 

narrated below in further discussion.



These (authors) also say that the fact of not ever engaging in two most 

important wars at the same time was due to the fortune and not the virtu of 

the Roman people; for they did riot engage in war with the Latins until they 

had so beaten the Samnites that the Romans had to engage in a war in defense 

of them: They did not combat with the Tuscans until they first subjugated 

the Latins, and had by frequent defeats almost completely enervated the 

Samnites: So that if these two powers had joined together ((while they were 

fresh)), without doubt it can easily be conjectured that the ruin of the 

Roman Republic would have ensued.



But however this thing may have been, it never did happen that they engaged 

in two most powerful wars at the same time; rather it appeared always that 

at the beginning of one the other would be extinguished, or in extinguishing 

one another would arise. Which is easily seen from the succession of wars 

engaged in by them; for, leaving aside the one they were engaged in before 

Rome was taken by the French (Gauls), it is seen that while they fought 

against the Equii and the Volscians, no other people ((while these people 

were powerful)) rose up against them. When these were subdued there arose the 

war against the Samnites, and although before that war was ended the Latin 

people rebelled against the Romans with their armies in subduing the 

insolence of the Latins. When these were subdued, the war against the 

Samnites sprung up again. When the Samnites were beaten through the many 

defeats inflicted on their forces, there arose the war against the Tuscans; 

which being composed, the Samnites again rose up when Pyrrhus crossed over 

into Italy, and as soon as he was beaten and driven back to Greece, the 

first war with the Carthaginians was kindled: and that war was hardly 

finished when all the Gauls from all sides of the Alps conspired against the 

Romans, but they were defeated with the greatest massacre between Popolonia 

and Pisa where the tower of San Vincenti stands today. After this war was 

finished, they did not have any war of much importance for a space of twenty 

years, for they did not fight with any others except the Ligurians and the 

remnants of the Gauls who were in Lombardy. And thus they remained until 

there arose the second Carthaginian war, which kept Italy occupied for 

sixteen years. When this war ended with the greatest glory, there arose the 

Macedonian war; (and) after this was finished there came that of Antiochus 

and Asia. After this victory, there did not remain in all the world either a 

Prince or a Republic that could, by itself or all together, oppose the Roman 

forces. 



But whoever examines the succession of these wars, prior to that last 

victory, and the manner in which they were conducted, will see mixed with 

Fortune a very great Virtu and Prudence. So that if one should examine the 

cause of that (good) fortune, he will easily find it, for it is a most 

certain thing that as a Prince or a People arrives at so great a reputation, 

that any neighboring Princes or Peoples by themselves are afraid to assault 

him, and he has no fear of them, it will always happen that none of them 

will ever assault him except from necessity; so that it will almost be at 

the election of that powerful one to make war upon any of those neighbors as 

appears (advantageous) to him, and to quiet the others by his industry. 

These are quieted easily in part because they have respect for his power, 

and in part because they are deceived by those means which he used to put 

them to sleep: and other powerful ones who are distant and have no commerce 

with him, will look upon this as a remote thing which does not pertain to 

them. In which error they remain until the conflagration arrives next to 

them, for which, when it comes, they have no remedy to extinguish it except 

with their own forces, which then will not be enough as he has become most 

powerful.



I will leave to one side how the Samnites remained to see the Volscians and 

the Equii conquered by the Romans, and so as not to be too prolix I will 

make use of the Carthaginians who were of great power and of great 

reputation when the Romans were fighting with the Samnites and Tuscans; for 

they already held all Africa, Sardinia and Sicily, and had dominion in part 

of Spain. Which power of theirs, together with their being distant from the 

confines of the Roman people, caused them never to think of assaulting them, 

nor of succoring the Samnites and Tuscans; rather it made them do as is done 

in any power that grows, allying themselves with them (the Romans) in their 

favor and seeking their friendship. Nor did they see before this error was 

made, that the Romans having subdued all the peoples (placed) between them 

and the Carthaginians, begun to combat them for the Empire of Sicily and 

Spain. The same thing happened to the Gauls as to the Carthaginians, and 

also to Philip King of Macedonia and to Antiochus; and everyone of them 

believed ((while the Roman people were occupied with others)) that the 

others would overcome them, and then it would be time either by peace or war 

to defend themselves from (the Romans). So that I believe that the (good) 

Fortune which the Romans had in these parts would be had by all those 

Princes who would proceed as the Romans and who would have that same Virtu 

as they had.



It would be well here in connection with this subject to show the course 

held by Roman people in entering the Provinces of others, of which we have 

talked about at length in our treatment of Principalities (Treatise on the 

Prince), for there we have debated this matter widely. I will only say this 

briefly, that they have always endeavored to have some friend in these new 

provinces who should be as a ladder or door to let them climb in, both to 

let them enter and as a means of keeping it; as was seen, that by means of 

the Capuans they entered Samnium, by means of the Camertines into Tuscany, 

by the Mamertines into Sicily, by the Saguntines into Spain, by Massinissa 

into Africa, by the Aetolians into Greece, by Eumences and other Princes 

into Asia, and by the Massilians and the Aeduans into Gaul. And thus they 

never lacked similar supports, both in order to be able to facilitate their 

enterprises of their acquiring provinces and in holding them. Which those 

people who observed them saw that they had less need of Fortune, than those 

people who do not make good observers. And so as to enable everyone to know 

better how much more Virtu enabled them to acquire that Empire than did 

Fortune, in the following chapter we will discuss the kind of people they 

had to combat and how obstinate they were in defending their liberty.



                    CHAPTER II



WITH WHAT PEOPLE THE ROMANS HAD TO COMBAT, AND HOW OBSTINATELY THEY DEFENDED 

THEIR LIBERTY



Nothing caused so much hard work for the Romans as the overcoming of the 

surrounding people and part of the distant Provinces, as the love many 

people in those times had for liberty; which they so obstinately defended 

but they would never have been subjugated except for the excessive virtu (of 

the Romans). For, from many examples, it is known into what dangers they 

placed themselves in order to maintain or recover (their liberty), and what 

vengeance they practiced against those who had deprived them of it. It is 

also to be learned from the lessons of history what injury the people and 

the City received from such servitude. And, while in these times there is 

only one Province of which it can be said has in it free Cities, in ancient 

times in all the Provinces there existed many free people. It will be seen 

that in those times of which we speak at present, there were in Italy, from 

the Alps ((which now divide Tuscany from Lombardy)) up to the furthest 

(part) in Italy, many free peoples, such as were the Tuscans, the Romans, 

the Samnites, and many other people, who inhabited the remaining part of 

Italy. Nor is there ever any discussion whether there was any King outside 

those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, King of Tuscany, whose line was 

extinguished in a manner of which history does not speak. But it is indeed 

seen that in those times when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Tuscany was 

free, and so much did it enjoy its liberty and so hated the title of Prince, 

that when the Veientians created a King for the defense of Veii, and 

requested aid of the Tuscans against the Romans, they decided, after much 

consultation, not to give aid to the Veientians as long as they lived under 

the King, judging it not to be good to defend the country of those who 

already had subjected themselves to others. And it is easy to understand 

whence this affection arises in a people to live free, for it is seen from 

experience that Cities never increased either in dominion or wealth except 

while they had been free. And truly it is a marvelous thing to consider to 

what greatness Athens had arrived in the space of a hundred years after she 

had freed herself from the tyranny of Pisistratus. But above all, it is a 

more marvelous thing to consider to what greatness Rome arrived after it 

liberated itself from its Kings. The cause is easy to understand, for not 

the individual good, but the common good is what makes Cities great. And, 

without doubt, this common good is not observed except in Republics, because 

everything is done which makes for their benefit, and if it should turn to 

harm this or that individual, those for whom the said good is done are so 

many, that they can carry on against the interests of those few who should 

be harmed. The contrary happens when there is a Prince, where much of the 

time what he does for himself harms the City, and what is done for the City 

harms him. So that soon there arises a Tyranny over a free society, the 

least evil which results to that City is for it not to progress further, nor 

to grow further in power or wealth, but most of the times it rather happens 

that it turns backward. And if chance should cause that a Tyrant of virtu 

should spring up, who by his courage and virtu at arms expands his dominion, 

no usefulness would result to the Republic but only to be himself; for he 

cannot honor any of those citizens who are valiant and good over whom he 

tyrannizes, as he does not want to have to suspect them. Nor also can he 

subject those Cities which he acquires or make them tributary to the City of 

which he is the Tyrant, because he does not help himself in making them 

powerful, but it will help him greatly in keeping the State disunited, so 

that each town and each province should recognize him. So that he alone, and 

not his country, profits from his acquisitions. And whoever should want to 

confirm this opinion with infinite other arguments, let him read Xenophon's 

treatise which he wrote on Tyranny.



It is no wonder, therefore, that the ancient people should have persecuted 

the Tyrants with so much hatred and should have loved living in freedom, and 

the name of Liberty so much esteemed by them; as happened when Hieronymus, 

nephew of Hiero the Syracusan, was killed in Syracuse; that when the news of 

his death came to his army, which was not very far from Syracuse, they at 

first begun to raise a tumult and take up arms against his killers; but when 

they heard that there was shouting of liberty in Syracuse, attracted by the 

name everyone became quiet, their ire against the Tyrannicides was quelled, 

and they thought of how a free government could be established in that City. 

It is also no wonder that the people took extraordinary vengeance against 

those who deprived them of liberty. Of which there have been many examples, 

but I intend to refer only to one which happened in Corcyra, a City of 

Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian war, where, the Province being 

divided into two factions, of which the Athenians followed one, the Spartans 

the other, there arose then among the many other Cities a division among 

themselves, some following (the friendship of) Sparta, the the others (of) 

Athens: and it happened in the said City (Corcyra) that the nobles had 

prevailed and had taken away the liberty from the people; the populari 

(popular party) with the aid of the Athenians recovered its power, and, 

having laid hands on the nobility, put them into a prison capable of holding 

all of them; from which they took out eight or ten at one time under a 

pretext of sending them into exile in different places, but put them to 

death with (examples of) extreme cruelties. When the remainder became aware 

of this, they resolved if possible to escape that ignominious death, and 

arming themselves as (best) as they could, they fought with those who 

attempted to enter and defended the entrance to the prison; but when the 

people came together at this noise, they pulled down the upper part of that 

place, and suffocated them in the ruins. Many other similar notable and 

horrible cases occurred in the said Province, so that it is seen to be true 

that liberty is avenged with great energy when it is taken away than when it 

is only threatened (to be taken).



In thinking, therefore, of whence it should happen that in those ancient 

times the people were greater lovers of Liberty than in these times, I 

believe it results from the same reason which makes men presently less 

strong, which I believe is the difference between our education and that of 

the ancients, founded on the difference between our Religion and the 

ancients. For, as our Religion shows the truth and the true way (of life), 

it causes us to esteem less the honors of the world: while the Gentiles 

(Pagans) esteeming them greatly, and having placed the highest good in them, 

were more ferocious in their actions. Which can be observed from many of 

their institutions, beginning with the magnificence of their sacrifices (as 

compared) to the humility of ours, in which there is some pomp more delicate 

than magnificent, but no ferocious or energetic actions. Theirs did not lack 

pomp and magnificence of ceremony, but there was added the action of 

sacrifice full of blood and ferocity, the killing of many animals, which 

sight being terrible it rendered the men like unto it. In addition to this, 

the ancient Religion did not beatify men except those full of worldly glory, 

such as were the Captains of armies and Princes of Republics. Our Religion 

has glorified more humble and contemplative men rather than men of action. 

It also places the highest good in humility, lowliness, and contempt of 

human things: the other places it in the greatness of soul, the strength of 

body, and all the other things which make men very brave. And, if our 

Religion requires that there be strength (of soul) in you, it desires that 

you be more adept at suffering than in achieving great deeds. 



This mode of living appears to me, therefore, to have rendered the world 

weak and a prey to wicked men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the 

great body of men, in order to go to Paradise, think more of enduring their 

beatings than in avenging them. And although it appears that the World has 

become effeminate and Heaven disarmed, yet this arises without doubt more 

from the baseness of men who have interpreted our Religion in accordance 

with Indolence and not in accordance with Virtu. For if they were to 

consider that it (our Religion) permits the exaltation and defense of the 

country, they would see that it desires that we love and honor her (our 

country), and that we prepare ourselves so that we can be able to defend 

her. This education and false interpretations, therefore, are the cause that 

in the world as many Republics are not seen in them that the people have as 

much love for liberty now as at that time. I believe, however, the reason 

for this rather to be, that the Roman Empire with its arms and greatness 

destroyed all the Republics and all civil institutions. And although that 

Empire was later dissolved, yet these Cities could not reunite themselves, 

nor reorganize their civil institutions, except in a very few places in that 

Empire.



But however it was, the Romans found a conspiracy in every smallest part of 

the world of Republics very well armed and most obstinate in the defense of 

their liberty. Which shows that the Roman people could never have overcome 

them without that rare and extreme virtu. And to give an example of one 

instance, the example of the Samnites suffices for me, which seems to be a 

marvelous one. And T. Livius admits that these (people) were so powerful and 

their arms so valiant, that, up to the time of the Consul Papirus Cursor, 

son of the first Papirus, for a period of forty six years, they were able to 

resist the Romans, despite the many defeats, destruction of Towns, and 

massacres suffered by their country. Especially as it is now seen that that 

country where there were so many Cities and so many men, is now almost 

uninhabited: and yet it was so well established and so powerful, that it was 

unconquerable except by Roman virtu. And it is an easy thing whence that 

order and disorder proceeded, for it all comes from their then living in 

freedom and now living in servitude. For all the towns and provinces which 

are free in every way ((as was said above)) make the greatest advances. For 

here greater populations are seen because marriages are more free and more 

desired by men, because everyone willingly procreates those children that he 

believes he is able to raise without being apprehensive that their patrimony 

will be taken away, and to know that they are not only born free and not 

slaves, but are also able through their own virtu to become Princes. They 

will see wealth multiplied more rapidly, both that which comes from the 

culture (of the soil) and that which comes from the arts, for everyone 

willingly multiplies those things and seek to acquire those goods whose 

acquisition he believes he can enjoy. Whence it results that men competing 

for both private and public betterment, both come to increase in a wondrous 

manner. The contrary of all these things happens in those countries which 

live in servitude, and the more the good customs are lacking, the more 

rigorous is the servitude. And the hardest of all servitudes is that of 

being subject to a Republic: the one, because it is more enduring and the 

possibility of escaping from it is missing: the other, because the final aim 

of a Republic is to enervate and weaken ((in order to increase its own 

power)) all the other states. Which a Prince who subjugates you does not do 

unless that Prince is some barbarous Prince, a destroyer of countries and 

dissipater of all human civilization, such as are oriental Princes: But if 

he has ordinary human feelings in him, most of the times he will love 

equally the Cities subject to him, and will leave them (enjoy) all their 

arts, and almost all their ancient institutions. So that if they cannot grow 

as if they were free, they will not be ruined even in servitude; servitude 

being understood as that in which Cities serve a foreigner, for of that to 

one of their own Citizens, we have spoken above.



Whoever considers, therefore, all that which has been said, will not marvel 

at the power which the Samnites had while they were free, and at the 

weakness to which they came afterwards under servitude: and T. Livius gives 

testimony of this in many places, and mainly in the war with Hannibal, where 

he shows that when the Samnites were pressed by a legion of (Romans) who 

were at Nola, they sent Orators (Ambassadors) to Hannibal to beg him to 

succor them. Who in their speech said to him. that for a hundred years they 

had combatted the Romans with their own soldiers and their own Captains, and 

many times had sustained (battle against) two consular armies and two 

Consuls; but now they had arrived at such baseness that they were hardly 

able to defend themselves against the small Roman legion which was at Nola.



                    CHAPTER III



ROME BECAME A GREAT CITY BY RUINING THE SURROUNDING CITIES AND ADMITTING 

FOREIGNERS EASILY TO HER HONORS



Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis. (Rome grew on the ruins of Alba) Those who 

plan for a City to achieve great Empire ought with all industry to endeavor 

to make it full of inhabitants, for without this abundance of men, one can 

never succeed in making a City great. This is done in two ways, by love and 

by force. Through love, by keeping the ways open and secure for foreigners 

who should plan to come to live there. Through force, by destroying the 

neighboring Cities and sending their inhabitants to live in your City. Which 

was so greatly observed by Rome, that in the time of the sixth King of Rome, 

that there lived there eighty thousand men capable of bearing arms. For the 

Romans wanted to act according to the custom of the good cultivator, who, in 

order to make a plant grow and able to produce and mature its fruits, cuts 

off the first branches that it puts out, so that by retaining that virtu in 

the roots of that plant, they can in time grow more green and more fruitful. 

And that this method of aggrandizing and creating an Empire was necessary 

and good, is shown by the example of Sparta and Athens; which two Republics 

although well armed and regulated by excellent laws, none the less did not 

attain to the greatness of the Roman Empire, and Rome appeared more 

tumultuous and not as well regulated as those others. No other reason can be 

adduced for this than that mentioned above; for Rome, from having enlarged 

the population of the City in both those two ways, was enabled to put two 

hundred thousand men under arms, while Sparta and Athens were never able (to 

raise) twenty thousand each. Which resulted not from the site of Rome being 

more favorable than those of the other, but solely from the different mode 

of procedure. For Lycurgus, founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking that 

nothing could more easily dissolve its laws than the admixture of new 

inhabitants, did everything (he could) so that foreigners would not come to 

them; and in addition to not receiving them into their citizenship by 

marriage, and other commerce that makes men come together, ordered that in 

that Republic of his only leather money should be spent, in order to take 

away from everyone the desire to come there in order to bring in merchandise 

or some arts: of a kind so that the City could never increase its 

inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate nature, it is neither 

possible nor natural that a slender trunk should sustain a big branch. A 

small Republic, therefore, cannot conquer Cities or Republics which are 

larger and more valiant than it; and if it does conquer them, it happens 

then to them as to that tree that has its branches bigger than its trunk, 

which sustains it only with great effort with every little breeze that 

blows; such as is seen happened in Sparta, which had conquered all the 

Cities of Greece, but as soon as Thebes rebelled, all the others rebelled, 

and the trunk remained alone without branches. Which could not have happened 

to Rome, as it had its trunk so big that it could sustain any branch. This 

mode of proceeding therefore, together with others which will be mentioned 

below, made Rome great and most powerful. Which T. Livius points out in two 

(few) words, when he said: Rome grew while Alba was ruined.



                    CHAPTER IV



REPUBLICS HAVE HAD THREE WAYS OF EXPANDING



Whoever has studied the ancient histories finds that Republics had three 

ways of expanding. One has been that which the ancient Tuscans observed, of 

being one league of many united Republics, where there is not any one before 

the other either in authority or in rank. And in acquiring other Cities they 

made them associates of themselves, as in a similar way the Swiss do in 

these times, and as the Achaens and Aetolians did in ancient times in 

Greece. And as the Romans had many wars with the Tuscans ((in order to 

illustrate better the first method)) I will extend myself in giving a 

particular account of them. Before the Roman Empire, the Tuscans were the 

most powerful people in Italy, both on land and on the sea, and although 

there is no particular history of their affairs, yet there is some small 

record and some signs of their greatness; and it is known that they sent a 

colony to the sea, above (north of) them, which they called Adria, which was 

so noble that it gave a name to that sea which the Latins also called the 

Adriatic. It is also known that their arms (authority) was obeyed from the 

Tiber up to the foot of the Alps which now encircle the greater part of 

Italy; notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans became so 

powerful that the said Tuscans lost the Dominion of that country which today 

is called Lombardy: which province had been seized by the Gauls, who, moved 

either by necessity or the sweetness of the fruits, and especially of the 

wine, came into Italy under their leader Bellovesus, and having defeated and 

driven out the inhabitants of the province, they settled there where they 

built many Cities, and they called that Province Gallia from the name they 

themselves had, which they kept until they were subjugated by the Romans. 

The Tuscans, then, lived in that equality and proceeded in their expansion 

through the first method which was mentioned above: and there were twelve 

Cities, among which were Clusium, Veii, Fiesole, Arezzo, Volterra, and 

others like them, which through a league governed their Empire; nor could 

they go outside of Italy with their acquisitions, a great part of which 

still remained intact (independent), for the reasons which will be mentioned 

below. 



The other method is to make them associates; not so closely, however, that 

the position of commanding the seat of the Empire and the right of 

sovereignty should not remain with you; which method was observed by the 

Romans. The third method is to make subjects of them immediately and not 

associates, as did the Spartans and Athenians. Of which three methods this 

last is entirely useless as is seen was the case in the above mentioned two 

Republics, which were ruined for no other reason than from having acquired 

that dominion which they were unable to maintain. For to undertake the 

governing of Cities by violence, especially those which were accustomed to 

living in freedom, is a difficult and wearisome thing. And unless you are 

armed, and powerfully armed, you cannot either command or rule them. And to 

want to be thus established, it is necessary to make associates of them who 

would help in increasing the population of your City. And as these two 

Cities (Sparta and Athens) did not do either the one or the other, their 

method of procedure was useless. And because Rome, which is an example of 

the second method, did both things, she therefore rose to such exceeding 

power. And as she had been the only one to act thusly, so too she had been 

the only one to become so powerful; for she had created many associates 

throughout all Italy, who lived with them in many respects equally under the 

law, but on the other hand ((as I said above)) she always reserved for 

herself the seat of Empire and the right of command, so that these 

associates of hers came ((without their being aware of it)) through their 

own efforts and blood to subjugate themselves. For as soon as they begun to 

go beyond Italy with their armies to reduce other Kingdoms to Provinces, and 

to make for themselves subjects of those who, having been accustomed to live 

under Kings, did not care to be subjects, and from having Roman governors, 

and having been conquered by armies under Roman command, they recognized no 

one to be superior other than the Romans. So that those associates of Rome 

(who were) in Italy found themselves suddenly surrounded by Roman subjects 

and pressed by a very large City like Rome: and when they understood the 

deceit under which they had lived they were not in time to remedy it, for 

Rome had achieved so much authority with the (acquisition) of the external 

provinces, and so much power was to be found within themselves, the City 

having become greatly populated and well armed. And although these 

associates of hers conspired against her in order to avenge the injuries 

inflicted on them, they were defeated (in war) in a short time, worsening 

their condition; for from being associates they too became their subjects. 

This method of proceeding ((as has been said)) had been observed only by the 

Romans; and a Republic which wants to aggrandize itself cannot have any 

other method, for experience has not shown anything else more certain and 

more true.



The fore-mentioned method of creating Leagues, such as were the Tuscans, 

Achaians, and the Aetolians, and as are the Swiss today, is, after that of 

the Romans, the better method; for with it, it is not possible to expand 

greatly, but two benefits ensue: the one, that they are not easily drawn 

into war: the other, that that which you take you can easily hold. The 

reason they are not able to expand is that Republics are not united and have 

their seats in several places, which makes it difficult for them to consult 

and decide. It also makes them undesirous of dominating, for, as many 

Communities participating in that dominion, they do not value much such 

acquisitions as does a single Republic which hopes to enjoy it entirely by 

itself. In addition to this they are governed by a council, and it follows 

that they are tardier in every decision than those which come from those who 

live in the same circle. It is also seen from experience that such methods 

of procedure have a fixed limit, of which there is no example which indicates 

it has ever been transgressed; and this (limit) is the addition of twelve or 

fourteen communities, beyond which they cannot go, and as their defending 

themselves appears to them to be difficult they do not seek greater 

dominion, as much because necessity does not constrain them to have more 

power, as well as for not recognizing any usefulness in further acquisitions 

for the reason mentioned above: for they have to do one of two things: 

either to continue making additional associates for themselves, as this 

multitude would cause confusion, or they would have to make them subjects to 

themselves. And as they see the difficulty of this, and little usefulness in 

maintaining it, they see no value in it. When, therefore, they are come to 

such a great number that it appears to them they can live securely, they 

turn to two things: the one, to take up the protection of others who seek 

it, and by this means obtain money from each one, and which they can readily 

distribute among themselves: the other, is to become soldiers for others and 

accept a stipend from this Prince or that, who hires them for undertaking 

his enterprises, as is seen the Swiss do these days, and as one reads was 

done by the above mentioned ones. Of which Titus Livius gives testimony, 

where he tells of Philip, King of Macedon, coming to negotiate with Titus 

Quintus Flaminius, and discussing the accord in the presence of a Praetor of 

the Aetolians, the said Praetor in coming to talk with him, was by him 

reprimanded for avarice and infidelity, saying that the Aetolians were not 

ashamed to enlist in the military service for one, and then also send their 

men into the service of the enemy, so that many times the Aetolian ensigns 

were seen among the two opposing armies. We see, therefore, that this method 

of proceeding through leagues has always been the same, and has had the same 

results. It is also seen that the method of making (them) subjects has 

always been ineffective and to have produced little profit: and when they 

had carried this method too far, they were soon ruined. And if this method 

of making subjects is useless in armed Republics, it is even more useless in 

those which are unarmed, as the Republics of Italy have been in our times.



It is to be recognized, therefore, that the Romans had the certain method, 

which is so much more admirable as there was no example before Rome, and 

there has been no one who has imitated them since Rome. And as to leagues, 

only the Swiss and the league of Swabia are found to be the only ones which 

imitated them. And finally of this matter it will be said, so many 

institutions observed by Rome, pertinent to the events both internal as well 

as external, have not only not been imitated in our times, but have not been 

taken into account, being judged by some not to be true, by some impossible, 

by some not applicable and useless. So that by remaining in this ignorance 

we (Italy) are prey to anyone who has wanted to rule this province. But if 

the imitation of the Romans appeared difficult, that the ancient Tuscans 

ought not to appear so, especially by the present Tuscans. For if they could 

not acquire that power in Italy, which that method of procedure would have 

given them, they lived in security for a long time, with very much glory of 

Dominion and arms, and especially praise for their customs and Religion. 

Which power and glory was first diminished by the Gauls, and afterwards 

extinguished by the Romans: and was so completely extinguished, that, 

although two thousand years ago the power of the Tuscans was great, at 

present there is almost no memory. Which thing has made me think whence this 

oblivion of things arises, as will be discussed in the following chapter.



                    CHAPTER V



THAT THE CHANGES OF SECTS AND LANGUAGES, TOGETHER WITH THE ACCIDENT OF 

DELUGES AND PESTILENCE, EXTINGUISHED THE MEMORY OF THINGS



To those Philosophers who hold that the World has existed from eternity, I 

believe it is possible to reply, that, if such great antiquity was true, it 

would be reasonable that there should be some record of more than five 

thousand years, except it is seen that the records of those times have been 

destroyed from diverse causes: of which some were acts of men, some of 

Heaven. Those that are acts of men are the changes of the sects (religion) 

and of languages. Because, when a new sect springs up, that is, a new 

Religion, the first effort is ((in order to give itself reputation)) to 

extinguish the old; and if it happens that the establishers of the new sect 

are of different languages, they extinguish it (the old) easily. Which thing 

is known by observing the method which the Christian Religion employed 

against the Gentile (heathen) sect, which has cancelled all its 

institutions, all of its ceremonies, and extinguished every record of that 

ancient Theology. It is true that they did not succeed in entirely 

extinguishing the records of the things done by their excellent men, which 

has resulted from their having maintained the Latin language, which was done 

by force, having to write this new law in it. For if they could have written 

it in a new language, considering the other persecutions they suffered, none 

of the past events would have been recorded. And whoever reads the methods 

used by Saint Gregory and the other Heads of the Christian Religion, will 

see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials, burning 

the works of the Poets and Historians, ruining statues, and despoiling every 

thing else that gave any sign of antiquity. So that, if to this persecution 

they had added a new language, it would have been seen that in a very brief 

time everything (previous) would have been forgotten.



It is to be believed, therefore, that that which the Christian Religion 

wanted to do against the Gentile sect, the Gentiles did against that which 

preceded them. And as these sects changed two or three times in five or six 

thousand years, all memory of things done before that time are lost. And if, 

however, some signs of it were left, it would be considered a fabulous 

thing, and not to be given credence: as happened with the history of 

Diodorus Siculus, who although he gives account of forty or fifty thousand 

years, none the less it is reputed ((as I believe it is )) a mendacious 

thing.



As to the causes that come from Heaven, they are those that extinguish the 

human race and reduce the inhabitants of parts of the world to a very few. 

And this results either from pestilence, or famine, or from an inundation of 

water; and the last is the most important, as much because it is the most 

universal, as because those who are saved are men of the mountains and 

rugged, who, not having any knowledge of antiquity, cannot leave it to 

posterity. And if among them there should be saved one who should have this 

knowledge, he would hide it or pervert it in his own way in order to create 

a reputation and name for himself; so that there remains to his successors 

only what he wanted to write, and nothing else. And that these inundations, 

pestilences, and famines, occur, I do not believe there is any doubt, not 

only because all histories are full of them, but also because the effects of 

these oblivious things are seen, and because it appears reasonable they 

should be; For in nature as in simple bodies, when there is an accumulation 

of much superfluous matter, it very often moves by itself and makes a 

purgation which is healthy to that body; and so it happens in this compound 

body of the human race, that when all the provinces are full of inhabitants 

so that they cannot live or go elsewhere in order to occupy and fill up all 

places, and when human astuteness and malignity has gone as far as they can 

go, it happens of necessity that the world purges itself in one of the three 

ways, so that men having been chastised and reduced in number, live more 

commodiously and become better. Tuscany, then, was once powerful, as was 

said above, full of Religion and Virtu had its own customs and its own 

national language; all of which was extinguished by the Roman power. So that 

((as was said)) nothing remained of it but the memory of its name.



                    CHAPTER VI



HOW THE ROMANS PROCEEDED IN MAKING WAR



Having discussed how the Romans proceeded in their expansion, we will now 

discuss how they proceeded in making war, and it will be seen with how much 

prudence they deviated in all the actions from the universal methods of 

others, in order to make their road to supreme greatness easy. The intention 

of whoever makes war, whether by election or from ambition, is to acquire 

and maintain the acquisition, and to proceed in such a way so as to enrich 

themselves and not to impoverish the (conquered) country and his own 

country. It is necessary, therefore, both in the acquisition and in the 

maintenance, to take care not to spend (too much), rather to do every thing 

for the usefulness of his people. Whoever wants to do all these things must 

hold to the Roman conduct and method, which was first to make the war short 

and sharp, as the French say, for corning into the field with large armies, 

they dispatched all the wars they had with the Latins, Samnites, and 

Tuscans, in the briefest time. And if all those things they did from the 

beginning of Rome up to the siege of the Veienti were to be noted, it will 

be seen that they were all dispatched some in six, some in ten, some in 

twenty days; for this was their usage. As soon as war broke out, they went 

out with the armies to meet the enemy and quickly came to the engagement. 

Which, when they won it, the enemy ((so that their countryside should not be 

completely laid waste)) came to terms, and the Romans condemned them (to 

turn over) lands, which lands they converted into private possessions or 

consigned them to a colony, which, placed on the confines of those people, 

served as a guard to the Roman frontiers, with usefulness as well to those 

colonists who received those fields as to the people of Rome, who, without 

expense, maintained that guard. Nor could this method be more secure, more 

effectual, or more useful. For, as long as the enemy were not in the fields, 

that guard was enough; but as soon as they went out in force to oppress that 

Colony, the Romans also came out in force and came to an engagement with 

them, and having waged and won the battle, (and), having imposed heavier 

conditions on them, they returned home. Thus, little by little, they came to 

acquire reputation over them and strength within themselves (their state). 

And they kept to this method up to the time of war when they changed the 

method of proceeding; which was after the siege of the Veienti, where, in 

order to be able to wage a long war, they ordered them to pay their 

soldiers, (and) which at first ((since it was not necessary as the wars were 

short)) they did not pay. And although the Romans gave them the money, and 

by virtue of which they were able to wage longer wars, and to keep them at a 

greater distance if necessity should keep them in the field longer, none the 

less they never varied from the original system of finishing them quickly, 

according to the place and time: nor did they ever vary from sending out of 

colonies. For, in the first system, the ambition of the Consuls contributed 

in making the wars short ((in addition to the natural custom)), who, being 

elected for one year, and six months of that year in quarters, wanted to 

finish the war in order to (have a) triumph. In the sending of colonies 

there was usefulness to them and resultant great convenience. They (the 

Romans) made a good distribution of booty, with which they were not as 

liberal as they were at first, as much because it did not appear to them to 

be so necessary ((the soldiers receiving a stipend)), as also because the 

booty being larger, they planned to enrich themselves of it so that the 

public should not be constrained to undertake the enterprises with the 

tributes from the City. Which system in a short time made their Treasury 

very rich. These two methods, therefore, of distributing the booty and of 

sending of colonies, caused Rome to be enriched by the wars while other 

unwise Princes and Republics were impoverished (by theirs). And these were 

brought to such limits that a Consul did not think he could obtain a triumph 

unless, with his triumph, he could bring much gold and silver, and every 

other kind of booty into the Treasury.



Thus the Romans with the above described conditions and by finishing wars 

quickly, being satisfied by the length (of the wars) to massacre the enemy, 

and by defeating (their armies) and overrunning (their lands), and (making) 

accords to their advantage, always became richer and more powerful.



                   CHAPTER VII



HOW MUCH LAND THE ROMANS GAVE EACH COLONIST



I believe it is very difficult to find out the truth as to how much land 

the Romans distributed per colonist. I believe they gave them more or less, 

according to the places where they sent the colonies. And I would judge that 

in any instance and in all places the distribution was small. First, in 

order to send a greater number of men assigned to guard that country: then, 

as they lived poorly at home it would not have been reasonable that they 

should desire that their men should live too abundantly outside.



And T. Livius says that, after taking Veii, they sent a colony there and 

distributed to each three and seven-twelfths (3 7/12) Jugeri of land, which 

in our measures are ... (2 2/3 acres). For, in addition to the above written 

things, they judged it was not the amount of land, but its good cultivation, 

that should suffice. It is necessary also that all the colonies have public 

fields where everyone could pasture their beasts, and forests where they 

could get wood to burn, without which things a colony cannot organize itself.



                   CHAPTER VIII



THE REASON WHY PEOPLE DEPART FROM THEIR NATIONAL PLACES AND INUNDATE THE 

COUNTRY OF OTHERS



Since there has been discussed above the method of proceeding in war 

observed by the Romans and how the Tuscans were assaulted by the Gauls, it 

does not appear to me alien to the subject to discuss how two kinds of war 

are made. One is waged because of the ambitions of Princes or of a Republic 

that seek to extend their Empire, such as were the wars that Alexander the 

Great waged, and those that the Romans waged, and those which one power 

wages against another. While these wars are dangerous, they never drive all 

the inhabitants out of a province, but the obedience of the people is enough 

for the conqueror, and most of the times he leaves them to live with their 

laws, and always with their homes and possessions: The other kind of war is 

when an entire people with all their families are taken away from a place, 

necessitated either by famine or by war, and goes to seek a new seat in a 

new province, not in order to seek dominion over them as those others above, 

but to possess it absolutely; and to drive out or kill its old inhabitants. 

This kind of war is most cruel and most frightful. And of these wars Sallust 

discusses at the end of (the history) of Jugurtha, when he says that, after 

Jugurtha was defeated, movements of the Gauls coming into Italy were heard: 

where he (also) says that the Roman People had combatted with all the other 

peoples only as to who should dominate, but that with the Gauls they 

combatted for the (very) existence of each. For to a Prince or a Republic 

that assaults a province, it is enough to extinguish only those who command, 

but to these entire populations, it behooves them to extinguish everyone 

because they want to live on that which the others lived. 



The Romans had three of these most perilous wars. The first was when Rome 

was taken, which was occupied by those Gauls who had detached Lombardy ((as 

was mentioned above)) from the Tuscans and made it their seat: for which 

Titus Livius assigns two causes: The first, as was said above, that they 

were attracted by the sweetness of the fruits and wines of Italy, which were 

lacking in France: The second, that in that Kingdom of Gaul, men multiplied 

so fast that they were no longer able to feed them, (and) the Princes 

decided it should be necessary that a part of them should go some place to 

seek a new country. And having made such a decision, they elected as 

captains over those who should depart Bellovesus and Sicovesus, two Kings of 

the Gauls, of whom Bellovesus went into Italy and Sicovesus passed into 

Spain. From the passage of this Bellovesus there resulted the occupation of 

Lombardy, and hence the first war that the Gauls made against Rome. After 

this came that which they made after the first Carthaginian war, where they 

(the Romans) killed over two hundred thousand Gauls between Piombino and 

Pisa. The third was when the Teutons and Cimbrians came into Italy, who 

having overcome several Roman armies, were defeated by Marius. The Romans, 

therefore, won these three most perilous wars. And no little virtu was 

necessary to win them; for it is seen that when that Roman virtu was lost 

(and), those arms lost their ancient valor, that Empire was destroyed by 

similar people, such as were the Goths, Vandals, and the like, who occupied 

all the western Empire.



These people go out from their countries ((as was said above)) driven by 

necessity; and the necessity arises from famine, or war, and oppression, 

which in their own country is experienced by them, so that they are 

constrained to seek new land. And these such are sometimes of a great 

number, and then enter into the countries of others with violence, killing 

the inhabitants, taking possession of their goods, create a new Kingdom, and 

change the name of the province, as Moses did, and those people who occupied 

the Roman Empire. For these new names that exist in Italy and in the 

provinces, do not come from anything else than of having been thus named by 

the new occupiers, such as is Lombardy which was called Cisalpine Gaul, 

France which was called Transalpine Gaul, and now is called after the 

Franks, as those people were called who had occupied it; Slavonia was called 

Illyria, Hungary Pannonia, England Brittania, and many other provinces which 

have changed names, to recount which would be tedious. Moses also called 

that part of Syria occupied by him Judea. And as I have said above that 

sometimes such people are driven from their own seats because of war, whence 

they are constrained to seek new lands, I want to cite the example of the 

Maurusians, a most ancient people of Syria, who, hearing of the coming of 

the Hebrew people and judging not to be able to resist them, thought it 

better to save themselves and leave their own country, than to attempt to 

save it and lose themselves; and taking up their families, they went to 

Africa where they established themselves after driving out those inhabitants 

whom they found in that place. And thus those who were unable to defend 

their own country, were able to occupy that of others. And Procopius, who 

wrote of the war that Belisarius made against the Vandals, occupiers of 

Africa, refers to having read letters written on certain columns in the 

places that were inhabited by these Maurusians, which said: We Maurusians 

here fled from before Jesus the robber, son of Narva. Whence appeared the 

reason of their departure from Syria. These people, therefore, who have been 

driven out by an extreme necessity are most formidable, and if they are not 

confronted by good arms, will never be checked. But when those who are 

constrained to abandon their own country are not many, they are not as 

dangerous as those people who were discussed, for they are unable to use as 

much violence but must employ cunning in occupying some place, and having 

occupied it, to maintain themselves by way of friends and confederates: as 

is seen was done by Aeneas, and Dido, and the Massalians, and the like, all 

of whom were able to maintain themselves, with the consent of their 

neighbors.



The great numbers of people that went out, and are going out, are almost all 

from the country of Scythia, a cold and poor place, where, because there 

were a great number of men and the country of a kind which was unable to 

feed them, they are forced to go out, having many things which drive them 

out and none to retain them. And if in the past five hundred years it has 

not occurred that some of these people have not inundated any country, it 

arises from several reasons. The first, the great evacuation which that 

country made during the decline of the Empire, when more than thirty tribes 

left (Scythia). The second is, that Germany and Hungary, whence also such 

people went out, have now improved their country so that they are able to 

live comfortably, that they are not necessitated to change places. On the 

other hand, their men being very warlike are a bastion in holding back the 

Scythians, who have the same boundary with them, from presuming to overcome 

or pass through them. And often times there occurred very great movements of 

Tartars, who were later checked by the Hungarians and the Poles, and they 

often boast that if it had not been for their arms, Italy and the Church 

would have many times felt the weight of the Tartar armies. And this I want 

to be enough concerning the people mentioned. 



                    CHAPTER IX



WHAT CAUSES COMMONLY MAKE WARS ARISE BETWEEN THE POWERFUL



The cause which made war arise between the Romans and the Samnites who were 

in league for a long time, is a common cause which arises among all powerful 

Principalities. Which cause either arises by chance or is made to arise by 

those who desire to set a war in motion. That which arose between the Romans 

and the Samnites was by chance, for it was not the intention of the 

Samnites, in setting the war in motion against the Sidicians, and afterwards 

against the Campanians, to set it in motion against the Romans. But the 

Campanians being hard pressed and having recourse to Rome, beyond the 

thoughts of the Romans and the Samnites, the Campanians forced the Romans to 

take them to themselves as subjects of theirs, so that it appeared to them 

(the Romans) they could not honorably evade (the obligation) of defending 

them, and (hence) take up that war. For it indeed appeared reasonable to the 

Romans not to defend the Campanians as friends against the Samnites, who were 

their friends, but it seemed to them disgraceful not to defend them as 

subjects, even though voluntary ones, judging that if they did not undertake 

such defense, it would alienate all those who should plan to come under 

their dominion. And as the aim of Rome was Empire and Glory, and not Quiet, 

she could not refuse this enterprise.



This same cause gave beginning to the first war against the Carthaginians 

because of the defense of the Messenians in Sicily which the Romans 

undertook, which was also by chance. But the second war which afterwards 

arose between them was not by chance, for Hannibal the Carthaginian Captain 

assaulted the Saguntines friends of the Romans in Spain, not to injure them, 

but to move the Romans to arms, and to have occasion to combat them and pass 

into Italy. This method of kindling new wars has always been customary among 

Powers, and who have some respect for the faith (treaties) with others. For 

if I want to make war against a Prince, and have between us a signed treaty 

observed for a long time, I would assault a friend of his very own with some 

other pretext and justification, especially knowing that in assaulting his 

friend either he would resent it and I would obtain my intention of making 

war against him, or if he did not resent it, his weakness and unfaithfulness 

in not defending his ally will take away reputation from him, and to execute 

my designs more easily.



It ought to be noted, therefore, because of the dedication of the Campanians 

in setting the war in motion in the way mentioned above, that the best 

remedy which a City has, that is unable to defend itself, but wants to 

defend itself in whatever manner against anyone who should assault them: 

which is to give itself freely to whomever they design to defend them, as 

the Campanians did to the Romans, and the Florentines to King Robert of 

Naples, who, unwilling to defend them as friends, defended them afterwards 

as subjects against the forces of Castruccio of Lucca who was pressing them 

hard.



                    CHAPTER X



MONEY IS NOT THE SINEW OF WAR ALTHOUGH THIS IS COMMON OPINION



Because anyone can commence a war at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it, 

a Prince ought before he undertakes an enterprise to measure his forces, and 

govern himself in accordance with them. But he ought to have so much 

prudence as not to deceive himself of the two forces: and he will deceive 

himself every time when he measures it either by his money, or by the 

location (of his country), or by good will of his people, while on the other 

hand he lacks his own arms. For although the above things will increase his 

strength, (but) they will not give it to him, and of themselves are nothing, 

and will not be of benefit without trustworthy arms. For without them, great 

amounts of money will not suffice you, the strength of the country will not 

benefit you, and the faith and good will of men will not endure, as these 

cannot remain faithful to you if you are not able to defend them. Every 

mountain, every lake, every inaccessible place becomes a plain where strong 

defenders are lacking. Money alone, also, will not defend you, but causes 

you to be plundered more readily. Nor can that common opinion be more false 

which says that money is the sinew of war. Which sentence was said by 

Quintus Curtius in the war which existed between Antipater the Macedonian 

and the King of Sparta, where he narrates that because of a want of money 

the King of Sparta was obliged to come to battle and was routed, that if he 

had deferred the fight a few days the news of the death of Alexander in 

Greece would have arrived, whence he would have remained victor without 

fighting. But lacking money, and being apprehensive that, for the want of 

which, his army would abandon him, was constrained to try the fortune of 

battle. So that for this reason Quintus Curtius affirms money to be the 

sinew of war. Which opinion is alleged every day, and acted on by not so 

prudent Princes to whom it is enough to follow it: For relying on it, they 

believe it is enough to have much treasure to defend themselves, and do not 

think that if treasure should be enough to win, that Darius would have 

vanquished Alexander, the Greeks would have vanquished the Romans, and in 

our times Duke Charles would have vanquished the Swiss, and a few days ago 

the Pope and the Florentine together would not have had difficulty in 

defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Julius II, in the war at Urbino. But 

all the above named were vanquished by those who esteemed not money, but good 

soldiers, as the sinew of war.



Among other things that Croesus, King of Lydia, showed to Solon the Athenian 

was a countless treasure: and asking what he thought his power to be, Solon 

answered that he did not judge him more powerful because of that, because 

war was made with iron and not gold, and that someone might come who had 

more iron than he and would take it away from him. In addition to this, 

when, after the death of Alexander the Great, a great multitude of Gauls 

passed into Greece and then into Asia, and the Gauls sent Ambassadors to the 

King of Macedonia to treat of certain accords, that King to show his power 

and to dismay them showed them much gold and silver: whence those Gauls who 

had already as good as signed the peace broke it, so much did the desire 

grow in them to take away that gold. And thus was that King despoiled by the 

very thing that he had accumulated for defense. The Venetians a few years 

ago also, having their Treasury full of treasure, lost the State without 

being able to be defended by it.



I say, therefore, that gold ((as common opinion shouts)) is not the sinew of 

war, but good soldiers; because gold is not sufficient to find good 

soldiers, but good soldiers are indeed sufficient to find gold. To the 

Romans ((if they had wanted to make war more with money instead of with 

iron)) it would not have been enough to have all the treasure of the world, 

considering the great enterprises that they made and the difficulties that 

they had to encounter. But making their wars with iron, they never suffered 

from want of gold, because it was brought, even up to their camps, by those 

who feared them. And if that King of Sparta, because of a dearth of money, 

had to try the fortune of battle, that which happened to him on account of 

money many times would have happened for other causes; for it has been seen 

that any army lacking provisions, and being obliged either to die of hunger 

or to engage in battle, will always take the side of fighting as being more 

honorable, and where fortune can in some way favor you. It has also happened 

many times that a Captain, seeing succor come to the army of his enemy, has 

preferred to come to an engagement with him at once and try the fortune of 

battle, rather than wait until he is reinforced and then have to fight him 

in any case under a thousand disadvantages. It has also been seen, how it 

happened to Hasdrubal when he was assaulted in the Marca (Metaurus River) by 

Claudius Nero, together with the other Roman Consul, that a Captain obliged 

either to fight or flee, always elects to fight, it seeming to him in this 

way, even if most doubtful, to be able to win, but in the other to lose in 

any case.



There are many necessities, therefore, which make a Captain choose the side 

of coming to battle against his will, among which sometimes it can be the 

dearth of money, but not for this ought money to be judged the sinew of war 

more than other things which induce men to a similar necessity. Repeating 

again, therefore, the sinew of war is not gold, but good soldiers. Money is 

indeed necessary in a secondary place, but it is a necessity that good 

soldiers by themselves will overcome; for it is impossible that good 

soldiers will lack money, as it is for money by itself to find good 

soldiers. Every history in a thousand places shows that which we say to be 

true, notwithstanding that Pericles had counselled the Athenians to make war 

with all the Peloponnesus, showing that they could win that war with 

perseverance and by the power of money. And although in that war the 

Athenians at times had prospered, in the end they lost, and the good 

counsels and good soldiers of Sparta were of more value than the 

perseverance and the money of Athens. But the testimony of Titus Livius is 

more direct than any other, where, discussing if Alexander the Great should 

have come into Italy, if he would have vanquished the Romans, he showed 

three things to be necessary for war, many and good soldiers, prudent 

Captains, and good fortune: where examining whether the Romans or Alexander 

should have prevailed in these things, afterwards makes his conclusion 

without ever mentioning money. The Campanians had, when they were requested 

by the Sidicians to take up arms of them against the Samnites, to measure 

their power by money and not by soldiers; for having undertaken the 

proceeding to aid them, after two defeats were constrained to make 

themselves tributaries of the Romans if they wanted to save themselves.



                    CHAPTER XI



IT IS NOT A PRUDENT PROCEEDING TO MAKE AN ALLIANCE WITH A PRINCE WHO HAS 

MORE REPUTATION THAN POWER



Titus Livius, wanting to show the error of the Sidicians in trusting to the 

aid of the Campanians, and the error of the Campanians in believing 

themselves able to defend them, could not say it with more forceful words, 

saying, The Campanians brought a greater name in aid of the Sidicians, than 

they did men for protecting them. Where it ought to be noted that leagues 

made with Princes who have neither the convenience of aiding you because of 

the remoteness of their location nor the strength to do so because of 

disorganization or other reasons of theirs, bring more notoriety than aid to 

those who trust in them: as happened in our times to the Florentines, when 

in one thousand four hundred seventy nine (1479) the Pope and the King of 

Naples assaulted them, that being friends of the King of France derived from 

that friendship more notoriety than protection; as also would happen to that 

Prince who should undertake some enterprise trusting himself to the Emperor 

Maximilian, because this is one of those friendships that would bring to 

whoever made it more notoriety than protection, as is said in this treatise 

of what that of the Campanians brought to the Sidicians.



¶ The Campanians, therefore, erred in this part by imagining themselves to 

have more strength than they had. And thus little prudence sometimes does to 

men, who not knowing how nor being able to defend themselves, want to 

undertake enterprises to defend others; as also the Tarentines did, who, 

when the Roman armies encountered the Samnites, sent ambassadors to the 

Roman Consul to make him understand that they wanted peace between those two 

people, and that they were ready to make war against the one that should 

refuse peace. So that the Consul, laughing at this proposition, in the 

presence of the ambassadors, had the (bugle) sound for battle and commanded 

his army to go and meet the enemy, showing the Tarentines by acts and not 

words of what a reply they were worthy. 



¶ And having in the present chapter discussed the wrong proceedings which 

Princes undertake for the defense of others, in the following one I want to 

talk of those means they should undertake for their own defense.



                   CHAPTER XII



IS IT BETTER, FEARING TO BE ASSAULTED, TO CARRY OUT OR AWAIT WAR



I have heard from men much practiced in the things of war some time discuss 

whether, if there are two Princes of almost equal strength, if one more 

stalwart has declared war against the other, what would be the better 

proceeding for the other, either to await the enemy within his own 

boundaries, or to go out to meet him in his house and assault him. And I 

have heard reasons cited on every side. And those who defend the going out 

to assault the other, cite the counsel that Croesus gave to Cyrus when, 

having arrived at the confines of the Messagates to make war against them, 

their Queen Tamiri sent to say that they should select which of the two 

proceedings they wanted, either to enter her Kingdom where she would await 

him, or that he want her to come out to meet him: And the matter coming 

under discussion, Croesus, against the opinion of the others, said that he 

would go to meet her, saying that if he should vanquish her at a distance 

from her kingdom, he would not be able to take away her kingdom because she 

would have time to recover; but if he should vanquish her within her 

confines he could follow her in flight and, by not giving her time to 

recover, could take away her State from her. He also cites the counsel that 

Hannibal gave Antiochus when that king planned to make war against the 

Romans, where he showed that the Romans could not be beaten except in Italy, 

for there the others could avail themselves of the arms and the wealth of 

their friends; but whoever would combat them outside Italy and would leave 

Italy free to them, he would leave them that font which would never lack 

life in supplying strength where it was needed: and he concluded that Rome 

could be taken from the Romans easier than the Empire, and Italy before the 

other provinces. He also cites Agatocles, who, not being able to sustain the 

war at home, assaulted the Carthaginians who were waging it against him, and 

reduced them to ask for peace. He cites Scipio, who, to lift the war from 

Italy, assaulted Africa.



Those who speak to the contrary say that he who wants to inflict an evil on 

the enemy will draw him away from home. They cite the Athenians, who, as 

long as they made war convenient to their home, remained superior, but that 

when they went a distance with their armies into Sicily, lost their liberty. 

They cite the poetic fables where it is shown that Anteus, King of Libya, 

being assaulted by Hercules the Egyptian, was insuperable as long as he 

awaited him within the confines of his own kingdom, but as soon as he went 

off a distance, through the astuteness of Hercules, lost the State and his 

life. Whence a place is given to the fable of Anteus who, when (thrown) on 

the ground, recovered his strength from his mother which was the earth, and 

that Hercules, becoming aware of this, lifted him high (and) off the ground. 

They also cite modern judges. Everyone knows that Ferrando, King of Naples, 

was held to be a most wise Prince in his time, and when two years before his 

death, news came that the King of France, Charles VIII, wanted to come to 

assault him, after he had made preparations, but fell sick, and as he was 

approaching death, among other advices he left to his son Alfonso, was that 

he should await the enemy inside the Kingdom, and for nothing in thy world 

to withdraw his forces outside of his State, but should await him entirely 

within all his borders. Which (advice) was not observed by him, but sending 

an army into the Romagna, without a fight, lost it and the State. In 

addition to the instances described, the reasons that are cited in favor of 

every (both) side are: That he who assaults comes with more spirit than he 

who awaits, which makes the army more confident. In addition to this, many 

advantages are taken away from the enemy to be able to avail himself of his 

resources, (and) he will not be able to avail himself of those from his 

subjects who have been plundered; and as the enemy is in his house, the Lord 

is constrained to have more regard in extracting money from them and in 

overworking them, so that that font comes to dry up, as Hannibal says, which 

makes him able to sustain the war. In addition to this, his solders, because 

they find themselves in the countries of others, are more necessitated to 

fight, and that necessity makes virtu, as we have several times said.



On the other hand, it is said that in awaiting the enemy one waits with many 

advantages, for without any inconvenience you can cause great inconveniences 

of provisions and of every other thing which an army needs: You can better 

impede his designs because of the greater knowledge of the country you have 

than he: You can meet him with more strength because of being able to unite 

(concentrate) (your forces) easily, while he cannot take his all away from 

home: You can ((if defeated)) recover easily, as much because much can be 

saved of your army having places of refuge near, as well as reinforcements 

do not have to come from a distance, so that you come to risk all your forces 

but not all your fortune; but taking yourself to a distance you risk all 

your fortune but not all your strength. And there have been some who, in 

order better to weaken their enemy, have allowed him to enter several days 

(march) into their country and to take many Towns, so that by leaving 

garrisons everywhere his army is weakened, and then they are able to combat 

him the more easily.



But to say now what I think, I believe that this distinction ought to be 

made: either I have my country armed like the Romans and as the Swiss have, 

or I have it disarmed like the Carthaginians, and as have the Kings of 

France and the Italians. In this (latter) case the enemy ought to be kept 

distant from home, for your virtu being in money and not in men, whenever 

that (money) may be impeded to you, you are lost, and nothing will impede it 

to you as war at home. As an example, there are the Carthaginians, who, as 

long as they were undisturbed at home with their revenues, could make war 

against the Romans, but when they were assaulted (in their own country) they 

were unable to resist (even) Agathocles. The Florentines did not have any 

remedy against Castruccio, Lord of Lucca, because he waged war against them 

at home, so that they were obliged to give themselves ((in order to be 

defended)) to King Robert of Naples. But after the death of Castruccio, 

those same Florentines had the courage to assault the Duke of Milan in his 

home (territory) and work to take away his Kingdom. As much virtu as they 

showed in distant wars, just so much baseness (did they show) in nearby 

ones. But when Kingdoms are armed as Rome was armed and as the Swiss are, 

the more difficult are they to overcome the nearer you are to them. For 

these bodies (states) can unite more forces to resist an attack (impetus) 

than they are able to assault others. Nor am I moved in this case by the 

authority of Hannibal, because his passion and his interests make him say 

thusly to Antiochus. For if the Romans had experienced in Gaul three such 

defeats in so great a space of time as they had in Italy from Hannibal, 

without doubt they would have been beaten; for they would not have availed 

themselves of the remnants of the armies as they did in Italy, (and) could 

not have reorganized them with the same ease, nor could they have resisted 

the enemy with that same strength as they were able to. It has never been 

found that they ever sent outside armies of more than fifty thousand men in 

order to assault a province: but to defend themselves at home against the 

Gauls after the first Punic war, they put eighteen hundred thousand men 

under arms. Nor could they have put to rout those (Gauls) in Lombardy as 

they routed them in Tuscany, for they could not have led so great a force 

against so great a number of enemies at so great a distance, nor fight them 

with such advantage. The Cimbrians routed a Roman army in Germany; nor did 

the Romans have a remedy. But when they (Cimbrians) came into Italy and they 

(Romans) were able to put all their forces together, they destroyed them 

(Cimbrians). The Swiss are. easily beaten when away from home where they 

cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men, but it is very difficult 

to beat them at home where they are able to gather together a hundred 

thousand.



I conclude again, therefore, that that Prince who has his people armed and 

organized for war should always await a powerful and dangerous war (enemy) 

at home and not go out to meet it. But that (Prince) who has his subjects 

unarmed and the country unaccustomed to war, should always keep it as 

distant as he can. And thus one and the other ((each in his own manner)) 

will defend himself better.



                   CHAPTER XIII



THAT ONE COMES FROM THE BOTTOM TO A GREAT FORTUNE MORE BY FRAUD THAN BY 

FORCE



I believe it to be a most true thing that it rarely or never happens that 

men of little fortune come to high rank without force and without fraud, 

unless that rank to which others have come is not obtained either by gift or 

by heredity. Nor do I believe that force alone will ever be found to be 

enough; but it will be indeed found that fraud alone will be enough; as 

those will clearly see who read the life of Philip of Macedonia, that of 

Agathocles the Sicilian, and many such others, who from the lowest, or 

rather low, fortune have arrived either to a Kingdom or to very great 

Empires. Xenophon shows in his life of Cyrus this necessity to deceive, 

considering that the first expedition that he has Cyrus make against the 

King of Armenia is full of fraud, and that he makes him occupy his Kingdom 

by deceit and not by force. And he does not conclude anything else from such 

action except that to a Prince who wants to do great things, it is necessary 

to learn to deceive. In addition to this, he made Cyraxes, King of the Medes, 

his maternal uncle, to be deceived in so many ways, without which fraud he 

shows that Cyrus could not have achieved that greatness he attained. Nor do 

I believe anyone will ever be found of such fortune to have arrived at great 

Empire only by force and ingenuity, but indeed only by fraud, as did 

Giovanni Galeazzo in order to take away the State and Dominion of Lombardy 

from his uncle Messer Bernabo. And that which Princes are obliged to do at 

the beginning of their expansions, Republics are also obliged to do until 

they have become powerful so that force alone will be enough. And as Rome 

used every means, either by chance or by election, necessary to achieve 

greatness, she did not also hesitate to use this one (fraud). Nor could she, 

in the beginning, use greater deceit than to take up the method discussed 

above by us to make associates for herself, because under this name she made 

them her slaves, as were the Latins, and other surrounding people. For first 

she availed herself of their arms to subdue the neighboring peoples and to 

take up the reputation of the State: after subduing them, she achieved such 

great expansion that she could beat everyone. And the Latins never became 

aware that they were wholly slaves until they saw two routs of the Samnites 

and (saw them) constrained to come to an accord. As this victory greatly 

increased the reputation of the Romans with the distant Princes, who heard 

the Roman name and not their arms, generating envy and suspicion in those 

who saw and felt those arms, among whom were the Latins. And so much was 

this envy and so powerful this fear, that not only the Latins, but the 

colonies they had in Latium, together with the Associates who had been 

defended a short time before, conspired against the Roman name. And the 

Latins began this war in the way mentioned above that the greater part of 

wars are begun, not by assaulting the Romans, but by defending the Sidicians 

against the Samnites, against whom the Samnites were making war with the 

permission of the Romans. And that it is true that the Latins began the war 

because they had recognized this deceit, is shown by T. Livius through the 

mouth of Annius Setinus, a Latin Praetor, who in their council said these 

words: If even now under the pretext of equal confederates, we can suffer 

servitude, etcetera.



It will be seen, therefore, that the Romans in their first expansions did 

not also lack using fraud; which has always been necessary for those to use 

who, from small beginnings, want to rise to sublime heights, which is less 

shameful when it is more concealed, as was this of the Romans.



                   CHAPTER XIV



MEN OFTEN DECEIVE THEMSELVES BELIEVING THAT BY HUMILITY THEY OVERCOME 

HAUGHTINESS



Many times it is seen that humility not only does not benefit, but harms, 

especially when it is used by insolent men who, either from envy or for 

other reasons, have conceived a hatred against you. Of this our Historian 

gives proof on the occasion of the war between the Romans and the Latins. 

For when the Samnites complained to the Romans that the Latins had assaulted 

them, the Romans did not want to prohibit such a war to the Latins, desired 

not to irritate them; which not only did not irritate them, but made them 

become more spirited against them (Romans), and they discovered themselves 

as enemies more quickly. Of which, the words of the aforementioned Annius, 

the Latin Praetor, in that same council, attest, where he says: You have 

tried their patience in denying them military aid: why do you doubt this 

should excite them? Yet they have borne this pain. They have heard we are 

preparing an army against their confederates, the Samnites, yet have not 

moved from their City. Whence is there such modesty, except from their 

recognition of both our virility and theirs? It is very clearly recognized, 

therefore, by this text how much the patience of the Romans increased the 

arrogance of the Latins. And therefore a Prince ought never to forego his 

own rank, and ought never to forego anything by accord, wanting to forego it 

honorably, unless he is able or believes that he is able to hold it; for it 

is almost always better ((matters having been brought to the point where you 

cannot forego it in the manner mentioned)) to allow it to be taken away by 

force, rather than by fear of force; for if you permit it from fear, you do 

so in order to avoid war, but most of the times you do not avoid it, for he 

to whom you have from baseness conceded this, will not be satisfied, but 

will want to take other things away from you, and he will excite himself 

more against you esteeming you less: and on the other hand, in your favor 

you will find the defenders more cold, it appearing to them that you are 

either weak or a coward: but as soon as you discover the intention of the 

adversary, if you prepare your forces, even though they may be inferior to 

his, he will begin to respect you, (and) the other neighboring Princes will 

respect you more, and the desire to aid you will come to those ((being armed 

by you)) who, even if you gave yourself up, would never aid you.



This is what is learned when you have an enemy: but when you have several, 

to render to some of them some of your possessions, either to gain him over 

to yourself even though war should already have broken out, or to detach 

your enemies from the other confederates, is always a prudent proceeding.



                   CHAPTER XV



WEAK STATES ARE ALWAYS AMBIGUOUS IN THEIR RESOLUTIONS, AND WEAK DECISIONS 

ARE ALWAYS HARMFUL



In connection with this same matter and with the origin of the war between 

the Latins and the Romans it can be noted, that in all deliberations it is 

well to come to the point of what it is to be decided and not to be always 

ambiguous, nor to remain uncertain of the matter. Which is manifestly seen 

in the deliberation that the Latins held when they thought of alienating 

themselves from the Romans. For having foreseen this bad mood that had come 

upon the Latin people, the Romans in order to assure themselves of the 

matter and to see if they could regain those people to themselves without 

resorting to arms, made them understand that they should send eight Citizens 

to Rome, because they wanted to consult with them. The Latins, learning of 

this, and being conscious of many things done against the wishes of the 

Romans, called a council to arrange who should go to Rome and to give them 

the commission of what they should say: And while this was deliberated in 

the councils, their Praetor Annius said these words: I judge it to be most 

important for our interest, that we should think of what we shall do that 

what we shall say: when we have decided that, it will be easy to accommodate 

our words (the details of our counsels) to our acts. These words without 

doubt are very true, and ought to be of benefit to every Prince and every 

Republic; for words are not made to explain the ambiguity and incertitude of 

that which is to be done, but once the mind is fixed, and that which is to 

be done decided, it is an easy thing to find the words. I have the more 

willingly noted this part, as I have known many such indecisions to 

interfere with public actions, with damage and shame to our Republic: And 

this will always happen that in doubtful proceedings and where spirit is 

needed in making decisions, this ambiguity (indecision) will exist when 

these deliberations and decisions have to be made by weak men. Slow and late 

decisions are also not less harmful than ambiguous ones, especially when 

they have to decide in favor of some friend, for no person is helped by 

their lateness, and it injures oneself. Such decisions so made proceed from 

feebleness of spirit and strength or from the malignity of those who have to 

decide, who, moved by their own passion to want to ruin the State or to 

fulfill some desire of theirs, do not allow the deliberations to proceed, 

but impede and thwart them. For good citizens ((even though they see a 

popular fad turning itself into a perilous course)) never impede 

deliberations, especially when those matters cannot be delayed.



After the death of Hieronymus, Tyrant of Syracuse, while the war between the 

Carthaginians and the Romans was at its height, a dispute arose among the 

Syracusans whether they ought to follow the Roman friendship (alliance) or 

the Carthaginian. And so great was the ardor of the parties that they 

remained undecided, nor was any action taken, until at last Appolonides, one 

of the first men of Syracuse, with a speech (of his) full of prudence, 

showed that those who held the opinion to adhere to the Romans were not to 

be blamed, nor those who wanted to follow the Carthaginian side; but that it 

was right to detest that indecision and tardiness in taking up the 

proceeding, because he saw surely the proceeding had been undertaken (the 

decision made), whatever it might be, some good could be hoped for. Nor 

could T. Livius show better than in this case the damage done by remaining 

undecided. He shows it also in the case of the Latins, for the Lavinians 

seeking their aid against the Romans, they delayed so long in determining 

upon it that, when they had just gone out of the gate with forces to give 

them succor, the news arrived that the Latins were routed. Whence Milonius, 

their Praetor, said: This short march would cost us much with the Roman 

people: For if they had decided at once either to help or not to help the 

Latins, they would by not aiding them not have irritated the Romans; and by 

helping them, the aid being in time, they could by joining forces enable 

them to win; but by delaying, they would come to lose in any case, as 

happened to them.



And if the Florentines had noted this text, they would not have received so 

much injury or so much trouble from the French as they had in the passage of 

King Louis XII of France to make war against Lodovico, Duke of Milan, in 

Italy. For the King when he was considering such a passage sought to make an 

accord with the Florentines, and the ambassadors to the King made an accord 

with him that they would remain neutral, and that the King after coming into 

Italy should take their State under his protection, and gave the City one 

month to ratify it. This ratification was delayed by those who, because of 

little prudence, favored the affairs of Lodovico, so that the King having 

already achieved his victory, and the Florentines then wanting to ratify it, 

the ratification was not accepted, as he recognized that the friendship of 

the Florentines came by force and not voluntarily. Which cost the City of 

Florence much money, and was to lose them the State, as happened to them 

another time from similar causes. And that proceeding was so much more 

damnable because it did not even serve the Duke Lodovico, who, if he had 

won, would have shown more signs of enmity against the Florentines than did 

the King.



And although above in another chapter I have discussed the evil that results 

to a Republic from this weakness, none the less having a new opportunity for 

a new incident, I wanted to repeat it, especially as it seems to me a matter 

that ought to be noted by Republics similar to ours.



                   CHAPTER XVI



HOW MUCH THE SOLDIERS IN OUR TIMES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE ANCIENT 

ORGANIZATION



The most important engagement ever fought in any war with any nation by the 

Roman People, was that which they had with the Latin people during the 

Consulate of Torquatus and of Decius. As every reason would have it, just as 

by the loss of the battle the Latins became slaves, so too the Romans would 

have been slaves if they had not won. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, 

because on both sides he makes the armies equal in organization, in virtu, 

in obstinacy, and in numbers: the only difference he makes is that the Heads 

of the Roman army were of more virtu than those of the Latin army. It will 

also be seen that in the managing of this engagement, two incidents arose 

which had not arisen before, and that afterwards were rare examples; that of 

the two Consuls, in order to uphold the courage of the soldiers and keep 

them obedient to their command and more deliberate in action, one killed 

himself and the other his son. The equality which Titus Livius says existed 

in these armies resulted from their having fought together a long time, 

having the same language, the same discipline, and the same arms: For they 

held to the same manner in the order of battle, and the organizations and 

Heads of the organization had the same names: Being of equal strength and of 

equal virtu, it was therefore necessary that something extraordinary should 

arise which would make one more firm and obstinate than the other; in which 

obstinacy victory ((as was said at another time)) was contained; for so long 

as that endured in the breasts of those who combatted, no army will ever 

turn its back. And as it endured more in the breasts of the Romans than in 

the Latins, partly chance and partly the virtu of the Consuls gave rise that 

Torquatus had to kill his son and Decius himself. 



In demonstrating this equality of strength, T. Livius shows the whole 

organization that the Romans had in the armies and in battles. As he has 

explained this at length, I will not otherwise repeat it; but I will discuss 

only that which I judge to be notable, and that which, because it is 

neglected by all Captains of these times, has caused many disorders in 

armies and battles. I say, then, that from the text of Livius it is gathered 

that the Roman armies were composed of three principal divisions, which in 

Tuscan can be called Ranks, and they named the first Astati, the second 

Principi, the third Triari, and each of these had its cavalry. In organizing 

a battle they put the Astati in front, directly behind in the second line 

they placed the Principi, and in the same manner in the third line they 

placed the Triari. The cavalry of all of these orders were placed to the 

right and the left of these three battalions, the ranks of which cavalry, 

from their shape and place, they called Alae (Wings), because they seemed 

like two wings of that body. They arranged the first ranks of the Astati, 

which were in the front and serried in a way that it could strike or sustain 

(the attack of) the enemy. The second line of the Principi ((as it was not 

the first in combat, but was bound to support the first line when it was 

struck or hurled back)), they did not make straight, but maintained its 

order open (thin) and of a kind so that it could receive within itself the 

first line, without disordering itself, whenever, pushed by the enemy, it 

should be necessary for them to retreat. The third line of the Triari was 

arranged even more open than the second, in order to receive within itself, 

if need be, the first two lines of Principi, and Astati. These three ranks 

thus deployed kindled the battle, and if the Astati were forced or overcome, 

they retreated into the open ranks of the Principi, and the two ranks being 

united together into one body rekindled the battle: if these were also 

forced or rebuffed, they both retired into the open ranks of the Triari, and 

all these ranks becoming one body, renewed the fight; where, if they were 

overcome ((for not having further reinforcements)) they lost the engagement. 

And as every time that this last rank of Triari became engaged, the army was 

in danger, and gave rise to that proverb, The matter has come to the Triari, 

which in Tuscan usage means to say, we have put up the last resource.



The captains of our times, having abandoned entirely the organization and no 

longer observing the ancient discipline, have thus abandoned this part which 

is not of little importance: for whoever arranges (his army) so as to be 

able to reorganize three times in an engagement, must have fortune inimical 

to him three times in order to lose, and must have (pitted) against him a 

virtu three times as adept to overcome him. But whoever cannot maintain 

himself against the first onrush ((as the Christian armies are today)) can 

lose easily, for every disorder, every half-way virtu, can take away the 

victory. And that which prevents our armies from being able to reorganize 

three times is to have lost the manner of receiving one rank into the other. 

Which arises because at present engagements are arranged with two defects: 

either their ranks are formed shoulder to shoulder, and make their battle 

line wide in front and thin in depth, which makes it very weak from having 

too few men in the depth of the ranks: or, in order to make it stronger, 

they reduce the ranks (in width of the front), in accordance as the Romans 

did; if the first rank is broken, there not being an arrangement to be 

received by the second, they will be entangled all together, and rout 

themselves; for if that front rank is pushed back, it will be hurled on the 

second; if the second rank wants to go forward, it is impeded by the first: 

Whence that the first being hurled upon the second, and the second on the 

third, there ensues so much confusion that the slightest accident often 

ruins an army.



In the battle at Ravenna, which was ((according to our times)) a very 

well-fought engagement, in which the Captain of the French forces, Monsignor 

De Foix, was killed, the Spanish and French armies were organized in one of 

the above mentioned methods, that is, that the one and the other army came 

with all its forces arranged shoulder to shoulder so as to have a wide front 

and little depth. And thus they always did when they had a large field as 

they had at Ravenna: for recognizing the disorder that is caused in 

retiring, when they put themselves all into one rank, they avoid it when 

they can by making the front wide, as has been said; but when the country is 

restricted, they remain in the disorder described above without thinking of 

a remedy. In similar disorder the cavalry rides through the enemy's country, 

either for plunder or for some other purpose of war. And at Santo Regolo and 

elsewhere in the war against Pisa, where the Florentines were routed by the 

Pisans in the (time of the) war which existed between the Florentines and 

that City because of her rebellion, after the passage of Charles, King of 

France, into Italy; that ruin did not result from anything else than the 

friendly cavalry, which being in front and repulsed by the enemy, was thrown 

back into the Florentine infantry and broke it, whence all the remaining 

forces turned back: and Messer Criaco Del Borgo, Head of the Florentine 

infantry, has affirmed in my presence many times that he would never have 

been routed except for the cavalry of his friends. The Swiss who are masters 

of modern war, when they fought for the French, above all things they take 

care to put themselves on the side where the friendly cavalry, if it should 

be repulsed, will not be hurled back on them.



And although this thing would appear easy to understand and not easy to do, 

none the less there has not yet been found any of our contemporary Captains 

who have imitated the ancient order and corrected the modem one. And 

although they also divide their army into three parts, calling one part the 

Vanguard, the next the Battle Corps, and the last the Rearguard, they do not 

serve themselves of it other than to command them in their quarters; but in 

using it, it is a rare thing ((as was said above)) that they do to unite 

them all in one body, so that they all share the same fortune: And as many, 

to excuse their ignorance, allege that the violence of the artillery will 

not allow the same arrangements that the ancients had to be used in these 

times, I want to discuss this matter in the following chapter, and to 

examine whether the artillery impedes them so that it is not possible to use 

the ancient virtu.



                   CHAPTER XVII



HOW MUCH THE ARMY OUGHT TO ESTEEM THE ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT TIMES, AND IF 

THAT OPINION THAT IS GENERALLY HAD OF IT IS TRUE



In addition to the things written above, in considering how the many field 

fights, called in our times by the French word Engagements (Giornate), and 

by the Italians Deeds of arms, were fought by the Romans at diverse times, I 

have thought upon the general opinions of many, which hold that if artillery 

had existed in those days the Romans would not have been permitted to 

conquer provinces and make other people tributary to themselves as they did, 

nor would they in any way have been able to make such large acquisitions: 

They say also that because of these instrument of fire men are not able to 

use or show their virtu as they were able to anciently. And a third thing 

should be added that one now comes to the joining of battle with more 

difficulty than formerly, nor is it possible to maintain the same discipline 

as in those times, so that in time wars will be reduced to artillery 

(exchanges). And as I judge it not to be outside this subject to discuss 

whether such opinions are true, and whether artillery has increased or 

diminished the strength of armies, and whether it gives or takes away 

opportunity to good Captains of acting with virtu.



I shall begin by speaking concerning the first opinion that the ancient 

Roman armies would not have made the conquests that they did if artillery 

had existed: Upon which in replying, I say that war is made either to defend 

oneself or to take the offensive: whence it must first be examined as to 

which of these two kinds of war make it (artillery) more useful or more 

damaging. And although there is something to say on both sides, none the 

less I believe that beyond comparison it does more damage to whoever defends 

himself than to whoever attacks. The reason I say this is that he who 

defends himself is either inside some fortified place or in a camp within a 

stockade: and if he is inside a town, either this town is small as are the 

greater part of the fortresses, or it is large: in the first case whoever 

defends himself is entirely lost, for the impetus of the artillery is such 

that a wall has not yet been found which is so strong that in a few days it 

will be battered down by it; and if whoever is inside does not have 

considerable space for retreat, and (cannot protect himself) with ditches 

and earthworks, he is lost, nor can he sustain the attack of the enemy who 

would then enter through the breach in the wall: nor will the artillery he 

has be of any benefit to him in this, for there is a maxim that where men 

attack in mass, the artillery will not stop them; and thus the fury of the 

Ultramontanes in the defense of their lands has never been resisted: the 

assaults of the Italians are easily resisted, as they go in battle, not in 

mass, but in small detachments, which by their own name are called 

Scaramouches (skirmishes): and when they deliberately go in this disordered 

manner into a breach in a wall where there is artillery, they go to a 

certain death, for against them the artillery is of value: but when they go 

in a dense mass, and one pushes the other as they come to a break, if they 

are not impeded by ditches or earthworks, they enter in every place and 

artillery will not hold them: and if some are killed, they cannot be so many 

that they would impede the victory. That this is true has been recognized by 

the many conquests made by the Ultramontanes in Italy, and especially that 

of Brescia; for when that land rebelled against the French, and the fortress 

being still held by the King of France, the Venetians, in order to resist 

the attacks which could come from the town, had fortified all the road that 

descends from the fortress to the City with artillery, placing it in front 

and on the flanks and in every convenient place: of which Monsignor De Foix 

took no account, rather, with his squadron, he descended on foot, and 

passing through the midst of it (the artillery) occupied the City, nor from 

what was heard had he received any recordable damage. So that whoever 

defends himself in a small area ((as was said)) and finding the walls of his 

town breached, and does not have space to retreat with earthworks and 

ditches, and have to rely on artillery, will quickly be lost. 



If you defend a large town and have the convenience of retreating, I none 

the less maintain beyond comparison that artillery is more useful to whoever 

is outside than to whoever is inside. First, because if you want artillery 

to harm those outside, you are necessitated to raise yourself with it above 

the level of the surrounding land, for being on the plain, every little 

embankment and earthwork that the enemy raises remains secure, and you 

cannot harm him, so that by having to raise it and draw it along the aisle 

between the walls, or in some other way raise it above the ground, you have 

two drawbacks: the first, that you cannot place artillery of the same size 

and power as those outside can bring to bear, as you are not able in a small 

place to handle large things: the other, no matter how well you can place 

it, you cannot make those earthworks trustworthy and secure in order to save 

the said artillery as those outside can do being on higher ground, and having 

that convenience and space which they themselves lacked: So that it is 

impossible to whoever defends a town to keep his artillery in elevated 

positions when those who are on the outside have plenty and powerful 

artillery: and if they have to place it in lower places, it becomes in large 

part useless, as has been said. So that the defense of a City is reduced to 

defending it with the same (manual) arms as was done anciently, and with 

small size artillery: from which little usefulness is derived ((because of 

the small size artillery)) unless there is a mine of disadvantages that 

counterweighs the advantage (of the artillery): for in respect to that, the 

walls of the town are kept low and almost buried in the ditches, so that 

when the battle comes to hand to hand fighting, either because the walls are 

breached or the ditches filled up, those inside have many more disadvantages 

than they had before. And therefore ((as was said above)) these instruments 

benefit much more whoever besieges the towns that whoever is besieged.



As to the third case when you are in a camp within a stockade and you do not 

want to come to an engagement unless it is at your convenience or advantage, 

I say that in this case you do not ordinarily have a better remedy to defend 

yourself without fighting than what the ancients had, and some times you may 

have greater disadvantage on account of your artillery: For if the enemy 

turns on you and has even a small advantage of ground, as can easily happen, 

and finds himself higher than you, or that at his arrival you have not yet 

finished your earthworks and covered yourself well with them, he quickly 

dislodges you before you have any remedy and you are forced to go out of 

your fortress and come to battle. This happened to the Spaniards in the 

engagement at Ravenna, who, being entrenched between the river Ronco and an 

earthwork which was built insufficiently high, and the French having a 

slight advantage of terrain, were constrained by the artillery to leave 

their fortified place and come to battle. But suppose ((as must often 

happen)) that the location you have chosen for your camp is higher than the 

other side at the (time of) encounter, and that your earthworks are good and 

secure, so that owing to the site and your other preparations, the enemy 

does not dare to assault you, in this case he will resort to those means 

that the ancients resorted to when one, with his army, was in a position 

where he could not be attacked, that is, he will overrun the country, take 

or besiege lands friendly to you and impede your provisions; so that you 

will be forced by some necessity to dislodge him, and come to battle, where 

artillery ((as will be mentioned below)) will not be of much use. 

Considering, therefore, in what manner the Romans made war, and observing 

that almost all their wars were to attack others and not to defend 

themselves, it will be seen ((if all the things said above were true)) that 

they would have had even greater advantage, and would have made their 

conquests more easily, if they should have lived in those times (of the 

advent of artillery).



As to the second proposition, that men are not able to show their virtu as 

they could anciently because of the use of artillery, I say that it is true 

that where men have to expose themselves in small groups, that they are 

exposed to greater danger than when they had to scale (the walls of) a town 

or make similar assaults, where men did not have to act bunched together, 

but by themselves one after the other. It is also true that the Captains and 

Heads of the army are now subjected to the danger of death than at that 

time, as they can be reached by artillery in every place, and it is of no 

benefit to them to be in the rear ranks, and protected by their strongest 

men: None the less it is seen that the one and the other of these dangers 

rarely caused extraordinary damages, for well fortified towns are not 

scaled, nor do you go to assault them with feeble attacks, but in wanting to 

conquer them, the matter is reduced to a siege, as was done anciently. And 

even in those places that can be conquered by assault, the dangers are not 

much greater now then they were then, for even in that time there did not 

lack to the defenders of towns means for throwing (missiles), which ((if 

they were not as furious (as cannon) is)) had a similar effect in killing 

men. As to the death of Captains and Candottieri, in the twenty four years 

in which there have been wars in Italy in recent times, there have been 

fewer examples then there were in any ten years time (of war) of the 

ancients. For, outside of Count Lodovico Della Mirandola ((who was killed at 

Ferrara when the Venetians assaulted that State a few years ago)) and the 

Duke of Nemours ((who was killed at Cirignuola)), it never happened that any 

were killed by artillery, since Monsignor De Foix was killed at Ravenna by 

steel (sword) and not by fire. So that if men do not show their virtu 

individually, it is not the result of the artillery, but from poor 

discipline and weakness of the armies, which, lacking virtu collectively, 

are not able to show it in the (individual) parts.



As to the third proposition mentioned by some, that it is no longer possible 

to come to hand-to-hand fighting, and that wars will be entirely conducted 

through artillery, I say this opinion is entirely false, and will always be 

so held by those who would want to manage their armies according to the 

ancient virtu: For whoever wants to create a good army must, by real or 

feigned exercises, accustom his men to meet the enemy, and to come against 

him with sword in hand and to seize him bodily, and he must rely more upon 

the infantry than on cavalry, for the reasons which will be mentioned below. 

And when they rely on infantry and on the aforementioned means (of 

training), the artillery will become entirely useless; for the infantry in 

meeting the enemy can escape the blows of the artillery with greater ease 

than anciently they were able to escape from the attacks of elephants, from 

scythed chariots, and other obsolete means of attack which the Roman 

infantry had to encounter, (and) against which they always found a remedy: 

and they would have found it so much more readily against this (artillery), 

as the time in which artillery can harm you is much shorter than that in 

which the elephants and chariots could do harm. For these disorganized you 

in the midst of battle, while that (the artillery) only impedes you before 

the battle; which impediment is easily avoided by the infantry either the 

nature of the site covering them or by lying down on the ground during the 

firing. Even experience has shown this not to be necessary, especially when 

defending themselves from large artillery, which cannot be so (accurately) 

aimed, (and) either ((if they are aimed high)) they pass over you, or ((if 

they are aimed low)) they do not reach you. Then when you have come with the 

army to hand to hand (fighting), this becomes clearer than light that 

neither the large nor the small artillery can then harm you. For if he has 

the artillery in front, you capture it, and if he has it in the rear, he 

first harms his friend rather than you: even on the flank he cannot harm you 

so, that you cannot go up to capture them, and the result mentioned above 

(first) will happen.



Nor is this disputed very much, because the example of the Swiss has been 

seen, who in MDXIII (1513) at Novara, without artillery or cavalry, went to 

encounter the French army armed with artillery within their fortresses, and 

routed them without having any impediment from that artillery. And the 

reason is ((in addition to the things mentioned above)) that the artillery, 

to be well served, has need to be guarded either by walls, ditches, or 

earthworks: and that if it lacks one of these guards, it is captured or 

becomes useless, as happens in open field engagements and battles when it is 

defended only by men. On the flank it cannot be employed except in that 

manner that the ancients used their catapults, which they placed outside of 

the squadrons, so that they should fight outside of the ranks, and every 

time they were pressed by cavalry or others, they took refuge within the 

legions. Who employs it otherwise does not understand it well, and relies on 

something which can easily deceive him. And if the Turk by means of 

artillery gained the victory over the Sofi (Persians) and the Soldan 

(Egyptians), it resulted from no other virtu than from the unaccustomed 

noise which frightened their cavalry. I conclude, therefore, coming to the 

end of this discussion, that artillery is useful in an army when it is mixed 

with the ancient virtu, but, without that, it is most useless against a 

valorous army.



                  CHAPTER XVIII



THAT BECAUSE OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROMANS AND BY THE EXAMPLE OF ANCIENT 

ARMIES, THE INFANTRY OUGHT TO BE MORE ESTEEMED THAN CAVALRY



And it can be clearly demonstrated by many arguments and by many examples 

how much the Romans in all their military actions esteemed the foot soldier 

more than the cavalry, and based all the plans of their forces on them: as 

is seen by many examples, and among others that which occurred when they 

came to battle with the Latins next to Lake Regillo, where the Roman army 

already having given way, made their cavalry descend from their horses in 

order to succor their foot soldiers, and by that means renewed the battle 

and obtained the victory. Where it is manifestly seen that the Romans had 

more confidence in their men, when on foot, than maintaining them on 

horseback. They used this same means in many other battles, and they always 

found it an optimum remedy in their dangers. Nor is the opinion of Hannibal 

opposed to this who, when he saw in the engagement at Cannae that the 

Consuls made their horsemen descend on foot, making a mock of a like 

proceeding, said: Quam malem vinctos mini traderent equites, that is, I 

would have more concern if they would give them to me bound. Which opinion, 

although coming from the mouth of a most excellent man, none the less if we 

have to go back to authority, we ought to believe more if it came from a 

Roman Republic and from so many excellent Captains which she produced, than 

to one single Hannibal; although even without authorities, there are 

manifest reasons, for a man can go into many places on foot where he cannot 

go on horseback: you can teach him to preserve the ranks, and should they be 

broken, how to reform them, but it is difficult to make horses preserve the 

ranks, and when they are disturbed impossible to reform them: in addition to 

this, it will be found ((as in men)) that some horses have little spirit and 

some have much, and many times it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by 

a base man, and a timid horse by a spirited man, and however this disparity 

arises, uselessness and disorder result. Well disciplined infantry can 

easily break the cavalry but only with difficulty can they be routed by 

them. Which opinion is corroborated ((in addition to many ancient and modern 

examples)) by the authority of those who make regulations for civil affairs, 

where they show that at first wars were begun to be fought by cavalry, 

because (good) infantry was not yet been organized: but as soon as this was 

done, it was quickly recognized how much more useful these were then 

cavalry: However, the cavalry is necessary in armies for reconnaissance, to 

overrun and plunder the country, and to pursue the enemy when in flight, and 

to be a part of the opposition to the cavalry of the adversaries: but the 

foundation and the sinew of the army, and that which should be more 

esteemed, ought to be the infantry.



And among the faults of the Italian Princes who have made Italy slave to 

foreigners, there is none greater than to have taken into little account 

this organization (infantry), and to have turned all their attention to 

mounted troops. Which error arose from the malignity of the Heads, and from 

the ignorance of those who ruled the State: For during the past twenty five 

years the Italian military have been brought under men who did not have a 

State, but were as Captains (Soldiers) of fortune, whose main thought was 

how they should be able to maintain their reputation by their being armed, 

and the Princes disarmed. And as a large number of infantry could not 

continuously be paid by them, and not having subjects of whom they could 

avail themselves, and as a small number would not give them reputation, they 

turned to keeping cavalry; for two hundred or three hundred cavalry paid by 

a Condottiere maintained his reputation, and the payment was not such that 

it could not be met by men who had a State: and so that this should be 

facilitated and to maintain themselves in even greater reputation, they took 

away all the affection for and the reputation of the infantry, and 

transferred those to their cavalry; and so greatly increased this disorder, 

that the infantry was a minimum part of any of the largest armies. Which 

usage ((together with many other disorders that accompanied it)) made the 

Italian military so weak, that their province has been easily trampled on by 

all the Ultramontanes. This error of esteeming cavalry more than infantry is 

shown more openly by another Roman example. The Romans were besieging Sora, 

and a squadron of cavalry having gone out from the town to assault the camp, 

the Master of the Roman cavalry went to meet it with his cavalry, and coming 

breast to breast, chance would have it that in the first shock the Heads of 

both armies were killed; and the fight continued none the less, while (both 

sides) remained without direction, when the Romans in order to overcome the 

enemy more easily, dismounted and forced the cavalry ((if they wanted to 

defend themselves)) to do similarly, and with all this the Romans carried 

the victory.



This example could not be better in demonstrating how much greater virtu 

there is in the infantry than in the cavalry; for if in the other cases the 

Consuls made the Roman cavalry dismount, it was to succor the infantry which 

was suffering and in need of aid; but in this case they dismounted, not to 

succor the infantry, nor to fight with enemy infantry, but a combat of 

cavalry against cavalry, (and) not being able to overcome them on horseback, 

they judged that by dismounting they would be able more easily to overcome 

them. I want to conclude, therefore, that a well organized infantry cannot 

be overcome without the greatest difficulty, except by another infantry. 

Crassus and Marc Anthony overran the dominion of Parthia for many days with 

very few cavalry and many infantry, and encountered innumerable cavalry of 

the Parthians. Crassus with part of the army was killed, Marc Anthony saved 

himself with virtu. None the less, in this Roman affliction is seen how much 

the infantry prevailed against the cavalry; for being in a large country 

where mountains are rare, rivers rarer, distant from the sea, and far from 

all conveniences, none the less, in the judgment of the Parthians 

themselves, he saved himself skillfully; nor did the Parthian cavalry ever 

dare to try the discipline of his army. If Crassus were returned to you, 

whoever examines his actions carefully will see that he was rather deceived 

than overpowered, and never in his greatest straits did the Parthians dare to 

hurl themselves against him, rather they always went on flanking him and 

impeding his provisions, (and) by promising them to him and then not 

observing it, they reduced him to the last extremity.



I believe I should have to endure more hard work in persuading (the reader) 

how much more superior is the virtu of the infantry than that of the 

cavalry, except that there are many modern examples which render the fullest 

testimony. And it has been seen how nine thousand Swiss at Novara, mentioned 

above by us, went out and attacked ten thousand cavalry and as many 

infantry, and defeated them, for the cavalry could not attack them, and the 

infantry being forces composed for the most part of Gascons and 

ill-disciplined, they (the Swiss) esteemed them little. It has subsequently 

been seen how twenty six thousand Swiss went to encounter north of Milan the 

King of the French, Francis, who had with him twenty thousand cavalry, forty 

thousand infantry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; and if they did not 

win the engagement, as at Novara, they fought valiantly for two days, and 

though they were later routed, half of them were saved. Marcus Attilius 

Regulus attempted to resist with his infantry not only (the attack of) the 

cavalry, but the elephants: and if his design did not succeed, yet it not 

that the virtu of his infantry was not such that he did not have faith in 

them believing them capable of overcoming those difficulties. I repeat, 

therefore, that to want to overcome a disciplined infantry it is necessary 

to oppose them with a better disciplined infantry, otherwise one goes to a 

manifest defeat.



In the time of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand Swiss 

descended into Lombardy, whence the Duke having at that time Carmignuola as 

his Captain, sent him with about a thousand cavalry and a few infantry to 

meet them. This man, not knowing their method of fighting, went to meet them 

with his cavalry presuming to be able to rout them quickly. But finding them 

immovable, having lost many of his men, he retired: and being a most valiant 

man, and knowing he had to take new proceeding in new events, reorganized his 

forces and went to meet them; and on coming to the engagement made all his 

men at arms dismount and go on foot, and placing them at the head of the 

infantry, went to attack the Swiss, who had no remedy (against them). For 

the forces of Carmignuola being on foot and well armored, could easily enter 

between the ranks of the Swiss without suffering any injury, and having 

entered therein could easily attack them: So that of all that number, there 

remained only the part which was saved through the humanity of Carmignuola.



I believe that many recognize this difference in virtu that exists between 

the one and the other of these systems, but so great is the infelicity of 

these times, that neither the examples of the ancients or the moderns, nor 

the confession of error, is enough to cause the modern Princes to re-see 

things, and to make them think that to give reputation to the military of a 

Province or a State it is necessary to revive these insinuations (of the 

ancients), to keep them close to one, to give them reputation, to give them 

life, so that in return it may give him life and reputation: And as they 

deviate from these methods, so they deviate from the other methods mentioned 

above: whence there results that the acquisitions become harmful, not an 

aggrandizement, to a State, as will be told below.



                   CHAPTER XIX



THAT ACQUISITIONS IN REPUBLICS NOT WELL ORGANIZED AND THAT DO NOT PROCEED 

ACCORDING TO ROMAN VIRTU, ARE THE RUIN AND NOT THE EXALTATION OF THEM



This opinion contrary to the truth, founded upon those bad examples that 

have been introduced by these corrupt centuries of ours, causes men not to 

think of deviating from their accustomed habits. Would it have been possible 

to persuade an Italian of thirty years ago that ten thousand infantry could 

have attacked, in an open plain, ten thousand cavalry and as many more 

infantry, and with these not only to fight them, but to defeat them, as is 

seen in the example at Novara given by us many times? And although histories 

are full (of such examples), yet they would not have believed it; and if 

they had believed it, they would have said that in these times one is better 

armed, and that a squadron of men at arms would be more adept at charging a 

rock than a body of infantry: and thus with these erroneous arguments their 

judgment was corrupted, nor have they considered that Lucullus with few 

infantry routed one hundred and fifty thousand cavalry of (King) Tigranes, 

and that among those horsemen was a kind of cavalry entirely similar to our 

men at arms. And thus that fallacy was uncovered by the example of the 

Ultramontane forces: And as that which is narrated in histories is seen to 

be true in regard to infantry, so also ought all the other ancient 

institutions to be believed to be true and useful. And if this were 

believed, the Republics and Princes would have erred less, would have been 

stronger in opposing the attack that might come upon them, they would not 

have put their hope in flight, and those who had the government in their 

hands would have known better how to direct the manner of aggrandizement or 

the manner of preservation; and they would have believed that for the city 

to increase its inhabitants, to make associations for themselves and not 

subjects, to send colonies to guard the acquired countries, to make capital 

of the plunder, to subdue the enemy by incursions and engagements, and by 

sieges, to keep the public rich, the private citizen poor, to maintain 

military exercises with the greatest zeal, these are the ways to make a 

Republic great and to acquire Empire. And if these means of expanding did 

not please them, they would consider that acquisitions by any other means 

are the ruin of a Republic; and they would place a restraint to all 

ambition, regulating the internal affairs of the City well with laws and 

other customs, prohibiting conquests, and thinking only of defending 

themselves, and to keep the defenses well organized; as do the Republics of 

Germany, who, in this manner, live and have lived for a long time.



None the less ((as I have said another time when discussing the difference 

that existed between being organized for conquest and being organized for 

preservation)) it is impossible that a Republic succeeds in remaining quiet 

and enjoy its liberty and her limited confines; for even if she does not 

molest others, she will be molested: and from being molested there will 

arise the will and desire for conquest: and even if she should not have any 

outside enemies, she would find some at home, as it appears necessary to 

occur to all great Cities. And if the Republics of Germany could live in 

this fashion, and have been able to endure a long time, it arises from 

certain conditions that exist in that country which are not found elsewhere, 

without which they could not have maintained such a manner of living. That 

part of Germany of which I speak was subject to the Roman Empire, as was 

France and Spain: but when the decline of the Empire came afterwards, and 

the rule of that Empire reduced in that Province, the more powerful Cities 

begun ((according to the weakness or necessity of the Emperors)) to make 

themselves free, ransoming themselves from the Empire by reserving a small 

annual rent to it: so that little by little all those Cities which were held 

directly by the Emperor, and were not subject to any Prince, ransomed 

themselves in similar fashion. There occurred in these same times when these 

Cities were ransoming themselves, that certain Communities subject to the 

Duke of Austria rebelled against him, among which were Fribourg, the Swiss, 

and other like, which prospering from the beginning, gradually expanded 

little by little, that they did not return under the yoke of Austria, and 

became feared by their neighbors; and these are those whom we call Swiss. 

And therefore this Province is divided between the Swiss, Republics which 

they call Free Towns, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason that among 

such a diversity of forms of government wars do not arise, or if they do 

arise they do not last long, is that this shadow of an Emperor, who, 

although he has no power, none the less he has so much reputation among them 

that he is their conciliator, and with his authority by interposing himself 

as a mediator, quickly extinguishes all trouble. And the major and longer 

wars that have occurred have been those that took place between the Swiss and 

the Duke of Austria: and although for many years past the Emperor and the 

Duke of Austria have been the same person, yet he has never been able to 

overcome the audacity of the Swiss, where there has never been a means of 

accord except by force: Nor has the rest of Germany given him much help, as 

much because the Communities do not want to injure those who want to live 

free as they do, as because those Princes (are unable to aid him) part of 

whom cannot because they are poor, part do not want to because they envy his 

power. These Communities therefore can live contentedly with their small 

dominions because they have no reason ((in respect to the Imperial 

authority)) of desiring a greater one: They can live united within their 

walls because they have an enemy nearby and who would take the opportunity 

to occupy them whenever they should have a discord. If this Province was 

constituted otherwise, it would behoove them to seek to expand and break 

their quiet existence.



And because elsewhere such conditions do not exist, this way of living 

cannot be adopted, and it is necessary either to expand by means of leagues, 

or to expand as the Romans did: And whoever governs otherwise seeks not his 

life, but his death and ruin, for in a thousand ways and for many reasons, 

the acquisitions are harmful; for he may very well extend his Empire, but 

not power; and whoever acquires Empire and not power together, comes to 

ruin. Whoever impoverishes himself in war cannot acquire power, even though 

he is victorious, for he puts in more than he draws out of the acquisitions; 

as the Venetians and Florentines have done, who have been much weaker when 

the one had Lombardy and the other Tuscany, than they were when the one was 

content with the (dominion of the) sea, and the other with six miles of 

boundaries. For all of this resulted from their having wanted to acquire but 

not to have known the means to do so: and they merit so much more blame as 

they had less excuse, having seen the methods which the Romans employed, and 

having been able to follow their example, while the Romans, without any 

example, through their prudence, knew how to find it by themselves. In 

addition to this, acquisitions sometimes do no little damage to any well 

ordered Republic when they acquire a City or a Province full of luxury, 

where those (indolent) habits can be picked up through intercourse they have 

with them, as happened to Rome first in the acquisition of Capua, and 

afterwards also to Hannibal. And if Capua had been further distant from the 

City (of Rome), and if the errors of the soldiers had not have prompt 

remedy, or if Rome had been in any part corrupted, that acquisition without 

doubt would have been the ruin of the Roman Republic: And Titus Livius bears 

witness of this with these words; Capua the instrument of all pleasures, the 

least conducive to military discipline, turned the spirit of the military 

away from the memory of their country. And truly similar Cities or Provinces 

avenge themselves against their conquerors without a fight and without 

bloodshed; for by transferring to them their own bad habits they expose them 

to being conquered by whoever assaults them. And Juvenal in his Satires 

could not have better understood this part, when he says that, because of 

the acquisitions of foreign lands, foreign customs had entered the breasts 

of the Romans, and in exchange for parsimony and other very excellent 

virtus, gluttony and luxury dwell there, and will avenge the conquered 

world. If, therefore, the conquest was to be pernicious to the Romans in the 

times when they proceeded with so much prudence and so much virtu, what then 

would it be to those who deviate from their methods? And what would it be, 

if in addition to the other errors they make ((which have been discussed at 

length above)), they avail themselves of mercenary or auxiliary soldiers? 

Whence often those injuries result which will be mentioned in the following 

chapter.



                    CHAPTER XX



WHAT PERILS ARE BROUGHT TO THAT PRINCE OR THAT REPUBLIC WHICH AVAILS ITSELF 

OF AUXILIARY AND MERCENARY TROOPS



If I had not in another work of mine treated a length of how useless 

mercenary and auxiliary troops are, and how useful their own (national 

troops) are, I should extend myself in this discourse much more than I will: 

but having talked of it at length elsewhere, I shall be brief in this part. 

Nor did it seem to me I ought to pass it over entirely, having found in 

Titus Livius ((as to auxiliary soldiers)) so striking an example, for 

auxiliary soldiers are those which a Prince or a Republic send to your aid, 

captained and paid: and referring to the text of Titus Livius, I say, that 

the Romans at different places had routed two armies of the Samnites with 

their army which had been sent to the succor of the Capuans, and by this 

liberated the Capuans from that war which the Samnites made against them, 

(and) as they wanted to return to Rome, in order that the Capuans, who had 

been deprived of their garrisons should not become a prey again to the 

Samnites, left two legions in the country of Capua for their defense: Which 

legions, plunged into idleness, begun to delight themselves there, so that 

forgetting their country and the reverence due to Senate, decided to take up 

arms and make themselves lords of that country which they had defended with 

their virtu, it appearing to them that the inhabitants were not worthy to 

possess those things which they did not know how to defend. Which matter 

becoming known, it was suppressed and corrected by the Romans, as will be 

shown more fully where we will speak of conspiracies.



I say again, therefore, that of all the other kinds of soldiers the 

auxiliaries are the most harmful, because that Prince or that Republic which 

calls them to their aid have no authority over them, but only he who sends 

them has authority. For auxiliary soldiers are those who are sent you by a 

Prince, as I have said, under their captains, under their ensigns, and paid 

by them, as was this army that the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers as 

these, when they had won, most of the time plunder as well him who leads 

them as him against whom they are led; and they do so either from the 

malignity of the Prince who sends them or from their own ambition. And 

although the intention of the Romans was not to break the accord and 

convention which they had made with the Capuans, none the less the ease of 

attacking them appeared to those soldiers to be such, that it was able to 

persuade them to think of taking the town and the State from the Capuans. We 

could give many examples of this, but I deem it sufficient to cite that of 

the Rhegians, whose lives and city were taken away by a legion which the 

Romans had placed there as a guard. A Prince or a Republic ought, therefore, 

first to take up any other proceeding than to have recourse to bringing 

auxiliary forces into their State relying on them for its defense, for every 

pact, every convention ((however hard)) that they have with the enemy, will 

be much lighter than such a proceeding. And if past events are well read, 

and present ones discussed, it will be found that for one who has had a good 

ending, infinite others have been deceived. And an ambitious Prince or 

Republic cannot have a greater opportunity to occupy a City or a Province, 

than to be requested by it to send their armies to its defense. Therefore, 

he who is so ambitious that he calls for such aid not only to defend himself 

but to attack others as well, seeks to acquire that which he will not be able 

to hold, and which can easily be taken away from him by him from whom he 

acquired it. But the ambition of men is so great, that to gratify a present 

desire, do not think of the evil which, in a short time, will result from 

it. Nor do the ancient examples move him, as well in this as in the other 

matters discussed; for if they were moved by them, they would see how much 

more the liberality they show their neighbors, and the less desirous they 

are of occupying them, so much the more they throw themselves into your 

arms, as will be told below through the example of the Capuans.



                   CHAPTER XXI



THE FIRST PRAETOR WHICH THE ROMANS SENT ANY PLACE WAS THE CAPUA, FOUR 

HUNDRED YEARS AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO MAKE WAR (AGAINST THAT CITY)



It has been discussed at length above, how the Romans differed in their 

manner of proceeding in their acquisitions from those who in the present 

time expand their jurisdiction; and how they left (the people of) those 

lands which they did not destroy living with their laws, including even 

those who had surrendered to them, not as associates, but as subjects, and 

how they did not leave in them any sign of the authority (Empire) of the 

Roman people, but obligated them to some conditions, which so long as they 

were observed by them, they would maintain them in their state and dignity. 

And it is known that these methods were observed until they went outside of 

Italy and commenced to reduce Kingdoms and States into Provinces. There is no 

clearer example of this than that of the Praetors sent by them to any place 

was to Capua; whom they sent, not because of their ambition, but because 

they had been requested by the Capuans, who ((there being discord among 

them)) judged it necessary to have a Roman Citizen within that City who 

would restore order and re-unify them. From this example, (and) moved and 

constrained by a similar necessity, the people of Antium also requested a 

Praetor from them. And T. Livius says of this incident and (commenting) on 

this new method of ruling, That they promised not only arms, but Roman 

justice. It is seen, therefore, how much this facilitated Roman expansion; 

for those Cities mainly that are accustomed to living free or to govern 

themselves by their own citizens, remain more quiet and content under a 

government they do not see ((even though it may have some inconvenience in 

itself)) than under one which they see every day, as it would appear to them 

they would be reproached by their servitude every day. Another advantage 

also results to the Prince who, not having at hand his ministers, judges and 

magistrates to render both civil and criminal decisions in that City, (and) 

no sentence being able ever to be pronounced which will bring censure or 

infamy upon the Prince, in this manner, comes to escape many causes of 

calumny and hatred.



¶ And that this is the truth, in addition to the ancient examples which 

could be cited, there is one recent example in Italy. For ((everyone knows)) 

Genoa having been occupied by the French many times, the King always 

((except at the present time)) has sent a French Governor who governs in his 

name. Only at present has he allowed that City to be governed by itself and 

by a Genoese governor, not by election of the King, but because necessity so 

ordained. And without doubt, if it were to be examined as to which of these 

two methods gives more security to the King from the Rule (Empire) over it, 

and more contentedness to that people, without doubt this latter method would 

be approved. In addition to this, men will so much more readily throw 

themselves into your arms the less you appear disposed to subjugate them, 

and so much less will they fear you in connection with their liberty as you 

are more humane and affable with them. This affability and liberality made 

the Capuans have recourse to request the Praetor from the Romans: that if 

the Romans had shown the slightest desire to send one, they would quickly 

have become jealous and would have kept their distance from them (Romans).



¶ But what need is there to go to Capua and Rome for examples, when we have 

them in Florence and Tuscany? Everyone knows how the City of Pistoia a long 

time ago came voluntarily under the Florentine Empire (Dominion). Everyone 

also knows how much enmity there has existed between the Florentines, the 

Pisans, the Lucchese, and the Sienese; and this difference in spirit has not 

arisen because the Pistoians do not value their liberty as the others or do 

not esteem themselves as much as the others, but because the Florentines have 

always borne themselves toward them (the Pistoians) as brothers, and like 

enemies towards the others. It was this that caused the Pistoians to have 

run voluntarily under their Dominion, and the others to have used, and still 

use, every force not to come under them. And doubtless, if the Florentines 

either by means of leagues or by rendering them aid, had cultivated instead 

of frightening their neighbors, at this hour they would have been Lords of 

Tuscany. I do not judge by this that arms and force are not to be employed, 

but that they ought to be reserved as the last resort where and when other 

means are not enough.



                   CHAPTER XXII



HOW OFTEN THE OPINIONS OF MEN IN JUDGING THINGS (TO BE) GREAT ARE FALSE 



Those who have found themselves witnesses of the deliberations of men have 

observed, and still observe, how often the opinions of men are erroneous; 

which many times, if they are not decided by very excellent men, are 

contrary to all truth. And because excellent men in corrupt Republics 

((especially in quiet times)) are frowned upon both from envy and from other 

reasons of ambition, it follows that a common deception (error) is judged 

good, or it is put forward by men who want favors more readily for 

themselves than for the general good. When this error, in times of 

adversity, is discovered, then from necessity refuge is sought among those 

who in times of quiet were almost forgotten, as will be discussed in full in 

its proper place. Certain events also arise where men who do not have a 

great amount of experience of things are easily deceived, for they have in 

them that incident which resembles so many similar actions which are true as 

to make that one believed, (and) upon cases such as this men are persuaded. 

These things have been said of that (error) which the Praetor Numicus ((when 

the Latins were routed by the Romans)) persuaded them, and of that (error) 

which a few years ago was believed by many, when Francis I, King of France, 

attempted the conquest of Milan, which was defended by the Swiss. 



¶ I say, therefore, that after the death of Louis XII, and Francis of 

Angouleme succeeded to the kingdom of France, and when he desired to restore 

to the kingdom the Duchy of Milan, which a few years before was occupied by 

the Swiss, through the help of Pope Julius II, desired to obtain aid in 

Italy which should facilitate the enterprise for him; and, in addition to 

the Venetians whom King Louis and gained over to himself, attempted to 

regain the Florentines and Pope Leo X, deeming his enterprise would be 

easier any time he should have regained those people to himself, inasmuch as 

the forces of the King of Spain were in Lombardy, and the other forces of 

the Emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo did not yield to the desires of the 

king, but was persuaded by those who counselled him ((according as it was 

said)) to remain neutral, showing him that certain victory consisted in this 

proceeding, for the Church not to have either the King (of France) or the 

Swiss too powerful in Italy; but if he wanted to bring it (the Church) to 

its ancient liberty, it was necessary to liberate her from the servitude of 

the one and the other. And because it was not possible to overcome one and 

the other, or each one separately, or both together, it would be best that 

one should overcome the other, and that the Church with her friends should 

attack the one that remained victor. And it was impossible to find a better 

opportunity than the present, as the one and the other were in the field, 

and the Pope had his forces organized so as to be able to show himself on 

the borders of Lombardy and near to both armies, under pretext of wanting to 

guard his possessions; and where he could remain until an engagement should 

take place, which reasonably ((both armies being of equal virtu)) ought to 

be bloody for both parties, and leave the victor so debilitated that it 

would be easy for the Pope to assail him and rout him, and thus he would, 

with great glory to himself, to remain Lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all 

Italy. And how much this opinion was wrong is to be seen from the result, 

for the Swiss were defeated after a long fight, and the forces of the Pope 

and of Spain did not presume to assault the victors, but prepared for 

flight: which also would not have done them good if it had not been for the 

humanity or indifference of the (French) King, who did not seek a second 

victory, but it sufficed him to make an accord with the Church.



This advice was based on certain reasons which at a distance appear true, 

but are entirely alien to the truth. For it rarely happens that the victor 

loses many of his soldiers, because the victor loses only those who die in 

battle, none by flight; and in the ardor of the combat, when men have turned 

to face one another, only a few fall, especially because very often it only 

lasts a short time: and even if it did last a long time and many of the 

victors should die, the reputation which follows the victory and the terror 

which it brings with it, are such that it greatly outweighs the injury which 

the death of his soldiers causes the victor to endure. So that an army, 

which in the belief that he has been weakened, should go and meet him, will 

find itself deceived, unless the army should be such as to be able to have 

combatted with him at any time, even before the victory. In this case it is 

possible to win or lose according to its fortune and virtu; but that one 

which should have first fought, and won, will have rather the advantage over 

the other. This was recognized for certain by the experience of the Latins 

and by the error that the Praetor Numicus committed, and by the injuries 

which those people suffered who believed him, when ((after the Romans had 

defeated the Latins)) he shouted throughout all the country of Latium now 

was the time to assault the Romans weakened by the fight they had had with 

them, and that only the name of victory remained to the Romans, inasmuch as 

all the other injuries they had suffered were as though they had been 

defeated, and that any little force that should assault them anew would 

destroy them. Whence those people who believed him raised a new army, but 

were quickly routed, and suffered those injuries which those people always 

suffer who hold similar opinions.



                  CHAPTER XXIII



HOW MUCH THE ROMANS, IN JUDGING THE MATTERS FOR ANY INCIDENT THAT SHOULD 

NECESSITATE SUCH JUDGMENT, AVOIDED HALF-WAY MEASURES



Such was the state of things in Latium, that they could endure neither peace 

nor war. Of all the happy and unhappy states to which a Prince or a Republic 

can be reduced is to come to such terms that they cannot accept peace or 

sustain war; to which those are reduced who are oppressed too much by the 

conditions of the peace, and who, on the other hand, ((wanting to make war)) 

would have to throw themselves as prey to those who aid them, or to remain 

prey to the enemy. And all this comes from evil counsels and from the bad 

procedure of not having well measured their strength, as was said above. For 

that Republic or that Prince which should measure them well, will only with 

difficulty be brought to that condition which the Latins were brought, who 

made an accord with the Romans when they ought not to have, and declared war 

when they ought not to have, and thus they knew how to manage so that the 

enmity and friendship of the Romans were equally damaging to them. The 

Latins were therefore overcome and afflicted in the extreme, first by 

Manlius Torquatus, and afterwards by Camillus, who having constrained them to 

give themselves up and put themselves into the arms of the Romans, and 

having placed guards throughout the towns of Latium, and having taken 

hostages from all, returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that all 

Latium was in the hands of the Roman people. And as this judgment was 

notable and merits being observed so as to be able to be imitated when 

similar opportunities are given to Princes, I want to cite the words which 

Livius placed in the mouth of Camillus, which give witness both of the 

manner which the Romans held in expanding and how in the judgments of the 

State they always avoided half-way measures and turned to extremes. For a 

government consists only in so holding the subjects that they cannot or 

ought not want to injure you. This is done either by assuring yourself 

entirely by taking away from them all means of harming you, or by benefiting 

them so that it would not be reasonable that they would have a desire for 

any change of fortune. Which is entirely understood, first from the 

proposition of Camillus, and then by the judgment given by the Senate upon 

it. His words were these: The immortal Gods caused you to go where you were 

able to by these counsels, placing in your hands whether Latium should 

exist. Therefore, you can prepare a peace in perpetuity in relation to the 

Latins, either by violence or forgiveness. Will you proceed cruelly against 

those whom you conquered and who gave themselves up to you? If so, you are 

at liberty to destroy all Latium. Will you rather by example desire to 

increase the power of the Roman Republic by accepting those whom you have 

overcome into your citizenship? If so, you have the opportunity for a most 

glorious increase. Certainly that Empire is more firm which enjoys 

obedience. While, therefore, their minds are in a stupor and in suspense, it 

behooves you to assure yourselves either through punishment or benefits. 

This proposition was followed by the decision of the Senate which was in 

accordance with the words of the Consul, so that going from town to town 

which were of importance, they either bestowed benefits on them or destroyed 

them, granting to the beneficiaries exemptions and privileges, giving them 

Citizenship, and assuring them in every way: the others they destroyed their 

towns, colonies were sent there, (the inhabitants) transferred to Rome, and 

so dispersing them that they could never by arms or by counsel injure Rome. 



Nor did they (the Romans) ever employ neutral means in these matters of 

moment ((as I have said)). Princes ought to imitate this judgment, and the 

Florentines ought to have adopted this course when, in MDII (1502) Arezzo 

and all the Val Di Chiana rebelled: which if they had done so, they would 

have secured their Empire and greatly increased the City of Florence, and 

given her those fields which she lacked in order to live. But they employed 

that middle way, which is most pernicious in the judging of men, so that 

they exiled part of the Aretini, and a part they condemned to death, and 

they deprived all of them of their honors and their ancient ranks in the 

City, but left the City entire. And when any Citizen in their deliberations 

advised that Arezzo should be destroyed, those who were deemed more wise said 

that it would be of little honor to the Republic to destroy her, as it would 

appear that Florence lacked the strength to hold her: which reasons are of 

those which appear to be, but are not, true; for by this same reason a 

parricide, a criminal, or an infamous person would not be put to death, as 

it would be a shame for that Prince to show that he did not have the power 

to be able to restrain a solitary man, And those who have similar opinions 

do not see, that individual men, and a whole City, will some times so sin 

against a State, that as an example to others, and for his own security, a 

Prince has no other remedy but to destroy them. And honor consists in being 

able and knowing when and how to castigate them, not in being able with a 

thousand dangers to hold them, for the Prince who does not castigate 

evil-doers in a way that he can no longer do evil, is held to be either 

ignorant or cowardly. This judgment which the Romans gave when it was 

necessary, is also confirmed by the sentence given against the Privernati. 

Where from the text of Livius, two things ought to be noted: the one, that 

which is mentioned above that subjects ought to given benefits or destroyed: 

the other, how much the generosity of spirit and speaking the truth helps, 

especially when it is spoken in the presence of prudent men. The Roman 

Senate had assembled to judge the Privernati, who had rebelled, but were 

later by force returned to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens had been sent 

by the people of Privernatum to beg pardon from the Senate, and when they 

had come into their presence, one of them was asked by a Senator, what 

punishment do you think the Privernati merit? To which the Privernate 

replied, That which those who feel themselves worthy of liberty merit. To 

which the Consul replied, If we remit your punishment, what peace can we 

hope to have with you? To which that man responded, A faithful and perpetual 

one, if you give us a good one; if a bad one, only a day-by-day one. Whence, 

although many were displeased, the wiser part of the Senate said, This was 

the voice of free and virile people, and they could not believe that it is 

possible for that people, or an individual, would otherwise remain in a 

condition that was punishment to them, except if it resulted from necessity. 

Peace would be trustful where it was made voluntarily, and not from a 

position where servitude is prevalent where it is hopeless to look for good 

faith. And after these words they decided that the Privernati should be 

Roman Citizens, and they honored them with the privileges of their society, 

saying: Those who think of nothing except liberty are here worthy of being 

Romans. So much did this true and generous response (of the Privernati) 

please those generous spirits (Romans); for any other response would have 

been false and cowardly. And those who believe men to be otherwise 

((especially if these are accustomed to be, or appeared to be, free)) 

deceive themselves, and under this deception take up proceedings that are 

neither good in themselves nor satisfactory to them (who are affected by 

it). From which there often results rebellions and the ruin of States.



But to return to our discussion, I conclude, both from this and from the 

judgment given to the Latins, when a City, powerful and accustomed to living 

free, is to be judged, it must be either destroyed or caressed, otherwise 

every judgment is vain; and above all the middle-way course ought to be 

avoided, which is pernicious, as it was to the Samnites when they had 

enveloped the Romans at the Caudine forks, and when they did not want to 

follow the advice of that old man who counselled them that they should allow 

the Romans to go honorably, or to kill them all; but by taking a middle way, 

disarming them and putting them under the yoke, they allowed them to go full 

of ignominy and anger. So that a little afterwards, to their harm, they 

realized how useful the sentence of that old man had been and how harmful 

was their decision, as will be discussed more fully in its place.



                  CHAPTER XXIV



FORTRESSES ARE GENERALLY MORE HARMFUL THAN USEFUL



It may perhaps appear to these sages of our times as something not well 

considered, that the Romans in wanting to assure themselves of the people of 

Latium and of the City of Privernum, did not think of building some 

fortresses there, which would be a restraint to hold them faithful; 

especially as there was a saying in Florence alleged by our wise men, that 

Pisa and other similar Cities ought to be held by fortresses. And truly, if 

the Romans had been like them, they would have thought to build them: but as 

they were of another virtu, of another judgment, of another power, they did 

not build them. And so long as Rome lived free and followed her institutions 

and virtuous constitutions, they never built one to hold either a City or a 

province, but they did save some that had already been built. Whence seeing 

the mode of proceeding of the Romans in this regard, and that of the Princes 

in our times, it appears to me proper to put into consideration whether it 

is good to build fortresses, or whether they are harmful Or useful to him 

who builds them. It ought to be considered, therefore, whether fortresses 

are built for defending oneself from the enemy or to defend oneself form 

one's subjects.



In the first case they are not necessary, in the second harmful. And I will 

begin by giving the reason why in the second case they are harmful, I say 

that that Prince or that Republic which is afraid of its subjects and of 

their rebelling, it results first from the fact that that fear arises from 

the hate which the subjects have for them, and the hate they have of the 

treatment given them. The ill treatment results either from the belief of 

being able to hold them by force, or from the little prudence of those who 

govern them; and one of the things that makes them believe they are able to 

force them, is to have their fortresses near them: for the ill treatment 

that is the cause of hatred, arises in good part because of that Prince or 

that Republic have the fortresses, which ((if this is true)) are much more 

harmful by far than useful: For firstly ((as has been said)) they cause you 

to be more audacious and more violent toward your subjects: afterwards there 

is not that internal security of which you persuade yourself, as all the 

strength and violence that is employed in holding a people are nothing, 

except these two: either you have always to place a good army in the field, 

as the Romans had, or you must disperse them, extinguish them, disorganize 

them, and so destroy them that they are not able to come together to attack 

you; for if you impoverish them, the despoiled ones will win their arms: if 

you disarm them, fury will serve as arms: if you kill the Captains and 

continue to injure the others, the Heads will spring up as those of the 

Hydra: if you build fortresses, they are useful in times of peace because 

they give you more courage to do evil to them, but in times of war most 

useless because they will be assaulted by the enemy and by your subjects, 

nor is it possible that they can resist the one and the other. And if ever 

they were useless, they are now in our times on account of artillery, 

because of which the small places, where moreover you cannot retire behind 

earthworks, are impossible to defend, as we discussed above.



I want to discuss this manner more tritely. Either you, a Prince, want to 

keep the people of the City in restraint with these fortresses, or you, a 

Prince or a Republic, want to keep a City in restraint that has been 

occupied in war. I want to turn to the Prince, and I say to him that such 

fortresses cannot be more useless to him in holding his Citizens in 

restraint for the reasons given above, for it makes you more prompt and less 

regardful in oppressing them, and that oppression will expose you to your 

ruin and will excite them so, that that fortress which is the reason for it 

cannot afterwards defend you; so that a wise and good Prince, in order to 

keep himself good and not give cause to his sons to dare to become bad, will 

never build fortresses, so that they will rely, not upon the fortresses, but 

on the good will of men. And if Count Francesco Sforza who had become Duke of 

Milan was reputed wise and none the less built fortresses in Milan, I say 

that in this case he was not wise, and the result has shown that that 

fortress was harmful and not a security to his heirs: for judging that 

through the medium of it to live securely, and to be able to oppress their 

Citizens and subjects, they indulged in all kinds of violence, so that they 

became so hated as described above, that they lost the State as soon as the 

enemy assaulted them: nor did that fortress defend them, nor did they have 

any usefulness for them in war, and in peace had done them much harm: for if 

they had not had them, and if because of little prudence they had not 

treated their Citizens harshly, they would have discovered the peril more 

quickly, and would have retreated, and would then have been able to resist 

the impetus of the French more courageously with friendly subjects and 

without a fortress, than with hostile subjects, and with the fortress, which 

do you no good in any way, for either they (fortresses) are lost through the 

treachery of those who guard them, or because of the violence of those who 

assault it, or by famine.



And if you want them to do you any good and to help you in recovering a lost 

State, where only the fortress remains to you, it behooves you to have an 

army with which you can assault those who have driven you out; and if you 

have the army you would recover the State in any case, (and) even more 

(easily) if the fortress did not exist, and so much more easily as men would 

be more friendly than they were to you, for you had maltreated them because 

of the pride of having the fortress. And from experience it has been seen 

that this fortress of Milan was of no usefulness either to the Sforza or to 

the French in times of adversity for the one or the other; rather it brought 

much harm and ruin to both, not having given thought because of it to more 

honest means of holding that State. Guidobaldo Duke of Urbino, son of 

Frederick, who is his time was an esteemed Captain, was driven out of his 

State by Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI; when afterwards because of 

an incident that had arisen he returned there, he caused all the fortresses 

that existed in that province to be destroyed, judging them to be injurious. 

For he being beloved by men, did not need them on their account, and with 

regard to his enemies, he had seen that he could not defend them; as they 

needed an army in the field to defend them, he resolved to destroy them. Pope 

Julius, after having driven out the Bentivogli from Bologna, built a 

fortress in that City, and afterwards had those people assassinated by one 

his Governors: so that that people rebelled, and the Pope quickly lost the 

fortress; and thus the fortress did him no good, but injury, and the more 

so, that by conducting himself otherwise it could have done him good. 

Niccolo Da Costello, father of the Vitelli, returning to his country when he 

had been exiled, quickly razed two fortresses that Pope Sixtus IV had built, 

judging that the good will people, not the fortresses, would keep him in 

that State. But of all the other examples, the most recent and the most 

notable in every way, and apt to show the uselessness of building them and 

the usefulness of destroying them, is that of Genoa which ensued in the most 

recent time. Everyone knows that in MDVII (1507) Genoa rebelled against Louis 

XII, King of France, who had come in person with all his forces to recover 

it, and having recovered it, he had a fortress built stronger than all 

others known up to the present time; it was impregnable because of its 

location and other circumstances, being placed on the apex of a hill that 

extended into the sea, called Codefa by the Genoese, and by means of this he 

commanded all the port and great part of the town of Genoa. Afterwards in 

the year MDVII (1512) it happened that the French forces were driven out of 

Italy, Genoa rebelled notwithstanding the fortress, and Ottaviano Fregoso 

seized the State, who, after sixteen months and with every industry, 

captured it by starvation. And everyone believed, and many counselled him, 

that he should preserve it as a refuge in any event: but being a most 

prudent man, (and) knowing that the good will of men and not fortresses 

maintained Princes in their States, destroyed it. And thus without founding 

his State on the fortress, but on his virtu and prudence, he has held it and 

still holds it. And where before only a thousand infantry usually were 

enough to overturn the State of Genoa, his adversaries have assaulted him 

with ten thousand and have not been able to harm him. It will be seen from 

this, therefore, that the destruction of the fortress did no more harm 

Ottaviano, than the building of it protected the King of France. For when he 

was able to come into Italy with his army, he was able to recover Genoa 

without the fortress being there; but without the army he could not come 

into Genoa even though he had a fortress there. For him, therefore, it was an 

expense to do (build) it and a disgrace to lose it: To Ottaviano the 

recovery of it was glorious and the destruction of it useful.



But let us come to the Republics which build fortresses, not within their 

own country, but inside the towns they acquire. And if the example given of 

France and Genoa are not enough to demonstrate the fallacy of this, those of 

Florence and Pisa will be enough for me; for the Florentines build 

fortresses in order to hold that City, and did not understand that to hold a 

City which was always hostile to Florentine rule, had lived in freedom, and 

had resorted to rebellion as a refuge for liberty, it was necessary in 

wanting to observe the old Roman method, either to make her an associate or 

to destroy her: for the virtu of fortresses is seen in the coming of King 

Charles, to whom they all surrendered, either through the treachery of those 

who guarded it, or from fear of a greater evil: for if there had not been 

one, the Florentines never would have based their holding Pisa on it, and the 

King (of France) could never in that manner have deprived the Florentines of 

that City: and the means by which they had maintained it up to that time 

would perhaps have been sufficient to preserve it, and without doubt would 

have stood the test better than the fortress.



I conclude, therefore, that to hold one's own country a fortress is 

injurious and to hold towns that are acquired fortresses are useless: And I 

want the authority of the Romans to be enough (for me), who razed the walls 

of those towns which they wanted to hold, having taken them by violent 

means, and never rebuilt them. And if anyone should cite in opposition to 

this opinion that (example) of Tarantum in ancient times and of Brescia in 

modern times, both of which places were recovered from their rebellious 

subjects by means of fortresses, I reply, that for the recovery of Tarantum 

Fabius Maximus was sent at the beginning of the year with the entire army, 

who would have been more apt to have recovered it if there had not been a 

fortress: for although Fabius had used that means, if there had not been 

this means (fortress), he would have used other means which would have had 

the same result. And I do not know of what usefulness a fortress may be, if 

in the recovery of a town, a consular army with Fabius Maximus for its 

Captain is needed to recover it: And that the Romans would have recovered it 

in any event, is seen by the example of Capua where there was no fortress, 

and which they reacquired through the virtu of the army. But let us come to 

Brescia. I say that there rarely occurs that which occurred in that 

rebellion, that while the fortress remains in your power ((the town having 

revolted)) you should have a large army (and) nearby as was that of the 

French: for Monsignor De Foix, Captain of the King, being with his army at 

Bologna and learning of the loss of Brescia recovered the town by means of 

the fortress. The fortress of Brescia, therefore, ((in order to be of 

benefit)) also needed a Monsignor De Foix, and a French army which had to 

succor it in three days: Hence this example in contrast to opposite examples 

is not enough, for many fortresses have been taken and retaken in wars of our 

times, by the same fortune as field campaigns (have taken and retaken), not 

only in Lombardy, but also in the Romagna, in the Kingdom of Naples, and 

throughout all parts of Italy.



But as to building fortresses in order to defend oneself from external 

enemies, I say that they are not necessary to those people, or to those 

Kingdoms that have good armies, and are useless to those who do not have 

good armies: for good armies without fortresses are sufficient to defend 

themselves, and fortresses without good armies cannot defend you. And this 

is seen from the experience of those who are held to be excellent as 

governors and in other things, as was the case with the Romans and the 

Spartans; for if the Romans did not build fortresses, the Spartans not only 

abstained from building them, but even did not permit the City to have 

walls, because they wanted (to rely on) the personal virtu of their men to 

defend them, (and) not some other means of defense. When, therefore, a 

Spartan was asked by an Athenian whether the walls of Athens appeared 

beautiful to him, he replied "yes, if the (City) was inhabited by women".



The Prince, therefore, who has good armies, may have on the frontiers of his 

State, or on the sea, some fortresses that could resist the enemy for some 

days until he could be checked; this may sometimes be a useful thing, but is 

not a necessary one. But when the Prince does not have a good army, then 

having fortresses throughout his State or at the frontiers, are either 

injurious or useless to him: injurious, because he loses them easily, and 

when they have been lost they are turned (make war) against him; or even if 

they should be so strong that that enemy cannot occupy them, they are left 

behind by the enemy army, and are of no benefit; for good armies, unless 

they are confronted by equally brave ones, enter into enemy country 

regardless of the City or fortress which they leave behind, as is seen in 

ancient histories; and as Francesco Maria did, who in recent times, in order 

to assault Urbino, left ten enemy Cities behind him, without taking any 

account of them. That Prince, therefore, who can raise a good army, can do 

without building fortresses: He who does not have a good army, ought not to 

build. He ought indeed to fortify the City where he lives, and keep it 

fortified, and keep the Citizens of that City well disposed, in order to be 

able to sustain an enemy attack so that he can (keep it) free by an accord 

or by external aid. All other plans are an expense in times of peace, and 

useless in times of war. And thus whoever considers all that I have said, 

will recognize the Romans as wise in all their other institutions, as they 

were prudent in their judgments concerning the Latins and the Privernati, 

where, not thinking of fortresses, they assured themselves of these people 

by wiser and more virtuous means.



                   CHAPTER XXV



THAT THE ASSAULTING OF A DISUNITED CITY IN ORDER TO OCCUPY IT BY MEANS OF 

ITS DISUNION IS AN ERROR



There was so much disunity within the Roman Republic between the Plebs and 

the Nobility that the Veienti together with the Etruscans ((through the 

medium of such disunion)) thought they could extinguish the name of Rome. 

And having raised an army and made incursions upon the fields of Rome, the 

Senate sent Gnaius Manilus and M. Fabius against them, (and) when they had 

led their army near the army of the Veienti, the Veienti did not cease both 

with assaults and insults to attack and abuse the Roman name; and so great 

was their temerity and insolence that, from being disunited the Romans 

became united, and coming to battle they defeated and routed them. It will 

be seen, therefore, how much men deceive themselves ((as we discussed above)) 

in adopting some course, and how many times they believe they can gain a 

thing and lose it. The Veienti believed that by assaulting the Romans when 

they were disunited, they could defeat them, but that assault was the cause 

of the unification of them (the Romans) and of their (the Veienti) ruin. For 

the cause of disunity in Republics most of the times is due to idleness and 

peace; the cause of unity is fear and war. And, therefore, if the Veienti 

had been wise, the more disunited they saw the Romans, the more they would 

have kept war away from them, and sought to oppress them by the arts of 

peace. The way to do this is to gain the confidence of the people of that 

City which is disunited, and to manage to become arbiters between the 

parties, as long as they did not come to arms. But if they come to arms, to 

give light aid to the weaker party, as much to keep up the war longer and 

make them consume themselves, as well not to make them wholly apprehensive 

because of your large forces that you should want to oppress them and become 

their Prince. And if this part is well carried out it will always almost 

happen that you will obtain the object which you had presupposed. The City 

of Pistoia ((as I have said in other discussions and on other matters)) did 

not come to the Republic of Florence with other arts than this; for she 

being divided, and the Florentines favoring first the one party, and then 

the other, without caring for either, brought her to such terms that, weary 

of her tumultuous existence, she came to throw herself spontaneously into the 

arms of Florence. The City of Siena has never changed her State with the 

help of the Florentines unless that help has been weak and small. For when 

it has been strong and large, they caused that City to become united in 

defense of the existing government. I want to add another example to those 

written above. Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, often made war against the 

Florentines, relying on their disunity, and always was the loser. So that he 

had to say, lamenting his enterprise, that the follies of the Florentines 

had made him spend two millions in gold uselessly.



The Veienti and the Tuscans, therefore, ((as was said above)) were deceived 

by this opinion, and were in the end defeated by the Romans in one 

engagement. And thus in the future anyone who believes he can subjugate a 

people in a similar manner and for similar reasons will be deceived.



                  CHAPTER XXVI



CONTEMPT AND INSULT GENERATE HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO EMPLOY THEM, WITHOUT 

ANY USEFULNESS TO THEM



I believe that it is one of the great signs of prudence which men exhibit in 

abstaining from threatening and injuring anyone with words, for neither the 

one and the other takes away strength from the enemy; but the one makes him 

more cautious, and the other causes him to have greater hatred against you, 

and with more industry to think of injuring you. This is seen from the 

example of the Veienti of whom discussion was had in the above chapter, who 

added the opprobrium of words to the injury of war against the Romans, from 

which every prudent Captain ought to make his soldiers abstain, as they are 

things which inflame and excite the enemy to revenge, and in no way impede 

him ((as has been said)) in attacking you, so that they are all as arms 

turned against you. A notable example of which occurred in Asia, where 

Gabades, Captain of the Persians, having for a long time besieged Amida, and 

becoming weary of the siege, decided to depart, and having already broken up 

his camp, all the inhabitants of the town came upon the walls; and having 

become haughty from (the thought) of victory, did not omit assailing them 

with every kind of injury, vituperating them, accusing and reproaching them 

for their cowardice and poltroonery. Irritated by this, Gabades changed his 

counsel and returned to the siege, and so great was his indignation at this 

injury, that in a few days he took and sacked it. And the same thing happened 

to the Veienti, to whom ((as has been said)) it was not enough to make war 

against the Romans, but they also had to vituperate them with words, and 

went up to the very stockade of their camp to speak their insults, 

irritating them more with words than with arms: and those soldiers who at 

first fought unwillingly, constrained the Consuls to enkindle the battle, so 

that the Veienti suffered the punishment for their contumacy as was 

mentioned previously. Good Princes (Leaders) of the army and good Governors 

of a Republic, therefore, have to take every convenient means that these 

injuries and reproaches are not used either by their Citizens or their army, 

either among themselves or against the enemy, for then there arises those 

inconveniences mentioned above; and among themselves, it would be even worse 

unless they are stopped, as prudent men have always stopped them. The Roman 

legions left at Capua having conspired against the Capuans, as will be 

narrated in its proper place, and this conspiracy having given rise to 

sedition, which was later quelled by Valerius Corvinus, among the other 

stipulations of the convention that was made, was that they ordained the 

greatest penalties against those who should ever reprove any of those 

soldiers with that sedition. Tiberius Gracchus, who in the war against 

Hannibal, was made Captain over a certain number of slaves whom the Romans 

had armed because of the scarcity of men, ordered among the first things that 

the capital penalty (be inflicted) on whoever should reproach any of them 

with their (previous) servitude. So much did the Romans think this was a 

harmful thing ((as has been said above)) to treat men with contempt and 

reproach them with any disgrace, because there is nothing that so excites 

their spirit and generates greater indignation, that whether true or false, 

it is said: For harsh statements, even when they have the least truth in 

them, leave their harshness in the memory.



                  CHAPTER XXVII



TO PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS, IT OUGHT TO BE ENOUGH TO WIN, FOR OFTEN IT 

IS NOT ENOUGH IF THEY LOSE



The use of dishonorable words against an enemy arises most of the times from 

the insolence that victory, or the false hope of victory, gives you; which 

false hope makes men err not only in their words, but also in their deeds. 

For when this (false) hope enters the hearts of men, it makes them go beyond 

the mark, and often lose that opportunity of obtaining a certain good, 

hoping to obtain an uncertain better. And because this is a matter that 

merits consideration, this deception that exists in men and very often 

causing damage to their State, it appears to me it ought to be demonstrated 

in detail by ancient and modem examples, as it cannot be so clearly 

demonstrated by arguments. After Hannibal and defeated the Romans at Cannae, 

he sent his ambassadors to the Carthaginians to announce the victory and 

request their support. This was discussed in the Senate as to what should be 

done. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian Citizen advised that they 

should use this victory wisely in making peace with the Romans, for, having 

won, they were able to do so with more favorable conditions than they would 

expect (to make them) after a defeat; for the intentions of the 

Carthaginians ought to be to show the Romans that it was enough for them in 

combatting them, to have obtained a victory for themselves and not to seek 

to lose it in the hope of a greater one. This proceeding was not taken, but 

later when the opportunity was lost, it was well recognized by the 

Carthaginian Senate to have been a wise one. After Alexander the Great had 

already conquered all the Orient, the Republic of Tyre ((noble and powerful 

in those times for having their City situated on water like the Venetians)), 

seeing the greatness of Alexander, sent ambassadors to tell him they wanted 

to be his good servants and to render him that obedience he wanted, but that 

they were not ready to accept him or his forces in their land. Whereupon 

Alexander, indignant that a City should close those doors that all the world 

had opened to him, rebuffed them, and, not accepting their conditions, went 

to besiege them. The town was situated in water and very well supplied with 

provisions and the other munitions necessary for defense, so that Alexander 

saw after four months (of siege) that taking the City would take away more 

time and glory from him that many other acquisitions had not taken away, 

decided to try for an accord and concede to them that which they themselves 

had asked. But those people of Tyre having become haughty, not only did not 

want to accept the accord, but killed whoever came to present it. At which 

Alexander being indignant, he exerted himself with so much strength to its 

extinction that he took and destroyed it, and killed or made slave its 

people. In the year 1502 a Spanish army came into the Florentine dominion to 

reinstate the Medici in Florence and to tax the City, they being called 

there by its Citizens who had given them hope that, as soon as they had 

entered the Florentine dominion, they would take up arms in their favor; and 

having entered the plain and not discovering anyone, and having a scarcity 

of provisions, they attempted an accord: which the people of Florence, 

having become haughty, did not accept; when there resulted the loss of Prato 

and the ruin of that State (Florence). Princes who are attacked cannot make 

a greater error, therefore, especially when the assault is made by men who 

are far more powerful than they, than to refuse any accord, and especially 

when it is offered; for it would never be offered so harshly that it will 

not be in some way good for those who accept it, and they will in a way have 

obtained a part of the victory. For it should have been enough for the 

people of Tyre that Alexander had accepted those conditions which he at 

first refused, and it should have been a great enough victory for them that 

they had with arms in hand made so great a man condescend to their will. It 

should also have been enough for the Florentine people, and it would have 

been a great victory for them, if the Spanish army had yielded in something 

to their will, and not fulfill all things of theirs, for the intention of 

that army was to change the State in Florence, to take it away from its 

attachment to, France, and extract money from it. If of the three things, 

they (Spaniards) should have obtained the last two, and there should have 

remained to the (Florentine) people the first, that of saving their State, 

there would have remained within each one some honor and satisfaction and 

the people ought not to have cared for the other two things, as long as they 

existed free; nor ought they ((even if they should have seen a greater and 

almost certain victory)) to have wanted to put any part of it (their 

liberty) to the discretion of fortune, as this was their last resource, 

which no prudent man would ever risk except from necessity.



Hannibal departed from Italy where he had been for sixteen glorious years, 

recalled by the Carthaginians to succor his own country; he found Hasdrubal 

and Syphax broken, the Kingdom of Numida lost, Carthage restricted between 

the confines of its walls, and no other refuge remaining but he and his 

army: and knowing that this was the last resource of his country, he did not 

want to place it in jeopardy without first having tried every other remedy, 

and was not ashamed to ask for peace, judging that if his country had any 

remedy, it was in it (peace) and not in war; which afterwards having been 

refused, he did not hesitate to combat ((and to be defeated)), judging he 

might have (a chance to) win, or if he lost, to lose gloriously. And if 

Hannibal who had so much virtu and had his army intact, sought peace first 

rather than a battle, when he saw that losing it his country would be 

enslaved, what ought someone else with less virtu and less experience than 

he do? But men make this error of not knowing where to place the limits to 

their hopes, and by relying on these without otherwise measuring their 

resources, they are ruined.



                 CHAPTER XXVIII



HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC, NOT TO AVENGE AN INJURY MADE 

AGAINST THE PUBLIC OR A PRIVATE (CITIZEN)



That which indignation makes men do, is easily recognized as that which 

happened to the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as ambassadors to the 

Gauls who had come to assault Tuscany, and Clusium in particular. For the 

people of Clusium having sent to Rome for aid, the Romans sent Ambassadors 

to the Gauls that in the name of the Roman people they should signify to 

them to abstain from making war against the Tuscans: These ambassadors, 

being more accustomed to act than to speak, having arrived there as the 

Gauls and Tuscans were engaged in battle, put themselves among the first in 

combatting against them: Whence there arose that, being recognized by them 

(the Gauls), all the indignation that they had against the Tuscans turned 

against the Romans. This indignation became greater, because the Gauls 

having complained to the Roman Senate through their Ambassadors of this 

injury, and asked that in satisfaction for the harm done that the three 

above-mentioned Fabii should be turned over to them; not only were they not 

delivered to them or in any way castigated, but when the Comitii assembled, 

they were made Tribunes with consular powers. So that the Gauls seeing those 

men honored who ought to have been punished, took it all to be to their 

disparagement and ignominy, and, excited by anger and indignation, went to 

assault Rome, and captured it all except the Campidoglio (Capitol). This 

ruin to the Romans resulted only from their own non-observance of justice, 

for their Ambassadors having sinned against the law of nations, instead of 

being castigated were honored.



It is to be considered, therefore, how much every Republic and every Prince 

ought to be careful in making a similar injury, not only against an entire 

people, but even to an individual. For if a man is greatly offended either 

by the public or by a private citizen, and is not avenged according to his 

satisfaction, if he lives in a Republic he will seek to avenge himself even 

with their ruin, if he lives under a Prince and has any courage within 

himself, he will never remain quiet until in some way he should have 

revenged himself against him, even though he may see in it his own ruin. To 

verify this, there is no better or truer example than that of Philip of 

Macedonia, father of Alexander. This man had in his court Pausanias, a 

beautiful and noble youth, of whom Attalus, one of the chief men close to 

Philip was enamored; and having several times sought that he should consent 

(to his desires), but finding him opposed to such things, decided to obtain 

by deceit and force that which he was unable to obtain by other means. And 

he gave a grand banquet at which Pausanias and many other noble Barons were 

gathered; after each one was full of viands and wine, he caused Pausanias to 

be seized, and brought to a retired place; and he not only gave vent to his 

libido by force, but also to shame him still more, caused him to be abused 

in a similar fashion by many others. Pausanias complained of this injury 

many times to Philip, who for a time kept him in the hope of avenging him, 

but not only did he not avenge him, but promoted Attalus to the governship 

of a Province of Greece: Whence Pausanias seeing his enemy honored and not 

castigated, turned all his indignation not against him who had injured him, 

but against Phillip who had not avenged him; and one morning during the 

solemn nuptial of the daughter of Phillip to Alexander of Epirus, while 

Phillip was going to the Temple to celebrate them, between the two 

Alexanders, his son and son-in-law, he (Pausanias) killed him. Which example 

is very similar to that of the Romans, should be noted by anyone who 

governs, that he ought never to underestimate a man so as to believe 

((adding injury on injury)) that he whom he has injured does not think of 

avenging himself, even with every danger and injury to himself.



                  CHAPTER XXIX



FORTUNE BLINDS THE MINDS OF MEN WHEN SHE DOES NOT WANT THEM TO OPPOSE HER 

DESIGNS



If we consider well how human affairs proceed, many times many events will 

be seen to arise and accidents happen against which the Heavens have not 

entirely desired that they should be provided. And if this of which I speak 

happened at Rome where there was so much virtu, so much religion, and so 

much order, it is no wonder that it should happen much more often in a City 

or a Province which lacks the above mentioned attributes. And as this case 

in point is most remarkable in demonstrating the power of Heaven over human 

affairs, T. Livius relates it at length and in the most effective language, 

saying that Heaven, wanting some means to have the Romans know its power, 

first made those Fabii err who had gone as ambassadors to the Gauls, and 

through whose deeds excited them to make war against Rome: Afterward it 

ordained that, to reprimand them for that war, nothing should be done in 

Rome worthy of the Roman people, having first ordained that Camillus, who 

alone could be the remedy for so much evil, was sent into exile at Ardea; 

afterwards when the Gauls were approaching Rome, those people who had many 

times before created a Dictator in order to check the attacks of the 

Volscians and other neighboring enemies, did not create one when the Gauls 

came. Also they were slow and without extraordinary diligence in making their 

selection of soldiers, and were so slow in taking up arms, that only with 

great effort were they in time to meet the Gauls on the river Allia, ten 

miles distant from Rome. Here the Tribunes established their camp without 

any of the customary diligence, without first examining the place, not 

circumscribing it with ditches and palisades, and not using any human or 

divine remedy. And in the order of battle, they made the ranks open and 

weak, so that neither the soldiers nor the Captains did anything worthy of 

the Roman discipline. They fought them without any bloodshed, for they fled 

before they had been assaulted; and the greater part went off to Veii, the 

remainder retreated to Rome, where they entered the Capitol without entering 

even their own homes; so that the Senate with no thought of defending Rome 

((any more than the others)) did not close its gates, (and) a part of them 

fled, another part entered the Capitol with the others. In defending it (the 

Capitol), however, they did employ some non-tumultuous methods, for they did 

not burden it with useless people, they supplied it with all the grain they 

could so as to be able to endure a siege, and of the useless crowd of old 

men and women and children, the greater part fled to the surrounding towns, 

the rest remained in Rome a prey to the Gauls. So that whoever had read of 

the things done by that people so many years before, and then should read of 

the events of those times, could in no way believe that it was the same 

people. And T. Livius who had told us of all the above mentioned troubles, 

concludes by saying: Fortune thus blinds the minds, when she does not want 

them to resist her power.



Nor can this conclusion be more true. Whence men who ordinarily live in 

great adversity or prosperity merit less praise or less blame, for most of 

the time it will be seen that they have been brought to ruin or to greatness 

by some great expedient which Heaven has caused, giving them the opportunity 

or depriving them of the ability to work with virtu. Fortune indeed does 

this, when she wants to bring some great things, she selects a man of much 

spirit and much virtu, that he will recognize those opportunities she 

offers. So too in the same way, when she wants to bring some great ruin, she 

promotes men who can do such ruin. And if anyone should be able to resist 

her, she either kills him or deprives him of all the faculties of being able 

to do any good. From this text it is to be clearly recognized how fortune, 

in order to make Rome greater and bring her to that greatness that she 

arrived at, judged it was necessary to beat her ((as will be discussed at 

length in the beginning of the next book)) but did not want to ruin her 

entirely. And because of this, it is seen that she caused Camillus to be 

exiled and not killed, caused Rome to be taken but not the Capitol, ordained 

that the Romans should not think of any good thing in preparing Rome (for 

the attack), but should not lack any good preparation for the defense of the 

Capitol. She caused ((as Rome was to be taken)) that the greater part of the 

soldiers who were defeated at the Allia to go to Veii, and thus cut off all 

means for the defense of the City of Rome. And yet in ordaining this, she 

prepared everything for her recovery, having conducted an entire Roman army 

to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, in order to be able to raise a large band 

under a Captain unstained by any ignominy of defeat and completely dedicated 

to the recovery of his country.



We might cite some modern example in confirmation of the things mentioned 

here, but as I judge it unnecessary, ((this one being able to satisfy 

anyone)) I shall omit it. I indeed reaffirm this to be most true ((according 

as is seen from all histories)) that men can second fortune but not oppose 

her, they can develop her designs but not defeat them. They ought never to 

abandon themselves; because not knowing her aims, (and) the devious and 

unknown ways she takes, they always have hope; and in hoping, not to abandon 

themselves no matter in what (ill) fortune or trouble they find themselves.



                   CHAPTER XXX



TRULY POWERFUL REPUBLICS AND PRINCES DO NOT PURCHASE FRIENDSHIP WITH MONEY, 

BUT WITH VIRTU AND REPUTATION OF STRENGTH



The Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and although they awaited succor 

from Veii and from Camillus, being driven by hunger, they came to terms with 

the Gauls to ransom themselves with a certain amount of gold, but while 

making these terms ((the gold already being weighed)) Camillus arrived with 

his army, which fortune caused ((as the historian says)) so that the Romans 

should not live under an aura of ransom. Which occurrence not only is more 

noteworthy in this instance, but more so in the course of events of this 

Republic, where it is seen that they never acquired lands by means of money, 

but always through the virtu of their army. Which I do not believe ever to 

have happened with any other Republic.



And among the other signs by which the power of a State is recognized, is to 

see how it lives with its neighbors; and if it is governed in a way that the 

neighbors ((so as to have them friendly)) are its pensioners, then it is a 

certain sign that that State is powerful: But when these said neighbors 

((although inferior to it)) draw money from it, then it is a great sign of 

its weakness. Let anyone read all the Roman histories and he will see that 

the Massalians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians, Hiero the Syracusan, Eumene and 

the Kings of Massinissa, who all lived near to the confines of the Roman 

Empire, in order to have its friendship, agreed to contribute to its needs 

and expenses by tribute, not seeking any other return from it than to be 

defended. On the other hand, it will be seen in weak States, and beginning 

with our own Florence in times past in the period of her greatest 

reputation, that there was not a petty Lord in the Romagna who did not get a 

pension from her, and in addition she gave one to the Perugini, the 

Castellani, and all her other neighbors. But if this City had been armed and 

strong, everything would have proceeded oppositely, for everyone in order to 

have her protection would have given money to her, and sought, not to sell 

their friendship, but to purchase hers. Nor are the Florentines to be seen 

alone in this baseness, but the Venetians and the King of France, who with 

so great a Kingdom lives tributary to the Swiss and the King of England. All 

of which resulted from having disarmed their people, and because that King 

and the others mentioned above desired rather to enjoy a present usefulness 

of being able to plunder the people, and to avoid an imaginary rather than a 

real peril, than to do things which would have assured them and made their 

States happy in perpetuity. Such baseness, if it sometimes produces some 

quiet, is in times of necessity the cause of irreparable harm and ruin.



And it would be lengthy to recount how many times the Florentines, and the 

Venetians, and this Kingdom (of France) have bought themselves off in wars, 

and how many times they subjected themselves to an ignominy to which the 

Romans were subjected only one time. It would be lengthy to recount how many 

lands the Florentines and the Venetians have purchased, in which disorders 

were seen afterwards, and that the things acquired with gold cannot be 

defended with iron. The Romans continued in this high-minded existence as 

long as they lived free, but when they came under the Emperors, and the 

Emperors commenced to be bad, and to love the shade more than the sun, they 

too begun to buy off now the Parthians, now the Germans, now other 

neighboring peoples, which was the beginning of the ruin of so great an 

Empire. Such troubles proceeded, therefore, from having disarmed its own 

people, from which an even greater evil results, that the more the enemy 

comes near, so much more will he find you weak. For whoever lives in the 

manner mentioned above, ill treats those subjects who are in the interior of 

his Empire so as to obtain men who can hold the enemy at the frontiers. From 

this there arises that to keep the enemy more distant he has to give 

subsidies to these Lords and peoples who are near their borders. Whence 

there arises that these States so paid make a little resistance at their 

frontiers, but as soon as the enemy has passed, they do not have any 

advantage. And they do not see that this mode of proceeding of theirs is 

against every good institution. For the heart and the vital parts of the 

body have to be kept armored, and not its extremities, for without these it 

is possible to live, but when the former are injured, it is possible to die: 

And these States have their hearts unarmored but their hands and feet 

armored. The disorders which have been caused to Florence have been seen, 

and can be seen, every day, that as soon as an army passes the frontiers and 

enters near the heart, no further remedy is to be found. In the last few 

years the Venetians afforded similar proof, and if their City had not been 

surrounded by water, their end would have been seen. This experience has not 

often been seen in France because that Kingdom is so great that it has few 

enemies who are superior. None the less, when the English in MDXIII (1513) 

assaulted that Kingdom, all that Province trembled, and the King himself and 

everyone else believed that only one defeat would take away the State.



The contrary happened to the Romans, for the more the enemy approached Rome, 

so much more he found that City powerful to resist him. And it is seen in 

the coming of Hannibal into Italy, that after three defeats and after so 

many captains and soldiers were killed, they were able not only to sustain 

the enemy, but to win the war. All of which resulted from her having the 

heart well armored and holding little account of the extremities. For the 

foundation of their State was in the people of Rome, the Latin people, and 

the other lands allied in Italy, and their Colonies, from which they drew so 

many soldiers sufficient for then to conquer and hold the world. And that 

this is true is seen from the question that Hanno the Carthaginian put to 

those Ambassadors of Hannibal after the battle at Cannae, who having 

magnified the things done by Hannibal, were asked by Hanno if anyone had 

come from the Roman people to ask for peace, and if any towns of the Latins 

or any of the Colonies had rebelled against the Romans: and when they 

replied negatively, Hanno replied; This war is yet as full as before.



It will be seen therefore, both from this discussion and from what we have 

said elsewhere several times, how much difference there is in the 

proceedings of present Republics from the ancient ones. Because of this 

every day are seen astonishing losses and remarkable conquest, for where men 

have little virtu, fortune greatly shows her power, and as she varies it, 

Republics and States change often, and they will always change until there 

springs up one who is a great lover of antiquity who is able to rule so that 

she has no reason at every revolution of the sun to show how powerful she 

can be.



                  CHAPTER XXXI



HOW DANGEROUS IT IS TO BELIEVE EXILES



And it does not appear to me to be foreign to this subject to discuss among 

other matters how dangerous a thing it is to believe those who have been 

driven out of their country, these being matters that are acted upon each 

day by those who govern States; and I am especially able to demonstrate this 

by a memorable example given by T. Livius in his history, even though it may 

be outside his subject. When Alexander the Great crossed with his army into 

Asia, Alexander of Epirus, his brother-in-law and uncle, came with his 

forces into Italy, having been called there by the exiled Lucanians, who had 

given him the hope that he could through their means occupy all that 

province. Whence he, upon their faith and hope, having come into Italy, was 

killed by them, because they had been promised a return to their Country by 

the Citizens if they would kill him. It ought to be considered, therefore, 

how vain are the faith and promises of those who find themselves deprived of 

their country. For, as to their faith, it has to be borne in mind that 

anytime they can return to their country by other means than yours, they 

will leave you and look to the other, notwithstanding whatever promises they 

had made you. As to their vain hopes and promises, such is the extreme 

desire in them to return home, that they naturally believe many things that 

are false and add many others by art, so that between those they believe and 

those they say they believe, they fill you with hope, so that relying on 

them you will incur expenses in vain, or you undertake an enterprise in 

which you ruin yourself. The previously mentioned example of Alexander is 

enough for me, but in addition, that of Themistocles, the Athenian, who, 

having been declared a rebel, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him 

so much if he should want to assault Greece, that Darius turned to that 

enterprise. Themistocles, not being able to observe these promises, he 

poisoned himself, either from shame or from fear of punishment. And if this 

error was made by Themistocles, a most excellent man, it ought to be 

considered how much more those men err who, because of less virtu, allow 

themselves to be drawn by their desires and passions. A Prince, therefore, 

ought to go slowly in undertaking an enterprise upon the representations of 

an exile, for most of the times he will be left either with shame or very 

grave injury. And as the taking of towns rarely succeeds by deceit or by 

intelligence others within may have, it does not appear outside the subject 

to discuss it in the following chapter, adding some account of how many ways 

the Romans acquired them.



                  CHAPTER XXXII



IN HOW MANY WAYS THE ROMANS OCCUPIED TOWNS



The Romans being very often at war, they always did so with every advantage, 

both as to expense and as to every other thing that it required. From this 

arose the fact that they guarded against the taking of towns by siege, as 

they judged this method to be of such an expense and so much trouble that it 

surpassed by far any usefulness that they could draw from the acquisition: 

and because of this they thought that it would be better and more useful to 

subjugate a town by any other means than besieging it: whence there are very 

few examples of sieges made by them in so many wars and in so many years. 

Their mode of taking Cities, therefore, was either by assault or by 

voluntary surrender. The capture by assault was either by force or by open 

violence, or by force mixed with fraud: the open violence was either by 

assault without piercing the walls ((which they called attacking the city in 

crown fashion)) because they surrounded the City with the entire army, as 

when Scipio took New Carthage in Spain; or if this assault was not enough 

they addressed themselves to breeching the walls with rams or with other 

machines of war of theirs; or they made a mine and by means of it entered 

the City, by which method they took the City from the Veienti: or in order 

to be at the same level with those who defended the walls, they made towers 

of wood: or they made embankments of earth placed against the outside of the 

walls in order to come to a height above them. In the first case those who 

were defending the towns against these assaults were exposed to the greatest 

peril quickly from being assaulted on all sides and had the greatest doubts 

of being able to remedy this, because they needed to have many defenders in 

every place, (and) those they had were not numerous enough to be able to 

substitute for or relieve those in every place, or if they were able to do 

so, they were not all of equal courage to resist; and if the fight was lost 

on any one side, all the rest were lost. It happened, therefore, ((as I have 

said)) that this mode (of assault) many times was a happy success. But if it 

did not succeed at the first (try), they did not repeat it much, as it was a 

dangerous method for the army, for defending themselves over so much space, 

everything was left weak so as to be unable to resist a sortie that those 

inside might make, and also it would fatigue the soldiers and cause 

disorder: so that they attempted this method only one time and by surprise. 

As to the breaking down of walls, it was opposed as in the present time by 

repairs; and to resist the mines they made counter mines, and through which 

they opposed the enemy either with arms or other means, among which was this 

that they filled barrels with feathers which they set on fire while burning 

they put them into the mine, so that the smoke and the smell impeded the 

entrance to the enemy: and if they assaulted them with towers, they 

endeavored to ruin them by fire. And as to earth embankments, they broke the 

wall down where the embankment leaned against it, drawing inside the earth 

which those outside were heaping, so that placing earth outside and taking 

it away from inside, the embankment did not grow. These means of attack 

cannot be attempted for long, and (if not successful) the siege must be 

abandoned and other means sought to win the war, as did Scipio, when he 

entered Attica, having assaulted Utica and not succeeding in taking it, he 

betook himself from the field and sought to break the Carthaginian army, or 

rather to turn to (regular) sieges as he did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, 

Jerusalem, and similar towns which they occupied by sieges.



As to the acquisition of towns by stealth and violence, ((as happened at 

Palepolis, where the Romans occupied it by treating secretly with those 

within)) this kind of conquest was tried by the Romans and many others, but 

few succeeded: the reason is, that every least impediment disrupts the 

design, and impediments come easily. For the conspiracy is discovered before 

the deed happens, which is done without much difficulty, as much from the 

treachery of those to whom it is communicated, as from the difficulty of 

carrying it out, having to come together with enemies or under some pretext 

with those with whom it is not permitted to speak. But if the conspiracy is 

not discovered in its progress, then thousand difficulties spring up in 

putting it into execution. For if you arrive before the designated time or 

if you arrive after, everything is spoiled. If a furtive noise is raised, as 

the geese at the Capitol, if a customary order is broken, every least least 

error and every least fault made, will ruin the enterprise. Added to this is 

the darkness of the night which puts more fear into those who are engaged in 

those dangerous things. And the greater part of men who are engaged in 

similar enterprises being unacquainted with the situation of the country or 

the places where they are sent, are confounded, become afraid, and will turn 

back at every least unforeseen accident. And every false imagining acts to 

make them put themselves in flight. Nor has anyone ever been found who was 

more successful in these fraudulent and nocturnal expeditions than Aratus of 

Sicyon, who was as valiant in these as he was pusillanimous in expeditions 

carried out openly and in daylight. Which can be attributed rather to some 

occult virtu which he possessed, than to any natural faculty in achieving 

success. Of these attempts, many are projected, few are put to the test, and 

very few succeed.



As to the acquisition of Towns through surrender, they give up either 

voluntarily, or by force. The willingness arises either from some extrinsic 

necessity that constrains them to find refuge under you, as did Capua to the 

Romans, or from the desire to be well governed, being attracted by the good 

government which that Prince bestows on those who have voluntarily placed 

themselves in his arms, as were the Rhodians, the Massileans, and other such 

Citizens, who gave themselves to the Roman People. As to forced surrenders, 

this force results either from a long siege ((as was said above)), or from a 

continuous pressure from incursions, depredations, and other ill treatment; 

which in wanting to avoid, a City surrenders. Of all the methods mentioned, 

the Romans employed this last more than any others, and during more than 

four hundred and fifty years of harassing their neighbors with routs and 

incursions, and then by means of accords obtained reputation over them, as 

we have discussed at another time. And they always relied on this method, 

even though they tried all others, which they found more dangerous or 

useless. For in a siege it is the length of time and expense; in open 

assault it is doubtful and dangerous; in a conspiracy it is uncertitude. And 

they (the Romans) saw that by one rout of an enemy army they acquired a 

Kin