IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
Friday, December 14, 1798.
The House resolved itself into a committee of the whole House, on the state of the Commonwealth, Mr. Brackenridge in the chair, when, Mr. John Taylor's resolutions being still under consideration, Mr. Magill said, if he were in order, he would move that the resolutions should be read.
The chairman declared the same to be in order, and the resolutions were read accordingly by the clerk. Whereupon,
Mr. GEORGE K. TAYLOR arose, and said that he never felt himself impressed with more awe than on that occasion. The subject was of itself sufficiently momentous; but the resolutions before them rendered it still more so. They contained a declaration, not of opinion, but of fact. They declared the acts of Congress, called the alien and sedition laws, to be unconstitutional, and not law. These laws, he said, had been passed by both houses of Congress. One of those houses was formed of the immediate representatives of the whole American people, the other of members chosen by the state legislatures. These two houses thus formed, and thus representing the whole people, and the respective state sovereignties, had passed those laws after solemn deliberation and discussion, and declared them to be constitutional. In such case, he conceived, the Legislature of Virginia, the representative of a part only of the American people, ought to deliberate seriously before they undertook to give an opinion upon them; and if their opinion should be such as the resolutions stated, they should still endeavour to couch that opinion in different language; for, by those resolutions, as they then stood, the people were encouraged most openly to make resistance. He compared the two legislative bodies, Congress and the Assembly of Virginia, together. He presumed the former to be as wise, as watchful of the public interests, as the latter. He then called the attention of the committee to what had been the determination of the legislatures of the other states. All which had taken these laws under their consideration, had given them their decided approbation, either by way of resolution, or address to the President. It could not be denied but that they had some wisdom, and that it was not exclusively confined to the Legislature of Virginia. As the legislatures then, of so many states, had concurred in the approbation of them, he thought it necessary for the Legislature of this state to hesitate in expressing its opinion of their unconstitutionality, especially when they reflected on the consequence attending it. For if these laws were unconstitutional, the resolutions made it the duty of the people to defend themselves against them. He said he would then proceed to show to the committee, that those laws were not unconstitutional. In that attempt he was not certain whether or not he should succeed. He possibly might bring them to doubt, and should he do that, he should feel in some measure satisfied. On the other hand, they might be assured that the consequences of pursuing the advice of the resolutions, would be insurrection, confusion, and anarchy. The business upon which they were acting, he said, was of an extensive nature. The gentleman from Caroline had spoken upon both laws. He should confine himself to the alien law only. He conceived that would be as much as he could perform. For in doing that, he should fatigue himself, and he expected the committee also.
He proceeded then to examine the situation of aliens coming into this country. He said, they had no more rights here, than they had elsewhere. He asked upon what footing aliens came into any country? By right, or by permission? Still it was said, that their rights were to be affected by this law of Congress. He then cited and read Vattel, page 157, section 94, to show that a nation may prohibit foreigners from entering its territory; and from that authority concluded, that their admission into a country was by no means a matter of right, but of favour. He said, the alien did not come within the scope of the general laws of the country into which he came. During his stay therein, he was to be protected indeed by those laws; but was not the object of them. He cited and read Vattel again, page 100, section 231, and Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, page 259, to show that by the law of nations, it is left in the power of all states to take such measures about the admission of strangers as they think convenient: that so long as their nation continued at peace with that in which they resided, and they behaved themselves peaceably, they were under the protection of the government of that nation, though liable to be sent or ordered away, whenever that government saw occasion, or its safety required it. If there were nothing then, he said, in the Constitution of the United States, respecting the migration of persons, the doctrine of the law of nations which he had read, was sound, and the general government might by that lawfully restrain or regulate the entry of aliens, and order them away if necessary. But the Constitution had a clause in it upon that subject, being the first clause of the ninth section of the first article, which he read, in these words: "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person." This clause then, he said contained a recognition of the right of Congress to prohibit migration or importation after the year 1809. In his opinion too, the prohibition of the right of Congress by that clause, extended only to such states as were existing at the time of framing the Constitution; which showed that Congress of course might regulate the migration of persons to such states as wore established after that time; and that was exemplified by the prohibition by Congress of the admission of slaves into the new states. The clause read, then, took away from Congress the right of prohibiting migration within a limited time. But though the entry was prevented, the question then recurred, was their removal when dangerous prevented also? The question was of great importance. When these states, he said, declared themselves independent, they entered into articles of confederation. That was a system composed of one body: there was no executive, no judiciary. By that system, that single body could enact nothing binding on the people. It was consequently dependent on the several states for the execution of all its measures. The old Congress wished to establish a duty of five per centum only on goods imported, but it could not be carried into effect by reason of the opposition of the states. To obviate that mischief the Federal Convention was appointed, which assembled and framed the present Constitution. That took from the several states all matters of a general nature; all matters relating to foreign nations. It established legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, which acted upon the several matters coming within their respective spheres; and it certainly intended that all matters of general national concern should be confided exclusively to the general government. There was a general consent of the people that such matters should be vested in the general government, and taken from the states. He then read the list of powers vested by the Constitution in the general government. By the general law of nations, he said, the admission of aliens into a country was altogether a matter of grace. They might therefore be removed by the government of the country, whenever it was deemed necessary. If the general government, then, possessed not the power of removal, one great mischief of a general nature, which it was intended to remedy, would remain as before. The union would be dependent upon sixteen sovereign and jealous states, for carrying into effect such a measure. Some of these states, too, might be on the verge of insurrection. An alien banished from one might be admitted into another, which would protect him, and thereby the general welfare in that instance defeated, and Congress laid at the mercy of the particular states. He asked what was the situation of America and France at that time? It was true there was no declaration of war between them, but they were not at peace. He enumerated their various acts of hostility towards us, and then asked if there was no danger to be apprehended from aliens of that country. He himself thought there was. He related also the numerous designs and machinations which they had been contriving against us. He deemed it therefore highly necessary that the general government, established for general benefit and common protection, should possess the power of removing them. But, if the law of Congress were to be construed unconstitutional, the general government could not remove them. He read the observations of Mr. Jefferson respecting the necessity of a government having the powers of defence and protection; also Mr. Madison's speech in the Convention of Virginia to the same effect; and applied them to the case in question. It was true, he said, that the Constitution prohibited the general government from preventing the migration of foreigners prior to the year 1808: but at the same time, the principles of protection must induce a belief that the Constitution did not intend or enact, that when here, they should riot be removed, however dangerous to the general weal. Still, however, it was objected, that by the twelfth amendment to the Constitution it was declared, that the powers not granted to Congress, were retained by the people, or the states respectively. It was clear, he said, that even without that amendment, no power could have been exercised by Congress, which was not expressly given to it, or did not follow by necessary implication. The case, he said, was still the same. In regard to an express grant, there could be no dispute; and the doctrine of necessary implication was proved by the Constitution, when in the last clause of the 8th section, it grants to Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by that Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." From that clause, then, he said, the power of Congress to pass the law in question, was clearly sanctioned by necessary implication. All cases arising under the Constitution could not be foreseen and enumerated: therefore, that clause was inserted for the purpose of enabling Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given it by the Constitution. Whatever then necessarily flowed from these express powers, were within the scope of Congress. He then asked if there were anything in the Constitution, from which the law in question could necessarily and properly proceed? To discover that, he first proceeded to examine the preamble. That, he said, declared the Constitution to be formed in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. The passage of an alien law then, he said, was justifiable for the purpose of answering the four great ends last mentioned in the preamble, which showed the object and intention of the Constitution. But he said, there was something in it more positive. He called their attention to that clause in the enumeration of the powers of Congress "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and against the law of nations;" and said, that aliens came within it, since for an alien to conspire against the peace of the nation, which permitted him a residence therein, was an offence against the law of nations. He further read the clause declaring that the United States would guarantee to the several states a republican form of government, and protect each of them against invasion. He relied much upon the term protect used in that clause. Protection, he said, was a preventing, a guarding against. He would compare it to a shield, which an individual cast before him to protect himself against the javelin before it reached him; for it would be no protection, if he waited till the wound was inflicted. He observed, that whatever flowed from a grant, followed the grant itself. Congress, therefore, in protecting the states, might enact cautionary laws for the purpose. A law sending away dangerous aliens was a cautionary law, tending to protect the states. Every society had as much right to prevent the mischief which aliens might do, as to punish them for it after it was done. Aliens might be punished for crimes as well as citizens. So, laws might be passed for preventing the commission of crimes by them, as well as for preventing the commission of them by citizens. But such a law must always be temporary. It could not be permanent. It would continue only so long as danger existed. It would affect only dangerous persons. Aliens could only be dangerous in time of war, or in times verging towards war. In times of safety, such a law would be unnecessary and improper. He agreed, therefore, that a permanent law of that kind including all aliens, passed before 1808, would be unconstitutional; since it might absolutely defeat the 9th section. But that a temporary law passed only for the purpose of ordering away dangerous aliens, was a law of protection to the states. It was a necessary power for every government to possess. A government would be worth nothing without it, since it could not protect the people. He then proceeded to take the Constitution altogether, recapitulated the several clauses before cited, and said it was a rule of construction of all instruments, that all the parts should be taken and considered together, that they might stand together, and be reconciled with one another if possible. He called their attention to two clauses of the Constitution, the ninth section of the first article reserving to the states the right of permitting migration, &c., and the fourth section of the fourth article, which declares that the United States shall protect each state against invasion. When one part, then, of the Constitution, he said, reserved to the states the right of permitting migration, and another granted to Congress the power and duty of passing all such laws as would protect the states from invasion or violence, would not the same operate as a proviso qualifying the former general expression, and allow Congress from principles of protection, to expel dangerous aliens? He thought at any rate the power in that case contended for, a necessary one, even were it not in the Constitution. And in such a case, the legislature ought to recommend an amendment to the Constitution for the purpose. Since the adoption of the Constitution, he said, Congress had passed laws for erecting forts in different parts of the United States. He asked what part of the Constitution gave them that power? They must derive it from the fourth section of the fourth article only, the same being for the purpose of protection. There was a necessity for exercising this power at that time. We had amongst us a number of dangerous Frenchmen. The chief author however of the plots had sneaked off, as well as his associates. He said he was happy to be clear of them. Since they were gone, that law was no Longer necessary: Congress might then properly repeal it. Yes, he said, the incendiaries were gone. He congratulated America upon it. He hoped they never might return. But an objection had been made that the alien law had taken away from the poor alien the trial by jury. He said that aliens were not a party to the compact, but citizens only. The Constitution secured rights to citizens, and declared that they should not be deprived of them, but by trial by jury. But, aliens not being a party to the compact, were not bound by it to the performance of any particular duty, nor did it confer upon them any rights. He referred to Vattel again, to show that by the law of nations, the admission of aliens into a country was not a matter of right, but of favour; and observed that ordering away an alien, was not divesting him of any right, but withdrawing from him a favour; and that it was new doctrine that a favour could not be withdrawn, but by trial by jury. He then observed that the alien law did not touch life, liberty, or properly; but only directed the alien to be removed. If he would not remove himself, however, when ordered away, but remained obstinate, he might then be imprisoned. He read, and relied upon the favourableness of that clause of the law which extended to the suspected alien the right of proving to the President that he was harmless. He still asserted that the law of nations gave a power to the government to remove aliens when dangerous; and that, by the law in question, neither life, liberty, or property was touched, except in cases of contumely. He then stated the case authorized by our municipal laws, respecting surety of the peace; and asked, how did the trial by jury stand in that case? The citizen, he said, was deprived of it, and that too in a free country. The case of the alien then, was not harder. The trial by jury was dispensed with in the case of the peace-breaker; therefore, the same might be done in the case of an alien. He said, that the terms upon which aliens were admitted, were, their not intermeddling with the concerns of the nation. Should they do so, and, upon being required to withdraw, continued obstinate, they must be committed in the same manner as citizens who refused to give surety of the peace.
Another objection had been made, that if they were sent out without trial by jury, they might next be deprived of life and property without it. This, he said, could not be done. An alien was entitled to them as natural rights; and therefore, as they were rights, could not be deprived of them without a trial by jury. The case was quite different in regard to his removal, as his admission into the country was not matter of right, but was merely a matter of favour. It had been also objected, that the three powers of government were all blended in the President by the alien law. He said that they were not. But, if such a power in regard to aliens were necessary, it must be entrusted somewhere. It could not be with a private individual. It could not be with the judiciary. It could not be with the legislature; but might most properly be with the executive. He, by the Constitution, was bound to execute the laws: therefore, it was most properly entrusted with him, being the executive officer, with whom all persons and bodies whatever were accustomed to communicate. It could least of all be entrusted with a court which transacted its business publicly. For these matters must be in confidence. That was often necessary for nipping things in the bud. Secrecy then being absolutely necessary, and a court of law being publicly held, and at stated periods, the proceedings might be divulged, or the explosion take place, before they could obtain information, or try the fact. And all that too, not for the sake of a matter of right, but mere courtesy. It could not be entrusted to the legislature, unless its sittings were permanent: it could, then, only be entrusted with the president. To prove the justice and fairness of this regulation, he again introduced the case of a man brought before a magistrate to give surety of the peace. On the complaint of A., he said, the magistrate might arrest and imprison B., until he gave security to be of good behaviour. In that case, a map was deprived of liberty without a trial by jury; but that was right, because society was bound to protect as well as vindicate its citizens; and before a trial of the fact could be had, the person apprehending danger might be murdered. He again cited Mr. Jefferson's piece to prove, that no cases under the law of nations were ever submitted to a jury to be tried. He cited also part of a speech of Mr. Madison, in the Convention of Virginia, nearly to the same effect; and thereupon observed, that the trial by jury was only used in municipal regulations, where citizens and others were concerned under the particular laws of the state, and not in cases between the government and aliens, which arise under the law of nations. That even in matters of right, the right of the individual ought to yield to the good of the community. He then read that clause in the Constitution concerning the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and said, that the suspension of that writ might take place during the existence of rebellion or invasion. In that case, a citizen might, at the will of the President, be committed and confined until the existing danger was over. And if a citizen, invested with all civil rights, might thus be confined in a time of danger, so ought an alien, who had no positive political right whatever, when the good of the community required it. He said, he might produce many other instances, to prove the propriety of necessary implication. He then mentioned the subject of foreign intercourse, and asked whence was that power derived? He knew no part of the Constitution which particularly authorized it. It could be derived only from that clause of the Constitution, which prohibited to the states the power of making any treaties, or entering into any agreements. It had been observed by the gentleman from Caroline, that Congress had passed a law to send away alien enemies, and that was a good law. Where was that power to be found? Nowhere, except it were derived from that protective power, which was to be gathered from the Constitution by means of implication only, or by implication from the power given to declare war. He further asked, at what time those laws were passed, and what was the cause? And then observed, that whatever construction led to an absurdity, was erroneous. He then supposed the case of the states having the power of admitting aliens, and the General Government not having the power of removing them. The Assembly of Virginia might think a whole army of aliens admissible. Suppose, he said, that Bonaparte and his army (if they could ever get out from the Nile again) were to arrive within the state, and they should think them too, admissible; by the construction of the resolutions before them, Congress in such case ought not to remove them. The right of protection, he said, was a natural right, appertaining to each individual, and that a number of individuals had as much right to protect themselves as one individual. Did the Constitution prohibit such a right? He then observed, that both the Constitution of the United States, and of this state, directed that the trial by jury should be held sacred. He said, he would then proceed to examine if that right had never been pretermitted by any law of the state; and requested that the law of Virginia, for removal of aliens, passed in 1792, should be first read. (It was read accordingly by the clerk.) He then observed, that although the Constitution of the state directed that the trial by jury should be held sacred, yet that law "authorized the Governor to apprehend, and secure, and compel to depart out of the commonwealth, all suspicious persons, &c., from whom the President of the United States should apprehend hostile designs against the said states." In that instance, then, a previous legislature had acknowledged as a matter indisputable, what this legislature disputed, that a suspicious alien might be sent away at the instance of the President. Their law even authorized the sending away the alien without a trial, and in the mean time his being imprisoned. Yet that legislature, in passing that law, did not suppose it had violated the Constitution. He then read the act of Congress under consideration. He compared both acts together, and said that he looked upon them to be nearly the same. If there were any difference between them, he said it was, that the law of the state was more severe than the law of Congress, inasmuch as the former subjected the alien to imprisonment at all events: the latter only in case of his refusal to remove himself. It was remarkable, too, he said, that the same law of the state, although passed in 1793, was re-enacted from one passed in 1785, thirteen years ago, and so many years nearer than the present time to the Revolution, when it is to be supposed the principles of that Revolution were much purer than they were at the present time. He then contended that there" was the same reservation to the people of all powers not granted to the state government, as was to the states of all powers not granted to the General Government. Consequently, the trial by jury being declared sacred by the bill of rights, the legislature of the state could have no more power by the Constitution to pass such a law, than Congress had by the Constitution of the United States. Yet no complaint against such a law had ever been heard until the law of Congress was passed. All the clamour had been reserved for that alone. He again observed, that no other state legislature had passed any such resolution as the one before them. They must be presumed to be equally watchful: they must be presumed to have wisdom too, and that it was not exclusively confined to this legislature. They should hesitate, therefore, in making such a declaration as was then contemplated. He then called for the reading of the law of the state, which authorized the delivering up a citizen committing a crime in a foreign country, at the instance he said of the United States, without trial by jury, on mere suspicion and on demand. (The clerk read the law.) Mr. Taylor then called the attention of the committee to the last clause of the law, from which it appeared that the offender might be tried by a jury for the offence in this state, but was deprived of such a trial by the fourth section, where he was delivered up to a foreign nation on requisition. He ascribed the reason for dispensing with the trial by jury, in the latter case, to be, because it was a case within the law of nations, which admits no trial by jury, and still that law was thought not incompatible with the Constitution. He observed that the gentleman from Caroline had dilated much upon the probable effects of the law of Congress in question. He would indulge himself in the same manner.
What, said he, would be the situation of this country, were it once known that Congress had no such power as that of removing aliens? He begged them to recollect what horrid scenes of devastation and carnage had been exhibited by Frenchmen in their own island of Saint Domingo. If France would abandon her people there, and desolate the fairest colony in the world, could it be supposed, that they would love us more than themselves: that they would spare their foes. He begged them to recollect too, the doubtful state of affairs between our country and France. It was true that the two nations were not at war, since no declaration of war had been on either side, but they were not at peace, since each party was seizing the vessels of the other. War then might ensue, and at the time the alien law was passed, it was a thing extremely probable. Every nation, before it struck, prepared as deadly a blow as possible. He then asked if the French could wound us in any respect so vitally, as by arming the slave against his master. Attempts, he said, had been already made, by French emigrants, to excite our slaves to insurrection. Suppose then, they were to attempt the thing again, and an insurrection should accordingly take place, what would be the consequence? In that common calamity, he said, the ranks of society would be confounded; the ties of nature would be cut asunder; the inexorable and blood-thirsty negro would be careless of the father's groans, the tears of the mother, and the lamentations of the children. The loudest in their wailings would be their wives and daughters torn from their arms, with naked bosoms, outstretched hands, and dishevelled hair, to gratify the brutal passion of a ruthless negro, who would the next moment murder the object of his lust. He then asked how all that was to be prevented? By vesting the general government with that power to remove such aliens, which it had already so generously exercised for the purpose, in the law then under consideration: a law particularly calculated for the protection of the southern states. He then mentioned what success the French had had, in other countries into which their emigrants had been admitted. What intrigues they had carried on in Venice, Switzerland, Holland, &c., all which countries had been expunged from the list of republics, and added to the already overgrown dominions of France. These events, he said, had been brought about chiefly by stirring up the people to discontent, by alien incendiaries. It was necessary then, that the United States should adopt proper measures to prevent such mischiefs. To that end, said he, let us cherish the law passed for the purpose. He then proceeded to relate the late conduct of the French towards us, and what description of persons had migrated from that country to the United States, the most noted characters of whom were Volney and Talleyrand. He made several remarks upon the conduct of both of them while in this country, but gave a particular account of the peregrination of the latter from Europe to America, thence back again to Europe: how he was denounced and proscribed by his countrymen, restored to favour again, and in the end preferred to the ministerial office which he then held. It behoved the people of this country, therefore, to be on their guard against him and all the rest. He wished, he said, to conclude; for he was conscious that he had fatigued himself, and he supposed the committee also. He should be glad, however, to be permitted at some other time to deliver his sentiments in regard to the sedition law. He thought indeed, that the best way thereafter would be to discuss one law at a time. He further observed, that the members of that Congress which had passed those laws, had been, as far as he could understand, since generally re-elected : therefore, he thought the people of the United States had decided in favour of their constitutionality, and that such an attempt as they were then making to induce Congress to repeal the laws, would be utterly nugatory.
Mr. RUFFIN arose next, and said that he was convinced his abilities would not enable him to place the subject in such a light as it would be placed before it was finished. However, as it was a matter of much importance, he was induced to assign his reasons for the vote which he was about to give. He should confine himself, he said, to two points: the constitutionality of the laws, and the consequences. The alien law, he said, was unconstitutional in two points: and, after observing that, although an alien did not enjoy all the rights of a citizen, yet he enjoyed some, he proceeded to show in what points that law was unconstitutional. He thought it so for two reasons: 1st. Because it blended several powers in one person; and 2dly. Because it contained powers not granted to Congress by the Constitution. He then proceeded to state how the alien was to be deprived of the trial by jury, and to be banished for particular acts, at the time of their commission, innocent, but which might, by a retrospective operation of the said act, (the President being thereby armed with legislative and judicial, as well as executive power,) be made criminal. The gentleman from Prince George, he said, had admitted that if Congress were to pass a law to exclude all aliens for ever, prior to the year 1808, it would be unconstitutional. Mr, Ruffin, then begged leave to inquire as to the difference of the effect which such a law would have from the present alien act of Congress, should Congress annually think proper to re-enact the law as it now stood, until 1808. The principle and effect, he said, were the same. The only rational conclusion, then, to be drawn from the concession of the gentleman was, that if Congress be incompetent to the passage of a permanent law, (except, indeed, where the Constitution interposes,) they must be incompetent to the passage of a temporary one. But the gentleman, he said, had attempted to prove the constitutionality of that act, by saying that Congress had passed, or might pass, laws respecting alien enemies. The cases, however, Mr. Ruffin, said, were extremely different. Congress alone could determine upon war or peace: consequently, alien enemies were proper subjects for congressional legislation: but that alien friends were exclusively subject to the sovereignty of the several individual states; as the twelfth article of the amendments to the Federal Constitution expressly declares, that "the powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." And as at the same time, he said, the only power given by that compact to the general government, over alien friends, was in the ninth section of the first article, it must follow that this was one of the rights reserved to the states. The gentleman last up, he said, had contended however, that this power was rightfully exercised by Congress, and had taken the broad ground of construction and implication, upon which to erect his fabric. Construction and implication, Mr. Ruffin said, was a doctrine which he had hoped was banished from the councils of America. It was a doctrine which the people of America had unanimously and uniformly protested against. It was the exercise of this kind of right by the British parliament which involved us in a war with that government. It was to guard against the exercise of such a power, that the state constitutions were formed: and it was that abhorrence in America to constructive and implied rights, that induced the specific delineation of congressional powers. Let them admit, he said, the position of the worthy member, and then mark the extent to which it would carry them. In the preamble to the Constitution, the ends designed to be produced by that compact, are enumerated. Amongst them the following: "to provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare:" and in the eighteenth clause of the eighth section of the first article, " to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, &c.," were the parts of the Constitution, by which it was contended, that those constructive and implied rights are given:
Suppose, said Mr. Ruffin, the general government should be of opinion that those objects would be produced in a higher degree by continuing the present members in office for ten years, or for life? Was there any person who then heard him, who would think such an exercise of power legitimate? Certainly not. Yet he contended that such a power was as impliedly given by the Constitution, as that which Congress had taken upon itself to exercise over alien friends. Mr. Ruffin then concluded by observing, that as it was then late, and the committee appeared to be fatigued, he should reserve the rest of his observations for another opportunity.
The committee then rose, reported progress, asked and bad leave to sit again.
Part II | Debate Dec. 13 | Debate Dec. 15 | Randolph Contents | Text Version