DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS 

              JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM LIBRI DUO



                            BY



                    SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF



                        VOLUME TWO 

                     THE TRANSLATION



                  By FRANK GARDNER MOORE 

          Professor of Latin in Columbia University



                      Reprinted 1964



                  OCEANA PUBLICATIONS INC. 

                     WILDY & SONS LTD. 

                 NEW YORK, U. S. A. LONDON.







                         CONTENTS



Translation by Herbert F. Wright of the Introduction by Walther Schücking 

......... 9a-27a



[Translation of the Dedication and Preface to De Officio Hominis et Civis 

... by Herbert F. Wright ......... i-xii]



Translation of the 1682 Edition of De Officio Hominis et Civis ... by Frank 

Gardner Moore ......... 1-146



Index by Herbert F. Wright ........ 147



______



                    INTRODUCTION



                 By WALTHER SCHÜCKING



           TRANSLATION BY HERBERT F. WRIGHT



In the history of international law two tendencies have struggled with one 

another for centuries and if it occasionally appeared as if one or the 

other were vanquished and stricken to the ground, it was not very long 

before it gave forth again powerful signs of life.[1] The one dominating 

during the nineteenth century in general is the positivistic.[2] It takes as 

its sole point of departure the law created by custom and conventions, 

consequently objectively produced. Its dangers lie in the fact that it often 

neglects to elaborate leading principles from the fullness of legal material 

available in international life, but still more in the denial of critical 

judgment in relation to the existing legal conditions and institutions.



When new circumstances arise, the world employs new norms. It is the task of 

scholarship in this case to bear in advance the torch for the development of 

law. But whence does the scholar receive the light wherewith to enkindle 

this torch, if he occupies himself only with the material of positive law, 

which perhaps long since has ceased to be the "just law" which the nations 

need? In such circumstances particularly the other tendency of the science 

of international law, that of the natural law, regains increased meaning. It 

seeks to develop the law philosophically out of the idea of justice and the 

necessities of the nations. For centuries, in regard to the legal 

principles developed by it, it has laid claim to immediate validity.[3] 



Both tendencies of international law go back to their old master, Hugo 

Grotius. Not without reason is one accustomed to designate Grotius as the 

father of natural law, though one ought not overlook the role which has 

already been played with regard to this idea by the Church fathers and the 

theologians and jurists of the Middle Ages, since the Catholic Church can 

even today lay claim to the merit of having retained the idea of natural 

law through a purely positivistic and in many ways materialistic age up to 

the immediate present.[4] The foundation of the science of natural law, 

which Hugo Grotius gives in the Prolegomena to his De jure belli ac pacis, 

forms also the foundation of his system of international law and, in a way 

which is charmingly naïve to us today, he seeks to demonstrate the consensus 

gentium, instead of from the practice of States, frequently from the 

pronouncements of philosophers, historians, poets and thinkers. At any 

rate, he is the representative of a dualistic view, he does not fail to 

recognize the existence of a positive law of nations which in his time was 

prevailingly based on customary law and for this [law of nations] he coins 

the idea of the jus gentium voluntarium. What indeed may be the comparative 

value of the two branches of the theory of international law created by him, 

he concedes to positive law only the meaning of an argument corroboratory of 

the intrinsic correctness of the natural law.



While the Englishman Zouche (1590-1660),[5] endowed with the practicalness 

of his nation, takes over from Grotius, it is true, the dualism between a 

natural and a positive law of nations, but very resolutely gives precedence 

to the latter, Thomas Hobbes indeed acknowledges no law of nations apart 

from natural law. Natural law is to him "vel naturale hominum, quod solum 

obtinuit dici lex naturae, vel naturale civitatum, quod did potest lex 

gentium, vulgo autem jus gentium appellatur: praecepta utriusque eadem 

sunt."[6] While Hobbes indeed permits the law of nations to be completely 

absorbed by the natural law, he opens up a line of development of which the 

standard-bearer is Pufendorf, the author of three works treating of 

international law, one of which only shall occupy our attention.



1. The Author and the Origin of the Work



The work of Samuel von Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis prout ipsi 

praescribuntur lege naturali, was published for the first time in the year 

1673 at Lund in Sweden. The author was in a certain sense representative of 

the international type of scholar, such as formerly was produced by the 

common use of Latin in the universities and as we must now endeavor to 

produce for the benefit of the science of international law by the more 

difficult path of polyglottism of the individual. For as the famous 

Italian, Alberico Gentili, had closed his days as professor at Oxford, as 

Francisco Suarez taught now in Italy, now in Spain, to mention only these 

two most famous predecessors of Grotius, so also Pufendorf belonged to the 

number of those cast by fate hither and thither.



Born in 1632 in the village of Flöhe near Chemnitz in Saxony, and active as 

a young man as a tutor in the home of the Swedish ambassador in Copenhagen, 

at 28 he had made such a name for himself by his Elementa jurisprudentiae 

universalis, which was published in 1660 at The Hague, that there was 

established for him in 1661 in the philosophical faculty of the University 

of Heidelberg, a chair of the law of nature and of nations, which he nine 

years later exchanged for the position of a professor primarius of law in 

the University at Lund founded by the Swedish king, Charles Gustavus. 

Established therefore in Sweden since 1670, he had not completed his days as 

professor at Lund before he soon took upon himself still other tasks.



As a matter of fact, he shared with his great predecessor, Grotius, 

versatility of genius. Though he, a clergyman's son, first passed over to 

jurisprudence from theology, he did not therefore restrict himself to 

juristic interests, but was also a far-sighted student of political science. 

We need only recall in this respect his famous work, which he had produced 

in 1664 under the title, Severinus de Monzambano: De statu Imperii Germanici 

ad Laelium fratrem, dominum Trezolani, liber unus. Under the mask of a 

Veronese nobleman he here not only pronounces an annihilating criticism of 

the condition of public law in the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, 

but also points the way to its regeneration which he discovers in the 

establishment of an army at the general expense, the secularization of the 

ecclesiastical principalities, the abolition of the cloister and the 

expulsion of the Jesuits. His reputation as a political scientist led in 

1677 to his transference as state historiographer to Stockholm, from which 

place he was called in 1686 to Berlin by the Great Elector, to write the 

history of the rising Brandenburg state. For the characterizing of his 

personality and of his works in the sphere of pure jurisprudence these dates 

are no immaterial factors, since we see here an interesting contrast to the 

most prominent law professors of the most recent past, who have often only 

temporarily deserted the boundaries of their native state and have often 

considered occupation with problems of politics as scientific falling from 

grace.



The work, De officio hominis et civis prout ipsi praescribunter lege 

naturali, of 1673 had been preceded in 1672 by the great work, De jure 

naturae et gentium libri octo, which appeared in 1674 in a considerably 

enlarged edition. Both books had a great popularity and linked the name of 

Pufendorf enduringly with the science of international law; to their 

propagation the French translation by Barbeyrac (1674-1744, member of the 

Berlin Academy, Professor in Lausanne and Groningen) had contributed 

much.[7]



2. The Preface of the Work



The preface of the book contains important considerations which are not even 

contained in Pufendorf's large work De jure naturae et gentium. After the 

author had first referred to the technical purpose for which he published 

this compendium for the benefit of students, he distinguishes three 

sciences: The natural law common to all men, deriving its origin from reason 

alone; the civil law, which is valid only in the individual state; and moral 

theology, the dictates of which God has given to Christians in the Holy 

Scripture, The greatest difference between natural law and moral theology 

consists in the fact that natural law, rooted only in this life, will make 

man only for this life into a worthy member of human society, while moral 

theology trains the citizen of the heavenly city, who considers himself here 

on earth only as a sojourner or stranger. Therefore the precepts of natural 

law are directed to the external conduct of man, those of moral theology to 

the heart. Natural law has to do with man, as he actually is, since the 

fall; an animal subject, with a great number of evil impulses. A natural law 

for man in the state of innocence would have had another content. Natural 

law need not have commanded aid for the poor, assistance of the unfortunate, 

care for widows and orphans, pardon for wrongs, maintenance of peace, had 

there not been necessity and death, enmity and discord since the fall from 

grace.



3. The Structure of the Work



The examination by Pufendorf of the duties of a man and citizen is divided 

into two books. The author follows a system the standard of which has been 

made in an interesting way the basis of the universal common law, the Code 

of Frederick the Great of 1794. The first book is devoted to the duties of 

the particular individual, the second rises from the individual to the 

larger spheres of life and considers the duties, which arise from membership 

in this community relationship, beginning with marriage, through the state 

to the association of states. Doubtless an ingenuous idea for the structure 

of a legal order exhausting all the relations of life. Through the whole 

there extends as the fundamental idea the ideal of social man, whose conduct 

is determined by the fact that man is not alone in the world and that his 

conduct must be conditioned by the necessities of community life.



a) BOOK I. In Chapters I and II the author speaks of human actions in 

general, their principles and their accountability, of the necessity of 

these actions to be subject to a rule, from which law arises, and of the 

righteousness and unrighteousness of a mode of action. In this connection 

the author distinguishes divine and human law according to the immediate 

authorship. All human law in his opinion is regularly positive, whether it 

be a natural law which undeniably is derived from the rational and social 

nature of man, so that without its consideration an honorable and peaceful 

society of men would be impossible, or only as positive law in a narrower 

sense of the word, rest upon the decision of a concrete lawgiver (cf. 

Chapter II, § 16).



The following Chapter III deals with natural law in general. The rules of 

conduct which must be followed to be a fit and useful member of human 

society are the leges naturales. The lex fundamentalis of natural law is 

the duty of every man, so far as in him lies, to strive that the welfare of 

human society in general be secured and maintained (§ 9). Universal 

sociability is the norm; all the other laws are merely corollaries. Reason 

is sufficient to discover these in our hearts.



The duties which result therefrom can be divided into the duties of man 

toward God (Chapter IV), toward himself (Chapter V), and toward other men 

(Chapter VI). The first absolute duty of an individual toward others is to 

do injury to no man and, where this might have happened, to make good the 

damage. The second duty in the relations of the individual to others, dealt 

with in Chapter VII, is the obligation to consider all others as by nature 

entitled to the same rights. The third general duty of the individual to 

his fellow-men is to promote as far as possible the advantage of others. 

This is treated in Chapter VIII of the book. Here the idealism of the author 

rises to particular heights. The dictum of Goethe: "What thou hast from thy 

father inherited, earn it, in order to possess it," or Article 153, 

paragraph 3, of the new German Constitution of Weimar: "Property imposes 

obligations. Its use by its owner shall at the same time serve the public 

good," is here indeed anticipated.



After the exposition of these absolute duties of the individual to his 

equals, the author, in the following nine chapters (Chapters IX-XVII, 

inclusive), proceeds to the conditional duties. These arise from engagements 

or agreements (Chapter IX), from the mere use of language (Chapter X), of 

oaths (Chapter XI), of acquisition of ownership (Chapter XII), and of bona 

fide ownerships (Chapter XIII); they relate to the price for an article or 

service (Chapter XIV), to contracts (Chapter XV), to the dissolution of 

obligations to which agreement has been made (Chapter XVI), and to the 

method of interpretation of agreements and laws (Chapter XVII). All these 

things, however, as stated, are treated only from the standpoint of the 

individual in his relation to other individuals or rather to society; of 

the state or even of the association of states we hear nothing.



b) BOOK II. In the second book of the work, as said above, the author no 

longer concerns himself solely with the particular individual, but with the 

larger spheres of life in which the individual is placed. In the first 

chapter, in open dependence upon Hobbes, he premises a reflection upon the 

status naturalis, wherein there was only a dependence upon God and society 

had not yet been constituted into a state, there is no true peace but at 

every instant everyone must be prepared for bat-tie, conflicting parties may 

select arbiters for themselves indeed, but eventually everyone is still 

compelled in default of a public authority to maintain his own right 

himself. The first beginning in the formation of a civil society is marriage 

(Chapter II).



Chapter III deals with the remaining family law, so far as there is 

question of the mutual relations between parents and children; Chapter IV of 

the mutual obligations between a master and his servants and slaves. To 

those who know that, according to the Bavarian marriage law[8] up to the 

year 1900 "moderate chastisements" were permitted to the husband even 

against his wife, it is not surprising that in this work of 1673 a similar 

right is conceded to the master against his servants. Of particular interest 

here, however, are the details concerning the treatment of slaves, as far as 

they pertain to international law. Pufendorf is still far from acknowledging 

Rousseau's "To be a man is to be free." Slavery, strangely enough, to this 

thinker of natural law, still passes as a natural institution, which he 

dares not impugn. And indeed he concludes therefrom that slaves can be made 

according to the law of war,[9] although the slave must be treated with 

consideration after the conclusion of the state of war, that is, one must 

give him what he needs for living and should not mistreat him without 

reason. Also bought slaves should be treated humanely.



It is only with the following Chapter V of the second book that we set foot 

upon the soil of public law proper. Pufendorf investigates the question why 

men have united together into large social groups of states. In keeping 

with Hobbes he denies the celebrated teaching of Aristotle of man as a zöon 

politikon (political being). He derives the foundation of the state rather 

from the fact that man loves himself and his own interests the most. Outside 

of social ties man is an animal longe miserrimum; in the political tie he 

finds according to his own perception the greatest possibility of satisfying 

his necessities and his desires. For proof Pufendorf, in his description of 

the natural state of man, gives a paraphrase of the famous phrase of his 

great predecessor, Hobbes, homo homini lupus. By nature, he thinks, no 

animal is fiercer and more untamed than man, none is prone to more vices 

which tend to menace others. For outside of his instinct of hunger and love, 

an insatiable desire dominates him of acquiring superfluous things and of 

inflicting upon others cruel wrongs. In the natural state man loves the 

independence to realize only his own interests. A good citizen, however, is 

he who promptly obeys the commands of his sovereign, strives with all his 

might for the common weal and prefers this unhesitatingly to his own 

interests, who considers nothing advantageous to himself except that which 

serves also the common good, and who shows himself accommodating to his 

fellow citizens. The true reason why the patriarchs united into the state 

is that they sought protection against the evils which threaten man from 

man. "Nisi judicia essent, unus alterum devoraret" (If there were no courts, 

one man would devour another). No other way would have had the same success 

as the foundation of states. Neither the mere existence of the natural law 

nor the fear of the deity would have been sufficient to check the malice of 

man, since "divine vengeance walks unfortunately with slow foot."



In the following Chapter VI Pufendorf investigates the internal structure 

of states. Within an insignis multitudo hominum a consensus of the wills, 

which otherwise run apart in a thousand different ways, is produced when 

everyone subjects his will to that of a single person or of an established 

council. At the same time everyone places his powers at disposal to cany out 

the now authoritative will. Consequently Pufendorf professes here the 

doctrine of the origin of the state through contract, which dominates the 

entire age of natural law. If Pufendorf in all these deductions moves in 

the main in the path of Hobbes, with whom "the theory of the social contract 

began its scientific career" (Jellinek),[10] he continues to develop it 

nevertheless in an extremely interesting fashion, since he claims for the 

foundation of the state no less than two compacts and one decree, while 

Hobbes, to say the least, in his Leviathan (xviii), nine years after the 

work, De cive, protests against every contractual relationship between ruler 

and subject.



Pufendorf is much more democratic than Hobbes insofar as, after the first 

compact on the union of the future citizens together and after the decree 

on the form of government, he claims a second compact, which has absolutely a 

bilateral character. The possession of the newly created public power must 

bind themselves as a matter of fact to guard the public welfare and the 

public security, while the citizens must pledge their obedience. Only then 

does a true state exist. In this connection Pufendorf then takes up Hobbes' 

definition[11] of the state and, as the latter does, speaks of the state as 

a "moral person." If the public power is exercised through a council, it is 

in keeping with its purpose that the majority decide. The citizens are 

originarii (descendants of the state's founders) or adscititii 

(naturalized), both to be well distinguished from foreigners (peregrini).



With Chapter VII of the second part comes an investigation concerning the 

function of the supreme authority. In a systematic manner, of rare charm to 

us today, Pufendorf divides the public power in no less than seven 

functions (potestas legislatoria, poenas sumendi, judiciaria, belli pacis ac 

foederum, creandi magistratus, indicendi tributa, constituendi doctores). 

That the right of the head of the state to appoint public teachers is here 

placed on a par with the potestas legislatoria and the power over war and 

peace, must be explained from that overrating of the author's own position 

as such a professor publicus ordinarius, which has been peculiarly 

traditional to this calling through the centuries. So primitive and 

imperfect is the systematic arrangement of the public power in Pufendorf 

that he still follows Hobbes[12] in the orthodox position that this power in 

the last analysis is indivisible.



In logical conclusion to his teaching on the public power in general, 

Pufendorf in the following Chapter VIII deals with the different forms of 

government. In keeping with the well-known doctrine of Aristotle, he also 

distinguishes three categories of regular forms of government: monarchy, 

aristocracy and democracy. He ascribes to monarchy a superiority over the 

other possibilities. Without distinction of the form of government, states 

can be unhealthy and corrupt through fault of man or fault of the state, for 

example, if the public institutions are not adapted to the genius of the 

people. Poorly functioning, unhealthy states pass over from monarchies, 

aristocracies and democracies, as Aristotle indeed teaches, to tyrannies, 

oligarchies and ochlocracies. Irregular states are those in which there is 

wanting that unity of the state's will which properly constitutes the 

characteristic of statehood. As proof of the foregoing, reference is made 

to the Roman Empire over which the senatus populusque Romanus once ruled. But 

the erstwhile Severinus de Monzambano does not neglect to point out in this 

connection that the irregularity of statehood can also arise from the fact 

that the nobles of a kingdom are subordinate to the king only as inaequales 

foederati (inferior colleagues). At the end of this chapter Pufendorf 

distinguishes two categories of state union, which we today, in accordance 

with the criteria suggested by him, call Personalunion and Staatenbund.



The following Chapter IX deals with the characteristics of civil authority. 

This authority is, apart from the form of government, supreme; the imperium 

is, as Pufendorf says, not only a summum, but also an anupeuthunon, that is, 

"nemini mortalium obstrictum reddendas rationes" (not bound to render 

account to any human being). By this statement Pufendorf places himself in 

noteworthy opposition to the doctrine of the right of resistance of the 

monarchists which had reached its height especially in the seventeenth 

century.[13] The supreme authority is superior to all laws; their force and 

duration in fact depend upon it. Only on moral grounds is the summus 

imperans wont to submit to his own laws. The sovereign authority is holy and 

inviolable. The spirit of absolutism appears before our eyes here in 

shocking candor, even for so highstanding a moral personality as Pufendorf 

unquestionably was. Citizens must endure all caprices and cruelties of their 

prince. They should submit to the most cruel injustices and the most dire 

misfortunes, never should they draw the sword, but always should see in the 

sovereign, the father of his country, however cruel he may be.



Pufendorf distinguishes further the absolute authority of the monarch from 

that limited by a lex fundamentalis. But the absolute monarch must not 

alienate, divide or transfer his kingdom, if it is not a patrimonial 

authority, but only if he is indebted to a free choice of the people for his 

crown. In the latter case he has more the position of a usufructuarius.[14]



Chapter X treats of the manner in which authority is acquired especially in 

a monarchical state. Though Pufendorf defends the proposition that every 

civil authority depends upon the consent of the subjects, he admits the 

possibility that one might seize the civil authority also in war by 

conquest. By a very artful construction he seeks to gloss over this 

contradiction. He speaks first only of the case of a just war, without 

considering that frequently unjust wars have led to conquests. Then he 

justifies the subjection of the vanquished by the fact that the victor does 

not need to spare the lives of the vanquished, but in addition he pretends 

also the consent of the vanquished who, because they furnished the cause of 

war, have consented as it were in advance to all the conditions which the 

victor might impose upon them. These discussions on the methods of acquiring 

authority are brought to a close by the precepts on the choice of monarchs, 

the interregnum and the inheritance of the crown.



In Chapter XI the author discusses the duty of the ruler. We rejoice to 

hear that if, as said above, the possessor of civil authority is exempt from 

all human and civil laws, still the character and the end of civil society 

as well as the tasks of civil authority impose upon him certain duties. 

Consequently there is drafted here a well-reasoned catechism of princely 

duties, nearly a generation before the noble Fénelon as tutor of the 

grandson of Louis XIV had sketched, in his work Les aventures de Télémaque, 

the ideal of an absolute ruler. The rule of conduct for rulers should be the 

idea: "Salus populi suprema lex esto." To educate the citizens up to good 

morals, public education should be fostered, the pure doctrine of Christ 

should flourish in the state and in the public schools such teachings should 

be imparted as are in conformity with the ends of the state. Moreover, we 

also obtain an abundance of wise precepts concerning the spirit of the laws, 

which the ruler should establish, their execution, the punishment for their 

violation, the prevention of injuries of citizens against one another, the 

selection of officials, the measure of taxation, the maintenance and 

increase of the general prosperity and the prevention of factions. At the 

end of the chapter these precepts on the duties of the prince are extended 

also to international relations. The courage of citizens and their skill in 

arms must be fostered. Everything which belongs to defense against violence, 

fortified places, arms, soldiers and especially money, must be available at 

the proper time. Even in the case of a just origin of war, no one should be 

provoked to the extent of going to war, unless the opportunity is entirely 

propitious and the condition of the State is favorable thereto. Even in 

peace neighbors must be carefully watched and friendships and alliances 

contracted with prudence.



The following Chapter XII treats of civil laws in particular. These leges 

civiles ensure effectiveness for the leges naturales only when they are 

provided with penal sanction and when they ensure to the possessors of 

natural rights the protection of the authorities. At the same time they 

make definite the content of natural rights. The civil laws must be obeyed 

as long as they are not in open conflict with the ius divinum. This holds 

good also for the particular commands of the rulers. In the latter case it 

is well to distinguish whether it concerns the performance of an act of the 

ruler or an act on his own responsibility. Even an unjust war, which the 

ruler has declared, must be carried on by citizens, for here the 

responsibility and likewise the sin lies only with the ruler, but never 

should the citizen himself perform an act, which is in conflict with natural 

and divine law, even if he be commanded thereto, as for instance, as judge 

to condemn an innocent person to death. For no one can relieve the judge of 

his own responsibility.



With regard to Chapter XIII we confine ourselves to mentioning that it 

contains the natural law principles for criminal law, and pass over Chapter 

XIV also, which is concerned with the reputation of individuals in the 

State, the valor personalis (personal worth) and the right of the civil 

authority to dispose thereof. Pufendorf, in this connection, speaks also of 

questions of preeminence and precedence under princes and nations, but 

though these questions still played an important role in the practice of 

state life of his time,[15] he does not stop with that, but is only content 

with the stipulation that a right to precedence can be acquired only by 

agreement or concession.



The following Chapter XV treats of the rights of the supreme authority over 

the property of citizens,[16] and only with Chapter XVI do we come upon the 

soil of international law.[17] Following the model of Grotius, Pufendorf 

writes above the discussion of this chapter: "De bello et pace", 

consequently he puts the consideration of war first, in noteworthy contrast 

to the first sentence of his conclusions that according to the natural law 

peace is the normal condition, in fact this condition distinguishes men from 

brutes. Yet at times he considers war not only permissible, but also 

necessary, when in no other way can our life and property be preserved and 

our lawful rights maintained. He also, in harmony with Grotius, sees in war 

only a means to the prosecution of rights and he rises far above 

Machiavelli, who considers war as a lawful means for the prosecution of 

state interests. Lawful war can also be an offensive war, if it is carried 

on for the prosecution of reparations claims and for the attainment of 

indispensable guaranties; the latter formula is indeed of dangerous 

elasticity. As Homer in the Iliad relates of the heroes of Greece that 

before embarking on their campaign of vengeance against the rape of Helen 

they dispatched an embassy to demand atonement, so Pufendorf desires in a 

conflict of states first of all the attempt at a peaceful settlement, 

especially in case of doubt about the right or the fact or even adverse 

possession. Peaceful negotiations, arbitral tribunal, or lot appear to him 

as suitable means.[18]



Terror and open force are the means of war, use may be made of trickery and 

ruses and the enemy may be deceived with false reports and tales, but 

promises and agreements are to be kept. And humanity commands that no more 

mischief be inflicted upon the enemy than defense, the vindication of right 

and security for the future require.[19] Pufendorf then distinguishes, 

according to the existence of a formal declaration of war, between bellum 

solemne and bellum minus solemne[20] and treats of the right to enter into 

war which fundamentally belongs only to the head of the state, but this 

does not debar every governor of a province or commander of a fortified 

place from having the right and duty of defense.



Moreover, the question of delicts and accountability under international 

law, so to speak, is investigated, since Pufendorf raises the question 

whether the ruler of a state or the whole state can be attacked by war for 

acts which do not proceed from them. The reply to this question is wisely 

made dependent upon whether there is any responsibility on the part of the 

state, for example, if the ruler has suffered injuries to be done by his own 

citizens against those belonging to a foreign state. The power of the 

supreme authority to prevent an injury to another state is presumed, unless 

the contrary is proved. A duty to deliver up those belonging to a foreign 

state for punishment is in this connection recognized only so far as 

provided for by particular agreements.[21] In connection with the question 

of responsibility of the state, moreover, the right of reprisals is 

discussed, which, because of the debts of a state or of injuries inflicted 

by it, can be exercised against the property as well as the person of its 

citizens abroad.[22]



The following section of this chapter treats of wars of alliance. In 

addition to the supposition that the other state, on whose side one enters, 

has taken up arms for a just cause, it also supposes that a satisfactory 

reason to support it is present. The latter considerations naturally 

disappear if the point in question is the existence of a treaty of alliance. 

There is still to be examined whether the allies are not perhaps beginning 

an unjust or imprudent war, and even, if this question is to be answered in 

the negative, the interests of the ally must yield precedence to the 

possible needs of our own citizens. Even without an alliance relationship 

one can come to the assistance of his friends; indeed Pufendorf recognizes 

that the communis cognatio can be sufficient occasion for coming to the help 

of the unjustly oppressed at their request,[23] since he has an intense 

appreciation of international solidarity.



The use of poison and the bribery of foreign citizens and soldiers to slay 

their own rulers are considered by the more civilized nations as 

dishonorable means of war.[24] Following this the right to spoils is briefly 

treated. Of the fundamental unassailability of private property in war 

Pufendorf as yet knows nothing. Movable property is considered as acquired 

if it has been brought into safety from the enemy's pursuit; immovable 

property, if the captor can drive away the enemy who desires to take it back 

again into his possession.[25] But the right to recover it is only 

extinguished if the former owner has in the treaty of peace renounced all 

his rights. Spoils belong fundamentally to the state, not to the 

soldiers;[26] movable property, however, especially such as is of small 

value, according to widespread usage is left to the soldiers. Immovable 

property, wrested back, reverts to the former owner;[27] movable property 

forming part of the spoils, which has been wrested back, remains for the 

most part to the soldiers who have captured it.



As has already been stated by Pufendorf in another connection, victory also 

gives the right to authority over individuals as well as over whole 

peoples. But to make the supreme authority legitimate and to bind the 

consciences of the subjects, the vanquished must have given their word to 

the victors and the victors must have changed their hostile attitude toward 

the vanquished, as if an extorted pledging of word could replace an actual 

consensus civium, upon which Pufendorf's entire theory of the state is 

erected! At the end of this chapter devoted to war Pufendorf treats of 

truces[28] and peace treaties.[29] A truce may extend to a complete laying 

down of arms, not only to a temporary cessation of their use; then it is as 

it were a temporary peace, while real peace is based upon perpetual 

duration. A so-called tacit truce is not a legal conception. Peace treaties 

must be faithfully observed.



Chapter XVII of the work also pertains to international law. Here the 

author treats of alliances and agreements between states.[30] He divides 

them into the following two groups, those which cover duties already 

enjoined by the natural law and those which add something over and above the 

duties enjoined or at least give them greater precision. In the former class 

he enumerates all such obligations as follow from humanity, such as 

agreements for friendship, hospitality and trade. The second class he 

distinguishes further into foedera aequalia and inaequalia. In the latter he 

enumerates among others those which in their content create an inequality 

between the contracting states, They might include an encroachment upon 

sovereignty, for example, if one state promised another not to exercise 

definite rights of its governing authority without the permission of the 

state which has become the superior through such a treaty. Accordingly, 

Pufendorf would have rightly considered the Boer republic, Transvaal, as no 

longer a sovereign state on account of the agreement of August 3, 1883, by 

which Transvaal was required to submit its international agreements to 

London.



On the other hand, he rightly emphasizes that burdening conditions, which do 

not include a permanent subjection, but can be fulfilled by an act done once 

and for all, such, for example, as are imposed on the vanquished in peace 

treaties, do not diminish their sovereignty. However, under certain 

circumstances there may be question of duties of a lasting nature, which 

nevertheless are completely in harmony with the sovereignty of a state, as, 

for example, if the treaty obligation is imposed unilaterally not to 

establish fortifications in certain regions. Pufendorf considers league and 

commercial treaties as the most frequent, and those extending permanently to 

a confederation of several states, through which consequently a sort of 

league of nations is established, as the strictest and most intimate. 

Finally, Pufendorf distinguishes between foedera realia and foedera 

personalia.[31] The latter expire with the death of the princes by whom they 

are concluded, while the former bind the state itself. To be carefully 

distinguished from foedera, though also in the same general category with 

them, are mere engagements (sponsiones) of the ministers, which are entered 

into without instruction from the sovereign and through which the latter is 

obligated only when he has ratified them.



The work of Pufendorf concludes with Chapter XVIII, "De officiis civium". 

Here are sharply distinguished the general duties of citizens from such 

duties as depend upon a particular official relationship. The former have 

regard to the rulers of the state, the state in its entirety and individual 

fellow citizens. Corresponding to the more or less patriarchal spirit of the 

absolutist age, there is elaborated here a duty under natural law of 

citizens of a state toward the ruler of the state, to accommodate themselves 

in peace to the existing constitution and not to strive for innovations, "to 

admire and to revere" the head of their state and not only to speak but also 

to think kindly and respectfully of his actions. Besides, to be sure, there 

also exist, as said above, duties of citizens toward the state as a whole 

and toward fellow citizens. For the particular duties of those citizens who 

stand in closer relations to the state as functionaries, the moral 

proposition is laid down by way of premise that no one should seek, to say 

nothing of undertaking, an office, for the performance of which he must 

consider himself as unfit. For the rest, a special professional ethics is 

laid down for ministers, religious dignitaries, scholars and professors, 

administrators and judges, officers, soldiers, ambassadors and envoys, and 

superintendents and tax-collectors. The general duties of citizens cease 

with emigration, the legal deprivation of the right of citizenship and the 

necessity of submitting to the rule of a victor.



4. The Importance of the Work



The value of Pufendorfs work, De officio hominis et civis, lies not in the 

manner in which the author deals with the individual questions of 

international law. Out of the eighteen chapters of the work, only two 

(Chapters XVI and XVII) deal with matters of international law in 

particular, consequently only a small portion of the whole. What is 

presented in these scanty discussions may be traced back entirely to 

Grotius. In spite of his democratic conception of the state, which bases the 

state not only upon one compact, but, as has been set forth above, requires 

a second compact with the ruler, a compact of bilateral character, which 

defines their rights and duties, he does not venture to apply this doctrine 

of the right of self-determination of the nation to what concerns 

international law. He recognizes here as before the right of conquest, and 

deduces the tacit consensus of citizens, forced into subjection to the new 

sovereignty, from the cause of the war furnished by hem, with which they 

have accepted for themselves in advance the consequences of the war, as if 

the desire for war did not proceed solely from an aggressor greedy for 

conquest and the vanquished could not be altogether innocent of the war. An 

interesting demonstration how even the adherents of natural law, who 

ostensibly derive the law solely from reason, were inclined in practical 

questions to adapt their conclusions on law to the practice of their age! 

Pufendorf's conclusions, therefore, in the field of international law, so 

far as they are contained in this work, present no tangible contributions.



Nevertheless one should not underestimate the importance of his work. In the 

depth of his ethical thinking he places, as the title of his work 

indicates, the entire system of law under the stamp of the concept of duty. 

And this concept of duty is derived from the abstract ideal of sociability. 

His fundamental idea is the social man. From this postulate is derived in a 

somewhat grandiose manner the entire system of private and public law. The 

idea, "Thou art not alone here in the world," affords the point of 

departure for all legal relations; it holds for mankind as for states. This 

deep, moral world-philosophy stands towering over all the doctrine harking 

back to the Hegelian deification of the individual state: "The social ideal 

is the victorious war." For apart from the fact that the prudent knew, even 

before the World War, that modem war in our age of world commerce weakens 

the victors as well as the vanquished, the regulatory principle for state 

relations can be established only upon the simultaneous prosperity of all. 

This idea Pufendorf had already accurately discovered. But if the 

international economic life of the present has in unexpected ways wrenched 

the states loose from their previous isolation and brought them closer 

together, then the point of departure of all legal relations which furnished 

the soil for the doctrinal system of Samuel von Pufendorf, "Thou art not 

alone in the world," must be authoritative in increased measure today for 

the relations of states under international law.



An epoch, which has as its task the "socialization of international 

law,"[32] must recognize in Pufendorf therefore a leader and pathfinder. And 

if we today must consider it as an error of method that Pufendorf according 

to the model of Hobbes allowed international law to disappear altogether in 

natural law, perhaps the setting forth of this doctrine concerning the 

obligatory power of natural law, in an age in which international law as the 

youngest branch on the tree of legal development was in practice still a 

very delicate little sprig, has in large measure been beneficial. The 

development of the idea of international law was thereby substantially 

facilitated and at that time it was possibly chiefly dependent thereon. We 

as jurists know better today than Pufendorf how to distinguish between a 

philosophical right, which is developed purely from reason and which should 

be a just right, and actually valid positive right, which may be a material 

injustice,[33] but we also know that it is always proper to continue to 

develop valid right rationally under great guiding principles, and that our 

age, which has overcome space and has completely transformed the face of the 

earth, needs the solution of this problem more urgently than any other. In 

the necessary and complete conquest of the age which lies behind us, of a 

mode of thought which is more or less historical, the natural lawyer, 

Pufendorf, consequently will be of assistance to us. Therefore, he, who as 

author more than 250 years after the appearance of his work still deserves 

consideration, is rightly counted among the "Classics" of international law.



WALTHER SCHÜCKING. June 10, 1925.



______



   Notes on the Introduction translated by Herbert F. Wright 



1. Cf. A. RIVIER, Literarhistorische Uebersicht der Systeme und Theorien des 

Völkerrechts seit Grotius, in FRANZ VON HOLTZENDORFF, Handbuch des 

Völkerrechts, vol. i (Berlin, 1885), pp. 393-523. The same work forms the 

fourth part in HOLTZENDORFF-RIVIER, Introduction au Droit des Gens, which 

appeared in French (Hambourg, 1888-1889).



2. Certainly the natural law "outsiders" are not among the worst 

representatives of the entire group. Only three of them need be mentioned 

here from the century in question. Professor JAMES LORIMER of Edinburgh, for 

example, says, in his The Institutes of the Law of Nations (1883-1884, also 

published in French translation by ERNEST NYS in 1884), vol. i, p. 19: "The 

law of nations is the law of nature, realised in the relations of separate 

political communities." J. K. BLUNTSCHLI, in his famous work, Das moderne 

Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (Nördlingen, 

1868), by no means gives merely positive law, and the Frenchman BONFILS in 

his oft-printed manual under No. 40 treats the natural law of nations as 

valid law.



3. Cf. especially the comprehensive work of ERICH CASSIRER, Naturrecht und 

Völkerrecht im Lichte der Geschichte und der systematischen Philosophie 

(Berlin, 1919).



4. Cf. hereon the work of the German Jesuit, VICTOR CATHREIN, Recht, 

Naturrecht und positives Recht (2d ed., Freiburg, 1909).



5. ZOUCHE, Juris et judicii fecialis, sive juris inter gentes, et 

quaestionum de eodem explicatio, qua, quae ad pacem et bellum inter diversos 

principes aut populos spectant, ex praecipuis historico-jure-peritis 

exhibentur (Oxford, 1650), republished with English translation in the 

Classics of International Law (Washington, 1911).



6. HOBBES, Elementa philosophica de cive (Paris, 1642), "Imperium", c. xiv, 

§ 4.



7. BARBEYRAC based his translation of the work De officio hominis et civis, 

dated in the preface at Berlin, March 1, 1707, upon the eleventh edition of 

the original, which was prepared in 1703 at Frankfort-am-Main by Professor 

IMMANUEL WEBER of Giessen. The fifth edition of this translation was dated 

in the preface by the translator himself at Groningen on August 25, 1734. A 

further edition appeared in 1756 at Amsterdam and Leipzig after the 

translator's death. The complete title runs: Les devoirs de l'homme et du 

citoyen, teis qu'ils sont prescrits par la loi naturelle, traduits du latin 

du Baron de Pufendorff, par Jean Barbeyrac. Nouvelle edition.



From a later date should also be mentioned a rather large edition in Latin, 

which appeared at Leyden in 1769 in two volumes totaling 1043 pages. It 

bears the title: S. Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civis secundum legem 

naturalem libri duo, cum observationibus Ev. Ottonis el Gottl. Gerh. Titii; 

cum supplementis et observationibus Gerschomi Carmichaelis, et 

annotationibus Gottl. Sam. Treneri.



8. The Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus of 1756 was authoritative in Bavaria.



9. A conclusion to which indeed HUGO GROTIUS also adhered. Cf. Book III, ch. 

vii and xiv.



10. Cf. hereon the explanatory remarks, which GEORGE JELLINEK makes in his 

Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin, 1914), chapter vii, on the doctrine of the 

justification of the state, concerning Hobbes and the relation between his 

doctrine and Pufendorf's.



11. HOBBES, De cive, chapter v, § 9.



12. De cive, chapter vii, § 5.



13. Pufendorf thereby also departs from Grotius. Grotius indeed denies in 

principle the right of resistance, but at the same time he recognizes, for 

seven particular cases in so large and uncertain a number, that the 

application of these principles would give a much slighter and much more 

uncertain guaranty for the stability of the civil authority than that of the 

doctrine of some avowed champions of the right of resistance. Cf. hereon the 

interesting explanations in the excellent work of my deceased pupil, KURT 

WOTZENDORFF, Staatsrecht und Völkerrecht (1916), pp. 247 ff.



14. Cf. GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis. Book I, chapter iii, § 11.



15. Cf. STIEVEN, Europäisches Hofceremonial (Leipzig, 1715).



16. Cf. GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis, Book I, chapter i, § 6; Book II, 

chapter xiv, § 7; Book II, chapter i, § 15; chapter xix, § 7.



17. For all the points raised in this chapter, compare the more detailed 

presentation in PUFENDORF'S work De jure naturae et gentium libri octo, Book 

VIII, chapters vi and vii; furthermore Grotius, op. cit. Book I, chapter ii, 

§ 3; Book II and Book III, passim.



18. Cf. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book II, chapters xxiii and xxiv.



19. On this question compare GROTIUS, op. cit. Book III, chapters xi-xvi.



20. GROTIUS, op. cit., Book III, chapter iii.



21. This corresponds to the practice of that time, but on this question 

compare also GROTIUS, op. cit. Book II, chapter xxi, § 4.



22. Hereon see GROTIUS, op. cit. Book III, chapter ii.



23. Cf. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book II, chapter xxv.



24. Cf. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book III, chapter iv, § 18.



25. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book III, chapter vi, §§ 2 ff.



26. GROTIUS, loc. cit., § 8.



27. GROTIUS, Book III, chapters ix and xvi.



28. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book III, chapter xxi, §§ 1-14.



29. Loc. cit., chapter xx.



30. Cf. GROTIUS, op. cit. Book II, chapter xv.



31. Op. cit., chapter xvi, §§ 7 and 8.



32. Cf. hereon the replies, which under the title, "Jus naturae et gentium," 

an inquiry for the anniversary of Hugo Grotius, appeared as a separate from 

Vol. 34 of the Zeitfchrift für internationales Recht, edited by Professor 

Dr. TH. NIEMEYER at Kiel in 1925.



33. Cf. hereon the statement of SCHÜCKING-WEHBERG, Die Satzung des 

Völkerbundes (2d edition, Berlin, 1924), p. 152.



______











          [The Title-Page of the Edition of 1682]



                      THE TWO BOOKS 

              ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 

               ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW



                 BY SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF







                       CAMBRIDGE



             FROM THE HOUSE OF JOHN HAYES 

          Printer to the Celebrated University 

                          1682

     At the Charges of John Creed, Bookseller, Cambridge.



______



   TO THE VERY ILLUSTRIOUS AND CELEBRATED GENTLEMAN 

               GUSTAVE OTTO STEENBOCK 

                  COUNT IN BOGESUND 

    FREIHERR VON CHRONEBECH AND OHRESTEEN, ETC. 

      ARCHITHALASSUS OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN 

  AND CHANCELLOR OF THE CAROLINE UNIVERSITY OF THE

                       GOTHS, ETC. 

                 MY MOST OBLIGING LORD



Most Illustrious and Distinguished Count, 

Most Obliging Lord,



No slight doubt troubled my distraught mind, as to whether it would be quite 

proper for such an insignificant work to claim for itself the auspices of 

such an illustrious name. For on the one hand the smallness of the little 

book caused a blush because it possessed no genius or splendor, seeing that 

it embraced merely the first rudiments of moral philosophy excerpted almost 

entirely from our more lengthy work. But just as it can furnish some use 

perhaps to those who are undertaking the first step to that study, so, if 

account must be taken here of your dignity and my obligation, it will seem 

sufficiently suitable for neither. On the other hand, your private no less 

than your public merits stimulated a mind so devoted to your Most 

Illustrious Excellency, so that I thought it a brand of ingratitude to be 

vigorously feared, if I neglected any such occasion at least of attesting 

how much it was beholden to You.



Nor do I now speak of those merits whereby through noble achievements at 

home and abroad you have rendered the country especially obligated to you, 

and at the same time have since dedicated your name to immortal glory. To 

recount those deeds commensurately with their dignity is the task of 

history, which, while it is relating at length the glorious deeds of your 

nation and the spreading of its arms victoriously throughout so many 

regions, finds you always an important factor in such great achievements; 

and wonders that the same man, when there has been a cessation from war, 

blossoms forth no less in the arts of peace, applying himself first to the 

government of a very large province and afterwards to a protecting 

administration of the entire kingdom.



Rather would it have been proper in this place to touch upon those gifts 

which have been received from your Most Illustrious Excellency by this newly 

established University in which it was given to me to fix the abode of my 

fortunes upon the invitation of the All-Highest King. It can never, in 

proportion to your merits, proclaim you enough as the wisest as well as the 

kindest defender and greatest moderator, while it daily finds you striving 

earnestly and untiringly for its own advantages and embellishments among 

such a great mass of public business.



Indeed with what respect ought I value the benefits which your Most 

Illustrious Excellency has conferred upon me in an especial manner? To 

others it is the height of their wishes to become known to men of rank and 

to be approved by them. But to me your effusive favor has been pleasing to 

such an extent that more than once have I experienced it most liberally 

bestowed both in promoting my advantages and in turning aside from myself 

the assaults of malevolent persons. Although it is far beyond the measure of 

my means to make any return for these favors, yet it will surely be 

necessary at least to acquit myself of a humble attitude of mind and a 

candid acknowledgment of so many benefits, inasmuch as the benevolence of 

great men has this characteristic also, that it gladly allows itself to be 

satisfied with the attestation of a grateful mind. And because it is 

customary for noble-minded men of their own accord to attach honor to even a 

slight exhibition of reverence for themselves by way of expressing one's 

loyalty, the goodness of your Most Illustrious Excellency bids me to hope 

likewise for this, that I may not seem to have been wanting to your 

greatness, if I make use of such a petty work as an occasion of publicly 

expressing my mind which is so devoted to your Excellency.



For it would be too much to expect from me a work which is brilliant and 

which can attain a long life, especially since geniuses are tremendously 

chilled, if they discover that, while they are striving to snatch themselves 

away from the common crowd, malice and ignorance use their teeth upon them 

with impunity and no regard is had for repose. Yet my mind will begin to 

bloom forth with new vigor and will cast aside the weariness that has sprung 

up, if I shall have understood that this homage has been received by your 

Most Illustrious Excellency with a placid brow, and if at the same time you 

shall have bid me rest easy forever about your favor and patronage. So may 

God preserve your Most Illustrious Excellency flourishing and vigorous for 

many years as the glory and gain of your country, your most brilliant 

family, and our new Commonwealth!



Your Most Illustrious Excellency's 

most devoted,



SAMUEL PUFENDORF. 

Lund, January 23, 1673.



TO THE BENEVOLENT READER, GREETING![1]



If the custom accepted by many erudite men had almost the force of law, it 

might have seemed superfluous to say anything by way of preface regarding 

the raison d'être of this work, since the subject matter itself tells 

sufficiently that I have done nothing else than set forth for beginners the 

chief headings of natural law, briefly, and, I think, in a clear compendium, 

lest, if they mingled themselves into the diffuse regions of this study 

beyond as it were an elementary knowledge, they be put to flight by the 

abundance and difficulty of the subject matter from the very beginning. At 

the same time it seemed to be to the public advantage that the minds of 

studious youths be imbued with moral doctrine of this character, in order 

that its manifest use in civil life might be considered. And although 

otherwise I would always have judged it inglorious to reduce to a compendium 

the more extensive writings of others, and much more of myself, yet when the 

authority of superiors is added, I do not think that the prudent will blame 

me for having wished to devote this labor simply to the advantage of youth, 

whose approval deservedly should be so great that a work undertaken for 

their favor, even when it does not possess genius or brilliancy, should not 

be judged unworthy by anyone. But that principles of this character are not 

more suitable for the entire study of law than any elements of civil law, no 

one denies who has half a sane head. And this might be sufficient for the 

present, did not some counsel that it would not be amiss to preface some 

remarks which might make for the understanding of the character of the 

natural law as a whole and the more accurate marking off of its limits. I 

have undertaken this all the more willingly because in this way a pretext is 

taken away from men who are importunately curious to put forth their 

feverish criticism upon this study, which, though often as it were 

intermingled, is separated from their province.



Therefore it is manifest that from three founts, so to speak, men derive 

the knowledge of their duty and what in this life they must do, as being 

morally good, and what not to do, as being morally bad: namely the light of 

reason, the civil laws and the particular revelation of the divine 

authority. From the first flow the commonest duties of man, especially those 

which make him sociable with other men; from the second, the duties of man 

in so far as he lives subject to a particular and definite State; from the 

third, the duties of a man who is a Christian. From this three separate 

studies arise, the first of which is the natural law, common to all nations; 

the second, the civil law of the single individual States, into which the 

human race departed. The third is called moral theology in contradistinction 

to that part of theology which explains what is to be believed [that is, 

dogmatic theology].



Each of these studies uses a method of proving its dogmas corresponding to 

its principle. In the natural law it is asserted that something must be 

done because the same is gathered by right reason as necessary for 

sociability between men. The last analysis of the precepts of the civil law 

is that the law-giver so established. The moral theologian acquiesces in 

that ultimate proposition, because God has so ordered in the Holy 

Scriptures. But just as the study of civil law presupposes the natural law 

as a more general study, so if the civil law contains anything upon which 

the natural law is silent, not on this account is the latter to be counted 

repugnant to the former. In a similar way, if in moral theology some 

doctrines are handed down as flowing from divine revelation to which our 

reason does not extend and therefore which the natural law ignores, it would 

be very ignorant on that account to match the former with the latter or 

imagine some repugnance between those studies. Vice versa, if any principles 

in the study of the natural law are presupposed from that which can be 

investigated by reason, on this account in no wise are the former opposed to 

those which the sacred literature hands down with greater clearness upon the 

same subject, but are only conceived by abstraction. Thus, e.g. in the study 

of the natural law, by abstracting from that knowledge which is drawn from 

the Sacred Scriptures, the condition of the first man is fashioned, 

howsoever he was projected in the world, in so far as reasoning alone can 

attain it. To oppose such principles to those which the divine literature 

hands down concerning the same condition, "this indeed is the juice of a 

black cuttlefish, this is mere envy."[2]



Indeed just as there will easily be harmony between the civil law and the 

natural law, so it seems a little more difficult to determine the boundary 

lines between the same natural law and moral theology and to define the 

chief respects in which they differ. I shall briefly set forth my opinion 

upon this matter, not indeed by virtue of papal authority, as if it would by 

some privilege protect me from all error, nor as one who from dreams sent 

down from on high, or some irrationable instinct, is animated with a 

trustworthiness of some singular illumination; but as one who is minded to 

ornament the Sparta which has been entrusted to him in proportion to the 

slight measure of his genius. In such a way, however, that, just as I am 

ready to gladly listen to the better suggestions of prudent and erudite men 

and to correct my previous pronouncements without obstinacy, so I do not 

care a straw for those rivals of Midas, the critics who wantonly rush into 

judgments upon matters which are no concern of theirs, or for a whole nation 

of busybodies whose character Phaedrus very cleverly depicts. "Tremblingly," 

he says, "they run about, busy in idleness, panting freely, doing much in 

doing nothing, troublesome to themselves and detestable to others."[3]



The first distinction therefore, whereby those studies are mutually 

separated, results from the different source from which each derives its 

dogmas, and upon this point we have just touched. Consequently, if there be 

some actions which we are bid by divine literature to perform or not to 

perform, yet whose necessity can not be grasped by reason left to itself, 

those actions fall outside the natural law and properly look toward moral 

theology. Moreover in theology law is considered proportionately as it has 

annexed a divine promise and a certain sort of pact between God and man. 

From this consideration the natural law abstracts, obviously since that 

which reason alone can not discover proceeds from the particular revelation 

of God.



Furthermore, that is by far the most important distinction whereby the end 

and aim of the natural law is included only in the circuit of this life, 

and therefore it moulds man accordingly as he ought to lead this life in 

society with others. But moral theology moulds a man into a Christian, who 

should not only have the purpose of passing honorably through this life, but 

who especially hopes for the fruit of piety after this life and who on this 

account has his politeuma [policy] in heaven, while here he lives merely as 

a wayfarer or sojoumer. For although the mind of man not only with a glowing 

desire leans, as it were, towards immortality and vigorously shrinks from 

self-destruction, and hence among many of the Gentiles the persuasion has 

become inveterate that the soul remains after its separation from the body 

and that then it will go well with the good and ill with the bad; 

nevertheless a persuasion of this sort on such matters, in which the mind of 

man might plainly and firmly acquiesce, is drawn only from the word of God. 

Hence the decrees of the natural law are adapted only to the human forum, 

which does not extend beyond this life, and they are wrongly applied in many 

places to the divine forum, which is the especial care of theology.



From this also it follows that, because the human forum is busied with only 

the external actions of man, while to those which he concealed within the 

breast and produce no effect or sign outside it does not penetrate and 

consequently is not disturbed about them, the natural law likewise is 

concerned to a great extent with the directing of the external actions of 

man. But for moral theology it is not sufficient that the external customs 

of men have been made in some way or another in keeping with decorum; but it 

is concerned chiefly with this, that the mind and its internal movements be 

fashioned after the will of the deity; and it reprobates those very actions 

which extrinsically indeed appear to be proper, but nevertheless emanate 

from an impure mind.



And this too seems to be the reason why in the divine books there is not so 

frequently question of those actions which have been forbidden under 

penalties of the human forum or concerning which the rights are there 

declared as of those actions which (to use the words of Seneca) are outside 

of public documents. This is manifestly evident to those who have carefully 

examined the precepts and virtues inculcated therein, although, while those 

very Christian virtues dispose the minds of men as much as possible to 

sociability, moral theology likewise promotes in a most efficacious manner 

honesty of civil life. So also vice versa, if you see anyone who shows 

himself a turbulent and troublesome member of civil life, you may safely 

judge that the Christian religion clings inside his lips only and has not 

yet penetrated his heart. And from this not only do I think that the genuine 

limits are manifestly evident which separate the natural law, as laid down 

by us, from moral theology; but also that natural law is by no means 

repugnant to the dogmas of true theology, but only abstracts from some of 

its dogmas which can not be investigated by reason alone.



Hence it is also patent that man now necessarily confides in the teachings 

of natural law, accordingly as his nature has been corrupted and 

consequently as he is an animal bubbling over with many wicked desires. For 

although no one is so stupid as not to perceive in himself affections that 

are inordinate and tending out of the beaten path, yet, if the divine 

literature did not light the way, no one could now be certain that that 

rebellion of the affections arose through the fault of the first man. And 

consequently since the natural law does not extend to those things to which 

reason can not reach it would be incongruous to wish to deduce it from the 

uncorrupted nature of man. Especially since many commandments of the 

Decalogue itself, seeing that they are couched in negative terms, manifestly 

presuppose the corrupted nature of man.



So, for example, the first commandment seems certainly to presuppose the 

proclivity of man to believe in idolatry and polytheism For if you suppose 

men as endowed with a nature still uncorrupted in whom the knowledge of God 

was perfectly clear and who from time to time enjoyed His familiar, so to 

speak, revelation I do not see how it could possibly enter the mind of such 

a man to fashion for himself something which he would wish to worship in 

place of the true God or along with Him, or believe that divinity was 

inherent in that thing which he himself had fashioned. Therefore there was 

no need to enjoin upon this man in negative terms, not to worship strange 

gods, but for him was sufficient the simple affirmative commandment, love, 

honor and worship God Whom you recognize as the Creator of this Universe and 

your own Creator likewise.



The same thing obtains with regard to the second commandment. For why should 

he be forbidden by a negative commandment to blaspheme God who clearly 

understood His majesty and benefactions and whom no wicked desires 

disturbed, and whose mind quietly acquiesced in the status assigned to it by 

God? How could such an insanity take possession of him? Nay rather he Was to 

be advised with an affirmative commandment only, to glorify the name of God.



Yet we must apparently speak otherwise with regard to the third as well as 

the fourth commandment, for since they are affirmative and do not 

necessarily presuppose a corrupted nature, they may find place in either 

status. Bat concerning the rest of the commandments, which have regard for 

one's neighbor, the matter is likewise very evident. For upon man, such as 

he was established by God in the beginning, it was sufficient simply to 

enjoin that he should love his neighbor; to this his nature was inclined. 

But how could he be commanded not to kill, when death had not yet fallen 

upon man, since it entered the world through sin?



But there is the greatest need of a negative commandment now when instead of 

love so many hatreds stalk among men that there is a great crop of those who 

from mere envy or lust for attacking another's fortune do not hesitate to 

overthrow others who are not only innocent but even friends and deserving 

well of them, and indeed who do not blush to pass off a terrible and rash 

attack of a turbulent mind under the word conscience. So why was there need 

expressly to forbid adulteries among those spouses who loved each other with 

such an ardent and sincere love? Or why was it relevant to forbid thefts, 

since there was no avarice, no penury as yet, and no one thought something 

belonged to himself which could benefit another? Or why was it necessary to 

forbid false testimony, since they did not yet exist who thereafter strove 

to obtain fame and glory for themselves, if they could asperge another by a 

base and stupid false accusation? So that it would not be inapt to apply to 

this that statement of Tacitus: "The most ancient of mortals, as yet without 

evil lust, used to live without baseness, crime, and therefore without 

punishment and coercions; and since they desired nothing beyond custom, they 

were forbidden nothing through fear."[4]



[Note 4 and beginning of next page apparently omitted from the original.] 



the state of uncorrupted nature or indeed the same law? Here reply can be 

made in a few words; that the chief headings of the law are the same in 

both states, but that the many particular precepts vary on account of the 

diversity of the human condition; or rather, that the same essence of the 

law is unfolded through different, though not contrary, precepts, according 

as the man by whom the law must be observed exists in a different manner. 

Our Saviour reduced the essence of the law to two heads: Love God and love 

your neighbor. To these heads can be referred the entire natural law, in 

the uncorrupted as well as in the corrupted state of mankind; unless because 

in the uncorrupted state there seems to have been little or no difference 

between the natural law and moral theology. For the sociability, which we 

have laid down as the foundation for the natural law, may be properly 

resolved into love of neighbor.



But when we come down to the particular precepts, surely no slight 

distinction arises with regard to the affirmative as well as the negative 

precepts. And indeed, so far as the affirmative precepts are concerned, not 

a few of them exist now in the present state for which there does not seem 

to have been room in the primeval state: and this partly because they 

presuppose an institution such as it is not clear whether it falls to the 

happiest condition of mankind; partly because they are not intelligible 

without misery and death which was exiled from that state. For example, it 

is now among the precepts of the natural law not to deceive another in a 

buying or selling, not to use a false ell, measure or weight, to return 

borrowed money at the time agreed upon. But it is not yet perfectly clear 

whether, if the human race had remained free from sin, commercial relations 

of the same character as are now carried on would have been put into 

practice, and whether there would then have been any use for money. So if 

such States as now exist had no place in the state of innocence, there was 

likewise no place there for precepts which presuppose States of this kind 

and the authority contained in them. Now too we are bidden by the natural 

law to succor the needy, to aid those oppressed by an unfortunate calamity, 

to take care of widows and of orphans. But these are prescribed in vain to 

those who are not subject to misfortune, need and death. We are now bidden 

by the natural law to be prone to condone wrongs and to seek out peace. This 

would be fruitless among those who do not sin against the laws of 

sociability.



And this very thing is likewise manifestly evident in negative precepts, 

which have regard for the natural (not the positive) law. For although any 

affirmative precept may virtually contain an interdict of everything 

opposed (for example, he who is bidden to love his neighbor, by that very 

fact is forbidden to do all those deeds to him which are repugnant to love); 

nevertheless it seems superfluous that they be set apart by express 

precepts when no wicked desires impel [one] to commit such deeds. To 

illustrate this we can bring forward the fact that Solon was unwilling to 

set aside a punishment for parricides by public law, because he did not 

think that such a great- crime would fall to the lot of any son. Similar to 

this is the statement of Francisco Lopez de Gomara[5] concerning the peoples 

of Nicaragua, that there was no punishment decreed among them for him who 

had killed a petty chief (cacique, they called him), because, they said, 

there was no subject who wished to think up or perpetrate so dire a crime.



I fear that it may seem affected to inculcate these principles which are so 

patent to the majority. Yet for the comprehension of beginners I shall add 

this example. There are two boys of altogether different dispositions 

entrusted to the education of someone. One is modest and bashful and glowing 

with a great love for letters. The other is dissolute, petulant, and loves 

abominable lusts rather than books. The substance of the duty of both is the 

same, to learn letters. But the individual precepts are different. For it 

is sufficient to enjoin upon the former what studies, at what time, and with 

what method he ought to treat them. The other, besides these precepts very 

sharply given, ought to be forbidden under threat to run around, to play 

dice, to sell his books, to depend entirely upon another in composing his 

exercises, to be a dude, to consort with harlots. In the same way if anyone 

would teach a boy of the former disposition to declaim carefully, he will 

bid him euphemein [use felicitous expressions], and him who is not affected 

with any desire of such things, to sing them to anyone rather than to 

himself.



From which it is manifest, I think, that there would be a far different 

aspect of natural law, if anyone wished to presuppose the state of man to be 

uncorrupted. And at the same time since the limits whereby this study is 

separated from moral theology are so clearly marked off, this study would be 

in no worse condition than civil jurisprudence, medicine, natural science or 

mathematics; if anyone should dare to burst forth into them amuetos 

[uninitiated], arrogating censure to himself unchosen, people would not 

hesitate to exclaim what Appelles once said to Megabyzus who was attempting 

some discourse or other upon the art of painting: "Be silent, I beseech you, 

lest the slave-boys who prepare the white paint laugh at you, in your 

attempt to speak upon subjects which you have not learned." But it will be 

easy for us to suit good and kindly men. The evil minded and unlearned 

calumniators, however, it were better to entrust to their own envy for 

punishment, seeing that it is certainly clear and based upon the eternal law 

that the Ethiopian does not change his skin.







1. [This Greeting and the preceding Dedicatory Letter and Title-Page have 

been translated by Herbert F. Wright.]



2. [HORACE, Sermones. 1, 4, 100-101.]



3. [PHAEDRUS, 2, 52.]



4. La Historia General de las Indias, ch. 207. [The reference is to be found 

in Chapter 206 in the edition published at Antwerp in 1554.]









______



                   TABLE OF CHAPTERS



                         BOOK I



                                                                    PAGE[1]



CHAPTER



1. On human action 

..................................................................... 1 [3]



2. On the norm of human actions, or law in general ................. 12 [12]



3. On natural law .................................................. 18 [17]



4. On the duty of man toward God, or natural religion .............. 24 [22]



5. On the duty of man toward himself ............................... 31 [28]



6. On mutual duties, and first, that of not injuring others ........ 42 [37]



7. On recognition of the natural equality of men ................... 47 [42]



8. On the common duties of humanity ................................ 50 [45]



9. On the duty of contracting parties in general ................... 53 [48]



10. On the duty of the users of language ........................... 62 [56]



11. On the duty of those who take oath ............................. 66 [59]



12. On duty as regards the acquisition of ownership ................ 69 [62]



13. On the duties which result from ownership per se ............... 76 [68]



14. On value ....................................................... 78 [70]



15. On contracts which presuppose the prices of things, and the duties 

thence derived ..................................................... 82 [74]



16. The methods of dissolving obligations arising from agreements .. 91 [81]



17. On interpretation .............................................. 93 [83]



                             BOOK II



                                                                     PAGE



CHAPTER 



1. On the natural state of men ..................................... 98 [89]



2. On conjugal duties ............................................. 104 [94]



3. On the duties of parents and children .......................... 106 [97]



4. On the duties of masters and servants .......................... 112 [101]



5. On the impelling cause for the establishment of a State ........ 115 [103]



6. On the internal structure of States ............................ 118 [106]



7. On the functions of the supreme authority ...................... 123 [110]



8. On the forms of government ..................................... 126 [113]



9. The characteristics of civil authority ......................... 130 [116]



10. On the methods of acquiring authority, especially monarchical . 132 [118]



11. On the duty of rulers ......................................... 135 [121]



12. On civil laws in particular ................................... 140 [125]



13. On the power of life and death ................................ 143 [128]



14. On reputation ................................................. 148 [133]



15. On the power of the supreme authority over property in the 

State ............................................................. 152 [136]



16. On war and peace .............................................. 154 [138] 



17. On alliances .................................................. 159 [142]



18. On the duties of citizens ..................................... 161 [144]







1. [The numbers in brackets refer to pages of this translation.]





______



                    THE FIRST BOOK ON 

               THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN



                          BY



                  SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF



                       CHAPTER I 

                    On Human Action



1. Duty is here defined by me as man's action, duly conformed to the 

ordinances of the law, and in proportion to obligation. To understand this, 

it is necessary to treat first of the nature of human action, and also of 

laws in general.



2. By human action we understand not any motion proceeding from the 

faculties of man, but that motion only which proceeds from and is directed 

by those faculties which the Creator[1] has given to mankind above the 

brutes, -- I mean that which is undertaken with intellect lighting the way, 

and at the bidding of the will.



3. Man has in fact been granted the power not only of knowing the different 

things which he meets in this universe, of comparing them and of forming new 

notions in regard to them, but also the ability to foresee what he is going 

to do, to bestir himself to accomplish it, to shape it to a certain norm and 

a certain end, and to infer what the result will be; and further, to judge 

whether things already done conform to rule. Moreover, not all the faculties 

of man act continually or in a uniform manner. Some of them, in fact, are 

excited, and then controlled and directed, by an impulse from within. 

Finally a man is not attracted to all objects indifferently, but seeks some 

and shuns others. Often too, though the object be present, he checks the 

impulse, and when several objects are before him, he selects one and rejects 

the others.



4. With regard then to the faculty of comprehending and judging things -- 

intellect it is called -- we must hold it absolutely certain that any man of 

mature age and sound mind has enough of natural light to be able, with 

training and due reflection, to comprehend properly at least those general 

precepts and principles which make for an honorable and a peaceful life in 

this world; also to appreciate the fact that they are in conformity with 

human nature. For if this be not admitted, at least within the competence of 

the human court, men would be able to shield any misdeeds of theirs by an 

invincible ignorance, since in the human court no one can be accused of 

violating a rule which it is beyond his powers to comprehend.



5. When a man's intellect has been well instructed as to what is to be done 

or left undone, to the point of understanding how to give certain and 

unmistakable reasons for its opinion, we call this a right conscience. But 

when a man has indeed a correct opinion as regards doing and leaving undone, 

without the ability to establish the same by argument, having acquired it 

from the general tenor of life in a community, from habit, or from the 

authority of superiors, and having no reason impelling him to the opposite 

course, we call this a probable conscience. By this the greater part of men 

are guided, for it has been given to few to discover the causes of things.



6. To some, however, it happens not infrequently, especially in regard to 

particular cases, that arguments for both sides suggest themselves, and they 

lack the strength of judgment to see clearly which have greater weight. This 

is usually called a doubtfui conscience. And here is the rule for it: So 

long as judgment is uncertain as to what is good, or what bad, action must 

be suspended. For while the doubt is unremoved, the decision to act involves 

an intention to do wrong, or at least neglect of the law.



7. Often too the human intellect mistakes the false for the true, and then 

is said to be in error. And error is usually called vincible, when a man 

with attention and due care can avoid falling into it; but invincible, when 

even by employing all the diligence which the circumstances of the common 

life require, one could not avoid the error. This sort, however, at least 

among those whose heart's desire it is to nurture the light of reason and 

order their lives in accordance with honor, does not usually happen in 

regard to the general precepts for living, but merely in connection with 

particular matters. For the general precepts of the natural law are clear; 

and then he who makes positive laws follows the custom and the duty of 

taking special pains that they be made known to his subjects. Hence, without 

supine neglect, this error does not arise. But in particular matters it is 

easy for error in regard to the object and other circumstances of the action 

to steal in against a man's will and without his fault.



8. But where there is simply an absence of knowledge, this is called 

ignorance. And the latter is treated in two ways, first, according as it 

contributes to the action; second, according as it comes about against the 

will, or not without blame. From the former point of view ignorance is 

usually divided into the effectual and the concomitant. In the absence of 

the former the action in question would not have been undertaken. The latter 

may have been absent, and still the action would have been undertaken. From 

the second point of view ignorance is voluntary or involuntary. The former 

is even knowingly affected, the means of arriving at the truth having been 

rejected; or, failing to employ due diligence, one has allowed it to steal 

in unawares. The involuntary ignorance is when one does not know what he 

could not know, and was not bound to know. And this again is twofold. For 

either a man was unable, indeed, to avoid ignorance for the present, and yet 

was to blame for being in that state; or else he was not only unable to 

conquer his ignorance for the present, but is also not to blame for having 

fallen into such a condition.



9. The second faculty which is exclusively seen in man, as compared with the 

brutes, is called the will. By means of this, as from some inward impulse, a 

man bestirs himself to action, and chooses what especially attracts him, 

rejects what does not seem to him suitable. From the will, therefore, man 

derives the power of acting of his own accord, in other words, the fact that 

he is not set to act by some inward necessity, but is himself the author of 

his own action; also the power of acting freely, which means that, when one 

object is put before him, he can act or not act, and choose the same, or 

reject it, or if several objects are set before him, can select one and 

reject the rest. Moreover some human actions are undertaken on their own 

account, some in so far as they serve to gain another object, that is, some 

have the functions of an end and others of means. Hence as regards an end, 

the concern of the will is first to recognize and approve it, then to bestir 

itself effectually to gain it, with more or less earnestness of aim; then 

having attained, to rest in quiet enjoyment of it. As for means, they are 

first approved, then the most suitable, as it appears, selected, and finally 

put into practice.



10. And just as the chief reason for considering a man responsible for his 

own acts is that he undertook them of his own will, so we must especially 

observe that the freedom of the will is by all means to be asserted, at 

least in regard to the acts for which a man is commonly held to account 

before a human court. But where no freedom at all is left a man, there he 

will not himself be held responsible for an act to which he unwillingly 

lends his limbs and powers, but the other man, who brings constraint to 

bear.



11. Furthermore, although the will always chooses a generic good, and avoids 

a generic evil, still, as between individuals, we see a great diversity of 

desires and actions. And the cause is the fart that not all good and bad 

things appear to a man uncontaminated, but mixed together, good with bad, 

bad with good. And because different objects affect peculiarly different 

parts, so to say, of the man, -- some, for example, his self-esteem, some 

his external senses, some his self-love, the instinct of self-preservation, 

-- the result is that the man views these different objects as respectively 

becoming, agreeable, and useful. And each of these makes the man incline 

especially toward itself, in exact proportion to the strength of the 

impression it has made upon him. There is in most men a special penchant 

also for certain things, and aversion to others. Consequently, in almost any 

action different kinds of good things and bad, real or apparent, crop out 

together, and to distinguish these truly, some men have more, some less, of 

penetration. It is no wonder then that one man is carried away to that which 

is especially abhorrent to another.



12. Moreover, the will of man is not always found in equilibrium as regards 

any action, so that his inclination to this or that side comes from his own 

inward impulse alone, after maturely weighing everything. But most 

frequently the man is impelled in the one direction rather than in the other 

by external influences. For, not to mention the common proclivity of human 

beings to the bad, the origin and nature of which it is not for our court to 

examine, the will gains a special penchant from a peculiarly constituted 

nature, by which some are much inclined to a certain kind of action. And 

this is observed not only in individuals, but also in entire nations. It 

appears to be produced by the character of the atmosphere all about us, and 

of the soil, also the combination of humors in the body. resulting from 

birth itself, age, food, health, occupation, and similar causes; further by 

the conformation of the organs, which the mind uses in performing its 

functions, and so on. Here we must note that not only can a man with care 

repress and alter his temperament considerably; but also, no matter how much 

force is attributed to the latter, it must not be thought to have such 

strength as to force the man necessarily into violation of the natural law, 

in so far as it is enforced in the human court, where base desires, stopping 

short of the outward act, are not considered. And, in fact, no matter how 

much Nature, though driven out with a fork, still returns, a man can 

nevertheless prevent her causing external acts that are immoral. And the 

difficulty encountered in conquering a bent of that sort is balanced by the 

glory and praise which here awaits the victor. But should the mind be goaded 

with passions such as no reason can hold in check, there is still a way of 

emptying them out, as it were, without sin.



13. And then the will is strongly bent toward certain acts by frequent 

repetition of acts of the same sort, from which arises a proclivity which we 

call habit. The result of habit is that an action is undertaken willingly 

and lightly, so that the mind seems to be, as it were, dragged toward the 

object, if present, or most ardently to desire it, if absent. And one should 

note that there is no habit such that a man cannot with care throw it off 

again; and also none that can so far pervert the mind, that a man is unequal 

to the task of restraining here and now the outward acts, at least, toward 

which habit is swept. And as it is in a man's power to contract a habit of 

the kind, no matter how much it facilitates the act, nothing is subtracted 

from the value of his good deeds, nor is the guilt of his misdeeds any the 

less. In fact, as a good habit heightens a man's praise, so a bad habit his 

shame.



14. It also makes a great difference whether there is a calm tranquillity of 

mind, or whether it is stirred by certain special emotions, which they call 

passions. With regard to these this must be our opinion: however violent 

they may be, still by due use of reason a man can be superior to them and 

check their attack, at least before the ultimate act. Moreover, some of the 

passions are excited by the appearance of a good, others of an evil, and 

they spur us on to win some agreeable thing, or to avoid the disagreeable. 

Consequently it is in keeping with human nature that more favor and 

indulgence among men should go with the second class of passions, and 

precisely in proportion to the intolerable violence of the evil which 

aroused them. It is in fact thought much more tolerable to dispense with a 

good not very necessary to self-preservation, than to suffer an evil tending 

to the destruction of our nature.



15. Finally, as there are certain diseases which quite take away the use of 

reason, permanently, or for a time, so among many nations it is a common 

thing for men actually to invite a kind of malady which soon passes away, 

and greatly disturbs the use of reason. By which hint I mean intoxication, 

arising from some beverages and some kinds of smoke. It creates in the blood 

and spirit a violent commotion, and gives men a proclivity to lust in 

particular, to anger, rashness, and excessive mirth, so that many seem to be 

carried out of themselves by intoxication, and to have put on an entirely 

different nature, as compared with their sober appearance. While it does 

not, however, always take away the complete use of reason, as being 

self-invited, it is apt to win odium, rather than favor, for the acts done 

in that condition.



16. Again, human actions are called voluntary, since they proceed from the 

will and are guided by it. In the same way whatever actions are knowingly 

undertaken in opposition to the will, are called involuntary, in the 

narrower sense of the term. For in its wider sense it also includes acts 

committed through ignorance. But by involuntary I here mean the same thing 

as compelled, that is, when a man is forced by a stronger principle from 

without to surrender the use of his limbs, in such wise as to show his 

aversion and dissent by signs, and especially by bodily resistance. Also, 

but less exactly, we speak of the involuntary, when under the stress of 

necessity one chooses as the lesser evil and undertakes a thing to which 

formerly, when unconstrained by necessity, one was absolutely averse. Such 

actions they commonly call mixed. With the voluntary they have this in 

common, that the will does in the emergency choose the apparently lesser 

evil. With the involuntary they agree to a certain extent in their effect, 

in that they are either not laid at all to the charge of the doer, or less 

severely than are the voluntary actions.



17. But human actions proceeding from and guided by intellect and will 

possess this particular attribute, that they can be imputed to a man, that 

is, that the man can rightly be regarded as their author, and held to the 

rendering of an account of them, and that the consequences which flow from 

them fall back upon himself. For there is no more intimate reason why an 

action can be imputed to a man, than because, directly or indirectly, it 

proceeded from him, knowing and willing it; or because it was in his power, 

whether the thing should be done or not. Hence in the moral sciences which 

concern the human tribunal, it is accounted a fundamental axiom, that a man 

can be called to account for those actions, the performance or omission of 

which was in his power; or, -- and this amounts to the same thing, -- that 

any action which can be directed by a man, and brought about or not at his 

discretion, can be laid at his own door. So too, on the other hand, no one 

can be reckoned the author of an action which neither in itself nor in its 

cause was within his power.



18. Out of these premises we shall form a number of particular propositions, 

from which it will be established what can be imputed to each man, that is, 

of what action and result each one can be regarded as the author. First, the 

actions which another commits, as also the workings of any other causes, and 

any effects, can only be imputed to a man in so far as he has the power and 

the duty to control them. Nothing, in fact, is more common among men than 

for one man to be intrusted with the direction of another's actions. In this 

case, then, if the other should commit any action in regard to which the 

first omitted to do what was in his power, that action will be imputed not 

only to him who immediately committed it, but also to him who neglected any 

part of the direction which was his duty and within his power. This, 

however, has its limits and bounds, so that the possible in the case is to 

be understood with a certain reservation and in a moral sense. By no 

subjection of one man to another is the freedom of the subject so far 

extinguished that he cannot resist the direction of the other, and have 

different aims, and, on the other hand, human life is not so constituted 

that a man continually attached to one man should be able to observe his 

every movement. It follows then that, if one has done everything which the 

nature of the direction laid upon him suggests, when, nevertheless, 

something has been done by the other, it will be imputed to the doer alone. 

Thus since men have assumed the ownership of animals, whatever has been done 

by them to the detriment of another will be laid to the charge of the owner, 

if, indeed, he has omitted any due care and watchfulness. Thus also any 

evils which befall another can be imputed to him who, having the power and 

duty, did not remove their cause and occasion. So, since men have it in 

their power to promote or suspend many natural operations, any advantage or 

loss, which they may have occasioned, will be imputed to them in proportion 

to their contributory pains or neglect. Also in some extraordinary cases a 

man is responsible for such events as are at other times beyond human 

control, since the Deity has in a special manner brought them about with 

reference to a certain man. These and similar cases aside, it is enough if a 

man can render account of his own actions.



19. Secondly, whatever qualities are found, or not found, in a man, when 

their presence or absence was not within his power, cannot be imputed to the 

man himself, except in so far as he failed by industry to make good his 

natural defect, or to second his native powers. Thus, since no one could 

insure himself mental penetration and bodily strength, nothing will be 

chargeable to any one on that account, save in so far as he availed himself 

of training, or failed to do so. Thus it is not the rustic, but the man of 

the city and the court, to whom uncouth manners are made a reproach. Hence 

fault-finding for qualities whose cause was not in our power is to be 

accounted very absurd, for example, shortness of stature, imperfection of 

form, and the like.



20. Thirdly, things done through invincible ignorance cannot be laid to 

one's charge. For we cannot direct an action when the light of intellect 

does not shine before us; and also we arc presupposing that the man was 

unable to gain such a light, and was not to blame for this inability. 

Indeed, in common life ability [to posse] is understood, in a moral sense, 

to be that degree of capacity, shrewdness, and caution, which is usually 

judged sufficient, and was based upon plausible reasons.



21. Fourthly, ignorance, as also error, in regard to laws and the duty 

imposed upon each man does not release one from responsibility. For he who 

imposes laws and duty upon a man is accustomed, and is bound, to bring these 

to the notice of the subject. And laws and rules of duty are usually 

adapted, and must be so, to the capacity of the subject; and to learn and 

remember them must be a care to everyone. Hence he who is the cause of 

others' ignorance will be held answerable for the acts also which flow from 

that ignorance.



22. Fifthly, if a man lacks opportunity to act without involving himself in 

a fault, his failure to act will not be laid to his account. And opportunity 

seems to include these four points: (1) that the object of the act be at 

hand, (2) that there be a convenient place, where we cannot be hindered by 

others, or suffer some harm, (3) that there be a favorable time, when we do 

not have more necessary business to transact, -- a time which is favorable 

for others also who concur in the act, (4) finally that we have the natural 

powers for the act. Without these circumstances the action could not take 

place, and hence it would be absurd to hold a man accountable, when the 

opportunity to act was lacking. Thus a physician cannot be accused of 

indolence, if no one is ill; and a man who is himself in want is not 

permitted to be liberal. So also he cannot be charged with hiding his 

talent, who has been refused the position for which he made a proper 

request. And "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much 

required."[2] Thus we cannot suck and blow at the same time.



23. Sixthly, it cannot be laid to a man's account either, that he did not do 

things which exceed his powers, and cannot be prevented by these, or brought 

about by them. Hence the common saying that there is no obligation for the 

impossible. We must, however, add the proviso that a man has not diminished 

or lost his power to perform by his own fault. For such a man can be treated 

just as if he still retained his powers; for otherwise there would be an 

easy way to evade any rather troublesome obligation, by electing to destroy 

the power to perform.



24. Seventhly, there is also no responsibility for what one suffers or does 

under compulsion. For to avert or escape such things is understood to be 

beyond the man's powers. Now compulsion is used in two senses: first, when a 

stronger by force employs our limbs to do or suffer something; secondly, if 

a more powerful person threatens some great harm at once, and has the 

ability to carry it out directly, unless we are ready to bestir ourselves to 

do something, or to refrain from action. For in that case, unless we are 

expressly obliged to buy off at our own cost the injury we were to inflict 

upon a third party, the man who imposes upon us that necessity will be 

considered the author of the crime; but the deed can no more be imputed to 

us than bloodshed to the sword or the ax.



25. Eighthly, those who are deprived of the use of their reason are not 

accountable for their actions. For they are unable to distinguish clearly 

what is being done, or to compare it with a standard. Here belong the acts 

of infants, before the reason begins to show itself at all dearly. As for 

the fact that they are scolded or whipped for certain acts, it is not done 

with the idea that they have strictly speaking deserved punishment in the 

human court; but it is by way of mere correction and discipline, that they 

may not make trouble for others by such actions, or may not form a bad 

habit. So, too, the acts of the insane, the unbalanced and dotards, if the 

disease has come without their fault, are not regarded as human actions.



26. Ninthly, and finally, one is not accountable for what he imagines he 

does in sleep, except in so far as by dwelling with pleasure upon the 

thought of such things by day he has deeply impressed their images upon his 

mind. And yet these too are very rarely considered in a human court. For in 

general imagination in sleep is like a boat adrift without a pilot, so that 

it is not in a man's power to determine what kind of images fancy is to 

produce.



27. With regard to responsibility for the acts of another, we should observe 

more closely that sometimes, to be sure, it happens that an action is not 

laid at all to the charge of him who directly committed it, but to another 

person who used him as a mere instrument. More commonly, however, an act is 

charged both to him who committed it, and to him who concurred by some act 

or omission. This happens especially in three ways: either the second party 

is accounted the principal cause of the act and he who committed it 

secondary; or they both walk pari passu; or the second party is the 

secondary cause, and he who committed it the principal. To the first class 

belong those who urged another to anything by their influence; those who 

gave the necessary consent, without which the other could not have acted; 

those who were able and bound to prevent, and did not do so. To the second 

class belong those who charge another, or hire him, to commit crime; those 

who help, harbor, or defend; those who, being able and bound to lend aid to 

the injured party, failed to do so. To the third class are referred those 

who give particular advice; those who applaud and approve before the deed; 

those who by their example inflame others to wrong-doing, and similar 

persons.





______



                         CHAPTER II 

       On the Norm of Human Actions, or Law in General



1. Because human actions depend upon the will, but the wills of individuals 

are not always consistent, and those of different men generally tend toward 

different things, therefore, in order to establish order and seemliness 

among the human race, it was necessary that some norm should come into 

being, to which actions might be conformed. For otherwise, if with such 

freedom of the will, and such diversity of inclinations and tastes, each 

should do whatever came into his head, without reference to a fixed norm, 

nothing but the greatest confusion could arise among men.



2. That norm is called law, that is, a decree by which a superior obliges a 

subject to conform his arts to his own prescription.



3. That this definition may be better understood, we must develop the 

meaning of obligation, whence it arises, who can undertake an obligation, 

and who impose it upon another. Obligation, then, is commonly defined as a 

legal bond, by which we are of necessity bound to perform something. That 

is, a kind of bridle is thereby put upon our freedom, so that, though in 

actual fact the will can have a different aim, still it finds itself imbued 

with an inward sentiment due to the obligation, with the result that, if the 

action performed is not in conformity with the prescribed norm, the will is 

forced to acknowledge that it has not done what is right. And so if any ill 

should befall a man on that account, he would judge that it befalls him not 

undeservedly; since by following the norm, as was proper, he might have 

avoided it.



4. For the fart that man is fitted to undertake an obligation there are two 

reasons: one, because he has a will which can turn in different directions, 

and so also conform to the rule; the other, since man is not free from the 

power of a superior. For where an agent's powers have been bound by nature 

to a uniform mode of action, there we look in vain for free action; and it 

is vain to prescribe a rule for a man who cannot understand it nor conform 

to the same. Again, assuming that a man does not recognize a superior, there 

is for that reason no one who can rightfully impose a necessity upon him. 

And if he be ever so strict in observing a certain method of action, and 

consistently abstain from certain arts, still he is understood to do this 

not from any obligation, but from his own good pleasure. It follows then 

that he is capable of an obligation who not only has a superior, but also 

can recognize a prescribed rule, and further has a will flexible in 

different directions, but conscious of the fart that, when the rule has been 

prescribed by a superior, it does wrong to depart from the same. Such is 

evidently the nature with which man is endowed.



5. Obligation is properly introduced into the mind of a man by a superior, 

that is, a person who has not only the power to bring some harm at once upon 

those who resist, but also just grounds for his claim that the freedom of 

our will should be limited at his discretion. For when these conditions are 

found in anyone, he has only to intimate his wish, and there must arise in 

men's minds a fear that is tempered with respect, the former in view of his 

power, the latter in consideration of the reasons, which, were there no 

fear, must still induce one to embrace his will. For whoever is unable to 

assign any other reason why he wishes to impose an obligation upon me 

against my will, except mere power, can indeed frighten me into thinking it 

better for a time to obey him, to avoid a greater evil; but, once that fear 

is removed, nothing further remains to prevent my acting according to my 

will rather than his. Conversely, if he has indeed the reasons which make it 

my duty to obey him, but lacks the power of inflicting any harm upon me, I 

may with impunity neglect his commands, unless a more powerful person comes 

to assert the authority upon which I have trampled. Now the reasons why one 

may rightly demand that another obey him are: in case some conspicuous 

benefits have come to the latter from the former; or if it be proved that he 

wishes the other well, and is also better able than the man himself to 

provide for him, and at the same time actually claims control over the 

other; and finally if a man has willingly subjected himself to another and 

agreed to his control.



6. But that the law may exert its power in the minds of those for whom it is 

made, knowledge both of the lawgiver and of the law itself is required. For 

no man will be able to yield obedience, if he knows neither whom he ought to 

obey, nor to what he is obligated. And as for the lawgiver, knowledge of him 

is very easy. For the natural laws, as the light of reason assures us, have 

the same author as the universe. And the citizen cannot fail to know who has 

authority over him. How the natural laws are made known, will be explained 

presently. Civil laws come to the knowledge of subjects by public and 

explicit promulgation. In this two things must be dear: that the law has as 

its author him who has the highest authority in the state; and also what is 

the meaning of the law. The former point is established, if the sovereign 

shall promulgate the law by his own lips, or sign them with his own hand, or 

if this be done by his ministers. The authority of the latter it is idle to 

question if it is clear that this function is connected with the office 

which they fill in the state, and that they are regularly employed for the 

same purpose; further if the laws in question are for the guidance of the 

courts, and if they contain nothing derogatory to the sovereign authority. 

As for the meaning of the law, that this may be rightly understood, it is 

incumbent upon those who promulgate them to use the utmost clearness. Should 

any obscurity be found in the laws, an interpretation must be sought from 

the lawgiver, or from those who are publicly ordained to render justice in 

accordance with the laws.



7. Every perfect law has two parts: one defining what is to be done, or not 

done; the other indicating what punishment is in store for him who neglects 

what is enjoined and does what is forbidden. For on account of the depravity 

of human nature, prone as it is to the forbidden, it is superfluous to say 

"Do this!" if there is no punishment in store for the non-doer. And it is 

equally absurd to say "You will pay the penalty," if the reason which merits 

punishment has not preceded. Accordingly all the force of a law consists in 

the declaration of what our superior wishes us to do or not do, and of the 

penalty which has been fixed for transgressors of the law. But the power to 

oblige, that is, to impose an inward necessity, and the power to force or 

compel by penalties to observe the law, resides exclusively in the lawgiver, 

and in him to whom has been committed the maintenance and execution of the 

laws.



8. Whatever is enjoined upon a man by the laws ought not only to be within 

his powers, for whom they are made, but should also bring some advantage 

either to the man himself or to others. For as it would be absurd and cruel 

to attempt-under threat of a penalty to exact from a man what is and has 

always been beyond his powers, so it is idle to constrain the natural 

freedom of the will, if no advantage for anybody be derived therefrom.



9. Moreover, although regularly a law embraces all the lawgiver's subjects 

to whom the content of the law applies, and whom the lawgiver did not from 

the beginning wish exempt, it nevertheless sometimes happens that a man is 

expressly released from the obligation of a law. And this is called 

dispensation. But he only can dispense to whom belongs the power of enacting 

and abrogating a law; and pains too must be taken that the authority of the 

laws be not undermined by promiscuous dispensation granted without the 

weightiest reasons, and thus occasion be given for jealousy and indignation 

among the subjects.



10. Very different from dispensation, however, is equity, a correction of a 

defect in the law due to its universality, or a skillful interpretation of 

the law, showing by the natural reason that a particular case is not 

included under the general law, since otherwise some absurdity would result. 

For because it is impossible either to foresee or state all cases on account 

of their infinite variety, the judges, whose task it is to apply general 

enactments of the laws to particular cases, are bound to except from the law 

the kind of cases which the lawgiver would himself have excepted, were he 

present, or had he foreseen such instances.



11. Again, from their relation to the moral standard and their agreement 

with it human actions gain certain qualifying terms. As for the actions in 

regard to which the law ordains nothing in either direction, they are called 

legitimate or permitted. Sometimes, to be sure, in the civil life, in which 

not everything can be cut back to the quick, those acts also are called 

legitimate against which no punishment has been ordained in the human court, 

though in themselves they are repugnant to natural goodness. Also, actions 

in agreement with law are called good, if not in harmony therewith, bad. But 

for an action to be good, it must in every way agree with the law; to be 

bad, it is enough that it be defective at a single point.



12. Justice, however, is sometimes an attribute of actions, sometimes of 

persons. When justice is attributed to a person, it is commonly denned as 

the "constant and perpetual will to render to every man his due."[3] For he 

who delights in doing just deeds, who is devoted to justice, who in 

everything endeavors to do what is just, is called a just man. On the other 

hand the unjust is he who neglects to give every man his due, or thinks the 

measure must be not that of his duty, but of present advantage. Consequently 

not a few of the just man's acts may be unjust, and conversely. For the just 

man acts justly on account of the precept of the law, but unjustly only 

through weakness, while the unjust acts justly on account of the penalty 

annexed to the law, and unjustly from an evil character.



13. But when justice is predicated of actions, there is merely a proper 

application of these to the person. And a just action is one which from 

deliberate choice, that is, by a knowing and willing agent, is applied to 

the person to whom it is due. Hence the justice of acts differs from their 

goodness especially in this, that the latter merely indicates conformity to 

law, while justice involves in addition a regard for those toward whom the 

action goes out. For this reason justice is also defined as virtue in 

relation to another. 



14. On the division of justice there is no agreement. The generally received 

division is into universal and particular. We speak of the former, when any 

duty whatever is practiced toward others, even that which could not be 

exacted by force or by suit at law; of the latter, when a man receives just 

what he could by rights demand. And this is again divided into distributive 

justice and commutative justice. The former rests upon a compact entered 

into between a society and its members concerning the pro rata sharing of 

profit and loss. The latter rests upon a bilateral contract in regard 

especially to things and acts connected with trade.



15. Having learned what justice is, it is easy to conclude what injustice 

is. But here one must observe that an unjust act, undertaken after 

premeditation, and violating what is by perfect right due another, or what 

he possessed by the same right, -- no matter whence obtained, -- that act is 

properly called an injury. And this happens in three ways: if one is refused 

a thing which he could by his own right demand (not if something was due him 

out of mere humanity, or some such virtue); or if that is taken away from 

him which he rightly held, by a title valid against the aggressor; or if we 

inflict upon another some harm which we had not the right to inflict. For an 

injury, moreover, premeditation is required, and malice on the part of the 

doer. Failing this, harming another is called an accident or a fault, more 

or less serious, according to the seriousness of the thoughtlessness and 

neglect, in consequence of which the encounter occurred.



16. With respect to its author, the law is divided into divine and human, 

the one enacted by God, the other by men. But if law be considered according 

as it has a necessary and universal adaptation to men or not, it is divided 

into the natural and the positive. The former is so adapted to the rational 

and social nature of man, that an honorable and peaceful society cannot 

exist for mankind without it. Consequently it can be investigated and 

learned as a whole, by the light of man's inborn reason and a consideration 

of human nature. The latter kind of justice by no means flows from the 

common condition of human nature, but proceeds from the decision of the 

lawgiver alone. And yet it ought not to lack its own reason, and the utility 

which it effects for certain men or a particular society. But while the 

divine law is now natural and now positive, human law is, in the strict 

sense, altogether positive.





______



                         CHAPTER III 

                        On Natural Law



1. What is the character of the natural law, what its necessity, and of what 

precepts it consists in the present state of mankind, are most clearly seen, 

after one has thoroughly examined the nature and disposition of man. For, 

just as for an accurate knowledge of civil laws, it is very important to 

have a clear understanding of the condition of the state, and of the habits 

and interests of its citizens, so if we have examined the common disposition 

of men and their condition, it will be readily apparent upon what laws their 

welfare depends.



2. Now man shares with all the animals that have consciousness the fact that 

he holds nothing dearer than himself, and is eager in every way to preserve 

himself; that he strives to gain what seem to him good things, and to reject 

the evil. This feeling is regularly so strong that all the others give way 

to it. And one cannot but resent it, if any man make an attack upon one's 

life, so much so that, even after the threatened danger has been averted, 

hatred usually still remains, and a desire for vengeance.



3. But in one respect man seems to be in a worse state even than the brutes, 

-- that scarcely any other animal is attended from birth by such weakness. 

Hence it would be a miracle, if anyone reached mature years, if he have not 

the aid of other men, since, as it is, among all the helps which have been 

invented for human needs, careful training for a number of years is 

required, to enable a man to gain his food and clothing by his own efforts. 

Let us imagine a man brought to maturity without any care and training 

bestowed upon him by others, having no knowledge except what sprang up of 

itself in his own mind, and in a desert, deprived of all help and society of 

other men. Certainly a more miserable animal it will be hard to find. 

Speechless and naked, he has nothing left him but to pluck herbs and roots, 

or gather wild fruits, to slake his thirst from spring or river, or the 

first marsh he encountered, to seek shelter in a cave from the violence of 

the weather, or to cover his body somehow with moss or grass, to pass his 

time most tediously in idleness, to shudder at any noise or the encounter 

with another creature, finally to perish by hunger or cold or some wild 

beast. On the other hand, whatever advantages now attend human life have 

flowed entirely from the mutual help of men. It follows that, after God, 

there is nothing in this world from which greater advantage can come to man 

than from man himself.



4. Yet this animal, though so useful to his kind, suffers from not a few 

faults, and is endowed with no less power to injure; which facts make 

contact with him rather uncertain, and call for great caution, that one may 

not receive evil from him instead of good. First of all, there is generally 

a greater tendency to injure found in man than in any of the brutes. For the 

brutes are usually excited by the desire for food and for love, both of 

which, however, they can themselves easily satisfy. But having stilled that 

craving, they are not readily roused to anger or to injure people, unless 

someone provokes them. But man is an animal at no time disinclined to lust, 

and by its goad he is excited much more frequently than would seem necessary 

for the conservation of the race. And his belly desires not merely to be 

satisfied, but also to be tickled, and often craves more than nature is able 

to digest. That the brutes should not need clothing nature has provided. But 

man delights to clothe himself, not for necessity only, but also for 

display. Many more passions and desires unknown to the brutes are found in 

man, as the desire to have superfluities, avarice, the love of glory and 

eminence, envy, emulation, and rivalry of wits. Witness the fact that most 

wars, in which men clash with men, are waged for reasons unknown to the 

brutes. And all these things can, and usually do, incite men to desire to 

injure one another. Then too there is in many a notable insolence and 

passion for insulting their fellows, at which the rest, modest though they 

be by nature, cannot fail to take offense, and gird themselves to resist, 

from the desire to maintain and defend themselves and their freedom. At 

times also men are driven to mutual injury by want, and the fact that their 

present resources are insufficient for their desires or their need.



5. Moreover men have in them great power for the infliction of mutual 

injuries. For though not formidable because of teeth or claws or horns, as 

are many of the brutes, still manual dexterity can prove a most effective 

means of injury; and shrewdness gives a man the opportunity to attack by 

cunning and in ambush, where the enemy cannot be reached by open force. 

Hence it is very easy for man to inflict upon man the worst of natural 

evils, namely death.



6. Finally, we must also consider in mankind such a remarkable variety of 

gifts as is not observed in single species of animals, which, in fact, 

generally have like inclinations, and are led by the same passion and 

desire. But among men there are as many emotions as there are heads, and 

each has his own idea of the attractive. Nor are all stirred by a single and 

uniform desire, but by one that is manifold and variously intermixed. Even 

one and the same man often appears unlike himself, and if he has eagerly 

sought a thing at one time, at another he is very averse to it. And there is 

no less variety in the tastes and habits, the inclinations to exert mental 

powers, -- a variety which we see now in the almost countless modes of life. 

That men may not thus be brought into collision, there is need of careful 

regulation and control.



7. Thus then man is indeed an animal most bent upon self-preservation, 

helpless in himself, unable to save himself without the aid of his fellows, 

highly adapted to promote mutual interests; but on the other hand no less 

malicious, insolent, and easily provoked, also as able as he is prone to 

inflict injury upon another. Whence it follows that, in order to be safe, he 

must be sociable, that is, must be united with men like himself, and so 

conduct himself toward them that they may have no good cause to injure him, 

but rather may be ready to maintain and promote his interests.



8. The laws then of this sociability, or those which teach how a man should 

conduct himself, to become a good member of human society, are called 

natural laws.



9. So much settled, it is clear that the fundamental natural law is this: 

that every man must cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies. 

From this it follows that, as he who wishes an end, wishes also the means, 

without which the end cannot be obtained, all things which necessarily and 

universally make for that sociability are understood to be ordained by 

natural law, and all that confuse or destroy it forbidden. The remaining 

precepts are mere corollaries, so to speak, under this general law, and the 

natural light given to mankind declares that they are evident.



10. Again, although those precepts have manifest utility, still, if they are 

to have the force of law, it is necessary to presuppose that God exists, and 

by His providence rules all things; also that He has enjoined upon the human 

race that they observe those dictates of the reason, as laws promulgated by 

Himself by means of our natural light. For otherwise they might, to be sure, 

be observed perhaps, in view of their utility, like the prescriptions of 

physicians for the regimen of health, but not as laws; since these of 

necessity presuppose a superior, and in fact one who has actually undertaken 

the direction of another.



11. But that God is the author of the natural law, is proved by the natural 

reason, if only we limit ourselves strictly to the present condition of 

humanity, disregarding the question whether his primitive condition was 

different from the present, or whence that change has come about. The nature 

of man is so constituted that the race cannot be preserved without the 

social life, and man's mind is found to be capable of all the notions which 

serve that end. And it is in fact clear, not only that the human race owes 

its origin, as do the other creatures, to God, but also that, whatever be 

its present state, God includes the race in the government of His 

providence. It follows from these arguments that God wills that man use for 

the conservation of his own nature those special powers which he knows are 

peculiarly his own, as compared with the brutes, and thus that man's life be 

distinguished from the lawless life of the brutes. And as this cannot be 

secured except by observing the natural law, we understand too that man has 

been obliged by God to keep the same, as a means not devised by will of man, 

and changeable at their discretion, but expressly ordained by God Himself, 

in order to insure this end. For whoever binds a man to an end, is 

considered to have bound him also to employ the means necessary to that end. 

And besides, we have evidence that the social life has been enjoined upon 

men by God's authority, in the fact that in no other creature do we find the 

religious sentiment or fear of the Deity, -- a feeling which seems 

inconceivable in a lawless animal. Hence in the minds of men not entirely 

corrupt a very delicate sense is born, which convinces them that by sin 

against the natural law they offend Him who holds sway over the minds of 

men, and is to be feared even when the fear of men does not impend.



12. The common saying that that law is known by nature, should not be 

understood, it seems, as though actual and distinct propositions concerning 

things to be done or to be avoided were inherent in men's minds at the hour 

of their birth. But it means in part that the law can be investigated by the 

light of reason, in part that at least the common and important provisions 

of the natural law are so plain and clear that they at once find assent, and 

grow up in our minds, so that they can never again be destroyed, no matter 

how the impious man, in order to still the twinges of conscience, may 

endeavor to blot out the consciousness of those precepts. For this reason in 

Scripture too the law is said to be "written in the hearts" of men.[4] 

Hence, since we are imbued from childhood with a consciousnes