[The Title-Page of the Edition of 1682]



                      THE TWO BOOKS 

              ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 

               ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW



                 BY SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF







                       CAMBRIDGE



             FROM THE HOUSE OF JOHN HAYES 

          Printer to the Celebrated University 

                          1682

     At the Charges of John Creed, Bookseller, Cambridge.



______



   TO THE VERY ILLUSTRIOUS AND CELEBRATED GENTLEMAN 

               GUSTAVE OTTO STEENBOCK 

                  COUNT IN BOGESUND 

    FREIHERR VON CHRONEBECH AND OHRESTEEN, ETC. 

      ARCHITHALASSUS OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN 

  AND CHANCELLOR OF THE CAROLINE UNIVERSITY OF THE

                       GOTHS, ETC. 

                 MY MOST OBLIGING LORD



Most Illustrious and Distinguished Count, 

Most Obliging Lord,



No slight doubt troubled my distraught mind, as to whether it would be quite 

proper for such an insignificant work to claim for itself the auspices of 

such an illustrious name. For on the one hand the smallness of the little 

book caused a blush because it possessed no genius or splendor, seeing that 

it embraced merely the first rudiments of moral philosophy excerpted almost 

entirely from our more lengthy work. But just as it can furnish some use 

perhaps to those who are undertaking the first step to that study, so, if 

account must be taken here of your dignity and my obligation, it will seem 

sufficiently suitable for neither. On the other hand, your private no less 

than your public merits stimulated a mind so devoted to your Most 

Illustrious Excellency, so that I thought it a brand of ingratitude to be 

vigorously feared, if I neglected any such occasion at least of attesting 

how much it was beholden to You.



Nor do I now speak of those merits whereby through noble achievements at 

home and abroad you have rendered the country especially obligated to you, 

and at the same time have since dedicated your name to immortal glory. To 

recount those deeds commensurately with their dignity is the task of 

history, which, while it is relating at length the glorious deeds of your 

nation and the spreading of its arms victoriously throughout so many 

regions, finds you always an important factor in such great achievements; 

and wonders that the same man, when there has been a cessation from war, 

blossoms forth no less in the arts of peace, applying himself first to the 

government of a very large province and afterwards to a protecting 

administration of the entire kingdom.



Rather would it have been proper in this place to touch upon those gifts 

which have been received from your Most Illustrious Excellency by this newly 

established University in which it was given to me to fix the abode of my 

fortunes upon the invitation of the All-Highest King. It can never, in 

proportion to your merits, proclaim you enough as the wisest as well as the 

kindest defender and greatest moderator, while it daily finds you striving 

earnestly and untiringly for its own advantages and embellishments among 

such a great mass of public business.



Indeed with what respect ought I value the benefits which your Most 

Illustrious Excellency has conferred upon me in an especial manner? To 

others it is the height of their wishes to become known to men of rank and 

to be approved by them. But to me your effusive favor has been pleasing to 

such an extent that more than once have I experienced it most liberally 

bestowed both in promoting my advantages and in turning aside from myself 

the assaults of malevolent persons. Although it is far beyond the measure of 

my means to make any return for these favors, yet it will surely be 

necessary at least to acquit myself of a humble attitude of mind and a 

candid acknowledgment of so many benefits, inasmuch as the benevolence of 

great men has this characteristic also, that it gladly allows itself to be 

satisfied with the attestation of a grateful mind. And because it is 

customary for noble-minded men of their own accord to attach honor to even a 

slight exhibition of reverence for themselves by way of expressing one's 

loyalty, the goodness of your Most Illustrious Excellency bids me to hope 

likewise for this, that I may not seem to have been wanting to your 

greatness, if I make use of such a petty work as an occasion of publicly 

expressing my mind which is so devoted to your Excellency.



For it would be too much to expect from me a work which is brilliant and 

which can attain a long life, especially since geniuses are tremendously 

chilled, if they discover that, while they are striving to snatch themselves 

away from the common crowd, malice and ignorance use their teeth upon them 

with impunity and no regard is had for repose. Yet my mind will begin to 

bloom forth with new vigor and will cast aside the weariness that has sprung 

up, if I shall have understood that this homage has been received by your 

Most Illustrious Excellency with a placid brow, and if at the same time you 

shall have bid me rest easy forever about your favor and patronage. So may 

God preserve your Most Illustrious Excellency flourishing and vigorous for 

many years as the glory and gain of your country, your most brilliant 

family, and our new Commonwealth!



Your Most Illustrious Excellency's 

most devoted,



SAMUEL PUFENDORF. 

Lund, January 23, 1673.



TO THE BENEVOLENT READER, GREETING![1]



If the custom accepted by many erudite men had almost the force of law, it 

might have seemed superfluous to say anything by way of preface regarding 

the raison d'être of this work, since the subject matter itself tells 

sufficiently that I have done nothing else than set forth for beginners the 

chief headings of natural law, briefly, and, I think, in a clear compendium, 

lest, if they mingled themselves into the diffuse regions of this study 

beyond as it were an elementary knowledge, they be put to flight by the 

abundance and difficulty of the subject matter from the very beginning. At 

the same time it seemed to be to the public advantage that the minds of 

studious youths be imbued with moral doctrine of this character, in order 

that its manifest use in civil life might be considered. And although 

otherwise I would always have judged it inglorious to reduce to a compendium 

the more extensive writings of others, and much more of myself, yet when the 

authority of superiors is added, I do not think that the prudent will blame 

me for having wished to devote this labor simply to the advantage of youth, 

whose approval deservedly should be so great that a work undertaken for 

their favor, even when it does not possess genius or brilliancy, should not 

be judged unworthy by anyone. But that principles of this character are not 

more suitable for the entire study of law than any elements of civil law, no 

one denies who has half a sane head. And this might be sufficient for the 

present, did not some counsel that it would not be amiss to preface some 

remarks which might make for the understanding of the character of the 

natural law as a whole and the more accurate marking off of its limits. I 

have undertaken this all the more willingly because in this way a pretext is 

taken away from men who are importunately curious to put forth their 

feverish criticism upon this study, which, though often as it were 

intermingled, is separated from their province.



Therefore it is manifest that from three founts, so to speak, men derive 

the knowledge of their duty and what in this life they must do, as being 

morally good, and what not to do, as being morally bad: namely the light of 

reason, the civil laws and the particular revelation of the divine 

authority. From the first flow the commonest duties of man, especially those 

which make him sociable with other men; from the second, the duties of man 

in so far as he lives subject to a particular and definite State; from the 

third, the duties of a man who is a Christian. From this three separate 

studies arise, the first of which is the natural law, common to all nations; 

the second, the civil law of the single individual States, into which the 

human race departed. The third is called moral theology in contradistinction 

to that part of theology which explains what is to be believed [that is, 

dogmatic theology].



Each of these studies uses a method of proving its dogmas corresponding to 

its principle. In the natural law it is asserted that something must be 

done because the same is gathered by right reason as necessary for 

sociability between men. The last analysis of the precepts of the civil law 

is that the law-giver so established. The moral theologian acquiesces in 

that ultimate proposition, because God has so ordered in the Holy 

Scriptures. But just as the study of civil law presupposes the natural law 

as a more general study, so if the civil law contains anything upon which 

the natural law is silent, not on this account is the latter to be counted 

repugnant to the former. In a similar way, if in moral theology some 

doctrines are handed down as flowing from divine revelation to which our 

reason does not extend and therefore which the natural law ignores, it would 

be very ignorant on that account to match the former with the latter or 

imagine some repugnance between those studies. Vice versa, if any principles 

in the study of the natural law are presupposed from that which can be 

investigated by reason, on this account in no wise are the former opposed to 

those which the sacred literature hands down with greater clearness upon the 

same subject, but are only conceived by abstraction. Thus, e.g. in the study 

of the natural law, by abstracting from that knowledge which is drawn from 

the Sacred Scriptures, the condition of the first man is fashioned, 

howsoever he was projected in the world, in so far as reasoning alone can 

attain it. To oppose such principles to those which the divine literature 

hands down concerning the same condition, "this indeed is the juice of a 

black cuttlefish, this is mere envy."[2]



Indeed just as there will easily be harmony between the civil law and the 

natural law, so it seems a little more difficult to determine the boundary 

lines between the same natural law and moral theology and to define the 

chief respects in which they differ. I shall briefly set forth my opinion 

upon this matter, not indeed by virtue of papal authority, as if it would by 

some privilege protect me from all error, nor as one who from dreams sent 

down from on high, or some irrationable instinct, is animated with a 

trustworthiness of some singular illumination; but as one who is minded to 

ornament the Sparta which has been entrusted to him in proportion to the 

slight measure of his genius. In such a way, however, that, just as I am 

ready to gladly listen to the better suggestions of prudent and erudite men 

and to correct my previous pronouncements without obstinacy, so I do not 

care a straw for those rivals of Midas, the critics who wantonly rush into 

judgments upon matters which are no concern of theirs, or for a whole nation 

of busybodies whose character Phaedrus very cleverly depicts. "Tremblingly," 

he says, "they run about, busy in idleness, panting freely, doing much in 

doing nothing, troublesome to themselves and detestable to others."[3]



The first distinction therefore, whereby those studies are mutually 

separated, results from the different source from which each derives its 

dogmas, and upon this point we have just touched. Consequently, if there be 

some actions which we are bid by divine literature to perform or not to 

perform, yet whose necessity can not be grasped by reason left to itself, 

those actions fall outside the natural law and properly look toward moral 

theology. Moreover in theology law is considered proportionately as it has 

annexed a divine promise and a certain sort of pact between God and man. 

From this consideration the natural law abstracts, obviously since that 

which reason alone can not discover proceeds from the particular revelation 

of God.



Furthermore, that is by far the most important distinction whereby the end 

and aim of the natural law is included only in the circuit of this life, 

and therefore it moulds man accordingly as he ought to lead this life in 

society with others. But moral theology moulds a man into a Christian, who 

should not only have the purpose of passing honorably through this life, but 

who especially hopes for the fruit of piety after this life and who on this 

account has his politeuma [policy] in heaven, while here he lives merely as 

a wayfarer or sojoumer. For although the mind of man not only with a glowing 

desire leans, as it were, towards immortality and vigorously shrinks from 

self-destruction, and hence among many of the Gentiles the persuasion has 

become inveterate that the soul remains after its separation from the body 

and that then it will go well with the good and ill with the bad; 

nevertheless a persuasion of this sort on such matters, in which the mind of 

man might plainly and firmly acquiesce, is drawn only from the word of God. 

Hence the decrees of the natural law are adapted only to the human forum, 

which does not extend beyond this life, and they are wrongly applied in many 

places to the divine forum, which is the especial care of theology.



From this also it follows that, because the human forum is busied with only 

the external actions of man, while to those which he concealed within the 

breast and produce no effect or sign outside it does not penetrate and 

consequently is not disturbed about them, the natural law likewise is 

concerned to a great extent with the directing of the external actions of 

man. But for moral theology it is not sufficient that the external customs 

of men have been made in some way or another in keeping with decorum; but it 

is concerned chiefly with this, that the mind and its internal movements be 

fashioned after the will of the deity; and it reprobates those very actions 

which extrinsically indeed appear to be proper, but nevertheless emanate 

from an impure mind.



And this too seems to be the reason why in the divine books there is not so 

frequently question of those actions which have been forbidden under 

penalties of the human forum or concerning which the rights are there 

declared as of those actions which (to use the words of Seneca) are outside 

of public documents. This is manifestly evident to those who have carefully 

examined the precepts and virtues inculcated therein, although, while those 

very Christian virtues dispose the minds of men as much as possible to 

sociability, moral theology likewise promotes in a most efficacious manner 

honesty of civil life. So also vice versa, if you see anyone who shows 

himself a turbulent and troublesome member of civil life, you may safely 

judge that the Christian religion clings inside his lips only and has not 

yet penetrated his heart. And from this not only do I think that the genuine 

limits are manifestly evident which separate the natural law, as laid down 

by us, from moral theology; but also that natural law is by no means 

repugnant to the dogmas of true theology, but only abstracts from some of 

its dogmas which can not be investigated by reason alone.



Hence it is also patent that man now necessarily confides in the teachings 

of natural law, accordingly as his nature has been corrupted and 

consequently as he is an animal bubbling over with many wicked desires. For 

although no one is so stupid as not to perceive in himself affections that 

are inordinate and tending out of the beaten path, yet, if the divine 

literature did not light the way, no one could now be certain that that 

rebellion of the affections arose through the fault of the first man. And 

consequently since the natural law does not extend to those things to which 

reason can not reach it would be incongruous to wish to deduce it from the 

uncorrupted nature of man. Especially since many commandments of the 

Decalogue itself, seeing that they are couched in negative terms, manifestly 

presuppose the corrupted nature of man.



So, for example, the first commandment seems certainly to presuppose the 

proclivity of man to believe in idolatry and polytheism For if you suppose 

men as endowed with a nature still uncorrupted in whom the knowledge of God 

was perfectly clear and who from time to time enjoyed His familiar, so to 

speak, revelation I do not see how it could possibly enter the mind of such 

a man to fashion for himself something which he would wish to worship in 

place of the true God or along with Him, or believe that divinity was 

inherent in that thing which he himself had fashioned. Therefore there was 

no need to enjoin upon this man in negative terms, not to worship strange 

gods, but for him was sufficient the simple affirmative commandment, love, 

honor and worship God Whom you recognize as the Creator of this Universe and 

your own Creator likewise.



The same thing obtains with regard to the second commandment. For why should 

he be forbidden by a negative commandment to blaspheme God who clearly 

understood His majesty and benefactions and whom no wicked desires 

disturbed, and whose mind quietly acquiesced in the status assigned to it by 

God? How could such an insanity take possession of him? Nay rather he Was to 

be advised with an affirmative commandment only, to glorify the name of God.



Yet we must apparently speak otherwise with regard to the third as well as 

the fourth commandment, for since they are affirmative and do not 

necessarily presuppose a corrupted nature, they may find place in either 

status. Bat concerning the rest of the commandments, which have regard for 

one's neighbor, the matter is likewise very evident. For upon man, such as 

he was established by God in the beginning, it was sufficient simply to 

enjoin that he should love his neighbor; to this his nature was inclined. 

But how could he be commanded not to kill, when death had not yet fallen 

upon man, since it entered the world through sin?



But there is the greatest need of a negative commandment now when instead of 

love so many hatreds stalk among men that there is a great crop of those who 

from mere envy or lust for attacking another's fortune do not hesitate to 

overthrow others who are not only innocent but even friends and deserving 

well of them, and indeed who do not blush to pass off a terrible and rash 

attack of a turbulent mind under the word conscience. So why was there need 

expressly to forbid adulteries among those spouses who loved each other with 

such an ardent and sincere love? Or why was it relevant to forbid thefts, 

since there was no avarice, no penury as yet, and no one thought something 

belonged to himself which could benefit another? Or why was it necessary to 

forbid false testimony, since they did not yet exist who thereafter strove 

to obtain fame and glory for themselves, if they could asperge another by a 

base and stupid false accusation? So that it would not be inapt to apply to 

this that statement of Tacitus: "The most ancient of mortals, as yet without 

evil lust, used to live without baseness, crime, and therefore without 

punishment and coercions; and since they desired nothing beyond custom, they 

were forbidden nothing through fear."[4]



[Note 4 and beginning of next page apparently omitted from the original.] 



the state of uncorrupted nature or indeed the same law? Here reply can be 

made in a few words; that the chief headings of the law are the same in 

both states, but that the many particular precepts vary on account of the 

diversity of the human condition; or rather, that the same essence of the 

law is unfolded through different, though not contrary, precepts, according 

as the man by whom the law must be observed exists in a different manner. 

Our Saviour reduced the essence of the law to two heads: Love God and love 

your neighbor. To these heads can be referred the entire natural law, in 

the uncorrupted as well as in the corrupted state of mankind; unless because 

in the uncorrupted state there seems to have been little or no difference 

between the natural law and moral theology. For the sociability, which we 

have laid down as the foundation for the natural law, may be properly 

resolved into love of neighbor.



But when we come down to the particular precepts, surely no slight 

distinction arises with regard to the affirmative as well as the negative 

precepts. And indeed, so far as the affirmative precepts are concerned, not 

a few of them exist now in the present state for which there does not seem 

to have been room in the primeval state: and this partly because they 

presuppose an institution such as it is not clear whether it falls to the 

happiest condition of mankind; partly because they are not intelligible 

without misery and death which was exiled from that state. For example, it 

is now among the precepts of the natural law not to deceive another in a 

buying or selling, not to use a false ell, measure or weight, to return 

borrowed money at the time agreed upon. But it is not yet perfectly clear 

whether, if the human race had remained free from sin, commercial relations 

of the same character as are now carried on would have been put into 

practice, and whether there would then have been any use for money. So if 

such States as now exist had no place in the state of innocence, there was 

likewise no place there for precepts which presuppose States of this kind 

and the authority contained in them. Now too we are bidden by the natural 

law to succor the needy, to aid those oppressed by an unfortunate calamity, 

to take care of widows and of orphans. But these are prescribed in vain to 

those who are not subject to misfortune, need and death. We are now bidden 

by the natural law to be prone to condone wrongs and to seek out peace. This 

would be fruitless among those who do not sin against the laws of 

sociability.



And this very thing is likewise manifestly evident in negative precepts, 

which have regard for the natural (not the positive) law. For although any 

affirmative precept may virtually contain an interdict of everything 

opposed (for example, he who is bidden to love his neighbor, by that very 

fact is forbidden to do all those deeds to him which are repugnant to love); 

nevertheless it seems superfluous that they be set apart by express 

precepts when no wicked desires impel [one] to commit such deeds. To 

illustrate this we can bring forward the fact that Solon was unwilling to 

set aside a punishment for parricides by public law, because he did not 

think that such a great- crime would fall to the lot of any son. Similar to 

this is the statement of Francisco Lopez de Gomara[5] concerning the peoples 

of Nicaragua, that there was no punishment decreed among them for him who 

had killed a petty chief (cacique, they called him), because, they said, 

there was no subject who wished to think up or perpetrate so dire a crime.



I fear that it may seem affected to inculcate these principles which are so 

patent to the majority. Yet for the comprehension of beginners I shall add 

this example. There are two boys of altogether different dispositions 

entrusted to the education of someone. One is modest and bashful and glowing 

with a great love for letters. The other is dissolute, petulant, and loves 

abominable lusts rather than books. The substance of the duty of both is the 

same, to learn letters. But the individual precepts are different. For it 

is sufficient to enjoin upon the former what studies, at what time, and with 

what method he ought to treat them. The other, besides these precepts very 

sharply given, ought to be forbidden under threat to run around, to play 

dice, to sell his books, to depend entirely upon another in composing his 

exercises, to be a dude, to consort with harlots. In the same way if anyone 

would teach a boy of the former disposition to declaim carefully, he will 

bid him euphemein [use felicitous expressions], and him who is not affected 

with any desire of such things, to sing them to anyone rather than to 

himself.



From which it is manifest, I think, that there would be a far different 

aspect of natural law, if anyone wished to presuppose the state of man to be 

uncorrupted. And at the same time since the limits whereby this study is 

separated from moral theology are so clearly marked off, this study would be 

in no worse condition than civil jurisprudence, medicine, natural science or 

mathematics; if anyone should dare to burst forth into them amuetos 

[uninitiated], arrogating censure to himself unchosen, people would not 

hesitate to exclaim what Appelles once said to Megabyzus who was attempting 

some discourse or other upon the art of painting: "Be silent, I beseech you, 

lest the slave-boys who prepare the white paint laugh at you, in your 

attempt to speak upon subjects which you have not learned." But it will be 

easy for us to suit good and kindly men. The evil minded and unlearned 

calumniators, however, it were better to entrust to their own envy for 

punishment, seeing that it is certainly clear and based upon the eternal law 

that the Ethiopian does not change his skin.







1. [This Greeting and the preceding Dedicatory Letter and Title-Page have 

been translated by Herbert F. Wright.]



2. [HORACE, Sermones. 1, 4, 100-101.]



3. [PHAEDRUS, 2, 52.]



4. La Historia General de las Indias, ch. 207. [The reference is to be found 

in Chapter 206 in the edition published at Antwerp in 1554.]









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                   TABLE OF CHAPTERS



                         BOOK I



                                                                    PAGE[1]



CHAPTER



1. On human action 

..................................................................... 1 [3]



2. On the norm of human actions, or law in general ................. 12 [12]



3. On natural law .................................................. 18 [17]



4. On the duty of man toward God, or natural religion .............. 24 [22]



5. On the duty of man toward himself ............................... 31 [28]



6. On mutual duties, and first, that of not injuring others ........ 42 [37]



7. On recognition of the natural equality of men ................... 47 [42]



8. On the common duties of humanity ................................ 50 [45]



9. On the duty of contracting parties in general ................... 53 [48]



10. On the duty of the users of language ........................... 62 [56]



11. On the duty of those who take oath ............................. 66 [59]



12. On duty as regards the acquisition of ownership ................ 69 [62]



13. On the duties which result from ownership per se ............... 76 [68]



14. On value ....................................................... 78 [70]



15. On contracts which presuppose the prices of things, and the duties 

thence derived ..................................................... 82 [74]



16. The methods of dissolving obligations arising from agreements .. 91 [81]



17. On interpretation .............................................. 93 [83]



                             BOOK II



                                                                     PAGE



CHAPTER 



1. On the natural state of men ..................................... 98 [89]



2. On conjugal duties ............................................. 104 [94]



3. On the duties of parents and children .......................... 106 [97]



4. On the duties of masters and servants .......................... 112 [101]



5. On the impelling cause for the establishment of a State ........ 115 [103]



6. On the internal structure of States ............................ 118 [106]



7. On the functions of the supreme authority ...................... 123 [110]



8. On the forms of government ..................................... 126 [113]



9. The characteristics of civil authority ......................... 130 [116]



10. On the methods of acquiring authority, especially monarchical . 132 [118]



11. On the duty of rulers ......................................... 135 [121]



12. On civil laws in particular ................................... 140 [125]



13. On the power of life and death ................................ 143 [128]



14. On reputation ................................................. 148 [133]



15. On the power of the supreme authority over property in the 

State ............................................................. 152 [136]



16. On war and peace .............................................. 154 [138] 



17. On alliances .................................................. 159 [142]



18. On the duties of citizens ..................................... 161 [144]







1. [The numbers in brackets refer to pages of this translation.]





______



                    THE FIRST BOOK ON 

               THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN



                          BY



                  SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF



                       CHAPTER I 

                    On Human Action



1. Duty is here defined by me as man's action, duly conformed to the 

ordinances of the law, and in proportion to obligation. To understand this, 

it is necessary to treat first of the nature of human action, and also of 

laws in general.



2. By human action we understand not any motion proceeding from the 

faculties of man, but that motion only which proceeds from and is directed 

by those faculties which the Creator[1] has given to mankind above the 

brutes, -- I mean that which is undertaken with intellect lighting the way, 

and at the bidding of the will.



3. Man has in fact been granted the power not only of knowing the different 

things which he meets in this universe, of comparing them and of forming new 

notions in regard to them, but also the ability to foresee what he is going 

to do, to bestir himself to accomplish it, to shape it to a certain norm and 

a certain end, and to infer what the result will be; and further, to judge 

whether things already done conform to rule. Moreover, not all the faculties 

of man act continually or in a uniform manner. Some of them, in fact, are 

excited, and then controlled and directed, by an impulse from within. 

Finally a man is not attracted to all objects indifferently, but seeks some 

and shuns others. Often too, though the object be present, he checks the 

impulse, and when several objects are before him, he selects one and rejects 

the others.



4. With regard then to the faculty of comprehending and judging things -- 

intellect it is called -- we must hold it absolutely certain that any man of 

mature age and sound mind has enough of natural light to be able, with 

training and due reflection, to comprehend properly at least those general 

precepts and principles which make for an honorable and a peaceful life in 

this world; also to appreciate the fact that they are in conformity with 

human nature. For if this be not admitted, at least within the competence of 

the human court, men would be able to shield any misdeeds of theirs by an 

invincible ignorance, since in the human court no one can be accused of 

violating a rule which it is beyond his powers to comprehend.



5. When a man's intellect has been well instructed as to what is to be done 

or left undone, to the point of understanding how to give certain and 

unmistakable reasons for its opinion, we call this a right conscience. But 

when a man has indeed a correct opinion as regards doing and leaving undone, 

without the ability to establish the same by argument, having acquired it 

from the general tenor of life in a community, from habit, or from the 

authority of superiors, and having no reason impelling him to the opposite 

course, we call this a probable conscience. By this the greater part of men 

are guided, for it has been given to few to discover the causes of things.



6. To some, however, it happens not infrequently, especially in regard to 

particular cases, that arguments for both sides suggest themselves, and they 

lack the strength of judgment to see clearly which have greater weight. This 

is usually called a doubtfui conscience. And here is the rule for it: So 

long as judgment is uncertain as to what is good, or what bad, action must 

be suspended. For while the doubt is unremoved, the decision to act involves 

an intention to do wrong, or at least neglect of the law.



7. Often too the human intellect mistakes the false for the true, and then 

is said to be in error. And error is usually called vincible, when a man 

with attention and due care can avoid falling into it; but invincible, when 

even by employing all the diligence which the circumstances of the common 

life require, one could not avoid the error. This sort, however, at least 

among those whose heart's desire it is to nurture the light of reason and 

order their lives in accordance with honor, does not usually happen in 

regard to the general precepts for living, but merely in connection with 

particular matters. For the general precepts of the natural law are clear; 

and then he who makes positive laws follows the custom and the duty of 

taking special pains that they be made known to his subjects. Hence, without 

supine neglect, this error does not arise. But in particular matters it is 

easy for error in regard to the object and other circumstances of the action 

to steal in against a man's will and without his fault.



8. But where there is simply an absence of knowledge, this is called 

ignorance. And the latter is treated in two ways, first, according as it 

contributes to the action; second, according as it comes about against the 

will, or not without blame. From the former point of view ignorance is 

usually divided into the effectual and the concomitant. In the absence of 

the former the action in question would not have been undertaken. The latter 

may have been absent, and still the action would have been undertaken. From 

the second point of view ignorance is voluntary or involuntary. The former 

is even knowingly affected, the means of arriving at the truth having been 

rejected; or, failing to employ due diligence, one has allowed it to steal 

in unawares. The involuntary ignorance is when one does not know what he 

could not know, and was not bound to know. And this again is twofold. For 

either a man was unable, indeed, to avoid ignorance for the present, and yet 

was to blame for being in that state; or else he was not only unable to 

conquer his ignorance for the present, but is also not to blame for having 

fallen into such a condition.



9. The second faculty which is exclusively seen in man, as compared with the 

brutes, is called the will. By means of this, as from some inward impulse, a 

man bestirs himself to action, and chooses what especially attracts him, 

rejects what does not seem to him suitable. From the will, therefore, man 

derives the power of acting of his own accord, in other words, the fact that 

he is not set to act by some inward necessity, but is himself the author of 

his own action; also the power of acting freely, which means that, when one 

object is put before him, he can act or not act, and choose the same, or 

reject it, or if several objects are set before him, can select one and 

reject the rest. Moreover some human actions are undertaken on their own 

account, some in so far as they serve to gain another object, that is, some 

have the functions of an end and others of means. Hence as regards an end, 

the concern of the will is first to recognize and approve it, then to bestir 

itself effectually to gain it, with more or less earnestness of aim; then 

having attained, to rest in quiet enjoyment of it. As for means, they are 

first approved, then the most suitable, as it appears, selected, and finally 

put into practice.



10. And just as the chief reason for considering a man responsible for his 

own acts is that he undertook them of his own will, so we must especially 

observe that the freedom of the will is by all means to be asserted, at 

least in regard to the acts for which a man is commonly held to account 

before a human court. But where no freedom at all is left a man, there he 

will not himself be held responsible for an act to which he unwillingly 

lends his limbs and powers, but the other man, who brings constraint to 

bear.



11. Furthermore, although the will always chooses a generic good, and avoids 

a generic evil, still, as between individuals, we see a great diversity of 

desires and actions. And the cause is the fart that not all good and bad 

things appear to a man uncontaminated, but mixed together, good with bad, 

bad with good. And because different objects affect peculiarly different 

parts, so to say, of the man, -- some, for example, his self-esteem, some 

his external senses, some his self-love, the instinct of self-preservation, 

-- the result is that the man views these different objects as respectively 

becoming, agreeable, and useful. And each of these makes the man incline 

especially toward itself, in exact proportion to the strength of the 

impression it has made upon him. There is in most men a special penchant 

also for certain things, and aversion to others. Consequently, in almost any 

action different kinds of good things and bad, real or apparent, crop out 

together, and to distinguish these truly, some men have more, some less, of 

penetration. It is no wonder then that one man is carried away to that which 

is especially abhorrent to another.



12. Moreover, the will of man is not always found in equilibrium as regards 

any action, so that his inclination to this or that side comes from his own 

inward impulse alone, after maturely weighing everything. But most 

frequently the man is impelled in the one direction rather than in the other 

by external influences. For, not to mention the common proclivity of human 

beings to the bad, the origin and nature of which it is not for our court to 

examine, the will gains a special penchant from a peculiarly constituted 

nature, by which some are much inclined to a certain kind of action. And 

this is observed not only in individuals, but also in entire nations. It 

appears to be produced by the character of the atmosphere all about us, and 

of the soil, also the combination of humors in the body. resulting from 

birth itself, age, food, health, occupation, and similar causes; further by 

the conformation of the organs, which the mind uses in performing its 

functions, and so on. Here we must note that not only can a man with care 

repress and alter his temperament considerably; but also, no matter how much 

force is attributed to the latter, it must not be thought to have such 

strength as to force the man necessarily into violation of the natural law, 

in so far as it is enforced in the human court, where base desires, stopping 

short of the outward act, are not considered. And, in fact, no matter how 

much Nature, though driven out with a fork, still returns, a man can 

nevertheless prevent her causing external acts that are immoral. And the 

difficulty encountered in conquering a bent of that sort is balanced by the 

glory and praise which here awaits the victor. But should the mind be goaded 

with passions such as no reason can hold in check, there is still a way of 

emptying them out, as it were, without sin.



13. And then the will is strongly bent toward certain acts by frequent 

repetition of acts of the same sort, from which arises a proclivity which we 

call habit. The result of habit is that an action is undertaken willingly 

and lightly, so that the mind seems to be, as it were, dragged toward the 

object, if present, or most ardently to desire it, if absent. And one should 

note that there is no habit such that a man cannot with care throw it off 

again; and also none that can so far pervert the mind, that a man is unequal 

to the task of restraining here and now the outward acts, at least, toward 

which habit is swept. And as it is in a man's power to contract a habit of 

the kind, no matter how much it facilitates the act, nothing is subtracted 

from the value of his good deeds, nor is the guilt of his misdeeds any the 

less. In fact, as a good habit heightens a man's praise, so a bad habit his 

shame.



14. It also makes a great difference whether there is a calm tranquillity of 

mind, or whether it is stirred by certain special emotions, which they call 

passions. With regard to these this must be our opinion: however violent 

they may be, still by due use of reason a man can be superior to them and 

check their attack, at least before the ultimate act. Moreover, some of the 

passions are excited by the appearance of a good, others of an evil, and 

they spur us on to win some agreeable thing, or to avoid the disagreeable. 

Consequently it is in keeping with human nature that more favor and 

indulgence among men should go with the second class of passions, and 

precisely in proportion to the intolerable violence of the evil which 

aroused them. It is in fact thought much more tolerable to dispense with a 

good not very necessary to self-preservation, than to suffer an evil tending 

to the destruction of our nature.



15. Finally, as there are certain diseases which quite take away the use of 

reason, permanently, or for a time, so among many nations it is a common 

thing for men actually to invite a kind of malady which soon passes away, 

and greatly disturbs the use of reason. By which hint I mean intoxication, 

arising from some beverages and some kinds of smoke. It creates in the blood 

and spirit a violent commotion, and gives men a proclivity to lust in 

particular, to anger, rashness, and excessive mirth, so that many seem to be 

carried out of themselves by intoxication, and to have put on an entirely 

different nature, as compared with their sober appearance. While it does 

not, however, always take away the complete use of reason, as being 

self-invited, it is apt to win odium, rather than favor, for the acts done 

in that condition.



16. Again, human actions are called voluntary, since they proceed from the 

will and are guided by it. In the same way whatever actions are knowingly 

undertaken in opposition to the will, are called involuntary, in the 

narrower sense of the term. For in its wider sense it also includes acts 

committed through ignorance. But by involuntary I here mean the same thing 

as compelled, that is, when a man is forced by a stronger principle from 

without to surrender the use of his limbs, in such wise as to show his 

aversion and dissent by signs, and especially by bodily resistance. Also, 

but less exactly, we speak of the involuntary, when under the stress of 

necessity one chooses as the lesser evil and undertakes a thing to which 

formerly, when unconstrained by necessity, one was absolutely averse. Such 

actions they commonly call mixed. With the voluntary they have this in 

common, that the will does in the emergency choose the apparently lesser 

evil. With the involuntary they agree to a certain extent in their effect, 

in that they are either not laid at all to the charge of the doer, or less 

severely than are the voluntary actions.



17. But human actions proceeding from and guided by intellect and will 

possess this particular attribute, that they can be imputed to a man, that 

is, that the man can rightly be regarded as their author, and held to the 

rendering of an account of them, and that the consequences which flow from 

them fall back upon himself. For there is no more intimate reason why an 

action can be imputed to a man, than because, directly or indirectly, it 

proceeded from him, knowing and willing it; or because it was in his power, 

whether the thing should be done or not. Hence in the moral sciences which 

concern the human tribunal, it is accounted a fundamental axiom, that a man 

can be called to account for those actions, the performance or omission of 

which was in his power; or, -- and this amounts to the same thing, -- that 

any action which can be directed by a man, and brought about or not at his 

discretion, can be laid at his own door. So too, on the other hand, no one 

can be reckoned the author of an action which neither in itself nor in its 

cause was within his power.



18. Out of these premises we shall form a number of particular propositions, 

from which it will be established what can be imputed to each man, that is, 

of what action and result each one can be regarded as the author. First, the 

actions which another commits, as also the workings of any other causes, and 

any effects, can only be imputed to a man in so far as he has the power and 

the duty to control them. Nothing, in fact, is more common among men than 

for one man to be intrusted with the direction of another's actions. In this 

case, then, if the other should commit any action in regard to which the 

first omitted to do what was in his power, that action will be imputed not 

only to him who immediately committed it, but also to him who neglected any 

part of the direction which was his duty and within his power. This, 

however, has its limits and bounds, so that the possible in the case is to 

be understood with a certain reservation and in a moral sense. By no 

subjection of one man to another is the freedom of the subject so far 

extinguished that he cannot resist the direction of the other, and have 

different aims, and, on the other hand, human life is not so constituted 

that a man continually attached to one man should be able to observe his 

every movement. It follows then that, if one has done everything which the 

nature of the direction laid upon him suggests, when, nevertheless, 

something has been done by the other, it will be imputed to the doer alone. 

Thus since men have assumed the ownership of animals, whatever has been done 

by them to the detriment of another will be laid to the charge of the owner, 

if, indeed, he has omitted any due care and watchfulness. Thus also any 

evils which befall another can be imputed to him who, having the power and 

duty, did not remove their cause and occasion. So, since men have it in 

their power to promote or suspend many natural operations, any advantage or 

loss, which they may have occasioned, will be imputed to them in proportion 

to their contributory pains or neglect. Also in some extraordinary cases a 

man is responsible for such events as are at other times beyond human 

control, since the Deity has in a special manner brought them about with 

reference to a certain man. These and similar cases aside, it is enough if a 

man can render account of his own actions.



19. Secondly, whatever qualities are found, or not found, in a man, when 

their presence or absence was not within his power, cannot be imputed to the 

man himself, except in so far as he failed by industry to make good his 

natural defect, or to second his native powers. Thus, since no one could 

insure himself mental penetration and bodily strength, nothing will be 

chargeable to any one on that account, save in so far as he availed himself 

of training, or failed to do so. Thus it is not the rustic, but the man of 

the city and the court, to whom uncouth manners are made a reproach. Hence 

fault-finding for qualities whose cause was not in our power is to be 

accounted very absurd, for example, shortness of stature, imperfection of 

form, and the like.



20. Thirdly, things done through invincible ignorance cannot be laid to 

one's charge. For we cannot direct an action when the light of intellect 

does not shine before us; and also we arc presupposing that the man was 

unable to gain such a light, and was not to blame for this inability. 

Indeed, in common life ability [to posse] is understood, in a moral sense, 

to be that degree of capacity, shrewdness, and caution, which is usually 

judged sufficient, and was based upon plausible reasons.



21. Fourthly, ignorance, as also error, in regard to laws and the duty 

imposed upon each man does not release one from responsibility. For he who 

imposes laws and duty upon a man is accustomed, and is bound, to bring these 

to the notice of the subject. And laws and rules of duty are usually 

adapted, and must be so, to the capacity of the subject; and to learn and 

remember them must be a care to everyone. Hence he who is the cause of 

others' ignorance will be held answerable for the acts also which flow from 

that ignorance.



22. Fifthly, if a man lacks opportunity to act without involving himself in 

a fault, his failure to act will not be laid to his account. And opportunity 

seems to include these four points: (1) that the object of the act be at 

hand, (2) that there be a convenient place, where we cannot be hindered by 

others, or suffer some harm, (3) that there be a favorable time, when we do 

not have more necessary business to transact, -- a time which is favorable 

for others also who concur in the act, (4) finally that we have the natural 

powers for the act. Without these circumstances the action could not take 

place, and hence it would be absurd to hold a man accountable, when the 

opportunity to act was lacking. Thus a physician cannot be accused of 

indolence, if no one is ill; and a man who is himself in want is not 

permitted to be liberal. So also he cannot be charged with hiding his 

talent, who has been refused the position for which he made a proper 

request. And "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much 

required."[2] Thus we cannot suck and blow at the same time.



23. Sixthly, it cannot be laid to a man's account either, that he did not do 

things which exceed his powers, and cannot be prevented by these, or brought 

about by them. Hence the common saying that there is no obligation for the 

impossible. We must, however, add the proviso that a man has not diminished 

or lost his power to perform by his own fault. For such a man can be treated 

just as if he still retained his powers; for otherwise there would be an 

easy way to evade any rather troublesome obligation, by electing to destroy 

the power to perform.



24. Seventhly, there is also no responsibility for what one suffers or does 

under compulsion. For to avert or escape such things is understood to be 

beyond the man's powers. Now compulsion is used in two senses: first, when a 

stronger by force employs our limbs to do or suffer something; secondly, if 

a more powerful person threatens some great harm at once, and has the 

ability to carry it out directly, unless we are ready to bestir ourselves to 

do something, or to refrain from action. For in that case, unless we are 

expressly obliged to buy off at our own cost the injury we were to inflict 

upon a third party, the man who imposes upon us that necessity will be 

considered the author of the crime; but the deed can no more be imputed to 

us than bloodshed to the sword or the ax.



25. Eighthly, those who are deprived of the use of their reason are not 

accountable for their actions. For they are unable to distinguish clearly 

what is being done, or to compare it with a standard. Here belong the acts 

of infants, before the reason begins to show itself at all dearly. As for 

the fact that they are scolded or whipped for certain acts, it is not done 

with the idea that they have strictly speaking deserved punishment in the 

human court; but it is by way of mere correction and discipline, that they 

may not make trouble for others by such actions, or may not form a bad 

habit. So, too, the acts of the insane, the unbalanced and dotards, if the 

disease has come without their fault, are not regarded as human actions.



26. Ninthly, and finally, one is not accountable for what he imagines he 

does in sleep, except in so far as by dwelling with pleasure upon the 

thought of such things by day he has deeply impressed their images upon his 

mind. And yet these too are very rarely considered in a human court. For in 

general imagination in sleep is like a boat adrift without a pilot, so that 

it is not in a man's power to determine what kind of images fancy is to 

produce.



27. With regard to responsibility for the acts of another, we should observe 

more closely that sometimes, to be sure, it happens that an action is not 

laid at all to the charge of him who directly committed it, but to another 

person who used him as a mere instrument. More commonly, however, an act is 

charged both to him who committed it, and to him who concurred by some act 

or omission. This happens especially in three ways: either the second party 

is accounted the principal cause of the act and he who committed it 

secondary; or they both walk pari passu; or the second party is the 

secondary cause, and he who committed it the principal. To the first class 

belong those who urged another to anything by their influence; those who 

gave the necessary consent, without which the other could not have acted; 

those who were able and bound to prevent, and did not do so. To the second 

class belong those who charge another, or hire him, to commit crime; those 

who help, harbor, or defend; those who, being able and bound to lend aid to 

the injured party, failed to do so. To the third class are referred those 

who give particular advice; those who applaud and approve before the deed; 

those who by their example inflame others to wrong-doing, and similar 

persons.





______



                         CHAPTER II 

       On the Norm of Human Actions, or Law in General



1. Because human actions depend upon the will, but the wills of individuals 

are not always consistent, and those of different men generally tend toward 

different things, therefore, in order to establish order and seemliness 

among the human race, it was necessary that some norm should come into 

being, to which actions might be conformed. For otherwise, if with such 

freedom of the will, and such diversity of inclinations and tastes, each 

should do whatever came into his head, without reference to a fixed norm, 

nothing but the greatest confusion could arise among men.



2. That norm is called law, that is, a decree by which a superior obliges a 

subject to conform his arts to his own prescription.



3. That this definition may be better understood, we must develop the 

meaning of obligation, whence it arises, who can undertake an obligation, 

and who impose it upon another. Obligation, then, is commonly defined as a 

legal bond, by which we are of necessity bound to perform something. That 

is, a kind of bridle is thereby put upon our freedom, so that, though in 

actual fact the will can have a different aim, still it finds itself imbued 

with an inward sentiment due to the obligation, with the result that, if the 

action performed is not in conformity with the prescribed norm, the will is 

forced to acknowledge that it has not done what is right. And so if any ill 

should befall a man on that account, he would judge that it befalls him not 

undeservedly; since by following the norm, as was proper, he might have 

avoided it.



4. For the fart that man is fitted to undertake an obligation there are two 

reasons: one, because he has a will which can turn in different directions, 

and so also conform to the rule; the other, since man is not free from the 

power of a superior. For where an agent's powers have been bound by nature 

to a uniform mode of action, there we look in vain for free action; and it 

is vain to prescribe a rule for a man who cannot understand it nor conform 

to the same. Again, assuming that a man does not recognize a superior, there 

is for that reason no one who can rightfully impose a necessity upon him. 

And if he be ever so strict in observing a certain method of action, and 

consistently abstain from certain arts, still he is understood to do this 

not from any obligation, but from his own good pleasure. It follows then 

that he is capable of an obligation who not only has a superior, but also 

can recognize a prescribed rule, and further has a will flexible in 

different directions, but conscious of the fart that, when the rule has been 

prescribed by a superior, it does wrong to depart from the same. Such is 

evidently the nature with which man is endowed.



5. Obligation is properly introduced into the mind of a man by a superior, 

that is, a person who has not only the power to bring some harm at once upon 

those who resist, but also just grounds for his claim that the freedom of 

our will should be limited at his discretion. For when these conditions are 

found in anyone, he has only to intimate his wish, and there must arise in 

men's minds a fear that is tempered with respect, the former in view of his 

power, the latter in consideration of the reasons, which, were there no 

fear, must still induce one to embrace his will. For whoever is unable to 

assign any other reason why he wishes to impose an obligation upon me 

against my will, except mere power, can indeed frighten me into thinking it 

better for a time to obey him, to avoid a greater evil; but, once that fear 

is removed, nothing further remains to prevent my acting according to my 

will rather than his. Conversely, if he has indeed the reasons which make it 

my duty to obey him, but lacks the power of inflicting any harm upon me, I 

may with impunity neglect his commands, unless a more powerful person comes 

to assert the authority upon which I have trampled. Now the reasons why one 

may rightly demand that another obey him are: in case some conspicuous 

benefits have come to the latter from the former; or if it be proved that he 

wishes the other well, and is also better able than the man himself to 

provide for him, and at the same time actually claims control over the 

other; and finally if a man has willingly subjected himself to another and 

agreed to his control.



6. But that the law may exert its power in the minds of those for whom it is 

made, knowledge both of the lawgiver and of the law itself is required. For 

no man will be able to yield obedience, if he knows neither whom he ought to 

obey, nor to what he is obligated. And as for the lawgiver, knowledge of him 

is very easy. For the natural laws, as the light of reason assures us, have 

the same author as the universe. And the citizen cannot fail to know who has 

authority over him. How the natural laws are made known, will be explained 

presently. Civil laws come to the knowledge of subjects by public and 

explicit promulgation. In this two things must be dear: that the law has as 

its author him who has the highest authority in the state; and also what is 

the meaning of the law. The former point is established, if the sovereign 

shall promulgate the law by his own lips, or sign them with his own hand, or 

if this be done by his ministers. The authority of the latter it is idle to 

question if it is clear that this function is connected with the office 

which they fill in the state, and that they are regularly employed for the 

same purpose; further if the laws in question are for the guidance of the 

courts, and if they contain nothing derogatory to the sovereign authority. 

As for the meaning of the law, that this may be rightly understood, it is 

incumbent upon those who promulgate them to use the utmost clearness. Should 

any obscurity be found in the laws, an interpretation must be sought from 

the lawgiver, or from those who are publicly ordained to render justice in 

accordance with the laws.



7. Every perfect law has two parts: one defining what is to be done, or not 

done; the other indicating what punishment is in store for him who neglects 

what is enjoined and does what is forbidden. For on account of the depravity 

of human nature, prone as it is to the forbidden, it is superfluous to say 

"Do this!" if there is no punishment in store for the non-doer. And it is 

equally absurd to say "You will pay the penalty," if the reason which merits 

punishment has not preceded. Accordingly all the force of a law consists in 

the declaration of what our superior wishes us to do or not do, and of the 

penalty which has been fixed for transgressors of the law. But the power to 

oblige, that is, to impose an inward necessity, and the power to force or 

compel by penalties to observe the law, resides exclusively in the lawgiver, 

and in him to whom has been committed the maintenance and execution of the 

laws.



8. Whatever is enjoined upon a man by the laws ought not only to be within 

his powers, for whom they are made, but should also bring some advantage 

either to the man himself or to others. For as it would be absurd and cruel 

to attempt-under threat of a penalty to exact from a man what is and has 

always been beyond his powers, so it is idle to constrain the natural 

freedom of the will, if no advantage for anybody be derived therefrom.



9. Moreover, although regularly a law embraces all the lawgiver's subjects 

to whom the content of the law applies, and whom the lawgiver did not from 

the beginning wish exempt, it nevertheless sometimes happens that a man is 

expressly released from the obligation of a law. And this is called 

dispensation. But he only can dispense to whom belongs the power of enacting 

and abrogating a law; and pains too must be taken that the authority of the 

laws be not undermined by promiscuous dispensation granted without the 

weightiest reasons, and thus occasion be given for jealousy and indignation 

among the subjects.



10. Very different from dispensation, however, is equity, a correction of a 

defect in the law due to its universality, or a skillful interpretation of 

the law, showing by the natural reason that a particular case is not 

included under the general law, since otherwise some absurdity would result. 

For because it is impossible either to foresee or state all cases on account 

of their infinite variety, the judges, whose task it is to apply general 

enactments of the laws to particular cases, are bound to except from the law 

the kind of cases which the lawgiver would himself have excepted, were he 

present, or had he foreseen such instances.



11. Again, from their relation to the moral standard and their agreement 

with it human actions gain certain qualifying terms. As for the actions in 

regard to which the law ordains nothing in either direction, they are called 

legitimate or permitted. Sometimes, to be sure, in the civil life, in which 

not everything can be cut back to the quick, those acts also are called 

legitimate against which no punishment has been ordained in the human court, 

though in themselves they are repugnant to natural goodness. Also, actions 

in agreement with law are called good, if not in harmony therewith, bad. But 

for an action to be good, it must in every way agree with the law; to be 

bad, it is enough that it be defective at a single point.



12. Justice, however, is sometimes an attribute of actions, sometimes of 

persons. When justice is attributed to a person, it is commonly denned as 

the "constant and perpetual will to render to every man his due."[3] For he 

who delights in doing just deeds, who is devoted to justice, who in 

everything endeavors to do what is just, is called a just man. On the other 

hand the unjust is he who neglects to give every man his due, or thinks the 

measure must be not that of his duty, but of present advantage. Consequently 

not a few of the just man's acts may be unjust, and conversely. For the just 

man acts justly on account of the precept of the law, but unjustly only 

through weakness, while the unjust acts justly on account of the penalty 

annexed to the law, and unjustly from an evil character.



13. But when justice is predicated of actions, there is merely a proper 

application of these to the person. And a just action is one which from 

deliberate choice, that is, by a knowing and willing agent, is applied to 

the person to whom it is due. Hence the justice of acts differs from their 

goodness especially in this, that the latter merely indicates conformity to 

law, while justice involves in addition a regard for those toward whom the 

action goes out. For this reason justice is also defined as virtue in 

relation to another. 



14. On the division of justice there is no agreement. The generally received 

division is into universal and particular. We speak of the former, when any 

duty whatever is practiced toward others, even that which could not be 

exacted by force or by suit at law; of the latter, when a man receives just 

what he could by rights demand. And this is again divided into distributive 

justice and commutative justice. The former rests upon a compact entered 

into between a society and its members concerning the pro rata sharing of 

profit and loss. The latter rests upon a bilateral contract in regard 

especially to things and acts connected with trade.



15. Having learned what justice is, it is easy to conclude what injustice 

is. But here one must observe that an unjust act, undertaken after 

premeditation, and violating what is by perfect right due another, or what 

he possessed by the same right, -- no matter whence obtained, -- that act is 

properly called an injury. And this happens in three ways: if one is refused 

a thing which he could by his own right demand (not if something was due him 

out of mere humanity, or some such virtue); or if that is taken away from 

him which he rightly held, by a title valid against the aggressor; or if we 

inflict upon another some harm which we had not the right to inflict. For an 

injury, moreover, premeditation is required, and malice on the part of the 

doer. Failing this, harming another is called an accident or a fault, more 

or less serious, according to the seriousness of the thoughtlessness and 

neglect, in consequence of which the encounter occurred.



16. With respect to its author, the law is divided into divine and human, 

the one enacted by God, the other by men. But if law be considered according 

as it has a necessary and universal adaptation to men or not, it is divided 

into the natural and the positive. The former is so adapted to the rational 

and social nature of man, that an honorable and peaceful society cannot 

exist for mankind without it. Consequently it can be investigated and 

learned as a whole, by the light of man's inborn reason and a consideration 

of human nature. The latter kind of justice by no means flows from the 

common condition of human nature, but proceeds from the decision of the 

lawgiver alone. And yet it ought not to lack its own reason, and the utility 

which it effects for certain men or a particular society. But while the 

divine law is now natural and now positive, human law is, in the strict 

sense, altogether positive.





______



                         CHAPTER III 

                        On Natural Law



1. What is the character of the natural law, what its necessity, and of what 

precepts it consists in the present state of mankind, are most clearly seen, 

after one has thoroughly examined the nature and disposition of man. For, 

just as for an accurate knowledge of civil laws, it is very important to 

have a clear understanding of the condition of the state, and of the habits 

and interests of its citizens, so if we have examined the common disposition 

of men and their condition, it will be readily apparent upon what laws their 

welfare depends.



2. Now man shares with all the animals that have consciousness the fact that 

he holds nothing dearer than himself, and is eager in every way to preserve 

himself; that he strives to gain what seem to him good things, and to reject 

the evil. This feeling is regularly so strong that all the others give way 

to it. And one cannot but resent it, if any man make an attack upon one's 

life, so much so that, even after the threatened danger has been averted, 

hatred usually still remains, and a desire for vengeance.



3. But in one respect man seems to be in a worse state even than the brutes, 

-- that scarcely any other animal is attended from birth by such weakness. 

Hence it would be a miracle, if anyone reached mature years, if he have not 

the aid of other men, since, as it is, among all the helps which have been 

invented for human needs, careful training for a number of years is 

required, to enable a man to gain his food and clothing by his own efforts. 

Let us imagine a man brought to maturity without any care and training 

bestowed upon him by others, having no knowledge except what sprang up of 

itself in his own mind, and in a desert, deprived of all help and society of 

other men. Certainly a more miserable animal it will be hard to find. 

Speechless and naked, he has nothing left him but to pluck herbs and roots, 

or gather wild fruits, to slake his thirst from spring or river, or the 

first marsh he encountered, to seek shelter in a cave from the violence of 

the weather, or to cover his body somehow with moss or grass, to pass his 

time most tediously in idleness, to shudder at any noise or the encounter 

with another creature, finally to perish by hunger or cold or some wild 

beast. On the other hand, whatever advantages now attend human life have 

flowed entirely from the mutual help of men. It follows that, after God, 

there is nothing in this world from which greater advantage can come to man 

than from man himself.



4. Yet this animal, though so useful to his kind, suffers from not a few 

faults, and is endowed with no less power to injure; which facts make 

contact with him rather uncertain, and call for great caution, that one may 

not receive evil from him instead of good. First of all, there is generally 

a greater tendency to injure found in man than in any of the brutes. For the 

brutes are usually excited by the desire for food and for love, both of 

which, however, they can themselves easily satisfy. But having stilled that 

craving, they are not readily roused to anger or to injure people, unless 

someone provokes them. But man is an animal at no time disinclined to lust, 

and by its goad he is excited much more frequently than would seem necessary 

for the conservation of the race. And his belly desires not merely to be 

satisfied, but also to be tickled, and often craves more than nature is able 

to digest. That the brutes should not need clothing nature has provided. But 

man delights to clothe himself, not for necessity only, but also for 

display. Many more passions and desires unknown to the brutes are found in 

man, as the desire to have superfluities, avarice, the love of glory and 

eminence, envy, emulation, and rivalry of wits. Witness the fact that most 

wars, in which men clash with men, are waged for reasons unknown to the 

brutes. And all these things can, and usually do, incite men to desire to 

injure one another. Then too there is in many a notable insolence and 

passion for insulting their fellows, at which the rest, modest though they 

be by nature, cannot fail to take offense, and gird themselves to resist, 

from the desire to maintain and defend themselves and their freedom. At 

times also men are driven to mutual injury by want, and the fact that their 

present resources are insufficient for their desires or their need.



5. Moreover men have in them great power for the infliction of mutual 

injuries. For though not formidable because of teeth or claws or horns, as 

are many of the brutes, still manual dexterity can prove a most effective 

means of injury; and shrewdness gives a man the opportunity to attack by 

cunning and in ambush, where the enemy cannot be reached by open force. 

Hence it is very easy for man to inflict upon man the worst of natural 

evils, namely death.



6. Finally, we must also consider in mankind such a remarkable variety of 

gifts as is not observed in single species of animals, which, in fact, 

generally have like inclinations, and are led by the same passion and 

desire. But among men there are as many emotions as there are heads, and 

each has his own idea of the attractive. Nor are all stirred by a single and 

uniform desire, but by one that is manifold and variously intermixed. Even 

one and the same man often appears unlike himself, and if he has eagerly 

sought a thing at one time, at another he is very averse to it. And there is 

no less variety in the tastes and habits, the inclinations to exert mental 

powers, -- a variety which we see now in the almost countless modes of life. 

That men may not thus be brought into collision, there is need of careful 

regulation and control.



7. Thus then man is indeed an animal most bent upon self-preservation, 

helpless in himself, unable to save himself without the aid of his fellows, 

highly adapted to promote mutual interests; but on the other hand no less 

malicious, insolent, and easily provoked, also as able as he is prone to 

inflict injury upon another. Whence it follows that, in order to be safe, he 

must be sociable, that is, must be united with men like himself, and so 

conduct himself toward them that they may have no good cause to injure him, 

but rather may be ready to maintain and promote his interests.



8. The laws then of this sociability, or those which teach how a man should 

conduct himself, to become a good member of human society, are called 

natural laws.



9. So much settled, it is clear that the fundamental natural law is this: 

that every man must cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies. 

From this it follows that, as he who wishes an end, wishes also the means, 

without which the end cannot be obtained, all things which necessarily and 

universally make for that sociability are understood to be ordained by 

natural law, and all that confuse or destroy it forbidden. The remaining 

precepts are mere corollaries, so to speak, under this general law, and the 

natural light given to mankind declares that they are evident.



10. Again, although those precepts have manifest utility, still, if they are 

to have the force of law, it is necessary to presuppose that God exists, and 

by His providence rules all things; also that He has enjoined upon the human 

race that they observe those dictates of the reason, as laws promulgated by 

Himself by means of our natural light. For otherwise they might, to be sure, 

be observed perhaps, in view of their utility, like the prescriptions of 

physicians for the regimen of health, but not as laws; since these of 

necessity presuppose a superior, and in fact one who has actually undertaken 

the direction of another.



11. But that God is the author of the natural law, is proved by the natural 

reason, if only we limit ourselves strictly to the present condition of 

humanity, disregarding the question whether his primitive condition was 

different from the present, or whence that change has come about. The nature 

of man is so constituted that the race cannot be preserved without the 

social life, and man's mind is found to be capable of all the notions which 

serve that end. And it is in fact clear, not only that the human race owes 

its origin, as do the other creatures, to God, but also that, whatever be 

its present state, God includes the race in the government of His 

providence. It follows from these arguments that God wills that man use for 

the conservation of his own nature those special powers which he knows are 

peculiarly his own, as compared with the brutes, and thus that man's life be 

distinguished from the lawless life of the brutes. And as this cannot be 

secured except by observing the natural law, we understand too that man has 

been obliged by God to keep the same, as a means not devised by will of man, 

and changeable at their discretion, but expressly ordained by God Himself, 

in order to insure this end. For whoever binds a man to an end, is 

considered to have bound him also to employ the means necessary to that end. 

And besides, we have evidence that the social life has been enjoined upon 

men by God's authority, in the fact that in no other creature do we find the 

religious sentiment or fear of the Deity, -- a feeling which seems 

inconceivable in a lawless animal. Hence in the minds of men not entirely 

corrupt a very delicate sense is born, which convinces them that by sin 

against the natural law they offend Him who holds sway over the minds of 

men, and is to be feared even when the fear of men does not impend.



12. The common saying that that law is known by nature, should not be 

understood, it seems, as though actual and distinct propositions concerning 

things to be done or to be avoided were inherent in men's minds at the hour 

of their birth. But it means in part that the law can be investigated by the 

light of reason, in part that at least the common and important provisions 

of the natural law are so plain and clear that they at once find assent, and 

grow up in our minds, so that they can never again be destroyed, no matter 

how the impious man, in order to still the twinges of conscience, may 

endeavor to blot out the consciousness of those precepts. For this reason in 

Scripture too the law is said to be "written in the hearts" of men.[4] 

Hence, since we are imbued from childhood with a consciousness of those 

maxims, in accordance with our social training, and cannot remember the time 

when we first imbibed them, we think of this knowledge exactly as if we had 

had it already at birth. Everyone has the same experience with his mother 

tongue.



13. Of the duties incumbent upon man in accordance with natural law the most 

convenient division seems to be according to the objects in regard to which 

they are to be practiced. From this standpoint they are classified under 

three main heads: the first of which instructs us how, according to the 

dictate of sound reason alone a man should conduct himself toward God, the 

second, how toward himself, the third, how toward other men. Although those 

precepts of natural law which concern other men may be derived primarily and 

directly from sociability, which we have laid down as a foundation, 

indirectly also the duties of man to God as creator can be derived from the 

same, since the ultimate confirmation of duties toward other men comes from 

religion and fear of the Deity, so that man would not be sociable either, if 

not imbued with religion; and since reason alone cannot go further in 

religion than in so far as the latter subserves the promotion of peace and 

sociability in this life. For, in so far as religion promotes the salvation 

of souls, it proceeds from a special divine revelation. But duties of man to 

himself spring from religion and sociability conjointly. For the reason why 

he cannot determine certain acts concerning himself in accordance with his 

own free will, is partly that he may be a fit worshiper of the Deity, and 

partly that he may be a good and useful member of human society.





______



                         CHAPTER IV 

     On the Duty of Man toward God, or Natural Religion



1. The duty of man toward God, so far as it can be investigated by the 

natural reason, reduces itself to two heads: that we have right views of 

God, and secondly that we order our acts in conformity with His will. Hence 

natural religion consists of propositions both theoretical and practical.



2. Among the views which every man must hold of God, he should first of all 

be persuaded that He exists, that is, that there really is some highest and 

first Being, upon whom this universe depends. The philosophers have most 

clearly demonstrated this by the subordination of causes, which demand their 

ultimate resting in a First; also by motion and by contemplation of the 

machinery of the universe, and similar arguments. And if any man shall deny 

that he can understand these, he does not on that account find excuse for 

his atheism. For as the whole human race has been in perpetual possession of 

that belief, it would be necessary, if anyone wished to attack it, not only 

to destroy utterly all the arguments by which the existence of God is 

proved, but also to produce more plausible reasons for his assertion. 

Likewise since it has been hitherto believed that the welfare of the human 

race depends upon that conviction, the man would have further to show that 

the race is better served by atheism than by retaining a sane cult of the 

Deity. This being impossible, the impiety of those who venture to attack 

that belief in any way is detestable and to be most severely punished.



3. The second truth is that God is founder of this universe. For since 

reason makes it clear that all those things did not exist of themselves, it 

must be that they have some first cause. And this is just what we call God. 

Consequently they are deceived who from time to time noisily talk of Nature 

as the ultimate cause of all things and all effects. For if by that term we 

understand that power of effecting and acting which is seen in things, that 

in itself certainly is an argument for its author, namely God: so impossible 

is it for Nature's power to enable us to deny God. If however by Nature is 

meant the ultimate cause of everything, it is a kind of profane 

fastidiousness to avoid the plain and received term, God. They too are in 

error who believe that God is some one of the things which impinge upon our 

senses, and especially the stars. For their very substance declares that all 

of these are no first thing, but sprung from another. Not less unworthy is 

their view of God who call Him the soul of the world. For whatever the soul 

of the world may be, it denotes a part of the world, and how could part of a 

thing have been its cause, that is, an antecedent? But if by soul of the 

world we mean that first invisible being upon which depends the force and 

morion of all things, then in place of a clear term we are substituting one 

that is obscure and figurative. Hence also it is evident that the world is 

not eternal; for that is incompatible with the nature of that which has a 

cause. And he who asserts the eternity of the world, denies it any possible 

cause, and thus denies God Himself.



4. The third maxim is that God rules over the whole world, and over the 

human race. This is perfectly clear from the wonderful and constant order 

seen in this universe. But so far as the moral effect is concerned, it is 

immaterial whether one denies that God exists, or that he governs the 

affairs of men, since either view completely destroys all religion. For it 

is vain to fear or venerate him who, though in himself preeminent, is not 

touched by any care for us, and will not, or cannot, bring us any good or 

ill.



5. The fourth principle is that no attribute involving any imperfection 

applies to God. For as He is the cause and origin of all things, it would be 

absurd for some creature of His to have the power to conceive of a 

perfection which God lacked. More than that, His perfection being infinitely 

beyond the capacity of so petty a creature, it will be proper to express it 

in negative rather than in positive terms. Hence we must by no means apply 

to God those terms which connote something finite or determinate, since the 

finite can always be matched by a greater. And every determination and 

figure involves boundaries and a delimitation. In fact we are not to say 

that He is distinctly and plainly comprehended or conceived by our 

imagination, or any other faculty of our soul, since whatever we are able to 

conceive distinctly and fully, is finite. Nor do we hold in mind a complete 

concept of God, because we call Him infinite, inasmuch as infinite does not 

properly denote anything in the thing itself, but powerlessness in our mind, 

just as if we should say that we do not understand the magnitude of His 

being. Hence one cannot say either that God has parts, or is a whole, since 

these are the attributes of the finite; nor that He is contained in some 

place, for this implies bounds and limits to His greatness; nor that He 

moves, or is at rest, for both of these suppose being in a place. So also we 

cannot properly attribute to God anything which indicates a pain or a 

passion, for instance anger, repentance, pity. I say properly, for where we 

read of such attributes of God, it stands for the effect, in terms of man's 

feelings, not for the passion itself. The same is true of all that indicates 

the need and absence of some good thing, for example, craving, hope, 

concupiscence, sensual love. For these involve want, and so imperfection, 

since we could not understand craving, hoping, and desiring, except in 

relation to things one needs or lacks. So too when one ascribes to God 

intellect, will, knowledge, and acts of sense, as seeing or hearing, these 

are to be understood as on a far higher plane than are the same things in 

ourselves. For will is the appetite of the reason; but an appetite 

presupposes absence and need of the corresponding thing. And intellect and 

sensation in man involve passion, impressed by objects upon the organs of 

the body and the powers of the soul; which is a proof of a power dependent 

upon another, and hence not the most perfect. Finally this also is 

inconsistent with divine perfection, to say that there are more gods than 

one. For aside from the fact that the marvelous harmony of the world proves 

that it has but a single ruler, God would also be limited, if there were 

several of equal power, not dependent upon Himself. Just so the existence of 

a number of infinites would involve a contradiction. Such being the case, it 

is most in harmony with reason, in expressing as best we may the attributes 

of God, to use words that are either negative, as infinite, 

incomprehensible, immense, eternal, viz., lacking end and beginning; or 

superlative, as best, greatest, most powerful, wisest, etc.; or else 

indefinite, as good, just, Creator, King, Lord, etc., with the understanding 

that we wish not so much to tell distinctly what He is, as to declare our 

wonder and obedience by some sort of an expression. And this is the sign of 

a mind that is humble, and honors to the best of its ability.



6. The practical propositions of natural religion have to do partly with the 

internal and partly with the external cult of God. The inward cult of God 

consists in honoring Him. And honor is the idea one has of another's power 

and goodness combined. On considering God's power and goodness, man must 

naturally conceive the utmost possible veneration of Him. Whence flows the 

obligation to love Him, as the author and giver of every good; to hope in 

Him, upon whom we believe that all our happiness, for the future too, 

depends; to rest content with His will, who in His goodness does all things 

well, and gives us what is most expedient for us; to fear Him, as most 

powerful, to offend whom is to incur the greatest punishment; finally in all 

things most humbly to obey Him, as Creator, Lord, and best and greatest 

Ruler.



7. The external cult of God consists especially in these things: returning 

thanks to God for so many blessings received from Him; expressing His will 

in one's acts, so far as possible, in other words, obeying Him; admiring and 

celebrating His greatness; offering prayers to Him, to obtain blessings and 

avert evils, since prayers are signs of hope, and hope the recognition of 

divine goodness and power. Further, swearing, if the occasion arises, by God 

alone, and observing one's oath most religiously, since this is required by 

God's omniscience and power. Also speaking of God with reserve, since that 

is a sign of fear, and fear a confession of power. It follows that we must 

not use the name of God rashly and in vain, both of which are unreserved; 

and that we must not swear where there is no need, as that is to no purpose; 

also that we should not argue curiously and impertinently in regard to the 

nature and government of God, for the only inference is that we wish to 

measure God by the standard of our reason. Another [duty of the external 

cult is] taking care that whatever is rendered to God be the best of its 

kind, and fitted to express the honor paid Him; another, worshiping God not 

only in private, but also openly and publicly in the sight of men. For 

concealing an act is as it were blushing to do it. On the other hand the 

public cult, besides testifying to our devotion, encourages others by our 

example. Finally, one should use every effort to keep the natural laws. For 

as holding God's authority in low esteem is worse than any insult, so 

conversely obedience is more acceptable than any sacrifice.



8. So much is indeed certain, that the effect of this natural religion, 

precisely considered, and with regard to man's present condition, is limited 

to the sphere of this life, and is of no avail to secure eternal salvation. 

For human reason, if left to itself, does not know that the depravity which 

is seen in man's faculties and inclinations came through human sin, and 

deserves the anger of God and eternal destruction. Hence too the necessity 

of a Saviour is hidden from the reason, as also His service and merit, 

likewise the promises of God, given to the human race, and whatever else 

depends upon these, -- the things through which alone eternal salvation is 

gained for men, as is known from the Scriptures.



9. Moreover it will be worth while to estimate a little more clearly the 

advantage which religion contributes to human life, that we may establish 

the fact that it is in truth the ultimate and strongest bond of human 

society. For in the natural liberty, if you take away the fear of the Deity, 

as soon as a man has confidence in his own powers, he will at his own 

caprice undertake anything against the weaker, and will consider honor, 

shame, good faith, as empty words; and will not be forced to do right except 

by a sense of his own weakness. Again, remove religion, and the internal 

stability of states would always be uncertain, and fear of temporal 

punishment, a promise given to superiors, the glory to be gained by keeping 

the same, gratitude because men have been rescued from the miseries of the 

natural state by the help of the government, -- none of these would suffice 

to hold citizens to their duty. For to that situation we could in truth 

apply the saying: "He who knows how to die, can never be forced."[5] For 

those who fear not God can fear nothing more than death. If one should have 

the hardihood to despise the latter, he could attempt anything against the 

rulers. And a reason for such a desire would scarcely be lacking; for 

example, in order to avoid the inconveniences which seem to fall upon one 

from the rule of another; or to gain for one's self those advantages which 

attend the possessor of powers; especially since one may easily think he is 

right in doing so, either because the man now in power seems to misgovern 

the state, or because the other hopes he will himself rule far better. And 

then an opportunity for such attempts might easily present itself, when the 

king fails to hedge his life about with sufficient caution (and in such a 

situation "who is to guard the guards themselves?"[6]) ; or when many 

conspire, or when in the midst of a foreign war enemies are made 

accomplices. Furthermore, citizens would be very prone to injure each other. 

For, as in the civil court judgment is rendered according to acts and things 

proved, all crimes and outrages from which profit is likely to be derived, 

would be regarded as cleverness, to be viewed with complaisance, if they 

could be done in secret and without witnesses. Also no one would do the 

works of pity or of friendship, except with the assurance of fame or 

emolument. Another consequence would be that, so long as no one could place 

any firm confidence in the integrity of another, were the divine punishments 

removed, individuals would live a life of perpetual anxiety and suspicion, 

fearing to be deceived or injured by others. Moreover rulers as well as 

subjects would be little inclined to do noble and glorious acts. For the 

rulers, fettered by no bonds of conscience, would treat all offices and 

Justice herself as venal, and seek in all things their personal advantage, 

involving the oppression of the citizens. They would also fear a rebellion 

on the part of the latter, and would accordingly understand their own safety 

to depend entirely upon weakening them as far as possible. Conversely, the 

citizens, fearing oppression from their rulers, would be always casting 

about for an opportunity to rebel, and yet would be no less mutually 

distrustful and fearful of each other. Even husbands and wives, if a 

trifling quarrel occurred, would mutually suspect that they were to be 

killed by poison, or some other secret method. An equal danger from one's 

household would impend. For since, without religion, there would also be no 

conscience, it would be difficult to detect such crimes, as these are 

usually disclosed through a restless conscience, and the terror which is 

revealed in external signs. Hence it is clear how much it is to the 

advantage of the human race to block all the ways of atheism, that it may 

not grow strong; also how great madness pursues those who assert that it is 

of service in winning a reputation for civic wisdom, if they appear inclined 

to impiety.





______



                         CHAPTER V 

             On the Duty of Man toward Himself



1. Although a deeply implanted self-love constrains a man to exercise 

anxious care of self, and to take thought in every way for his own 

interests, so that it would seem superfluous to invent any obligation in 

this respect, still in another way man is obliged in any case to observe 

certain things concerning himself. For man was not born for himself alone, 

but equipped with such remarkable endowments by the Creator, that he may 

glorify Him, and become a fit member of human society. Consequently he is 

bound so to order himself that he do not suffer the Creator's gifts to 

perish from neglect, and that he contribute his due share to human society. 

Thus, although lack of education is a reproach and a loss chiefly to one's 

self, the master does well to chastise his pupil, if he neglects to learn 

arts of which he was capable.



2. Again, man consists of two parts, soul and body, of which the one 

performs the function of a ruler, the other that of a servant or instrument, 

so that we use the authority of the mind, the servitude of the body. Hence 

both must indeed be cared for, but especially the former. And the mind must 

first of all be molded fitly to endure the social life, and imbued with a 

sense and a love of duty and honor. Then, in accordance with the capacity 

and station of the individual, something more must be learned, that a man 

may not be a useless cumberer of the ground, of no profit to himself, an 

annoyance to others. Moreover, one must in due time choose an honorable 

calling in life, according to the prompting of one's bent, or as determined 

by bodily and mental ability, birth, fortune, parental authority, command of 

the civil authorities, opportunity, or necessity.



3. Furthermore, since the mind is upheld by the body, the powers of the 

latter must therefore be strengthened and conserved by suitable food and 

labors, and not injured by intemperance in eating and drinking, untimely and 

unnecessary labor, or any other means. Hence one must avoid gluttony, 

drunkenness, excess in love, and the like. And since disordered and violent 

passions are not only an incentive to disturb society, but also greatly 

injure the man himself, one must consequently take pains to restrain one's 

passions so far as possible. And because many dangers can be repelled, when 

one faces them courageously, faintness of heart must be banished, and the 

mind steeled against the fear of danger.



4. Besides, no man has given himself life, which must rather be accounted a 

gift of God. Hence it is evident that man by no means has power over his own 

life, to such an extent that he may at his own discretion cut it off; that, 

on the contrary, one must wait in any case, until one is called away by Him 

who stationed us at this post. However, since a man can by his efforts serve 

others, and is bound to do so, and since a certain kind of work, or a more 

intense labor, wastes his strength so much as to bring old age and the end 

of life upon him more promptly than if he had lived a life of ease, it seems 

in every way justifiable for him to choose what will probably cause a 

shorter life, in order that he may lavish the benefit of his talent upon 

others. And again, as frequently the life of many cannot be saved, unless in 

their behalf others expose themselves to the probable risk of death, the 

legitimate ruler could enjoin upon a citizen under threat of gravest 

punishment, not to avoid such a danger by flight. Even on one's own 

authority it will be permissible to run such risk, if only weightier reasons 

do not hold us back, and there is hope that it will bring safety to others, 

and these are worthy to be ransomed at such a price. For it would be foolish 

vainly to join company with another who is to perish, or, being an 

extraordinary man, to meet death for a worthless one. For the rest, however, 

natural law does not appear at all to enjoin that any man prefer the life of 

any other to his own; but other things being equal, each man is permitted to 

be his own nearest neighbor. But those who in weariness of the annoyances 

which commonly attend human life, or in protest against misdeeds which would 

not have made human society ashamed of them, or in fear of pains which might 

have been bravely endured, a helpful example for others; or those who with 

an empty display of loyalty or courage throw away their own lives, -- all 

these are certainly to be thought sinners against the natural law.



5. But frequently self-preservation, which a most sensitive instinct and 

reason commend to man, seems to conflict with the precept of sociability; 

namely, when our safety is so endangered by another that either we must 

suffer death or some serious disadvantage, or else the other must be 

repelled to his hurt. Therefore we must now explain how far self-defense is 

to be tempered with restraint. Now self-defense takes place either without 

injury to him who threatens evil to us (i.e., while we let him see that an 

attack upon us is a dubious or a fearsome thing), or with injury to him, or 

even death. The former method is undoubtedly permissible and free from any 

guilt



6. As for the second method, however, scruple can arise, since the human 

race seems to suffer an equal loss, whether my assailant is killed, or I 

myself perish; and because I must in any event destroy an image of myself, 

with whom I am bound to maintain the social life; and, once more, because a 

violent defense seems to cause a greater disturbance than if I either take 

to flight, or yield my body submissively to my assailant. But all these 

arguments do not make this kind of defense at all illegal. For in order that 

my conduct toward a man be peaceful and friendly, it is required that, in 

his attitude toward me, he show himself a fit person to receive attentions 

from me. And since the law of sociability looks to the safety of men, it 

must be so interpreted as not to destroy the safety of individuals. Hence 

when another threatens me with death, there is no law which commands me to 

betray my own safety, that another's malice may attack me with impunity. And 

whoever in such a case is hurt or killed, has reason to blame his own 

perversity, which put upon me that necessity. Otherwise, in fact, all the 

good things which nature or industry has gained for us would have been given 

to us for nothing, if it were not permitted to offer violence to another who 

unjustly descends upon them. And the good would be exposed as a ready prey 

to the bad, if they must never offer them violence. Hence to proscribe 

utterly forcible self-defense, would be the destruction of the human race.



7. Yet, when injury is threatened, one may not always fly to extreme 

measures; but the safer must first be tried, for instance, allowing my 

assailant no access to me, shutting myself up behind walls, warning him to 

desist from his madness. So too it is the part of prudence, to practice 

patience in a slight injury, if it can conveniently be done, and to waive 

some of one's rights, rather than expose one's self to a greater danger by 

untimely resistance to force, especially when the thing attacked is one 

which can easily be repaired or made good. But when my safety cannot be 

secured by this or any such method, it will be permissible to try even 

extreme measures to that end. 



8. But to decide clearly whether a man has kept within the bounds of 

blameless defense, we have first to consider whether he lives in natural 

freedom, not subject to any mortal, or on the other hand is responsible to 

civil authority. In the former condition, when another insists upon 

inflicting an injury, and is unwilling to be moved to repentance for his 

base attempt, and to be at peace with me as before, then I shall be able to 

repel him even with bloodshed; and this not only if he attack my life, but 

also if he attempt to wound or merely to hurt me, or even to steal, without 

injury of person. For I have no security that he will not pass from these to 

greater injuries; and he who shows himself a public enemy is protected by no 

further rights from being repelled by me in any way whatever. And life would 

indeed be unsocial, if it were not permitted to employ extreme measures 

against him who does not cease to pile up moderate injuries. For on that 

basis the most inoffensive would be the perpetual mockery of the worst. 

Furthermore, in this condition of natural liberty, I cannot only repel a 

danger threatened for the present, but also, that averted, I can pursue the 

assailant until I have secured myself against him for the future. With 

regard to this security, we must hold that, if a man after inflicting an 

injury is moved to spontaneous repentance, asks pardon, and offers 

compensation for the loss, I am bound to accept his word and be reconciled 

to him. For to repent of one's own motion and ask pardon, is a strong 

indication of a change of character. But if a man shows penitence only when 

his powers of resistance fail, it seems unsafe to trust his bare promise. 

Therefore from such a man the power to injure must be taken away, or some 

other bond must be imposed upon him, that henceforth he may not be 

formidable to us. 



9. On the other hand, those who are subjected to civil authority employ a 

forcible self-defense lawfully only when time and place do not permit of 

imploring the aid of a magistrate in repelling an injury by which life, or a 

blessing as valuable as life, or irreparable, is brought into immediate 

danger. That the danger may be averted, I say, and that only, whereas 

vengeance and security against future offense shall be left to the 

discretion of the magistrate.



10. Moreover I may undertake my defense as well against him who threatens my 

life with malice aforethought, as against him who does so by mistake; for 

example, if a man assaults me while insane or because he thought me another, 

with whom he has a quarrel. For it is enough that the other have no right to 

attack or kill me, and there be on my side no obligation to die in vain.



11. As for the time within which defense is right and proper, this view is 

to be held: where both parties live in natural liberty, even though they 

could presume, and ought to presume, that others would observe toward them 

the duties of natural law, still, on account of the wickedness of human 

nature, they are bound never to be so free from concern as not to surround 

themselves with timely and legitimate defenses; for example, by blocking the 

approach of those who have hostile designs, by getting together arms and 

men, by winning allies, by closely watching the attempts of the others, and 

by like measures. But that suspicion, arising from the common wickedness of 

men, does not suffice to enable me, under pretext of self-defense, actually 

to surprise my enemy by an armed attack, not even if I see his power growing 

unduly, especially where he has increased it by harmless industry, or by the 

favor of fortune, without oppressing others. More than that if a man show, 

besides the ability also the wish to harm, and this not indeed against me, 

but against a third party, I cannot for that reason at once venture to 

attack him on my own account, unless I am bound by an agreement to aid the 

other, who is being unjustly attacked by a more powerful man. It is 

expedient to do this all the more promptly, if it be probable that, after 

overpowering the other, he will turn to me also, and will use his former 

victory as a means to the next. But where it is quite clear that the other 

is already planning an attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully 

revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible 

self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided 

there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off 

his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause 

Hence he is to be regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to 

injure, and prepared himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense 

will be his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. And for 

defense it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid 

and parry those aimed at him.



12. But in states no such ample room is allowed for self-defense. For here, 

though one knows that a citizen is preparing to attack him, or else 

scattering fierce threats, it will by no means be permitted to anticipate 

him, but he must be reported to their common ruler, and security sought from 

the same. But when a man is already being attacked by another, and reduced 

to such straits that there is no opportunity to call for the aid of a 

magistrate or other citizens, then only will it be permitted to repel 

violence by employing extreme measures against the assailant; not indeed 

with the intention of exacting vengeance for the wrong by bloodshed, but 

because without such bloodshed life cannot be rescued from immediate danger. 

Moreover, the beginning of the time within which one can kill another in 

self-defense with impunity, is reckoned from the moment when the aggressor, 

manifesting his wish to make an attack upon my life, and furnished with the 

bodily powers and the instruments necessary to injure, is now on the spot 

from which he can actually injure me, reckoning also that space which is 

needed, if I prefer to anticipate, rather than to be anticipated. And yet, 

on account of the mental excitement which such danger occasions, exceeding 

the limits slightly is disregarded in the human court. Further, the time of 

blameless self-defense lasts until the aggressor has been repelled, or has 

of himself retired (whether because he was touched by penitence in the very 

moment of his crime, or because his attempt met with no success), so that 

for the present he can no longer injure, and we have the opportunity to 

withdraw to a place of safety. For vengeance for an assault, and security 

for the future, concern the responsibility and power of the civil authority.



13. But although it has been said that it is not right to rush into 

bloodshed when the danger can be repelled in a more convenient way, still on 

account of the excitement which imminent danger commonly produces, it is not 

usual to be over-particular. For one in the flutter of such danger may not 

be so careful in surveying all the ways of escape, as the man who is 

considering the subject with a mind unperturbed. And then, just as it is 

rash to venture down from a safe place, to meet the challenger, so, if he 

attacks me in an exposed situation, I am not expressly obliged to flee, 

except perhaps when there is near by a refuge, to which I may betake myself 

without danger. And I am not always obliged to retreat backwards. For then 

one must expose his back, and the danger of a fall is both before and 

behind; and once you have been forced from your position, it is difficult to 

recover it again. Moreover, one is not excluded from the privilege of 

self-defense by the fact that he has gone abroad to attend to his business, 

whereas he would have been safe from all danger, if he had remained at home. 

Yet the same privilege is not enjoyed by him who has been challenged by 

another to a duel, and, upon presenting himself, is so hard put to it that, 

unless he run the other through, he must himself perish. For since the laws 

forbid one to run into that danger, no account is made of it to excuse 

bloodshed.



14. The same concession is made for the defense of members of the body, as 

for that of life. Consequently he too is held innocent who has killed an 

assailant using force with the intention perhaps of mutilating merely a 

member, or inflicting a serious wound. For we naturally shrink very much 

from mutilation and a serious wound; and mutilation of a member, especially 

one of the nobler, is at times appraised as nearly equal to loss of life 

itself. In fact one cannot tell in advance, but death may be the result of 

mutilation or wound; and such long-suffering goes beyond the common 

self-possession of men, -- a patience to which the laws do not regularly 

bind us, especially in favor of a wicked man.



15. Further, what is conceded in defense of life, is also accounted 

permissible in behalf of chastity. For no greater insult can be offered a 

respectable woman, than to attempt to take away against her will that virtue 

whose preservation brings the highest esteem to her sex, and reduce her to 

the necessity of rearing her offspring for a public enemy.



16. Again, the defense of property, at least among those who live in natural 

liberty, can go so far as the death of the assailant, provided the 

possessions are not such as to be contemptible. For certainly without 

possessions our life cannot he preserved, and he who attacks our possessions 

shows as hostile a spirit as he who assaults our life. But in states, where 

stolen goods can be recovered by the help of a magistrate, this is not 

regularly permitted, except in case the man who has come to steal our goods 

cannot be brought to court. For this reason it is lawful to slay pirates and 

burglars.



17. So much for self-defense in the case of those who are assaulted by 

others without provocation. But the aggressor can rightly defend himself, 

and in so doing injure the other a second time, if, after he has been moved 

to repentance and has offered reparation and security against injury for the 

future, the injured man in a harsh spirit rejects his offer and endeavors to 

avenge himself with his own hand.



18. Finally self-preservation is so highly regarded, that, if it cannot be 

obtained otherwise, in very many cases it is thought to exempt from the 

obligation of the general laws. On this account necessity is said to know no 

law. Naturally, since a man is impelled with such ardor to 

self-preservation, it is difficult to assume that so strong an obligation 

has been imposed upon him, that his own safety must give way before it. For, 

though not only God, but also, if the seriousness of the matter requires, 

the civil authority may be able to impose upon us so rigid an obligation 

that death should be suffered rather than yield a hair's breadth therefrom, 

we do not always assume that the obligation of the laws is so rigid. For 

those who have promulgated these, or have introduced certain institutions 

among men, wishing of course thereby to promote the safety or advantage of 

men, are believed to have had regularly before their eyes the condition also 

of human nature, and how impossible it is for man not to avoid and avert 

whatever tends to his destruction. Hence regularly the laws, especially the 

positive sort, and all human institutions, are considered to except the case 

of necessity, in other words, not to oblige, when observance of them would 

be attended by an evil destructive of human nature, or exceeding the common 

endurance of men; unless even the case of necessity was included, either 

expressly, or on account of the nature of the affair. Therefore necessity 

does not indeed have the effect of making it possible for the law to be 

directly violated and sin committed; but from the benevolence of lawgivers, 

and also from a regard for human nature, it is presumed that the case of 

necessity is not included under a law conceived in general terms. The matter 

must be made dear by one or two examples.



19. Although otherwise a man has no right over his own members, to mutilate 

or destroy them at discretion, he will however be permitted to cut off a 

member attacked by an incurable disease, that the whole body may not perish, 

or that parts still sound may not be involved, or that the use of other 

members may not be hampered by a useless appendage.



20. If in case of shipwreck more persons have leaped into a boat than it can 

carry, and the boat does not belong to one man by a particular right, it 

seems that they must draw lots to see who shall be thrown overboard. And if 

anyone shall refuse the hazard of the lot, he can be thrown into the water, 

without casting his lot, as one who seeks the destruction of all.



21. If two fall into imminent danger of death, in which both must perish, it 

is permitted one of them, in order to save himself, to do anything which may 

hasten the death of the other, who would perish in any case. For example, if 

I, a skilled swimmer, had fallen into deep water with another who was not, 

and he threw his arms about me and held me, and I had not the strength to 

carry him out of the water with me, I could get rid of him by force, in 

order not to be drowned with him, even though I could hold him up somehow 

for a short time. So in a shipwreck, when I have seized a plank that will 

not hold two, if a man swimming up tries to throw himself on the same plank, 

and is likely to destroy us both, I shall be able to push him off by any 

force. So when an enemy threatens instant death to two fugitives, one can 

leave the other in danger for his life, by closing a gate behind himself, or 

by throwing down a bridge, if both cannot be saved together.



22. Necessity also gives us the right to expose another indirectly to the 

danger of death or serious injury, it being no purpose of ours to harm him, 

but only in the interest of self-preservation to undertake an act from which 

harm probably can come to him; provided we prefer, however, to meet the 

necessity of our case in any other way, and mitigate the injury itself so 

far as in us lies. Thus, if a stronger pursues me, with designs upon my 

life, and somebody happens to meet me in a narrow street, my necessary way 

of escape, if, though admonished, he does not give way, or the limitations 

of time or space do not admit of his doing so, I shall have a right to knock 

him down, and continue my flight over his fallen body, even though it may 

seem probable that he will be seriously hurt by the blow. All this, unless I 

am bound to the man by special obligation, so that I ought actually to take 

the risk for his sake. But if he who stands in the way of flight, is unable, 

though admonished, to get out of the road, for example an infant or a lame 

man, it will be at least excusable, if one tries to leap over him, rather 

than expose one's own body to the enemy by delaying. On the contrary, if a 

man insolently and inhumanly blocks me, and refuses to make way for me in my 

flight, he can even be directly pushed and thrown down.



For the rest, those who suffer injury in such cases ought to bear the 

misfortune as their destiny.



23. If a man, without fault of his own, is in extreme want of food and 

clothing necessary against the cold, and has been unable, by prayers, or 

purchase, or offer of service, to prevail upon others, who are richer and in 

abundance, to let him have those things willingly, he may without the charge 

of theft or robbery take them away by force or secretly; especially if he 

shall have the intention of paying their estimated value, when occasion 

shall offer. For the rich man ought, out of humanity, to succor one placed 

in such straits. And although in general what is owed on the score of 

humanity cannot be taken away forcibly, still extreme necessity has this 

effect, that such things can be claimed no less than those due on the basis 

of a perfect obligation. It is, however, required that the poor man first 

try every means to meet his necessities with the consent of the owner; also 

that the owner be not in the same straits, or likely soon to be reduced to 

them. Further, there must be restitution, especially when the fortunes of 

the other do not permit him to make any such free gift.



24. Finally the necessity which presides over our fortunes seems to bestow 

upon us the permission to destroy the property of others; but with these 

restrictions: that the danger to our property must have come about without 

our fault; that it cannot be removed in a more convenient way; that we do 

not destroy a more valuable thing belonging to another, to save ours, being 

less precious; that we make good the value, if indeed the thing would not 

otherwise have perished; or else we should share in the loss, if the other's 

property would otherwise have perished along with ours, but now by its 

sacrifice preserves ours. This principle of equity is usually followed by 

admiralty law. So too, when a fire has broken out and is threatening my 

house, it will be permissible to tear down my neighbor's house. provided 

those whose houses have been thus saved make good their neighbor's loss pro 

rata.





______



                         CHAPTER VI 

   On Mutual Duties, and First, That of Not Injuring Others



1. Next come the duties which a man must practice toward other men. Some of 

them spring from the common obligation, by which the Creator willed that all 

men as such should be bound together. But some flow from a definite 

institution, introduced or received by men, or from a certain adventitious 

status of men. The first are to be practiced by every man toward every 

other; the second only toward certain persons, a certain condition or status 

being assumed. Hence one may call the former absolute duties, the latter 

conditional. 



2. Among the absolute duties, i.e., of anybody to anybody, the first place 

belongs to this one: let no one injure another. For this is the broadest of 

all duties, embracing all men as such. It is also the easiest, as consisting 

in mere refraining from action, unless the passions that resist reason have 

somehow to be checked at times. Again, it is likewise the most necessary 

duty, because without it the social life could in no way exist. For with the 

man who confers no benefit upon me, who makes no interchange even of the 

common duties with me, I can still live at peace, provided he injure me in 

no way. In fact, from the vast majority of men we desire nothing more than 

that. Benefits are generally exchanged by the few. But with the man who 

injures me, I cannot by any means live peaceably. For nature has implanted 

in each man so sensitive a love of self and one's own possessions, that one 

cannot help repelling by every means the man who essays to injure them.



3. Moreover, this same duty is a bulwark not only to what a man has by 

nature itself, for instance, life, body, members, chastity, freedom, but 

also to all that has been acquired through some institution and convention 

of men. Hence by this precept it is forbidden to carry off, spoil, injure, 

or withdraw from our use, in whole or in part, anything that by any 

legitimate title is ours. Consequently the same duty is understood to 

interdict any crimes by which injury is inflicted upon others, as bloodshed, 

wounding, beating, robbery. theft, fraud, violence, directly or indirectly, 

mediately or immediately and the like.



4. It follows also that, if a man has been hurt by another, or a loss 

inflicted in any way that can be properly laid to the other's charge, it 

must so far as possible be made good by him. For otherwise it would be a 

vain injunction, not to injure, or not to inflict loss, if the man who has 

actually been injured must swallow his loss, and his assailant can in 

security, and without refunding, enjoy the profit of the wrong he has done. 

For human depravity will never refrain from mutual injuries, unless there is 

the necessity of restitution. And it would be difficult for the man who has 

suffered loss to make up his mind to live at peace with the other, so long 

as he did not obtain reparation from him.



5. Although, properly speaking, loss appears to concern an injury to things, 

the word is however understood by us here in a broad sense, to include every 

injury, spoiling, diminishing, or taking away, of that which is already 

ours; or intercepting of that which by a perfect right we ought to have, 

whether this may have been given us by nature, or assigned us by act of man, 

or by a law; or, finally, any omission or refusal on the part of another to 

perform anything which he was bound to do for us in accordance with a 

perfect obligation. But if things due us under an imperfect obligation 

merely are intercepted, it is not considered that a loss has been inflicted, 

which must be made good. For it would be unseemly to consider it a loss not 

to have received, or to demand compensation for, such things as I could not 

expect from another except as a voluntary gift, and things which I cannot 

reckon my own, until I have received them.



6. Under the term loss, moreover, comes not only a thing of ours, or owed to 

us, which is injured, destroyed, or intercepted, but also the fruits which 

spring from it, whether they have been gathered in already, or are still 

hoped for, provided the owner would have gathered them in. But we must 

deduct the outlay necessary to the gathering in of the crops. Also the 

valuation of anticipated crops is raised or lowered, according as they arc 

nearer Ac uncertain outcome, or further from it. Finally also, whatever 

flows later from an injury, as by natural necessity, is regarded as an 

integral part of the damage.



7. It is moreover possible for a man to inflict toss upon another not only 

immediately and of himself, bat also through others- And a loss caused 

immediately by a man can be imputed to the other, because, by doing 

something, or not doing something, he was bound to do, he has contributed to 

that result. Sometimes, as between several who have concurred in the same 

act, one is regarded as the principal cause, another as an accessory; 

sometimes all are on an even footing. With regard to these, we must observe 

that they are bound to make good the loss only in case they were realty the 

cause of the loss, and were a factor in the whole loss, or a part thereof. 

But when a man did not contribute any real assistance to that act itself 

which occasioned the loss, and did not previously cause it to be undertaken, 

and did not share in the profit, although at the time of the act he may 

involve himself in some misdeed, still he will not be bound to make 

restitution for Ac loss. Examples are, those who rejoice at others' 

misfortunes, those who afterward praise or excuse the damage, and those who 

beforehand hope it may happen, and approve or applaud at the time.



8. When several concur in a single act from which damage results, the first 

responsibility will be his, who by his authority, or in some other way 

involving constraint, urged others to act. The doer of the deed, if it was 

not open to him to refuse his services, will be accounted a mere instrument. 

Whoever without constraint has committed a crime will himself be responsible 

first of all, and then the others who contributed to the crime; with this 

reservation, that if the first in order have already made restitution, the 

rest are exempt (which is not the case with penalties). If several have 

committed a crime by conspiracy, they are collectively responsible for the 

individuals, and individually for all their companions, so that if all are 

arrested, each is bound to contribute his proper share to make good the 

damage. Where only one is seized, and the rest escape, he will be bound to 

pay for them all. But where some of those arrested are insolvent, the rich 

ones will be responsible for the whole amount. If, however, several have 

concurred in a crime without a conspiracy, and it can be clearly 

distinguished how much each has contributed to the damage, each will be 

bound to make good that part alone which was due to himself. But if one has 

paid the whole amount, the rest are exempt from restitution.



9. Not alone the man who has injured another with malice aforethought, is 

bound to make good the damage, but also he who, without direct intention, 

has done so through neglect, or a fault which it was easy to avoid. For it 

is not the smallest part of sociability, to act so circumspectly that our 

intercourse does not become formidable or insufferable to others. And then, 

in consequence of a particular obligation, one is often required to use 

extraordinary diligence. In fact even the slightest fault can suffice to 

require restitution, provided the nature of the matter does not actually 

resent, as it were, the most exact diligence; or if the blame does not 

belong rather to the man who suffers the damage, than to him who causes it; 

or unless great excitement, or the circumstances of the case, do not admit a 

studied circumspection; for example, if one, while brandishing his arms in 

the heat of battle, should injure a man standing near him.



10. But whoever injures by mere chance, and without his own fault is not 

bound to make restitution. For nothing having been committed which can be 

laid to the man's charge, there is no reason why the unwilling agent should 

atone for an evil that was destined to happen, rather than the other, who 

has suffered it.



11. Another precept in agreement with natural equity is that, if my man has 

caused damage to another without my fault, I should make it good to the 

injured party, or surrender my man to him. For a slave is of course 

naturally liable for reparation of damage he has caused. But since he has no 

property of his own, from which reparation may be made, and his person 

belongs to the master, it is surely right that the master should either mend 

the