THE



                           DEBATES



                              IN



                        THE CONVENTION



                              OF



                     THE STATE OF NEW YORK,



                            ON THE



              ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.



                         IN CONVENTION, POUGHKEEPSIE, June 17, 1788.



But, sir, I trust we shall divest ourselves, on this occasion, of every 

consideration of a private nature, and determine on the Constitution with 

caution and moderation.



Mr. R. R. LIVINGSTON rose to reply.



The CHANCELLOR, in explanation, said, it gave him pain to observe a meaning 

attributed to him which was totally foreign from his mind. He by no means 

had intended to insinuate that the opposition to ON the 1st of February, 

1788, the legislature of the state of New York passed a resolution in the 

words following, to wit: --



"Whereas the United States, in Congress assembled, did, on the 28th day of 

September last unanimously resolve, that the report of the Convention of 

the states lately assembled in Philadelphia, with the resolutions and letter 

accompanying the same, be transmitted to the several legislatures, in order 

to be submitted to a Convention of delegates, chosen in each state by the 

people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of the Convention, made and 

provided in that case, -- Therefore,



"Resolved, as the sense of the legislature, that the said report, with the 

said resolutions and letter accompanying the same, be submitted to a 

Convention of delegates to be chosen by the people of this state; that it be 

recommended to the people of this state to choose, by ballot, delegates to 

meet in Convention for the purpose aforesaid; that the number of delegates 

to be elected be the same as the number of members of Assembly from the 

respective cities and counties; that all free male citizens of the age of 

twenty-one years and upwards be admitted to vote, and that any person of 

that description be eligible; that the election be held on the last Tuesday 

in April next, at the same respective places where the elections for members 

of Assembly shall be held, and be continued by adjournment from day to day, 

until the same shall be completed, not exceeding five days; that the 

inspectors, who shall inspect the election for members of Assembly, be also 

inspectors of the election of delegates; that the inspectors do also appoint 

two clerks, each of whom shall keep a poll list of the electors for 

delegates; that the inspectors do provide a box to receive the ballots for 

delegates; that the poll books or lists shall, after due examination and 

correction, be signed by the inspectors attending at the closing of the 

poll, and the clerks who shall have kept the same poll books, respectively; 

and then the box containing the ballots for delegates shall be opened, and 

the ballots therein contained taken out, and, without being inspected, 

shall, together with the poll books or lists for delegates, be immediately 

put up under cover and enclosed, and the enclosure bound with tape, and 

sealed in such manner as to prevent its being opened without discovery; and 

the inspectors present at the closing of the poll shall then put their 

seals, and write their names, upon the same enclosure, and one of the 

inspectors then present, to be appointed by a majority of them, shall 

deliver the same enclosure, so sealed up as aforesaid, to the clerk of the 

county, without delay, who shall carefully preserve and keep the same, 

unbroken and unopened, until the meeting of the persons who are to canvass 

and estimate the ballots therein contained, when he shall deliver the same 

enclosure, unbroken and unopened, to them; that the person authorized by law 

to canvass and estimate the votes for members of Assembly, do, also, 

immediately after they shall have canvassed and estimated the votes to be 

taken at the election to be held on the last Tuesday in April next, for 

members of Assembly, proceed to open the said enclosures containing the 

ballots for the delegates, and canvass and estimate the votes taken for 

delegates; and when, as soon as they shall be able to determine, upon such 

canvass or estimate, who, by the greatest number of votes, shall have been 

chosen for delegates for the city and county, they shall determine the 

same, and thereupon, without delay, make, and subscribe with their own 

proper names and hand-writing, the requisite number of certificates of such 

determination, and cause one to be delivered to each of the persons so 

elected a delegate; and that the said election and canvass shall, in every 

other respect not herein provided for, be conducted in like manner as is 

provided for by law for holding elections for members of Assembly; that the 

delegates, so to be chosen, do meet in convention at the court-house in 

Poughkeepsie, in the county of Duchess, on the third Tuesday of June next; 

that the clerks of the Senate and Assembly do forthwith, after the 

Convention shall have assembled, deliver to them copies of the said report, 

and of the letter and resolutions which accompanied the same to Congress, 

and of the said resolution of Congress; that the delegates be allowed the 

same wages as the members of Assembly, and that it will be proper for the 

legislature, at their next meeting, to provide for the payment thereof."



In pursuance of the above resolution, an election was held in the several 

counties, and the following gentlemen were returned: --



From the City and County of New York. -- John Jay, Richard Morris, John 

Sloss Hobart, Alexander Hamilton, Robert R. Livingston, Isaac Roosevelt, 

James Duane, Richard Harrison, Nicholas Low.



From the City and County of Albany. -- Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jun., 

Henry Outhoudt, Peter Vroman, Israel Thompson, Anthony Ten Eyck, Dirck 

Swart.



From the County of Suffolk. -- Henry Scudder, Jonathan N. Havens, John 

Smith, Thomas Tredwell, David Hedges.



From the County of Ulster. -- Governor Clinton, John Cantine, Cor. C. 

Schoonmaker, Ebenezer Clark, James Clinton, Dirck Wynkoop.



From the County of Queens. -- Samuel Jones, John Schenck, Nathaniel 

Lawrence, Stephen Carman.



From the County of Kings. -- Peter Lefferts, Peter Vandervoort. 



From the County of Richmond. -- Abraham Bancker, Gozen Ryerss. 



From the County of Westchester. -- Lewis Morris, Philip Livingston, Richard 

Hatfield, Philip Van Courtland, Thaddeus Crane, Lott W. Sarls.



From the County of Orange. -- John Haring, Jesse Wood-hull, Henry Wisner, 

John Wood.



From the County of Duchess. -- Zephaniah Platt, Melancton Smith, Jacobus 

Swartwout, Jonathan Akins, Ezra Thompson, Gilbert Livingston, John De Witt.



From the County of Montgomery. -- William Harper, Christopher P. Yates, John 

Frey, John Winn, Volkert Veeder, Henry Staring.



From the County of Columbia. -- Peter Van Ness, John Bay, Matthew Adgate.



From the Counties of Washington and Clinton. -- Ichabod Parker, John 

Williams, Albert Baker, David Hopkins.



The Convention, having accordingly assembled on the 17th of June, 

unanimously elected his excellency, GEORGE CLINTON, president. After 

appointing the proper subordinate officers, and having ordered that the 

doors should be kept open, and the business of the Convention opened every 

morning with prayer, Mr. Duane, Mr. Jones, Mr. R. Morris, Mr. Lansing, and 

Mr. Harris, were chosen a committee to report rules for conducting the 

business.



Next day, the committee of regulations brought in their report, on which 

the following resolves were passed, viz.: --



1st. That, at the meeting of the Convention each day, the minutes of the 

preceding day shall in the first place be read, at which times, mistakes, if 

any, shall be corrected.



2d. That all motions and addresses be made to the chair, and standing.



3d. That every motion made and seconded, except motions for adjournment, 

shall be handed to the chair in writing and there read before any debate or 

question taken thereon.



4th. That, upon every question taken, the yeas and nays shall be entered, 

if requested by any two members.



5th. That, if two members rise to speak, and there shall be a dispute which 

of them rose first, it shall be determined by the president.



6th. That no interruption shall be suffered while a member is addressing 

the chair, but by a call to order by the president, or by a member through 

the president.



7th. That no member be referred to by name in any debate.



8th. That, if any member shall transgress the rules a second time, the 

president may refer to him by name; that the Convention may examine and 

censure the member's conduct, he being allowed to extenuate or justify.



9th. That any member, making a motion, may withdraw it before the question 

is put thereon; after which any other member may renew the same motion, if 

he thinks proper.



10th. That the appointment of all committees shall be by ballot.



11th. That none be admitted within the bar, excepting the members and 

secretaries.



12th. That the preceding rules shall be observed when the Convention 

resolves itself into a committee of the whole.



The Constitution reported by the general Convention was then read, together 

with the resolutions and letter accompanying the same to Congress, and the 

resolve of Congress thereon; after which the Convention, on motion of Mr. 

Lansing, agreed to resolve itself, the succeeding day, into a committee of 

the whole.



On the 19th of June, the Convention met, pursuant to adjournment, and, the 

order of the day being read, resolved itself into a committee of the whole, 

and Mr. OUTHOUDT was called to the chair.



The Constitution being again read, the Hon. ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON rose, and 

addressed the chair as follows: --



Mr. Chairman, as the preamble of the plan under consideration comprises the 

great objects of the Union, it will be proper, at this place, to introduce 

such general observations as may with less propriety be noticed, when 

particular articles are under consideration, and which may serve, at the 

samp time, to show the necessity of adopting some more efficacious plan of 

union, than that by which we are now bound. In the course of the 

observations I shall make with this view, many things will be urged that 

will be of little use to those gentlemen who have heard all that has been 

said, who have read all that has been written on this subject, and who have 

formed their judgments after mature consideration. With such, all debate is 

unnecessary. But I trust, sir, there are many gentlemen present, who have 

yet formed no decided opinion on the important question before us, and who 

(like myself) bring with them dispositions to examine whatever shall be 

offered, and not to determine till after the maturest deliberation. To such 

I address myself.



Ever since a pure and perfect religion has lent her mild lights to 

philosophy, and extended her influence over the sentiments of men, ft has 

been a received opinion that the happiness of nations, as well as of 

individuals, depends on peace, and that intimate connection which mutual 

wants occasion. To establish this on the basis of a general union of 

nations, has, at various times, employed the thoughts and attention of wise 

and virtuous men. It is said to have been the last great plan of the 

illustrious Henry IV. of France, who was justly esteemed one of the wisest 

and best of princes. But, alas! sir, in the old world, every attempt of this 

nature will prove abortive. There, governments are the children of force or 

fraud, and carry with them strong features of their parent's character. 

Disputes will not be referred to a common umpire, unless that umpire has 

power to enforce his decrees; and how can it be expected that princes, 

jealous of power, will consent to sacrifice any portion of it to the 

happiness of their people, who are of little account in their estimation? 

Differences among them, therefore, will continue to be decided by the sword, 

and the blood of thousands will be shed before the most trifling controversy 

can be determined. Even Peace can hardly be said to bestow her usual 

blessings on them; their mutual jealousies convert peace into an armed 

truce. The husbandman feels the oppression of standing armies, by whom the 

fruits of his labor are devoured; and the flower of youth is sacrificed to 

the rigors of military discipline. It has pleased Heaven to afford the 

United States means for the attainment of this great object, which it has 

withheld from other nations. They speak the same language; they profess the 

same religion; and, what is of infinitely more importance, they acknowledge 

the same great principle of government -- a principle, if not unknown, at 

least little understood in the old world -- that all power is derived from 

the people. They consider the state and the general governments as different 

deposits of that power. In this view, it is of little moment to them whether 

that portion of it which they must, for their own happiness, lodge in their 

rulers, be invested in the state governments only, or shared between them 

and the councils of the Union. The rights they reserve are not diminished, 

and probably their liberty acquires an additional security from the 

division.



Let us not, then, sir, neglect to improve the advantages we possess; let us 

avail ourselves of the present moment to fix lasting peace upon the broad 

basis of national union; let us, while it is still in our power, lay the 

foundation of our own happiness, and that of our posterity. Jealousies may 

spring up; the seeds of them are already sown; the present moment may be the 

only one afforded for eradicating them.



I am too well satisfied, sir, of the virtue and patriotism of those to whom 

I address myself, to suppose that their determination will be influenced by 

any unworthy motive. But, sir, I dread the effect which a hasty or partial 

review may have on their minds; and, above all things, I dread lest the 

chimerical ideas of perfection in government, which gentlemen may have 

formed, should induce them to reject this, as falling short of their 

standard. Perfection, sir, is not the lot of humanity; and perhaps, were the 

gentlemen on this floor to compare their sentiments on this subject, no two 

of them would be found to agree. Nay, such is the weakness of our judgment, 

that it is more than probable that, if a perfect plan was offered to our 

choice, we should conceive it defective, and condemn it. The only people 

whose government was visibly directed by God himself, rejected his 

administration, and induced him, in his wrath, to give them a king. Let us 

be cautious, sir, lest, by our negligence or eager pursuit after chimerical 

perfection, we should forfeit the blessings we enjoy, and lose this precious 

opportunity of completing what other nations have been unable to effect.



As, on the one hand, sir, our situation admits of a union, so, on the 

other, our distresses point out its necessity. I will not, at this time, 

touch on the declining state of our commerce; nor will I remind you of our 

national bankruptcy, of the effect it has upon our public measures, and the 

private misery that it causes; nor will I wound your feelings by a 

recapitulation of the insults we daily receive from nations whose injuries 

we are compelled to repay by the advantages of our commerce. These topics 

have been frequently touched; they are in every man's mind; they lie heavy 

at every patriot's heart. They have induced states, the most independent in 

their situation, to unite in their endeavors to remove them; they operate 

with peculiar force on us. Permit me, however, to make some observations, 

drawn from our particular situation, and which will show, in the clearest 

light, that our existence, as a state, depends on a strong and efficient 

federal government.



He went into a minute consideration of the natural advantages of this 

state, drawn from its valuable and abundant staples; the situation of its 

principal seaport; the command of the commerce of New Jersey, by the rivers 

discharging themselves in our bay; the facility that the Sound afforded for 

an intercourse with the Eastern States. He observed upon the advantages 

resulting from the Hudson, which he described as bearing upon its bosom the 

wealth of the remotest part of the state. He touched upon the prospects that 

a lasting peace afforded of commanding the treasures of the western world, 

by the improvement of our internal navigation. He said, that to these 

natural advantages we might add many other adventitious circumstances. He 

observed, that a considerable proportion of our domestic debt was already in 

the treasury, and though we were indebted for a part of this to our 

citizens, yet that debt was comparatively small, and could easily be 

extinguished by an honest exertion on the part of the government. He 

observed, that our back lands were competent to the discharge of our foreign 

debt, if a vigorous government should be adopted, which would enable us to 

avail ourselves of this resource; so that we might look forward to a day 

when no other taxes would be required from us than such as would be 

necessary to support our internal government, the amount of the impost being 

more than adequate to the other expenses of the Union. He feared that a 

prospect of these advantages had excited an improper confidence in 

ourselves; that it has produced an inflexibility, which had rendered us 

regardless of the wishes and expectations of the other states, and lessened 

that respect which was due, as well from nations to each other, as from 

individuals. We have insisted, says he, that every knee shall bow to the 

golden image we have set up. But let us remember that, how valuable soever 

the materials of which its nobler parts are composed, its feet (like those 

of the image in the vision) are composed of iron and clay, of materials that 

will not adhere together, and which the slightest shock will tumble on the 

earth.



He observed, that wealth excited envy, stimulated avarice, and invited 

invasions; that, if the Union was dissolved, we could only be protected by 

our domestic force. He then urged the incapacity of the state to defend 

itself, from the detached situation of its ports, remarking particularly 

upon that of Staten Island and Long Island; their vicinity to states, which, 

in case of a disunion, must be considered as independent, and perhaps 

unfriendly powers. He turned the attention of the committee to the 

north-east, where he showed Vermont ready to avail itself of our weakness, 

speaking of the people of that state, as a brave and hardy body of men, that 

we had neither the spirit to subdue, nor, what be more strongly 

recommended, the magnanimity to yield to. On the north-west, he pointed to 

the British posts, and hostile tribes of savages. He showed that, in case of 

domestic war, Hudson River, that great source of our wealth, would also be 

that of our weakness, by the intersection of the state, and the difficulty 

we should find in bringing one part to support the other. 



He then ran over the alliances that would be formed in case of a disunion; 

pointed out the connection between the Eastern States, and urged various 

reasons to show that it was neither the interest nor wish of the states, on 

the east or west, to form a league offensive or defensive with us. Having 

dwelt largely on this subject, he deduced, as a consequence from it, that 

our wealth and our weakness equally required the support of a federal union. 

He observed that this could only be found in the existing Confederation, or 

in that under consideration; urging that, as union could only be founded on 

the consent of the states, it should be sought where we had reason to expect 

that consent; that to depart from this would be to investigate as many ideal 

systems as there were persons who had thought on the subject of government. 

He observed that, in the then state of things, it was problematical, at 

least, whether we would recur to the old Confederation; but, as many 

gentlemen thought it possible, he would proceed to investigate it. He then 

went through the Confederation, and showed that the powers intended to be 

vested in Congress were very similar to those given by the new government, 

to wit: to raise troops, possess a common treasure, borrow money, make 

treaties, appoint civil officers, &c. He observed that as, on the one hand, 

the want of these powers would not be objected to in the Confederation, so, 

on the other, the possession of them could not be urged as a fault in the 

new plan.



He asked whether, with these powers, it had been able to effect the 

purposes designed by the Union; whether it had repelled invaders, maintained 

domestic peace, supported our credit, or extended our commerce. He proved 

that not one of these objects had been effected by it. He pointed to the 

British possessions in the limits of this state, held in defiance of the 

most solemn treaties, and contempt of our government, as proof of its 

incompetency to defend our rights against foreign powers. How has it 

happened, said he, that Vermont is, at this moment, an independent state? 

How has it happened that new states have been rent from those on the west, 

that were entitled to protection? He asked if any gentlemen would assert 

that our national credit was fixed upon a proper basis; that our commerce 

enjoyed the advantages we had a right to expect. If, then, said he, 

experience has shown that the existing Confederation (if I may use the 

term) has not answered the great ends of the Union, it must either have 

arisen from an insufficiency in its powers, or from some defect in the 

execution of them: if insufficient, more should be added; if not executed, 

the cause should be inquired into. He showed that, with the addition of a 

few powers, those it possessed were competent to the purposes of the Union; 

but that the defect of the system rested in the impossibility of carrying 

into effect the rights invested in them by the states. He then ran through 

every power intended to be vested in Congress, and showed that the exercise 

of them, by the intervention of the state governments, and subject to their 

pleasure or their different views of the matters recommended to them, would 

be attended with insuperable difficulties, inconveniences, and delays, even 

if they were disposed to carry them into effect; but that, if (which, 

experience had shown, would often be the case) they should either neglect or 

refuse to comply with the requisition, no means were pointed out by the 

Confederation to coerce them, but that it was left, as all leagues among 

nations, to military force. He showed, in a strong point of view, the danger 

of applying this; and deduced from all those observations, that the old 

Confederation was defective in its principle, and impeachable in its 

execution, as it operated upon states in their political capacity, and not 

upon individuals; and that it carried with it the seeds of domestic 

violence, and tended ultimately to its dissolution. He then appealed to our 

experience in the late war, to show the operation of this system, and 

demonstrated that it must, from its own construction, leave every state to 

struggle with its own difficulties, and that none would be roused to action 

but those that were near the seat of war. He alleged that this idea of a 

federal republic, on the ground of a league among independent states, had, 

in every instance, disappointed the expectations of its advocates. He 

mentioned its effects in the ancient republics, and took a view of the union 

of the Netherlands, and showed that, even when they were struggling for 

every thing that was dear to them, in the contest with Spain, they 

permitted the burden of the war to be borne, in a great measure, by the 

province of Holland; which was, at one lime, compelled to attempt to force a 

neighboring province, by arms, to a compliance with their federal 

engagements. He cited the Germanic league, as a proof that no government, 

formed on the basis of the total independency of its pans, could produce the 

effects of union. He showed that, notwithstanding the power of their federal 

head, from his hereditary dominions, the decrees of their general diet were 

little regarded, and different members of the confederacy were perpetually 

rushing upon each other's swords.



He then observed upon the necessity of adding to the powers of Congress, 

that of regulating the militia, referring to the article in the proposed 

plan, which he said he would not anticipate. He urged the common consent of 

America as a proof of the necessity of adding the power of regulating 

commerce to those Congress already possessed, which, he said, not only 

included those of forming laws, but of deciding upon those laws, and 

carrying them into effect; that this power could never be trusted to the 

individual states, whose interests might, in many instances, clash with that 

of the Union. From hence he inferred the necessity of a federal judiciary, 

to which he would have referred not only the laws for regulating commerce, 

but the construction of treaties and other great national objects, -- 

showing that, without this, it would be in the power of any state to commit 

the honor of the Union, defeat their most beneficial treaties, and involve 

them in a war. He next adverted to the form of the federal government. He 

said that, though justified when considered as a mere diplomatic body, 

making engagements for its respective states, which they were to carry into 

effect, yet, if it was to enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive powers, 

an attention as well to the facility of doing business as to the principles 

of freedom, called for a division of those powers. After commenting on each 

of them, and showing the mischief that would flow from their union in one 

House of Representatives, and those, too, chosen only by the legislatures, 

and neither representing the people nor the government, (which he said 

consisted of legislative, executive, and judicial,) he proposed the 

Constitution of this state as the model for the state governments.



From these observations he deduced, first, that the powers which were, by 

common consent, intended to be vested in the federal head, had either been 

found deficient, or rendered useless by the impossibility of carrying them 

into execution, on the principle of a league of states totally separate and 

independent; -- secondly, that, if the principle was changed, a change would 

also become necessary in the form of the government; but if we could no 

longer retain the old principle of the confederacy, and were compelled to 

change its form, we were driven to the necessity of creating a new 

constitution, and could find no place to rest upon in the old Confederation; 

that he had urged these considerations to fix gentlemen's attention to the 

only true ground of inquiry; to keep them from reverting to plans which had 

no single feature that could now be serviceable, and to lead the way to a 

minute discussion of every article with candor and deliberation; and, in 

order that this might be the better effected, and no gentleman pledged 

before he had fully considered the subject, he intended, before he sat down, 

to move the resolution he had in his hand. He considered the question as one 

that not only affected the happiness, and perhaps the existence, of this 

state, but as one that involved the great interests of humanity. Many of us, 

sir, said he, are officers of government; many of us have seats in the 

Senate and Assembly: let us, on this solemn occasion, forget the pride of 

office; let us consider ourselves as simple citizens, assembled to consult 

on measures that are to promote the happiness of our fellow-citizens. As 

magistrates, we may be unwilling to sacrifice any portion of the power of 

the state; as citizens, we have no interest in advancing the powers of the 

state at the expense of the Union. We are only bound to see that so much 

power as we find it necessary to intrust to our rulers, be so placed as to 

insure our liberties, and the blessings of a well-ordered government.



He then offered a resolution, the purport of which was, "That no question, 

general or particular, should be put in the committee upon the proposed 

Constitution of government for the United States, or upon any clause or 

article thereof, nor upon any amendment which should be proposed thereto, 

until after the said Constitution and amendments should have been considered 

clause by clause."



The said resolution, being taken into consideration, was agreed to by the 

Convention.



The committee then rose, and the Convention adjourned till next day, 10 

o'clock, A. M.



FRIDAY, June 20, 1788. -- Convention met pursuant to adjournment. Went into 

committee of the whole, Mr. Outhoudt in the chair.



The Hon. Mr. LANSING then rose, and addressed the chair as follows: -- 



Mr. Chairman, I am equally disposed with the honorable gentleman from New 

York, who favored the committee with his sentiments yesterday, to a candid 

and dispassionate investigation of the important business now under 

consideration, and to receive every possible information on the occasion.



I do not mean to state any objections to the clause now read, but wish the 

indulgence of the committee, while I make some observations in answer to 

those which were given to the committee by the honorable gentleman from New 

York.



Sir, the project devised by Henry IV., in his closet, to form a 

confederated republic of the European states, may perhaps be considered as 

visionary in its object, but originating; in motives which were in some 

measure peculiar to him self, as, from the power and importance he 

possessed, he might have flattered himself that he should have been at the 

head of it. But a difference in language, manners, religion, and interests 

of their sovereigns, would have defeated it, if it had been attempted. Here 

a confederated republic is only more attainable from the circumstances of 

all the powers existing in, or originating from, the people, and a 

similarity of language and manners. We ought, therefore, to be extremely 

cautious how we establish a government which may give distinct interests to 

the rulers and governed, so as to induce the former to pursuits adverse to 

the happiness of the United States.



It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, delegate 

essential powers either to the individual or general sovereignties, it is 

perfectly immaterial where they are lodged; but, as the state governments 

will always possess a better representation of the feelings and interests of 

the people at large, it is obvious that those powers can be deposited with 

much greater safety with the state than the general government.



I am equally averse to cherishing, on this occasion, the idea of obtaining 

a perfection which never existed, and to despairing of making important 

amendments to the system now offered for consideration; for, sir, however 

much I may be disposed to perpetuate union, however sensible of the defects 

of the existing Confederation, I cannot help differing from those gentlemen 

who are of opinion it is incapable of amelioration.



I would ask, What are the objections which have been so ably urged against 

it? They are comprised under two heads. First, it affords no defence against 

foreign assault; second, no security to domestic tranquillity. Both these 

objects might be compassed if Congress could be vested with a power to raise 

men and money.



Requisitions made under the existing Confederation by Congress, it is 

allowed, are insufficient; but this defect might, in a great measure, have 

been remedied by permitting the United States to legislate on individuals 

after the requisitions had been made, and not been complied with. If the 

requisition could be thus enforced, loans of money might be negotiated when 

necessary, and Congress be authorized to raise money to replace them.



The languishing situation of our commerce has also been attributed to the 

impotence of Congress; but I think their journals will justify me in the 

assertion that all the states, excepting two, had passed laws to enable 

Congress to regulate commerce, and that those two were not indisposed to 

vest that power.



The conduct of the king of Great Britain, with respect to the western 

posts, has also been urged as the result of the inefficiency of our 

government; but, however organized our general government might be, I should 

doubt whether it was either prudent or expedient to risk a war, which would 

expose our coast to depredation by an enemy, against whose attacks in that 

point we must remain defenceless, until we can create a fleet to repel their 

invasions. Will any government enable us to do this in a few years? I am 

convinced it will not.



That we have to encounter embarrassments, and are distressed for want of 

money, is undoubted; but causes which could not be controlled by any system 

of government, have principally contributed to embarrass and distress us. On 

the termination of war, which operated to exhaust our resources, we launched 

into every species of extravagance, and imported European goods to an amount 

far beyond our ability to pay. The difficulties which arose from this and 

several other causes, equally uninfluenced by the system of government, were 

without hesitation attributed to its want of energy.



Sir, the instance adduced from the history of the Jewish theocracy evinces 

that there are certain situations in communities which will unavoidably lead 

to results similar to those we experience. The Israelites were unsuccessful 

in war; they were sometimes defeated by their enemies: instead of reflecting 

that these calamities were occasioned by their sins, they sought relief in 

the appointment of a king, in imitation of their neighbors.



The united Dutch provinces have been instanced as possessing a government 

parallel to the existing Confederation; but I believe it will be discovered 

that they were never organized, as a general government, on principles so 

well calculated to promote the attainment of national objects as that of the 

United States. They were obliged to resort to subordinate societies to 

collect the sense of the state, before the deputies were authorized to 

assent to any public measure binding on their states. Sir William Temple 

relates that an important measure was prevented from taking place by the 

dissent of a single town, till one of its citizens was accommodated with a 

commission.



The Germanic confederacy consists of a heterogeneous mass of powerful 

princes, petty despots, and republics, differently organized, divided by 

religious jealousies, and existing only in its forms by the pressure of the 

great controlling powers of the emperor. I know not that history furnishes 

an example of a confederated republic coercing the states composing it by 

the mild influence of laws operating on the individuals of those states. 

This, therefore, I suppose to be a new experiment in politics; and, as we 

cannot always accurately ascertain the results of political measures, and as 

reasoning on them has been frequently found fallacious, we should not too 

confidently predict those to be produced by the new system.



The dangers to which we shall he exposed by a dissolution of the Union, 

have been represented; but, however much I may wish to preserve the Union, 

apprehensions of its dissolution ought not to induce us to submit to any 

measure which may involve in its consequences the loss of civil liberty. 

Conquest can do no more, in the state of civilization, than to subject us to 

be ruled by persons in whose appointment we have no agency. This, sir, is 

the worst we can apprehend at all events; and, as I suppose a government so 

organized, and possessing the powers mentioned in the proposed Constitution, 

will unavoidably terminate in the depriving us of that invaluable privilege, 

I am content to risk a probable, but, on this occasion, a mere possible 

evil, to avoid a certain one. But if a dissolution of the Union should 

unfortunately ensue, what have we to apprehend? We are connected, both by 

interest and affection, with the New England States; we harbor no 

animosities against each other; we have no interfering territorial claims; 

our manners are nearly similar, and they are daily assimilating, and mutual 

advantages will probably prompt to mutual concessions, to enable us to form 

a union with them. I, however, contemplate the idea of a possible 

dissolution with pain, and I make these remarks with the most sincere 

reluctance, only in answer to those which were offered by the honorable 

gentleman from New York.



Sir, I have formerly had occasion to declare to the public my apprehensions 

that a consolidated government, partaking in a great degree of republican 

principles, and which had in object the control of the inhabitants of the 

extensive territory of the United States, by its sole operations could not 

preserve the essential rights and liberties of the people. I have not as yet 

discovered any reason to change that sentiment; on the contrary, reflection 

has given it additional force. But I stand here the representative of 

others, and, as far as I can ascertain the views of my constituents, it is 

my duty to promote them with the utmost assiduity; and in no one pursuit can 

I be better supported by the almost unanimous opinion of my fellow-citizens 

in the county I have the honor to represent, than in proposing amendments to 

the Constitution which is now the subject of our deliberations, as the mode 

of introducing amendments was the only point of difference. Influenced by 

these considerations, every amendment which I am convinced will have a 

tendency to lessen the danger of invasion of civil liberty by the general 

government, will receive my sincere approbation. But none which can, in the 

remotest degree, originate in local views, will meet my concurrence; and I 

trust an intention will not be attributed to me to preserve the consequence 

of official state establishments.



Sir, when motives of this kind are supposed to actuate men in office, by 

persons who have imbibed prejudices from a want of information -- when they 

originate from an illiberality of sentiment which would disgrace the worst 

cause -- every man who feels the imputation, while he laments the misguided 

zeal which aims, by the sacrifice of private feelings, to obtain a favorite 

object, will disregard the attempt, and consign it to merited oblivion. But 

when an honorable gentleman, distinguished for his liberal turn of thinking, 

who is possessed of one of the most lucrative offices of the state, 

deliberately gives his name to the public, as impliedly sanctioning the 

sentiment, silence must unavoidably be construed into a tacit confession of 

its justice. The committee will therefore indulge me in remarking that, if 

the operations of the general government will subvert those of the 

individual states, the interest of the state officers may be affected in 

some measure, otherwise their emoluments will remain undiminished -- their 

consequence not so much impaired as not to compensate men of interested 

pursuits by the prospect of sharing the offices of the general government. 

Does this imputation only apply to the officers of this state? Are they more 

discerning in distinguishing their interest, or are they only capable of 

being warped by apprehensions of loss? In the neighboring states, the 

officers of government are among the warmest advocates of the new system; 

and even in this state they are perhaps more divided in sentiment than any 

other class of men whatsoever. 



the Constitution flowed from interested or improper motives. He knew that 

the officers of this state had taken different sides; he himself held a 

public station, and many of the officers of the several states were among 

its warmest advocates. He was sensible that every man in place felt, in a 

delicate degree, the dignity attached to his office. Far from aiming an 

improper suggestion of the previous or present disposition of any member, 

his only view was to express a hope, and at the same time a caution, that, 

in the prosecution of this business, gentlemen might not suffer themselves 

to be influenced by partial views or private prejudices. For, said he, we 

sit here as simple citizens, and every species of official authority is lost 

in this equal assembly. But, sir, as the officers of government were 

selected from the mass of the people, with an expectation that they would be 

their wisest and best friends, it is to be hoped that, if this Constitution 

is proved to be a good one, and friendly to the liberties of the people, 

those men who are highest in office will be the most urgent to adopt, and 

most active to execute it. He begged leave to take notice of an observation 

which had just been made He should notice it, because it tended to establish 

a new and singular opinion; that is, that, if a conditional power of 

coercion only was lodged in the government, the purposes of me union might 

be answered. The idea was, that Congress should make requisitions on the 

states, and, on their non-compliance, the compulsory authority should be 

exercised on individuals. This idea includes an acknowledgment that the old 

Confederation is totally incompetent to federal purposes.



But let us view, said he, the operation of a system founded on such a 

principle. In the first place, the necessary revenue officers must be 

appointed. Congress will then send out the requisitions, and, on refusal or 

neglect, will resort to individual coercion. If the states punctually comply 

with the requisitions, an expensive establishment must be supported, without 

object or employment. If, on the contrary, they are delinquent, what an 

alarming image of disorder is presented to our view! A body of federal 

officers, in the heart of a state, acting in direct opposition to the 

declared sense of the legislature! Would not this be a source of eternal 

disorder? Would not a government, thus calculated to promote a spirit of 

civil dissension, be forever impracticable? Such a government must be 

attended with every delay, with every expense -- must defeat itself, and be 

its own destruction.



The Hon. Mr. SMITH said, he conceived that the Constitution ought to be 

considered by paragraphs. An honorable gentleman yesterday had opened the 

debate with some general observations; another honorable gentleman had just 

answered him by general observations. He wished the Constitution to be 

examined by paragraphs. In going through it, he should offer his objections 

to such parts of it as he thought defective.



The first section of the first article was then read, and passed by without 

remark.



The second section being read,



Mr. SMITH again rose. He most heartily concurred in sentiment with the 

honorable gentleman who opened the debate, yesterday, that the discussion 

of the important question now before them ought to be entered on with a 

spirit of patriotism; with minds open to conviction; with a determination to 

form opinions only on the merits of the question, from those evidences which 

should appear in the course of the investigation.



How far the general observations made by the honorable gentleman accorded 

with these principles, he left to the house to determine.



It was not, he said, his intention to follow that gentleman through all his 

remarks. He should only observe that what had been advanced did not appear 

to apply to the subject under consideration.



He was as strongly impressed with the necessity of a union as any one could 

be. He would seek it with as much ardor. In the discussion of this question, 

he was disposed to make every reasonable concession, and, indeed, to 

sacrifice every thing for a union, except the liberties of his country, than 

which he could contemplate no greater misfortune. But he hoped we were not 

reduced to the necessity of sacrificing, or even endangering, our liberties, 

to preserve the Union. If that was the case, the alternative was dreadful. 

But he would not now say that the adoption of the Constitution would 

endanger our liberties; because that was the point to be debated, and the 

premises should be laid down previously to the drawing of any conclusion. He 

wished that all observations might be confined to this point, and that 

declamations and appeals to the passions might be omitted.



Why, said he, are we told of our weakness? of the defenceless condition of 

the southern parts of our state? of the exposed situation of our capital? of 

Long Island, surrounded by water, and exposed to the incursions of our 

neighbors in Connecticut? of Vermont having separated from us, and assumed 

the powers of a distinct government? and of the north-west parts of our 

state being in the hands of a foreign enemy? Why are we to be alarmed with 

apprehensions that the Eastern States are inimical, and disinclined to form 

alliances with us? He was sorry to find that such suspicions were 

entertained. He believed that no such disposition existed in the Eastern 

States. Surely it could not be supposed that those states would make war 

upon us for exercising the rights of freemen, deliberating and judging for 

ourselves, on a subject the most interesting that ever came before any 

assembly. If a war with our neighbors was to be the result of not acceding, 

there was no use in debating here; we had better receive their dictates, if 

we were unable to resist them. The defects of the old Confederation needed 

as little proof as the necessity of a union. But there was no proof in all 

this that the proposed Constitution was a good one. Defective as the old 

Confederation is, he said, no one could deny but it was possible we might 

have a worse government. But the question was not whether the present 

Confederation be a bad one, but whether the proposed Constitution be a good 

one.



It had been observed, that no example of federal republics had succeeded. 

It was true that the ancient confederated republics were all destroyed; so 

were those which were not confederated; and all ancient governments, of 

every form, had shared the same fate. Holland had, no doubt, experienced 

many evils from the defects in her government; but, with all these defects, 

she yet existed: she had, under her confederacy, made a principal figure 

among the nations of Europe, and he believed few countries had experienced a 

greater share of internal peace and prosperity. The Germanic confederacy was 

not the most pertinent example to produce on this occasion. Among a number 

of absolute princes, who consider their subjects as their property, whose 

will is law, and to whose ambition there are no hounds, it was no difficult 

task to discover other causes from which the convulsions in that country 

rose, than the defects of their confederation. Whether a confederacy of 

states, under any form, be a practicable government, was a question to be 

discussed in the course of investigating the Constitution.



He was pleased that, thus early in debate, the honorable gentleman had 

himself shown that the intent of the Constitution was not a confederacy, but 

a reduction of all the states into a consolidated government. He hoped the 

gentleman would be complaisant enough to exchange names with those who 

disliked the Constitution, as it appeared from his own concessions, that 

they were federalists, and those who advocated it were anti-federalists. He 

begged leave, however, to remind the gentleman, that Montesquieu, with all 

the examples of modern and ancient republics in view, gives it as his 

opinion, that a confederated republic has all the internal advantages of a 

republic, with the external force of a monarchical government. He was happy 

to find an officer of such high rank recommending to the other officers of 

government, and to those who are members of the legislature, to be unbiased 

by any motives of interest or state importance. Fortunately for himself, he 

was out of the verge of temptation of this kind, not having the honor to 

hold any office under the state. But, then, he was exposed, in common with 

other gentlemen of the Convention, to another temptation, against which he 

thought it necessary that we should be equally guarded. If, said he, this 

Constitution is adopted, there will be a number of honorable and lucrative 

offices to be filled; and we ought to be cautious lest an expectancy of some 

of them should influence us to adopt without due consideration.



We may wander, said he, in the fields of fancy without end, and gather 

flowers as we go. It may be entertaining, but it is of little service to the 

discovery of truth. We may, on one side, compare the scheme advocated by our 

opponents to golden images, with feet part of iron and part of clay; and on 

the other, to a beast dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly, having 

great iron teeth, -- which devours, breaks in pieces, and stamps the residue 

with his feet; and after all, said he, we shall find that both these 

allusions are taken from the same vision; and their true meaning must be 

discovered by sober reasoning.



He would agree with the honorable gentlemen that perfection in any system 

of government was not to be looked for. If that was the object, the debates 

on the one before them might soon be closed. But he would observe, that this 

observation applied, with equal force, against changing any system, 

especially against material and radical changes. Fickleness and inconstancy, 

he said, were characteristic of a free people; and, in framing a 

constitution for them, it was, perhaps, the most difficult thing to correct 

this spirit, and guard against the evil effects of it. He was persuaded it 

could not be altogether prevented without destroying their freedom. It would 

be like, attempting to correct a small indisposition in the habit of the 

body, fixing the patient in a confirmed consumption. This fickle and 

inconstant spirit was the more dangerous in bringing about changes in the 

government. The instance that had been adduced by the gentleman from sacred 

history, was an example in point to prove this. The nation of Israel, 

having received a form of civil government from Heaven, enjoyed it for a 

considerable period; but, at length, laboring under pressures which were 

brought upon them by their own misconduct and imprudence, instead of 

imputing their misfortunes to their true causes, and making a proper 

improvement of their calamities, by a correction of their errors, they 

imputed them to a defect in their constitution; they rejected their divine 

Ruler, and asked Samuel to make them a king to judge them, like other 

nations. Samuel was grieved at their folly; but still, by the command of 

God, he hearkened to their voice, though not until he had solemnly declared 

unto them the manner in which the king should reign over them. "This (says 

Samuel) shall be the manner of the king that shall reign over you. He will 

take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and for his 

horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots; and he will appoint him 

captains over thousands, and captains over fifties, and will set them to ear 

his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and 

instruments of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be 

confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he will take your 

fields, and your vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the best of them, and 

give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of 

your vineyards, and give to his officers and to his servants, and he will 

take your men-servants, and your maid-servants, and your goodliest young 

men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of 

your sheep; and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day, 

because of your king which ye have chosen you; and the Lord will not hear 

you in that day!" How far this was applicable to the subject, he would not 

now say. it could be better judged of when they had gone through it. On the 

whole, he wished to take up this matter with candor and deliberation.



He would now proceed to state his objections to the clause just read, 

(section 2, of article 1, clause 3.) His objections were comprised under 

three heads: 1st, the rule of apportionment is unjust; 2d, there is no 

precise number fixed on, below which the house shall not be reduced; 3d, it 

is inadequate. In the first place, the rule of apportionment of the 

representatives is to be according to the whole number of the white 

inhabitants, with three fifths of all others; that is, in plain English, 

each state is to send representatives in proportion to the number of 

freemen, and three fifths of the slaves it contains. He could not see any 

rule by which slaves were to he included in the ratio of representation. The 

principle of a representation being that every free agent should be 

concerned in governing himself, it was absurd in giving that power to a man 

who could not exercise it. Slaves have no will of their own. The very 

operation of it was to give certain privileges to those people who were so 

wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would be admitted that this rule of 

apportionment was founded on unjust principles, but that it was the result 

of accommodation; which, he supposed, we should be under the necessity of 

admitting, if we meant to be in union with the Southern States, though 

utterly repugnant to his feelings. In the second place, the number was not 

fixed by the Constitution, but left at the discretion of the legislature; 

perhaps he was mistaken; it was his wish to be informed. He understood, from 

the Constitution, that sixty-five members were to compose the House of 

Representatives for three years; that, after that time, the census was to be 

taken, and the numbers to be ascertained by the legislature, on the 

following principles: 1st, they shall be apportioned to the respective 

states according to numbers; 2d, each state shall have one, at least; 3d, 

they shall never exceed one to every thirty thousand. If this was the case, 

the first Congress that met might reduce the number below what it now is -- 

a power inconsistent with every principle of a free government, to leave it 

to the discretion of the rulers to determine the number of representatives 

of the people. There was no kind of security except in the integrity of the 

men who were intrusted; and if you have no other security, it is idle to 

contend about constitutions. In the third place, supposing Congress should 

declare that there should be one representative for every thirty thousand 

of the people, in his opinion, it would he incompetent to the great purposes 

of representation. It was, he said, the fundamental principle of a free 

government, that the people should make the laws by which they were to be 

governed. He who is controlled by another is a slave; and that government 

which is directed by the will of any one, or a few, or any number less than 

is the will of the community, is a government for slaves.



The new point was, How was the will of the community to be expressed? It 

was not possible for them to come together; the multitude would be too 

great: in order, therefore, to provide against this inconvenience, the 

scheme of representation had been adopted, by which the people deputed 

others to represent them. Individuals entering into society became one body, 

and that body ought to be animated by one mind; and he conceived that every 

form of government should have that complexion. It was true, notwithstanding 

all the experience we had from others, it had appeared that the experiment 

of representation had been fairly tried; there was something like it in the 

ancient republics, in which, being of small extent, the people could easily 

meet together, though, instead of deliberating, they only considered of 

those things which were submitted to them by their magistrates. In Great 

Britain, representation had been carried much further than in any government 

we knew of, except our own; but in that country it now had only a name. 

America was the only country in which the first fair opportunity had been 

offered. When we were colonies, our representation was better than any that 

was then known: since the revolution, we had advanced still nearer to 

perfection. He considered it as an object, of all others the most important, 

to have it fixed on its true principle; yet he was convinced that it was 

impracticable to have such a representation in a consolidated government. 

However, said he, we may approach a great way towards perfection by 

increasing the representation and limiting the powers of Congress. He 

considered that the great interests and liberties of the people could only 

be secured by the state governments. He admitted that, if the new 

government was only confined to great national objects, it would be less 

exceptionable; but it extended to every thing dear to human nature. That 

this was the case, would be proved without any long chain of reasoning; for 

that power which had both the purse and the sword had the government of the 

whole country, and might extend its powers to any and to every object. He 

had already observed that, by the true doctrine of representation, this 

principle was established -- that the representative must be chosen by the 

free will of the majority of his constituents. It therefore followed that 

the representative should be chosen from small districts. This being 

admitted, he would ask, Could 65 men for 3,000,000, or 1 for 30,000, be 

chosen in this manner? Would they be possessed of the requisite information 

to make happy the great number of souls that were spread over this extensive 

country? There was another objection to the clause: if great affairs of 

government were trusted to few men, they would be more liable to corruption. 

Corruption, he knew, was unfashionable amongst us, but he supposed that 

Americans were like other men; and though they had hitherto displayed great 

virtues, still they were men; and therefore such steps should be taken as to 

prevent the possibility of corruption. We were now in that stage of society 

in which we could deliberate with freedom; how long it might continue, God 

only knew! Twenty years hence, perhaps, these maxims might become 

unfashionable. We already hear, said he, in all parts of the country, 

gentlemen ridiculing that spirit of patriotism, and love of liberty, which 

carried us through all our difficulties in times of danger. When patriotism 

was already nearly hooted out of society, ought we not to take some 

precautions against the progress of corruption?



He had one more observation to make, to show that the representation was 

insufficient. Government, he said, must rest, for its execution, on the 

good opinion of the people: for, if it was made heaven, and had not the 

confidence of the people, it could not be executed; that this was proved by 

the example given by the gentleman of the Jewish theocracy. It must have a 

good setting out, or the instant it takes place, there is an end of liberty. 

He believed that the inefficacy of the old Confederation had arisen from 

that want of confidence; and this caused, in a great degree, by the 

continual declamation of gentlemen of importance against it from one end of 

the continent to the other, who had frequently compared it to a rope of 

sand. It had pervaded every class of citizens; and their misfortunes, the 

consequences of idleness and extravagance, were attributed to the defects 

of that system. At the close of the war, our country had been left in 

distress; and it was impossible that any government on earth could 

immediately retrieve it; it must be time and industry alone that could 

effect it. He said, he would pursue these observation? no further at 

present, -- and concluded with making the following motion: --



"Resolved, That it is proper that the number of representatives be fixed at 

the rate of one for every twenty thousand inhabitants, to he ascertained on 

the principles mentioned in the 2d section of the 1st article of the 

Constitution, until they amount to three hundred; after which they shall be 

apportioned among the states, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of 

the states respectively; and that, before the first enumeration shall be 

made, the several states shall be entitled to choose double the number of 

representatives, for that purpose mentioned in the Constitution."



The Hon. Mr. HAMILTON then rose. Mr. Chairman, the honorable member who 

spoke yesterday went into an explanation of a variety of circumstances, to 

prove the expediency of a change in our national government, and the 

necessity of a firm union. At the same time, he described the great 

advantages which this state, in particular, receives from the confederacy, 

and its peculiar weaknesses when abstracted from the Union. In doing this, 

he advanced a variety of arguments, which deserve serious consideration. 

Gentlemen have this day come forward to answer him. He has been treated as 

having wandered in the flowery fields of fancy; and attempts have been made 

to take off from the minds of the committee that sober impression which 

might be expected from his arguments. I trust, sir, that observations of 

this kind are not thrown out to cast a light air on this important subject, 

or to give any personal bias on the great question before us. I will not 

agree with gentlemen who trifle with the weaknesses of our country, and 

suppose that they are enumerated to answer a party purpose, and to terrify 

with ideal dangers. No. I believe these weaknesses to be real, and pregnant 

with destruction. Yet, however weak our country may be, I hope we never 

shall sacrifice our liberties. If, therefore, on a full and candid 

discussion, the proposed system shall appear to have that tendency, for 

God's sake, let us reject it! But let us not mistake words for things, nor 

accept doubtful surmises as the evidence of truth. Let us consider the 

Constitution calmly and dispassionately, and attend to those things only 

which merit consideration.



No arguments drawn from embarrassment or inconvenience ought to prevail 

upon us to adopt a system of government radically bad; yet it is proper that 

these arguments, among others, should be brought into view. In doing this, 

yesterday, it was necessary to reflect upon our situation; to dwell upon the 

imbecility of our union; and to consider whether we, as a state, could stand 

alone. Although I am persuaded this Convention will be resolved to adopt 

nothing that is bad, yet I think every prudent man will consider the merits 

of the plan in connection with the circumstances of our country, and that a 

rejection of the Constitution may involve must fatal consequences. I make 

these remarks to show that, though we ought not to be actuated by 

unreasonable fear, yet we ought to be prudent.



This day, sir, one gentleman has attempted to answer the arguments advanced 

by my honorable friend; another has treated him as having wandered from the 

subject. This being the case, I trust I shall be indulged in reviewing the 

remarks that have been made.



Sir, it appears to me extraordinary, that, while gentlemen in one breath 

acknowledge that the old Confederation requires many material amendments, 

they should in the next deny that its defects have been the cause of our 

political weakness, and the consequent calamities of our country. I cannot 

but infer from this, that there is still some lurking favorite imagination, 

that this system, with correctness, might become a safe and permanent one. 

It is proper that we should examine this matter. We contend that the radical 

vice in the old Confederation is, that the laws of the Union apply only to 

states in their corporate capacity. Has not every man who has been in our 

legislature experienced the truth of this position? It is inseparable from 

the disposition of bodies, who have a constitutional power of resistance, to 

examine the merits of a law. This has ever been the case with the federal 

requisitions. In this examination, not being furnished with those lights 

which directed the deliberations of the general government, and incapable of 

embracing the general interests of the Union, the states have almost 

uniformly weighed the requisitions by their own local interests, and have 

only executed them so far as answered their particular convenience or 

advantage. Hence there have ever been thirteen different bodies to judge of 

the measures of Congress, and the operations of government have been 

distracted by their taking different courses. Those which were to be 

benefited have complied with the requisitions; others have totally 

disregarded them. Have not all of us been witnesses to the unhappy 

embarrassments which resulted from these proceedings? Even during the late 

war, while the pressure of common danger connected strongly the bond of our 

union, and incited to vigorous exertion, we have felt many distressing 

effects of the important system. How have we seen this state, though most 

exposed to the calamities of the war, complying, in an unexampled manner, 

with the federal requisitions, and compelled by the delinquency of others to 

bear most unusual burdens! Of this truth we have the most solemn proof on 

our records. In 1779 and '80, when the state, from the ravages of war, and 

from her great exertions to resist them, became weak, distressed, and 

forlorn, every man avowed the principle which we now contend for -- that our 

misfortunes, in a great degree, proceeded from the want of vigor in the 

Continental government. These were our sentiments when we did not speculate, 

but feel. We saw our weakness, and found ourselves its victims. Let us 

reflect that this may again, in all probability, be our situation. This is a 

weak state, and its relative state is dangerous. Your capital is accessible 

by land, and by sea is exposed to every daring invader; and on the 

north-west you are open to the inroads of a powerful foreign nation. Indeed, 

this state, from its situation, will, in time of war, probably be the 

theatre of its operations.



Gentlemen have said that the non-compliance of the states had been 

occasioned by their sufferings. This may in part be true. But has this state 

been delinquent? Amidst all our distresses, we have fully complied. If New 

York could comply wholly with the requisitions, is it not to be supposed 

that the other states could in part comply? Certainly every state in the 

Union might have executed them in some degree. But New Hampshire, which has 

not suffered at all, is totally delinquent. North Carolina is totally 

delinquent. Many others have contributed in a very small proportion. And 

Pennsylvania and New York are the only states which have perfectly 

discharged their federal duty.



From the delinquency of those states which have suffered little by the war, 

we naturally conclude, that they have made no efforts; and a knowledge of 

human nature will teach us that their ease and security have been a 

principal cause of their want of exertion. While danger is distant, its 

impression is weak; and while it affects only our neighbors, we have few 

motives to provide against it. Sir, if we have national objects to pursue, 

we must have national revenues. If you make requisitions, and they are not 

complied with. what is to be done? It has been observed, to coerce the 

states is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of 

compliance will never be confined to a single state This being the case, can 

we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? Suppose Massachusetts, or any 

large state, should refuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them, 

would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those 

states which are in the same situation as themselves? What picture does this 

idea present to our view? A complying state at war with a non-complying 

state; Congress marching the troops of one state into the bosom of another; 

this state collecting auxiliaries, and forming, perhaps, a majority against 

its federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable 

man be well disposed towards a government which makes war and carnage the 

only means of supporting itself -- a government that can exist only by the 

sword? Every such war must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single 

consideration should be sufficient to dispose every peaceable citizen 

against such a government.



But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as an 

instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is impossible. Then we are 

brought to this dilemma -- either a federal standing army is to enforce the 

requisitions, or the federal treasury is left without supplies, and the 

government without support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? 

Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the 

same manner as those of the states do. This is the true reasoning upon the 

subject, sir. The gentlemen appear to acknowledge its force; and yet, while 

they yield to the principle, they seem to fear its application to the 

government.



What, then, shall we do? Shall we take the old Confederation, as the basis 

of a new system? Can this be the object of the gentlemen? Certainly not. 

Will any man, who entertains a wish for the safety of his country, trust the 

sword and the purse with a single assembly organized on principles so 

defective -- so rotten? Though we might give to such a government certain 

powers with safety, yet to give them the full and unlimited powers of 

taxation and the national forces, would be to establish a despotism; the 

definition of which is, a government in which all power is concentred in a 

single body. To take the old Confederation, and fashion it upon these 

principles, would be establishing a power which would destroy the liberties 

of the people. These considerations show clearly that a government totally 

different must be instituted. They had weight in the Convention who formed 

the new system. It was seen that the necessary powers were too great to be 

trusted to a single body; they therefore formed two branches, and divided 

the powers, that each might be a check upon the other. This was the result 

of their wisdom; and I presume that every reasonable man will agree to it. 

The more this subject is explained, the more clear and convincing it will 

appear to every member of this body. The fundamental principle of the old 

Confederation is defective; we must totally eradicate and discard this 

principle before we can expect an efficient government. The gentlemen who 

have spoken to-day have taken up the subject of the ancient confederacies; 

hut their view of them has been extremely partial and erroneous. The fact 

is, the same false and impracticable principle ran through the ancient 

governments. The first of these governments that we read of, was the 

Amphictyonic confederacy. The council which managed the affairs of this 

league possessed powers of a similar complexion to those of our present 

Congress. The same feeble mode of legislation in the head, and the same 

power of resistance in the members, prevailed. When a requisition was made, 

it rarely met a compliance; and a civil war was the consequence. Those that 

were attacked called in foreign aid to protect them; and the ambitious 

Philip, under the mask of an ally to one, invaded the liberties of each, and 

finally subverted the whole.



The operation of this principle appears in the same light in the Dutch 

republics. They have been obliged to levy taxes by an armed force. In this 

confederacy, one large province, by its superior wealth and influence, is 

commonly a match for all the rest; and when they do not comply, the province 

of Holland is obliged to compel them. It is observed, that the United 

Provinces have existed a long time; but they have been constantly the sport 

of their neighbors, and have been supported only by the external pressure of 

the surrounding powers. The policy of Europe, not the policy of their 

government, has saved them from dissolution. Besides, the powers of the 

stadtholder have given energy to the operations of this government, which is 

not to be found in ours. This prince has a vast personal influence; he has 

independent revenues; he commands an army of forty thousand men.



The German confederacy has also been a perpetual source of wars. They have 

a diet, like our Congress, who have authority to call for supplies. These 

calls are never obeyed; and in time of war, the imperial army never takes 

the field till the enemy are returning from it. The emperor's Austrian 

dominions, in which he is an absolute prince, alone enable him to make head 

against the common foe. The members of this confederacy are ever divided and 

opposed to each other. The king of Prussia is a member; yet he has been 

constantly in opposition to the emperor. Is this a desirable government?



I might go more particularly into the discussion of examples, and show 

that, wherever this fatal principle has prevailed, even as far back as the 

Lycian and Achaean leagues, as well as the Amphictyonic confederacy, it has 

proved the destruction of the government. But I think observations of this 

kind might have been spared. Had they not been entered into by others, I 

should not have taken up so much of the time of the committee. No inference 

can be drawn from these examples, that republics cannot exist: we only 

contend that they have hitherto been founded on false principles. We have 

shown how they have been conducted, and how they have been destroyed. 

Weakness in the head has produced resistance in the members; this has been 

the immediate parent of civil war: auxiliary force has been invited; and 

foreign power has annihilated their liberties and name. Thus Philip 

subverted the Amphictyonic, and Rome the Achaean republic. 



We shall do well, sir, not to deceive ourselves with the favorable events 

of the late war. Common danger prevented the operation of the ruinous 

principle, in its full extent; but, since the peace, we have experienced the 

evils; we have felt the poison of the system in its unmingled purity.



Without dwelling any longer on this subject, I shall proceed to the 

question immediately before the committee.



In order that the committee may understand clearly the principles on which 

the general Convention acted, I think it necessary to explain some 

preliminary circumstances. Sir, the natural situation of this country seems 

to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and 

non-navigating states. The Northern are properly navigating states: the 

Southern appear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. 

This difference of situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests 

and views respecting foreign commerce. It was the interest of the Northern 

States that there should be no restraints on their navigation, and they 

should have full power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial 

regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation of 

foreigners. The Southern States wish to impose a restraint on the Northern, 

by requiring that two thirds in Congress should be requisite to pass an act 

in regulation of commerce. They were apprehensive that the restraints of a 

navigation law would discourage foreigners, and, by obliging them to employ 

the shipping of the Northern States, would probably enhance their freight. 

This being the case, they insisted strenuously on having this provision 

ingrafted in the Constitution; and the Northern States were as anxious in 

opposing it. On the other hand, the small states, seeing themselves embraced 

by the Confederation upon equal terms, wished to retain the advantages which 

they already possessed. The large states, on the contrary, thought it 

improper that Rhode Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with 

themselves. From these sources a delicate and difficult contest arose. It 

became necessary, therefore, to compromise, or the Convention must have 

dissolved without effecting any thing. Would it have been wise and prudent 

in that body, in this critical situation, to have deserted their country? 

No. Every man who hears me, every wise man in the United States, would have 

condemned them. The Convention were obliged to appoint a committee for 

accommodation. In this committee, the arrangement was formed as it now 

stands, and their report was accepted. It was a delicate point, and it was 

necessary that all parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will see that, if 

there had not been a unanimity, nothing could have been done; for the 

Convention had no power to establish, but only to recommend, a government. 

Any other system would have been impracticable. Let a convention be called 

to-morrow; let them meet twenty times, -- nay, twenty thousand times; they 

will have the same difficulties to encounter, the same clashing interests to 

reconcile.



But, dismissing these reflections, let us consider how far the arrangement 

is in itself entitled to the approbation of this body. We will examine it 

upon its own merits.



The first thing objected to is that clause which allows a representation 

for three fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of the impropriety of 

representing men who have no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or 

declamation, I will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of 

the Southern States to have a great part of their population, as well as 

property, in blacks. The regulation complained of was one result of the 

spirit of accommodation which governed the Convention; and without this 

indulgence no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir, considering 

some peculiar advantages which we derive from them, it is entirely just that 

they should be gratified. The Southern States possess certain staples, -- 

tobacco, rice, indigo, &c., -- which must be capital objects in treaties of 

commerce with foreign nations; and the advantages which they necessarily 

procure in those treaties will be felt throughout all the states. But the 

justice of this plan will appear in another view. The best writers on 

government have held that representation should be compounded of persons and 

property. This rule has been adopted, as far as it could be, in the 

constitution of New York. It will, however, by no means be admitted that the 

slaves are considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded 

to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of 

the states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of nature. But 

representation and taxation go together, and one uniform rule ought to apply 

to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of 

taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the apportionment of 

representatives? Would it be just to impose a singular burden, without 

conferring some adequate advantage?



Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule we have been speaking 

of is a general rule, and applies to all the states. Now, you have a great 

number of people in your state, which are not represented at all, and have 

no voice in your government. These will be included in the enumeration -- 

not two fifths, nor three fifths, but the whole This proves that the 

advantages of the plan are not confined to the Southern States, but extend 

to other parts of the Union.



I now proceed to consider the objection with regard to the number of 

representatives, as it now stands. I am persuaded the system, in this 

respect, stands on a better footing than the gentlemen imagine.



It has been asserted that it will be in the power of Congress to reduce the 

number. I acknowledge that there are no direct words of prohibition, but 

contend that the true and genuine construction of the clause gives Congress 

no power whatever to reduce the representation below the number as it now 

stands. Although they may limit, they can never diminish the number. One 

representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants is fixed as the 

standard of increase; till, by the natural course of population, it shall 

become necessary to limit the ratio. Probably, at present, were this 

standard to be immediately applied, the representation would considerably 

exceed sixty-five. In three years, it would exceed one hundred. If I 

understand the gentlemen, they contend that the number may be enlarged, or 

may not. I admit that this is in the discretion of Congress; and I submit to 

the committee whether it be not necessary and proper. Still, I insist that 

an immediate limitation is not probable, nor was it in the contemplation of 

the Convention. But, sir, who will presume to say to what precise point the 

representation ought to be increased? This is a matter of opinion, and 

opinions are vastly different upon the subject. A proof of this is drawn 

from the representations in the state legislatures. In Massachusetts, the 

Assembly consists of about three hundred; in South Carolina, of nearly one 

hundred; in New York, there are sixty-five. It is observed generally that 

the number ought to be large; let the gentlemen produce their criterion. I 

confess it is difficult for me to say what number may be said to be 

sufficiently large. On one hand, it ought to be considered that a small 

number will act with more facility, system, and decision; on the other, that 

a large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to 

consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a reasonable man, may 

appear as near the proper medium as any number whatever, at least for the 

present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon 

any constructions of the Constitution; it is the creation of new states. 

Vermont, Kentucky, and Franklin,[1] will probably become independent. New 

members of the Union will also be formed from the unsettled tracts of 

western territory. 



These must be represented, and will all contribute to swell the federal 

legislature. If the whole number in the United States be, at present, three 

millions, as is commonly supposed, according to the ratio of one for thirty 

thousand, we shall have, on the first census, a hundred representatives. In 

ten years, thirty more will be added; and in twenty-five years, the number 

will be double. Then, sir, we shall have two hundred, if the increase goes 

on in the same proportion. The Convention of Massachusetts, who made the 

same objections, have fixed upon this number as the point to which they 

chose to limit the representation. But can we pronounce, with certainty, 

that it will not be expedient to go beyond this number? We cannot. 

Experience alone must determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left 

to the discretion of the legislature, as it will be the interest of the 

large and increasing states of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, &c., 

to augment the representation. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and 

Maryland, can be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely 

calculate upon a growing representation, according to the advance of 

population, and the circumstances of the country. 



The state governments possess inherent advantages, which will ever give 

them an influence and ascendency over the national government, and will 

forever preclude the possibility of federal encroachments. That their 

liberties, indeed, can be subverted by the federal head, is repugnant to 

every rule of political calculation. Is not this arrangement, then, sir, a 

most wise and prudent one? Is not the present representation fully adequate 

to our present exigencies, and sufficient to answer all the purposes of the 

Union? I am persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal 

government will afford a conclusive answer.



Many other observations might be made on this subject, but I cannot now 

pursue them; for I feel myself not a little exhausted. I beg leave, 

therefore, to waive, for the present, the further discussion of the 

question.



SATURDAY, June 21, 1788. -- Convention met pursuant to adjournment.



The Hon. Mr. WILLIAMS rose, and addressed the chair. We are now, sir, said 

he, to investigate and decide upon a Constitution, in which not only the 

present members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the 

happiness or misery of generations yet unborn is, in a great measure, 

suspended. I therefore hope for a wise and prudent determination. I believe 

that this country has never before seen such a critical period in political 

affairs. We have felt the feebleness of those ties by which the states are 

held together, and the want of that energy which is necessary to manage our 

general concerns. Various are the expedients which have been proposed to 

remedy these evils; but they have been proposed without effect; though I am 

persuaded that, if the Confederation had been attended to as its value 

justly merited, and proper attention paid to a few necessary amendments, it. 

might have carried us on for a series of years, and probably have been in 

as great estimation with succeeding ages as it was in our long and painful 

war, notwithstanding the frightful picture that has been drawn of our 

situation, and the imputation of all our difficulties to the want of an 

energetic government. Indeed, sir, it appears to me that many of our present 

distresses flow from a source very different from the defects in the 

Confederation. Unhappily for us, immediately after our extrication from a 

cruel and unnatural war, luxury and dissipation overran the country, 

banishing all that economy, frugality, and industry, which had been 

exhibited during the war.



Sir, if we were to reassume all our old habits, we might expect to prosper. 

Let us, then, abandon all those foreign commodities which have hitherto 

deluged our country, which have loaded us with debt, and which, if 

continued, will forever involve us in difficulties. How many thousands are 

daily wearing the manufactures of Europe, when, by a little industry and 

frugality, they might wear those of their own country! One may venture to 

say, sir, that the greatest part of the goods are manufactured in Europe by 

persons who support themselves by our extravagance. And can we believe a 

government ever so well formed can relieve us from these evils? What 

dissipation is there from the immoderate use of spirits! Is it not notorious 

that men cannot be hired, in time of harvest, without giving them, on an 

average, a pint of rum per day? so that, on the lowest calculation, every 

twentieth part of the grain is expended on that article; and so, in 

proportion, all the farmer's produce. And what is worse, the disposition of 

eight tenths of the commonalty is such, that, if they can get credit, they 

will purchase unnecessary articles, even to the amount of their crop, before 

it becomes merchantable. And therefore it is evident that the best 

government ever devised, without economy and frugality, will leave us in a 

situation no better than the present.



Sir, the enormous expense of the article of tea will amount, in two years, 

to our whole foreign debt. Much more might be said on the subject; but I 

fear I have trespassed on your patience already. The time of the committee 

would not have been so long taken up, had there not appeared a propriety in 

showing that all our present difficulties are not to be attributed to the 

defects in the Confederation; and, were the real truth known, part of its 

defects have been used as an instrument to make way for the proposed system; 

and whether or not it is calculated for greater emoluments and more placemen 

the committee will determine. However, from what has been said, and the mode 

agreed on for our proceedings, it appears probable that the system of 

government under consideration is preferred before the Confederation. This 

being the case, let us examine whether it be calculated to preserve the 

invaluable blessings of liberty, and secure the inestimable rights of 

mankind. If it be so, let us adopt it. But if it be found to contain 

principles that will lead to the subversion of liberty, -- if it tends to 

establish a despotism, or, what is worse, a tyrannical aristocracy, -- let 

us insist upon the necessary alterations and amendments.



Momentous is the question, and we are called upon by every motive to 

examine it well, and make up a wise and candid judgment.



In forming a constitution for a free country like this, the greatest care 

should be taken to define its powers, and guard against an abuse of 

authority. The constitution should be so formed as not to swallow up the 

state governments: the general government ought to be confined to certain 

national objects; and the states should retain such powers as concern their 

own internal police. We should consider whether or not this system is so 

formed, as, directly or indirectly, to annihilate the state governments. If 

so, care should be taken to check it in such a manner as to prevent this 

effect. Now, sir, with respect to the clause before us, I agree with the 

gentlemen from Albany and Duchess, who spoke yesterday. The number of 

representatives is, in my opinion, too small to resist corruption. Sir, how 

guarded is our state Constitution on this head! The number of the Senate 

and House of Representatives proposed in the Constitution does not surpass 

those of our state. How great the disparity, when compared with the 

aggregate number of the United States! The history of representation in 

England, from which we have taken our model, is briefly this: Before the 

institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the community 

usually met for that purpose: when this became impracticable by increase of 

numbers, the people were divided into districts, from each of which was sent 

a number of deputies, for a complete representation of the various orders of 

the citizens within them. Can it be supposed that six men can be a complete 

representation of the various orders of the people of this state?



I conceive, too, that biennial elections are a departure from the true 

principles of democracy. A well-digested democracy has advantages over all 

other forms of government. It affords to many the opportunity of being 

advanced, and creates that desire of public promotion, and ardent affection 

for the public weal, which are so beneficial to our country. It was the 

opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu that annual elections are 

productive of this effect. But as there are more important defects in the 

proposed Constitution, I shall desist making any further observations at 

this time.



In order to convince gentlemen it is my sincere intention to accede to this 

system, when properly amended, I give it as my opinion that it will be best 

for gentlemen to confine themselves to certain points which are defective.



Before I conclude, I would only mention, that while, on one hand, I wish 

those endowed with a spirit of moderation through the whole debate, to give 

way to small matters, yet, on the other hand, not to be intimidated by 

imaginary dangers; for to say that a bad government must be established for 

fear of anarchy, is, in reality, saying that we must kill ourselves for fear 

of dying. 



Mr. M. SMITH. I had the honor, yesterday, of submitting an amendment to the 

clause under consideration, with some observations in support of it. I hope 

I shall be indulged in making some additional remarks in reply to what has 

been offered by the honorable gentleman from New York.



He has taken up much time in endeavoring to prove that the great defect in 

the old Confederation was, that it operated upon states instead of 

individuals. It is needless to dispute concerning points on which we do not 

disagree. It is admitted that the powers of the general government ought to 

operate upon individuals to a certain degree. How far the powers should 

extend, and in what cases to individuals, is the question.



As the different parts of the system will come into view in the course of 

our investigation, an opportunity will be afforded to consider this 

question. I wish, at present, to confine myself to the subject immediately 

under the consideration of the committee. I shall make no reply to the 

arguments offered by the honorable gentleman to justify the rule of 

apportionment fixed by this clause; for, though I am confident they might be 

easily refuted, yet I am persuaded we must yield this point, in 

accommodation to the Southern States. The amendment therefore proposes no 

alteration to the clause in this respect. 



The honorable gentleman says, that the clause, by obvious construction, 

fixes the representation. I wish not to torture words or sentences. I 

perceive no such obvious construction.



I see clearly that, on one hand, the representatives cannot exceed one for 

thirty thousand inhabitants; and, on the other, that whatever larger number 

of inhabitants may be taken for the rule of apportionment, each state shall 

be entitled to send one representative. Every thing else appears to me in 

the discretion of the legislature. If there be any other limitation, it is 

certainly implied. Matters of moment should not be left to doubtful 

construction. It is urged that the number of representatives will be fixed 

at one for thirty thousand, because it will be the interest of the larger 

states to do it. I cannot discern the force of this argument. To me it 

appears clear, that the relative weight of influence of the different states 

will be the same, with the number of representatives at sixty-five as at six 

hundred, and that of the individual members greater; for each member's share 

of power will decrease as the number of the House of Representatives 

increases. If, therefore, this maxim be true, that men are unwilling to 

relinquish powers which they once possess, we are not to expect the House of 

Representatives will be inclined to enlarge the numbers. The same motive 

will operate to influence the President and Senate to oppose the increase of 

the number of representatives; for, in proportion as the House of 

Representatives is augmented, they will feel their own power diminished. It 

is, therefore, of the highest importance that a suitable number of 

representatives should be established by the Constitution. 



It has been observed, by an honorable member, that the Eastern States 

insisted upon a small representation, on the principles of economy. This 

argument must have no weight in the mind of a considerate person. The 

difference of expense, between supporting a House of Representatives 

sufficiently numerous, and the present proposed one, would be twenty or 

thirty thousand dollars per annum. The man who would seriously object to 

this expense, to secure his liberties, does not deserve to enjoy them. 

Besides, by increasing the number of representatives, we open a door for the 

admission of the substantial yeomanry of our country, who, being possessed 

of the habits of economy, will be cautious of imprudent expenditures, by 

which means a greater saving will be made of public money than is sufficient 

to support them. A reduction of the numbers of the state legislatures might 

also be made, by which means there might be a saving of expense much more 

than sufficient for the purpose of supporting the general legislature; for 

as, under this system, all the powers of legislation, relating to our 

general concerns, are vested in the general government, the powers of the 

state legislatures will be so curtailed as to render it less necessary to 

have them so numerous as they now are.



But an honorable gentleman has observed, that it is a problem that cannot 

be solved, what the proper number is which ought to compose the House of 

Representatives, and calls upon me to fix the number. I admit that this is 

a question that will not admit of a solution with mathematical certainty; 

few political questions will; yet we may determine with certainty that 

certain numbers are too small or too large. We may be sure that ten is too 

small, and a thousand too large a number. Every one will allow that the 

first number is too small to possess the sentiments, be influenced by the 

interests of the people, or secure against corruption; a thousand would be 

too numerous to be capable of deliberating.



To determine whether the number of representatives proposed by this 

Constitution is sufficient, it is proper to examine the qualifications which 

this house ought to possess, in order to exercise their power discreetly for 

the happiness of the people. The idea that naturally suggests itself to our 

minds, when we speak of representatives, is, that they resemble those they 

represent. They should be a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge 

of their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, 

and be disposed to seek their true interests. The knowledge necessary for 

the representative of a free people not only comprehends extensive political 

and commercial information, such as is acquired by men of refined education, 

who have leisure to attain to high degrees of improvement, but it should 

also comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the common concerns and 

occupations of the people, which men of the middling class of life are, in 

general, more competent to than those of a superior class. To understand the 

true commercial interests of a country, not only requires just ideas of the 

general commerce of the world, but also, and principally, a knowledge of the 

productions of your own country, and their value, what your soil is capable 

of producing, the nature of your manufactures, and the capacity of the 

country to increase both. To exercise the power of laying taxes, duties, and 

excises, with discretion, requires something more than an acquaintance with 

the abstruse parts of the system of finance. It calls for a knowledge of the 

circumstances and ability of the people in general -- a discernment how the 

burdens imposed will bear upon the different classes.



From these observations results this conclusion -- that the number of 

representatives should be so large, as that, while it embraces the men of 

the first class, it should admit those of the middling class of life. I am 

convinced that this government is so constituted that the representatives 

will generally be composed of the first class in the community, which I 

shall distinguish by the name of the natural aristocracy of the country. I 

do not mean to give offence by using this term. I am sensible this idea is 

treated by many gentlemen as chimerical. I shall he asked what is meant by 

the natural aristocracy, and told that no such distinction of classes of men 

exists among us. It is true, it is our singular felicity that we have no 

legal or hereditary distinctions of this kind; but still there are real 

differences. Every society naturally divides itself into classes. The Author 

of nature has bestowed on some greater capacities than others; birth, 

education, talents, and wealth, create distinctions among men as visible, 

and of as much influence, as titles, stars, and garters. In every society, 

men of this class will command a superior degree of respect; and if the 

government is so constituted as to admit but few to exercise the powers of 

it, it will, according to the natural course of things, be in their hands. 

Men in the middling class, who are qualified as representatives, will not 

be so anxious to be chosen as those of the first. When the number is so 

small, the office will be highly elevated and distinguished; the style in 

which the members live will probably be high; circumstances of this kind 

will render the place of a representative not a desirable one to sensible, 

substantial men, who have been used to walk in the plain and frugal paths of 

life.



Besides, the influence of the great will generally enable them to succeed 

in elections. It will be difficult to combine a district of country 

containing thirty or forty thousand inhabitants, -- frame your election laws 

as you please, -- in any other character, unless it be in one of conspicuous 

military, popular, civil, or legal talents. The great easily form 

associations; the poor and middling class form them with difficulty. If the 

elections be by plurality, -- as probably will be the case in this state, -- 

it is almost certain none but the great will be chosen, for they easily 

unite their interests: the common people will divide, and their divisions 

will be promoted by the others. There will be scarcely a chance of their 

uniting in any other but some great man, unless in some popular demagogue, 

who will probably be destitute of principle. A substantial yeoman, of sense 

and discernment, will hardly ever be chosen. From these remarks, it appears 

that the government will fall into the hands of the few and the great. This 

will be a government of oppression. I do not mean to declaim against the 

great, and charge them indiscriminately with want of principle and honesty. 

The same passions and prejudices govern all men. The circumstances in which 

men are placed in a great measure give a cast to the human character. Those 

in middling circumstances have less temptation; they are inclined by habit, 

and the company with whom they associate, to set bounds to their passions 

and appetites. If this is not sufficient, the want of means to gratify them 

will be a restraint: they are obliged to employ their time in their 

respective callings; hence the substantial yeomanry of the country are more 

temperate, of better morals, and less ambition, than the great. The latter 

do not feel for the poor and middling class; the reasons are obvious -- they 

are not obliged to use the same pains and labor to procure property as the 

other. They feel not the inconveniences arising from the payment of small 

sums. The great consider themselves above the common people, entitled to 

more respect, do not associate with them; they fancy themselves to have a 

right of preeminence in every thing. In short, they possess the same 

feelings, and are under the influence of the same motives, as an hereditary 

nobility. I know the idea that such a distinction exists in this country is 

ridiculed by some; but I am not the less apprehensive of danger from their 

influence on this account. Such distinctions exist all the world over, have 

been taken notice of by all writers on free government, and are founded in 

the nature of things. It has been the principal care of free governments to 

guard against the encroachments of the great. Common observation and 

experience prove the existence of such distinctions. Will any one say that 

there dues not exist in this country the pride of family, of wealth, of 

talents, and that they do not command influence and respect among the common 

people? Congress, in their address to the inhabitants of the province of 

Quebec, in 1775, state this distinction in the following forcible words, 

quoted from the Marquis Beccaria: "In every human society there is an essay 

continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, 

and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness and misery. The intent of 

good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence 

universally and equally." We ought to guard against the government being 

placed in the hands of this class. They cannot have that sympathy with their 

constituents which is necessary to connect them closely to their interests. 

Being in the habit of profuse living, they will be profuse in the public 

expenses. They find no difficulty in paying their taxes, and therefore do 

not feel public burdens. Besides, if they govern, they will enjoy the 

emoluments of the government. The middling class, from their frugal habits, 

and feeling themselves the public burdens, will be careful how they increase 

them. 



But I may be asked, Would you exclude the first class in the community from 

any share in legislation? I answer, By no means. They would be factious, 

discontented, and constantly disturbing the government. It would also be 

unjust. They have their liberties to protect, as well as others, and the 

largest share of property. But my idea is, that the Constitution should be 

so framed as to admit this class, together with a sufficient number of the 

middling class to control them. You will then combine the abilities and 

honesty of the community, a proper degree of information, and a disposition 

to pursue the public good. A representative body, composed principally of 

respectable yeomanry, is the best possible security to liberty. When the 

interest of this part of the community is pursued, the public good is 

pursued, because the body of every nation consists of this class, and 

because the interest of both the rich and the poor are involved in that of 

the middling class. No burden can be laid on the poor but what will sensibly 

affect the middling class. Any law rendering property insecure would be 

injurious to them. When, therefore, this class in society pursue their own 

interest, they promote that of the public, for it is involved in it.



In so small a number of representatives, there is great danger from 

corruption and combination. A great politician has said that every man has 

his price. I hope this is not true in all its extent; but I ask the 

gentleman to inform me what government there is in which it has not been 

practised. Notwithstanding all that has been said of the defects in the 

constitution of the ancient confederacies in the Grecian republics, their 

destruction is to be imputed more to this cause than to any imperfection in 

their forms of government. This was the deadly poison that effected their 

dissolution. This is an extensive country, increasing in population and 

growing in consequence. Very many lucrative offices will be in the grant of 

the government, which will be objects of avarice and ambition. How easy will 

it be to gain over a sufficient number, in the bestowment of offices, to 

promote the views and the purposes of those who grant them! Foreign 

corruption is also to be guarded against. A system of corruption is known to 

be the system of government in Europe. It is practised without blushing; and 

we may lay it to our account, it will be attempted amongst us. The most 

effectual as well as natural security against this is a strong democratic 

branch in the legislature, frequently chosen, including in it a number of 

the substantial, sensible yeomanry of the country. Does the House of 

Representatives answer this description? I confess, to me they hardly wear 

the complexion of a democratic branch; they appear the mere shadow of 

representation. The whole number, in both houses, amounts to ninety-one; of 

these forty-six make a quorum; and twenty-four of those, being secured, may 

carry any point. Can the liberties of three millions of people be securely 

trusted in the hands of twenty-four men? Is it prudent to commit to so small 

a number the decision of the great questions which will come before them? 

Reason revolts at the idea.



The honorable gentleman from New York has said, that sixty-five members in 

the House of Representatives are sufficient for the present situation of the 

country; and, taking it for granted that they will increase as one for 

thirty thousand, in twenty-five years they will amount to two hundred. It is 

admitted, by this observation, that the number fixed in the Constitution is 

not sufficient without it is augmented. It is not declared that an increase 

shall be made, but is left at the discretion of the legislature, by the 

gentleman's own concession; therefore the Constitution is imperfect. We 

certainly ought to fix, in the Constitution, those things which are 

essential to liberty. If any thing falls under this description, it is the 

number of the legislature. To say, as this gentleman does, that our 

security is to depend upon the spirit of the people, who will be watchful of 

their liberties, and not suffer them to be infringed, is absurd. It would 

equally prove that we might adopt any form of government. I believe, were we 

to create a despot; he would not immediately dare to act the tyrant; but it 

would not be long before he would destroy the spirit of the people, or the 

people would destroy him. If our people have a high sense of liberty, the 

government should be congenial to this spirit, calculated to cherish the 

love of liberty, while yet it had sufficient force to restrain 

licentiousness. Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well 

as the spirit of the people operates upon it; and if they are not 

conformable to each other, the one or the other will prevail. In a less time 

than twenty-five years, the government will receive its tone. What the 

spirit of the country may be at the end of that period, it is impossible to 

foretell. Our duty is to frame a government friendly to liberty and the 

rights of mankind, which will tend to cherish and cultivate a love of 

liberty among our citizens. If this government becomes oppressive, it will 

be by degrees: it will aim at its end by disseminating sentiments of 

government opposite to republicanism, and proceed from step to step in 

depriving the people of a share in the government. A recollection of the 

change that has taken place in the minds of many in this country in the 

course of a few years, ought to put us on our guard. Many, who are ardent 

advocates for the new system, reprobate republican principles as chimerical, 

and such as ought to be expelled from society. Who would have thought, ten 

years ago, that the very men, who risked their lives and fortunes in support 

of republican principles, would now treat them as the fictions of fancy? A 

few years ago, we fought for liberty; we framed a general government on free 

principles; we placed the state legislatures, in whom the people have a full 

and a fair representation, between Congress and the people. We were then, it 

is true, too cautious, and too much restricted the powers of the general 

government. But now it is proposed to go into the contrary, and a more 

dangerous extreme -- to remove all barriers, to give the new government free 

access to our pockets, and ample command of our persons, and that without 

providing for a genuine and fair representation of the people. No one can 

say what the progress of the change of sentiment may be in twenty-five 

years. The same men who now cry up the necessity of an energetic government, 

to induce a compliance with this system, may, in much less time, reprobate 

this in as severe terms as they now do the Confederation, and may as 

strongly urge the necessity of going as far beyond this as this is beyond 

the Confederation. Men of this class are increasing: they have influence, 

talents, and industry. It is time to form a barrier against them. And while 

we are willing to establish a government adequate to the purposes of the 

Union, let us be careful to establish it on the broad basis of equal 

liberty.



Mr. HAMILTON then resumed his argument. When, said he, I had the honor to 

address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances 

which attended the Convention, when forming the plan before you. I 

endeavored to point out to you the principles of accommodation on which this 

arrangement was made, and to show that the contending interests of the 

states led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the 

second place, I attempted to prove that, in point of number, the 

representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no man agrees more perfectly 

than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree 

that there should be a broad democratic branch in the national legislature. 

But this matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is impossible, in the 

first instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is 

equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future to 

increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on 

this subject of government, I rely more on the interests and opinions of 

men, than on any speculative parchment provisions whatever. I have found 

that constitutions are more or less excellent as they are more or less 

agreeable to the natural operation of things. I am, therefore, disposed not 

to dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and 

forms; but to adopt a system whose principles have been sanctioned by 

experience, adapt it to the real state of our country, and depend on 

probable reasonings for its operation and result. I contend that sixty-five 

and twenty-six, in two bodies, afford perfect security, in the present state 

of things; and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the 

contemplation of the general Convention, will leave not an apprehension of 

danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the 

large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing 

instruction to their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the members of 

Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as it will diminish 

their relative influence. In all their reasoning upon this subject, there 

seems to be this fallacy: They suppose that the representative will have no 

motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty; or on the other, 

but corruption. They do not reflect that he is to return to the community; 

that he is dependent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be his 

interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the people will 

regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there are 

exceptions to this rule: there are certain conjunctures, when it may be 

necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the 

people have formed. But, in the general course of things, the popular views, 

and even prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers.



All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on 

opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case. In these, the 

will of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the 

laws which control the community receive their tone and spirit from the 

public wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds 

of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined. Here, then, we may 

expect the laws to be proportionably agreeable to the standard of perfect 

policy and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate 

conformity between the views of the representative and his constituent. If 

the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take 

place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and 

the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon 

them. Sir, if I believed that the number would remain at sixty-five, I 

confess I should give my vote for an amendment, though in a different form 

from the one proposed.



The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twenty thousand. I would ask by 

what rule or reasoning it is determined that one man is a better 

representative for twenty than thirty thousand. At present we have three 

millions of people; in twenty-five years, we shall have six millions; and in 

forty years, nine millions. And this is a short period, as it relates to the 

existence of states. Here, then, according to the ratio of one for thirty 

thousand, we shall have, in forty years, three hundred representatives. If 

this be true, and if this be a safe representation, why be dissatisfied? Why 

embarrass the Constitution with amendments that are merely speculative and 

useless? I agree with the gentleman, that a very small number might give 

some color for suspicion. I acknowledge that ten would be unsafe; on the 

other hand, a thousand would be too numerous. But I ask him, Why will not 

ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation? This, at present, 

appears to be the proper medium. Besides, the President of the United States 

will be himself the representative of the people. From the competition that 

ever subsists between the branches of government, the President will be 

induced to protect their rights, whenever they are invaded by either branch. 

On whatever side we view this subject, we discover various and powerful 

checks to the encroachments of Congress. The true and permanent interests of 

the members are opposed to corruption. Their number is vastly too large for 

easy combination. The rivalship between the houses will forever prove an 

insuperable obstacle. The people have an obvious and powerful protection in 

their state governments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these 

bodies of perpetual observation will be capable of forming and conducting 

plans of regular opposition. Can we suppose the people's love of liberty 

will not, under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused into 

resistance, and the madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow? Sir, the 

danger is too distant; it is beyond all rational calculations.



It has been observed, by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if 

it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has 

proved that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient 

democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one 

feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure, 

deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an 

ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every 

enormity. In these assemblies, the enemies of the people brought forward 

their plans of ambition systematically. They were opposed by their enemies 

of another party; and it became a matter of contingency, whether the people 

subjected themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant or by another.



It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous representation was necessary to 

obtain the confidence of the people. This is not generally true. The 

confidence of the people will easily be gained by a good administration. 

This is the true touchstone. I could illustrate the position by a variety of 

historical examples, both ancient and modern. In Sparta, the ephori were a 

body of magistrates, instituted as a check upon the senate, and representing 

the people. They consisted of only five men; but they were able to protect 

their rights, and therefore enjoyed their confidence and attachment. In 

Rome, the people were represented by three tribunes, who were afterwards 

increased to ten. Every one acquainted with the history of that republic 

will recollect how powerful a check to the senatorial encroachments this 

small body proved; how unlimited a confidence was placed in them by the 

people, whose guardians they were; and to what a conspicuous station in the 

government their influence at length elevated the plebeians. Massachusetts 

has three hundred representatives; New York has sixty-five. Have the people 

in this state less confidence in their representation than the people of 

that? Delaware has twenty-one. Do the inhabitants of New York feel a higher 

confidence than those of Delaware? I have stated these examples to prove 

that the gentleman's principle is not just. The popular confidence depends 

on circumstances very distinct from considerations of number. Probably the 

public attachment is more strongly secured by a train of prosperous events, 

which are the result of wise deliberation and vigorous execution, and to 

which large bodies are much less competent than small ones. If the 

representative conducts with propriety, he will necessarily enjoy the 

good-will of the constituent. It appears, then, if my reasoning be just, 

that the clause is perfectly proper, upon the principles of the gentleman 

who contends for the amendment; as there is in it the greatest degree of 

present security, and a moral certainty of an increase equal to our utmost 

wishes.



It has been further, by the gentlemen in the opposition, observed, that a 

large representation is necessary to understand the interests of the people. 

This principle is by no means true in the extent to which the gentlemen seem 

to carry it. I would ask, Why may not a man understand the interests of 

thirty as well as of twenty? The position appears to be made upon the 

unfounded presumption that all the interests of all parts of the community 

must be represented. No idea is more erroneous than this. Only such 

interests are proper to be represented as are involved in the powers of the 

general government. These interests come completely under the observation of 

one or a few men; and the requisite information is by no means augmented in 

proportion to the increase of number. What are the objects of the 

government? Commerce, taxation, &c. In order to comprehend the interests of 

commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat is raised, and in what 

proportion it is produced in one district and in another? By no means. 

Neither is this species of knowledge necessary in general calculations upon 

the subject of taxation. The information necessary for these purposes is 

that which is open to every intelligent inquirer, and of which five men may 

be as perfectly possessed as fifty. In royal governments, there are usually 

particular men to whom the business of taxation is committed. These men have 

the forming of systems of finance, and the regulation of the revenue. I do 

not mean to commend this practice. It proves, however, this point -- that a 

few individuals may be competent to these objects, and that large numbers 

are not necessary to perfection in the science of taxation. But grant, for a 

moment, that this minute and local knowledge the gentlemen contend for is 

necessary; let us see if, under the new Constitution, it will not probably 

be found in the representation. The natural and proper mode of holding 

elections will be, to divide the state into districts, in proportion to the 

number to be elected. This state will consequently be divided, at first, 

into six. One man from each district will probably possess all the knowledge 

gentlemen can desire. Are the senators of this state more ignorant of the 

interests of the people than the Assembly? Have they not ever enjoyed their 

confidence as much? Yet, instead of six districts, they are elected in four; 

and the chance of their being collected from the smaller divisions of the 

state consequently diminishes. Their number is but twenty-four; and their 

powers are coextensive with those of the Assembly, and reach objects which 

are most dear to the people -- life, liberty, and property.



Sir, we hear constantly a great deal which is rather calculated to awake 

our passions, and create prejudices, than to conduct us to the truth, and 

teach us our real interests. I do not suppose this to be the design of the 

gentlemen. Why, then, are we told so often of an aristocracy? For my part, I 

hardly know the meaning of this word, as it is applied. If all we hear be 

true, this government is really a very bad one. But who are the aristocracy 

among us? Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank above their 

fellow-citizens, and possessing powers entirely independent of them? The 

arguments of the gentlemen only go to prove that there are men who are rich, 

men who are poor, some who are wise, and others who are not; that, indeed, 

every distinguished man is an aristocrat. This reminds me of a description 

of the aristocrats I have seen in a late publication styled the Federal 

Farmer. The author reckons in the aristocracy all governors of states, 

members of Congress, chief magistrates, and all officers of the militia. 

This description, I presume to say, is ridiculous. The image is a phantom. 

Does the new government render a rich man more eligible than a poor one? No. 

It requires no such qualification. It is bottomed on the broad and equal 

principle of your state constitution.



Sir, if the people have it in their option to elect their most meritorious 

men, is this to be considered as an objection? Shall the Constitution oppose 

their wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege? While property 

continues to be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of 

information pervades the community, the tendency of the people's suffrages 

will be to elevate merit even from obscurity. As riches increase and 

accumulate in few hands, as luxury prevails in society, virtue will be in a 

greater degree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the 

tendency of things will be to depart from the republican standard. This is 

the real disposition of human nature: it is what neither the honorable 

member nor myself can correct; it is a common misfortune, that awaits our 

state constitution as well as all others.



There is an advantage incident to large districts of election, which 

perhaps the gentlemen, amidst all their apprehensions of influence and 

bribery, have not adverted to. In large districts, the corruption of the 

electors is much more difficult; combinations for the purposes of intrigue 

are less easily formed; factions and cabals are little known. In a small 

district, wealth will have a more complete influence, because the people in 

the vicinity of a great man are more immediately his dependants, and because 

this influence has fewer objects to act upon. It has been remarked, that it 

would be disagreeable to the middle class of men to go to the seat of the 

new government. If this be so, the difficulty will be enhanced by the 

gentleman's proposal. If his argument be true, it proves that the larger 

the representation is, the less will be your chance of having it filled. But 

it appears to me frivolous to bring forward such arguments as th