DISCOURSES



         Upon The First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy



                          To



                  ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI

                        AND TO

                    COSIMO RUCELLAI







                  NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

                          TO

                  ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI

                        AND TO

                    COSIMO RUCELLAI





                       GREETINGS. 



I send you a present which if it is not equal to the obligations that I have 

toward you, it is one which without doubt the best that Niccolo Machiavelli 

has been able to offer you. Because in it I have expressed what I know and 

what I have learned through a long experience and a continuing study of the 

things of the world. And neither you nor others being able to desire more of 

me, I have not offered you more. You may well complain of the poverty of my 

endeavor since these narrations of mine are poor, and of the fallacy of (my) 

judgement when I deceive myself in many parts of my discussion. Which being 

so, I do not know which of us should be less obligated to the other, either 

I to you who have forced me to write that which by myself I would not have 

written, or you to me that having written I have not satisfied you. Accept 

this, therefore, in that manner that all things are taken from friends, 

where always the intention of the sender is more than the quality of the 

thing that is sent. And believe me I obtain satisfaction from this when I 

think that even if I should have been deceived on many occasions, I know I 

have not erred on this one in having selected you, to whom above all other 

of my friends I address (dedicate) these Discourses; as much because in 

doing this it appears to me I have shown some gratitude for the benefits I 

have received, as well because it appears to me I have departed from the 

common usage of those writers, who usually (always) address (dedicate) their 

works to some Prince, and blinded by ambition and avarice laud him for all 

his virtuous qualities when they should be censuring him for all his 

shameful parts. Whence I, so as not to incur this error, have selected, not 

those who are Princes, but those who by their infinite good qualities would 

merit to be such; (and) not to those who could load me with rank, honors, 

and riches, but to those who although unable to would want to do so. For 

men, when they want to judge rightly, should esteem those who are generous, 

not those who are able to be so; and likewise those who govern a Kingdom, 

not those who can but have not the knowledge. And writers lauded more Hiero 

of Syracuse when he was a private citizen than Perseus the Macedonian when he 

was King, for to Hiero nothing was lacking to be a Prince than the 

Principality, and the other did not possess any part of the King than the 

Kingdom. Enjoy this, therefore, whether good or bad, that you yourselves 

have wanted; and if you should continue in this error that these thoughts of 

mine are acceptable, I shall not fail to continue the rest of the history 

according as I promised you in the beginning. Farewell.







                DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

            ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS

           TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI



                           FIRST BOOK



When I consider how much honor is attributed to antiquity, and how many 

times, not to mention many other examples, a fragment of an antique statue 

has been bought at a great price in order to have it near to one, honoring 

his house, being able to have it imitated by those who delight in those 

arts, and how they then strive with all industry to present them in all 

their work: and when I see, on the other hand, the works of greatest virtu 

which Historians indicate have been accomplished by ancient Kingdoms and 

Republics, by Kings, Captains, Citizens, Lawgivers, and others who have 

worked themselves hard for their country, to be more readily admired than 

imitated, or rather so much neglected by everyone in every respect that no 

sign of that ancient virtu remains, I cannot otherwise than wonder and at 

the same time be sad: and so much more when I see in the civil differences 

that arise between Citizens, or in the maladies which men incur, they always 

have recourses to those judgments or to those remedies that have been judged 

or instituted by the ancients. For the civil laws are nothing else but the 

decisions given by the ancient Jurisconsults, which reduced to a system 

presently teach our Jurisconsults to judge and also what is medicine if not 

the experience had by the ancient Doctors, (and) on which the present 

Doctors base their judgments? None the less in the instituting of Republics, 

in maintaining of States, in the governing of Kingdoms, in organizing an army 

and conducting a war, in (giving) judgment for Subjects, in expanding the 

Empire, there will not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain, or 

Citizen, who has recourse to the examples of the ancients. Which I am 

persuaded arises not so much from the weakness to which the present 

education has brought the world, or from that evil which an ambitious 

indolence has created in many Christian Provinces and Cities, than from not 

having a real understanding of history, and from not drawing that (real) 

sense from its reading, or benefiting from the spirit which is contained in 

it. whence it arises that they who read take infinitely more pleasure in 

knowing the variety of incidents that are contained in them, without ever 

thinking of imitating them, believing the imitation not only difficult, but 

impossible: as if heaven, the sun, the elements, and men should have changed 

the order of their motions and power, from what they were anciently. 

Wanting, therefore, to draw men from this error, I have judged it necessary 

to write upon all those books of Titus Livy which, because of the malignity 

of the times, have been prevented (from coming to us), in order that I might 

judge by comparing ancient and modern events what is necessary for their 

better understanding, so that those who may read these Discourses of mine 

may be able to derive that usefulness for which the understanding of History 

ought to be sought. And although this enterprise may be difficult, none the 

less, aided by those who have advised me to begin carrying this load, I 

believe I can carry it so that there will remain for others a short way to 

bring it to its destined place (end).



                     CHAPTER I



WHAT HAVE GENERALLY BEEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME CITIES, AND WHAT WAS THAT OF 

ROME



Those who read what the beginning of the City of Rome was, and of her 

Law-givers and how it was organized, do not wonder that so much virtu had 

been maintained for so many centuries in that City, and that afterward there 

should have been born that Empire to which that Republic was joined. And 

wanting first to discuss its birth, I say that all Cities are built either 

by men born in the place where they build it or by foreigners. The first 

case occurs when it appears to the inhabitants that they do not live 

securely when dispersed into many and small parties, each unable by himself 

both because of the location and the small number to resist attacks of those 

who should assault them, and they are not in time ((the enemy coming)) in 

waiting for their defense: or if they should be, they must abandon many of 

their refuges, and thus they would quickly become the prey of their enemies: 

so much that in order to avoid these dangers, moved either by themselves or 

by some one among them of greater authority, they restrict themselves to 

live together in a place selected by them, more convenient to live in and 

more easy to defend. Of these, among others, have been Athens and Venice: 

the first under the authority of Theseus was built by the dispersed 

inhabitants for like reasons: the other built by many people (who) had come 

to certain small islands situated at the head of the Adriatic Sea, in order 

to escape those wars which every day were arising in Italy because of the 

coming of new barbarians after the decline of that Roman Empire, began among 

themselves, without any particular Prince who should organize them, to live 

under those laws which appeared to them best suited in maintaining it (their 

new state). In this they succeeded happily because of the long peace which 

the site gave to them (for) that sea not having issue, where those people 

who were afflicting Italy, not having ships with which they could invest 

them; so that from a small beginning they were enabled to come to that 

greatness which they now have.



The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces, is caused by free 

men and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies sent either by a 

Republic or by a Prince to relieve their towns of (excessive) inhabitants or 

for the defense of that country which they have newly acquired (and) want to 

maintain securely and without expense; (thy Roman people built many cities, 

throughout all their Empire) or they are built by a Prince, not to live 

there but for his own glory, as was the City of Alexandria built by 

Alexander. And because these cities at their origin do not have their 

freedom, it rarely happens that they make great progress and are able to be 

numbered among the chief Kingdoms. Such was the building of Florence, for 

(it was built either by the soldiers of Sulla, or perhaps by the inhabitants 

of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in that long peace which prevailed 

in the world under Octavian were led to live in the plain along the Arno) it 

was built under the Roman Empire, and could not in its beginning have any 

other growth that those which were conceded to her through the courtesy of 

the Prince.



The builders of Cities are free when any people either under a Prince or by 

themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine or by war to 

abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either inhabit the 

cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses did, or they 

build new ones, as Eneas did. This is a case where the virtu and fortune of 

the builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater or less wonder 

according as that man who was the beginner was of greater or less virtu. The 

virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: the first is in the selection of 

the site, the other in the establishment of the laws. And because men work 

either from necessity or from choice: and because it is seen here that virtu 

is greater where choice has less authority (results from necessity), it is 

(something) to be considered whether it would be better for the building of 

a city to select sterile places, so that men constrained to be industrious 

and less occupied with idleness, should live more united, where, because of 

the poverty of the site, they should have less cause for discord, as 

happened at Ragusa and in many other cities built in similar places; which 

selection would without doubt be more wise and more useful if men would be 

content to live of their own (possessions), and not want to seek to command 

that of others.



However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except through power, 

it is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and locate it in very 

fertile places, where because of the fertility of the site, it can grow, can 

defend itself from whoever should assault it, and suppress whoever should 

oppose its aggrandizement. And as to that idleness which the site should 

encourage, it ought to be arranged that in that necessity the laws should 

constrain them (to work) where the site does not constrain them (does not do 

so), and to imitate those who have been wise and have lived in most amenable 

and most fertile countries, which are apt to making men idle and unable to 

exercise any virtu: that to obviate those which the amenity of the country 

may cause through idleness, they imposed the necessity of exercise on those 

who were to be soldiers: of a kind that, because of such orders, they became 

better soldiers than (men) in those countries where nature has been harsh 

and sterile: among which was the Kingdom of Egypt, which notwithstanding 

that the country was most amenable, that necessity ordained by the laws was 

so great, that most excellent men resulted therefrom: and if their names had 

not been extinguished by antiquity, it would be seen that they would have 

merited more praise than Alexander the Great, and many others of whom memory 

is still fresh. And whoever had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the 

order of the Mamelukes, and of their military (organization) before it was 

destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, would have seen there how much the 

soldiers exercised, and in fact would have known how much they feared that 

idleness to which the benignity of the country could lead them if they had 

not obviated it by the strongest laws. I say therefore that the selection of 

a fertile location in establishing (a city) is more prudent when (the 

results) of that fertility can be restricted within given limits by laws.



Alexander the Great, wishing to build a city for his glory, Dinocrates, the 

Architect came to him and showed him how he could do so upon the mountain 

Athos, which place in addition to being strong, could be arranged in a way 

that the City would be given human form, which would be a marvelous and rare 

thing and worthy of his greatness: and Alexander asking him on what the 

inhabitants would live, he replied that he had not thought of it: at which 

he laughed, and leaving that mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where 

the inhabitants would stay willingly because of the richness of the country 

and the convenience to the sea and of the Nile.



Whoever should examine, therefore, the building of Rome if he should take 

Eneas for its first ancestor, will know that that City was built by 

foreigners: (but) if Romulus, it would have been built by men native to the 

place, and in any case it would be seen to have been free from the beginning 

without depending on anyone: it will also be seen (as it will be said below) 

to what necessity the laws made by Romulus, Numa, and the others had 

constrained them; so much so that the fertility of the site, the convenience 

of the sea, the frequent victories, the greatness of the Empire, could not 

corrupt her for many centuries, and they maintained her full of so much 

virtu than any other republic has ever been adorned. And because the things 

achieved by them and that are made notable by Titus Livius, have taken place 

either through public Councils or private (individuals) either inside or 

outside the City, I shall begin to discourse upon those things which occured 

inside; and as for the public Council, which is worthy of greater 

annotation, I shall judge, adding all that is dependent on them; with which 

discourses this fast book, or rather this fast part will be ended.



                    CHAPTER II



OF THE KINDS OF REPUBLICS THERE ARE, AND OF WHICH WAS THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 



I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that had their 

beginning subject to others, and I will talk of those which have had their 

beginning far removed from any external servitude, but which (were) 

initially governed themselves through their own will, either as Republics or 

as Principalities; which have had (as diverse origins) diverse laws and 

institutions. For to some, at the beginning or very soon after, their laws 

were given to them by one (man) and all at one time, as those which were 

given to the Spartans by Lycurgus: Some have received them by chance, and at 

several times, according to events, as Rome did. So that a Republic can be 

called fortunate which by chance has a man so prudent, who gives her laws so 

ordered that without having need of correcting them, she can live securely 

under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed hers (laws) for more than 

eight hundred years without changing them and without any dangerous 

disturbance: and on the contrary that City has some degree of unhappiness 

which (not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker) is compelled to reorganize 

her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy which has diverged more 

from her institutions; and that (Republic) is even further from them whose 

laws lead her away from perfect and true ends entirely outside of the right 

path; for to those who are in that condition it is almost impossible that by 

some incident they be set aright. Those others which do not have a perfect 

constitution, but had made a good beginning, are capable of becoming better, 

and can become perfect through the occurrence of events. It is very true, 

however, that they have never been reformed without danger, for the greater 

number of men never agree to a new law which contemplates a new order for 

the City, unless the necessity that needs be accomplished is shown to them: 

and as this necessity cannot arise without some peril, it is an easy thing 

for the Republic to be ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect 

constitution. The Republic of Florence gives a proof of this, which because 

of the incident of Arezzo in (the year) one thousand five hundred and two 

(1502) was reorganized, (and) it was disorganized by that of Prato in (the 

year) one thousand five hundred and twelve (1512).



Wanting therefore to discourse on what were the institutions of the City of 

Rome and what events brought her to her perfection, I say, that some who 

have written of Republics say there are (one of) three States (governments) 

in them called by them Principality (Monarchy), of the Best (Aristocracy), 

and Popular (Democracy), and that those men who institute (laws) in a City 

ought to turn to one of these, according as it seems fit to them. Some 

others (and wiser according to the opinion of many) believe there are six 

kinds of Governments, of which those are very bad, and those are good in 

themselves, but may be so easily corrupted that they also become pernicious. 

Those that are good are three mentioned above: those that are bad, are three 

others which derive from those (first three), and each is so similar to them 

that they easily jump from one to the other, for the Principality easily 

becomes a tyranny, autocracy easily become State of the Few (oligarchies), 

and the Popular (Democracy) without difficulty is converted into a 

licentious one (anarchy). So much so that an organizer of a Republic 

institutes one of those three States (governments) in a City, he institutes 

it for only a short time, because there is no remedy which can prevent them 

from degenerating into their opposite kind, because of the resemblance that 

virtu and vice have in this instance.



These variations in government among men are born by chance, for at the 

beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, (and) lived for a time 

dispersed and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied they gathered 

together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves they began to 

seek among themselves the one who was most robust and of greater courage, 

and made him their head and obeyed him. From this there arose the knowledge 

of honest and good things; differentiating them from the pernicious and 

evil; for seeing one man harm his benefactor there arose hate and compassion 

between men, censuring the ingrates and honoring those who were grateful, 

and believing also that these same injuries could be done to them, to avoid 

like evils they were led to make laws, and institute punishments for those 

who should contravene them; whence came the cognition of justice. Which 

thing later caused them to select a Prince, not seeking the most stalwart 

but he who was more prudent and more just. But afterwards when they began to 

make the Prince by succession and not by election, the heirs quickly 

degenerated from their fathers, and leaving off from works of virtu they 

believed that Princes should have nothing else to do than surpass others in 

sumptuousness and lasciviousness and in every other kind of delight. So that 

the Prince began to be hated, and because of this hate he began to fear, and 

passing therefore from fear to injury, a tyranny quickly arose. From this 

there arose the beginnings of the ruin and conspiracies; and these 

conspiracies against the Prince were not made by weak and timid men, but by 

those who because of their generosity, greatness of spirit, riches, and 

nobility above the others, could not endure the dishonest life of that 

prince. 



The multitude therefore following the authority of these powerful ones armed 

itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him, they obeyed them as 

their liberators. And these holding the name of chief in hatred, constituted 

a government by themselves, and in the beginning (having in mind the past 

tyranny) governed themselves according to the laws instituted by them, 

preferring every common usefulness to their conveniences, and governed and 

preserved private and public affairs with the greatest diligence. This 

administration later was handed down to their children, who not knowing the 

changeability of fortune (for) never having experienced bad (fortune), and 

not wanting to remain content with civil equality, they turned to avarice, 

ambition, violation of women, caused that aristocratic government (of the 

Best) to become an oligarchic government (of the Few) regardless of all 

civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing happened to them as it 

did to the Tyrant, for the multitude disgusted with their government, placed 

itself under the orders of whoever would in any way plan to attack those 

Governors, and thus there arose some one who, with the aid of the multitude, 

destroyed them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries received from 

him being yet fresh (and) having destroyed the oligarchic state (of the 

Few), and not wanting to restore that of the Prince, the (people) turned to 

the Popular state (Democracy) and they organized that in such a way, that 

neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority. And because 

all States in the beginning receive some reverence, this Popular State 

maintained itself for a short time, but not for long, especially when that 

generation that had organized it was extinguished, for they quickly came to 

that license where neither private men or public men were feared: this was 

such that every one living in his own way, a thousand injuries were 

inflicted every day: so that constrained by necessity either through the 

suggestion of some good man, or to escape from such license, they once again 

turn to a Principality; and from this step by step they return to that 

license both in the manner and for the causes mentioned (previously).



And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed and will 

eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same (original) 

governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life as to be able 

often to pass through these changes and remain on its feet. But it may well 

happen that in the troubles besetting a Republic always lacking counsel and 

strength, it will become subject to a neighboring state which may be better 

organized than itself: but assuming this does not happen, a Republic would 

be apt to revolve indefinitely among these governments. I say therefore that 

all the (previously) mentioned forms are inferior because of the brevity of 

the existence of those three that are good, and of the malignity of those 

three that are bad. So that those who make laws prudently having recognized 

the defects of each, (and) avoiding every one of these forms by itself 

alone, they selected one (form) that should partake of all, they judging it 

to be more firm and stable, because when there is in the same City 

(government) a Principality, an Aristocracy, and a Popular Government 

(Democracy), one watches the other.[1]



Among those who have merited more praise for having similar constitutions is 

Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that in giving parts to the 

King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state that endured more than 

eight hundred years, with great praise to himself and tranquillity to that 

City. The contrary happened to Solon who established the laws in Athens, 

(and) who by establishing only the Popular (Democratic) state, he gave it 

such a brief existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of 

Pisistratus: and although after forty years his (the tyrants) heirs were 

driven out and liberty returned to Athens, for the Popular state was 

restored according to the ordinances of Solon, it did not last more than a 

hundred years, yet in order that it be maintained many conventions were made 

by which the insolence of the nobles and the general licentiousness were 

suppressed, which had not been considered by Solon: none the less because he 

did not mix it (Popular state) with the power of the Principate and with 

that of the Aristocracy, Athens lived a very short time as compared to 

Sparta.



But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it did not have a 

Lycurgus who so established it in the beginning that she was not able to 

exist free for a long time, none the less so many were the incidents that 

arose in that City because of the disunion that existed between the Plebs 

and the Senate, so that what the legislator did not do, chance did. For, if 

Rome did not attain top fortune, it attained the second; if the first 

institutions were defective, none the less they did not deviate from the 

straight path which would lead them to perfection, for Romulus and all the 

other Kings made many and good laws, all conforming to a free existence. But 

because their objective was to found a Kingdom and not a Republic, when that 

City became free she lacked many things that were necessary to be 

established in favor of liberty, which had not been established by those 

Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire for the reasons and in the 

manner discussed, none the less those who drove them out quickly instituted 

two Consuls who should be in the place of the King, (and) so it happened 

that while the name (of King) was driven from Rome, the royal power was not; 

so that the Consuls and the Senate existed in forms mentioned above, that is 

the Principate and the Aristocracy. There remained only to make a place for 

Popular government for the reasons to be mentioned below, the people rose 

against them: so that in order not to lose everything, (the Nobility) was 

constrained to concede a part of its power to them, and on the other hand 

the Senate and the Consuls remained with so much authority that they were 

able to keep their rank in that Republic. And thus was born (the creation) of 

the Tribunes of the plebs,[2] after which creation the government of that 

Republic came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of 

government. And so favorable was fortune to them that although they passed 

from a Monarchial government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People 

(Democracy), by those same degrees and for the same reasons that were 

discussed above, none the less the Royal form was never entirely taken away 

to give authority to the Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the 

Aristocrats diminished in order to give it to the People, but it remained 

shared (between the three) it made the Republic perfect: which perfection 

resulted from the disunion of the Plebs and the Senate, as we shall discuss 

at length in the next following chapters.



                    CHAPTER III



WHAT EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS IN ROME, WHICH 

MADE THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT



As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions, and as every 

history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever arranges to found a 

Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that all men are bad and 

that they will use their malignity of mind every time they have the 

opportunity; and if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds from 

the unknown reason that would not be known because the experience of the 

contrary had not been seen, but time, which is said to be the father of 

every truth, will cause it to be discovered. It seemed that in Rome there 

was a very great harmony between the Plebs and the Senate (the Tarquins 

having been driven out), and that the nobles had laid aside their 

haughtiness and had become of a popular spirit, and supportable to everyone 

even to the lowest. This deception was hidden, nor was the cause seen while 

the Tarquins lived, whom the nobility feared, and having fear that the 

maltreated plebs might not side with them (the nobles) they behaved 

themselves humanely toward them: but as soon as the Tarquins were dead, and 

that fear left the Nobles, they begun to vent upon the plebs that poison 

which they had kept within their breasts, and in every way they could they 

offended them: which thing gives testimony to that which was said above that 

men never act well except through necessity: but where choice abounds and 

where license may be used, everything is quickly filled with confusion and 

disorder. It is said therefore that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious, 

and Laws make them good. And where something by itself works well without 

law, the law is not necessary: but when that good custom is lacking, the law 

immediately becomes necessary. Thus the Tarquins being dead through fear of 

whom the Nobles were kept in restraint, it behooved them (the Nobles) to 

think of a new order, which would cause the same effect which the Tarquins 

had caused when they were alive. And therefore after many confusions, 

tumults, and dangers of troubles, which arose between the Plebs and the 

Nobility, they came for the security of the Plebs to the creation of the 

Tribunes, and they were given so much preeminence and so much reputation, 

that they then should always be able to be in the middle between the Plebs 

and the Senate, and obviate the insolence of the Nobles.



                    CHAPTER IV



THAT DISUNION OF THE PLEBS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT REPUBLIC FREE AND 

POWERFUL



I do not want to miss discoursing on these tumults that occurred in Rome 

from the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the Tribunes; and 

afterwards I will discourse on some things contrary to the opinions of many 

who say that Rome was a tumultuous Republic and full of so much confusion, 

that if good fortune and military virtu had not supplied her defects, she 

would have been inferior to every other Republic.



I cannot deny that fortune and the military were the causes of the Roman 

Empire; but it indeed seems to me that this would not happen except when 

military discipline is good, it happens that where order is good, (and) only 

rarely there may not be good fortune accompanying. But let us come to the 

other particulars of that City. I say that those who condemn the tumults 

between the nobles and the plebs, appear to me to blame those things that 

were the chief causes for keeping Rome free, and that they paid more 

attention to the noises and shouts that arose in those tumults than to the 

good effects they brought forth, and that they did not consider that in 

every Republic there are two different viewpoints, that of the People and 

that of the Nobles; and that all the laws that are made in favor of liberty 

result from their disunion, as may easily be seen to have happened in Rome, 

for from Tarquin to the Gracchi which was more than three hundred years, the 

tumults of Rome rarely brought forth exiles, and more rarely blood. Nor is 

it possible therefore to judge these tumults harmful, nor divisive to a 

Republic, which in so great a time sent into exile no more than eight or ten 

of its citizens because of its differences, and put to death only a few, and 

condemned in money (fined) not very many: nor can a Republic in any way with 

reason be called disordered where there are so many examples of virtu, for 

good examples result from good education, good education from good laws, and 

good laws from those tumults which many inconsiderately condemn; for he who 

examines well the result of these, will not find that they have brought 

forth any exile or violence prejudicial to the common good, but laws and 

institutions in benefit of public liberty. And if anyone should say the 

means were extraordinary and almost savage, he will see the People together 

shouting against the Senate, The Senate against the People, running 

tumultuously throughout the streets, locking their stores, all the Plebs 

departing from Rome, all of which (things) alarm only those who read of 

them; I say, that every City ought to have their own means with which its 

People can give vent to their ambitions, and especially those Cities which 

in important matters, want to avail themselves of the People; among which 

the City of Rome had this method, that when those people wanted to obtain a 

law, either they did some of the things mentioned before or they would not 

enroll their names to go to war, so that to placate them it was necessary 

(for the Senate) in some part to satisfy them: and the desires of a free 

people rarely are pernicious to liberty, because they arise either from 

being oppressed or from the suspicion of going to be oppressed. And it these 

opinions should be false, there is the remedy of haranguing (public 

assembly), where some upright man springs up who through oratory shows them 

that they deceive themselves; and the people (as Tullius Cicero says) 

although they are ignorant, are capable of (appreciating) the truth, and 

easily give in when the truth is given to them by a trustworthy man.



One ought therefore to be more sparing in blaming the Roman government, and 

to consider that so many good effects which came from that Republic, were 

not caused except for the best of reasons: And if the tumults were the cause 

of creation of Tribunes, they merit the highest praise, for in addition to 

giving the people a part in administration, they were established for 

guarding Roman liberty, as will be shown in the next chapter.



                    CHAPTER V



WHERE THE GUARDING OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURELY PLACED, EITHER IN THE PEOPLE 

OR IN THE NOBLES; AND WHICH HAVE THE GREATER REASON TO BECOME TUMULTUOUS 

EITHER HE WHO WANTS TO ACQUIRE OR HE WHO WANTS TO MAINTAIN



Among the more necessary things instituted by those who have prudently 

established a Republic, was to establish a guard to liberty, and according 

as this was well or badly place, that freedom endured a greater or less 

(period of time). And because in every Republic there exists the Nobles and 

the Populace, it may be a matter of doubt in whose hands the guard is better 

placed. And the Lacedemonians, and in our times the Venetians, placed it in 

the hands of the Nobles, but that of Rome was placed in the hands of the 

Plebs. It is necessary therefore to examine which of the Republics had made 

the better selection. And if we go past the causes and examine every part, 

and if their results should be examined, the side of the Nobles would be 

preferred since the liberty of Sparta and Venice had a much longer life than 

that of Rome: And to come to the reasons, I say (taking up first the part of 

the Romans) that thing (liberty) which is to be guarded ought to be done by 

those who have the least desire of usurping it. And without doubt, if the 

object of the Nobles and of the Ignobles (populace) is considered, it will 

be seen that the former have a great desire to dominate, and the latter a 

desire not to be dominated and consequently a greater desire to live free, 

being less hopeful of usurping it (liberty) than are the Nobles: so that the 

People placed in charge to guard the liberty of anyone, reasonably will take 

better care of it; for not being able to take it away themselves, they do 

not permit others to take it away.



On the other hand, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian arrangement, says 

that those who placed that guardianship in the hands of the Powerful 

(Nobles), made two good points: The one, that they satisfy more the 

ambitions of those who playing a greater part in the Republic, (and) having 

this club in their hands, have more reason to be content; the other, that 

they take away a kind of authority from the restless spirit of the People 

which is the cause of infinite discussions and troubles in a Republic, and 

apt to bring the Nobility to some (act of) desperation which in times may 

result in some bad effects. And they give for an example this selfsame Rome, 

where the Tribunes of the Plebs having this authority in their hands, (and) 

the having of one Consul from the Plebs was not enough for them (the People), 

but that they wanted to have both (the Consuls from the Plebs). From this 

they afterward wanted the Censure, the Praetorship, and all the other ranks 

of the Empire (Government) of the Republic. Nor was this enough for them, 

but urged on by the same fury they began in time to idolize those men whom 

they saw adept at beating down the Nobility: whence arose the power of 

Marius and the ruin of Rome.



And truly whoever should discuss well both of these things could be in doubt 

as to what kind of men may be more harmful to the Republic, either those who 

desire to acquire that which they do not have, or those who desire to 

maintain the honors already acquired. And in the end whoever examines 

everything skillfully will come to this conclusion: The discussion is either 

of a Republic which wants to create an Empire, as Rome, or of one which is 

satisfied to maintain itself. In the first case it is necessary for it to do 

everything as Rome did; in the second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for 

those reasons why and how as will be described in the succeeding chapter.



But to return to the discussion as to which men are more harmful in a 

Republic, either those who desire to acquire, or those who fear to lose that 

which they have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius had been made 

Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the cavalry, both plebeians, in order 

to investigate certain conspiracies that had been formed in Capua against 

Rome, they were also given authority by the people to be able to search out 

who in Rome from ambition and by extraordinary means should endeavor to 

attain the Consulate and other houses (offices) of the City. And it 

appearing to the Nobility that such authority given to the Dictator was 

directed against them, they spread the word throughout Rome that it was not 

the Nobles who were seeking the honors for ambition, or by extraordinary 

means, but the Ignobles (Plebeians) who, trusting neither to their blood 

(birth) nor in their own virtu, sought to attain those dignities, and they 

particularly accused the Dictator: And so powerful was this accusation, that 

Menenius having made a harangue (speech) and complaining of the calumnies 

spread against him by the Nobles, he deposed the Dictatorship, and submitted 

himself to that judgement (of himself) which should be made by the People: 

And then the cause having been pleaded, he was absolved; at which time there 

was much discussion as to who was the more ambitious, he who wanted to 

maintain (his power) or he who wanted to acquire it, since the desires of 

either the one or the other could be the cause of the greatest tumults. But 

none the less more frequently they are caused by those who possess (power), 

for the fear of losing it generates in them the same desires that are in 

those who want to acquire it, because it does not seem to men to possess 

securely that which they have, unless they acquire more from others. And, 

moreover, those who possess much, can make changes with greater power and 

facility. And what is yet worse, is that their breaking out and ambitious 

conduct arouses in the breasts of those who do not possess (power) the 

desire to possess it, either to avenge themselves against them (the former) 

by despoiling them, or in order to make it possible also for them to partake 

of those riches and honors which they see are so badly used by the others.



                    CHAPTER VI



WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN ROME WHICH COULD 

ELIMINATE THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE SENATE



We have discussed above the effects which were caused by the controversies 

between the People and the Senate. Now these having continued up to the time 

of the Gracchi, where they were the cause of the loss of liberty, some might 

wish that Rome had done the great things that she did without there being 

that enmity within her. It seems to me therefore a thing worthy of 

consideration to see whether in Rome there could have been a government 

(state) established that could have eliminated the aforementioned 

controversies. And to desire to examine this it is necessary to have 

recourse to those Republics which have had their liberty for a long time 

without such enmities and tumults, and to see what (form) of government 

theirs was, and if it could have been introduced in Rome.



For example, there is Sparta among the ancients, Venice among the modern, 

(both) having been previously mentioned by me. Sparta created a King with a 

small Senate which should govern her. Venice did not divide its government 

by these distinctions, but gave all those who could have a part in the 

administration (of its government) the name of Gentlemen: In this manner, 

chance more than prudence gave them (the Venetians) the laws (form of 

Government), for having taken refuge on those rocks where the City now is, 

for the reasons mentioned above many of the inhabitants, as they had 

increased to so great a number, with the desire to live together, so that 

needing to make laws for themselves, they established a government, (and) 

came together often in councils to discuss the affairs of the City; when it 

appeared to them that they had become numerous enough for existing as a 

commonwealth, they closed the path to all the others who should newly come 

to live there to take part in their government: And in time finding in that 

place many inhabitants outside the government, in order to give reputation 

to those who were governing, they called them Gentlemen, and the others 

Popolari. This form (of Government) could establish and maintain itself 

without tumult, because when it was born, whoever then lived in Venice 

participated in that government, with which no one could complain: Those who 

came to live there later, finding the State firm and established did not 

have cause or opportunity to create a tumult. The cause was not there 

because nothing had been taken from them. The opportunity was not there 

because those who ruled kept them in check and did not employ them in 

affairs where they could pick up authority. In addition to this, those who 

came to inhabit Venice later were not very many, or of such a great number 

that these would be a disproportion between those who governed and those who 

were governed, for the number of Gentlemen were either equal to or greater 

than the others: so that for these reasons Venice could establish that State 

and maintain it united.



Sparta, as I have said, being governed by a King and limited Senate could 

thus maintain itself for a long time because there being few inhabitants in 

Sparta, and the path having been closed to those who should want to live 

there, and the laws of Lycurgus having acquired such reputation that their 

observance removed all the causes for tumults. They were able to live united 

for a long time, for Lycurgus had established in Sparta more equality of 

substance and less equality in rank, because equal poverty existed here and 

the Plebs were lacking ambitious men, as the offices of the City were 

extended to few Citizens, and were kept distant from the Plebs, nor did the 

Nobles by not treating them badly ever create in them the desire to want 

them. This resulted from the Spartan Kings, who, being placed in that 

Principate and living in the midst of that Nobility, did not have may better 

means of maintaining their office, than to keep the Plebs defended from 

every injury: which caused the Plebs neither to fear nor to desire 

authority, and not having the dominion, nor fear of it, there was eliminated 

the competition which they might have had with the Nobility, and the cause 

of tumults, and thus they could live united for a long time. But two things 

principally caused this union: The one, the inhabitants of Sparta were few, 

and because of this were able to be governed by a few: The other, that not 

accepting outsiders in their Republic, they did not have the opportunity 

either of becoming corrupt or of increasing so much that they should become 

unsupportable to those few who governed her.



Considering all these things, therefore, it is seen that it was necessary 

that the legislators of Rome do one of two things in desiring that Rome be 

as quiet as the above mentioned Republic, either not to employ the Plebs in 

war like the Venetians, or not to open the door to outsiders like the 

Spartans, But they did the one and the other, which gave the Plebs strength 

and increased power and infinite opportunities for tumults. And if the Roman 

State had come to be more tranquil, it would have resulted that she would 

have become even more feeble, because there would have been cut off from her 

the means of being able to attain that greatness which she achieved. So that 

Rome wanting to remove the causes for tumults, would also take away the 

causes for expansion. And as in all human affairs, those who examine them 

will indeed see that it is never possible to avoid one inconvenience but 

that another one will spring up. If therefore, you want to make a people 

numerous and armed in order to create a great Empire, you will make it of a 

kind that you are not able afterward to manage it in your own way: if you 

keep them either small or disarmed in order to be able to manage them, 

(and), if you acquire other dominion, you will not be able to hold them, or 

you will become so mean that you will become prey to whoever assaults you. 

And therefore, in every one of our decisions, there ought to be considered 

where the inconveniences are less, and then take up the better proceeding, 

for there will never be formed anything entirely clear of suspicion. Rome 

could therefore, like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and 

established a limited Senate; but desiring to build a great Empire, she 

could not, like Sparta, limit the number of her Citizens: which, in creating 

a King for life and a small number in the Senate, would have been of little 

benefit in connection with her unity. If anyone therefore should want to 

establish a new Republic, he should have to consider if he should want it to 

expand in dominion and power as did Rome, or whether it should remain within 

narrow limits. In the first case, it is necessary to establish it as Rome, 

and to give place to tumults and general dissensions as best he can; for 

without a great number of men, and (those) well armed, no Republic can ever 

increase, or if it did increase, to maintain itself. In thy second case he 

may establish her as Sparta and Venice: but because expansion is the poison 

of such Republics, he ought in every way he can prevent her from making 

acquisitions, for such acquisitions, based on a weak Republic, are entirely 

their ruin, as happened to Sparta and Venice, the first of which having 

subjected almost all of Greece, showed the weakness of its foundation with 

the slightest accident; for when there ensued the rebellion of Thebes caused 

by Pelopidas, the other cities also rebelling, ruined that Republic 

entirely.



Similarly Venice having occupied a great part of Italy, and the greater part 

(obtained) not by war but by money and astuteness, when it came to make a 

test of her strength everything was lost in one engagement. I believe then 

that to create a Republic which should endure a long time, the better way 

would be to organize internally like Sparta, or like Venice locate it in a 

strong place, and of such power that no one should believe he could quickly 

oppress her: and on the other hand, it should not be so powerful that she 

should be formidable to her neighbors, and thus she could enjoy its state 

(independence) for a long time. For there are two reasons why war is made 

against a Republic: The one, to become lord over her: the other, the fear of 

being occupied by her. These two means in the above mentioned manner almost 

entirely removed (the reasons for war), for it is difficult to destroy her, 

being well organized for her defense, as I presuppose, it will rarely or 

never happen that one can design to conquer her. If she remains within her 

limits, and from experience it is seen that there is no ambition in her, it 

will never happen that someone for fear of her will make war against her: 

and this would be so much more so if there should be in her constitution or 

laws (restrictions) that should prohibit her expansion. And without doubt I 

believe that things could be kept balanced in this way, that there would be 

the best political existence, and real tranquillity to a City. But all 

affairs of men being (continually) in motion and never being able to remain 

stable, it happens that (States) either remain stable or decline: and 

necessity leads you to do many things which reason will not lead you to do; 

so that having established a Republic adept at maintaining itself without 

expanding, and necessity should induce her to expand, her foundations would 

be taken away and her ruin accomplished more readily. Thus, on the other 

hand, if Heaven should be so kind that she would never have to make war, the 

languidness that should arise would make her either effeminate or divided: 

which two together, or each one by itself, would be cause of her ruin. Not 

being able, therefore, (as I believe) to balance these things, and to 

maintain this middle course, it is necessary in organizing a Republic to 

think of the more honorable side, and organize her in a way that if 

necessity should induce her to expand, she may be able to preserve that 

which she should have acquired. And to return to the first discussion, I 

believe it is necessary to follow the Roman order and not that of any other 

Republic (because I do not believe it is possible to find a middle way 

between one and the other) and to tolerate that enmity that should arise 

between the People and the Senate, accepting it as an inconvenient necessity 

in attaining the Roman greatness. Because in addition to the other reasons 

alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is shown to be necessary for 

the guarding of liberty, it is easy to consider the benefit that will come 

to the Republic from this authority of accusing (judiciary), which among 

others was committed to the Tribunes, as will be discussed in the following 

chapter. 



                   CHAPTER VII



HOW MUCH THE FACULTY OF ACCUSING (JUDICIARY) IS NECESSARY FOR A REPUBLIC FOR 

THE MAINTENANCE OF LIBERTY



No more useful and necessary authority can be given to those who are 

appointed in a City to guard its liberty, as is that of being able to accuse 

the citizen to the People or to any Magistrate or Council, if he should in 

any way transgress against the free state. This arrangement makes for two 

most useful effects for a Republic. The first is, that for fear of being 

accused, the citizens do not attempt anything against the state, and if they 

should (make an) attempt they are punished immediately and without regard 

(to person). The other is, that it provides a way for giving vent to those 

moods which in whatever way and against whatever citizens may arise in the 

City. And when these moods do not provide a means by which they may be 

vented, they ordinarily have recourse to extra ordinary means that cause the 

complete ruin of a Republic. And there is nothing which makes a Republic so 

stable and firm, as organizing it in such a way that changes in the moods 

which may agitate it have a way prescribed by law for venting themselves. 

This can be demonstrated by many examples, and especially by that of 

Coriolanus, which Titus Livius refers to, where he says that the Roman 

Nobility being irritated against the Plebs, because it seemed to them the 

Plebs had too much authority concerning the creation of the Tribunes who 

defended them, and Rome (as happened) experiencing a great scarcity of 

provisions, and the Senate having sent to Sicily for grain, Coriolanus, 

enemy of the popular faction, counselled that the time had come (to be able) 

to castigate the Plebs and take away authority which they had acquired and 

assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them famished and not 

distributing the grain: which proposition coming to the ears of the people, 

caused so great an indignation against Coriolanus, that on coming out of the 

Senate he would have been killed in a tumultuary way if the Tribunes had not 

summoned him to appear and defend his cause. From this incident there is to 

be noted that which was mentioned above, that it is useful and necessary for 

a Republic with its laws to provide a means of venting that ire which is 

generally conceived against a citizen, for if these ordinary means do not 

exist, they will have recourse to extraordinary ones, and without doubt 

these produce much worse effects that do the others. For ordinarily when a 

citizen is oppressed, even if he has received an injustice, little or no 

disorder ensues in the Republic, because its execution is done by neither 

private nor foreign forces which are those that ruin public liberty, but is 

done by public force and arrangement which have their own particular limits, 

and do not transcend to things that ruin the Republic.



And to corroborate this opinion with examples, among the ancient ones I want 

this one of Coriolanus to be enough, on which anyone should consider how 

much evil would have resulted to the Roman Republic if he had been killed in 

the tumults, for there would have arisen an offense by a private (citizen) 

against a private (citizen); which offense generates fear, fear seeks 

defense, for this defense partisans are procured, from the partisans 

factions arise in the City, (and) the factions cause their ruin. But the 

matter being controlled by those who had authority, all those evils which 

could arise if it were governed by private authority were avoided. We have 

seen in our time that troubles happened to the Republic of Florence because 

the multitude was able to give vent to their spirit in an ordinary way 

against one of her citizens, as befell in the time of Francesco Valori, who 

was as a Prince in that City (and) who being judged ambitious by many, and a 

man who wanted by his audacity and animosity to transcend the civil 

authority, and there being no way in the Republic of being able to resist 

him except by a faction contrary to his, there resulted that he (Valori) 

having no fear except from some extraordinary happening, began to enlist 

supporters who should defend him: On the other hand, those who opposed him 

not having any regular way or repressing him, thought of extraordinary ways, 

so that it came to arms. And where (if it were possible to oppose him, 

Valori, by regular means) his authority would have been extinguished with 

injury to himself only, but having to extinguish it by extraordinary means, 

there ensued harm not only to himself, but to many other noble citizens. We 

could also city in support of the above mentioned conclusion the incident 

which ensued in Florence in connection with Piero Soderini, which resulted 

entirely because there was not in that Republic (means of making) 

accusations against the ambitions of powerful citizens: for the accusing of 

a powerful one before eight judges in a Republic is not enough; it is 

necessary that the judges be many because the few always judge in favor of 

the few. So that if such a means had been in existence, they would have 

accused him (Soderini) of evil while yet alive, and through such means 

without having the Spanish army (called) to come in, they would have given 

vent to their feelings; or if he had not done evil they would not have had 

the audacity to move against him, for fear that they would be accused by 

him: and thus both sides would have ceased having that desire which was the 

cause of the trouble.



So that this can be concluded, that whenever it is seen that external forces 

are called in by a party of men who live in a City, it can be judged to 

result from its bad organization because there did not exist within that 

circle of arrangements, a way to be able without extraordinary means to give 

vent to the malignant moods that arise in men, which can be completely 

provided by instituting accusations before many judges and giving them 

reputation (authority). These things were so well organized in Rome that in 

so many discussions between the Plebs and the Senate, neither the Senate nor 

the Plebs nor any particular citizen, ever attempted to avail (himself) of 

external force, for having the remedy at home it was not necessary to go 

outside for it. And although the above examples are amply sufficient to 

prove this, none the less I want to refer to another recital by Titus Livius 

in his history, which refers to there having been in Chiusi (Clusium), at 

that time a most noble City of Tuscany, one Lucumones who had violated a 

sister of Aruntes, and Aruntes not being able to avenge himself because of 

the power of the violator, went to seek out the French (Gauls) who then 

ruled in that place which today is called Lombardy, and urged them to come 

to Chiusi with arms in hand, pointing out to them how they could avenge the 

injury he had received with advantage to themselves: but if Aruntes could 

have seen how he could have avenged himself by the provisions of the City, 

he would not have sought the barbarian forces. But just as these accusations 

are useful in a Republic, so also are calumnies useless and harmful, as we 

shall discuss in the next chapter.



                   CHAPTER VIII



AS MUCH AS ACCUSATIONS ARE USEFUL TO A REPUBLIC, SO MUCH SO ARE CALUMNIES 

PERNICIOUS



Notwithstanding that the virtu of Furius Camillus when he was liberating 

(Rome) from the oppression of the French (Gauls) had caused the Roman 

citizens to yield him (top honors) without appearing to them to have lost 

reputation or rank, none the less Manlius Capitolinus was not able to endure 

that so much honor and glory should be bestowed on him; for it seemed to him 

he had done as much for the welfare of Rome by having saved the Campidoglio 

(Capitol), he had merited as much as Camillus, and as for other warlike 

praises he was not inferior to him. So that filled with envy, he was not 

able to sow discord among the Fathers (Senators) he turned to the Plebs, 

sowing various sinister opinions among them. And among other things he said 

was, that the treasure which had been collected (together) to be given to 

the French (Gauls), and then was not given to them, had been usurped by 

private citizens: and if its should be recovered it could be converted to 

public usefulness, alleviating the plebs from tribute or from some private 

debt. These words greatly impressed the Plebs, so that Manlius begun to have 

concourse with them and at his instigation (created) many tumults in the 

City: This thing displeased the Senate and they deeming it of moment and 

perilous, created a Dictator who should take cognizance of the case and 

restrain the rashness of (Manlius); whereupon the Dictator had him summoned, 

and they met face to face in public, the Dictator in the midst of the Nobles 

and Manlius in the midst of the Plebs. Manlius was asked what he had to say 

concerning who obtained the treasure that he spoke about, for the Senate was 

as desirous of knowing about it as the Plebs: to which Manlius made no 

particular reply, but going on in an evasive manner he said, that it was not 

necessary to tell them that which they already knew, so that the Dictator 

had him put in prison. And it is to be noted by this text how detestable 

calumnies are in free Cities and in every other form of government, and that 

in order to repress them no arrangement made for such a proposition ought to 

be neglected. Nor can there be a better arrangement to putting an end to 

these (calumnies) than to open the way for accusations, for accusations are 

as beneficial to Republics as calumnies are harmful: and on the other hand 

there is this difference, that calumnies do not need witnesses nor any other 

particular confrontation to prove them so that anyone can be calumniated by 

anyone else, but cannot now be accused, as the accuser has need of positive 

proof and circumstances that would show the truth of the accusation. Men 

must make the accusations before the Magistrates, the People, or the 

Councils: calumnies (are spread) throughout the plaza and lodgings (private 

dwellings). These calumnies are practiced more where accusations are used 

less and where Cities are less constituted to receive them. An establisher 

of a Republic therefore ought so to organize it that it is possible to 

accuse every citizen without any fear and without any suspicion: and this 

being done, and well carried out, he should severely punish the calumniators, 

who cannot complain if they are punished, they having places open to them to 

hear the accusations of those who had caluminated them in private. And where 

this part is not well organized great disorders always follow, for calumnies 

irritate but do not castigate citizens, and those who have been irritated 

think of strengthening themselves, easily hating more than fearing the 

things that are said against them.



¶ This part (as has been said) was well organized in Rome, and has always 

been poorly organized in our City of Florence. And as in Rome this 

institution did much good, at Florence this poor order did much evil. And 

whoever reads the history of this City, will see how many calumnies have 

been perpetrated in every time against those citizens who occupied 

themselves in its important affairs. Of one, they said he had robbed money 

from the Community; of another, that he had not succeeded in an enterprise 

because of having been corrupted; and of yet another, because of his 

ambitions had caused such and such inconvenience. Of the things that 

resulted there sprung up hate on every side, whence it came to divisions, 

from divisions to Factions (Sects), (and), from Factions to ruin. If in 

Florence there had been some arrangement for the accusation of citizens and 

punishment of calumniators, there would not have occurred the infinite 

troubles that have ensued, for those Citizens who had been either condemned 

or absolved, could not have harmed the City, and there would have been a much 

less number accused than there had been calumniated, as it could not have 

been (as I have said) as easy to accuse as to calumniate any one. And among 

the other things that some citizens might employ to achieve greatness have 

been these calumnies, which employed against powerful citizens who opposed 

his ambition, did much for them; for by taking up the past of the people, 

and confirming them the opinion which they had of them (the nobles), he made 

them his friends.



And although we could refer to many examples, I want to be content with only 

one. The Florentine army which was besieging Lucca was commanded by Messer 

Giovanni Guicciardini, their Commissioner. It was due either to his bad 

management or his bad fortune, that the fall of that City did not ensue. But 

whatever the case may have been, Messer Giovanni was blamed, alleging he had 

been corrupted by the Lucchesi: which calumny, being favored by his enemies, 

brought Messer Giovanni almost to the last desperation. And although, to 

justify himself because there was no way in that Republic of being able to 

do so. From which there arose great indignation among the friends of Messer 

Giovanni, who constituted the greater part of the nobility, and (also) among 

those who desired to make changes in Florence. This affair, both for this 

and other similar reasons, grew so, that there resulted the ruin of the 

Republic. 



Manlius Capitolinus was therefore a calumniator and not an accuser; and the 

Romans showed in this case in point how the calumniators ought to be 

punished. For they ought to be made to become accusers, and if the 

accusation proves true either to reward them or not punish them; but if it 

does not prove true, to punish them as Manlius was punished.



                    CHAPTER IX



HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE MAN ALONE IN DESIRING TO ORGANIZE A NEW REPUBLIC 

TO REFORM ITS INSTITUTIONS ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE ANCIENT ONES



And it may appear perhaps to some that I have gone too far into Roman 

history, not having yet made any mention of the organizers of this Republic, 

or of (having regard for) her institutions, her religion, and her military 

establishment. And therefore, not wanting to keep in suspense the minds of 

those who want to understand these matters, I say, that many perhaps should 

judge it a bad example that the founder of a civil society, as Romulus was, 

should first have killed his brother, then have consented to the death of 

Titus Tatius, a Sabine, who had been chosen by him to share the Kingdom; 

because of which it might be judged that the citizens could, from ambition 

and the desire to rule, with the authority of their Prince, attack those who 

should be opposed to their authority. Which opinion would be correct, if the 

object he had in mind in causing that homicide should be considered. But 

this must be assumed, as a general rule, that it never or rarely occurs that 

some Republic or Kingdom is well organized from the beginning, or its 

institutions entirely reformed a new, unless it is arranged by one 

(individual only): rather it is necessary that the only one who carries it 

out should be he who on whose mind such an organization depends. A prudent 

Organizer of a Republic, therefore, who has in mind to want to promote, not 

himself, but the common good, and not his own succession but his (common) 

country, ought to endeavor to have the authority alone: and a wise planner 

will never reprimand anyone for any extraordinary activity that he should 

employ either in the establishment of a Kingdom or in constituting a 

Republic. It is well then, when the deed accuses him, the result should 

excuse him; and when it is good, as that of Romulus, he will always be 

excused; for he ought to be reprehended who is violent in order to destroy, 

and not he who does so for beneficial reasons. He ought, however, to be so 

prudent and wise that the authority which he has assumed, he will not leave 

to his heirs (or) any other: for men being more prone to evil than to good, 

his successor could employ for reasons of ambition that which should be 

employed for virtuous reasons by him. In addition to this, even if one is 

adept at organizing, the thing organized will not endure long if its 

(administration) remains only on the shoulders of one individual, but it is 

good when it remains in the care of many, and thus there will be many to 

sustain it. As the organization of anything cannot be made by many because 

of the diverse opinions that exist among them, yet having once understood 

this, they will not agree to forego it. And that Romulus merited to be 

excused for the death of his brother and that of his companion, and that 

what he had done he did for the common good and not for his own ambition, is 

shown by his immediate institution of a Senate with which he should consult, 

and according to the opinions of which he would make his decision. And 

whoever considers well the authority which Romulus reserved for himself, 

will see that he did not reserve anything else other than the command of the 

army when war was decided upon, and of convening the Senate. This was seen 

at that time when Rome became free after the driving out of the Tarquins, 

where there was no other innovation made on the ancient institutions except 

that in place of an hereditary King there should be two Consuls (elected) 

each year. Which gives testimony that all the institutions at the origin of 

that City were more in conformity with a free and civil society than with an 

absolute and tyrannical one.



Infinite examples could be given in corroboration of the things mentioned 

above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of Kingdoms and 

Republics, who were able to formulate laws for the common good (only) by 

assigning the (necessary) authority to themselves: but I want to omit these 

as they are already well known. I will refer only to one not so well known, 

but which should be given consideration by those who desire to be 

institutors of good laws, (and), this is that of Agis, King of Sparta, who 

desiring to bring the Spartans back to those limits which the laws of 

Lycurgus had delimited for them, (and), it seeming to him that by deviating 

in part from them his City had lost much of that ancient virtu, and 

consequently her power and dominion, was at once killed by Spartan Ephors as 

a man who wanted to become a Tyrant. But Cleomenes succeeding him in the 

Kingdom, there arose in him the same desire from (reading) the records and 

writings of Agis that he found, in which his thoughts and intentions were 

seen, (and) he recognized that he could not render this good to his country, 

unless he should become alone in authority, as it seemed to him he would not 

be able because of the ambitions of men to provide the good for the many 

against the desires of the few: and seizing a convenient opportunity had all 

the Ephors killed and those who could oppose him: after which he completely 

restored the laws of Lycurgus. This decision helped to revive Sparta and 

give to Cleomene that reputation which was (equal) to that of Lycurgus, if 

it had not been for the power of Macedonia and the weakness of the other 

Greek Republics. For after this establishment (of the laws) he was soon 

assaulted by the Macedonians, and finding that by herself (Sparta) was 

inferior in strength, and not having anyone to whom he could have recourse, 

he was defeated, and his plans (no matter how just and laudable) remained 

incompleted. Considering all these things, therefore, I conclude that to 

establish a Republic it is necessary that one must be alone, and Romulus 

merits to be excused and not censured for the death of Remus and of Tatius.



                    CHAPTER X



AS MUCH AS THE FOUNDERS OF REPUBLICS AND KINGDOMS ARE LAUDABLE, SO MUCH ARE 

THOSE OF A TYRANNY SHAMEFUL



Among all men who have been praised, the most lauded are those who are heads 

and establishers of Religion. Next after them are those who have founded 

Republics or Kingdoms. After these are celebrated those who have commanded 

armies, (and) who have enlarged the (territory) of their Kingdom of those of 

their country. To these should be added men of letters, and because these 

are of many fields, they are celebrated according to their degree (of 

excellence). To other men, the number of whom is infinite, some degree of 

praise is given to them as pertain to their art and profession. On the other 

hand, those men are infamous and destroyers of Religion, dissipators of 

Kingdoms and Republics, enemies of virtu, of letters, and of every other art 

which brings usefulness and honor to human generations (mankind), such as 

are the impious and violent, the ignorant, the idle, the vile and degraded. 

And no one will ever be so mad or so wise, so wicked or so good, that 

selecting between these two kinds of men, does not laud what is laudable, 

and censure what is censurable. None the less, however, nearly all men 

deceived by a false good or a false glory allow themselves to drift either 

voluntarily or ignorantly into the ranks of those who merit more censure 

that praise. And being able to establish either a Kingdom or a Republic with 

eternal honor to themselves, they turn to Tyranny, nor do they see because 

of this action how much fame, how much glory, how much honor, security, and 

tranquil satisfaction of the mind, they lose; and how much infamy, disgrace, 

censure, danger, and disquiet, they incur. And it is impossible that those 

who live as private individuals in a Republic, or who by fortune or virtu 

become Princes, if they read the history and the records of ancient events, 

would do well living as private citizens in their country to live rather as 

a Scipio than a Caesar; and those who are Princes, rather as Agesilaus, 

Timoleon, and Dion, than as Nabis, Phalaris, and Dionysius, because they 

will see these (latter) to be thoroughly disgraced and those (former) most 

highly praised. They will also see that Timoleon and the others had no less 

authority in their country than had Dionysius and Phalaris, but they will 

see that they had had greater security for a longer time. Nor is there 

anyone who deceives himself by the glory of Caesar, he being especially 

celebrated by writers, for those who praised him were corrupted by his 

fortune and frightened by the long duration of the Empire which, ruling 

under his name did not permit that writers should talk of him freely. But 

whoever wants to know what the writers would have said of him freely, let 

him observe what they say of Cataline. And so much more is Caesar to be 

detested, as how much more is he to be censured for that which he did, than 

he who (just) intends to do evil. He will also see how Brutus was extolled 

with so many praises; so that not being able to censure him (Caesar) because 

of his power they extolled his enemy. Let he who has become a Prince in a 

Republic also consider how much more praise those Emperors merited who, after 

Rome became an Empire, lived under the laws (and) as good Princes, than 

those who lived an in a contrary manner; and he will also see that it was 

not necessary for the praetorian soldiers or the multitudes of the legions 

to defend Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrai Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and 

Marcus (Aurelius), because their customs, the good will of the people, and 

the love of the Senate would defend them. He will also see that the Eastern 

and Western armies were not sufficient to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, 

and so many other wicked emperors, from those enemies which their bad customs 

and evil lives had raised up against them.



And if the history of those men should be well considered, it would be very 

instructive to any Prince in pointing out to him the way to glory or 

censure, to security or fear. For of the twenty-six who were Emperors from 

Caesar to Maximinius, sixteen were murdered. Ten died in a natural way; and 

if among those who were murdered there may have been some good men, such as 

Galba and Pertinax, they were killed by that corruption that his 

predecessors had left among the soldiers. And if among those who died in a 

natural way there were some wicked, such as Severns, it resulted from their 

very great good fortune and virtu, which two things are found together in 

few men. He will also learn from this lesson of history how a good Kingdom 

can be organized, for all, except Titus, were bad: (and) those who succeeded 

by adoption were all good, such as were those five from Nero to Marcus 

(Aurelius). And when the Empire became hereditary, it came to ruin. Let a 

Prince therefore place himself in the times of Nero and Marcus, and let him 

compare them with those which preceded and followed (that period) and 

afterward let him select in which (of the two) he would want to be born and 

in which he would want to reign. For in those times governed by good 

(Emperors), he will see a Prince secure in thy midst of secure citizens, he 

will see the world full of peace and justice, he will see the Senate with 

its authority, the Magistrates with their honor, rich citizens enjoying 

their wealth, nobility and virtu exalted, he will see every quiet and good; 

and on the other hand (he will see) every rancor, every license, corruption, 

and ambition extinct; he will see that golden era where everyone can hold and 

defend whatever opinion he wishes: In the end, he will see the triumph of 

the world, the Prince full of reverence and glory, the people full of love 

and security. Then if he will consider the sorrowful times of the other 

Emperors, he will see the atrocities from war, discords from seditions, 

cruelty in peace and war, so many Princes slain by the sword, so many civil 

wars, so many foreign wars, Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes, her 

Cities ruined and sacked: He will see Rome burned, the Capitol of its 

citizens destroyed, the ancient temples desolate, ceremonies corrupted, the 

City full of adulterers: he will see the sea full of exiles, the shores full 

of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties take place in Rome, and 

nobility, riches, honors, and above all virtu, accounted capital crimes. He 

will see informers rewarded, servants corrupted against the masters, freemen 

against their patrons, and those who should lack enemies, oppressed by 

friends. And he will also recognize very well what obligations Rome, Italy, 

and the world owed to Caesar. And without doubt (if he was born of man), he 

would be dismayed at every imitation of those evil times, and burning with 

an immense desire to follow the good. And truly, a Prince seeking the glory 

of the world ought to desire to possess a corrupt City, not to spoil it 

entirely like Caesar, but to reorganize it like Romulus. And truly the 

heavens cannot give man a greater opportunity for glory, nor could man 

desire a better one. And if to want to organize a City well, it should be 

necessary to abolish the Principate, he who had failed to (give her good 

laws) should merit some excuse. But he does not merit any excuse who can 

hold the Principate and organize it. And in sum, let he to whom the heavens 

gives the opportunity consider that there are two ways: The one which will 

make him live securely and render him glorious after his death, the other 

which will make him live in continual anxiety and after death leave of 

himself an eternal infamy.



                    CHAPTER XI



OF THE RELIGIONS OF THE ROMANS



Although Rome had Romulus as its original organizer and, like a daughter, 

owed her birth and education to him, none the less the heavens, judging that 

the institutions of Romulus were not sufficient for so great an Empire, put 

it into the breasts of the Roman Senate to elect Numa Pompilius as successor 

to Romulus, so that those things that he had omitted, would be instituted by 

Numa. Who, finding a very ferocious people and wanting to reduce them to 

civil obedience by the acts of peace, turned to religion as something 

completely necessary in wanting to maintain a civilization, and he 

established it in such a manner that for many centuries there never was more 

fear of God than in that Republic, which facilitated any enterprise which 

the Senate or those of great Roman men should plan to do. And whoever should 

discuss the infinite actions of the people of Rome (taken) all together, and 

of many Romans (individually) by themselves, will see that those citizens 

feared much more the breaking of an oath than the laws, like those men who 

esteem more the power of God than that of man, as is manifestly seen in the 

examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus, for after the defeat that 

Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans at Cannae, many citizens had gathered 

together (and) frightened and fearful (and) had agreed to abandon Italy and 

take themselves to Sicily: when Scipio heard of this, he went to meet them, 

and with bared sword in hand he constrained them to swear not to abandon 

their country. Lucius Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called 

Torquatus, had been accused by Marcus Pomponius, a Tribune of the Plebs: and 

before the day of judgment arrived, Titus went to meet Marcus, and 

threatening to kill him if he did not swear to withdraw the accusation 

against his father, constrained him to swear, and he (Marcus) from fear of 

having sworn withdrew the accusation from him (Lucius). And thus those 

citizens whom (neither) the love of their country and of its laws could keep 

in Italy, were kept there by an oath that they were forced to take, and the 

Tribune put aside the hatred that he had for his father, the injury that his 

son had done him, and his honor, in order to obey the oath taken; which did 

not result from anything else than from that religion which Numa had 

introduced in that City. And whoever considers well Roman history will see 

how much Religion served in commanding the armies, in reuniting the plebs, 

both in keeping men good, and in making the wicked ashamed. So that if it 

were discussed as to which Prince Rome should be more obligated, Romulus or 

Numa, I believe that Numa would (rather) attain the higher rank; for where 

Religion exists it is easily possible to introduce arms, but where there are 

arms and not religion, it (religion) can only be introduced there with 

difficulty. And it is seen that for Romulus to institute the Senate and to 

make the other civil and military arrangements, the authority of God was not 

necessary, but it was very necessary for Numa, who pretended he had met with 

a Nymph who advised him of that which he should counsel the people; and all 

this resulted because he wanted to introduce new ordinances and institutions 

in that City, and was apprehensive that his authority was not enough. And 

truly there never was any extraordinary institutor of laws among a people 

who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise he would not have been 

accepted; for they (these laws) are very well known by prudent men, but 

which by themselves do not contain evident reasons capable of persuading 

others. Wise men who want to remove this difficulty, therefore, have 

recourse to God. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, thus many others who had the 

same aims as they.



¶ The Roman people, therefore, admiring his (Numa's) goodness and prudence, 

yielded to his every decision. It is indeed true that those times were full 

of Religion, and those men with whom he (Numa) had to work were coarse 

(which) gave him great facility to pursue his designs, being able easily to 

impress upon them any new form. And without doubt whoever should want to 

establish a Republic in the present era, would find it more easy to do so 

among men of the mountains where there is no civilization, than among those 

who are used to living in the City, where civilization is corrupt, as a 

sculptor more easily extracts a beautiful statue from crude marble than of 

one badly sketched out by others. Considering all this I conclude therefore, 

that the Religion introduced by Numa was among the chief reasons for the 

felicity of that City, for it caused good ordinances, good ordinances make 

good fortune, and from good fortune there arises the happy successes of the 

enterprises. And as the observance of divine institutions is the cause of 

the greatness of Republics, so the contempt of it is the cause of their 

ruin, for where the fear of God is lacking it will happen that that kingdom 

will be ruined or that it will be sustained through fear of a Prince, which 

may supply the want of Religion. And because Princes are short lived, it 

will happen that that Kingdom will easily fall as he (Prince) fails in 

virtu. Whence it results that Kingdoms which depend solely on the virtu of 

one man, are not durable for long, because that virtu fails with the life of 

that man, and it rarely happens that it is renewed in (his) successor, as 

Dante prudently says:



     Rarely there descends from the branches (father to son)

     Human probity, and this is the will (of the one) who gives it, 

     because it is asked alone from him.



The welfare of a Republic or a Kingdom, therefore, is not in having a Prince 

who governs prudently while he lives, but one who organizes it in a way 

that, if he should die, it will still maintain itself. And although crude 

men are more easily persuaded by new ordinances and opinions, yet it is not 

impossible because of this to persuade civilized men, (and) who presume 

themselves not to be crude. The people of Florence did not seem either crude 

or ignorant, none the less Brother Girolamo Savonarola was persuaded that he 

talked with God. I do not want to judge whether that was true or not, 

because one ought not to talk of so great a man except with reverence. But I 

may well say that an infinite (number) believed him without they having seen 

anything extraordinary which would make them believe, because his life, the 

doctrine, the subjects he took up were sufficient to make them have faith. 

Let no one be dismayed, therefore, if he is not able to attain that which 

had been attained by others, for men (as was said in our preface) are born, 

live, and die, always in the same way.



                   CHAPTER XII



OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN RELIGION; AND HOW ITALY, BECAUSE THE 

MEDIUM OF THE ROMAN CHURCH WAS LACKING, WAS RUINED



Those Princes or those Republics that want to maintain themselves 

uncorrupted, have above everything else to maintain uncorrupted the 

servances of Religion, and hold them always in veneration. For no one can 

have a better indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine 

institutions held in contempt. This is easy to understand, when it is known 

upon what the Religion of the fatherland is founded; for every Religion has 

the foundation of its existence on some one of its principal institutions. 

The life of the Gentile Religion was founded upon the responses of the 

Oracles and upon the tenets of the Augurs and Aruspices; all their other 

ceremonies, sacrifices, rites, depended on these. For they readily believed 

that that God who could predict your future good or evil, should also be 

able to concede it to you. From this arose their temples, their sacrifices, 

their supplication, and all the other ceremonies venerating him; for the 

Oracle of Delphi, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated Oracles 

kept the world in admiration and devotion. As soon as these began to speak 

in the manner of the Potentates, and this falsity was discovered by the 

people, men became incredulous and disposed to disturb every good 

institution. The Princes of a Republic or a Kingdom ought therefore to 

maintain their Republic's religions, and in consequence well and united. And 

therefore they ought in all things which arise to foster it (even if they 

should judge them false) to favor and encourage it: and the more prudent 

they are, and the more they understand natural things, so much more ought 

they to do this. And because this practice has been observed by wise men, 

there has arisen the beliefs in the miracles that are celebrated in 

Religion, however false; for the prudent ones have increased (their 

importance) from whatever origin they may have derived and their authority 

gives them credence with the people. There were many of these miracles in 

Rome, and among others was that (which occurred) when the Roman soldiers 

were sacking the City of Veienti, some of whom entered the Temple of Juno, 

and, standing in front of her statue, and saying "WILL YOU COME TO ROME?", it 

appeared to some that she had made a sign (of assent), and to others that 

she had said yes. For these men, being full of Religion, (which T. Livius 

demonstrated) when they entered the Temple went in without tumult and 

completely devoted and full of reverence, seemed to hear that response to 

their question which perhaps they had presupposed: which opinion and belief 

was favored and magnified by Camillus and by the other Princes of the City.



If the Princes of the Republic had maintained this Christian religion 

according as it had been established by the founder, the Christian States 

and Republics would have been more united and much more happy than they are. 

Nor can any greater conjecture be made of its decline, than to see that 

those people who are nearer to the Church of Rome, the head of our Religion, 

have less Religion. And whoever should give consideration to its 

foundations, and observe how much different present usage is from them, 

should judge that without doubt her ruin or flagellation (chastisement) is 

near. And because some are of the opinion that the well-being of Italian 

affairs depend on the Church of Rome, I want to discuss those reasons 

against them that occur to me, and I will present two most powerful ones, 

which according to me are not controvertible. The first is, that by the evil 

example of that court, this province has lost all devotion and all Religion: 

so that it brings (with it) infinite troubles and infinite disorders; for 

where there is Religion every good is presupposed, so too where it is 

lacking the contrary is presupposed. We Italians therefore have this 

obligation with the Church and with the Priests of having become bad and 

without Religion; but we also have a greater one, which is the cause of our 

ruin. This is that the Church has kept and still keeps this province 

(country) of ours divided: and Truly any country never was united or happy, 

except when it gave its obedience entirely to one Republic or one Prince, as 

has happened to France and Spain. And the reason that Italy is not in the 

same condition, and is not also governed by one Republic or one Prince, is 

solely the Church, for having acquired and held temporal Empire, she has not 

been so powerful or of such virtu that she was able to occupy the rest of 

Italy and make herself its Prince. And on the other hand, she has not been 

so weak that the fear of losing her dominion of temporal things has made her 

unable to call in a power that could defend her against those who had become 

too powerful in Italy, as was seen anciently by many experiences, when 

through the medium of Charles the Great she drove out the Lombards who 

already were the kings of almost all Italy, and when in our times she took 

away the power of Venetians with the aid of France; afterwards she drove out 

the French with the aid of the Swiss. The church therefore not being 

powerful (enough) to occupy Italy, and not having permitted that another 

should occupy her, has been the cause why she (Italy) has not been able to be 

united under one head, but has been under so many Princes and Lords, from 

which there has resulted so much disunion and so much weakness, that she 

became prey not only to the powerful Barbarians, but to anyone who should 

assault her. This we other Italians owe to the Church of Rome, and to none 

others. And anyone who should want to observe the truth of this more readily 

through experience, should need to be of such great power that he should be 

sent to live at the Roman Court, with all the power it has in Italy, over 

the towns of the Swiss, who today are the only People who live accordingly 

to ancient customs both as far as Religion and military institutions (are 

concerned) and he would see that in a little time the evil customs of that 

Court would cause more disorders in that province (country) than could 

spring up from any other incident in any other time.



                   CHAPTER XIII



HOW THE ROMANS SERVED THEMSELVES OF RELIGION TO ESTABLISH THE CITY AND TO 

CARRY OUT THEIR ENTERPRISES AND STOP TUMULTS



And it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer to some examples 

where the Romans served themselves of Religion in order to reorganize the 

City and to further their enterprises. And although there are many in (the 

writings of) Titus Livius, none the less I want to content myself with 

these. The Roman people having created the Tribunes with Consular Power, and 

all but one (selected from the) Plebs, and pestilence and famine having 

occurred there that year, and certain prodigies coming to pass, the Nobles 

used this occasion of the creation of the new Tribunes, saying that the Gods 

were angered because Rome had ill-used the majesty of its Empire, and that 

there was no other remedy to placate the Gods than by returning the election 

of the Tribunes to its own (original) place; from which there resulted that 

the Plebs frightened by this Religion created all the Tribunes from the 

(class of the) Nobles.



¶ It was also seen at the capture of the City of the Veienti, that the 

Captains of the armies availed themselves of Religion to keep them disposed 

to an enterprise, when lake Albano had risen astonishingly that year, and 

the soldiers being weary from the long siege (and) wanted to return to Rome, 

the Romans insinuated that Apollo and certain other (oracles) had given 

replies that that year the City of the Veienti should be captured when Lake 

Albano should overflow: which event made the soldiers endure the weariness 

of the war and the siege, being taken by this hope of capturing the town, 

and they remained content to pursue the enterprise so much that Camillus who 

had been made Dictator captured that City after it had been besieged for ten 

years. And thus Religion well used was helpful both in the capture of that 

City and for the restoration of the Tribuneships to the Nobility, that 

without the said means either would have been accomplished only with 

difficulty.



¶ I do not want to miss referring to another example to this purpose. Many 

tumults had arisen in Rome caused by Terentillus the Tribune, (because of) 

his wanting to promulgate a certain law for the reasons which will be given 

in their place below: and among the first remedies that were used by the 

Nobility was Religion, of which they served themselves in two ways. In the 

first, they caused the sibylline books to be exhibited, and to give a reply 

to the City, that through the medium of civil sedition, there was impending 

that year the danger of (the City) losing its liberty; which thing (although 

it was discovered by the Tribunes) none the less put so much terror into the 

breasts of the Plebs that it cooled (their desire) to follow them. The other 

mode was when one Appius Erdonius with a multitude of bandits and servants 

numbering four thousand men occupied the Campidoglio (Capitol) by night, so 

that it was feared that the Equians and Volscians, perpetual enemies of the 

Roman name, should have come to Rome and attacked her; and the Tribunes 

because of this did not cease insisting in their pertinacity of promulgating 

the Terentillan law, saying that that fear was fictitious and not true; 

(and) one Publius Rubetius, a grave citizen of authority, went out from the 

Senate, (and) with words partly lovingly and partly menacing, showed them 

(the people) the danger to the City and the unreasonableness of their 

demands, so that he constrained the Plebs to swear not to depart from the 

wishes of the Consul. Whence the Plebs, forced to obey, reoccupied the 

Campidoglio: but the Consul Publius Valerius being killed in that attack, 

Titus Quintius was quickly made Consul, who in order not to allow the Plebs 

to rest, or to give them time to think again of the Terentillan law, 

commanded them to go out from Rome and go against the Volscians, saying that 

because of that oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul they were 

obligated to follow him: to which the Tribunes opposed themselves saying 

that that oath was given to the dead Consul and not to him. None the less 

Titus Livius shows that the Plebs for fear of Religion wanted more readily 

to obey the Consul than believe the Tribunes, saying in favor of the ancient 

Religion these words: "He feared that the age had not yet come, when the 

Gods were to be neglected, nor to make interpretations of their oaths and 

laws to suit themselves." Because of which thing, the Tribunes, apprehensive 

of their losing all their liberty, made an accord with the Consul to remain 

in obedience to him and that for one year there should be no discussion of 

the Terentillan law and the Consuls, on the other hand, should not draw on 

the Plebs for war outside (of Rome). And thus Religion enabled the Senate to 

overcome that difficulty which without it, they could never overcome.



                   CHAPTER XIV



THE ROMANS INTERPRETED THE AUSPICES ACCORDING TO NECESSITY, AND WITH THEIR 

PRUDENCE MADE A SHOW OF OBSERVING RELIGION, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE FORCED NOT 

TO OBSERVE IT, AND IF ANYONE RECKLESSLY DISPARAGED IT THEY PUNISHED HIM



The Auguries not only ((as was discussed above)) were the foundation in good 

part of the ancient Religion of the Gentiles, but they were also the causes 

of the well-being of the Roman Republic. Whence the Romans cared more for 

this than any other institution, and used it in their Consular Comitii, in 

starting their enterprises, in sending out their armies, in fighting 

engagements, and in every important activity of theirs, whether civil or 

military: and they never would go on an expedition unless they had persuaded 

the soldiers that the Gods promised them the victory. And among the 

Aruspices there were in the armies certain orders of Aruspices which they 

called Pollari (guardians of the Sacred Fowls). And anytime they were ordered 

to fight an engagement with the enemy they desired these Pollari make their 

Aruspices; and if the fowls pecked away, they fought with a good augury: if 

they did not peck away, they abstained from battle. None the less, when 

reason showed them that a thing ought to be done, not withstanding the 

Aruspices should be adverse, they did it anyway: but then they turned these 

(aruspices) with conditions and in such a manner so adeptly, that it should 

not appear they were doing so with disparagement to their Religion: which 

method was used by Consul Papirus in a most important battle which he waged 

against the Samnites, which afterward left them entirely weak and afflicted. 

For Papirus being in the field encountered the Samnites, and as victory in 

battle appeared certain to him, and because of this wanting to come to an 

engagement, he commanded the Pollari that they make their Aruspices: but the 

fowls did not peck away, and the Prince of the Pollari seeing the great 

disposition of the army to fight and the thoughts to win which were in the 

Captain and all the soldiers, and in order not to take away this opportunity 

from the army of doing well, reported to the Consul that the Aruspices were 

proceeding well, so that Papirus ordered out his squadrons; but some of the 

Pollari having told certain soldiers that the fowls had not pecked away, 

they in turn told it to Spurius Papirus nephew of the Consul; and when he 

reported this to the Consul, he (the Consul) quickly replied that he should 

attend to doing his duty well, and that as to himself and the army the 

Aruspices were correct, and if the Pollarius had told a lie, it would come 

back on him to his prejudice. And so that the result should correspond to 

the prognostication, he commanded his legates that they should place the 

Pollari in the front ranks of the battle. Whence it resulted that in going 

against the enemy, a Roman soldier drawing a dart by chance killed the 

Prince of the Pollari: which thing becoming known, the Consul said that 

every thing was proceeding well and with the favor of the Gods, for the army 

through the death of that liar was purged of every blame and of whatever 

anger (the Gods) should have had against him. And thus by knowing well how 

to accommodate his designs to the Aruspices, he (Papirus) took steps to give 

battle without his army perceiving that he had in any part neglected the 

institutions of their Religion.



Appius Pulcher acted in a contrary fashion in Sicily in the first Punic war; 

for wanting to give battle to the Carthaginian army, he caused the Pollari 

to make Aruspices, and when they reported to him that those fowl did not 

peck away, he said "Let us see if they would drink," and had them thrown 

into the sea: whence that giving battle he lost the engagement; for which he 

was condemned at Rome, and Papirus honored, not so much for the one having 

lost and the other having won, but because the one had gone against the 

Aruspices in a prudent manner, and the other fearfully. Nor did this method 

of making Aurispices have any other object than to have the soldiers go into 

battle with confidence, from which confidence almost always victory 

resulted. Which institution was not only used by the Romans, but by those 

outsiders; of which it seems to me proper to adduce an example in the 

following chapter.



                   CHAPTER XV



HOW THE SAMNITES HAD RECOURSE TO RELIGION AS AN EXTREME REMEDY FOR THE 

THINGS AFFLICTING THEM



The Samnites having been routed many times by the Romans, and having lastly 

been defeated in Tuscany, and their armies destroyed and Captains killed, 

and their allies such as the Tuscans, French (Gauls), and Umbrians having 

also been defeated, so that "They were not able to continue any longer with 

their own men or with those from outside, yet would not abstain from the 

war, and instead of giving up the unsuccessful defense of liberty, they 

would undertake one more attempt at victory before being overcome". Whence 

they decided to make one last try: and since they knew that to want to win 

it was necessary to induce obstinacy into the courage of the soldiers, and 

that to induce it there was no better means than Religion, they decided to 

repeat their ancient sacrifices through the medium of Ovius Paccius their 

Priest, who arranged it in this form: that a solemn sacrifice being made, 

(and), in the midst of the slain victims and burning altars make all the 

heads of the army swear never to abandon the fight; then they summoned the 

soldiers one by one and in the midst of those altars and surrounded by many 

centurions with bared swords in their hands, they made them first swear that 

they would not reveal the things they saw or heard, then with execrable 

phrases and words full of terror they made them swear and promise the Gods 

that they would go readily wherever the Emperor should command them, and 

never to flee in battle, and to kill whomever they should see fleeing; which 

oath if not observed would be visited on the head of his family and on his 

descendants. And some of them being frightened, (and) not wanting to swear, 

were quickly put to death by the centurions: so that the others who 

followed, terrified by the ferocity of the spectacle, all swore. And in 

order to make this gathering of theirs more imposing, there being forty 

thousand men there, they dressed half of them in white clothes with crests 

and plumes on the helmets, and thus arrayed they took position at Aquilonia: 

Papirius came against them, who in encouraging his soldiers said, "Those 

crests cannot inflict wounds, and paint and gilding keep Roman javelins from 

transfixing shields". And to weaken the opinion that his soldiers had of the 

enemy because of the oath they had taken, he said that it (the oath) was to 

inspire fear, and not courage, in those (who had taken it), for it made them 

at the same time fear their own Citizens, their Gods, and their enemies. And 

coming to the fight, the Samnites were defeated; for the virtu of the 

Romans, and the fear conceived from the past routs overcame whatever 

obstinacy they were able to assume by virtu of their Religion and by the 

oath they had taken. None the less it is seen that they (the Samnites) did 

not appear to have any other refuge, nor try other remedies to be able to 

revive hope and reestablish their lost virtu. Which fully testifies how much 

confidence can be obtained by means of Religion well used. And although this 

part might perhaps be rather placed among affairs of outside (peoples), none 

the less as this refers to one of the most important institutions of the 

Republic of Rome, it has appeared to me proper to commit this in this place 

so as not to divide this material and have to return to it many times.



                   CHAPTER XVI



A PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, IF BY SOME ACCIDENT BECOMES 

FREE, MAINTAINS ITS LIBERTY WITH DIFFICULTY



Many examples derived from the records of ancient history will show how 

difficult it is for a people used to living under a Prince to preserve their 

liberty after they had by some accident acquired it, as Rome acquired it 

after driving out the Tarquins. And such difficulty is reasonable; because 

that people is nothing else other than a brute animal, which ((although by 

nature ferocious and wild)) has always been brought up in prison and 

servitude, (and) which later being left by chance free in a field, (and) not 

being accustomed to (obtain) food or not knowing where to find shelter for 

refuge, becomes prey to the first one who seeks to enchain it again. This 

same thing happens to a people, who being accustomed to living under 

governments of others, not knowing to reason either on public defense or 

offense, not knowing the Princes or being known by them, return readily 

under a yoke, which often times is more heavy than that which a short time 

before had been taken from their necks: and they find themselves in this 

difficulty, even though the people is not wholly corrupt; for a people where 

corruption has not entirely taken over, cannot but live at all free even for 

a very brief time, as will be discussed below: and therefore our discussions 

concern those people where corruption has not expanded greatly, and where 

there is more of the good than of the bad (spoiled). To the above should be 

added another difficulty, which is that the state which becomes free makes 

enemy partisans, and not friendly partisans. All those men become its enemy 

partisans who avail themselves of the tyrannical state, feeding on the 

riches of the Prince, (and) who when they are deprived of the faculty of 

thus availing themselves, cannot live content, and some are forced to 

attempt to reestablish the tyrancy so as to recover their authority. It does 

not ((as I have said)) acquire friendly partisans, for a free society 

bestows honors and rewards through the medium of honest and predetermined 

rules, and outside of which does not honor or reward anyone; and when one 

receives those honors and rewards as appears to them he merits, he does not 

consider he has any obligation to repay them: in addition to this that 

common usefulness which free society brings with it, is not known by anyone 

((while he yet possesses it)), which is to be able to enjoy his own 

possessions freely without any suspicion, not being apprehensive of the 

honor of his womenfolk, or that of his children, and not to fear offer 

himself; for no one will ever confess himself to have an obligation to one 

who only does not offend him.



Thus ((as was said above)) a free state that has newly sprung up comes to 

have enemy partisans and not friendly partisans. And wanting to remedy this 

inconvenience and these disorders which the above mentioned difficulties 

bring with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, healthy, 

and necessary than (was) the killing of the sons of Brutus, who, as history 

shows, together with other Roman youths were induced to conspire against 

their country for no other reason than because they could not obtain 

extraordinary advantages for themselves under the Consuls as under the 

Kings; so that the liberty of that people appeared to have become their 

servitude. And whoever undertakes to govern a multitude either by the way of 

liberty (Republic) or by the way of a Principate, and does not make sure of 

those who are enemies of that new institution, establishes a short lived 

state. It is true that I judge those Princes unfelicitous who, to assure 

their state when the multitude is hostile, have to take extraordinary means; 

for he who has only a few enemies can easily and without great scandals make 

sure of them, but he who has the general public hostile to him can never 

make sure of them, and the more cruelty he uses, so much more weak becomes 

his Principate; so that the best remedy he has is to seek to make the People 

friendly. And although this discussion departs from that written above, in 

speaking of a Prince here and of a Republic there, none the less in order 

not to have to return again to this matter I want to speak a little more.



A Prince, therefore, wanting to gain over to himself a people who are 

hostile to him ((speaking of those Princes who have become Tyrants in their 

country)), I say that they ought first to look into that which the people 

desire, and he will find they always desire two things: the one, to avenge 

themselves against those who are the cause of their slavery: the other, to 

regain their liberty. The first desire the Prince is able to satisfy 

entirely, the second in part. As to the first, there is an example in point. 

When Clearchus, Tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile, a controversy arose 

between the people and the Nobles of Heraclea, (and) the Nobles seeing 

themselves inferior, turned to favor Clearchus, and conspiring with him they 

placed him in opposition to the disposition of the people of Heraclea, and 

(thus) took away the liberty from the people. So that Clearchus finding 

himself between the insolence of the Nobles, whom he could not in any way 

either content or correct, and the rage of the People who could not endure 

having lost their liberty, he decided suddenly to free himself from the 

nuisance of the Nobles, and to win the people over to himself. And on this, 

taking a convenient opportunity, he cut to pieces all the Nobles, to the 

extreme satisfaction of the People. And thus, in this way, he satisfied one 

of the desires people had, that is, to avenge themselves. But as to the 

desire of the people to regain their liberty, the Prince, not being able to 

satisfy it, ought to examine what are the reasons that make them desire to 

be free, and he will find that a small part of them desire to be free in 

order to command, but all the others, who are an infinite number, desire 

liberty also as to live in security. For in all Republics in whatever manner 

organized, there are never more than forty or fifty Citizens of a rank to 

command, and because this number is small, it is an easy matter to assure 

oneself of them, either by taking them out of the way, or by giving them a 

part of so many honors as, according to their condition, ought in good part 

to content them. The others, to whom it is enough to live in security, are 

easily satisfied by creating institutions and laws which, together with his 

power, gives realization to the general security of the people. And when a 

Prince does this, and the people see that no one breaks such laws by 

accident, they will begin in a very short time to live in security and 

contentment. In example for this, there is the Kingdom of France, which 

lives in security from nothing else other than those Kings being bound by an 

infinite number of laws in which the security of his people is realized. And 

whoever organized that state wanted that those Kings should do ((in their 

own way)) with the arms and the money as they wanted, but should not be able 

to dispose of any other thing otherwise than by the laws that were ordained. 

That Prince, therefore, or that Republic, that does not secure itself at the 

beginning of its state, should assure itself at the first opportunity, as 

the Romans did. And he who should allow this to pass will repent too late of 

not doing that which he ought to have done. The Roman people, therefore, 

being not yet corrupted when they recovered their liberty, were able to 

maintain it, after the sons of Brutus were put to death and the Tarquins 

destroyed, with all those remedies and institutions which have been 

discussed at another time. But if that people had been corrupted, there 

never would have been found valid remedies, in Rome or elsewhere, to 

maintain it (their liberty), as we shall show in the next chapter.



                   CHAPTER XVII



A CORRUPT PEOPLE COMING INTO THEIR LIBERTY CAN MAINTAIN ITSELF FREE ONLY 

WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY



I judge that it was necessary that Kings should be eliminated in Rome, or 

(else) that Rome would in a very short time become weak and of no valor; for 

considering to what (degree of) corruption those Kings had come, if it 

should have continued so for two or three successions, (and) that that 

corruption which was in them had begun to spread through its members; (and) 

as the members had been corrupted it was impossible ever again to reform her 

(the state). But losing the head while the torso was sound, they were able 

easily to return to a free and ordered society. And it ought to be 

presupposed as a very true matter that a corrupted City which exists under a 

Prince, even though that Prince with all his lives (family) may be 

extinguished, can never become free; and that rather it should happen that 

one Prince destroy the other, for (these people) will never be settled 

without the creation of a new Lord, who by his goodness together with his 

virtu will then keep them free: but that liberty will last only during his 

life time, as happened at different times in Syracuse to Dion and Timoleon, 

whose virtu while they lived, kept that City free: but when they died, it 

returned to the ancient Tyranny. But there is no more striking example to be 

seen than that of Rome, which after the Tarquins had been driven out, was 

able quickly to resume and maintain that liberty; but after the death of 

Caesar, Caligula, and Nero, and after the extinction of all the line of 

Caesar, she could not only never maintain her liberty, but was unable to 

reestablish it. And so great a difference in events in the same City did not 

result from anything else other than (the fact that) the Roman People in the 

time of Tarquin was not yet corrupt, and in the latter time (Caesar's) it 

became very corrupt. For to keep her sound and disposed to keep away from 

Kings at that time, it was enough to make them swear that they should never 

consent that any of them should ever reign in Rome; but in the time of the 

other (Caesar) the authority of Brutus with all the Eastern legions was not 

enough to keep her disposed to want to maintain that liberty which he, in 

imitation of the first Brutus, had restored to her. Which resulted from that 

corruption which the party of Marius had spread among the people, at the 

head of which was Caesar, who was able so to blind the multitude that they 

did not recognize the yoke which they themselves were placing on their 

necks.



And although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example, 

none the less on this proposition I want to refer to people known before our 

times. I say, therefore, that no incident ((although grave and violent)) can 

ever restore Milan or Naples to freedom, because those people are entirely 

corrupt. Which was seen after the death of Filippo Visconti, who, wanting to 

restore liberty to Milan, did not know how and could not maintain it. It was 

therefore a great good fortune for Rome that no sooner had these Kings 

become corrupt than they were driven out, and that before their corruption 

should pass into the vitals of that City; which corruption was the cause of 

the infinite tumults which took place in Rome ((men having good intentions)) 

(and which) did no harm, but rather benefited the Republic. And this 

conclusion can be drawn, that where the people is not corrupted, tumults and 

other troubles do no harm; but where corruption exists, well ordered laws 

are of no benefit, unless they are administered by one who, with extreme 

strength, will make them be observed until the people become good (cured); I 

do not know if this ever happened, or whether it be possible that it could 

happen; for it is seen ((as I have said a little above)) that a City coming 

to decadence because of the corruption of its people, if it ever happens 

that she is raised up again, it happens through the virtu of one man who is 

then living, and not by the virtu of the general public, that the good 

institutions are sustained: and as soon as such a one is dead, they will 

return to their pristine habits, as happened at Thebes, which by the virtu 

of Epaminondas, while he was alive, was able to maintain the form of a 

Republic and Empire, but after his death returned to its first disorders: 

the reason is this, that one man cannot live so long that the time will be 

enough to bring a City back to good habits which for a long time has had 

evil habits. And if one of very long life or two continuous successors of 

virtu do not restore it (the state), so one which lacks them ((as was said 

above)) is quickly ruined, unless it should be made to be restored through 

many dangers and much bloodshed. For such corruption and little inclination 

for a free society result from an inequality that exists in that City; and 

wanting to bring them to equality, it is necessary to use the most 

extraordinary means, which few know or want to use, as will be described in 

more detail in another place.



                  CHAPTER XVIII



IN WHAT WAY IN A CORRUPT CITY A FREE STATE CAN BE MAINTAINED, IF THERE IS 

ONE THERE, OR IF NOT, HOW TO ESTABLISH IT



I believe it is not outside the purpose of this discussion, nor too distant 

from that written above, to consider whether a free State can be maintained 

in a City that is corrupted, or, if there had not been one, to be able to 

establish one. On this matter I say that it is very difficult to do either 

one or the other: and although it is almost impossible to give rules 

((because it will be necessary to proceed according to the degrees of 

corruption)), none the less, as it is well to discuss every thing, I do not 

want to omit this. And I will presuppose a City very corrupt, where such 

difficulties come to rise very fast, as there are found there neither laws 

or institutions that should be enough to check a general corruption. For as 

good customs have need of laws for maintaining themselves, so the laws, to 

be observed, have need of good customs. In addition to this, the 

institutions and laws made in a Republic at its origin when men were good, 

are not afterward more suitable, when they (men) have become evil. And if 

laws vary according to circumstances and events in a City, its institutions 

rarely or never vary: which results in the fact that new laws are not 

enough, for the institutions that remain firm will corrupt it. And in order 

to make this part better understood, I will tell how the Government was 

established in Rome, or rather the State, and the laws with which afterwards 

the Magistrates restrained the Citizens. The institution of the State 

included the authority of the People, the Senate, thy Tribunes, the Consuls, 

method of seeking and creating Magistrates, and the method of making laws. 

These institutions were rarely or never varied by events. The laws that 

restrained the Citizens varied, such as was the law of the Adulterers, the 

Sumptuary, that of Ambition, and many others, according as the Citizens from 

day to day became corrupt. But the institutions of the State becoming firm, 

although no longer good for the corrupt (people), those laws that were 

changed were not enough to keep men good, but would have been of benefit if 

with the changes of the law the institutions should have been modified.



And that it is true that such institutions in a City that had become corrupt 

were not good, is expressly seen in these two principal points. As to the 

creation of the Magistracies and the laws, the Roman People did not give the 

Consulship and other high offices of the City, except to those who asked for 

them. In the beginning these institutions were good because no one asked for 

these (offices) except those Citizens who judged themselves worthy, and 

having a refusal was ignominious: so that in order to judge himself worthy 

every one worked well. However, this system became pernicious in a corrupt 

City, for it was not those who had more virtu, but those who had more power, 

who asked for the Magistracies, and the less powerful ((no matter of how 

much virtu)) abstained from asking from fear. This evil did not come on 

suddenly, but by degrees, as happens with all other evils: for the Romans 

having subjugated Africa and Asia, and reduced almost all of Greece to their 

obedience, had become assured of their liberty, nor did they seem to have 

more enemies who should give them fear. This security, and this weakness of 

her enemies, caused the Roman people no longer to regard virtu in bestowing 

the Consulship, but graciousness, drawing to that dignity those who knew 

better how to handle men, not to those who knew better how to conquer their 

enemies: afterwards they descended from those who had more graciousness to 

give it to those who had more power. So that because of the defects of such 

institutions, the good were entirely excluded from everything. A Tribune or 

some other Citizen could propose a law to the people on which every Citizen 

could speak in favor or against it before it should be adopted. This 

institution was good when the Citizens were good, for it was always well 

that anyone who intended some good for the public was able to propose it, 

and it was well that everyone could speak his thoughts on it, so that the 

people, having listened to all sides, could then select the best. But when 

the Citizens had become bad such institutions became the worst, for only the 

powerful proposed laws, (and) not for the common liberty, but for their own 

power, and everyone for fear of them was not able to speak against them: so 

that the people came to be deceived or forced into deciding their own ruin.



It was necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to maintain herself free in her 

corruption, that she should have made new institutions, just as she had made 

new laws in the process of her existence, for other institutions and modes 

of living ought to be established in a bad people as well as in a good one, 

nor can the form be the same in a people entirely different. But because 

these institutions when they are suddenly discovered no longer to be good 

have to be changed either completely, or little by little as each (defect) 

is known, I say that both of these two courses are almost impossible. For in 

the case of wanting to change little by little a prudent man is required who 

sees this evil from a distance and at its beginning. It is easily probable 

that no one such as these springs up in a City: and even if one should 

spring up he is never able to persuade others of that which he intends; for 

men living in one manner, do not want to change, and the more so as they do 

not see the evil face to face, but being shown to them as (mere) conjecture.



As to changing these institutions all at once when everyone recognizes they 

are not good, I say that the defect which is easily recognized is difficult 

to correct, for to do this it is not enough to use ordinary means, as 

ordinary means are bad, but it is necessary to come to the extraordinary, 

such as violence and arms, and before anything else to become Prince of that 

City, and to be able to dispose of it as he pleases. And as the 

re-organization of the political life of a City presupposes a good man, and 

the becoming of a Prince of a Republic by violence presupposes a bad man; 

for because of this it will be found that it rarely happens that a (good) 

men wants to become Prince through bad means, even though his objectives be 

good; or that a bad one, having become Prince, wants to work for good and 

that it should enter his mind to use for good that authority which he had 

acquired by evil means. From all the things written above, arises the 

difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a Republic in a City that has 

become corrupted, or to establish it there anew. And even if it should have 

to be created or maintained, it would be necessary to reduce it more to a 

Royal State (Monarchy) than to a Popular State (Republic), so that those men 

who because of their insolence cannot be controlled by laws, should be 

restrained by a Power almost Regal. And to want to make them become good by 

other means would be either a most cruel enterprise or entirely impossible; 

as I said above this is what Cleomenes did, who for wanting to be alone (in 

the Government) killed the Ephors, and if Romulus for the same reasons killed 

his brother and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, and afterwards they used their 

authority well, none the less, it ought to be noted that one and the other 

of these men did not have their subjects stained with that corruption of 

which we have discussed in this chapter, and therefore they could desire 

(good), and desiring it, conform their designs accordingly.



                   CHAPTER XIX



A WEAK PRINCE WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE CAN BE MAINTAINED, BUT ANY 

KINGDOM CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IF A WEAK ONE IS SUCCEEDED BY ANOTHER WEAK ONE 



In considering the virtu and the mode of proceeding of Romulus, of Numa, and 

of Tullus, the first three Kings of Rome, it will be seen that Rome was 

favored by the greatest good fortune, having the first King most ferocious 

and warlike, the next quiet and religious, the third similar in ferocity to 

Romulus, and a greater lover of war than of peace. For it was necessary in 

Rome that in the beginning there should spring up an Organizer of civil 

institutions, but it then indeed was necessary that the other Kings should 

reassume the virtu of Romulus, otherwise that City would have become 

effeminate and prey to her neighbors. Whence it can be noted that a 

successor not having as much virtu as the first, is able to maintain a State 

which was erected by that man before him and can enjoy his labors; but if it 

happens either that his life is a long one, or that after him there should 

not spring up another who should reassume the virtu of the first one, that 

Kingdom of necessity will be ruined. And so, on the contrary, if two, one 

after the other, are of great virtu, it will often be seen that they