POLITICAL SCIENCE CLASSICS

ISSUED UNDER THE GENERAL EDITORSHIP OP LINDSAY ROGERS, OF THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The STATESMAN'S BOOK of JOHN OF SALISBURY

Being the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books, and Selections from the Seventh and Eighth Books, of the

POLICRATICUS

Translated into English with an Introduction by

JOHN DICKINSON, A.M., PH.D. [Princeton]
LL.B. [Harvard]

New York RUSSELL & RUSSELL

1963

COPYRIGHT, 1927, BY ALFRED A. KNOFF, INC.

COPYRIGHT, 1955, BY LINDSAY ROGERS

REISSUED, 1963, BY RUSSELL & RUSSELL, INC.

BY ARRANGEMENT WITH APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS, INC.

L. C. CATALOG CARD NO: 62—16195

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO

ANDREW FLEMING WEST

Teacher: Builder: Humanist,

in gratitude and affection.

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

The following translation of the earliest, and one of the most influential of mediæval treatises on politics, should have a practical rather than an antiquarian interest. The political thought and institutions of the Middle Ages are receiving increased attention from modern students. This is as it should be, for certain theories and problems of the Twelfth Century are not without their Twentieth Century parallels. Such a connection between widely separated epochs gives a more concrete meaning to the phrase "the unity of history." It is not necessary to multiply examples. Anthropologists investigating the life of primitive peoples throw fresh light on present day behavior. Historians of the Roman Empire deal with problems which now, as they did then, result from an enlargement of the area of human intercourse. Scholars in different fields are continually unearthing streams of tendency and development which in hidden ways exert their modern influences from the graves of a past that refuses to die. The Policraticus has its modern applications, and not the least apposite ones are in the United States. Too definite a connection, of course, should not be insisted upon, but the main lines, though dim, are unmistakable. Recent political theorists have sung the requiem of the unitary system of the Renaissance nation-state. Whether the wrong music was chosen, or whether the chorus was premature remains to be seen. It cannot be denied, however, that we now have diversities and multiplicities of interests that put heavy strains on the political institutions of the modern state. Internally, the state must avoid dissolving into a welter of competing groups, while externally these same groups reach across national boundaries

and threaten other states. What emerges even more clearly is that amid such confusion, the mechanism for the orderly expression and adjustment of the wills of the different groups breaks down. The problems to be decided are too complicated, the wills are too numerous and too irreconcilable, and the human capacity for attention is too limited. Thus an increasing number of pessimistic writers are doubting whether public opinion is a possible, or, if possible, whether it is a safe motive force for political institutions. Cries are becoming more numerous that "democracy" is breaking down, and there are tendencies to seek automatic good government either in the rule of "experts" administering a supposedly satisfactory set of ready made scientific principles, or in the personal excellence of a supposed superman vested with the powers of a dictator. These alternatives represent a recrudescence of ideas prevalent in the early Middle Ages, under conditions of confusion in many ways similar to our own, and before machinery for organized group action had yet been evolved.

There is also, as has been said, an added interest for Americans in the study of such mediæval ideas. In the United States there are at work the forces of complexity and confusion which are incidental to modern life everywhere, but mediæval ideas are also encouraged by our special form of government. The American Constitution puts no premium on government by discussion; it makes difficult the formulation of enlightened public opinion. Whether wisely or no, we do in fact use governmental machinery which is so checked and balanced that it can respond only at fixed intervals and when public pressure is especially strong. We rely to a much greater degree than do other political systems on a body of higher law supposed to be evolved from written constitutions by the expert consciousness of judges. We resort in times of stress to the personal power of a President, who is thought to represent and act for the whole nation in a way denied to our representative assemblies. The

country desires these assemblies to be as little in evidence as possible. We seem to crave executive authority and prefer to be told rather than argued with.

For these reasons, the lamp of the Middle Ages burns with a light that may illumine our present. The lamp, however, has been neglected. With one exception, this volume is the first modern translation of an important mediæval political treatise to appear in English. Mr. Dickinson brings to his editorial task the equipment of an original training in the classics followed by graduate studies in political science and law, and by several years of active legal practice. He deals with the Policraticus as a student of politics rather than of philology, and applies to twelfth century institutions and ideas a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of the problems of constitutional law and government.

L. R.

PREFACE

The aim of this book is to make available for a wider circle of readers an outstanding mediæval treatise on politics. The political literature of the middle ages has no such compelling and universal human appeal as belongs to the great masterpieces of classical political thought; but from the narrower stand-point of political science it is at least equally deserving of study. The mediæval literature represents not the lonely insight of great thinkers, but the commonplace ideas which ruled the common minds of men for long centuries and wrote themselves indelibly into abiding institutions; and it must not be forgotten that the modern world is the direct heir of mediæval institutions and ideas, while it is the heir of classical antiquity only indirectly. The Policraticus has more light to shed on the issues of 1688 and 1789 than either the Republic of Plato or the Politics of Aristotle.

The increased attention paid to social history by the newer schools of historical writers has served to emphasize the importance of the history of thought; and this means not so much the history of the systematic theories of particular thinkers as of the broad currents of thought which, coming to the surface with varying emphasis in the writings of different individuals, can yet be said to underlie and characterize the whole culture of a period. From this stand-point the history of thought during the middle ages, and especially of political thought, is of the utmost consequence; for it represents the seed-plot of many, if not most, of the ideas and attitudes which became explicit for practical effectiveness in later periods. The signifi-

cance of the Policraticus is that it contains the inchoate and incipient forms of so large a number of the political doctrines which were to identify themselves with greater clarity in later centuries.

Considerations of space have made it impossible to present here more than approximately half of the entire treatise. While the amputation has eliminated some of the finest parts, notably the chapters on philosophy at the commencement of the Seventh Book, the plan and scope of the work minimize the loss for the student of politics. The political thought of the Policraticus is loosely embedded in a general discussion of manners and philosophy in such a way that it has proved easy to separate and present here in their entirety all the directly political sections without doing violence to the integrity or consecutiveness of the treatment. The result is a practically self-contained treatise, disengaged from a mass of other materials which, however important from the standpoint of literary history, have only an indirect political relevance.

The text used for the translation is that of Professor Clement C. J. Webb's monumental edition, Oxford, 1909. The existence of Professor Webb's elaborate annotations, as well as the specialized purpose for which the present translation is intended, have led me to restrict the footnotes, with a few exceptions, to indicating the sources of direct quotations. For convenience of reference biblical citations, except to the apocryphal books, are to the Revised Version rather than to the Douai version. In the case of proper names an effort has been made to reproduce the spelling of Professor Webb's text. In the Introduction I have resisted the temptation to duplicate biographical, historical and critical material which is easily available elsewhere. I have rather tried to indicate the place of the Policraticus in the development of political thought and to show its connection with preceding and subsequent theories. I have emphasized especially the theory which it contains of the relation

between law and government and its doctrine of a "higher law;" not only because of the perennial importance of this set of problems for political science, but more particularly because it was this aspect of the thought of the Policraticus which first seriously attracted my attention in the course of preparing my book on Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (Harvard University Press, 1927), a treatment of some of the current aspects of the same problem.

For counsel and aid in making the translation I am under many obligations. Chief among these is my deep indebtedness to Professor Edward Kennard Rand who generously supplied comments and suggestions on a large number of passages which seemed to me to leave room for differences of opinion. For similar aid in special fields I am indebted to Professors Ephraim Emerton, George LaPiana, Charles H. McIlwain and Chandler R. Post. I have had the satisfaction throughout my task of receiving from Professor Haskins a constant encouragement which, from such a source, supplied the highest incentive to workmanship. Professor Alfred O'Rahilly of University College, Cork, Ireland, called my attention to a number of matters which would otherwise have escaped me. The editor of the series, Professor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University, has exercised his editorial functions with the patience and sympathy of generous personal friendship; and Mr. Paul B. Thomas, of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the publishers, has shown exemplary forbearance and understanding of the details and delays incidental to the preparation of a book of this character. Apart from these immediate and specific obligations, I have a sense of underlying debt to the teachers whose aid and inspiration in the past aroused my interest in the Latin language and literature: Edward Lucas White, Esq., of Baltimore, Maryland: Professor Wilfred P. Mustard, of Johns Hopkins University; and the distinguished scholar who first made me see the charm and importance of the Latin literature of the middle ages

in general, and of the Policraticus in particular, and to whom I have dedicated this book, Dean West of Princeton.

JOHN DICKINSON

BRIER HILL, ASHFIELD, MASS., APRIL, 1927.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF THE POLICRATICUS IN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT xvii

I THE COMMONWEALTH xviii

II THE LAW xxvii

III THE PRINCE AND HIS GOVERNMENT xl

IV THE CHURCH Iviii

V TYRANNY, TYRANNICIDE, AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY Ixvi

THE POLICRATICUS

TABLE OF CHAPTERS lxxxv

BOOK IV 3

BOOK V 63

BOOK VI 171

BOOK VII 281

BOOK VIII 335

INTRODUCTION

THE PLACE OF THE POLICRATICUS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT ¹

The Policraticus of John of Salisbury is the earliest elaborate mediæval treatise on politics.² Completed in 1159, the date of its composition makes it a landmark in the history of political speculation for two reasons. It is the only important political treatise written before western thought had once more become familiar with the Politics of Aristotle. It thus represents the purely mediæval tradition unaffected by ideas newly borrowed from classical antiquity. It is the culmination in their maturest form of a body of doctrines which had evolved in unbroken sequence from patristic literature in contact with the institutions of the earlier middle ages. In the second place it comes just before the important turning-point in institutional development at the end of the twelfth, and at the beginning of

¹ LITERATURE: "loannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Carnotensis Policratici, sive de Nugis Curialium el Vesiigiis Philosophorum, Libri viii, recog. Clemens C. I. Webb, Oxonii, MCIX," hereafter cited as Webb; "Johannes Saresberiensis," C. Schaarschmidt, Leipzig, 1862; "Die Staatsund Kirchenlehre Johanns von Salisbury," Paul Gennrich, Gotha, 1894; "Die Staatslehre Johanns von Salisbury" Ernst Schubert, Inaug. Diss., Berlin, 1897; "John of Salisbury and the Policraticus," by E. F. Jacob in "Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers," ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw, New York, 1923; "History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West," R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, vol. iii, pp. 136-146, vol. iv, pp. 330-337; "Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval Thought and Learning," by Reginald Lane Poole, 2 ed., London, 1920.

² "The first attempt to produce a coherent system which should aspire to the character of a philosophy of politics," R. Lane Poole, "Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought," 2 ed., p. 204.

the thirteenth, century, when legal precision began to be stamped on a great number of previously indefinite relationships and when feudal independence tended to become consolidated into definite organs of political control. It therefore speaks from a point of view which was about to disappear, but which it is all the more important to understand because it contributed a heritage of ideas whose momentum made them, in spite of the newer influences, the dominant force in political thought down to at least the middle of the sixteenth century.

I. THE COMMONWEALTH

The first half of the twelfth century was in some respects the great age of conscious feudalism. It is therefore striking that there is hardly a trace of contractual feudal theory in the Policraticus.³ It is true that in one passage John of Salisbury accepts the feudal doctrine that public offices are transmissible by descent like private property;⁴ in a second he conceives the relation between the prince and his subjects in terms of the oath of fealty;⁵ in a third he denies the right of tyrannicide to those who are bound by fealty to the tyrant.⁶ But these passages are exceptional; the whole view of the state which is presented is at variance with the conception that there is anything contractual or voluntary in its composition.

The obvious explanation of this failure to mirror a dominant contemporary tendency is almost certainly the true one, — namely that John represents the standpoint and theory not of purely secular politics but of the Church. But this by no means implies that his viewpoint is academic or aside from the main currents

³ This is noted by Schaarschmidt, "Johannes Saresberiensis," p. 349.

⁴ Bk. v, c. 6, infra.

⁵ Bk. vi., c. 25, infra. Dr. Lane Poole goes too far in saying that "there is not a trace even of the terminology of feudalism." "Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought," 2 ed., p. 204.

⁶ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra.

of practical governmental development. On the contrary the ecclesiastical theory of the state was a powerful element in practical politics throughout the feudal period in opposition to the distinctively feudal theory; and it was precisely this ecclesiastical theory which was at the basis of the pretensions of national monarchy against feudal aggression, and which served to keep alive the conception of "commonwealth" during an era of particularistic disintegration. Luchaire has pointed out that the monarchy of Hugh Capet and his immediate successors was royalty of an ecclesiastical character inheriting Roman tradition through the channel of church theory, and that at the era of its lowest ebb it was prevented by this theory from ever degenerating into purely feudal suzerainty.⁷ From the standpoint of practical development this body of ecclesiastical-Roman doctrine is accordingly vital in that it was the doctrine which finally emerged triumphant in the triumph of national monarchy; and its statement by John of Salisbury is therefore significant as a stage in the transmission of the conception of organic political unity from antiquity to modern times.

The conception of a true political relationship between the members of a state as distinguished from the mere network of private relations to which feudalism tended to reduce them ⁸ is embodied in the survival and use of the term "respublica" or "commonwealth." It is the ear-mark of the ecclesiastical-Roman as opposed to the feudal view; and it occurs repeatedly not merely in political treatises written by churchmen, but in the official utterances of princes and their ecclesiastical advisers from the time of Charlemagne to the date of the Policraticus.⁹

⁷ "Institutions Monarchiques," 2 ed., i, 35-59; Guizot, "Histoire de la Civilisation en France," 11th ed., 1869, iii, 290 ff; 312 ff.

⁸ Luchaire, in Lavisse, Hist. de France, vol. ii, pt. 2, pp. 7-14.

⁹ e. g. Hincmar of Rheims, "De Regis Persona et Regio Ministerio," praef., in Migne, P. L., tom. 125, col. 834; Sedulius Scotus, "De Rectoribus Christianis," c. vi., et passim, Migne, P. L., tom. 103, col. 291 ff; speech of Adelbero at election of Hugh Capet, Richer, Chron., ed.

The term implies some grasp of the meaning of political organization; and this perception comes to even clearer consciousness in another kindred conception which reaches its first full development in the Policraticus and has generally been treated as the most striking feature of John's political thought, — the so-called "organic analogy," or comparison of the body politic to a natural organism.

The organic analogy, which was so congenial to the symbolic tendency in mediæval thought, and which after its first elaboration in the Policraticus was to reappear with ever increasing refinements down to its culmination in Nicholas of Cues,¹⁰ traces back in part no doubt to the Christian identification of the Church with the body of Christ.¹¹ The union of Father and Son in the Trinity was used to explain the coexistence in the "body" of the Church of the temporal and priestly powers.¹² In an introduction to the Institutes of Justinian which Fitting attributes to a date between 850 and 1100, and which he regards as representing earlier Byzantine tradition, the different ranks in the imperial hierarchy are compared to different parts of the human body — the prince to the head, the "illustres" to the eyes, the "spectabiles" to the hands, the "clarissimi" to the thorax, etc.¹³

Waitz, pp. 132-33; charter of Philip I to Abbey of St. Denis, 1068, "Receuil des Actes de Philippe I^er," ed. Prou, p. 115. The word seems to have been transmitted through Augustine, as in the earlier treatises it is often found in quotations from his works. See Jonas of Orleans, "De Institutione Regia," c. xvii., in D'Achéry, Spicilegium, tom. i., p. 324. Jonas's work is also in Migne, P. L., tom. 106.

¹⁰ "De Concordantia Catholica," i, cc. 1-6, in Schard, "De Jurisdictione," pp. 465 ff.

¹¹ Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Age," tr. Maitland, note 77. See Rom. xii, 4, 5.

¹² Hugh of Fleury, "Tractatus de Regia Potestate et Sacerdotali Dignitate," Bk. i., cc. 1, 2, M. G. H., Libelli de Lite, vol. ii, p. 468.

¹³ Fitting, "Juristische Schriften des früheren Mittelalters," Halle, 1876. p. 148; for date see ibid, p. 98. Cf. also Justinian, Cod., ix, 8, 5, quoted in vi, 25, infra, where the senators are referred to by the Emperor as "pars corporis nostri."

A similar comparison, but far more elaborate, constitutes the framework on which a great part of the political theory of the Policraticus is hung.¹⁴ The "commonwealth" is a body "endowed with life by the benefit of divine favor." The prince is its head, the priesthood its soul. "The place of the heart is filled by the Senate, from which proceeds the initiation of good works and ill. The duties of eyes, ears and tongue are claimed by judges and the governors of provinces. Officials and soldiers correspond to the hands. Those who always attend upon the prince are likened to the sides. Financial officers may be compared with the stomach and intestines.... The husbandmen correspond to the feet which always cleave to the soil." ¹⁵

John claims that he has borrowed this elaborate scheme from a "libellus" of Plutarch entitled "Institutio Trajani." ¹⁶ No such work of Plutarch at present exists or is elsewhere referred to; and since John did not know Greek, opinion is divided between the view that his source was a Latin translation of a compilation of passages from Plutarch's writings and the view that it was a Latin original masquerading under the name of Plutarch.¹⁷ At all events, its adoption into the Policraticus launches the "organic analogy" on a new and triumphant career through the remainder of the middle ages.

It seems clear from John's handling of the organic analogy that he had very firmly grasped the conception of the interdependence of individuals in society. He repeatedly returns to the saying that "all are members one of another." ¹⁸ "Then and then only will the health of the commonwealth be sound and flourishing ... when each regards his own interest as best served by what he knows to be most advantageous for the others." ¹⁹ "So long as the duties of each individual are performed with an eye to the prosperity of the whole, so long, that is, as justice is

¹⁴ i. e. Books v and vi. ¹⁵ Bk. v., c. 2, infra. ¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Schaarschmidt, op. cit., pp. 123-124; Webb, vol. i., p. 280.

¹⁸ Bk. iv., c. 1, infra. ¹⁹ Bk. vi., c. 20, infra.

practiced, the sweetness of honey pervades the allotted sphere of all."²⁰ "The function of duty is to bring different acts into harmony by allotting them to the different individuals to whom they are appropriate."²¹ And elsewhere in a passage of truly poetic eloquence he expresses the harmony of a well-ordered society by musical analogies reminiscent of Plato.²²

And not only does John grasp the functional interdependence of the members of society, he grasps also what is more remarkable for his age, the need for that basis of psychological unity, for that bond of common social feeling, which was to remain almost unemphasized in later political thought until Rousseau put forth his doctrine of a general will.²³ "There can be no faithful and firm cohesion," he says, "where there is not an enduring union of wills and as it were a cementing together of souls. If this is lacking it is in vain that the works of men are in harmony, since hollow pretence will develop into open injury unless the real spirit of helpfulness is present." ²⁴ In at least two places John even uses what we are accustomed to regard as the characteristically modern term, "public opinion." ²⁵

There is, however, one great difference between John's conception of the functional and psychological unity of society and the modern conception. John's view was essentially Platonic. The relation between the parts of his organism was a fixed and static one. It was built upon, or at least was to be brought into conformity with, a pre-established design which he took for granted was eternal and immutable. He has no conception of any continuous process of reciprocal adaptation whereby the relations between the different elements in the body politic shall gradually alter. The plan is once and for all divinely given, and the perfect society is that wherein the members exactly fit them-

²⁰ Bk. vi., c. 22, infra. ²¹ Bk. v., c. 4, infra. ²² Bk. iv., c. 8, infra.

²³ See A. Lawrence Lowell, "Public Opinion and Popular Government," pp. 7-9.

²⁴ Bk. v. c. 7, infra. ²⁵ Bk. iv., c. 8; Bk. v., c. 12, infra.

selves into the respective niches which it marks out for them. And these niches are conceived almost as rigidly as those of Plato's Republic. The great body of the people, the husbandmen and craftsmen and artisans, are totally divorced from political functions. Their place is "to provide their superiors with service just as the superiors in their turn owe it to their inferiors to provide them with all things needful for their protection." ²⁶ No channel is supplied whereby their collective views and wishes can be brought to bear on the conduct of government. The supreme directing power is concentrated in the hands of the prince,²⁷ who has all power that he may bear the entire responsibility to God. "Wherefore deservedly there is conferred on him and gathered together in his hands the power of all his subjects to the end that he may be sufficient unto himself in seeking and bringing about the advantage of each individually and of all." ²⁸

²⁶ Bk. vi., c. 22, infra.

²⁷ This Platonic conception became more fully developed in the later scholastic theology. The lex aeterna provided a distribution of functions among individuals according to a sublime plan wherein each had an allotted place. It should be the aim of human society to approximate as nearly as possible to this great design. The entire universe was conceived as "under a providential plan, governed by an eternal law which is nothing but the order of things, the sum of relations which result from the nature of beings. The rationale of governing others must therefore be in the final analysis a divine command according to which the rulers carry out those necessary functions which will enable the individual members to occupy their assigned places in the divine economy." De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, Princeton, 1922, p. 243, and passages from the Summa Theol. of St. Thomas there cited. The whole conception goes back to Augustine (see e.g., "De Civ. Dei," xix, 13-14) who made the harmonious co-operation of members of society, each in his appointed place, the essential feature of that ideal of "pax" which was to be so powerful throughout the Middle Ages. Cf. Dante, "De Monarchia," i, 15. Cf. also John of Salisbury's conception of "duty," infra, v, 4.

²⁸ Bk. iv., c. 1, infra.

It was therefore only in a passive and not in an active sense that John conceived of society as a psychological organism. It was not an organism wherein each element contributed of its own thought, feeling and aspirations to shape the combined direction of the whole. The psychological bond was the passive one of contentment, of willingness on the part of each individual to fulfill the duties of the station allotted to him in the eternal scheme of things. It was in the co-ordination of these different duties and their allotment to different individuals and classes according to the divine plan that the organic unity of society consisted. It was a functional organization, but the functions were those of automata which must move only in the direction dictated to them by the rational order of the universe. John might refuse to take his stand on the side of predestination when a clear-cut issue was presented on the question of free-will;²⁹ but when he turned to deal with other problems the tacit presuppositions of his age were too strong for him and he regarded the individual, not to be sure as subordinate to the state, but as a mere unit in that universal organization whose design was implicit in the eternal law.

A question is thus raised to which John gives no explicit answer — what "commonwealth" or society did he have in mind in his comparison of the "commonwealth" to an organic body? Was it a city, or a province, or a kingdom, or the Roman Empire, or the Universal Church? One of the chief difficulties which we meet throughout the Policraticus is that we can never be quite certain of what organization John is at any given moment speaking. He avoids any admission that the whole Christian world still constitutes a single state, the Roman Empire; and when he has occasion to speak of a contemporary emperor of the German line he cautiously refers to him as merely "King

²⁹ Policraticus, Bk. ii, c. 26, "liberum arbitrium manet cum providentia."

of the Romans." ³⁰ In the same connection he remarks in passing that in some manner the "principate," — i. e., the Empire — seems to have been "cut off at the root." ³¹ Accordingly, he generally appears to have in mind the "provincia" ³² as the political unit or "commonwealth" whose head, whether bearing the title of "rex" or "dux," is the "prince" of whom he is speaking. This term "provincia," suggested undoubtedly by the territorial correspondence of kingdoms like France and England to provinces of the older empire, is the designation which the later middle ages came regularly to apply to the kind of political organization which we should call a "nation-state." ³³ But John seems to apply the term indifferently to a kingdom like England, which stood under no feudal overlord, and to a territory like Brittany ³⁴ which was a vassal state.

Indeed, one of the striking features of John's political thought is the way in which he totally omits to consider the relationships between the different political powers, feudal, royal, imperial, which were at the moment so hotly contending with one another for a demarcation of their respective jurisdictions. The questions arising out of their competing claims are completely ignored, although these are precisely the first questions which a modern political scientist would have set about seeking to answer. John seems to have accepted the fact that all were "powers" of a temporal as distinguished from a spiritual character, and for

³⁰ Bk. iv., c. 6, infra. Strictly speaking, this title was technically correct, as Conrad was never actually crowned at Rome. But it was only from the time of Conrad's predecessor, Lothair, that the restriction of the imperial title to an emperor crowned at Rome commences. Even Lothair had in effect used the title before coronation. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 2 ed., vi., pp. 106-7, p. 173.

³¹ Ibid. ³² Bk. vi., c. I; Bk. vi., c. 24; infra.

³³ Bartolus treats the terms "provincia" and "regnum" as interchangeable and as applying to a political group all the members of which are not gathered together into a single city. Comment on Const. "Qui sint Rebelles," cited in Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato, p. 124.

³⁴ Bk. IV., c. 18. infra.

his purposes that was sufficient. Indeed he makes no clear distinction between "political" power and the power of rulership over such a group as the family, or household, which from the modern standpoint is not political at all. He deals with the concept of "rulership" in the lump and undifferentiated. The rich man, the "dives," ³⁵ ruling over a large household, falls within the scope of his treatment as much as and in quite the same way as the lord of a province, or a king, or even the emperor himself.

It may be supposed that to some extent this failure to draw what we to-day regard as necessary distinctions was a deliberate attempt to blink embarrassing questions. It was more than a century longer before men became bold enough to proclaim openly that the kings of the national "regna" were independent of the supremacy of the empire.³⁶ It took several centuries before the greater feudal princes in France were willing to abandon their claims to a practically complete independence of the crown.³⁷ John of Salisbury's own king, Henry II, aptly illustrates both attitudes. There is some evidence that at one time he did lip service to the Emperor ³⁸ and at another dallied with the prospect of seizing the imperial crown for himself;³⁹ on the other hand he was almost continually at war with his feudal overlord, the King of France.⁴⁰ Amid such conditions

³⁵ Bk. v., c. 10; Bk. vi., c. 22, c. 27, infra.

³⁶ The earliest writers cited by Woolf as advancing the idea are Andreas de Isernia (1220-1316) and Durandus (1237-1296); see Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrata, p. 373.

³⁷ See Du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII., tom. ii., pp. 605-606.

³⁸ Rahewin, Gesta Friderici, iii., c. 7, M. G. H., SS. xx., p. 419. See F. Hardegen, "Imperialpolitik König Heinrichs II. von England" (Heidelberg, 1905).

³⁹ G. B. Adams, Political History of England, 1066-1216, p. 306.

⁴⁰ But see ibid., p. 268, for a remarkable instance where apparently "the feudal spirit of Henry could not reconcile itself to a direct attack on the person of his suzerain."

a more relentless logician than John might well have shrunk from the consequences of clean-cut analysis.

There is no reason, however, to suppose that the omission was deliberate. After many centuries men were just beginning to make an attempt to think with legal accuracy. If they were commencing to grip once more the meaning of the idea of organic political union which had never completely vanished from abstract thought, it is too much to expect that they should at once have faced some of the deepest difficulties in which it involved them. They were saved from these difficulties for the time being by two prevalent and deeply-grounded elements in their political thinking. The first of these was the persistence from their barbarian past and from their saturation in scriptural tradition of what may be called the patriarchal ideal, which admitted no distinction between the state and what we now designate as "society" on the one hand, or between the state and the family on the other.⁴¹ The result was that just as to-day we are not especially disturbed over the existence of incoherent and even conflicting organizations within "society," so the thought of the twelfth century does not seem to have been for the moment interested in the existence of competing and conflicting governmental organizations. It took them largely for granted. Meanwhile the same attitude was promoted by the dominant mediæval conception of law.

II. THE LAW

It is the idea of law which in the Policraticus as throughout the political thought of the middle ages really dictates the ap-

⁴¹ See below, p. liii. Much of what is said by Professor Pott (Chinese Political Philosophy, pp. 65 ff.) concerning the Chinese attitude toward government applies to the Middle Ages. The difference is that the Middle Ages were continually working out of this attitude under the influence of actual institutional progress and of the progressive development of ideas inherited from classical antiquity.

proach to all the other problems of government, and affords the clew to the solution which is found for them. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for the representative significance of the Policraticus as a sample of mediæval political thought is precisely the fulness and clarity with which it discloses the typical mediæval conception of the relation between law and government.

It has become a historical commonplace that mediæval thought was dominated by the conception of a body of law existing independently of the authority of any government and to which all positive law must conform and to which governments no less than individuals owed obedience.⁴² Rulers were thought of as bound by a "higher law," which, in the vivid phrase of Mr. Justice Holmes, was a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," ⁴³ and which accordingly made it possible to apply to their acts the criterion of legality or illegality. In the words of the Policraticus, "between a tyrant and the true prince there is this single or chief difference, that the latter obeys the law and rules the people by its dictates." ⁴⁴ "A tyrant is one who oppresses the people by rulership based upon force while he who rules in accordance with the laws is a prince."⁴⁵ "There are certain precepts of the law which have a perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations.... And not only do I withdraw from the hands of rulers the power of dispensing with the law, but in my opinion those laws which carry a perpetual injunction are not subject at all to their pleasure." ⁴⁶

This conception of a "higher law" accounts not merely for the characteristic trend of mediæval political theory, both in its

⁴² "Medieval doctrine while it was truly medieval never surrendered the thought that Law ... does not depend upon the State for its existence. To base the State upon some ground of Law ... the medieval publicist felt himself absolutely bound." Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Age," tr. Maitland, p. 74.

⁴³ Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. Rep. (Sup. C't.) 205 at 222. ⁴⁴ Bk. iv., c. 1, infra. ⁴⁵ Bk viii, c. 17, infra. ⁴⁶ Bk. iv., c. 7, infra.

omissions and in the points which it selected for emphasis, but it also explains many aspects of mediæval political organization and development which from the modern point of view are most difficult to understand.

For one thing, it rationalizes the coexistence side by side for so many centuries of a number of competing types of political organization, like the Church, the Empire, the national kingdoms and the practically independent feudal principalities, which must otherwise appear as a mere chaos of anarchy. In mediæval theory their coexistence was not anarchic because all were conceived as alike agencies of, and existing under, the "higher law," which was supposed to allot to them their respective functions, and to regulate their relations. The conception is quite analogous to that of eighteenth-century international law which was thought of as a body of rules obligatory upon sovereign and independent states, although emanating from no human legislature and enforceable in no independent international court. So the higher law of the middle ages was enforceable only by the several powers which were conceived as being under its authority.

Just as such a conception permits the existence side by side of a number of independent systems of authority without any attempt to bring them into more organic connection than is supplied by the abstract "higher law" itself, so within each system it tends to postpone the perception of any need for organizing an effective machinery of government as we understand such organization. For, unlike international law, the "higher law" of the middle ages was thought of as binding directly upon individuals. Positive law must be simply a reproduction of it and therefore it supplied all the organization and regulation needful to bring human relations into order, including the relations between governmental officials.⁴⁷ It was at once international,

⁴⁷ Cf. St. Bernard's view that the functions of ecclesiastical officials, lower as well as higher, were derived from and prescribed by the

constitutional, and private law. All that was necessary for each individual, whether official or private person, was to learn and perform his duties under that law. "What is the official duty of a publican?" asks John of Salisbury: "This is his duty, to exact and receive no more than is appointed." ⁴⁸ The directive and discretionary element in government is thus completely eliminated and attention is diverted from the problem of how best to organize and allocate governmental functions for the attainment of political ends to a more or less barren insistence upon the necessity of the strict personal performance of pre-established legal duties under the organization of society at the time existing.

The conception of a "higher law" had two other consequences which tended to retard the organization of effective government. On the one hand it opened the door wide to individual resistance to governmental power. If government as well as the individual was under a higher law it followed that governmental acts against the individual might well be illegal. In such a case it would be obviously unfair to conclude the individual by the illegal decision of the government in its own favor, and since there was no other agency to judge between them, they were in the same position toward one another as independent states under modern international law. In such a case the individual had therefore a legal right of judging for himself and insisting upon his own rights and duties under the law as against the government. Even the soldier according to John of Salisbury, must resist the commands of his superior officer in cases where these transcend the "higher law." ⁴⁹ The result of this conception was at once to promote the natural mediæval proclivity toward private war which expressed itself in the practical work-higher law and therefore could not be altered by the supreme authority of the Pope. The Pope could not lawfully "place the members in the body of Christ otherwise than He Himself arranged them." "De Consideratione," iii, 4, § 17, tr. Lewis, p. 85.

⁴⁸ Bk. vi., c. 1, infra. ⁴⁹ Bk. vi., c. 12, infra.

ings of feudalism⁵⁰ and on the other hand to give to such war that character of a struggle for legal rights which Stubbs has noted as one of the most characteristic features of mediæval history.⁵¹

In the second place the mediæval tendency to remit all questions to the decision of a "higher law" had a consequence which in exactly the opposite way from the tendency just noted worked toward the same end of retarding effective political organization. If on the one hand it promoted the resort to private resistance, on the other it produced a tendency toward political "quietism." This followed from the mediæval identification of the "higher law" with the law of God. On this view, if government acted illegally it disobeyed God and God might very well be trusted to punish violations of His own law. If He did not do so, it must be because He had some hidden purpose of His own to further, perchance the punishment of an unfaithful people, by permitting them to be oppressed by the illegal acts of an unjust king. Under such circumstances men would be impiously presumptuous if they undertook to thwart God's purpose by taking their relief into their own hands and attempting to throw off the tyranny to which God wished them to be subjected for their sins. This view is very strong in John of Salisbury.⁵² "If Kings hear and keep the word of God, they will fill out their days in prosperity and their years in glory; but if they hearken not, they shall pass by the sword or be consumed by their folly."⁵³ With God thus in continual attendance to enforce obedience to His law, subjects who act directly to rid

⁵⁰ Luchaire, "Manuel des Institutions Françaises," pp. 213-230.

⁵¹ "Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History" pp. 208-223.

⁵² "He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God," Rom. xiii, 2, quoted Bk iv, c. 1, Bk. vii, c. 21, infra. See also Bk. vi., c. 27, "Ego quidem non tantum bonis et modestis sed etiam discolis arbitror serviendum in omni humilitate et reverentia, fideliter tamen et in cultu potestatis Dei venerandum a quo est instituta." See also Bk. viii., c. 18.

⁵³ Bk. v., c. 6, infra.

themselves of tyranny are always in danger of interfering with the divine plan. This line of thought survived strongly into the post-Reformation period of monarchical absolutism and characterizes much of the French and Jacobite theory of the later seventeenth century.

The conception of a "higher law" rests at bottom upon a failure or refusal to distinguish between the kind of rule of conduct to which the name of law seems best fitted, and the raw materials for such a rule, — in other words between the rule which is actually applied and enforced by a governing authority from which there is no legal procedure of appeal to any earthly superior, and the mere body of principles or ideas of right and wrong which that authority can select from and combine for the purpose of announcing or applying such a rule. More briefly, it results from a failure or refusal to see a difference between what had better be called "positive law" on the one hand and "justice" on the other. The failure to draw this distinction has been laid by a distinguished authority at the door of classical philosophy.⁵⁴ Whether or not the charge is entirely justified as to Plato and Aristotle, it is certainly true of the Stoic tradition through which classical philosophy was transmitted to the middle ages, and especially of Cicero.⁵⁵

To conceive of an identity between justice and the rules of positive law, requires that justice itself must be conceived as more than the raw-material for rules but as itself a body of rules, or as capable of being immediately translated into a body of rules. This was essentially the Stoic doctrine. Their derivation of justice from nature, and their conception of nature as a rational order, brought into the foreground that trend of thought which identified the "laws" of justice with what we should to-day call the laws of physical science. They were definite rules which could be "discovered" and formulated in the

⁵⁴ Voigt, "Jus Naturale," vol. i., p. 208.

⁵⁵ See especially "De Legibus," Bk. i., c. xvi.

same sense as the "laws" of heat and motion. This conception had a close affinity, and therefore entered into very powerful combination, with the Christian conception of the "law of God." The importance of the Christian element in the combination consisted in the fact that it was able to supply ready-made a body of such concrete and tangible rules, practically a code, in the shape of the Scriptures.^55a Here was a corpus of "higher law" which consisted of rules as definite as those emanating from the legislative power of prince or emperor. A "higher law" became possible as never before because the law-making authority was placed in Heaven while its specific enactments remained definite and visible in the sight of men on earth.

It is interesting to note that John of Salisbury conceives the "higher law" to which princes are subject almost entirely in terms of scriptural commandments or prohibitions. He discusses in detail in two places in the Policraticus the injunctions which are binding upon rulers. The first passage sets forth the provisions of Deuteronomy, xvii, 14-20. Almost the whole of the Fourth Book of the Policraticus is simply a commentary on this passage as constituting the "law" which princes must obey. The second set of scriptural injunctions cited by John as especially binding on princes are drawn from Job, xxix, 7-25.⁵⁶ But there is no doubt that he conceived the whole Bible as having a similar obligatory force.

With the revival of the study of Justinian's law-books in the eleventh century the doctrine of a "higher" law received another

^55a See Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Sociallchren der Christlichen Kirchen," in Gesammelte Schriften, i, 157 ff.

⁵⁶ Both these passages had already been cited in the same connection by Jonas of Orleans (c. 828 A.D.), "De Institutione Regia," c. 3, 4. (D'Achéry, Spicilegium, tom. I., pp. 324 ff.) The passage from Job is used as establishing the rule for princes by Hugh of Flavigny, M. G. H., SS., tom. viii, p. 436, and thence copied by Hugh of Fleury, "Tract. de Reg. Pot. et Sac. Dig., i., c. 6, Libelli de Lite, tom. ii, p. 473. The passage from Deuteronomy is used for the same purpose in the fifteenth century by Fortescue, "De Laudibus Legum Angliae," c. i.

increment of strength in a peculiar way. It seems to have been conceived that if human enactments to be valid must simply reproduce the provisions of a higher law, therefore the provisions of this higher law could be discovered from the human enactments which had come to be looked upon as valid. In other words, men treasured the Roman law because they regarded it as faithfully reproducing the divine law and therefore as affording a means of knowing the latter.⁵⁷ This attitude pervades the Policraticus. John of Salisbury regards the provisions of the Corpus Juris as but "publications" and "expositions" of the divine law. Thus he says that Justinian and Leo "disclosed and proclaimed" the "sacred" laws and "took especial pains to the end that the most sacred laws which are binding upon the lives of all should be known by all."⁵⁸ And elsewhere, referring to the silencing of Vacarius in England, he casually speaks of the Roman law as "the law" itself.⁵⁹

The identification of the "higher law" with the "law of God" as embodied in the scriptures, and the belief that its provisions were directly reproduced in existing texts of the Roman law, eliminated for thinkers of the twelfth century one of the cardinal difficulties which beset the doctrine of a "higher law" when it appears in the form of the supremacy of a "law of nature," — the

⁵⁷ Cf. Maitland, "Bracton's Note Book," vol. i., p. 9.

⁵⁸ Bk. iv., c. 6, infra.

⁵⁹ Bk. viii, c. 22, infra; so also Bk. vi., c. 26. To "civil law," as distinguished from "the law," John exhibits a decided and natural aversion. Thus, in one place (Bk. vii., c. 20, infra), he quotes with approval a comparison of "the civil laws" to a spider's web, "which catches flies and gnats, but lets birds and larger insects through; in the same manner the civil laws restrain the wills of people of the humbler sort, but give way at once to the more powerful." This hostility to "civil law" in general John concentrates upon custom in particular: "If you urge reason or authority, they will cast in your teeth 'custom,' which they abuse, or which they themselves have made" (Bk. vii., c. 19, infra). This attitude suggests the similar stand later made famous by John's friend, Thomas Becket. See Ramsay, "The Angevin Empire," p. 43; G. B. Adams, Political History of England, 1066-1216, p. 281.

difficulty, namely, of identifying any specific rules or precepts as belonging to this law.⁶⁰ When a "higher law" must be spelled out from a vague body of principles of "natural justice" it is hard to conceal the fact that the agency which is charged with the process of selecting and translating these into enforceable rules has a discretionary power so wide as to amount practically to creative law-making. This was the difficulty which became more and more apparent to mediæval thought from the thirteenth century onward. But it had not yet arisen for John of Salisbury. While he repeats the cliche that "nature is the best guide of life," and seems to take it for granted that the will of God and the precepts of rational nature are the same, his attention is directed wholly to the first member of the equation, and he is troubled by no difficulty of identifying the precepts of rational nature, — the "higher law" is itself given in the form of clean-cut scripture texts.

But even where the texts of a "higher law" are thus not to seek, but are concretely given, there remain the seeds of ultimate confusion in what the layman is apt to regard as the comparatively insignificant matter of the need for interpretation.⁶¹ For a text needs to be interpreted; and interpretation is a mighty lever in the hands of whoever applies it. The person who has authority to say what a text means is in a position to say when it shall, and when it shall not, apply; and the established doctrine of the Roman jurists that a law was to be extended to all cases where the same reason applied and on the other hand was not to be enforced in cases falling outside its

⁶⁰ In one passage, Bk. iv, c. 7, where John is confronted by the necessity of specifying a precept of the "immutable law," he instances the so-called "golden rule." This is substantially the answer given by George Buchanan (c. 1570) as to the content of the "law of nature" (De Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. xi).

⁶¹ In the sixteenth century Buchanan ascribed the growth of the whole Papal power to the fact that the Popes had made good their claim to the right to interpret the law. Op. cit., cc. xxx-xxxii.

"spirit"⁶² could be used to convert the power of interpretation into a practical power of legislation on the one hand and of dispensing with the law on the other. More and more during the twelfth century this power of interpretation came to be brought into play until Innocent III could claim for the popes that "secundum plentitudinem potestatis de jure possumus supra jus dispensare."⁶³

The difficulties inherent in the problem of interpreting the higher law were already present to the mind of John of Salisbury, and to it is devoted some of the most subtle thinking in the Policraticus, even if the final result seems inconclusive and obscure. Previous thinkers had done their best to close their eyes to the difficulty. Cicero in a burst of Stoic grandeur had announced categorically that the higher law needed no interpretation — that it was one and the same in the minds of all rational beings.⁶⁴ Augustine says that there can be no two opinions about what the divine law commands or forbids, — that there can be no human judgments concerning it, and therefore no interpretation.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the practical inevitability of interpretation was bound to be present to the minds of lawyers and was expressly recognized in Gratian's Decretum.⁶⁶

John of Salisbury seems to approach the problem of interpretation in different passages from two distinct points of view, the juristic and the metaphysical. From the juristic standpoint he recognizes that justice — aeqititas — is in the final

⁶² See Digest I., iii., 12-25.

⁶³ Innocent III., Decretal Greg., ix., Lib. iii. Tit. viii., de concess. praebend., c. proposuit, ed. Friedberg, ii., p. 488.

⁶⁴ "De Republica," iii, 22, preserved in Lactantius, Inst., vi., 8.

⁶⁵ "De Vera Religione," c. 31 (Migne, P. L., tom. 34, col. 147).

⁶⁶ Decreti Secunda Pars, causa xxv., Quest. I, Pars ii., c. 2, Gratianus: "Sacri canones ita aliquid constituunt ut suae interpretationis auctoritatem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae reservent, ipsi namque soli canones valeant interpretari qui jus condendi eos habent." (ed. Friedberg, i., p. 1011).

analysis not a body of rules, but a vaguer entity which is focused into rules for purposes of application. This he expresses by saying that "the law" is itself the interpreter of equity.⁶⁷ But he tacitly recognizes that the rule may in certain cases not adequately accomplish, or may even defeat, the justice which it is its place to further. In such a case there is needed an "interpreter" between law and justice. He then quotes the passage of Justinian's Code which states that the power of "interpreting between law and equity belongs solely to the prince as the author of the law," and goes on to argue from this that the law of which God is the author can be interpreted by no one save God Himself.⁶⁸ From the juristic standpoint John thus gives no clear answer to the question of where the power is located to interpret the divine laws. Some light, however, is shed on this question from the metaphysical standpoint in a passage where John is speaking of the wisdom of counsellors. "They fall into error," he says, "who think that everything is a matter for the arbitrary will and discretion of those who make decisions instead of being rather a matter of truth and science. But there is, as the ancient philosophers knew, a supreme guiding principle of things divine and human, namely Wisdom, and a science of things to be done and left undone." This wisdom is the result of the fear and love of God, and the man who has it will do the things that he ought to do and omit to do the things that he ought not to do. In others words, apparently, the "wise man" will have, so far as is humanly possible, the capacity to know and interpret the law of God.⁶⁹ Therefore the prince should surround himself with wise counsellors and learned priests.⁷⁰ John's view thus seems to be that the prince has no peculiar prerogative to interpret the "higher law," but that this right,

⁶⁷ Bk. iv., c. 2, infra.

⁶⁸ Bk. iii, c. 26. This passage does not fall within the translation below.

⁶⁹ Bk. v, c. 9, infra. ⁷⁰ Bk. iv., c. 6, infra.

so far as it can be humanly exercised, belongs to every individual who is qualified therefor by the gift of Divine wisdom. What is substantially the same problem as that of interpretation is raised when John comes to discuss directly the prince's right to "dispense" with "the law." "Every censure imposed by law," he says, "is vain if it does not bear the stamp of the divine law.... Through the prince no jot or tittle of the law shall fall to earth because he shall make no exception in favor of his own hands or the hands of his subjects." However, John makes a concession to practical necessity and anticipates the thought of the later middle ages by distinguishing between two different kinds of divine precepts. "There are certain precepts of the law which have a perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be broken with impunity....⁷¹ Not only do I withdraw from the hands of rulers the power of dispensing with the law, but in my opinion those laws which carry a perpetual injunction or prohibition are not subject at all to their pleasure. In the case of those rules which are flexible, I admit a power of dispensing with verbal strictness, but only in such fashion that the purpose of the law shall be preserved in its integrity by a compensating concession made to propriety or public utility." ⁷² John nowhere gives examples of the laws which he regards as "flexible," but a distinction which he draws in another connection is pertinent to the point. Speaking of the duty of soldiers to obey their commanders, he says that they must refuse obedience to commands which violate the necessary precepts of God's law. But there are other things "which philosophers count as 'indifferent,' " as for instance whether or not to enter upon a campaign, or

⁷¹ Bk. iv., c. 6, infra.

⁷² Bk. iv, c. 7, infra. For a particularly bitter attack by John on the "dispensing power," where he recognizes that it practically amounts to converting will into law, or, in other words, to law-making sovereignty, see Bk. vii., C, 17, infra.

whether or not to conduct a foray or sortie; and these are left to the discretion of the commander.⁷³ The distinction between precepts as to things necessary and things indifferent is certainly not quite the same as that between flexible and inflexible precepts, but it points in the same direction. The effect of John's theory is to narrow almost to the vanishing point the power of the prince qua prince to dispense with the precepts of the divine texts just as it is to extend the legal power of interpreting these to all persons endowed with Divine Wisdom. An extreme illustration of this reluctance to allow the prince to interpret the law is his doctrine that where the law is doubtful the prince should dismiss a case without decision.⁷⁴

One basic difficulty involved in the doctrine that the prince was subject to the higher law was solved by John in a way which anticipates the more famous later solution by Aquinas. This is the difficulty that there is no earthly power having jurisdiction to enforce the law against him — the same difficulty which presents itself in connection with the obligatory character of modern international law upon sovereign states. Aquinas met the difficulty by distinguishing between the vis directiva and the vis coactiva of law, and insisting that while the prince was not subject to the compulsive power he was subject to the directive power.⁷⁵ John of Salisbury had already expressed substantially the same distinction in a different form. He says that while the prince is not bound by the law in the sense that he will be subjected by any earthly authority to penalties for breaking it, he is subject to it in the sense that it is his duty to obey it without the threat of penalties;⁷⁶ he remains a prince only while his will is conformable to the law; and when he departs from its injunctions he becomes a tyrant.⁷⁷

⁷³ Bk. vi., c. 12, infra. ⁷⁴ Bk. v., c. 12, infra.

⁷⁵ Summa Theol, I^a., 2^ae., q. xcvi., art v., ad 3.

⁷⁶ Bk., iv., c. 2, infra. ⁷⁷ Bk., viii., c. 17, infra.

III. THE PRINCE AND HIS GOVERNMENT

There is no comparison of the relative merits of different forms of government in the Policraticus. The conventional discussion of the respective claims of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is an academic imitation of classical political theory which comes into mediæval thought only with the recovery of Aristotle's "Politics" in the following century. Monarchy is the only form of government in which John is interested as a working reality, although he seems conscious that there may be other forms.⁷⁸

There is one kind of government, however, which John in several passages sets up as an ideal in contrast to monarchy, to illustrate the short-comings of the latter. This is rule by judges, as it existed among the people of Israel in the time of Samuel and before the establishment of the Kingdom. John's preference for such a government is closely connected with, and serves to emphasize again, his conception of the supremacy of law. A king is not really needed by a people who follow the law and submit to its dictates — all that they require is a judge to administer it among them as Samuel did. The beginning of kingship marks a falling away from the purity of obedience to the law, and was a token of God's anger. "The earliest patriarchs," says John, "followed nature, the best guide of life. They were succeeded by leaders, beginning with Moses, who followed the law, and judges who ruled the people by the authority of the law; and we read that the latter were priests. At last, in the anger of God, they were given kings, some good, many bad. For Samuel had grown old, and when his sons did not walk in his ways, but followed after avarice and uncleanness, the people, who perchance deserved that such priests should be in authority over them, forced God, whom they had despised, to give them

⁷⁸ Bk. v., c. 1, infra.

a King."⁷⁹ "And yet a King was not truly needed, had not Israel after the likeness of the gentiles walked crookedly and showed themselves not content to have God for their King."⁸⁰ "And if iniquity and injustice, banishing charity, had not brought about tyranny ... perhaps there would be no kingdoms at all, since it is clear from the ancient historians that in the beginning these were founded by iniquity as encroachments against God or were extorted from Him."⁸¹

These passages form an interesting link between important earlier and later theories. They reach back to the patristic doctrine that in the state of innocence there was no coercive government, and that it was sin which caused God to set men over one another, subjecting some to the authority of others. In the language of St. Augustine, the primitive just men were rather shepherds of their flocks than kings of men.⁸² On the other hand the same passages reach forward to the important distinction taken by the author of the second book of the De Regimine Principum between "political" and "regal" rule. Political rule was that of the judges of Israel. This was suited to man in the uncontaminated state of human nature which was called the state of innocence; but in the state of sin, regal rule is more beneficial. "Therefore the rod of discipline, which all men fear, and the rigor of justice, are necessary in the governance of the world because thereby the people and the rude untutored multitude are the better ruled."⁸³ Whether St. Thomas wrote this passage or not, the distinction which it drew came to

⁷⁹ Bk., viii., c. 18, infra. ⁸⁰ Bk. iv., c. iii., infra,

⁸¹ Bk. viii., c. 17., infra.

⁸² DC Civ. Dei., xix., 15; Irenaeus, adv. Haer., v. 24: Carlyle, "History of Mediaeval Political Theory," vol. i., pp. 126-129. St. Isidore held that temporal rulership would not be necessary if men would heed the preaching of God's law and did not require to be coerced. Lib. Sent., III., 51, quoted in Jonas of Orleans, De Inst. Reg., c. 3; in Hugh of Fleury, Tract. de Reg. Pot., M. G. H., Libelli Ac Lite, ii., p. 469.

⁸³ Thomas Aquinas, De Reg. Prin., ii., 9.

be identified with a similar distinction which he based on Aristotle's Politics,⁸⁴ and formed the groundwork of Fortescue's famous distinction between the English and French monarchies.⁸⁵

John of Salisbury, when contrasting monarchy with government by judges, represents the former as essentially despotic in character. "And so Saul was elected with the aforesaid right of a King, namely that he might take their sons and make them his charioteers, and take their daughters to bake his bread and cook his food, and take their fields and lands to distribute at his pleasure among his servants, and in short oppress the whole people beneath the yoke of slavery."⁸⁶ This conception of kingship ⁸⁷ is out of line with the main trend of John's views on monarchy. It represents a direction of thought which, however congenial with his attitude toward law, is not the direction which he chose in the main to follow. On the other hand the theory of kingship which he developed in detail embraces at least two distinct elements which it is difficult to harmonize.

John insists in numerous passages that the king is the "representative" of the commonwealth.⁸⁸ He is "the minister of the common interest ... and bears the public person."⁸⁹ He

⁸⁴ Com. in Aristot. Pol., III., lect. 13, lect. 15. Grabmann holds that the commentary is the work of St. Thomas only as far as III., lect. 6, and that the later parts are by Petrus of Alvernia (M. Grabmann, "Die echten Schriften des M. Thomas," Munster, 1920, p. 206). Grabmann also holds that the "De Regimine" is genuine only as far as the middle of ii, 4. Ibid., p. 151.

⁸⁵ "This Diversite is wel taught bi Seynt Thomas in hys boke wich he wrote, Ad Regem Cipri de Regimine Principum." Fortescue, "Governance of England," ch. 1.

⁸⁶ Bk. viii., c. 18, infra.

⁸⁷ The identification of kingship and tyranny in connection with the theory of the origin of government, and the resulting inconsistency between this view and the attempt made elsewhere to draw a clear distinction between a king and a tyrant, reproduces itself in the continuation of St. Thomas's "De Regimine Principum," — cf. ii., 9, and iii., 9.

⁸⁸ Bk. v., c. 2., infra. ⁸⁹ Bk. iv, 2., infra.

must regard himself as only the servant of the people.⁹⁰ He is an "officer," and his acts are not his own, but those of the "universitas" or corporate community in whose place he stands.⁹¹ This conception of kingship as representative or ministerial is in line with a current of opinion which was emphasized in twelfth century thought by the revived study of the Corpus Juris. A famous text based the authority of the emperor on a lex regia whereby the Roman people had transferred their power to him.⁹² Therefore the Glossators explained the position of the emperor as that of a "representative" or "vicar" of the people. It happens that the earliest passages in the writings of the jurists which develop this view are probably later than the Policraticus or approximately contemporaneous with it;⁹³ but it was a view which was to become the orthodox legal doctrine of the next century,⁹⁴ and for that reason its early statement by John of Salisbury is all the more remarkable and significant.

It does not, however, represent John's dominant conception of the position of the monarch. He regards him for the most part not as the representative of the people, but as the "image of God on earth." ⁹⁵ His ministry is conferred on him not by

⁹⁰ Bk. iv., c. 1., infra. ⁹¹ Bk. v., c. 4, infra.

⁹² Dig., I., 4., 1; Inst. I., 2., 6.

⁹³ Com. in Dig. Tit. "De Diversis Reg. Juris," att. to Bulgarus, reg. 176, ed. F. G. C. Beckhaus, Bonn, 1856, p. 112; Placentinus Summa Institutionum, 1., 2. Tourtoulon places the work of Placentinus after 1166, Vie de Placentin, pp. 120-121. It is impossible to date the Commentary accurately. If it was the work of Bulgarus as Savigny supposes ("Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter," Bd. iv., pp. 94 ff.), it might have been written before 1156 and probably before 1159 (ibid., pp. 86-87).

⁹⁴ Aquinas, Summa Theol., 1^a2^ae, q. 90, art. 3; Baldus, Com. on Code Venice, 1586), Bk. 10, Rubr. 1, nr. 12, 13, 18; other citations in Maitland's Gierke, notes 210-217 incl.

⁹⁵ Cf. Hugh of Fleury, Tract. de Reg. Pot., i, 3: "rex in regni sui corpore patris omnipotentis optinere videtur imaginem"; Suger, Vita Ludovici, Oeuvres, ed. Lecoy de la Marche, p. 72: "partum Dei cujus ad vivificandum portat rex imaginem." See Flach, "Les Origines de l'Ancienne France," t. iii, pp. 236 ff.

the people but by God. "All power is from the Lord God; the power which the prince has is therefore from God, for the power of God is never lost nor severed from him, but He merely exercises it through a subordinate hand." ⁹⁶ The power of the prince is "instituted by God for the punishment of evil-doers and for the reward of good men." ⁹⁷ The prince "is placed at the apex of the commonwealth by the divine governance."⁹⁸ Kingship is an honor bestowed by God," and a criminal attempt against the prince is an attempt against God himself.¹⁰⁰ He is subject only to God and to the priesthood, who represent God upon earth;¹⁰¹ and he will be judged by God and held to account for his ministry."¹⁰²

The later middle ages were troubled by the problem of reconciling the doctrine that on the one hand the ruler was the agent or representative of the people, and on the other hand that he held his power from God.¹⁰³ John does not seem to have felt the difficulty, perhaps because he had a solution for it. "The commonwealth," he says, "stands in the same relation to the prince as a ward to a guardian." ¹⁰⁴ In other words, the prince is responsible for the commonwealth, but not to it; he represents it legally, but his responsibility runs to the legal authority to which he owes his appointment, namely to God. The same idea is differently expressed in another passage: "The prince is the Lord's servant, but he performs his service by faithfully serving his fellow-servants, namely his subjects."¹⁰⁵

This solution evades the necessity of taking one side or the other upon an issue which was of immediate practical con-

⁹⁶ Bk. iv., c. 1., infra. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Bk. v., 6., infra.

⁹⁹ Bk. vi., c. 26., infra. ¹⁰⁰ Bk. vi., c. 25., infra. ¹⁰¹ Bk. v., c. 2., infra.

¹⁰² Bk. iv., c. 10; Bk. iv., c. 12; Bk. vi., c. I., infra.

103 For efforts to effect a reconciliation see Maitland's Gierke, notes 140 and 141.

¹⁰⁴ Bk. v., c. 7., infra. For the discharge of this trust, the king is responsible to his own judge in Heaven. Bk. v, c. 11; Bk. vi., c. 1, infra.

¹⁰⁵ Bk. iv., c. 7., infra.

sequence in the twelfth century, — the issue, namely, between elective and hereditary monarchy. In the Carolingian period the conventional formulae of public acts described the Frankish kings as "elected by the whole people."¹⁰⁶ During the feudal era the baronage had succeeded for a time in France¹⁰⁷ and permanently in Germany in making the election more than a mere formality.¹⁰⁸ In England, at least the form of election seems to have prevailed down to the time of Edward the First.¹⁰⁹ At the very era when the Policraticus was being written the French and English monarchs were finally succeeding in making the crown hereditary in their families through the practice of securing the election and coronation of the heir during the life-time of his predecessor.¹¹⁰ "Philip Augustus was the first of his race who felt himself strong enough to dispense with the designation and coronation of his son during his own life-time. It had taken two centuries for the dynasty of Hugh Capet to attain this result."¹¹¹ During the whole period when the hereditary and elective principles were contending with one another, current theory sought to evade difficulties by accepting both at the same time and refusing to see any inconsistency between them. The typical formulae run to the effect that the king is "Rex jure hæreditario, ... et mediante tam cleri quam populi unanimi consensu et favore;¹¹² or, as Ivo of Chartres explained,

¹⁰⁶ Flach, Les Origines de l'Ancienne France, t. iii., pp. 238, ff. ¹⁰⁷ See Luchaire, Institutions Monarchiques, t. i, pp. 61-86. ¹⁰⁸ Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 7 ed., pp. 226 ff.

¹⁰⁹ Stubbs, Constitutional Hist., ii., p. 107.

¹¹⁰ Luchaire, op. cit., t. i, p. 61, p. 69. Henry II of England had his eldest son, Henry, crowned twice: first in 1170 (G. B. Adams, Political History of England, 1066-1216, p. 293), and again with his wife in 1172 (ibid., p. 303).

¹¹¹ Luchaire, op. cit., p. 87.

¹¹² Rymer, Foedcra, ed. Clarke and Holbrooke, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 75. Cf. the account of the succession of Richard I given by Ralph de Diceto: "Conies itaque Pictavorum Ricardus hæreditario jure promovendus in regem post tam cleri quam populi solempnem et debitam

"Jure in regem est consecratus cui jure hæreditario regnum competebat et quem communis consensus episcoporum et procerum jampridem eligerat."¹¹³

In fact, this mixed theory of election and heredity was not so much the result of a mere failure to distinguish between the two as it was the outcome of a carefully devised argument which formed an important element in that ecclesiastical tradition of political thought which John of Salisbury represents. The full statement of this theory is perhaps the point at which the Policraticus sheds the most direct light on the institutional history of its era.

John starts from the position that "the kingly power is not born of flesh and blood, since in the bestowal thereof regard for ancestry ought not to prevail over merits and virtues."¹¹⁴ Again he says that, while ordinarily public offices descend to the heirs of the holder, governance of the people does not so descend as a matter of right, but is bestowed upon one who has in him the spirit of God, and has a knowledge of the law.¹¹⁵ The theory of absolute hereditary right is thus rejected. On the other hand, John is equally far from accepting an unrestricted freedom of election on the part of the commonwealth. In describing the "ordination" of a Hebrew king, and implying that it is a model to be followed in instituting rulers, he says, "Here is plainly no acclamation by the people, any more than a title founded upon ties of blood"; but the prince should be chosen in the presence of the people, "so that afterwards no man may

electionem involutus est triplici sacramento," etc. Imagines Historiarum, anno 1189, Opera Historica, Rolls Series, no. 68, vol. II., p. 68.

113 "Receuil des Historiens de France," tom. xv., p. 144. For the combination of hereditary and elective theory in the Empire, see Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, (ed. 1896), vi, 163 ff. Cf. the account of the accession of Otto I. in the Annales QuedKnburgenses, M. G. H. SS, iii, 54: "Henricus rex obiit ... cujus filius Otto ... jure hæreditario paternis eligitur succedere regnis."

¹¹⁴ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra. ¹¹⁵ Bk. v., c. 6, infra.

have ground for retraction, and no least scruple of uncertainty may remain to cloud his title."¹¹⁶ John is particularly opposed to the efforts of kings to ensure the succession of their heirs. "Why is it," he asks, "that the poor are crushed beneath wrongs and outrages, made lean with exactions, despoiled by manifold and often repeated rapine, why are the peoples bidden to clash together in arms and shake the world, to no end but that princes may be succeeded by their natural heirs?"¹¹⁷ "To-day all are actuated by the single motive of making their children, no matter what the character of the latter may be, resplendent with riches and honors rather than with virtues. They even neglect and forget that the burden and responsibility of the common weal rest upon them."¹¹⁸

If thus neither election nor hereditary right affords a sufficient basis for the royal title, whence is it derived? John derives it directly from God, through election or inheritance or such other means as God in the given instance chooses to employ. "The prince is placed by the divine governance at the apex of the commonwealth, sometimes through the secret ministry of God's providence, sometimes by the decision of His priests, and again it is the votes of the whole people which concur to place the ruler in authority."¹¹⁹ Having been so chosen, if he then proceeds to discharge his office faithfully and in accordance with divine law, a presumptive right arises in his children to succeed him. "The father is succeeded by the son if the latter imitates the father's justice. Parents will be succeeded by their children if these shall have faithfully followed them in obeying the commandments of the Lord.... Since there is nought which men more desire than to have their sons succeed in their possessions, therefore this promise is given to princes as the greatest incentive to the practice of justice.... It is the privilege of a prince to have his sons succeed him with-

¹¹⁶ Bk. v., c. 6, infra. ¹¹⁷ Bk. v., c. 7, infra.

¹¹⁸ Bk. iv., c. 11, infra. ¹¹⁹ Bk. v., c. 6, infra.

out any question and in continuance of the original grant from God unless their princely power is subverted as a result of iniquity."¹²⁰ "It is not right to pass over in favor of new men the blood of princes, who are entitled by the divine promise and the right of family to be succeeded by their own children, provided they have walked in the judgments of the Lord."¹²¹

What the theory amounts to, then, is this: that heredity establishes a presumptive or defeasible title which if abused either by the incumbent, his predecessor, or the claimant to the succession, is capable of being divested by human action pursued in execution of the judgment of God and by virtue of authority derived from Him. This was substantially the form in which a compromise between the hereditary and elective principles was maintained by church theory during the two centuries from the election of Hugh Capet to the end of the twelfth century. On the former occasion it was expressed by Adalbero of Rheims: "We are not ignorant that Charles of Lorraine has partisans who pretend that the throne belongs to him by right of birth. But if the question is stated in this way we shall reply that royal power is not acquired by hereditary right, and that he alone should be elevated to it who is designated not merely by his birth and family but also by the wisdom of his spirit and who finds his natural support in his faithfulness to religion, his chief strength in his greatness of soul."¹²² What is substantially the same view is set forth in the much-disputed speech attributed to Archbishop Hubert of Canterbury on the occasion of the "election" of King John of England. "Let your discretion know," the Archbishop is made to say, "that no one has a right to succeed another in the kingship unless after the invocation of the Holy Spirit he is chosen by the unanimous approval of the universitas of the kingdom, having been previously

¹²⁰ Bk. iv., c. 11, infra. ¹²¹ Bk. v., c. 6, infra.

¹²² Richer, Bk. iv., c. 11, ed. Waitz, pp. 132-3.

designated for the post because of his pre-eminence in good qualities, according to the example and likeness of Saul, whom God set over His people although he was not the son of a king nor even sprung from a royal stock; and of David likewise, the son of Semey, who succeeded him, the one because he was able and fit for the royal dignity, the other because of his holiness and humanity; thus showing that he who excels all in the kingdom in point of ability should be set over all in power and rulership. But if any of the family of the deceased king so excels others, his election must be consented to all the more readily and promptly."¹²³

Read in the light of contemporary doctrine as developed in the Policraticus, there is no need to see in Hubert's speech the announcement of the principle of election in any modern sense, or to regard it as exceptional in the way that Stubbs seems to do.¹²⁴ It is merely the emergence of the conventional view upon an opportunity and from a source from which it might naturally be expected to emerge. We should make a serious mistake if we supposed that the elective element was conceived with anything like the sharpness of nineteenth, or the hereditary element with anything like the legitimist absolutism of eighteenth, century theory. Both were outlined with a hazy

¹²³ Matthew Paris, Chron. Maj., Rolls Series, no. 57, vol. ii, pp. 454, 5. The inconsistency between the two elements of the conventional theory, heredity and election, was already breaking apart in the investiture controversy at the end of the eleventh century. The imperialists were driven to advance a theory of indefeasible hereditary right: see Petrus Crassus, Defensio Henrici, M. G. H., Libelli de Lite, i, 432 ff; Liber de unitate ecclesiae conservanda, ibid, ii, 173. On the other hand, for the papalists, Manegold of Lautenbach rested royal authority on delegation by the people: Liber ad Gebehardum, cc. xxx, xlvii, ibid., i, 308 ff. See A. Fliche, "Les Théories Germaniques de la Souveraineté," in Revue Historique (May-June, 1917), cxxv, 1 ff.

¹²¹ Stubbs, Const'l Hist., vol. i., p. 454. Election was only a channel through which God manifested his will. See M. Prou, preface to Hincmar, "De Ordine Palatii," p. xxix, Bibl. de L'École des Hautes Etudes, fasc. 58.

informality, which was no doubt all the more congenial to church writers because of the opportunity which was thus left to the Church to intervene in doubtful cases and declare upon the highest authority the will of God.¹²⁵ But John cautiously refrains from saying that the power of decision always rests with the priesthood; it is true that they always have the power of deposition because they have the power of conferring royalty;¹²⁶ but it is only sometimes that God works through this power, and He frequently employs other agencies to elevate his chosen candidate to royal office.¹²⁷

The conception of the king's title as derived from God goes hand in hand with the conception of his "office" as a religious one. "Every office existing under and concerned with the execution of the sacred laws is really a religious office."¹²⁸ A great part of the Policraticus is taken up with a discussion of the duties of the ruler conceived from this standpoint. The discussion is illuminating as disclosing absolutely no distinction between what we should class as public and private duties.¹²⁹ The king should be chaste and avoid avarice;¹³⁰ he should be learned in letters;¹³¹ he should be humble;¹³² he should banish from his realm actors and mimes, buffoons and harlots;¹³³ he should seek the welfare of others and not his own;¹³⁴ he should wholly forget the affections of flesh and blood and do only that

¹²⁵ See the very interesting "opinion" handed down by Innocent III when he undertook to decide the case of the disputed election of Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick to the Empire (1201): HuillardBreholles, "Historica diplomatica Friderici secundi," I. 70-76; also in Migne, P. L., tom. 216, 1025 ff.

¹²⁶ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra. ¹²⁷ Bk. v., c. 6, infra. ¹²⁸ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra.

129 Augustine, still living in the classical tradition, had recognized such a distinction. Ad. Bon., Ep. 50., c. 5, § 19. This letter appears as no. 185 in Migne's edition. See P. L., tom. 33, 801.

¹³⁰ Bk. iv., c. 5, infra.

¹³¹ Bk. iv., c. 6, infra. Hugh of Fleury would have the king learn to read, "ut acuatur cotidie ejus ingenium lectione divinorum librorum." "Tract. de Reg. Pot.," i., 6.

¹³² Bk. iv., c. 7, infra. ¹³³ Bk. iv., c. 4, infra. ¹³⁴ Bk. iv., c. 8, infra.

which is demanded by the welfare and safety of his subjects; he should be both father and husband to them;¹³⁵ he should correct their errors with the proper remedies;¹³⁶ he should be affable of speech and generous in conferring benefits; he should temper justice with mercy;¹³⁷ he should punish the wrongs and injuries of all, and all crimes, with even-handed equity;¹³⁸ he has duties to the very wise and the very foolish, to little children and to the aged;¹³⁹ his shield is a shield for the protection of the weak, and should ward off the darts of the wicked from the innocent;¹⁴⁰ he must act on the counsel of wise men;¹⁴¹ he must protect the widow and the orphan;¹⁴² he must curb the malice of officials and provide for them out of the public funds to the end that all occasion for extortion may be removed;¹⁴³ he must restrain the soldiery from outrage;¹⁴⁴ he should be learned in law and in military science;¹⁴⁵ he must in all things provide for the welfare of the lower classes;¹⁴⁶ he must avoid levity;¹⁴⁷ he is charged with the disposal of the means of the public welfare,¹⁴⁸ and is the dispenser of honor;¹⁴⁹ he must not close his ear to the cries of the poor;¹⁵⁰ he must raise aloft the roof-tree of the Church and extend abroad the worship of religion;¹⁵¹ he must protect the Church against sacrilege and rapine;¹⁵² and finally, he must ever strive so to rule that in the whole community over which he presides none shall be sorrowful.¹⁵³

This patriarchal-ecclesiastical conception of monarchy and government forms part of a tradition which had become dominant sometime before the reign of Justinian and was destined to govern western thought almost until the end of the sixteenth

¹³⁵ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra. ¹³⁶ Bk. iv., c. 8, infra. ¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Bk. iv., c. 2, infra. ¹³⁹ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra. ¹⁴⁰ Bk. iv., c. 2 infra. ¹⁴¹ Bk. v., c. 6, infra. ¹⁴² Ibid. ¹⁴³ Bk. v., c. 10, infra.

¹⁴⁴ Bk. vi., c. 1, infra. ¹⁴⁵ Bk. vi., c. 2, infra.

¹⁴⁶ Bk. vi., c. 20, c. 25, infra. ¹⁴⁷ Bk. vi., c. 23, infra.

¹⁴⁸ Bk. vi., c. 24, infra. ¹⁴⁹ Bk. vi., c. 26, infra.

¹⁵⁰ Bk. vi., c. 27, infra. ¹⁵¹ Bk. vi., c. 2, infra.

¹⁵² Bk. vi., c. 13, infra. ¹⁵³ Bk. vi., c. 6, infra.

century.¹⁵⁴ It emerges with especial emphasis in the Carolingian period,¹⁵⁵ and writes itself into coronation oaths and official documents. Thus Otto the First, when crowned King of the Franks, swore that he would "drive out all the enemies of Christ by the divine authority committed to him, and would stretch out the hand of pity to the ministers of God and to all widows and orphans, and never be wanting in the oil of mercy."¹⁵⁶ Barbarossa seems to have sworn to defend the Church and the clergy of God, to keep peace and order, and to protect the widows and the fatherless and all his people, "that those who obeyed and trusted him might rejoice, and that he might win glory in the sight of men and eternal life with the King of Kings."¹⁵⁷ Bishop Adalbero at the election of Hugh Capet told the assembly, "you shall have him for a father; for who of you when in trouble shall not be able to take refuge with him and find in him a patron and protector?"¹⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that in two treatises on royalty written during the Carolingian period,¹⁵⁹ there is quoted the same passage from a work certainly not earlier than the fifth century,¹⁶⁰ in which this

¹⁵⁴ See Sir Thomas More, "Utopia," Everyman's ed., pp. 39-40, for substantially the same conception of kingship as that of John of Salisbury; so also Bodin, "Six Livres de la République," Bk. ii., c. iii; George Buchanan, "De Jure Regni apud Scotos," cc. xxxviii., xxxix, also Epigram ii., 27. See P. Hume Brown, "George Buchanan, Humanist and Reformer," p. 254.

¹⁵⁵ Seeliger, in Cambridge Mediaeval History, vol. ii, p. 656.

¹⁵⁶ Widukind, ii., c. 1, ed. Waitz, M. G. H. SS., iii, p. 438.

¹⁵⁷ Jaffé, Bibliotheca Rermn Germanicarum, vol. I. p. 513. Wibaldi epp., no. 382.

¹⁵⁸ Richer, Chron., ed. Waitz, p. 133.

¹⁵⁹ Jonas of Orleans, De Inst. Reg., c. 3; Hincmar of Rheims, De regis persona et regio ministerio, c. 2, Migne, P. L., tom. 125, 833 ff.

¹⁶⁰ The passage is from a work entitled "De Duodicum Abusionibus Sacculi," (c. 9), wrongly attributed by mediæval writers to St. Cyprian, and printed among his works (Migne, P. L., tom. 4, col. 870 at col. 877 ff.). A scholarly edition of this work under the earlier title "De Duodecim Abusivis Saeculi" has been published by S. Hellmann (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, ed.

ecclesiastical-patriarchal conception of royalty is very fully developed; and the passage as an obviously important source of much of the later theory deserves comparison with the statement of the ruler's duties in the Policraticus: "The justice of a King is this: not to use his power to oppress any one; to judge between a man and his neighbor without respect of persons; to be the defender of pilgrims and orphans and widows; to prevent thefts: to punish adultery; not to exalt the wicked to power; not to nourish unchaste persons and actors; to destroy the wicked from the face of the earth; not to permit parricides and perjurers to live; to defend churches; to sustain the poor by alms; to place righteous men in charge of the business of the realm; to have old men and wise men and sober men for his counsellors; not to give ear to the superstitions of magicians, soothsayers and pythonesses; to put away anger; to defend the land bravely and righteously against foes; to trust to God in all things; to hold the Catholic faith in God; not to permit his sons to act wickedly; to attend to prayers at regular hours; not to take food before the appointed hours."¹⁶¹ This passage practically sums

Harnack and Schmidt, vol. 34, Leipzig, 1910). Hellmann points out the extensive influence of the work upon Carolingian and later political literature, and ascribes its origin to southwestern Ireland between 630 and 700. See also Bury, "Life of St. Patrick," p. 205.

¹⁶¹ This passage is adopted by Abbo of Fleury (c. 990) as expressing his view of monarchy. "Receuil des Histor. de France," t. x., p. 627. The way in which it reached him is interesting. He attributes it to the Sixth Council of Paris, canons, ii., c. 1. The second book of canons of this Council incorporates practically in its entirety the treatise of Jonas of Orleans above referred to, including of course Jonas's quotation from the "De Abusionibus" (Mansi, xiv, 574 ff.). Prou thinks that the treatise of Jonas is a mere copy from the canons rather than that the canons are taken from the treatise, preface to Hincmar's "De Ordine Palatii," ed. Prou, Bibl. de L'École des Hautes Études fasc. 58, p. xxv. The same conclusion was reached earlier by B. Simson, "Jahrbücher des Frankischen Reichs unter Ludwig den Frommen," i, 381 ff.

up all that John of Salisbury has to say on the duties of the prince. He has nothing to add to it.¹⁶²

The patriarchal-ecclesiastical conception of monarchy thus looked upon the relations between the monarch and his subjects as purely personal. Its ideal was Job sitting in the gate and rendering judgment in favor of the widow and the poor man,¹⁶³ an ideal which was actually realized in St. Louis's well-known practice of doing justice under the oak at Vincennes.¹⁶⁴ It ignored altogether the question of the organization of an ad-

¹⁶² For a similar conception of monarchy in Justinian's Novels, see Bussell, "The Roman Empire" vol. ii., pp. 50 ff. The duties of a king are set forth as follows by Hugh of Flavigny (c. 1100): "The duty of a king is to rule the people of God in justice and equity; to be the defender of churches, the protector of widows and orphans, to deliver the poor man from the mighty and the needy man whom there is none to aid; and like blessed Job to break the jaws of the unjust man and bear away his prey from his teeth; to be the father of the poor, an eye to the blind and a foot to the lame" (M. G. H., SS., viii, p. 436). The passage is copied by Hugh of Fleury, "Tract. de Reg. Pot." i., 6 (Libelli de Lite, ii., p. 473). For a collection of passages from contemporaneous writers setting forth the same view see Waitz, "Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte" (ed. 1896), vi, 469 ff. A familiar type of treatise consisted of a list of the virtues proper to a king, and a moral discourse on each. Such is the "Via Regia" of Abbot Smaragdus, a Carolingian writer (Migne, P. L., tom. cii, col. 931 ff.), and the first book of the "De Principis Instructione" of Giraldus Cambrensis at the end of the twelfth century (Opera, Rolls Series, no. 21, vol. viii.). Cf. also Sedulius Scotus, "Liber de Rectoribus Christianis," Migne. P. L., tom. ciii, col. 291.

¹⁶³ Bk. v., c. 6, 8, infra.

¹⁶⁴ De Joinville, "Histoire de Saint Louis," ed. Natalis de Wailly, p. 35. It is to be observed that John conceives of the king's public functions as falling into two departments, military and judicial. See Bk. vi, c. 2, infra. The King's non-military duties consist in knowing and applying the law, not in making it. John nowhere suggests the existence of an earthly legislative power vested in the king or elsewhere. Law-making was still viewed as a part of the judicial process, — a more or less surreptitious incident of "jus dicere." See J. Pétrau-Gay, "La Notion de 'Lex' dans la Coutume Salienne," Grenoble, 1920, p. 28. For other examples of the "judicial" conception of the kingly office, see Jonas of Orleans, "De Institut. Reg." c. 4; Hincmar, "De regis persona, etc.," c. 16.

ministrative mechanism for establishing an impersonal contact between government and the individual. There is no hint of this problem in the Policraticus. From the theoretical standpoint it thus omitted some of the most important problems of the science of government. From the practical standpoint it was at once the cause and the reflection of the condition of affairs which resulted in the administrative disintegration that we know as feudalism. The relation of the prince to his subjects being conceived as not essentially different from their relation to one another, there follows naturally the distintegration of public law into private law which characterizes the middle ages. The relation of the subjects to one another being conceived as not different from their relations to the prince, there resulted the establishment by the more powerful subjects of what practically amounted to princely power over their lesser neighbors. The same tendency was furthered by the conception of princely power as paternal; every lord of a large household was necessarily regarded by John of Salisbury¹⁶⁵ as in some sort a prince. The patriarchal conception of authority thus worked toward the same result as the conception of a pre-established higher law.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the existence of only a personal as distinguished from an institutional bond between the prince and his subordinate officials ¹⁶⁷ operated on the one hand to make efficient supervision of the administrative system impossible, and on the other hand to place their relations on a footing of private law which lent a color of legality to claims of feudal in¹⁶⁵ Bk. vi., c. 22, c. 27, infra.

¹⁶⁶ "The mediæval view of government admitted and indeed required that wealth and social influence should be accompanied by political power.... Every householder had some jurisdiction under his roof-gutter and within the hedge. Personal authority over domestic servants and slaves took among other things the shape of criminal and police jurisdiction." Vinogradoff, in Cambridge Mediaeval History, vol. ii., p. 651.

¹⁶⁷ Supra, p. xxviii

dependence. Feudalism was thus bred in part from the very ideas of personal absolutism which superficially seem most strongly opposed to it. Its persistence was to some degree due to the fact that its presuppositions were accepted by its opponents.¹⁶⁸

The absence of any sense of the need for organizing on an institutional basis the relations between the prince and his subordinates no doubt accounts for the scandalous venality of the bureaucracy which so much of the Policraticus is devoted to castigating.¹⁶⁹ It is a result which always follows from such a cause; it did so in the Byzantine Empire ¹⁷⁰ and in the Renaissance monarchies of the sixteenth century.¹⁷¹ The restraining influence of purely personal supervision is entirely inadequate to control a large body of officials functioning over a wide territorial area; an institutionalized system of responsibility can alone develop the tradition and enforce the practice of honest efficiency. It has been well said that when more power is conferred upon the people than they are able to exercise, effective control is really taken from them,¹⁷² and similarly when more power is left in the hands of the prince than he can humanly exercise, effective power passes really to an irresponsible bureaucracy.

There is much food for modern thought in John of Salisbury's attempt to correct the abuses of governmental power by strenuously preaching the virtues of personal morality. It was

¹⁶⁸ When the French kings by the middle of the fourteenth century had succeeded in getting possession of the greater feudal principalities which they had been striving to control for more than two centuries, they could think of nothing better to do with them than to parcel them out as "appanages" among younger members of the royal family in whose hands they became the basis of a new feudalism. See Lodge "The Close of the Middle Ages." p. 46.

¹⁶⁹ Bk. v., cc. 10, 11, 15, 16; Bk. vi., c. 1, infra.

¹⁷⁰ Bussell, "The Roman Empire," vol. ii., p. 53 ff,; 93 ff.

¹⁷¹ L. Einstein, "Tudor Ideals," pp. 56-62.

¹⁷² Henry Jones Ford, "Rise and Growth of American Politics," p. 209.

the only method that he knew. It is the method which still appeals most strongly to the average human beings who have in their hands the destinies of modern democracies. But the teaching of all political history proves that it is a futile method. Men's qualities and standards are determined largely by their opportunities and temptations. John himself saw this,¹⁷³ but it led him to no more fruitful conclusion than a lapse into the Stoic recommendation, so inconsistent with all the rest of his teaching, that a man who wished to preserve his virtue should have nothing to do with public affairs. "Who desires to be good, let him quit the court."¹⁷⁴ If this is the inevitable conclusion, political philosophy is a vain and unprofitable study.

John is innocent of any idea of correcting the abuses of administration by an institutional organization of public functions under the prince. Everything rests in his personal judgment. Everything is "guided solely by the determinations of his own mind."¹⁷⁵ And this absolutism is tinctured with elements which enable us to see the patriarchal origins of the feudal point of view. The prince is in a sense the owner of all the goods of his subjects. Private law is again called into play and the subjects are conceived as mere tenants by superficies; and "when the advantage of the ruling power so requires, they are not so much owners of their possessions as mere custodians. But if there is no pressure of necessity then the goods of the provincials are their own and not even the prince himself may lawfully abuse them."¹⁷⁶ On the other hand "the prince will not regard as his own the wealth of which he has the custody for the account of others, nor will he treat as private the property of the fisc, which is acknowledged to be public. Nor is this any ground for wonder, since he is not even his own man, but belongs wholly to his subjects."¹⁷⁷ This is a view which can

¹⁷³ Bk. v., c. 10, infra. ¹⁷⁴ Bk. v., c. 6, infra.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. ¹⁷⁶ Bk. vi., c. 1, infra. ¹⁷⁷ Bk. iv., c. 5, infra.

easily degenerate into the claim of the overlord to ownership of all the goods of his vassals;¹⁷⁸ while in its essence it seems to approach quite nearly to the modern conception of trusteeship. The king can take and use the goods of his subjects when necessary for the common advantage; and he is accountable not to their judgment but only to the "higher law." Implicit belief in the certainty of this law and its enforcement serves to conceal the danger of entrusting such power to an individual. On the other hand, a power of "eminent domain" had obviously to be vested somewhere; and John and his contemporaries were incapable of conceiving it as vested in the state itself because they could not yet conceive of the universitas as acting except through the prince, or as having a persona of its own apart from the persona of the prince. In other words, they had to think in terms of trusts and not of corporations; and they could do so without difficulty because they had the higher law to fall back upon.

IV. THE CHURCH

John of Salisbury's conception of the Church is a corollary of his view that the "higher" law is the law of God; and that "every office existing under and concerned with the execution of the sacred laws is really a religious office."¹⁷⁹ Therefore both the organization of the state and the ecclesiastical organization are agencies for the administration and execution of the same body of divine rules and precepts. The sacerdotal power is a part of the same "body" or commonwealth as the princely or temporal power.¹⁸⁰ So far, this is but the traditional Gelasian doctrine,¹⁸¹ which had gained general currency at the

¹⁷⁸ See More, "Utopia," Everyman's ed., p. 38.

¹⁷⁹ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra. ¹⁸⁰ Bk. v., c. 2, infra.

¹⁸¹ Gelasius I., Ep. viii., ad Anastasium Imp., Migne, P. L., tom. lix, col. 41; Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory, i, 190.

hands of Carolingian writers. But even the Carolingian writers had gone farther and maintained that while emperors might be "judged" by priests, priests could not be judged by emperors.¹⁸² It is interesting to note that one of these writers, Jonas of Orleans, cities the emperor Constantine as authority for this proposition;¹⁸³ while John of Salisbury in further developing it relies upon stories of the acts and words of Constantine at the Council of Nicaea.¹⁸⁴ The priestly power cannot be judged by the temporal power because the functions of the latter are of inferior dignity, consisting essentially in physical coercion and "being typified in the person of the hangman." The wielder of temporal power "is therefore, as it were, the minister of the priestly power for the purpose of enforcing the divine law by physical sanctions, and receives his sword from the Church." In the organic analogy the priesthood holds the place of the soul in the body as the prince holds that of the head; and hence the prince is subject "to those who exercise God's office and represent Him on earth, even as in the human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul."¹⁸⁵ God regards the honor or dishonor of those who "administer the divine laws, i.e. the priesthood, as His own, saying 'Who hears you, hears me.'"¹⁸⁶ Accordingly Constantine had declared that "it was not permissible for him, as a man, and one who was subject to the judgment of priests, to examine cases touching Gods, who cannot be judged save by God alone."¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, since God sometimes uses the priesthood as the means of conferring kingship,¹⁸⁸ they have the power to take away that which they have the power to bestow; and John cites the example of the transfer of the Hebrew crown from Saul to David by Samuel.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸² Jonas of Orleans, De Inst. Reg., c. 2. ¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Bk. v., c. 2, infra. ¹⁸⁵ Bk. v., c. 2., infra.

¹⁸⁶ Bk. v., c. 5, infra. ¹⁸⁷ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra.

¹⁸⁸ Bk. v., c. 6, infra. ¹⁸⁹ Bk. iv., c. 3, infra.

With the question of the organization of the priestly hierarchy John does not deal directly; his views must be pieced together from statements made in other connections. He was of the school and generation of Bernard of Clairvaux, who had made it their ideal to exalt the papal primacy. Accordingly he says that the "Roman Church" — i. e. the Apostolic See, — is the "mother and head of all the churches."¹⁹⁰ "Whoever dissents from the teaching of the Roman Church is either a heretic or a schismatic." ¹⁹¹ "The Roman Church by the high authority of God is the parent and nursing mother of faith and life, and, fortified by the privilege of Heaven, can neither be judged nor blamed of men." ¹⁹² "Judgment upon the supreme pontiff is reserved for God alone." ¹⁹³

On the other hand he makes it clear that he does not approve of the direct centralization of church administration at Rome by the grant of exemptions and immunities from the jurisdiction of the local bishops and other church authorities.¹⁹⁴ "I do not presume," he says, "to criticize the generosity of the Apostolic See, but I do think that these indulgences which it grants are not to the advantage of the Church of God ... I say that men who seek exemptions of this character would cast off the yoke of Christ and his Father if they could; nay even, I say more, they do cast off His yoke, so far as in them lies, and falsely contradict the divine ordinances."¹⁹⁵ Others, to shield their malice from correction, "get themselves altogether exempted from the jurisdiction of the churches and cause themselves to be received as special children of the Roman Church, with the result that while they may sue in any court, they cannot be sued save at Rome or Jerusalem."¹⁹⁶ John

¹⁹⁰ Bk. vi., c. 24, infra. ¹⁹¹ Bk. vi., c. 24, infra.

¹⁹² Bk. viii., c. 17, infra. ¹⁹³ Bk. viii., c. 23, infra.

194 For the same view see St. Bernard, "De Consideratione," iii., 4, § 17, tr. Lewis, p. 89. ¹⁹⁵ Bk. viii., c. 19, infra. ¹⁹⁶ Bk. vii., c. 21, infra.

protests repeatedly that he has no intention of criticizing or resisting the Apostolic See;¹⁹⁷ but he expresses disapproval of some of its acts and a belief that they were due to improper pressure brought to bear upon it.¹⁹⁸

The impression left by John's whole discussion of the organization and state of the Church is that it is hesitating and ambiguous. He says at one point that the Supreme Pontiff is above the law; and while this might seem to admit a complete dispensing power in the Pope, he hastens to add that one who is in such a position "is all the more strictly obliged not to commit unlawful acts."¹⁹⁹ Elsewhere he criticizes the Pope for granting a privilege which was contrary to the canons, — i. e. for an exercise of the dispensing power,²⁰⁰ — and thus seems to imply that the Pope like other magistrates is after all under the "higher law" which the canons reproduce. John conceives of the Pope no more than the Prince as "sovereign" in the modern sense.

John is similarly ambiguous in dealing with the thorny, and in his day extremely practical, question of disputed papal elections. He deplores that the papal throne has too often been the prize contended for by ambitious men who "tear the Church asunder and profane the sanctuary, shake the nations, harry kingdoms, to procure but a wider license and larger immunity for themselves, to heap up money, to favor, aggrandize, and corrupt flesh and blood, to ennoble their families, to lord it over their flocks rather than to be an example unto them. Such men are more rightly to be numbered among tyrants than among princes." ²⁰¹ He makes, perhaps only half in earnest, the naive suggestion that the world should stand aside and let such contenders fight out their quarrel; after which the defeated party should be drowned in the Tiber and the victor

¹⁹⁷ Bk. vii., c. 21; Bk. viii., c. 17, infra.

¹⁹⁸ Bk. vii., c. 21; Bk. viii., c. 23, infra. ¹⁹⁹ Bk. viii., c. 23, infra. 200 Bk. vii., c. 21, infra. ²⁰¹ Bk. viii., c. 23, infra.

condemned to penal servitude in the mines or quarries.²⁰² But one who has been canonically elected must be held for pope, whoever he be.²⁰³ The question of what election is canonical is not discussed, being apparently remitted to the higher law, which can only mean to the judgment of the individual.²⁰⁴

Most of John of Salisbury's discussion of church affairs occurs in connection with his bitter invectives against abuses, of which he emphasizes chiefly the advancement of improper persons to church preferment, and the resulting corruption in the exercise of ecclesiastical authority.²⁰⁵ Following the traditions of the reforming party in the Church during the preceding century, he traces the root of the evil to the influence of the secular authority in ecclesiastical appointments;²⁰⁶ but even papal legates "at times rage through the provinces in such bacchanalian frenzy as if Satan himself had come forth from the presence of the Lord to scourge the Church";²⁰⁷ and it was contrary to all custom and experience for a legate to return poor after discharging an embassy.²⁰⁸ One of the most vivid chapters of the Policraticus is that in which John recounts a conversation with his friend, Pope Adrian IV, in which he frankly disclosed to the pontiff his opinion of the shortcomings of the Roman See. He thought that many, if not most, of

²⁰² Bk. viii., c. 23, infra. ²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ John of Salisbury in later life took an active part in the Third Lateran Council of 1178 which promulgated the decree "Licet de Evitanda" regulating the rules of Papal elections.

205 "For the most part such men have been promoted by the court to the offices of the Church against the unanimous wishes of the faithful." Bk. v., c. 16, infra.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. ²⁰⁷ Ibid.

208 Bk. v., c 15, infra. Note also the ironical tone in Bk. viii., c. 17, where John, after saying that he will not criticize the Roman See, proceeds to recount the outrages of legates and ends by saying that these things cannot be, because they are unthinkable. Says St. Bernard: "To think of a legate returning from a land of gold without gold! Does it not sound like news from another world?" De Consideratione, iv, 5, § 13, tr. Lewis, p. 112.

the Roman officials were pure and honest, but "the contamination of the dishonest few brings infamy upon the Church universal; and in my opinion the reason why they die so fast is to prevent their corrupting the entire Church ... Father, you are wandering in the trackless wilderness, and have strayed from the true way."²⁰⁹ And in almost the last chapter of the Policraticus, John sets forth the practically impossible position of the Pope, who in order to maintain himself on his throne must make compromises and yield to influences which taint him with the very sins and vices which it should be his chief duty to combat and destroy. "If he follows these practices, must he not condemn himself with his own voice?"²¹⁰

It is hard to resist the impression in analyzing John's discussion of the Church that we are witnessing the crumbling of an ideal. The reformers of the eleventh century had seen no other way of purifying the Church and restoring its moral and spiritual influence than by setting it wholly free from temporal control and erecting it upon a pinnacle of supremacy under a world-wide authority of its own, embodied in the Papacy. It remained for their successors in the twelfth century to witness the subtle corrosion of the church organization itself by the same influences which they had been taught to regard as wholly due to secular causes. The result is a vague feeling on the part of both St. Bernard and John of Salisbury that something is wrong; and it is perhaps in consequence of this feeling that John's discussion of the Church is on the whole so unsatisfactory, and marred by so many inconsistencies. Two things, however, stand out from it with sufficient clearness: he held firmly to a theory of papal supremacy, however uncertain he may have been as to just what was meant by that supremacy; and he held with equal firmness to the notion that the church organization, like the organization of temporal government,

²⁰⁹ Bk. vi., c. 24, infra.

²¹⁰ Bk. viii., c. 23, infra.

was but an instrumentality for applying a "higher" law which marked out the duties of church authorities no less than of laymen. Following centuries were to witness the gradual divergence of these conceptions.²¹¹

John's treatment of the relation of the Church to the temporal ruler is marked by similar ambiguities.²¹² He is explicit enough in his positive assertions that the prince is subject to the priesthood and is but the minister of priests. This might be expected to lead logically to the conclusion that the prince must submit to the supreme adjudication of the priesthood all questions requiring an interpretation of the divine law. But John nowhere institutionalizes to this extent the priestly supremacy. Responsibility for bringing human law into accord with equity rests upon the Prince himself. Where the Church has al-

²¹¹ Robert Grosseteste in the middle of the 13th century displays far more clearly than John of Salisbury the conflict between an implicit acceptance of Papal Supremacy and a sense of intolerable evils and corruption within the Church. See A. L. Smith, "Church and State in the Middle Ages," Lecture III.

²¹² See especially Bk. iv., c. 3; Bk. iv., c. 6, infra. A clear statement of the ambiguities of John's view of the relation of Church and state is that of Ernst Schubert, "Die Staatslehre Johann's von Salisbury." Inaug. Diss. (Erlangen), Berlin, 1897, "If we take certain of John's general expressions as to the relation of Church and state, the view which results of the basis of the relation is the extreme hierarchical one ... John thus seems to be the first who theoretically put forward the complete absorption of the state in the Church; his theory of the two swords could not be more destructive of the state. But if we examine his theories more closely on precisely this point, we must agree that on several very critical points, as for example, the choice of the prince by the priests, the right of the Church to depose the ruler, the manner and way in which the Church communicates its commands to the prince and imposes them upon him, he simply evades them silently. This shows that he did not have in mind a complete subjection and absorption of the state in practice, as his theories seem to indicate, but rather regards the prince and the state as servants of the Church and of the priesthood only in an ideal sense, that is to say, only when the priests are really such as they ought to be." (Op. cit., p. 36). I am the more inclined to agree with Dr. Schubert as I had reached the same conclusion before I saw his monograph.

ready acted and laid down a rule he must follow it. If "lawful" priests advise him, he must hearken to them. But there is no assertion that he must remit all doubtful points to their decision, or that they constitute a governmental organ vested with the official function of deciding such questions as a legal tribunal of last appeal. It would be easy to draw such a conclusion from his premises, but John does not draw it himself. Instead, he says that the ruler must know the law personally, and to that end should learn to read; but if he cannot read, then he should learn the law from the mouths of priests. "In accordance with their preaching should the ruling power guide the government of the magistracy committed to him."

The impression produced by such language is that John conceived the Church as having rather what we should today call a moral supremacy than a strictly legal one.²¹³ Of course, he would not have understood such a distinction; and as time passed and ideas came to be defined with greater legal precision, such views as his tended to shape themselves into the papal claim of something like legal sovereignty over the whole world. But no such articulated doctrine is to be found in the Policraticus. John does not even specify what priests the prince must obey; apparently he is thinking of all priests indiscriminately, provided only they be "legitimate." Obviously such obedience is characterized by an informality which is difficult to bring within the modern categories of legal or political subordination.²¹⁴

²¹³ The Carolingian writers had definitely expressed this idea by defining the function of the bishop as that of "oversight." Hincmar, "De Ordine Palatii," c. v., ed. Prou, p. 16.

²¹⁴ John's theory is ordinarily represented as an extreme form of the doctrine that temporal governments are subject to the political and legal supremacy of the priesthood. "The safest conclusion would be that in John of Salisbury and Honorius of Augsburg we find the first definite statement that all authority, ecclesiastical or secular, belongs to the spiritual power." Jacob, in "Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers," p. 79. John "gathered together in his hand the separate threads of argument which had here and there been

Precisely because it was thus informally conceived, the doctrine was able to maintain itself; it broke down in the moment of achieving final legal definition.²¹⁵

V. TYRANNY, TYRANNICIDE, AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

The doctrine of the Policraticus is that there can be "tyranny" wherever there is rulership. "Tyranny exists not only in the case of princes, but everyone is a tyrant who abuses power that has been granted to him from above over those who are subjected to him." ²¹⁶ "In common speech the tyrant is one

used by the Hildebrandine party and busied himself in weaving out of them, as well as out of newly invented material of his own, an enduring and colorful web wherein all the relations of the political and legal life of individuals as well as of peoples are firmly held together by the indestructible connecting link of the universal supremacy of the Church." Gennrich, "Staats-und Kirchenlehre Johanns von Salisbury, p. 157. See also Schaarschmidt, p. 348; Carlyle, "History of Mediaeval Political Theory," vol. 4, pp. 335-6; Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Age," tr. Maitland, note 10. It seems to me that this view is the result of unconsciously reading into the Policraticus the clean-cut definiteness of constitutional ideas with which we are familiar but of which John of Salisbury was innocent. His conception of the relations between Church and state cannot be interpreted in terms of constitutional law because he drew no distinction between constitutional and moral conceptions. His doctrine undoubtedly pointed in the direction of the constitutional supremacy of the church but did not itself embody it. Schubert seems to me correct in his view that most of the interpretation of John's doctrine has been one-sided (Die Staatslehre Johanns van Salisbury, p. 8) and that "the theories of the Policraticus are not exclusively of the high ecclesiastical variety but are combined with others which attribute to the state a high and independent significance" (ibid., p. 49 ff., pp. 36-37).

²¹⁵ "Unam Sanctam" preceded by one year the collapse at Anagni, and by three years the subjection of the Papacy to the French King.

²¹⁶ Bk. viii., c. 18. "Tyrant" is a name frequently applied, from the Carolingian period onward, to the feudal magnates who were forcibly extending their authority. Einhard, Vita Caroli, c. 2; Suger, Vita Ludovici, c. xxiii., Oeuvres, ed. Lecoy de la Marche, pp. 92-93, William of Newburgh, Historia Rerum Anglicarum, i, 22, in "Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I.," Rolls Series, no. 82, i, 69.

who oppresses a whole people by rulership based on force; and yet it is not only over the people as a whole that a man can play the tyrant, but he can do so, if he will, in the meanest station"²¹⁷ ... "It is not only kings who practice tyranny, but among private men there are a host of tyrants, since the power which they have, they turn to some forbidden object."²¹⁸ These passages illustrate the absence of any clear distinction in John's thought between the social and the political; abuse of public power is conceived simply in terms of a breach of personal morality.

So there may be tyranny on the part of persons holding ecclesiastical as well as temporal offices;²¹⁹ and "of the two kinds the ecclesiastical tyrant is worse than the temporal."²²⁰ Much of John's discussion of the behavior of tyrants has reference to the ecclesiastial variety; but his theory of temporal tyrants is far more complete and well-defined.

In the sphere of temporal rulership the difference between a prince and a tyrant is that the prince obeys "the law," while the tyrant "oppresses the people by rulership based upon force, and regards nothing as accomplished unless the laws are brought to nought and the people reduced to slavery."²²¹ John then quotes the traditional etymology of "rex," which connected it with "recte," and gave a basis for the argument that he alone is entitled to the name of king who rules rightly.²²² This leads to the further inference that the will of the prince cannot be unjust or opposed to the law, because when it becomes so, he

²¹⁷ Bk. viii., c. 17 infra. ²¹⁸ Ibid.. ²¹⁹ Bk. viii. c. 23, infra.

220 See especially Bk. vii., c. 17; Bk. viii., c. 17, c. 23, infra.

²²¹ Bk. viii., c. 17, infra. The idea that the difference between a prince and a tyrant consists in the fact that the one rules in accordance with law, and the other not, goes back in ecclesiastical tradition to St. Gregory's Com. on Job, xv., 20, Migne, P. L., lxxv, 1006.

²²² Hor., Ep., i., 1, 59-60; the definition seems to have come into serious political thought with St. Isidore of Seville, Etym., ix., 3, Migne, P. L., tom. 82, 342.

then ceases to be truly a prince and becomes a tyrant instead. "The will of the true ruler depends upon the law of God ... but the will of a tyrant is the slave of his desire."²²³ It is therefore quite proper to say that the will of the Prince has the force of law, because, insofar as he is truly a prince, his will cannot fail to be in accordance with the law.²²⁴ "Who, indeed, in respect of public matters can properly speak of the will of the prince at all, since therein he may not lawfully have any will of his own, apart from that which the law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common interest requires? For in these matters his will is to have the force of a judgment; and most properly that which pleases him therein has the force of law, because his decision may not be at variance with the intention of equity."²²⁵

Having by this sleight-of-hand reconciled the doctrine of a "higher law" with the text "Quod principi placet," it would no doubt have been possible for John to proceed to the conclusion later reached by Bartolus that some or all of the acts of the tyrant are legally void, and that his rule is without authority;²²⁶ but he does not do so; for his way is here blocked by another current of authority to which he could hardly have dared to refuse deference. This is the tradition proceeding from the scriptural texts "The powers that be are ordained of God,"²²⁷ and "Servants, obey your masters."²²⁸ The tyrant must be regarded as holding his power from God no less than the true prince, for "all power is from the Lord God.... It is not the ruler's own act when his will is turned to cruelty against

²²³ Bk. viii., c. 22. infra.

²²⁴ Dante attempted to show realistically that one who was sole monarch of the world must have a will directed toward good, for there is nothing further for him to desire. De Mon., i., 11, 5.

²²⁵ Bk. iv. c. 1, infra.

²²⁶ See Bartolus, "De Tyrannia," trans. in Emerton, "Humanism and Tyranny," especially c. vii, pp. 134 ff.

²²⁷ See Bk. iv., c. 1, infra. ²²⁸ Quoted Bk. vi., c. 27, infra.

his subjects, but it is rather the dispensation of God for His good pleasure to punish or chasten them. Power is worthy of veneration even when it comes as a plague upon the elect."²²⁹ "Even tyrants of the gentiles who have been damned unto death from eternity are yet the ministers of God and are called the anointed of the Lord."²³⁰

In other words, tyranny is a part of God's providential ordering of the universe, and, as such, it must be met with due submission. "All power is good since it is from Him from whom alone are all things, and from whom cometh only good. But at times it may not be good, but rather evil, to the particular individual ... upon whom it is exercised, though it is good from the universal standpoint, being the act of Him who uses our evil for His own good purposes. Therefore the rule of a tyrant is good, although there is nothing worse than tyranny."²³¹ "Because of the wickedness of our generation, who are continually provoking against ourselves the wrath of God, it more frequently happens that power comes into the hands of bad, than of good, men."²³² "For tyrants are demanded, introduced, and raised to power by sin," and "are properly deserved by a stiff-necked and stubborn people."²³³ And just as God inflicts a tyrant upon a sinful people, so when they turn from their wickedness, God frees them from the oppressor.²³⁴ A wicked king cannot escape the judgment of God. "Run through the sequence of all the histories, and you will see in brief the succession of kings and how they were cut off by God, like threads in the warp of a web." ²³⁵ Therefore the best way to get rid of tyrants "is for those who are oppressed to take

²²⁹ Bk. iv., c. 1, infra. ²³⁰ Bk. viii., c. 18, infra.

²³¹ Ibid. This is a commonplace of the 12th century: "De bonis et de malis bene facit Deus qui omnia juste facit atque disponit. Et sic fit ut et malus angelus et malus homo divinae militent providentiae." Hugh of Fleury, Tract de Reg. Pot., i., c. 4.

²³² Ibid. ²³³ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra.

²³⁴ Ibid.; also Bk. iv, c. 11, infra. ²³⁵ Bk. iv., c. 12, infra.

refuge humbly in the protection of God's mercy, and, lifting Up undefiled hands to the Lord, to pray devoutly that the scourge wherewith they are afflicted may be turned aside from them."²³⁶ For "the end of tyrants is confusion, leading to destruction if they persist in malice, to pardon if they repent and return to the way of righteousness."²³⁷ Therefore a tyrant should be borne with in patience until he either suffers a change of heart or falls in battle, or otherwise meets his end by the just judgment of God.²³⁸

The notion that in God's good time tyrants are certain to meet a bad end is part of the conventional tradition of ecclesiastical political theory. It is found in the early work "De Duodecim Abusionibus Saeculi,"²³⁹ from which it is taken over by the Carolingian writers. According to this text if the king fails in his duty, many evils will come upon him and his land, his children will die, enemies will invade the provinces, there will be storms and tempests, wild beasts will devour the flocks, and his children will not inherit his throne.²⁴⁰ In other words, his ruin will be brought about through causes wholly beyond the control of his subjects. They are encouraged to pray and to wait passively in the faith that God is just and will do justice. It is the strictly logical conclusion of the doctrine that tyrants are ministers sent of God.

From this conclusion, John of Salisbury strikes off at an inconsistent tangent into one of the most interesting and characteristic of his contributions to political thought. His point of departure may have been the situation presented when the tyrant commands the Christian subject to perform an act which is

²³⁶ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra. For a full statement of this doctrine see Hugh of Fleury, loc. cit. note 231, supra.

²³⁷ Bk. viii., c. 21, infra. ²³⁸ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra. ²³⁹ See above note 160.

²⁴⁰ De Duodecim Abusionibus Saeculi, c. 9; Jonas of Orleans, De Inst. Reg., c. 3; Hincmar of Rheims, De Reg. Persona el Reg. Minist., c. 2.

contrary to the divine law. Here John's theory of the higher law compels him to say that the subject is bound to decline obedience. God must be preferred before man.²⁴¹ "Loyal shoulders should sustain the power of the ruler so long as it is exercised in subjection to God and follows His ordinances; but if it resists and opposes the divine commandments, and wishes to make me share in its war against God, then with unrestrained voice, I answer back that God must be preferred before any man on earth."²⁴²

Whether in such a case John advocates active opposition by the subject, or merely passive resistance as Luther was afterwards to do on practically the same premisses,²⁴³ he does not make entirely clear. He appears to feel that as a matter of policy passive resistance is ordinarily best. "If princes have departed little, by little from the true way, even so it is not well to overthrow them utterly at once, but rather to rebuke injustice with patient reproof until finally it becomes obvious that they are stiff-necked in evil-doing."²⁴⁴ But there may come a time when active resistance is necessary: "Better would it be by far were the diadem torn from the head of the prince than that the good order of the chief and best part of the commonwealth, which is the part concerned with religion, should be destroyed at his pleasure."²⁴⁵

The right of resistance thus established, the transition is almost inevitable to the thought that here is one of the instruments which God can use in executing His judgment upon tyrants. Why should He be confined to resorting to the use of the inanimate forces of nature or the attacks of foreign enemies rather than to the arm of the tyrant's oppressed subjects? Since God must have an intermediary in the physical world through

²⁴¹ Bk. vi., c. 9; c. 12, infra. ²⁴² Bk. vi., c. 25, infra.

²⁴³ Cf. J. W. Allen, "The Political Conceptions of Luther," in "Tudor Studies," ed. R. W. Seton-Watson, pp. 98-100.

²⁴⁴ Bk. v., c. 6., infra. ²⁴⁵ Bk. vii., c. 20, infra.

which to administer His vengeance, why is not a subject justified in becoming such an intermediary? "Malice is always punished by God; but sometimes it is His own, at others it is a human, hand which He employs to administer punishment to the unrighteous." ²⁴⁶ This is apparently the chain of inference which resulted in John's famous doctrine of tyrannicide,²⁴⁷ a doctrine which perhaps more than any other part of the Policraticus engaged the attention of later mediæval thinkers and which emerged into practical prominence during the period of the Counter-Reformation.²⁴⁸

John bases his theory of tyrannicide on the authority of examples drawn from scriptural, classical and ecclesiastical history. Many times, he says, the Children of Israel were in bondage to tyrants in accordance with the dispensation of God, "and then, when they cried aloud to God, they were set free. And when the allotted time of their punishment was fulfilled, they were allowed to cast off the yoke from their necks by the slaughter of their tyrants; nor is blame attached to any of those by whose valor a penitent and humbled people was thus set free, but their memory is preserved in affection and honor by posterity as the servants of God."²⁴⁹ By the example of Sisera and Holofernes he "establishes" that "it is just for public tyrants to be killed and the people set free for the service of God."²⁵⁰ These stories show that the use of "pious dissimulation" to lure tyrants to their ruin "is not treachery be-

²⁴⁶ Bk. viii., c. 21, infra. And again: ''The Lord employed first the sword of the angel against the army of the wicked king, and afterwards against the king himself He used the hands of his own sons." Ibid.

²⁴⁷ John of Salisbury was the first mediæval writer to erect tyrannicide into a doctrine and defend it with reasoned arguments. See Gennrich, "Die Staats- und Kirckenlehre Johanns von Salisbury," pp. 106 ff.

²⁴⁸ See A. Douarche, De Tyrannicidio apud Scriptores xvi Seculi, Latin thesis, Paris, Hachette, 1888.

²⁴⁹ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra. ²⁵⁰ Ibid.

cause it serves the cause of the faith, and fights in behalf of charity." "Even priests of God repute the killing of tyrants as piety, and if it should appear to wear the semblance of treachery, they say that it is consecrated to God by a sacred mystery." But as for the use of poison against tyrants, John says that he has not read that it is ever permitted by any law. "Not that I believe that tyrants ought not to be removed from our midst, but it should be done without loss of religion and honor."²⁶¹ Similarly "the histories all teach that none should undertake the death of a tyrant who is bound to him by an oath or by the obligation of fealty."²⁵² With these limitations, "it is as lawful to kill a tyrant as to kill a condemned enemy." All these passages merely go to show that tyrannicide is not unlawful, and not that it is a positive duty; indeed it is in connection with them that John expressed his opinion, already quoted, that usually the safest and most expedient method of destroying tyrants is for those who are oppressed to pray to God that their scourge may be removed; and he praises the forbearance of David, who "although he had to endure the most grievous tyrant, and although he often had an opportunity of destroying him, yet preferred to spare him, trusting to the mercy of God, within whose power it was to set him free without sin."²⁵³ Elsewhere, however, John represents tyrannicide as amounting to a public duty. "To kill a tyrant," he says, "is not merely lawful, but right and just. For whosoever takes up the sword deserves to perish by the sword. And he is understood to take up the sword who usurps it by his own temerity and who does not receive the power of using it from God. Therefore the law rightly takes arms against him who disarms the laws, and the public power rages in fury against him who strives to bring to nought the public force. And while there are many acts which amount to lèse majesté, none is a graver crime than that which is aimed

²⁵¹ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra. ²⁵² Ibid. ²⁵³ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra.

against the body of Justice herself. Tyranny therefore is not merely a public crime, but, if there could be such a thing, a crime more than public. And if in the crime of lèse majesté all men are admitted to be prosecutors, how much more should this be true in the case of the crime of subverting the laws which should rule even over emperors? Truly no one will avenge a public enemy, but rather whoever does not seek to bring him to punishment commits an offence against himself and the whole body of the earthly commonwealth."²⁵⁴

John of Salisbury, it seems plain from this passage, had fundamentally no clear conception of the difference between private individual action and public collective action to rid the community of a tyrant. Or rather he seems to have been unable to conceive of the community as capable of so ridding itself except by private action; the need for, or the possibility of, organized collective action is not suggested.²⁵⁵ It was the obvious danger latent in the irresponsibility of private tyrannicide which caught the attention of later thinkers and caused them to repudiate John's position. St. Thomas points out that it would be subversive of all civil order if private individuals should claim the right to murder their governors on the ground

²⁵⁴ Bk. iii., c. 15. This passage does not fall within the part of the Policraticus covered by my translation. Unlike the reference to tyranny in other parts of the work, it seems to emphasize usurpation of authority as the essence of tyranny. This suggests a possible foreshadowing of the later distinction between "tyrants by defect of title" and "tyrants by abuse of power." See Bartolus in Emerton, "Humanism and Tyranny," p. 132. The notion that usurpers — i. e. "tyrants by defect of title," — might be lawfully resisted, although it was never lawful to resist a legitimate hereditary ruler no matter how he might abuse his power, was advanced by an imperialist writer at the end of the eleventh century: Liber de unitate ecclesiae conservanda, i, 13, M. G, H., Libelli de Lite, ii, 173 ff.

²⁵⁵ In the next generation after John of Salisbury, the doctrine of tyrannicide is stated as a commonplace by Giraldus Cambrensis, "De Principis Instructione," Dis. I., c. xvi. Opera, Rolls Ser., no. 21, vol. viii., p. 56: "Percussori tyranni non poena sed palma promittitur."

that they believe them tyrants.²⁵⁶ Coluccio Salutati undertakes to answer John specifically and denies that a single person or even several together can properly take justice into their own hands; the tyrant must be removed, if at all, only by the collective action of the community.²⁵⁷ The question came to the attention of all Europe in a vivid and dramatic way at the beginning of the fifteenth century when the Council of Constance was called upon to condemn a book written by one Jean Petit in which the murder of Louis of Orleans at the instigation of the Duke of Burgundy was defended on the ground of the right of tyrannicide. Petit cited the Policraticus as an authority.²⁵⁸ Gerson replied by arguing that to vest the right of tyrannicide in a subject would be to make him the legitimate judge of his ruler; and a legitimate judge, even the king himself, may not condemn an accused person without summons, trial and conviction. "Certainly no mere private individual can have greater authority over one not lawfully subject to him than a king has over his own subjects."²⁵⁹

John of Salisbury had based his doctrine of tyrannicide on the conception that a private individual may lawfully act to enforce "the law" against a tyrannical or "outlaw" ruler. What

²⁵⁶ De Reg. Prin., Bk. i., c. 6. There is nothing to indicate that John did or did not regard the self-appointed slayer of a tyrant as in some informal way "representing," or at least acting in behalf of, the community. Perhaps he did. But since he permitted any individual to take this service upon himself without waiting for any orderly mandate from the community, the result certainly does not conform to our conception of organized community action. In most instances, however, John seems to have regarded the slayer of the tyrant as "representing" God rather than the community.

²⁵⁷ "De Tyrannia," c. ii., in Emerton, "Humanism and Tyranny," p. 92. But Coluccio apparently holds that a private individual may assassinate a "tyrant by defect of title." Ibid. p. 85.

²⁵⁸ See his "Assertio Propositionum adversus magistrum Joannum de Gersono," Gerson, Opera, (Antwerp, 1706) tom. v., col. 397.

²⁵⁹ "Reprobatio novem Assertionum Joannis Parvi," op. cit., tom. v., col. 363.

later thought brought out was that law can be enforced only by an agent holding a legitimate mandate from the community. The difference between these two conceptions registers the most momentous advance in political thought during the interval; and it isolates and emphasizes the cardinal element which was missing from the political thought of the Policraticus and the whole tradition which it represents. John of Salisbury does not seem to have conceived that the community, or universitas, could act except through the prince.²⁶⁰ If action was to be taken against him, it had therefore to be taken as private individual action. This seems to stand out clearly from the last passage quoted from the Policraticus. The action there contemplated against the prince is public action; but public action not taken through the prince cannot be organized action; it can only be action by all or any, that is to say, action by separate individuals. This is the natural outcome of the patriarchal conception of society as an organized hierarchy; it is the same conception which no doubt lay at the bottom of Bodin's denial that a representative assembly could do more than offer good advice to the prince.²⁶¹

But meanwhile in John of Salisbury's own generation another idea was taking form which was to supply this missing element to later thought. It was an idea which seems to have had its source among the Roman lawyers, and it consisted in identifying the corporate or organized community with the whole membership of the group, — the "universitas" with the "populus." Once this idea had taken hold, it is no longer necessary to think that the community can act as a community only through the prince who is set over them by God; from now on they can

²⁶⁰ This view is definitely expressed by Baldus in the fourteenth century: "imperator est ipsum imperium," Com. on Cod., Bk. X., Ruhr. 1, nr. 13; see also Baldus, Consil., vol. iii., c. clix., nr. 5. John of Salisbury himself seems to identify the corporate community with its head: "adversus caput aut universitatem membrorum." Bk. vi, c. 25, infra.

²⁶¹ "Six Livres de La Republique," Bk. i., c. 8.

act through whatever organization they choose to shape for themselves. The idea of the king's trusteeship gives way before the idea of an autonomous corporation. The universitas ceases to be a mere inert thing whose "persona" is permanently delegated to and "borne by" the prince; it becomes an active unity, bearing its own "persona," and capable of speaking and acting for itself, against the prince if need be. This is the idea which is already emerging in the speech of Archbishop Hubert at the coronation of King John of England, above referred to; Hubert says that it is the universitas, not merely the "clerus et populus," which must assent to the choice of a King. In other words the universitas can act independently of, and even against, the king. The importance of the idea for establishing a check on the king and eliminating the necessity of resort to tyrannicide comes to a head in Bracton. Bracton like John of Salisbury says that the king is the vicar of God and as such is subject only to God; so that if he abuses his power, there is room only for supplication that he should amend his ways, and if he will not do this, he must be left to the judgment of God. But Bracton no more than John is content with this result; and by the same sort of sudden inconsistency with which John had advanced the doctrine of tyrannicide, Bracton turns about upon himself and adds that the "universitas regni" and "baronagium," acting through the king's court, may restrain his tyranny.²⁶² Here is the beginning of a conception which men were more and more to grasp during the thirteenth century but which they were not to transform into effective political practice until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²⁶³

Meanwhile the doctrine of individual action in the form of tyrannicide was, apart from the self-limitation of their own

²⁶² Bracton, iv., 10.

²⁶³ The idea first takes a firm hold in Buchanan's "De Jure Regni apud Scotos," cc. xxviii, and in the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, ed. Laski, pp. 127-136.

power by rulers,²⁶⁴ the only conceivable check upon despotism; and at the same time it was the almost necessary inference from the doctrine of a higher law. For, after all, kings and governments and organized communities had no peculiar prerogative to know and enforce that law; it was binding upon them no less than upon private individuals, and knowledge of it was the result of grace and wisdom and not of official position. If this view was honestly and fully accepted there was nothing inherently objectionable in the idea that a private individual might enforce the law by private action; for its precepts were definite and uniform and were as accessible to private persons as to officials. The doctrine of a higher law carried with it an inevitable implication of what today would probably be called philosophic anarchism.²⁶⁵

It is not hard to see that this philosophic anarchism forms an important strain running through the thought of the Policraticus. It emerges in John's yearning for a condition of society where there would be no princely rule, but men in a state of innocence would live together under "the law" in Christian love. "For if iniquity and injustice, banishing charity, had not brought about tyranny, firm concord and perpetual peace would have possessed the peoples of the earth forever, and no one would think of enlarging his boundaries. Then kingdoms would

²⁶⁴ Bk. viii., c. 20, infra.

²⁶⁵ For John's individualism, see Gennrich, "Die Staats- und Kirchenlehre Johanns von Salisbury," p. 14; E. F. Jacob in "The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers," pp. 61 ff. Gennrich, loc cit., points out the significant absence from John's thought of any consideration of the connection between individual and social life or of the transition from one to the other. For a survival in the seventeenth century of the notion that there was no agency save the conscience of individuals to judge whether the ruler had broken the "fundamental laws," see the passages from Philip Hunton's Treatise of Monarchy quoted and criticized in Sir Robert Filmer's Anarchy of Mixed Monarchy, in The Freeholders Grand Inquest (ed. 1680), pp. 265, 272.

be as peaceful, according to the great father Augustine, and would enjoy as undisturbed repose as the separate families in a well-ordered state, or as different persons in the same family; or perhaps, which is even more credible, there would be no kingdoms at all, since it is clear from the ancient histories that in the beginning these were founded by iniquity." ²⁶⁶ Here comes to the surface that combined current of Christian and Stoic thought which religious tradition was to carry forward from the days of the apostles to the days of Godwin and Shelley. The same thought lies behind John's reiterated assertion that it is the function of the prince to reign and not to rule,²⁶⁷ — the true prince says, "I will not rule over you, but God shall rule over you";²⁶⁸ under a good prince, it is not the prince himself who governs, but the law.

In other words the existence of a complete code of intelligible laws of divine authority practically eliminates the necessity of government except as a purely ministerial instrumentality of enforcement; and in so far as men are good they will obey without being forced. There need not be, there must not be, any subordination of one merely human "will" to another, for men can find agreement and harmony in their contacts only by being shaped or by shaping themselves to the passionless reason of the divine law. It is better that they should shape themselves than that they should be shaped by the power of government. At this point there enters John's thought the concept of "liberty," which is akin to the individualism underlying his doctrine of tyrannicide.

"Liberty means judging everything freely in accordance with private judgment." Nothing is more important, because liberty and virtue are interdependent. "Virtue can never be fully attained without liberty," while on the other hand a man who is not virtuous, i. e. whose will does not faithfully follow the

²⁶⁶ Bk. viii., c. 17, infra. ²⁶⁷ Bk. viii., c. 20, c. 22, infra.

²⁶⁸ Bk. viii., c. 22, infra.

divine laws, can never be said to be truly free. The love of liberty therefore leads to the introduction of good laws because only with such laws is true liberty compatible. "It is the part of a wise man to give free rein to the liberty of others." "But when under the pretext of liberty rashness unleashes the violence of its spirit it properly incurs reproach."²⁶⁹

Here is another unmistakable vein of tradition — the tradition which runs from St. John's "The truth shall make you free,"²⁷⁰ to Milton's

"They still revolt when truth would set them free, — License they mean when they cry liberty."

But of this doctrine of liberty, John of Salisbury makes almost no further use. The one inference that he draws from it is an earnest plea in favor of freedom of speech; for "what will be safe and secure if even the virtues, among which the spirit of liberty and independence holds a leading place, are to be punished?" And he cites the example of the Roman Saturnalia to prove that "the law" itself recognized a right of free speech "in respect of utterances which are designed to serve the public advantage." John's thought seems to be that since all have at least potential access to knowledge of the "higher law," the community is entitled to the benefits of the knowledge of all; and this requires that all should be allowed to speak their knowledge freely.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is the very inconsistencies in the political thought of the Policraticus and its blending of apparently incompatible elements which give it its principal value; for it discloses still in combination a number of separate strains of thought whose later

²⁶⁹ Bk. vii., c. 25, infra. ²⁷⁰ John, viii., 32.

dissociation was to form the main currents of opposing doctrine for many succeeding centuries. It presents the patriarchal theory of monarchy which in union with ideas derived from Renaissance Italy was to culminate in the seventeenth century conception of personal absolutism. It foreshadows the doctrine of the divine right of kings in its derivation of the ruler's title directly from God. In its insistence on the superiority of spiritual over temporal rulers and on the primacy of the Apostolic See it contains the elements of the theory of universal papal supremacy. In its emphasis on a "higher law" supreme over all governments it has its place in the tradition leading up to Coke's doctrine of judicial supremacy. In its insistence that men in so far as they are free from sin can live by the law alone and need no government, it anticipates the Christian communism of the more advanced Reformation Sects and modern doctrines of philosophic anarchism. The one outstanding current of thought of which absolutely no trace is present is that which was to prove ultimately the most fruitful of all — the thought, namely, that the community can organize itself for the accomplishment of its common purposes by developing institutions for pooling the ideas and harmonizing the ends of its members.

It seems a futile question to ask which of these various strains of thought was dominant in the Policraticus or to seek some way of harmonizing their divergent tendencies. The very point for emphasis is that their diversities are the product of the distinctness which was to be given them by centuries of subsequent controversy. They were able to live together side by side in the Policraticus simply because they were not conceived with modern distinctness. Early thought, Maitland has said, is confused thought. "Simplicity is the outcome of technical subtlety, it is the goal, not the starting point. As we go backward, the familiar outlines become blurred; the ideas be-

come fluid, and instead of the simple we find the indefinite."²⁷¹ It is from this point of view that we must read the Policraticus. We must not ask exactly where John of Salisbury would have drawn the line between princely power and priestly supremacy; or between royal discretion and the "higher law." The point is that he draws no clear line. Every important idea is deeply tinged with much of what we conceive to be its opposite; and it carried much of this tinge with it into its later history. The significance of the Policraticus for students of the political ideas of after times consists precisely in the fact that it discloses the more or less confused mass of contradictory ideas in which they were originally embedded, and which served to limit and correct them.

²⁷¹ "Domesday Book and Beyond," p. 9.

THE

STATESMAN'S BOOK

OF

JOHN OF SALISBURY

TABLE OF CHAPTERS

THE FOURTH BOOK

(AND HEREIN CHIEFLY OF THE PRINCE AND THE LAW)

THE FIFTH BOOK

(AND HEREIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND ITS MEMBERS, AND ESPECIALLY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE)

THE SIXTH BOOK

(AND HEREIN OF THE ARMED HAND OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND OF THE MUTUAL COHESION OF HEAD AND MEMBERS)

SELECTIONS FROM THE SEVENTH BOOK

(CHAPTERS DEALING CHIEFLY WITH AMBITION AND THE WILES OF THE AMBITION)

SELECTIONS FROM THE EIGHTH BOOK

(CHAPTERS ON TYRANNY AND TYRANNICIDE)

Here Begins THE FOURTH BOOK

(AND HEREIN CHIEFLY OF THE PRINCE AND THE LAW)

CHAPTER I

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRINCE AND A TYRANT AND OF WHAT IS MEANT BY A PRINCE.

Between a tyrant and a prince there is this single or chief difference, that the latter obeys the law and rules the people by its dictates, accounting himself as but their servant. It is by virtue of the law that he makes good his claim to the foremost and chief place in the management of the affairs of the commonwealth and in the bearing of its burdens; and his elevation over others consists in this, that whereas private men are held responsible only for their private affairs, on the prince fall the burdens of the whole community. Wherefore deservedly there is conferred on him, and gathered together in his hands, the power of all his subjects, to the end that he may be sufficient unto himself in seeking and bringing about the advantage of each individually, and of all; and to the end that the state of the human commonwealth may be ordered in the best possible manner, seeing that each and all are members one of another. Wherein we indeed but follow nature, the best guide of life; for nature has gathered together all the senses of her microcosm or little world, which is man, into the head, and has subjected all the members in obedience to it in such wise that they will all function properly so long as they follow the guidance of the head, and the head remains sane. Therefore the prince stands on a pinnacle which is exalted and made splendid with all the great and high privileges which he deems necessary for himself. And rightly so, because nothing is more advantageous to the people than that the needs of the prince should be fully

satisfied; since it is impossible that his will should be found opposed to justice. Therefore, according to the usual definition, the prince is the public power, and a kind of likeness on earth of the divine majesty. Beyond doubt a large share of the divine power is shown to be in princes by the fact that at their nod men bow their necks and for the most part offer up their heads to the axe to be struck off, and, as by a divine impulse, the prince is feared by each of those over whom he is set as an object of fear. And this I do not think could be, except as a result of the will of God. For all power is from the Lord God, and has been with Him always, and is from everlasting. The power which the prince has is therefore from God, for the power of God is never lost, nor severed from Him, but He merely exercises it through a subordinate hand, making all things teach His mercy or justice. "Who, therefore, resists the ruling power, resists the ordinance of God,"¹ in whose hand is the authority of conferring that power, and when He so desires, of withdrawing it again, or diminishing it. For it is not the ruler's own act when his will is turned to cruelty against his subjects, but it is rather the dispensation of God for His good pleasure to punish or chasten them. Thus during the Hunnish persecution, Attila, on being asked by the reverend bishop of a certain city who he was, replied, "I am Attila, the scourge of God." Whereupon it is written that the bishop adored him as representing the divine majesty. "Welcome," he said, "is the minister of God," and "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord," and with sighs and groans he unfastened the barred doors of the church, and admitted the persecutor through whom he attained straightway to the palm of martyrdom. For he dared not shut out the scourge of God, knowing that His beloved Son was scourged, and that the power of this scourge which had come upon himself was as nought except it came from God. If good men thus regard power as ¹ Rom., xiii., 2.

worthy of veneration even when it comes as a plague upon the elect, who should not venerate that power which is instituted by God for the punishment of evil-doers and for the reward of good men, and which is promptest in devotion and obedience to the laws? To quote the words of the Emperor, "it is indeed a saying worthy of the majesty of royalty that the prince acknowledges himself bound by the Laws."² For the authority of the prince depends upon the authority of justice and law; and truly it is a greater thing than imperial power for the prince to place his government under the laws, so as to deem himself entitled to do nought which is at variance with the equity of justice.

² Justin., Cod., I., 14, § 4.

CHAPTER II

WHAT THE LAW IS; AND THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRINCE IS NOT BOUND BY THE LAW, HE IS NEVERTHELESS THE SERVANT OF THE LAW AND OF EQUITY, AND BEARS THE PUBLIC PERSON, AND SHEDS BLOOD BLAMELESSLY.

Princes should not deem that it detracts from their princely dignity to believe that the enactments of their own justice are not to be preferred to the justice of God, whose justice is an everlasting justice, and His law is equity. Now equity, as the learned jurists define it, is a certain fitness of things which compares all things rationally, and seeks to apply like rules of right and wrong to like cases,¹ being impartially disposed toward all persons, and allotting to each that which belongs to him. Of this equity the interpreter is the law, to which the will and intention of equity and justice are known. Therefore Crisippus asserted that the power of the law extends over all things, both divine and human, and that it accordingly presides over all goods and ills, and is the ruler and guide of material things as well as of human beings. To which Papinian, a man most learned in the law, and Demosthenes, the great orator, seem to assent, subjecting all men to its obedience because all law is, as it were, a discovery, and a gift from God, a precept of wise men, the corrector of excesses of the will, the bond

¹ Webb (vol. I., p. 237) cites this definition from Azo without specific reference and suggests a comparison with Cic., Top., 4, § 23. But the same definition is found in an ancient introduction to the Institutes (Fitting, "Juristische Schriften des früheren Mittelalters") which Fitting ascribes to a date prior to the rise of the Bolognese law-school and regards as representing earlier Byzantine tradition, op. cit., p. 146; for date, ibid., p. 98.

which knits together the fabric of the state, and the banisher of crime;² and it is therefore fitting that all men should live according to it who lead their lives in a corporate political body. All are accordingly bound by the necessity of keeping the law, unless perchance there is any who can be thought to have been given the license of wrong-doing. However, it is said that the prince is absolved from the obligations of the law; but this is not true in the sense that it is lawful for him to do unjust acts, but only in the sense that his character should be such as to cause him to practice equity not through fear of the penalties of the law but through love of justice; and should also be such as to cause him from the same motive to promote the advantage of the commonwealth, and in all things to prefer the good of others before his own private will. Who, indeed, in respect of public matters can properly speak of the will of the prince at all, since therein he may not lawfully have any will of his own apart from that which the law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common interest requires? For in these matters his will is to have the force of a judgment; and most properly that which pleases him therein has the force of law, because his decision may not be at variance with the intention of equity. "From thy countenance," says the Lord, "let my judgment go forth, let thine eyes look upon equity";³ for the uncorrupted judge is one whose decision, from assiduous contemplation of equity, is the very likeness thereof. The prince accordingly is the minister of the common interest and the bond-servant of equity, and he bears the public person in the sense that he punishes the wrongs and injuries of all, and all crimes, with even-handed equity. His rod and staff also, administered with wise moderation, restore irregularities and false departures to the straight path of equity, so that deservedly may the Spirit congratulate the power of the prince

² Dig., I., 3, §§ 1-2. ³ Ps., xvii, 2.

with the words, "Thy rod and thy staff, they have comforted me."⁴ His shield, too, is strong, but it is a shield for the protection of the weak, and one which wards off powerfully the darts of the wicked from the innocent. Those who derive the greatest advantage from his performance of the duties of his office are those who can do least for themselves, and his power is chiefly exercised against those who desire to do harm. Therefore not without reason he bears a sword, wherewith he sheds blood blamelessly, without becoming thereby a man of blood, and frequently puts men to death without incurring the name or guilt of homicide. For if we believe the great Augustine, David was called a man of blood not because of his wars, but because of Uria. And Samuel is nowhere described as a man of blood or a homicide, although he slew Agag, the fat king of Amalech. Truly the sword of princely power is as the sword of a dove, which contends without gall, smites without wrath, and when it fights, yet conceives no bitterness at all. For as the law pursues guilt without any hatred of persons, so the prince most justly punishes offenders from no motive of wrath but at the behest, and in accordance with the decision, of the passionless law. For although we see that the prince has lictors of his own, we must yet think of him as in reality himself the sole or chief lictor, to whom is granted by the law the privilege of striking by a subordinate hand. If we adopt the opinion of the Stoics, who diligently trace down the reason for particular words, "lictor" means "legis ictor," or "hammer of the law," because the duty of his office is to strike those who the law adjudges shall be struck. Wherefore anciently, when the sword hung over the head of the convicted criminal, the command was wont to be given to the officials by whose hand the judge punishes evil-doers, "Execute the sentence of the law," or "Obey the law," to the end that the misery of the victim might be mitigated by the calm reasonableness of the words. ⁴ Ps. xxiii, 4.

CHAPTER III

THAT THE PRINCE IS THE MINISTER OF THE PRIESTS AND INFERIOR TO THEM; AND OF WHAT AMOUNTS TO FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF THE PRINCE'S MINISTRY.

This sword, then, the prince receives from the hand of the Church, although she herself has no sword of blood at all. Nevertheless she has this sword, but she uses it by the hand of the prince, upon whom she confers the power of bodily coercion, retaining to herself authority over spiritual things in the person of the pontiffs. The prince is, then, as it were, a minister of the priestly power, and one who exercises that side of the sacred offices which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood. For every office existing under, and concerned with the execution of, the sacred laws is really a religious office, but that is inferior which consists in punishing crimes, and which therefore seems to be typified in the person of the hangman. Wherefore Constantine, most faithful emperor of the Romans, when he had convoked the council of priests at Nicaea, neither dared to take the chief place for himself nor even to sit among the presbyters, but chose the hindmost seat. Moreover, the decrees which he heard approved by them he reverenced as if he had seen them emanate from the judgment-seat of the divine majesty. Even the rolls of petitions containing accusations against priests which they brought to him in a steady stream he took and placed in his bosom without opening them. And after recalling them to charity and harmony, he said that it was not permissible for him, as a man, and one who was subject to the judgment of priests, to examine cases touching gods,

who cannot be judged save by God alone. And the petitions which he had received he put into the fire without even looking at them, fearing to give publicity to accusations and censures against the fathers, and thereby incur the curse of Cham, the undutiful son, who did not hide his father's shame. Wherefore he said, as is narrated in the writings of Nicholas the Roman pontiff, "Verily if with mine own eyes I had seen a priest of God, or any of those who wear the monastic garb, sinning, I would spread my cloak and hide him, that he might not be seen of any." Also Theodosius, the great emperor, for a merited fault, though not so grave a one, was suspended by the priest of Milan from the exercise of his regal powers and from the insignia of his imperial office, and patiently and solemnly he performed the penance for homicide which was laid upon him. Again, according to the testimony of the teacher of the gentiles, greater is he who blesses man than he who is blessed;^l and so he in whose hands is the authority to confer a dignity excels in honor and the privileges of honor him upon whom the dignity itself is conferred. Further, by the reasoning of the law it is his right to refuse who has the power to grant, and he who can lawfully bestow can lawfully take away.² Did not Samuel pass sentence of deposition against Saul by reason of his disobedience, and supersede him on the pinnacle of kingly rule with the lowly son of Ysai?³ But if one who has been appointed prince has performed duly and faithfully the ministry which he has undertaken, as great honor and reverence are to be shown to him as the head excels in honor all the members of the body. Now he performs his ministry faithfully when he is mindful of his true status, and remembers that he bears the person of the universitas of those subject to him; and when he is fully conscious that he owes his life not to himself and his own private ends, but to others, and

¹ Heb. vii. 7. ² Dig., I. 17, §3. He. Jesse.

allots it to them accordingly, with duly ordered charity and affection. Therefore he owes the whole of himself to God, most of himself to his country, much to his relatives and friends, very little to foreigners, but still somewhat. He has duties to the very wise and the very foolish, to little children and to the aged. Supervision over these classes of persons is common to all in authority, both those who have care over spiritual things and those who exercise temporal jurisdiction. Wherefore Melchisedech, the earliest whom the Scripture introduces as both king and priest (to say nought at present concerning the mystery wherein he prefigures Christ, who was born in heaven without a mother and on earth without a father); of him, I say, we read that he had neither father nor mother, not because he was in fact without either, but because in the eyes of reason the kingly power and the priestly power are not born of flesh and blood, since in bestowing either, regard for ancestry ought not to prevail over merits and virtues, but only the wholesome wishes⁴ of faithful subjects should prevail; and when anyone has ascended to the supreme exercise of either power, he ought wholly to forget the affections of flesh and blood, and do only that which is demanded by the safety and welfare of his subjects. And so let him be both father and husband to his subjects, or, if he has known some affection more tender still, let him employ that; let him desire to be loved rather than feared, and show himself to them as such a man that they will out of devotion prefer his life to their own, and regard his preservation and safety as a kind of public life; and then all things will prosper well for him, and a small bodyguard will, in case of need, prevail by their loyalty against innumerable adversaries. For love is strong as death; and the wedge⁵ which is held together by strands of love is not easily broken.

⁴ Vota. ⁵ i. e., a military formation.

When the Dorians were about to fight against the Athenians they consulted the oracles regarding the outcome of the battle. The reply was that they would be victorious if they did not kill the king of the Athenians. When they went to war their soldiers were therefore enjoined above all else to care for the safety of the king. At that time the king of the Athenians was Codrus, who, learning of the response of the god and the precautions of the enemy, laid aside his royal garb and entered the camp of the enemy bearing faggots on his back. Men tried to bar his way and a disturbance arose in the course of which he was killed by a soldier whom he had struck with his pruning-hook. When the king's body was recognized, the Dorians returned home without fighting a battle. Thus the Athenians were delivered from the war by the valor of their leader, who offered himself up to death for the safety of his country. Likewise Ligurgus in his reign established decrees which confirmed the people in obedience to their princes, and the princes in just principles of government; he abolished the use of gold and silver, which are the material of all wickedness, he gave to the senate guardianship over the laws and to the people the power of recruiting the senate; he decreed that virgins should be given in marriage without a dowry to the end that men might make choice of wives and not of money; he desired the greatest honor to be bestowed upon old men in proportion to their age; and verily nowhere else on earth does old age enjoy a more honored station. Then, in order to give perpetuity to his laws, he bound the city by an oath to change nothing of his laws until he should return again. He thereupon set out for Crete and lived there in perpetual exile; and when he died, he ordered his bones to be thrown into the sea for fear that if they should be taken back to Lacedaemon, they might regard themselves as absolved from the obligation of their oath in the matter of changing the laws.

These examples I employ the more willingly because I find

that the Apostle Paul also used them in preaching to the Athenians. That excellent preacher sought to win entrance for Jesus Christ and Him crucified into their minds by showing from the example of many gentiles that deliverance had come through the ignominy of a cross. And he argued that this was not wont to happen save by the blood of just men and of those who bear the magistracy of a people. Carrying forward this line of thought, there could be found none sufficient to deliver all nations, to wit both Jews and gentiles, save One to whom all nations were given for His inheritance, and all the earth foreordained to be His possession. But this, he asserted, could be none other than the Son of the all-powerful Father, since none except God holds sway over all nations and all lands. While he preached in this manner the ignominy of the cross to the end that the folly of the gentiles might gradually be removed, he little by little bore upward the word of faith and the tongue of his preaching till it rose to the word of God, and God's wisdom, and finally to the very throne of the divine majesty, and then, lest the virtue of the gospel, because it has revealed itself under the infirmity of the flesh, might be held cheap by the obstinacy of the Jews and the folly of the gentiles, he explained to them the works of the Crucified One, which were further confirmed by the testimony of fame; since it was agreed among all that they could be done by none save God. But since fame frequently speaks untruth on opposite sides, fame itself was confirmed by the fact that His disciples were doing marvellous works; for at the shadow of a disciple those who were sick of any infirmity were healed. Why should I continue? The subtlety of Aristotle, the refinements of Crisippus, the snares of all the philosophers He confuted by rising from the dead.

How the Decii, Roman generals, devoted themselves to death for their armies, is a celebrated tale. Julius Cæsar also said, "A general who does not labor to be dear to his sol-

diers' hearts does not know how to furnish them with weapons, does not know that a general's humaneness to his troops takes the place of a host against the enemy." He never said to his soldiers, "Go thither," but always "Follow me"; he said this because toil which is shared by the leader always seems to the soldier to be less hard. We have also his authority for the opinion that bodily pleasure is to be avoided; for he said that if in war men's bodies are wounded with swords, in peace they are no less wounded with pleasures. He had perceived, conqueror of nations as he was, that pleasure cannot in any way be so easily conquered as by avoiding it, since he himself who had subdued many nations had been snared in the toils of Venus by a shameless woman.

CHAPTER IV

THAT IT IS ESTABLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF THE DIVINE LAW THAT THE PRINCE IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW AND TO JUSTICE.

But why do I thus resort to begging instances from the history of the gentiles, although they are at hand in countless numbers, seeing that men can be moved to deeds more directly by laws than by examples? That you may not, then, be of opinion that the prince is wholly absolved from the laws, hear the law which is enjoined upon princes by the Great King who is terrible over all the earth and who takes away the breath of princes:¹ "When thou art come," He says, "into the land which the Lord thy God shall give to thee, and shalt possess it and shalt dwell therein and shalt say, 'I will set over me a king such as all the nations that are round about me have over them'; thou shalt appoint him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose from the number of thy brethren. Thou mayst not set over thee for thy king a man of another nation, who is not thy brother. And when he is made thy king, he shall not multiply the number of his horses, nor lead back the people into Egypt, made proud by the number of his horsemen; for the Lord hath enjoined upon thee that no more shalt thou return by that way. He shall not have many wives to turn away his heart, nor a great weight of silver and gold. And it shall be when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom that he shall write him a copy of this law of the Deuteronomy in a book, taken from the copy which is in the hands of the priests of the tribe of Levi, and he shall keep it with him and

¹ Deut. xvii, 14 ff.

read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God and to keep His words and the rites of His worship which are prescribed in the law. And his heart shall not be lifted up in pride above his brethren, nor incline to the right hand nor to the left, to the end that his reign and his son's reign may be long over Israel." Need I ask whether one whom this law binds is restrained by no law? Surely this law is divine and cannot be broken with impunity. Every word thereof is a thunderclap in the ears of princes if they would be wise. I say nought concerning election, and the form thereof which is prescribed for the creation of a prince; rather attend with me for a little to the rule or formula of living which is enjoined upon him.

When there has been appointed, it is written, a man who professes himself a brother of the whole people in the practice of religion and in affection and charity, he shall not multiply unto himself horses, by the number whereof he may become a burden unto his subjects. For to multiply horses is to collect, from vainglory or some other error, more than need requires. Now "much" and "little," if we follow the prince of the Peripatetics, signify diminution or excess of the legitimate quantity of specific kinds of things. Will it then be lawful to multiply dogs, or rapacious birds, or fierce beasts, or any other monsters of nature, when even the number of horses, which are a military necessity and serve all the useful purposes of life, is thus strictly limited in advance to a lawful quantity? Concerning actors and mimes, buffoons and harlots, panders and other like human monsters, which the prince ought rather to exterminate entirely than to foster, there needed no mention to be made in the law; which indeed not only excludes all such abominations from the court of the prince, but totally banishes them from among the people of God. Under the name of horses is to be understood all things needful for the use of a household, and all its necessary equipment; of which a legitimate quantity is

that which necessity or utility reasonably requires, understanding, however, that the useful is identified with the honorable, and that the refined comfort of living is limited to honorable things. For philosophers have long ago agreed that no opinion is more pernicious than the opinion of those who distinguish the useful from the honorable; and that the truest and most useful view is that the honorable and the useful are convertible terms.² Plato, as is told in the histories of the gentiles, when he saw Dionisius the tyrant of Sicily surrounded by his bodyguards, asked him, "What harm have you done that you should need to have so many guards?" This in no wise behooves a prince who by the faithful performance of his duties so wins for himself the affection of all that for his sake every subject will expose his own head to imminent dangers in the same manner that by the promptings of nature the members of the body are wont to expose themselves for the protection of the head. And skin for skin, and all that a man has, he will put forward for the protection of his life.

The next commandment is, "He shall not lead back the people into Egypt, made proud by the number of his horsemen." Truly every precaution must be taken, and great diligence used, by all who are set in high place not to corrupt their inferiors by their example,³ nor by their abuse of things, nor by following the way of pride and luxury to lead back the people into the darkness of confusion. For it often comes to pass that subjects imitate the vices of their superiors, because the people desire to be like their magistrates, and everyone will eagerly follow the appetites which he observes in another who occupies a distinguished station. There is a celebrated passage of the excellent versifier setting forth the opinion and words of the great Theodosius:

² Cicero, De Officiis, iii., 3, § 11.

³ Cf. Jonas of Orleans, De Inst. Reg., c. 3 (D'Achéry, Spicilegium, vol. i., p. 324).

"If thou dost bid and decree that aught is to be commonly observed, First obey thy decree thyself; then the people will be more observant of that which is just

And not refuse to bear it when they see the author thereof himself Obey his own command. The world is shaped To the model of its king, nor are edicts as effective To influence the feelings of men as is the ruler's way of life. The fickle people changes ever with its prince."⁴

But the means of single individuals are of course never so great as the resources of the whole body. The individual draws from his own coffers, the ruling power drains the public chest or exhausts the treasury; and when this finally fails, then he has recourse to the means of private individuals. But private persons must be content with their own. And when this is exhausted, he who but now thirsted after the splendor of the rich and powerful, falls into poverty and disgrace, and blushes at the blackness of his confusion. Therefore by the decree of the Lacedemonians, a frugal use of the public funds was enjoined upon their rulers, although they were permitted to use according to the common laws their own inherited property and what they chanced to obtain by good fortune.

⁴ Claud., IV. Consul. Hon., 296-302. This passage is quoted in the same connection by George Buchanan, "De Jure Regni apud Scotos," c. xxxvii.

CHAPTER V

THAT THE PRINCE SHOULD BE CHASTE AND AVOID AVARICE.

The law adds: "He shall not have many wives to turn away his heart." It was at one time permitted among the people of God that for the sake of propagating the race and increasing the number of the chosen people, each man might have several wives. The patriarchs come to mind as an example of this privilege, as when Sara used her right, to wit to the body of Abraham, in the womb of another, receiving from her husband a son Ismael through the service of her handmaiden. Jacob also, after a double marriage with two sisters, took unto himself their fertile handmaidens. And yet kings are now bound by the restraint of a perpetual prohibition, and are forbidden the embraces of several wives; and though in the case of other men it may have been lawful for several women to be the wife of one man, yet in the case of kings the rule always prevails of one wife for one husband. Shall it be lawful for him to fornicate or commit adultery or defilement with several when not even for the sake of multiplying the race or begetting an heir may he have to do with more than one wife? How shall the ruling power punish immorality and adultery or fornication in others if he is guilty of the same crimes?¹ Let no one bring forward the example of David by way of objection, who perchance in this as in so many other respects, enjoyed a special privilege; though for myself I should readily allow that herein he, too, sinned. Clearly his weakness for

¹ Cf. Hincmar of Rheims, De Ordine Palatii, c. vi.: "Qualiter alios corrigere potent qui proprios mores ne iniqui sint non corrigit?"

women drew him into adultery by the way of treachery and homicide, nor will I labor to excuse a man who, when accused and condemned by the word of the prophet, confessed out of his own mouth that he was a man of death. You have the case of one king sinning like other kings; and would that they would repent as he repented, and confess their fault even as he confessed, and, making satisfaction as he did, return again into the way of life! Even the wisdom of Salomon was infatuated with the love of women.

The next commandment is that he shall not have a great weight of silver and gold. Let them go to, and, against the commandment of God, heap up for themselves a treasure of silver and gold, seeking gain from falsehood; and let them wring abundance from the poverty of others, riches from rapine, and found their own private prosperity on the calamity of many. But someone brings forward the wealth of Salomon as an objection. Granted; I do not say that the prince should not be wealthy, but that he should not be avaricious. Were not gold and silver cheap in the time of Salomon? They would not have been by any means so cheap if an immense mass of them, exceeding use, had been hoarded up for himself by a covetous king. By burying them in the ground, he could have effectually withdrawn them from use to the end that they might become dearer. In Petronius, Trimalchio tells a story of a craftsman who made vases of glass of such hardness that they could not be broken more easily than if of gold or silver. When he had once made a vessel of this kind of the purest glass, and worthy, as he thought, of Cæsar alone, he went to Cæsar with his gift, and was admitted. The beauty of the present was praised, the skill of the artificer was commended, and the devotion of the giver was accepted. But the craftsman, to turn the admiration of the onlookers into wonder, and to win for himself in fuller measure, as he expected, the favor of the emperor, asked Cæsar to hand him the vessel, and taking it,

hurled it violently to the pavement with such force that the most solid and hardest substance of bronze would not have remained unbroken. At this Cæsar was not more astounded than terrified. But the craftsman picked up the vessel from the ground, and it was not broken, but only dented, as if the appearance of glass had but covered the substance of bronze. Then, taking his little hammer from his bosom, he mended the fault skilfully and neatly, and, like a dented vase of bronze, repaired it with repeated blows. When he had completed this, he thought that he had Jupiter's own heaven in his grasp, because he supposed that he had merited the friendship of Cæsar and the admiration of all. But it fell out quite otherwise. For Cæsar inquired whether any other knew this composition of glass vessels. When he replied in the negative, the emperor ordered him to be beheaded at once, saying that if this process should come into common knowledge gold and silver would become as cheap as mud. Whether the story is true or not is doubtful, and there are diverse opinions regarding the act of Cæsar. But I for my part, without presuming to pass judgment on the view of wiser men, consider that the devotion of a most able craftsman was ill requited, and that it is a barren prospect for the human race when an excellent art is wiped out in order that money and the material of money, which is the fuel of avarice, the food of death, and the cause of battles and quarrels, may be held in high value, which it would have in any event without effort on the part of the man, since without value there could be no money, which is but the measure of value.²

"Price is the thing now prized; it is a man's census-rating which

brings him honors,

Which brings him friends; the poor man is everywhere trampled on."³

² This is Webb's interpretation. ³ Ov., Fasti, i, 217-218.

To far better advantage have certain peoples sought to banish utterly from their public business this subject-matter of disputes and litigation, this cause of hatred, to the end that the cause being removed the resulting ill-will and its consequences might disappear; such is the enactment of Ligurgus among the Lacedemonians, and such, in ancient Greece, which now is a part of Italy, was the teaching of Pitagoras of Samos, who by the durability and goodness of his constitutions is traditionally reported to have well served all Italy. Would that gold along with silver might become cheap, since the only really valid kind of value is that of the things whose usefulness is recommended by nature, the best guide of life. Then the poor man will not be trampled on, nor the rich man honored solely on account of his money, but each will be held dear or cheap on the strength only of his own endowments. Further, some things derive their value from themselves intrinsically, other things from the opinion of others. Thus bread and victuals, which consist of necessary foodstuffs or clothing, are regarded as valuable everywhere throughout the earth by the dictates of nature. Things which please the senses are naturally valued by all. Why should I elaborate? The things which derive their value from nature are not only everywhere the same, but are held in esteem among all peoples; those which depend upon opinion are uncertain; and as they come with fancy, so they disappear when the fancy passes. The emperor therefore had no need to fear that the material of commercial dealings would become lacking, since buying and selling are common even among those peoples who are not acquainted with the use of money. I know that Salomon was a man of such wisdom that he at least would never have feared lest gold and silver might become cheap for his posterity, whose nature he saw was of a hungry kind, and thirsted chiefly after nothing so much as money. Wherefore, through inspired wisdom, that excellent king despised utterly this rust, and by his example invited those who came after him

to share his contempt for money. Of course it is advantagedus for a king to be wealthy provided he looks upon his wealth as belonging to the people. He will therefore not regard as his own the wealth of which he has the custody for the account of others, nor will he treat as private the property of the fisc, which is acknowledged to be public. Nor is this any ground for wonder since he is not even his own man, but belongs wholly to his subjects.

CHAPTER VI

THAT HE SHOULD HAVE THE LAW OF GOD EVER BEFORE HIS MIND AND EYES, AND SHOULD BE LEARNED IN LETTERS, AND SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE COUNSEL OF MEN OF LETTERS.

"And it shall be when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom that he shall write him a copy of this law of the Deuteronomy in a book." Observe that the prince must not be ignorant of the law, and, though he enjoys many privileges, he is not permitted, on the pretext that his duties are military, to be ignorant of the law of God. He shall therefore write the law of the Deuteronomy, that is to say the second law, in the book of his heart; it being understood that the first law is that which is embodied in the letter; the second, that which the mystical insight learns from the first. For the first could be inscribed on tablets of stone; but the second is imprinted only on the purer intelligence of the mind. And rightly is the Deuteronomy inscribed in a book in the sense that the prince turns over in his mind the meaning of this law so that its letter never recedes from before his eyes. And thus he holds the letter firm, without permitting it in any wise to vary from the purity of the inner meaning. For the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life, and it rests in his hands to give a mediating interpretation of human law and equity which must be at once necessary and general.

"Taken from the copy," says the scripture, "which is in the hands of the priests of the tribe of Levi." And rightly so. Every censure imposed by law is vain if it does not bear the stamp of the divine law; and a statute or ordinance of the

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prince is a thing of nought if not in conformity with the teaching of the Church. This did not escape the notice of that most Christian prince,¹ who required of his laws that they should not disdain to imitate the sacred canons. And not only are men enjoined to take priests as models for imitation, but the prince is expressly sent to the tribe of Levi to borrow of them. For lawful priests are to be hearkened to in such fashion that the just man shall close his ear utterly to reprobates and all who speak evil against them. But who are priests of the tribe of Levi? Those, namely, who without the incentive of avarice, without the motive of ambition, without affection of flesh and blood, have been introduced into the Church by the law. And not the law of the letter, which mortifieth, but the law of the spirit, which in holiness of mind, cleanness of body, purity of faith and works of charity, giveth life. And as the old law of the shadow, which presented all things figuratively, foreordained to the priesthood the members of a special family of flesh and blood; so after the shadows ceased, and the Truth was revealed, and justice looked forth from heaven, those who were commended by the merit of their life and the fragrance of their good reputation, and whom the united will of the faithful or the diligent foresight of prelates caused to be set apart for the work of the ministry, were enrolled by the spirit into the tribe of Levi, and were instituted lawful priests.

It is added: "He shall keep it with him and read therein all the days of his life." Observe how great should be the diligence of the prince in keeping the law of God. He is enjoined always to have it, read it, and turn it over in his mind, even as the King of kings, born of woman, born under the law, fulfilled the whole justice of the law, though He was subject to it not of necessity but of His own free will; because His will was embodied in the law, and on the law of God He meditated day and

¹ I. e. Justinian.

night. But it may be thought that in this respect He is not a model for imitation, seeing that He embraced not the glory of kings but the poverty of the faithful, and, putting on servile form, sought on earth no place to lay His head; and, when asked by His judge, confessed that His kingdom was not of this world. If so, other examples may be found of famous kings whose memory is blessed. From the tents of Israel let David, Ezechias and Josias come forth, and the others who thought that the glory of their kingship consisted in this alone, that seeking the glory of God they subjected themselves and their subjects to the bonds of the divine law. And lest perchance these examples appear too remote, and the less to be followed because we seem to have departed somewhat from their law and ritual and religious worship and profession of faith (though our faith and theirs are in fact the same, with only this difference, that what they looked forward to in expectation of the future, we now in great measure enjoy and worship as fulfilled, casting aside the shadows of figures since the Truth has risen from the earth and stands revealed in the sight of the gentiles); yet, as I say, lest their examples be scorned as alien and profane, our own Constantine, Theodosius, Justinian, Leo and other most Christian princes, afford instruction for the Christian prince. For they took especial pains to the end that the most sacred laws, which are binding upon the lives of all, should be known and kept by all, and that none should be ignorant thereof, save in cases where the damage due to the error was compensated by some public advantage or where the edge of the law's severity was mitigated by compassion for age or for the weakness of sex. Their deeds are so many incentives to virtue; their words so many lessons in morals. Finally, their life, with its record of vices subdued and made captive, is like an arch of triumph consecrated to posterity, which they erected and inscribed with the list of their splendid virtues, declaring in every part with devout humility that not our hands, but the hand of God,

wrought all these our wondrous works. Constantine, for founding and endowing the Roman church, to say nought of his other excellent deeds, is honored with perpetual benediction. What manner of men Justinian and Leo were is clear from the fact that by disclosing and proclaiming the most sacred laws, they sought to consecrate the whole world as a temple of justice. What shall I say of Theodosius, whom these emperors regarded as a model of virtue, and whom the Church of God has revered not only as an emperor but as a high priest, because of his character, venerable for piety and justice, and his patient humility toward priests, holding himself in low esteem beside them? How patiently he who had himself given laws bore the sentence of the priest of Milan! And, lest you should falsely conceive that that sentence was the light one of a weak and cowardly presbyter accustomed to show complacency toward princes, know that the emperor was suspended from the exercise of his royal rights, was excluded from the church, and was compelled to fulfil a solemn penance. What was it that subjected him to such a necessity? Nought save his own will, which was wholly subjected to the justice of God, and obedient in all respects to His law. And unless you hold in contempt that which is written with the levity of a poet, you will find briefly in Claudius Claudian, in the instructions which the emperor wrote for his son, how high a place he attained in the sanctuary of morals.

To return to the words of the law which I have set forth, when I revolve them in my own mind, each and every one of them seems weighty and strikes upon the mind as if impregnated with the spirit of discernment. "He shall keep the law beside him," it is written, taking care that when he needs to have it, he may not have it against him to his own damnation. For men of might will suffer mighty torments. And it is added, "And he shall read it." It is of little profit to have the law in one's wallet if it is not faithfully treasured in the soul. Therefore it is to be read all the days of his life. From which it is

crystal clear how necessary is a knowledge of letters to princes who are thus commanded to turn over the law of God in daily reading. And perchance you will not often find that priests are bidden to read the law daily. But the prince is to read it daily, and all the days of his life; because the day on which he does not read the law is for him a day not of life but of death. But plainly he will hardly be able to do this if he is illiterate. Wherefore in the letter which I remember that the king of the Romans sent to the king of the Franks, urging him to have his children educated in liberal studies,² he added tastefully to his other arguments that an illiterate king is like an ass who wears a crown. If, nevertheless, out of consideration for other distinguished virtues, it should chance that the prince is illiterate, it is needful that he take counsel of men of letters if his affairs are to prosper rightly. Therefore let him have at his side men like the prophet Nathan, and the priest Sadoch, and the faithful sons of the prophets, who will not suffer him to turn aside from the law of God; and since his own eyes do not bring it before his mind, let these men, the scholars, make a way for it with their tongues into the opening of his ears. Thus let the mind of the prince read through the medium of the priest's tongue, and whatever of excellence he sees in their lives, let him revere it as the law of the Lord. For the life and tongue of priests are like a book of life before the face of peoples. Perchance this is what is meant when he is bidden to take a copy of the law from the priests of the tribe of Levi; namely, that in accordance with their preaching should the ruling power guide the government of the magistracy committed to him. Nor is he altogether destitute of reading who, although he does not read himself, yet hears faithfully what is read to him by others. But if he does neither, how shall he, thus scorning the precept, fulfil faithfully what the precept enjoins? For the attainment

2 Conrad III to Louis VII.

of wisdom is the union and concourse of all desirable things. Did not Tholomeus think that something was still lacking to the sum of his happiness until, summoning seventy interpreters, although he was a gentile, he had communicated the law of God to the Greeks? It makes no difference whether the interpreters were enclosed in the same room and conferred therein together, or whether they prophesied separately, so long as it is established that the king, anxious in pursuit of the truth, caused the law of God to be translated into Greek. In the Attic Nights I remember to have read when the notable traits and habits of Philip of Macedon were treated, that among other things his love of letters colored as it were the business of war and the triumphs of victory, the liberality of his table, the offices of humanity and whatever he did or said gracefully or elegantly. He recognized that in this quality he excelled others, and was anxious to transmit it as the basis of his inheritance to the only son who he hoped would be the heir of his kingdom and good fortune. For this reason he thought fit to write his famous letter to Aristotle, who he hoped would become the teacher of the newly born Alexander. It is substantially in the following words: "Philip sends greetings to Aristotle. Know that a son has been born to me, for which I give thanks to the Gods not more because he has been born than because his birth has chanced in your life-time. For I hope that it will come to pass that, educated and trained by you, he will grow up worthy of ourselves and of taking over such great affairs."³ I do not remember that the Roman emperors or commanders, so long as their commonwealth flourished, were illiterate. And I do not know how it chances, but since the merit of letters has languished among princes, the strength of their military arm has become enfeebled and the princely power itself has been as it were cut off at the root. But no wonder, since without wisdom no

³ Aulus Gellius, ix, 3.

government can be strong enough to endure or even to exist. Socrates, who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, and who without contradiction excelled incomparably, not only in reputation for wisdom but also in virtue, those who are called the seven sages, asserted that commonwealths would only be happy if they were governed by philosophers or if their rulers at least became students and lovers of wisdom. And (if you hold the authority of Socrates of small account), "Through me," says Wisdom, "kings reign and the establishers of laws decree that which is just; I love them that love me, and they that watch for me in the morning shall find me; with me are wealth and glory, proud riches and justice; better is my fruit than gold and precious stones, my increase than choice silver; I walk in the ways of justice, in the midst of the paths of judgment, that I may enrich them that love me and that I may fill their treasuries."⁴ And again, "Counsel is mine and equity, mine is prudence, mine is fortitude."⁵ And elsewhere, "Receive my instruction and not money, choose knowledge rather than gold. For wisdom is better than all the most precious riches, and every object of desire is not to be compared with it."⁶ While the gentiles thought that nothing should be done without the command of divinities, yet one they worshipped as the god of gods and prince of them all, namely wisdom, as being in authority over all else. Wherefore the ancient philosophers thought fit that the likeness of wisdom should be depicted before the doors of all temples and that these words should be inscribed thereon:

I am begotten by experience, born of memory; "Sophia" the Greeks call me, you "Sapientia."⁷

And these words likewise: "I hate foolish men and idle works and philosophic commonplaces." And surely the fiction was

⁴ Prov. viii, 15, 21. ⁵ Prov. viii, 14.

⁶ Prov. viii, 10-11. ⁷ Quoted from Afranius by Gellius, xiii, 8.

aptly conceived, although they did not know the Truth in its fulness; yet they closely approached thereto, regarding wisdom as the guide and head of all things rightly done, since it truly boasts that in every nation and people from the beginning it has held the primacy, treading under foot by its own inherent power the necks of the haughty and the proud. Salomon also confesses that he had loved it beyond his own salvation and above all fair things, and that in its company all good things had been added unto him.

CHAPTER VII

THAT HE SHOULD BE TAUGHT THE FEAR OF GOD, AND SHOULD BE HUMBLE, AND SO MAINTAIN HIS HUMILITY THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRINCE MAY NOT BE DIMINISHED; AND THAT SOME PRECEPTS ARE FLEXIBLE, OTHERS INFLEXIBLE.

The next commandment is that he shall learn to fear the Lord his God, and to keep God's words which are prescribed in the law. The law itself adds the reason for keeping its precepts, — "To the end that he may learn," it says. For the diligent reader of the law is a pupil, not a master; he does not twist the law captive to his own inclination, but accommodates his inclinations to its intention and purity. But what does such a pupil learn? Above all, to fear the Lord his God. Rightly so, because it is wisdom which institutes and strengthens the government of a prince; and the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord. He therefore who does not begin with the first step of fear aspires in vain to the pinnacle of legitimate princely rule. I say legitimate; for of certain rulers who are cast down while they are exalted, and are worthy of a yet more miserable fate, it is written: "They have reigned, and not by me; princes have arisen and I knew it not";¹ and elsewhere, "They that handle the law have not known wisdom."² Therefore let the prince fear God, and by prompt humility of mind and pious display of works show himself His servant. For a lord is the lord of a servant. And the prince is the Lord's servant, and performs his service by serving faithfully his fellow-servants, namely his

¹ Hos., viii, 4. ² Jer., ii, 8.

subjects. But let him know also that his Lord is God, to whom is to be shown not alone fear of His majesty, but also pious love. For He is also a father, and one to whom as a result of His merits no creature of His can deny affection and love. "If I am Lord," He says, "where is my fear? If I am father, where is my love?"³ Also the words of the law are to be kept, which, commencing with the first timid step of fear, mounts upward through the virtues as upon a rising stair with happy ascent. "Love of Him," He says, "is the guardian of His laws" ⁴ because all wisdom is fear of God. Further: "Who fears God will do good works, and who is faithful unto justice will apprehend her, and she will come forth to meet him as an honored mother."⁵

What are the words which are to be kept with such diligence? First of all the precepts of the law, so that through the prince no jot or tittle of the law shall fall to earth, because he shall make no exception in favor of his own hands or the hands of his subjects.

Now there are certain precepts of the law which have a perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be broken with impunity. Before the law, under the law, and still under the new covenant of grace, there is one law which is binding upon all men alike: "What thou wouldst not should be done unto thee, do thou not unto another"; and "what thou wouldst should be done unto thee, do that unto others." Let the whitewashers of rulers now come forward, and let them whisper, or if this is too little, let them trumpet abroad that the prince is not subject to the law, and that whatsoever is his will and pleasure, not merely in establishing law according to the model of equity, but absolutely and free from all restrictions, has the force of law. Let them thus, if they so desire and dare, make of their king, whom they except

³ Mac., i, 6. ⁴ Wis., vi, 19. ⁵ Eccli., xv, 1, 2.

from the obligations of the law, a very outlaw, and still I will maintain not merely in the teeth of their denials but in the teeth of all the world, that kings are bound by this law. For He who neither deceives nor is deceived says, "By what judgment ye judge, ye shall yourselves be judged."⁶ And surely the heaviest judgment that could be passed upon these rulers would be to have their own good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over, poured back into their own bosoms. And not only do I withdraw from the hands of rulers the power of dispensing with the law, but in my opinion those laws which carry a perpetual injunction or prohibition are not subject at all to their pleasure. In the case of those rules which are flexible, I admit a power of dispensing with verbal strictness; but only provided that the purpose of the law is preserved in its integrity by a compensating concession made to propriety or public utility.

"And his heart shall not be lifted up," it is written, "in haughtiness above his brethren." This commandment, which is especially needful, is several times repeated, because humility never sufficiently commends itself to princes, and it is very difficult for success in ascending the ladder of honor not to produce inflation in the mind of a man without prudence. But God sets Himself against the proud beyond all others, and bestows His grace upon the humble. Therefore the prudent king prays that pride may not set its foot in his path because those that work iniquity have tripped thereon and have been driven forth and could not stand fast. Let him therefore not be haughty above his brethren; but remembering that they are his brethren, show brotherly affection to all his subjects. It is an admonition of prudence to princes to cultivate humility as well as discretion and charity, since without these qualities it is altogether impossible for the government of a prince to en-

⁶ Matt., vii, 2.

dure. Whoever therefore loves the height of his own elevation should with the greatest diligence maintain the utmost humility in his life and manners. For whoever falls away from the works of humility, falls from the pinnacle of his honors with all his inflated weight. It is an everlasting and abiding rule that he who humbles himself shall be exalted, and, vice versa, he who exalts himself shall be brought low. Pride made Tarquin the last king of the Romans, and put in his place magistrates who were more useful because of their humility. What man of pride have you ever read of whose reign was longer? History is filled with those who fell because of their pride. But he should not avoid pride to the point of falling into contempt; abjectness is to be avoided as much as haughtiness. Wherefore the Roman law cautions those who administer justice to make themselves easy of access but not to bring themselves into contempt; and the provision is added to the commissions of governors of provinces that they shall not admit provincials to undue familiarity, because association on an equal footing tends to produce contempt for a man's dignity. Let him therefore in public preserve respect for the majesty of the people and at home observe the fit measure of his private station.

This is the precept contained in the writings of the ancient philosophers. A father and son once came to Athens to see and make the acquaintance of the philosopher Taurus. The son was governor of the province of Crete, but the father was a private citizen. Taurus quietly rose to greet them as they approached, and sat down again after their mutual salutation. A single chair which stood nearby was brought, and was placed while others were sent for. Taurus invited the father of the governor to sit down. But he declined, saying, "Rather let him be seated who is a magistrate of the Roman people." "Without prejudice to our decision," said Taurus to him, "do you sit down while we examine which is the more proper, whether you should rather be seated because you are his father, or he be-

cause he bears a magistracy of the Roman people" When the father had taken the seat and another chair was placed for the son, Taurus discussed the question before those who had gathered about, weighing with the greatest care the respective claims of fairness, justice, public station, and official duty. The substance of his words was this. In public places and functions, the rights of fathers as compared with those of sons who hold public office and power become dormant. But when, outside the sphere of public affairs, it is a question of sitting, walking, or reclining at a friendly banquet in private life, then as between a son who is a magistrate and a father who is a private citizen, public honors cease and the claims of nature and birth revive. "Your coming to me," said Taurus, "and our talking together at this present time and discussing the question of duties, is a private act. Therefore you as a father are entitled to the same precedence and respect as it is proper for you to enjoy in your own home."

I think that magistrates generally should be urged that in the splendor of their public dignity they should be mindful of their condition as private men, and at the same time should so regard their private station as not to bring disgrace upon the honor of their public office; each should maintain the honor conferred on him without derogating from the dignity of others, and should so value his private dignity as not to bring insult or harm upon the public power.

CHAPTER VIII

THAT THE PRINCE SHOULD EFFECT A RECONCILIATION OF JUSTICE WITH MERCY, AND SHOULD SO TEMPER AND COMBINE THE TWO AS TO PROMOTE THE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

It should hold true of the prince, as it should hold true of all men, that no one should seek his own interest but that of others. Yet the measure of the affection with which he should embrace his subjects like brethren in the arms of charity must be kept within the bounds of moderation. For his love of his brethren should not prevent him from correcting their errors with proper medicine; he acknowledges the ties of flesh and blood to the end that he may subdue these to the rule of the spirit. It is the practice of physicians when they cannot heal a disease with poultices and mild medicines to apply stronger remedies such as fire or steel. But they never employ these unless they despair of restoring health by milder means, and so the ruling power when it cannot avail by mild measures to heal the vices of its subjects, rightly resorts, though with grief, to the infliction of sharp punishments, and with pious cruelty vents its rage against wrong-doers to the end that good men may be preserved uninjured. But who was ever strong enough to amputate the members of his own body without grief and pain? Therefore the prince grieves when called upon to inflict the punishment which guilt demands, and yet administers it with reluctant right hand. For the prince has no left hand, and in subjecting to pain the members of the body of which he is the head, he

obeys the law in sadness and with groans. Philip once heard that a certain Phicias, who was a good fighting man, had become alienated from him because in his poverty he found difficulty in supporting his three daughters and yet received no aid from the king. When his friends advised him accordingly to beware of the man, "What," said Philip, "if a part of my body were sick, would I cut it off rather than seek to heal it?" Then he sought out this Phicias privately in a friendly way, and provided him with sufficient money which he accepted for the necessities of his private difficulties. And thereby the king made this man better disposed toward him and more faithful than he had been before he supposed himself offended. Accordingly, as Lucius says: "A prince should have an old man's habit of mind, who follows moderate counsels, and should play the part of a physician, who heals diseases sometimes by reducing the diet of the overfed, and again by increasing that of the under-nourished, who allays pain at times by cautery, and at other times by poultices." In addition, he should be affable of speech, and generous in conferring benefits, and in his manners he should preserve the dignity of his authority unimpaired. A pleasant address and a gracious tongue will win for him the reputation of benignity. Kindness will compel the most faithful and constant love from even the sternest, and will increase and confirm the love which it has produced. And the reverence of subjects is the fit reward of dignity of manners.

Excellently did Trajan, the best of the pagan emperors, answer his friends when they reproached him with making himself too common toward all men and more so, they thought, than was becoming for an emperor; for he said that he desired to be toward private citizens such an emperor as he had desired to have over him when he was a private citizen himself. And in accordance with this principle, acting on the report of the younger Pliny who at that time with other judges was designated to persecute the Church, he recalled the sword of persecution

from the slaughter of the martyrs and moderated his edict. And perchance he would have dealt more gently still with the faithful, had not the laws and examples of his predecessors, and the advice of men who were considered wise counsellors, and the authority of his judges, all urged him to destroy a sect regarded by public opinion^l as superstitious, and as enemies of true religion. I do not unreservedly and in all respects commend the judgment of a man who knew not Christ, yet I do extenuate the fault of him who broke loose from the pressure of others and followed the instinct of his own natural piety toward kindness and pity, a man whose nature it was to be merciful toward all, though stern toward the few whom it would be sinful to spare; so that in the course of his whole reign only one of the senators or nobles of the city was condemned, although a great number could have been found who had offended grievously against him. And this man was condemned by the senate without the knowledge of Trajan himself. For it was his habit to say that a man is insane who, having inflamed eyes, prefers to dig them out rather than to cure them. So again he said that the nails, if they are too sharp, should be trimmed and not plucked out. For if a cithern player and other performers on stringed instruments can by diligence find a way to correct the fault of a string which is out of tune and bring it again into accord with the other strings, and so out of discord make the sweetest harmony, not by breaking the strings but by making them tense or slack in due proportions; with how much care should the prince moderate his acts, now with the strictness of justice, and now with the leniency of mercy, to the end that he may make his subjects all be of one mind in one house, and thus as it were out of discordant dispositions bring to pass one great perfect harmony in the service of peace and in the works of charity? This, however, is certain, that it is safer for the cords to be relaxed than

¹ "Opinio publica," — the expression is noteworthy.

to be stretched too tautly. For the tension of slack cords can be corrected by the skill of the artificer so that they will again give forth the proper sweetness of tone; but a string that has once been broken, no artificer can repair. Further, if a sound is asked of them which they do not have, they are stretched in vain, and more often come speedily to nought than to what is improperly asked. As the ethical writer says:

The true prince is slow to punish, swift to reward, And grieves whenever he is compelled to be severe.²

For while justice is one thing and godliness another, still both are so necessary to the prince that whoever without them attains, not necessarily to princely power, but even to any magistracy whatever, mocks himself in vain but will surely provoke against himself the mockery and scorn and hatred of others. "Let not kindness and truth," saith the Lord, "forsake thee, bind them about thy neck, and write them on the tablet of thy heart; so shalt thou find favor and obedience in the sight of God and men."³ For kindness deserves favor, justice deserves obedience. The favor and love of one's subjects, which are brought to pass by divine favor, are the most effective instrument of all accomplishments. But love without obedience is of no avail, because when the spur of justice ceases, then the people relax into unlawful courses. Therefore he must ceaselessly meditate wisdom, that by its aid he may do justice, without the law of mercy being ever absent from his tongue; and so temper mercy with the strictness of justice that his tongue speaks nought save judgment. For his office transmutes his justice into judgment continually and of necessity because he may never lawfully repose therefrom without thereby divesting himself of the honor that has been conferred on him. For the honor of a king delights in judgment and represses the faults of offenders with tranquil moderation of mind.

² Ovid, Pont., i, 2, lines 123-24. ³ Proverbs, iii, 3, 4:

The moderation of magistrates is said to have been the subject of a book written by Plutarch, entitled Archigramaton; and he is also said by word and example to have instructed the magistrates of his own city in forbearance and the practice of justice. Another story is told of him to the effect that he had a slave, a worthless and stubborn fellow, but well trained in liberal studies, and much practised in philosophic disputations. It happened that for some fault, I know not what, Plutarch ordered him to have his tunic taken off and be flogged. He had already begun to be struck sharply with the lash, but still denied the fault, saying that he had done nothing wrong, that he had committed no offence, and insisted that for his many faithful services he did not deserve to be thus beaten. Finally, when he found it all to no avail, he commenced to cry aloud, and in the midst of the flogging broke out, not into complaints and groans, but into words of serious reproach; Plutarch was not acting, he said, as befitted a philosopher; it was disgraceful to give way to anger, especially for a man who had often discoursed on the wrongfulness of anger and had written a fine book on forbearance. He added that it was shameful for him now to contradict his own doctrine by his acts, and, lapsing into inconsistency, to fly off into a rage and punish an innocent man with many blows. At this Plutarch, speaking gently and slowly and with the greatest seriousness, asked the man, "Do I seem to you to be angry for the simple reason that you are receiving a flogging? Is it a sign of anger on my part if you are getting from me that which is your due? Can you perceive from my face or voice or complexion, or even from my words, that I am in the grip of anger? I do not believe that my eyes look fierce or my face passionate, I am not shouting immoderately, nor am I hot or red or perspiring, I am speaking no words for a man to be ashamed of, or any that I ought to repent, nor am I trembling with rage or gesticulating. These, if you do not know it, are the usual signs of anger." And then turning to the man who

was administering the blows, he said: "While I and this man dispute, go on with your work; and, without sharing my anger, pound out his slavish obstinacy, and teach him to repent of his wrong-doing instead of thus disputing." Thus Plutarch. Wherein remains much matter of instruction for all who are in high place.

CHAPTER IX

WHAT THE MEANING IS OF INCLINING TO THE RIGHT HAND OR THE LEFT, WHICH IS FORBIDDEN TO THE PRINCE.

The next commandment is, "He shall not incline to the right hand nor to the left." To incline to the right hand signifies to insist too enthusiastically on the virtues themselves. To incline to the right is to exceed the bounds of moderation in the works of virtue, the essence of which is moderation. For truly all enthusiasm is the foe of salvation and all excess is a fault; nothing is worse than the immoderate practice of good works. Wherefore the heathen author says:

"The wise man will get the name of mad, the just man of being

unjust,

If he pursue virtue itself beyond the measure of what is sufficient."¹

And the philosopher warns us to avoid excess; for if a man depart from this caution and moderation, he will in his lack of caution forsake the path of virtue itself. Salomon, too, says, "Be not too just."² What excess can then be of any profit, if justice herself, the queen of the virtues, is hurtful in excess? And elsewhere to the same effect: "Excessive humility is the highest degree of pride." To incline to the left means to slip or deviate from the way of virtue down the precipices of the vices. Therefore one turns aside to the left who is too ready to punish his subjects, and take revenge on them for their faults; on the

¹ Hor., Ep., i., 6, ll. 15, 16. ² Eccles., vii. 17.

other hand, he deviates to the right who is too indulgent to offenders out of excess of kindness. Both roads lead away from the true path; but that which inclines toward the left is the more harmful.

CHAPTER X

OF THE ADVANTAGE WHICH PRINCES MAY DRAW FROM THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE.

But is there any advantage in thus keeping the law? The language of the prophet supplies it forthwith, — to the end "that his reign, and the reign of his son, may be long over Israel." Behold, the reward of so difficult a task is the transmission of hereditary kingship from father to son over a long period. For the virtue of the parents will prolong the succession of the children, while the good fortune of later generations will be cut off at the root by the wickedness of their predecessors. For it is certain from the testimony of the Holy Spirit that the unjust shall perish together, and the heirs of the ungodly shall be cut off.¹ But the salvation of the just is from God, who protects them in the time of their tribulation. But since the eternity of time as a whole, however great it is, runs out by the minutest moments, and within the whole nought save an extremely brief moment ever subsists, what can be long therein, since all these moments together, if they might be collected into one, would still not fill the place of a point in comparison with the true eternity, because after all there can be no comparison of things finite with infinite? In the opinion of many, there is a proportion or ratio, though a small one, between the center and the periphery or circumference; but between time and eternity there can be none. What then can be long within that which as a whole is short? Or what blessedness in time will seem long to the faithful and everlasting soul if it must yet lack

¹ Ps. xxxvii, 38-39.

a still further measure of time? My own opinion, speaking, however, without prejudice to better, is that in the passage in question "a long reign" means a reign for the life-time of the unfailing soul who will be crowned with the glory of eternal blessedness for a kingdom well administered. For since it is certain that God will reward the works of each and all in overflowing mercy and in the fulness of justice, whom will He look upon with a more searching eye than those who either train all men to justice, or else on the other hand have drawn others down with them to destruction and death? And even as the mighty shall suffer mighty torments, so likewise they shall rejoice more fully in the rewards of justice if they have rightly employed their power; and in the life to come will surpass their subjects in glory, in proportion as they have surpassed them in virtue because of the greater opportunity which they have to sin. "It was within his power to transgress," says the Scripture, "and he transgressed not; to do ill, and he did not; therefore his good works are established in the Lord."² For it is imputed as justice to princes that they merely refrain from wrong-doing; and their plentiful opportunity to sin is for them a subject-matter of merit. To turn away from evil is a great thing in princes, even though they do no great good, provided they do not ruin their subjects by tolerating and indulging evil. Is it not a great thing that a continuance of the visible happiness which they enjoy here on earth is promised to them provided they shall have acted rightly? Some say that it is impossible both to prosper in this life after the way of the world and also to attain eternal joy with Christ; and the opinion is a true one if among the prizes of worldly success you include pandering to the vices. And yet it is truly within the power of kings to prosper here and at one and the same time pluck both

² Eccli. xxxi, 10, 11.

the sweetest flowers of the world and the most precious fruits of eternity. For what happier fortune is there than if princes are translated from riches to riches, from delights to delights, from glory to glory, from things temporal to things eternal?

CHAPTER XI

OF ANOTHER REWARD OF PRINCES.

Nor do I disregard the promise which is made prima facie by the letter of the law when it promises a long reign to the father and holds out the prospect of succeeding him to his children, who are to be heirs, not merely of his temporal kingdom, but also of eternal blessedness. For I know that the law was speaking to a carnal people, who having as yet a heart of stone and being uncircumcised of mind if not of the flesh, were still for the most part ignorant of eternal life, and set chief store by having the good things of the earth either given or promised them for their bodily subsistence. And so to the carnally minded a carnal promise was given, and a long duration of time was promised to those who had not yet conceived the hope of eternal blessedness; and the prospect of a temporal kingdom with succession from father to son was held out to men who as yet did not seek an eternal one. And so, temporally, the father is succeeded by the son, if the latter imitates the father's justice. "Remove ungodliness," says Salomon, "from the face of a king, and his throne shall be established in justice."¹ For if ungodliness departs from his countenance, that is to say from his will, all his acts of rulership will be guided aright by the metwand of equity and by the practice of justice. Whence the saying that, "A king that sitteth on the throne of judgment putteth all evil to flight by his look."² Lo, how great a privilege do princes enjoy, for whom the glory of reigning is thus made

¹ Prov. xxv, 5. ² Prov. xx, 8.

perpetual in their flesh and blood, to say nought of eternal blessedness! God glories that He has found a man after His own heart, and when He has exalted him to the pinnacle of kingly power, promises to him kingship everlasting in the line of his sons who shall succeed him. "Of the fruit of thy body," he says, "will I set upon thy throne"; and "If thy children keep my commandments which I have given, and my testimonies which I shall teach them through myself or my deputies, they and their children shall sit upon thy throne";³ and "I will make his seed to endure forever and his throne as the day of heaven. But if his children forsake my law and walk not in mine ordinances, if they profane my decrees and keep not my commandments, then will I visit their iniquities with a rod,"⁴ thus signifying that kingly power shall be transferred from one family to another, and that those heirs after the flesh who are seen to be of carnal breed shall be destroyed, and the succession transferred to those who are found to be the heirs of faith and justice. And herein the truth of the promise endures, and the words which have issued from the mouth of the Most High remain in force, to the effect, namely, that to the seed of just kings the succession of the faithful remains everlastingly. It also, I think, holds perpetually true to the letter that parents will be succeeded by their children if these shall have faithfully imitated them in following the commandments of the Lord (to say nought at present concerning Christ, who, being of the seed of David according to the flesh, is King of kings and Lord of all who rule). So that even if, all things being rightly ordered and remaining so, there seems to be no care or any task at all left for a ruler to perform, still, it is a settled fact that those who have once taken a prince to rule over them shall never be without a successor of his seed, although for no other reason than to preserve the honor and renown of his blood.

³ Ps. cxxxii, 11 ff. ⁴ Ps. lxxxix, 29.

And this is shown by examples drawn from the books of history. For it is told how, when the great Alexander had reached the farthest shore of Ocean, he made ready to vanquish the isle of the Bragmanni. They despatched to him thereupon a letter couched in these terms: "We have heard, most unconquered king, of your battles, and that the good fortune of victory has everywhere followed them. But wherewith will a man be satisfied who is not satisfied with the whole world? We have no riches, whereof the desire might entitle you to attack us; all our goods are common to all. Food is our only wealth, and instead of having ornaments of gold, our raiment is poor and scanty. Our women are not decked out to please; devotion to ornaments they despise as rather a fault than a merit. They know not how to increase their beauty or to pretend to more than that wherewith they were born. Caves serve us for two purposes, for a shelter in life and for a tomb in death. We have a king not for the sake of administering justice but to maintain and preserve his nobility. For what room can there be for administering punishment where no injustice is ever committed?" These words convinced Alexander that it would be no victory to disturb their perpetual peace, and he dismissed them to their own quiet. And perchance had he attacked them in war, he might little enough have prevailed against an innocent people, because not easily is innocence vanquished, and the truth, standing firm in its own strength, ever triumphs over evil, albeit completely armed.

But, since there is nought which men more desire than to have their sons succeed them in their possessions, even as men foreseeing that death is an incident of their mortal state seek to prolong their own existence in the heirs of their body, therefore this promise is given to princes as the greatest incentive to the practice of justice. For somehow it happens that those who are without anxiety for themselves, are always solicitous for the welfare of their children. Herein is an inversion of the proper

order of affection in that the love which is due before all else to one's fatherland and parents should be thus poured out by a father upon his children until love of children wholly drains dry his heart, and shuts out all other affections. The children in turn repay their parents as the latter deserve, bestowing on their own children the affection which they received from their parents; although the proper order of affection demands a different order, which was wisely expressed by the most learned of the poets. For after the fall of Troy he places the aged Anchises upon the shoulders of his dutiful son, he gives to Ascanius the right hand of his father Aeneas, while Creusa, the wife, clings to her husband, tracking the footsteps of the others because of the weakness of her sex. To all his fellow-countrymen the poet gave as a leader a man who was famous at once for his feats of arms and for his sense of duty. For a leader of another kind would have availed not, since kingdoms cannot be won without prowess or retained without justice. But today all are actuated by the single motive of making their children, no matter what the character of the latter may be, resplendent with riches and honors rather than with virtues. They even neglect and forget that the burden and responsibility of the common weal rests upon them. After the expulsion of Tarquin the Proud, who was the last king to reign in the City, Brutus, the first who held the office of consul, learned that his sons were concerned in a plot to bring back the kings into the City. He forthwith caused them to be dragged into the forum, and in the midst of a public assembly ordered them to be flogged with rods and afterwards beheaded, to show publicly that he was the father of the whole people and had adopted the people in place of his own children. And although of course I look upon parricide with the utmost horror, still I cannot refrain from approving the loyalty and faithfulness of this consul, who preferred to jeopardize the safety of his own children rather than that of the people. Whether he did rightly, let wiser

men decide. For I know that the question has been a battleground of oratorical commonplace, and that declaimers have often enough toiled and sweated over it on both sides, laboring either to excuse the parricide on the ground of fidelity to public duty, or on the other hand to prove that the merit of fidelity to the public was effaced by the infamy of the crime. But if you press me to state an opinion, I will give you the answer which I find was given to Gneius Dolabella by the Areopagites in the case of the woman of Smyrna. For when he governed the province of Asia as proconsul, a certain woman of Smyrna was brought before him, who confessed that she had murdered her husband and son by secretly giving them poison, because they had foully and treacherously slain a son of hers by another marriage, a fine blameless youth. She asserted that her act was lawful by the indulgence of the laws themselves, and that besides she did not know the law, and that she was but punishing an atrocious outrage against herself, her flesh and blood, and the whole commonwealth. The law was separate from the case, since the facts were admitted, and only a question of law remained. Therefore, when Dolabella referred the matter to his council, there was none who in such a doubtful case as it seemed to be was willing either to go the length of absolving the manifest poisoning and parricide, or on the other hand to condemn the just vengeance which had befallen godless wretches who were parricides themselves. The matter was accordingly referred to the council of the Areopagus at Athens, as being graver and more experienced judges. But after they had heard the case, they adjourned it, and ordered the prosecutors and the accused woman to appear before them a hundred years from that day. Thus they neither absolved the poisoning, which was illegal under the law, nor punished the woman who had committed the crime, but who in the opinion of many could have been justly acquitted. This story is told in the ninth book of the work of Valerius Maximus entitled "Mem-

orable Words and Deeds." I will readily agree that both Brutus and the woman transgressed, because "The remedy exceeded due measure and followed too far the course of the disease,"⁵ and, although the crimes were great, still it would have been better had they been avenged without resorting to another crime by way of punishment. Wherefore even the poet who lauds Brutus, bears witness also to his unhappy plight; for Virgil says in the sixth book:

"The father in the name of fair liberty will cite to punishment his sons who are kindling new wars, — unhappy father none the less, it matters not how later ages will tell the story of his deed." ⁶

But in the following line he seeks to excuse the ill-hap of the parricide, and at the same time blame it, by attributing it to the vanity of vainglory:

"Love of country will prevail with him, and boundless desire of praise."

There is, however, no need for anxiety that the example given by Brutus of preferring the people to one's own children will be followed to excess, since generally a man prefers even the vices of his children to the safety of the commonwealth, although it is certain that the safety of the people ought to be placed before all children. In the Book of Kings it is related how a vow was made to keep a fast day at the peril of him who should break his vow by taking food before night. Jonathan, the son of King Saul, tasted some honey which he had touched with his scepter, that is to say, with his spear; and the king, moved by fatherly affection, is blamed for having spared his son contrary to the obligation of his vow; to which transgression the defeat of the people of Israel on that day was thought to have been due. Heli also, although it is writ-

⁵ Lucan, Phars., ii, 143, 144. ⁶ Aen., vi, 820-823.

ten of him that he was blameless in his own conduct, yet pardoned the vices of his sons; and in consequence when his chair was overturned, he fell and broke his neck and so died. To say nought of others, how greatly, I ask, did He love and seek the general welfare of mankind who did not spare His own Son, but gave Him for our sake, to the end that He might bear the chains and stripes and cross which we had merited, and be condemned to a shameful death, though Himself blameless and innocent? Search the history of the kings of Israel, and you will find that the reason wherefor the people besought God to give them a king was that he might go before the face of the people, and fight their battles, and, after the likeness of the gentiles, bear the burdens of the whole people. And yet a king was not truly needed, had not Israel after the likeness of the gentiles walked crookedly and showed themselves not content to have God for their king. For had they themselves practised justice and walked faithfully in the commandments of the Lord, God would freely and without price have humbled their enemies and stretched out His hand over their tribulations, so that by the wonted help of God one might have vanquished a thousand, and two put to flight ten thousand.

Well do I remember to have heard it said by my host at Placentia, a man of the noblest birth and blood, who had the prudence of this world in the fear of God, that it is well known from frequent experience in the city-states of Italy that so long as they love peace and practise justice and abstain from falsehood and perjury, they enjoy liberty and peace in such fulness that there is nought whatsoever that can in the least degree disturb their repose. But when they fall into deceptions, and by the devious by-ways of injustice are divided against themselves, then straightway the Lord brings down upon them either the arrogance of Rome or the fury of the Germans, or some other scourge; and His hand remains heavy upon them until of their own free accord they return from their

iniquity by the way of repentance; by which remedy alone the storm wholly ceases from among them. He added that the good deserts of the people bring to an end every instance of princely rule or else cause it to be of the mildest character; while on the contrary it is certain that it is because of the sins of the people that God permits a hypocrite to reign over them; and it is impossible that the reign of a ruler should be long who bears himself too haughtily and exults in the humiliation of the people and in his own elevation. But he said that long was the rule of the man who through consciousness of his humility was ever dissatisfied with himself, and reigned as though unwillingly. This was told me by my host of Placentia; and it impressed me as worthy of belief.

Something to the same effect is found in the writings of old times. For Helius, having brilliantly filled the office of prefect of Rome, was advanced from senator to emperor. The Senate then besought him to confer the title of Augustus on his son Cæsar; but he replied, "It should be enough that I myself have reigned against my will and without deserving it. For the office of prince is not due to blood, but to merit; and there is no advantage in the rule of one who is born a king without being a king by merit. Nor can there be doubt that he sins against parental affection who crushes his little ones under a burden which they cannot bear. This is to suffocate one's children, not to advance them. They are first to be nourished and trained in the virtues; and when they have become so proficient therein that they prove themselves to excel in virtue those whom they are to excel in public honors, then let them ascend the throne, if they are invited to do so, and let them never lose the good wishes of their fellow-citizens. For who doubts that those are to be preferred above others who besides being enriched as it were with the privilege of natural worth are also inspired to virtue by the example of their ancestors, and by reason of this inspire in others a confidence in their future good-

ness?" Such were his words. And surely he expressed aptly the privilege of a prince, whose sons succeed him without the raising of any question and in continuance of the original grant from God unless their princely power is subverted as a punishment of iniquity.

CHAPTER XII

FOR WHAT REASONS THE KINGSHIP OR PRINCELY POWER IS TRANSFERRED.

A familiar passage of Divine Wisdom teaches that kingship shall be transferred from family to family because of injustices and injuries and contumelies and diverse deceits.¹

Is it not evident after how short a space of time the throne of the first king among the people of God was overturned? Because of their faults Saul, and Jonathan, and the others of the king's sons, met destruction on the hill-tops to the end that his throne might be established who was chosen from following the ewes that gave suck. Run through the sequence of all the histories and you will see in brief the successions of kings, and how they were cut off by God, like threads in the warp of a web. And the more illustrious the kings, so much the more speedily, if their pride rebels against God, is their seed trampled under foot. There is no wisdom, no prudence, no counsel which can prevail against God, and certainly no courage. If He rises up and pursues, it is vain to have recourse to, or beg aid of, sacraments or the protection of fortresses, because there is none who can escape His hand. Who was greater than Alexander in Greece? And yet we read that he was succeeded not by his own son but by the son of a dancing girl. Who does not know the list of emperors of the house of Cæsar? Few or none of them left his heritage to his own son, and all of them in brief, after various perils and many murders of their own flesh and blood, were blotted out as if in a moment by

¹ Eccli. x, 8.

diverse deaths, generally of a shameful kind; and descending into the lower world, they were succeeded by enemies or strangers.

What, I ask, so swiftly subverted and transferred such mighty kingdoms? Surely the indignation of God, provoked by manifold injustices against Him. Injustice, the Stoics think, is a frame of mind which banishes equity from the realm of the habits. That the soul is "deprived" of justice is signified by the use of the privative particle. Now the principal element of justice is not to do harm, and to prevent, out of a duty of humanity, those who seek to do harm. When you do harm, you fall into injustice. And when you put no obstacle in the way of those who seek to do harm, you then serve and aid injustice.

Contumely is when an outward act results from mental passion to the manifest hurt of another. And it serves iniquity because it arrogantly rises up against one to whom reverence is due, either because of his rank, or office, or some bond of natural connection.

Deceit, according to the definition of Aquilius, is when one thing is done and another pretended; and is clearly wrong whenever committed with the intention of harming. Deceit differs greatly from contumely, since the latter acts openly and even proudly, while the former acts fraudulently and, as it were, from ambush.

These are the things which, when they occur, overturn the thrones of all rulers because the glory of princes is perpetuated by their opposites. Deceit is the mask of weakness and the image of timidity, and is opposed directly to courage. Contumely is repressed by prudence, which continually repeats "Why should dust and ashes be proud over dust and ashes?" Injury is forbidden by temperance, which is unwilling to inflict on another what it would not wish to suffer from another. And injustice is excluded by justice, which in all things does to others that which it desires to have others do to it. These

are the four virtues which philosophers call cardinal, because they are thought to flow like primary rivulets from the original source of honor and right living, and to beget from themselves the streams of all other good things. These are perchance the four rivers which emerge from the delicious paradise of God to water all the earth to the end that it may bear desirable fruit in its own good season. Would that to me from the fountain of life — I speak of the divine grace, — there might penetrate these rivers of plenty, watering the earth of my barrenness, that by increasing fruit of good works I might at least have strength to ward off the blow of the impending axe which for my sins is laid to my root as to the root of an unfruitful tree! The tree which is planted beside those waters does not wither; but the tree which they moisten not at the root, decays and perishes as dust which the wind blows from the face of the earth. In this respect I think no exception is made of leaders nor of rulers, because the glory of kings will be transferred if they are found to be guilty of injustice or injury or contumely, or deceit; for so the mouth of the Lord hath spoken. But with due respect for the opinion of wiser men, my own opinion is that it is not inappropriate that He speaks of the different vices by a plurality of names, and in this plurality has prudently inserted a certain diversity. For He says, as was mentioned above, that kingship shall be transferred from family to family, because of injustice and injuries and contumelies and diverse deceits. The word "diverse," which is added at the end, is to be understood, I think, as referring to all in common, and understood so broadly as to refer not merely to different species of vices, but also to embrace the various kinds of persons and all the modes in which these vices are committed by any one. For the prince is responsible for all, and seems to be himself the doer of all things, since, having the power to correct all, he is deservedly regarded as a participant in the things which he omits or refuses to cor-

rect. For being, as we said above, the public power, he draws from the strength of all, and, in order that his own strength may not fail, he should accordingly take care to preserve the soundness of all the members. For as many offices and stations of duty as there are in the administration of a prince's government, so many are the members as it were of the prince's body. Therefore, in preserving each office in unimpaired integrity of strength and purity of reputation, he is preserving as it were the health and reputation of his own members. But when through the negligence or concealment of the prince as regards the members there is loss of strength or good reputation, then diseases and blemishes come upon his own members. Nor does the well-being of the head long continue when sickness attacks the members.

Here ends the Fourth Book.

Here begins

THE FIFTH BOOK (AND HEREIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH

AND ITS MEMBERS, AND ESPECIALLY

OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE)

CHAPTER I

OF PLUTARCH'S LETTER FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF TRAJAN.

There is extant a letter of Plutarch, written for the instruction of Trajan, which expounds the meaning of one sort of political constitution. It is said to run in this wise: "Plutarch to Trajan sends greetings. I know that your modesty did not seek the principate, which, however, you have always striven to deserve by the correctness of your life. You will in fact be esteemed all the more worthy of honor in proportion as you are seen to be the more free from the charge of ambition. I therefore congratulate your virtue and my own good fortune if you rightly discharge the office which you have merited by your uprightness. However, I doubt not that you will be subject to many perils, and I to the tongues of detractors, since on the one hand Rome will not tolerate the weaknesses of emperors, and on the other public gossip is always wont to cast back the faults of pupils upon their teachers. Thus the tongues of detractors carp at Seneca because of the deserts of his pupil Nero, the wildness of Quintilian's young charges is cast back upon him, and Socrates is blamed for having been too lenient toward his famous pupil. You, however, will perform the tasks to which you set yourself with all correctness if you do not become untrue to yourself. If you first put your own self in order and dispose everything about you wholly to virtue, all will go well for you. I have composed for you an exposition of the strength of the political constitution of our ancestors. If you follow it, you will take Plutarch as the guide of your life. If otherwise, I call this letter to witness that if you proceed to ruin the empire Plutarch will not be the cause thereof."

CHAPTER II

WHAT A COMMONWEALTH IS, ACCORDING TO PLUTARCH, AND WHAT FILLS THEREIN THE PLACE OF THE SOUL AND THE MEMBERS.

The above-mentioned letter is followed by the different headings of this political constitution, set forth in a little treatise entitled "The Instruction of Trajan," which I mean to insert in part in the present work, but in such wise as to follow rather the general trend of the ideas than the actual sequence of the words. The prince is first of all to make a thorough survey of himself, and diligently study the condition of the whole body of the commonwealth of which he is the representative, and in whose place he stands. A commonwealth, according to Plutarch, is a certain body which is endowed with life by the benefit of divine favor, which acts at the prompting of the highest equity, and is ruled by what may be called the moderating power of reason. Those things which establish and implant in us the practice of religion, and transmit to us the worship of God (here I do not follow Plutarch, who says "of the Gods") fill the place of the soul in the body of the commonwealth. And therefore those who preside over the practice of religion should be looked up to and venerated as the soul of the body. For who doubts that the ministers of God's holiness are His representatives? Furthermore, since the soul is, as it were, the prince of the body, and has rulership over the whole thereof, so those whom our author calls the prefects of religion preside over the entire body. Augustus Cæsar was to such a degree subject to the priestly power of the pontiffs that in order to set

himself free from this subjection and have no one at all over him, he caused himself to be created a pontiff of Vesta, and thereafter had himself promoted to be one of the gods during his own life-time. The place of the head in the body of the commonwealth is filled by the prince, who is subject only to God and to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth, even as in the human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul. The place of the heart is filled by the Senate, from which proceeds the initiation of good works and ill. The duties of eyes, ears, and tongue are claimed by the judges and the governors of provinces. Officials and soldiers correspond to the hands. Those who always attend upon the prince are likened to the sides. Financial officers and keepers¹ (I speak now not of those who are in charge of the prisons, but of those who are keepers of the privy chest) may be compared with the stomach and intestines, which, if they become congested through excessive avidity, and retain too tenaciously their accumulations, generate innumerable and incurable diseases, so that through their ailment the whole body is threatened with destruction. The husbandmen correspond to the feet, which always cleave to the soil, and need the more especially the care and foresight of the head, since while they walk upon the earth doing service with their bodies, they meet the more often with stones of stumbling, and therefore deserve aid and protection all the more justly since it is they who raise, sustain, and move forward the weight of the entire body. Take away the support of the feet from the strongest body, and it cannot move forward by its own power, but must creep painfully and shamefully on its hands, or else be moved by means of brute animals. Our author after his fashion lays down many things of this kind, which he elaborates at great pains and with a treatment which is rather diffuse, all tending to com-

¹ This word, while not a translation, serves to reproduce the effect of the double meaning of "commentarienses."

plete the conception of the commonwealth for the instruction of magistrates; but to follow him verbatim into these details would belong to that servile kind of interpretation which seeks rather to expound the surface than the sinews of an author. And because much that he has to say concerning ceremonies and the worship of the gods, wherein he thought that a religious prince should be deeply indoctrinated, is treated from the standpoint of superstition, I shall omit the things which pertain to the cult of idolatry, and briefly summarize the meaning of the man insofar as he sought to shape the prince and the offices of the commonwealth to the practice of justice.

CHAPTER III

WHAT THINGS ARE CHIEFLY EMPHASIZED IN PLUTARCH'S DESIGN; AND CONCERNING THE REVERENCE WHICH IS TO BE SHOWN TO GOD AND TO SACRED THINGS.

In summary, then, there are four things which he strives to inculcate in the rulers of a commonwealth: reverence for God, self-training, the need for learning on the part of officials and rulers, and for winning the affection of subjects and giving them protection. First of all he asserts that God is to be honored; then that each man is to train and cultivate himself to the end that, according to the saying of the Apostle (although of course he does not know the Apostle), each may possess his own vessel in sanctification and honor; afterwards that the learning of the whole house should savor of the learning of its head; and finally that the whole Corporate community of subjects should have cause for rejoicing in the preservation and safety of the life of its rulers. He cites examples of the strategies and stratagems of famous men, which, if I were to insert them one by one, would prove tedious for the reader, and might in part even reflect on the sincerity of my own faith. However, since the holy fathers and the laws of princes seem to follow in the same track, although of course without the taint of his infidelity, let me touch on his doctrine briefly and in catholic language, adding a part of his stratagems.

His point of departure is from reverence for supernatural beings; ours is from God, who is to be loved by all men alike and worshipped with all their heart, and all their soul, and all their strength. The proof of love is the works which it shows

forth; and though He can be loved for Himself and directly, after the manner of one who pours out his soul to his beloved without the need of any medium, nevertheless for external worship the intervention of something intermediate is necessary, since no one has ever seen God. Of course you can apply the term "seeing" in an enlarged meaning to describe all the senses of both kinds, because no man can see God presently and directly and still live, except with that part of his senses which is not restricted by bodily limitations and is not sensible of the lapse of time, but lives and endures through His grace for all eternity; I speak of Christian love, which is not diminished, but increases in proportion as it draws into nearer intimacy and closeness to the object which it desires. As for faith, it wears a veil, and hope defers its joy and sets its desire in the future, with the incentive of grace and merit soothing present consciousness. Therefore, while faith and hope resemble a kind of sense, they nevertheless subsist and work on this side of the great divide, and as temporary expedients, working as through a glass darkly, and in a kind of enigma, until their nature shall be changed and the substance of the truth shall illuminate them in all its fulness. But one who cannot be clearly seen by sense, cannot easily be known; and that which is not known cannot be diligently worshipped save through a medium or symbol. Wherefore we read that Numa Pompilius introduced among the Romans certain ceremonies and sacrifices, to the end that under the pretence of immortal gods he might the more easily induce them to cultivate piety, religion, good faith and the other things which he wished to make known to them. This is attested by the shield which was said to have fallen from Heaven, and by the Palladium, both regarded as sacred pledges of imperial power; by two-faced Janus, the arbiter of war and peace; and by the hearth of Vesta, sacred to virgins, whereon, in honor of the stars of heaven, the flame that guarded the empire burned forever

watchfully. To the same end the year was expanded into twelve months, decked out with a variety of "lawful" and "unlawful" days, and there were pontiffs, augurs, and various schools of priests, all to curb the barbarism of the people, restrain them from wrong-doing, and cause them to keep a holiday from arms, cultivate justice, and steadily train themselves in civic affection toward one another; and he did in fact so succeed in taming that fierce people, that the empire which they had seized, as it is said, by violence and wrong, they governed happily by the laws of justice and piety. But why should I put forward the example of Numa, when the fathers of our own faith likewise assert that the sacrifices and ceremonies of the old law¹ were instituted lest the people, becoming captivated by the worship of demons, should unlearn the practice of the true religion, burning their sacrifices to demons after the manner of the gentiles, and not to God?

God is worshipped, therefore, either by affection, which is a disposition of the mind, or by the display of works. The disposition of affection or love touches Him directly, though He cannot be fully comprehended by means of any sense of the body or even of the soul, so long as it sojourns abroad from Him, and while the mind is weighed down under the burden of the body; but certainly He is loved the more ardently, and sought the more zealously, in proportion as His loftiness, and the immensity of His riches, power, and wisdom, exceeds all understanding; yet, even so, with His goodness and power He so envelops, penetrates, fills and protects every creature, that He cannot remain altogether hidden from any creature that is rational. Even those which are irrational bear witness that He is, and what He is, and how great He is, by numerous signs and tokens. And so in a wonderful way He gives knowledge of himself while taking it away; and takes it away while giving it;

¹ i. e., under Judaism.

and according to the measure of His own good pleasure so works in different individuals that, while He is without increase or abatement, He yet seems to be more present or less present in one or another as respects grace, although not of course as respects His essence, wherewith He fills every creature equally and uniformly. For that He can exist in complete union is fully proved in the instance, though it be the only one, of His only-begotten son of the Virgin. And so He is now one thing in one man, another in another, but as it is written, will be all in all to His elect. And just as the nature of the sun's heat, to use an unequal comparison, for nothing can be compared to Him on equal terms, produces different effects in different bodies because of their diversity, so His nature, if it is permissible to compare great things with the greatest of all, shines forth in manifold ways in many men. Thus if a ray of the sun chances to fall on a carbuncle, it emerges or is reflected with a red color, which reddens the surrounding air. The same ray becomes green in a smaragdus, and is colored to the clearest azure in a sapphire. The facets of a jacinth lend it their hue. In a topaz, which is the more precious as it is the more rare, it glories proudly in the color of almost all things. If you hold up Yris before it, it will reflect the image of Thaumantias. Cast upon water, it passes in undulations across the ceiling, and, transmitted through the beryl, it imprints the fire of heaven upon what lies beneath. You see, then, how many different things a ray can be, in different objects. In the same way, prudence is in some, fortitude in others, in still others temperance, or justice, or faith, and, in others again, long-suffering hope; in some is the ardor of love, in others endurance of labor, here consolation for grief, there perseverance in good works; all of which separate qualities in separate individuals are yet but one and the same God. But, in time to come, when through His grace we shall look upon Him face to face, and see Him as He is, then He will be all in all; and

then none shall lack for his blessedness the substance of any virtue, since He will be the fulness of virtue in all, and the sum of beatitude; to such a degree that according to the tradition of the fathers, He will appear to His elect in such fulness of majesty that they shall lack nothing of any grace, and He alone shall be visible in them, and they shall be reckoned in His name, their true substance being preserved entire and without any changefulness of nature. This is perhaps the meaning of the saying, "The sanctified shall exult in glory, they shall rejoice in the beds";² for then the hearts of the sanctified shall be open to one another, and each shall glory not only in his own consciousness but in the consciousness of all. For just as fire, to use the same simile which we have already used, penetrates the nature of iron and heats it till nought is seen therein save fire; and just as when a ray of the sun shines upon copper, the copper is accounted as the sun or a ray thereof; in the same way God will so fill all the elect that, all infirmity and mutability having been removed from them, and the mortal having put on immortality, and the corruptible incorruptibility, God alone shall be seen and known in all. By this opinion some explain the fact that in spite of the general rule that it is never permissible for one creature to be adored by another, yet the angels, who already participate in the blessedness which is reserved for us in the future, are adored when seen of men, because in them a certain actual presence of the Deity is visible. Thus too in the face of the Saviour something of Deity shone forth, when he made a scourge of cords and drove the buyers and sellers from the temple, thus showing that all transaction of business is to be banished from the house of prayer. But in other men, although the presence of Deity may be felt near at hand, His fulness is never actually present, and yet cannot wholly be concealed. He is therefore marvellous in

² Ps. cxlix, 5.

every manifestation of majesty, venerable in every manifestation of wisdom, lovable in every manifestation of goodness, and this worship the faithful creature can pay to him without the intervention of any intermediary. What more is needful than this, that we honor, venerate, and love Him? For these three form a three-fold cord between Creator and creature, which cannot easily be broken. But strongest of all is the strength of love. Truly, Christian love never passes away, wherewith if a man clings to God, he is united to Him and becomes one spirit with Him; and he who is thus united to Him so as to become one in spirit, becomes a servant of His household, and can in no wise be kept from obedience to Him, which is a thing of the spirit. But the worship which consists in the display of external works requires a medium; in as much as no bodily approach to the spirit is accessible to us, as was plainly taught by Him who, in the case of the woman of Samaria, said for the instruction of the Church, "God is a spirit, and they that would worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth."³ In order, however, to provide a way whereby the weakness of our humility may ascend to His throne, and have some ground for merit, He who endowed us with senses has wished to be worshipped with the senses; and He who will glorify both soul and body demands the faithful service of both. He also desires to be worshipped with the body to the end that the tardiness of unfaithfulness or negligence may have nought wherewith to excuse itself.

³ John ix, 24.

CHAPTER IV

OF REVERENCE FOR PERSONS AND THINGS; AND IN WHAT WAYS A PERSON MAY BE WORTHY OF REVERENCE.

The reverence which is paid with the body is directed either toward persons or things. The reasons for reverencing persons proceed either from nature, or from office, or from character, or from rank, or from fortune. Nature causes us to honor our parents and our children and those who are joined to us by ties of flesh and blood, as for instance wife, relatives, and connections. This precept is received in the law of nations because it is followed among all nations alike. We are also urged to the same effect by the divine law, for we know that it is written, "Honor thy father and thy mother that thou mayest have long life on earth";¹ and again, "He that curseth father or mother shall surely be put to death."² It was hardly needful to issue such a command in regard to children, since no one hates his own flesh; nor in regard to the wife, on whose account a man leaves father and mother, cleaving to his wife, so that the twain become one flesh. But commandments on this point are not lacking in the divine law, although because of the strong incentive supplied by nature, they are comparatively infrequent; and the same commandments are extended to relatives and connections, as nature herself enjoins.

Office is the duty of doing the acts which laws or morals enjoin upon a given individual. Its function is to bring different acts into harmony by allotting them to the different in-

¹ Ex. xx, 12. ² Ex. xxi, 17.

dividuals to whom they are appropriate. Among the duties which are thus to be performed some have a public bearing, others relate to the private status of individuals. From this it is clear that some duties or offices are conveniently called public, others private. Of those which are private there is almost as great a multiplicity as there are different kinds of persons. Public offices on the other hand can all be referred to two kinds: for they have their origin either from divine law or human law. These things are explained at large in the books of offices, but they are pertinent in the present connection because of the fact that reverence is paid to public offices. It is due to them in proportion to the relative eminence of each magistracy. This, in turn, is the result of, and is indicated by, the extent of the jurisdictional competence of each, for the reverence or contempt which is shown to magistrates redounds to the honor or disgrace of all those who are subject to them. Wherefore in the ordinances of princes and the edicts or promulgations of magistrates the plural number is used by prolemsis, to the end that every ordinance or other kind of promulgation may be seen to be the act not so much of the officer personally as of the corporate community. This is well-known from daily usage even to one who is ignorant of the laws or canons. The rationale of duty or office is developed further not merely in the enactments of the canons and laws but also in the precepts of all the ethical writers.

Character is a cast of mind from which a habitual series of particular acts proceed. For if an act is done once or oftener, it does not immediately become a part of character, unless by being done steadily it passes into usage. Usage includes both virtues and vices, although the vices are not generally reckoned as character (for the latter term may also be translated "morals"), to which the vices are usually set in opposition. From the latter fact it is plain that only the virtues are included under the name of morals, or character, although

sometimes we speak of "good" and "bad" morals to distinguish the vices and virtues. Thus we use the term in its good sense when we speak of "moral" people, or people of "character," while we also derive from it the word "morose," which we use to describe a kind of vice. This shows that the name signifies abundance, although it never happens that there is a surfeit of "morals" in any person in the flesh, while on the other hand many possess a superfluity of vices. When, therefore, we say that anyone acquires reverence by reason of his character or morals, we mean that he has virtues which deserve to be honored. For who ought not to revere and respect the man whom he supposes to be wise, brave, temperate, and just? Hence it is the counsel of wisdom for the man who desires to be esteemed, loved, honored and advanced, that he should honor, love, and revere God, and submit to Him with entire devotion.

Rank is defined as the accidental status of a person, as for instance whether he is sunk in adversity or raised aloft by prosperity. It is the stamp which evidences on its face that his lot is one or the other. This is the ground on which we honor men who are free-born, while on others we cast the reproach of slavery. So likewise we respect the wealth of some men and despise the poverty of others.

Tully says that it is difficult to define nature.³ To define fortune is I think even more difficult, because, while the former has some substance, the latter has none. Nature provides the source and origin of things; which would be impossible if she herself did not actually exist. For what is altogether nonexistent cannot supply existence to something else. But since fortune does not exist, it cannot be defined. Because it is nonexistent, it is not possible for anyone to determine wherein it consists.

³ Cic., de Invent., i, 24 § 34.

At this point, however, the Epicureans come forward with their doctrines to which they give the name of "master teachings," and to which they claim that all philosophy must yield obedience; and, after their fashion, they make all things subject to fortune. I think that herein, as on so many other points, it is worth our while to hear the opinion of Plutarch. He says that the blind goddess ought not to be worshipped, for she cannot, after all, be worshipped except by the blind. And he cites many examples to demonstrate that all who have worshipped her have been made blind themselves and have been hurried straightway into the pit of destruction. Galba is one instance, who having lived admirably for a whole life-time and well into old age, was then through his service of this goddess and her worship suddenly exalted for a brief space and even more suddenly cast down. For the manner of it, look into Suetonius. Yet the same philosopher complains in the ear of the aforesaid prince, and tearfully laments, that this goddess, so infected with the taint of blind and heedless rashness, and so shameful to all other divinities, has polluted the temples of all the Gods and stolen away their worshippers to such an extent that, in addition to the private sanctuaries which she has everywhere throughout the City and the world, she has even seized a post on the Tarpeian rock on the same footing with supreme Jove; and a golden image of "Fortuna Publica" is publicly adored in the Capitol by strangers, pilgrims, and natives; and has such authority beyond all other gods that in the general account-book of mortals, as the saying is, she alone seems to fill up both pages. You can see her there turning her revolving wheel; and, what is more to be marvelled at, with a turn of that wheel she dashes down and crushes the thread of the three sisters which is woven from the breast of Jove; for whosoever sets up fortune, plucks down fate. "Fate," says the Stoic, "rules over men; fate is in those places which are hidden in secret." ⁴

⁴ Juv. ix, 32, 33.

Against this paradox the "master teachings" of Epicurus protest. "Away with the necessity of fate," he says, because "If fortune wills it, a consul will be made from a rhetorician; if the same power wills, a rhetorician will be made from a consul."⁵

However, not to treat further of fortune, there may indeed be a form of unforeseen events, and though this may seem to some to resemble very closely what we have called "rank," because a man's status, to which we applied that term, may be determined by a coincidence of accidental circumstances, still there is this important difference, namely that rank results in some cases from nature, in others from office, in others again from a man's morals or character; and only in the remaining cases does it spring from the chance of events, while fortune always consists in things which emerge unforeseen. Plutarch seeks to eliminate it entirely, and from the preceding four sources, to wit nature, office, character, and rank, derives the origin of all reverence. Nevertheless, on this point he develops his argument on somewhat superstitious lines, after the manner of pagans. I have thought fit to insert some of his ideas, however, expressing them in Catholic sense and language. He asserts that in the worship of the gods those are above all to be included who come closest and nearest to them^5a either because of their nature, as Liber who conquered India, or Hercules who showed that he had Jove in him by strangling snakes in his cradle; or because of their office, as priests and prefects of sacred things; or because of their character, as philosophers who by investigation and the gift of wisdom prove that they have drunk deeply from the fountain of the divine mind; or by reason of their rank, as those who have been exalted by the favor of

⁵ Juv, vii, 197, 198.

^5a To make this passage intelligible, it seems to me necessary to read "eis" for "ei."

heaven to be over others, rather for some personal reason than because of their public office.

This language is indeed that of an infidel, and worthy of execration; nor is the sense of the words such as befits a philosopher. But perchance he did not dare express his real opinion concerning the nature of the gods in the ears of a corrupt people, having read how the books of the philosopher Pitagoras had been burned, and he himself driven into exile by the Athenians, because he had expressed a doubt whether those things which were commonly told regarding the gods were true. Why then should he be so rash as directly to assert the contrary, when he knew that even a doubt of their correctness had not gone unpunished? It is therefore likely that he adapted his style to his hearers, and in order that he might persuade them to give up unpermitted things, indulged them somewhat in their errors. For in moral doctrine he is unimpeachable. And in this opinion I acquiesce the more readily, since even the Apostle of the gentiles, while preserving his faith and religion intact, yet became all things to all men to the end that he might win all.⁶ We, however, who have been enlightened by the Truth from heaven, believe that reverence is to be shown to the ministers and friends not of "gods," who we know are nothing, but of the true God; and even at times to His foes also, since this is enjoined by God Himself, who often for the purification of His people has conferred power on the worst of men. Whence the command, "Be subject to every human creature on account of God, whether to the king as holding supreme power, or to other magistrates, as being sent by Him for vengeance on evildoers and the reward of the just."⁷ And the other command, "Slaves, be in subjection to your masters, not only to those who are good and gentle, but also to those who are froward." ⁸

We become friends of God either through grace, without

⁶ 1 Cor. ix, 22. ⁷ 1 Pet. ii, 13. ⁸ 1 Pet. ii, 18.

the operation of merit, like Jeremiah and John, who were sanctified before they were born, and like that gem of the priesthood, Nicholas, who while still in the cradle kept fast on the fourth day and the sixth day, on those days suckling only once; or through the merits of grace, like those who win the kingdom of Heaven by the easy road of good works, as did the penitent thief, or by a difficult and happy death, like the choir of the apostles and martyrs. These three classes were indicated by Maro:

"Easy is the descent into Avernus; Night and day stands open the gate of gloomy Dis; But to climb the steep ascent again and regain the upper air, This requires toil and labor; few have attained thereto, And those the favorites of just Jove, or they that Were exalted to the skies by the ardor of their virtue, Or else were born of gods."⁹

Those, then, whom we see conforming by the propriety of their life to the divine goodness, we ought to revere as the truest and most faithful image of God.

God's ministers are they that have been called by the divine governance to procure the salvation of themselves and others by rooting out and correcting vices, or by implanting and increasing the virtues. But those who minister to Him in the sphere of human law are as much inferior to those who minister in divine law as things human are below things divine.

⁹ Verg., Aen. vi, 126 ff.

CHAPTER V

WHAT PUNISHMENT IS THREATENED AGAINST THOSE WHO COMMIT INJURIES AGAINST MINISTERS OF THE CHURCH AND AGAINST SACRED PLACES; AND THAT ABSOLUTION CANNOT BE EXTORTED BY FORCE, NOR PURLOINED BY FRAUD.

In the persons of those who administer the divine laws, God is honored or brought into contempt more than in the case of others because He regards their honor or dishonor as His own. Hence the scripture, "I said, Ye are Gods";¹ and again "The lips of the priest keep knowledge, and from his mouth they seek the law because he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts."² Also the Gospel says, "Who hears you, hears me; who receives you, receives me; and who rejects you, rejects Him that sent me";' and again, "Who touches you, touches the pupil of my eye." ⁴

The reverence which is to be shown to things is of many different kinds. For things are either corporeal, as shrines, and sacred places, and things dedicated to pious uses, and sacrifices performed visibly; or else incorporeal, as the laws which apply to sacred things, and disregard whereof is a sacrilege to be expiated by death or some other punishment of the severest kind, proportioned to the gravity of the offence. Therefore, to outrage the immunities of sacred things is to rebel against God Himself, and as it were condemn Him to slavery. And surely many arguments founded on the divine law could be

¹ Ps. lxxxi, 6. ² Mal. ii, 7. ³ Luke x, 16; Math.

⁴ Zach. ii, 8.

brought forward in support of its provisions, but to prevent the audacity of a rival power from gainsaying it, the statutes of princes on this point are of broad and generous application, embodying reverence and approval of the Christian faith, and confirming in their entirety the privileges of churches, priests and all sacred places. For who has not heard of the ordinance of the prince whose memory is forever blessed — I speak of Archadius?⁵ "If anyone has broken out into this species of sacrilege, namely of entering Catholic churches by force, and committing outrage against the ministers and priests, or in the sacred place itself, let notice be taken of the act by the rulers of the province, and let the governor of the province know that such injury to priests and ministers of the Catholic Church, and to the place which is theirs, and to the worship of God, must be punished by sentence of death upon those who are convicted thereof or who confess the crime. Nor let him wait until the punishment of the injury is demanded by the bishop, to whom is rather left the holy glory of pardon and forgiveness, but let it be a praiseworthy act for all or any to track down atrocities against priests or ministers as a public crime and acquire merit by taking vengeance therefor."⁶ And likewise, "It pleases our mercy that the clergy shall have nought to do with proceedings at law or those which pertain to our court, to the body whereof they are not attached."⁷ And elsewhere, "If the privileges of any holy church shall have been violated by audacity or neglected by dissimulation, let the offence be punished by a fine of five pounds of gold."⁸ The nature of these privileges of churches and holy places and ministers is made clearly known by the law both divine and human, although it is now obvious from usage that they can only be determined before ecclesiastical judges; and if anyone lays violent hands on one of the clergy, he is to be punished by anathema which none

⁵ Justin, Cod., i, 3, § 10. ⁶ Justin, Cod., i, 3, § 10.

⁷ Justin, Cod., i, 3, § 17. ⁸ Justin, Cod., i, 3, § 13.

save the Roman pontiff has power to absolve.⁹ It is vain to seek from any other source remission of this crime unless perchance the very article of death is imminent, because absolution cannot be extorted by force or purloined by fraud. According to Claudian, Theodosius says:

"You cannot extort love by force; It is the gift of mutual faith, and simple favor."¹⁰

The reason why it is not possible to extort absolution is because it is earned only by contrition of heart, confession of the lips, and satisfaction by works. Clearly not force, but grace alone can atone for impiety; and fraud will not profit the sinner, because the Holy Spirit abhors a feigned obedience and will not dwell in a body subjected to sin. Elsewhere I remember to have said (on the authority of the great father Augustine) that simulated innocence is not innocence at all, but a double offence, because there is both the offence itself and the dissimulation. So too pretended equity is not equity, but double iniquity, because there is both the iniquity and the pretence. I am therefore confounded with amazement beyond measure when I so often see men, whom I do not know whether to count as Christians or as infidels, striving with all their might, when detected in some sacrilege of this kind, to compel priests by means of threats and terrors to grant them absolution, which the ones cannot honestly give nor the others in their hardness of heart receive with any real profit to themselves. Surely it is easier for both to become involved than for either of them to be extricated. Which of the two should be blamed the more severely, it would not be easy for me to say. So much concerning those who in Plutarch's political constitution fill the place of the soul in the commonwealth.

⁹ Lat. Council of 1139, c. 15. in Gratian, ed. Friedberg, Corp. Jur. Can., i, 822. ¹⁰ IV Cons. Honor., 282, 3.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING THE PRINCE, WHO IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND OF HIS ELECTION AND PRIVILEGES; AND CONCERNING THE RECOMPENSE OF VIRTUE AND GUILT: AND THAT BLESSED JOB SHOULD BE IMITATED; AND CONCERNING THE VIRTUES OF BLESSED JOB.

Following in the footsteps of our author, we come next to consider the members of the commonwealth. It has been said that the prince holds the place of the head, and is guided solely by the judgment of his own mind. And so, as has been said, he is placed by the divine governance at the apex of the commonwealth, and preferred above all others, sometimes through the secret ministry of God's providence, sometimes by the decision of His priests, and again it is the votes of the whole people which concur to place the ruler in authority. Wherefore we read in the Old Testament that Moyses, when about to ordain him who should have authority over the people, called together the whole synagogue to the end that he might be chosen in the presence of the people, so that afterwards no man might have ground for retraction, and no least scruple of uncertainty might remain to cloud his title. We read in the Book of Kings that Saul, when about to be made king, appeared before the face of the people, and was lifted up on their shoulders, above the whole people. Why so, I ask, if not because he that is to be over others ought in heart and countenance to show that he has strength sufficient to embrace as it were the breadth of the whole people in the arms of his good works,

and to protect them, as being more learned, more holy, more prudent, and more excellent in every virtue? For the Lord said unto Moyses: "Take unto thee Jesus the son of Nave, a man in whom is the spirit of God, and lay thy hands upon him, and set him before Eleazer the priest, and let him give him commandments in the sight of the whole synagogue; and thou shalt give instructions concerning him in their presence, and shalt put of thy honor upon him that the children of Israel may hear and obey him."¹ Evidently we are here listening to the ordination of a prince of the people, described so clearly that it needs no explanation. If, however, you ask for one in yet plainer terms, I will explain it to you on the authority of the Lord if you will advise me at the proper time and place, and I will add the meaning of the robes and certain features of the ritual. But here is plainly no acclamation by the people, no argument or title founded upon ties of blood, no consideration accorded to family relationship.

On the death of Salphaat, his daughters came before Moyses. and claimed their father's inheritance.² God himself bears witness that their petition was a just one; for a man's inheritance of lands and estates is to be left to his relatives, and so far as possible, his public offices likewise. But governance of the people is to be handed over to him whom God has chosen, to wit to such a man as has in him the spirit of God, and the commandments of God are in his sight, who is well known and familiar to Moyses, that is to say a man in whom is honor and knowledge of the law, so that the children of Israel may hearken unto him. Nevertheless it is not right to pass over, in favor of new men, the blood of princes, who are entitled by the divine promise and the right of family to be succeeded by their own children provided that, as has been said above, they have walked in the judgments of the Lord. But

¹ Num. xxvii, 18. ² Num. xxvii, 1-6.

if they have departed, little by little, from the way, even so it is not well to overthrow them utterly at once, but rather to rebuke injustice with patient reproof until finally it becomes obvious that they are stiff-necked in evil-doing. Roboam was not immediately expelled from his father's throne when he spurned the counsel of the old men, and, departing from the way of Salomon, sought to place an unsupportable burden on the backs of the children of Israel. But his kingdom was split in twain by the withdrawal of the ten tribes who followed Jeroboam the servant of Salomon, and the kingdom were divided, Juda having one kingdom and Israel the other.³ Thus he was made to feel at one and the same time punishment for his stubbornness, and the mercy which flowed from the grace of God and the privilege of blood, for he remained king, but with a great part of his kingdom cut off. Wherefore did this befall him? Because he adhered to the counsels of young men, scorning the ways and precepts of prudence. For it is impossible to administer princely power wholesomely if the prince does not act on the counsel of wise men. "Woe to the land," says the scripture, "whose king is a boy and whose counsellors feast in the morning; happy the land Whose king is of noble blood and whose chief men eat in due season, for nourishment, and not for luxury";⁴ for in the former there can be no wisdom. From this point hear holy Job:⁵ "Where shall wisdom be found, and where is the place of understanding? Man knoweth not the value thereof, neither is it found in the land of those who live pleasantly." Nought that perishes may be compared with it, for wisdom is drawn from secret places. It would have been better far for Roboam, had he driven the young men from him, following the counsels of the elders and keeping the life of blessed Job ever before him as a pattern and model for ruling. For hear what Job tells of himself: ⁶ "When I

³ I Kings xii, 13. ⁴ Eccles. x, 11-12.

⁵ Job xxviii, 12-13. ⁶ Job xxix, 7 ff.

went forth unto the gate of the city and they prepared a seat for me in the street, the young men looked upon me and hid themselves away, but the elders rose up and stood; the chief men ceased from speaking and placed a finger on their lips; the leaders hushed their voice, and their tongue cleaved to the roof of their mouth. The ear that heard me blessed me, and the eye that saw me gave witness unto me, because I set free the poor man that cried, and the orphan that had none to aid him. The blessing of him that was about to perish came upon me, and I comforted the heart of the widow. I clothed myself with justice, and I garbed myself with judgment as with a robe and diadem. I was an eye for the blind and a foot for the lame. I was a father to the poor, and diligently inquired into the case which I did not understand. I brake the jaws of the unjust man and from his teeth I bore away his prey. And I said: 'I shall die in my nest, and like the palm tree I shall multiply my days. My root is opened to the waters, and the dew shall linger in my harvest; my glory shall always be renewed and my bow shall be repaired in my hand.' Those who heard me awaited my opinion, and kept silent, attentive to my counsel. They dared not add to my words, and my speech distilled upon them. If at times I laughed in their presence, they did not believe it, and the light of my countenance did not fall to the earth. If I had wished to go to them, my seat was the first; and when I had seated myself like a king with his army standing round, I was the solace of them that mourned."

Here in the example of a just man is embodied in great part the formula of ruling. If we wished to follow it into its details, the series of virtues which it enumerates would alone fill up a whole book. The diligent reader will weigh and analyze each word, because in them all is no jot nor tittle which is not useful for understanding the mystery of salvation. I shall, however, as briefly as I can, touch on a few points which stand out on the surface of the words. He says "When I washed my

feet in butter and the rock poured forth for me rivers of oil; when I sat me down in a chair prepared for me in the street, the young men went away and hid themselves but the elders stood about me."⁷ Here he means to signify that affluence of earthly things and a combination of blessings did not banish his prudence, but its authority over him remained throughout unshaken on the witness of his own conscience and of the good works which he did. He walked forth to the gate as one who needed not concealment; and as one who by his merits was entitled to the seat of instruction, he augmented the wisdom of the elders while youthful levity hid itself away. "The chief men ceased to speak and the tongue of the leaders cleaved to the roof of their mouth," as not having courage to speak of great themes and to place on the shoulders of men burdens too heavy to be borne, and such as are not wont to be touched with even the tip of the finger. For he taught that the sole excellence of virtue consists in action, and that the splendor of the word is an empty thing if it is not supported by the solidity of the deed. "In all labor," says Salomon, "there will be abundance, but where words are many, there frequently is penury."⁸ It is the place of the chief men and leaders to walk before others in the way of good morals, and show them the way, and not to declaim with inflated eloquence as to what others ought to do. "The ear that heard me and the eye that saw me blessed me." Here he expresses elegantly the bodily instrumentalities whereon the soul's power of perception chiefly depends; for the knowledge of external objects penetrates to the soul most accurately through the services of eye and ear, and too frequently the careless tongue scatters the treasures of the heart. In adding the words "which heard me" and "which saw me," he expresses the judgment of a wise man according to the saying, "Happy the man who speaks into an ear that hears." He does

⁷ Job xxix, 6, 7. ⁸ Prov. xiv, 23.

not say that he is made blessed by the tongues of men, which frequently move in either direction, as they chance to be impelled at one time by love or again by hate. Sufficient to him is the testimony of his own conscience, especially when it is confirmed by the judgment of the wise. The reason, he says, is "that I had set free the poor man, the orphan, and him that was about to perish; and because I consoled the heart of the widow." For in such acts the nature of princely authority chiefly reveals itself, which was instituted by the Lord to banish wrongs. For these are indeed works of mercy, and the name of him who does them will be blessed from age to age. But, that you may not suppose that he lent encouragement to vice by showing mercy too leniently, he says, "I was clothed in justice, and with my judgment as with a diadem; the cause which I did not understand I searched out diligently." For it behooves a judge to lay open all things, and to analyze the relation of facts with the fullest measure of investigation, and not to go against any one before the case has been most fully staked out by lawful reasons. For as the ethical writer says, "Speedy shall be the penitence of him whose judgment is speedy." "I brake the jaws of the unjust man." The unjust man is whosoever in legal proceedings seeks not his lawful right but plunder; who so loves wealth that he exacts retribution. And though it is just that judgment should be given for the value, yet he who is a slave to avarice hurries to destruction. Whence it follows, "And from his teeth I plucked away his prey, and 1 said I shall die in my own nest"; for peace of mind belonged to him because he was content with the measure of his own possessions. He was not spurred on by the goad of avarice or ambition to add house to house and field to field to the very boundaries of space as if he alone was destined to inhabit the entire surface of the earth.⁹

⁹ Isa. v, 8.

"And as the palm tree, I shall multiply my days." Aristotle in the seventh book of his Problems, and Plutarch in the eighth of his Memorabilia, tell a marvellous fact,¹⁰ to wit, that if you place great weights upon the trunk of a palm tree, and press and weigh it down so heavily that it cannot sustain the greatness of the weight, still it does not bend nor bow downward, but rises up against the weight, and struggles upward, and rebounds. For this reason, says Plutarch, men chose the palm for the symbol of victory in contests, because it is the nature of this tree not to yield to hard and persistent pressure. It is also said that the branch of the palm tree which the Greeks call the "royal branch" cannot be torn out by pulling it downward, but gives way only if you pull it up. It is also well-known that the trunk or stock of the palm tree is narrowed at the root, but thickens in its upper parts. The opposite is true of all other trees, whose stock increases in size as it approaches nearer to the ground. The palm tree, therefore, signifies unconquerable justice, which knows not how to descend but only to rise to ever higher things. Hence the saying, "The just man shall flourish like the palm tree."¹¹

"My root is opened to the waters" (that is to say, the waters of the scriptures and virtues, mentioned above), "and the dew" (to wit, of grace) "shall linger in my harvest," — namely of good works, whose sheaves the just judge shall treasure up in His bosom and repay unto the elect who shall come before Him on that day.

Accordingly he continues, "My glory shall always be renewed; and my bow shall be repaired," because,

"There is that at which" the just man "bends and aims the bow," nor does he "chase ravens at random with shards and mud."¹²

"Those who heard me awaited my opinion," and so forth. It is a common saying that an opinion is always to be re-

¹⁰ Aulus Gellius iii, 6. ¹¹ Ps. xci, 13. ¹² Persius, Sat. iii, 60.

ceived in good part, according to the proverb, "A sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men rendering opinions."¹³ You hear him say that in a wise man three things concur. "They kept silent," he says, "attentive to my council, they dared not add to my words, my speech distilled upon them." Difficult matters demand attention, and it behooves a grave man to meditate his counsel, to the end that whatsoever he says, whatsoever he does, may be as counsel in the eyes of the man who is seeking after wisdom. Furthermore it is a mark of a circumcised mouth to utter words to which nought may be added and from which nought may be taken away. It is a scandalous thing for a grave man continually to meddle in tales and trivialities, and to cackle among babblers like a noisy goose among swans, believing that one sort of matter is as good as another for a dispute:

"What is the argument? Whether Castor or Docilis has more

skill,

Or the Numician or Appian road is the better way to Brundisium?"¹⁴

Besides, things which are plentiful are cheapened by their plenty, and much talking is not merely a sin, but the words of a man who speaks a few things wisely are of great price. Wherefore Socrates made answer to one who inquired of him how to attain the best reputation, that his deeds should be good and his words few. This is why the just man, fearing to offend in speaking, says that his speech distilled drop by drop; for the perfect man does not offend by his words.

"If at times I laughed in their presence, they did not believe it." Laughter is a mark of levity; and the more public it is, the more shameful and worthy of rebuke. For it is written, "The fool lifts up his voice in laughter";¹⁵ and it is recorded

¹³ Prov. xxvi, 16. ¹⁴ Hor., Ep. i, 18, ll. 19, 20. ¹⁵ Eccli. xxi, 23

that the Saviour wept, but nowhere that he laughed. I should not readily believe that he was given to cackling, who speaks of his laughter so ambiguously that he says that they did not believe that he laughed.

"And the light of my countenance did not fall to the earth." Perhaps the just man laughed, but no worldly nonsense relaxed him into mirth, and whatsoever was worldly in manners, feared his austere countenance.

"Had I wished to go to them my seat was the first," and surely he was worthy of the foremost seat who so far excelled others in the way of virtue. When he sat like a king in the midst of his attendants he wiped away the tears of them that mourned. This is indeed a pleasing conclusion, for it belongs to the public power ever to strive so to rule that in the whole corporate community over which it presides it will not suffer any to be sorrowful. As to the art by which this will come to pass, the moral field which is subject to its governance attains thereby to such pleasantness and abundance of fruits and flowers that if one enters therein he rejoices as though he were amid the delights of paradise. Perchance you wonder and are struck with amazement that any one in this exile of the flesh can be & partaker of so much sweetness, and as it were a fellow-citizen with the citizens of heaven; but whether or not this can be, judge for yourself from the works of the just man. "If I have withheld from the poor their desire, and caused the eyes of the widow to wait; if I have eaten my morsel alone, and the orphan hath not eaten thereof with me (for whom my youth compassion has grown up with me, and came forth with me from my mother's womb); if I have despised the passer-by because he had no garment, and the poor man because he was without a covering; if his sides have not blessed me and if he has not been warmed with the fleece of my sheep; if I have lifted up my hand against the orphan when I saw myself above him in the gate; then may my shoulder fall from its socket, and let my arm be broken with

the bones thereof. For I have ever feared God above me as a swelling wave, and I could not endure the weight thereof. If I have thought that gold was my strength and have said to the fine gold, 'Thou art my trust'; if I have delighted because my wealth was great and because mine hand had gotten much; if I have beheld the sun when it shined or the moon walking in brightness, and my heart rejoiced secretly, and I kissed my hand with my mouth, which is the greatest wickedness, and a denial of God the Most High; if I rejoiced at the downfall of him that hated me and exulted because evil had found him; if the men of my tent have not said, 'Who is it who would give us of his own flesh that we might be filled?' — nor hath the stranger lodged outside my gates, but my door has stood open to the wayfarer —; if like a son of Adam I have concealed my sin and hidden mine iniquity in my bosom; if I have trembled at the sight of too great a multitude, and the scorn of my relatives has terrified me, and I have not rather kept silent, nor ventured out of doors; if my land cries out against me, and the furrows thereof weep with it; if I have eaten of the fruits thereof without payment and have caused the husbandmen to lose their life; then may my wheat grow up as thistles, and instead of my barley a thorn!"¹⁶ Do you not regard this man as indeed walking in the fulness of God's delights, who out of a pure heart and with a clean conscience and with no pretended faith, confesses such things of himself under such awful imprecations? Who needs any interpretation of such words, or does not see clearly by the light of such virtues? He is dull indeed and a man of blunted intelligence to whom they do not explain themselves. Here are gathered into one many things, whereof each singly would suffice to illuminate a world. If princes scorn to read more or to hear more, let them at least read and give ear to this short passage, and ponder on it with diligent reflection as a model for

¹⁶ Job xxxi, 16-29, 31-34, 38-40.

their imitation. For the same book continues: "If kings hear and keep the word of God, they will fill out their days in prosperity and their years in glory; but if they hearken not they shall pass by the sword, or be consumed by their folly."¹⁷ Do you thus see what is to be the two-fold end of unprofitable kings? Either they will pass by the sword, or they will be consumed by folly. And rightly are they said to "pass" by the sword, and not to be ended by it, because the sword is for them as it were but a passageway to the place where the mighty, in proportion to the multitude of their wickednesses, are punished mightily; but folly, too, consumes the ungodly, because in the enfeeblement of his people the prince's own vigor is sapped; for a wasted people neither can nor will support the power of a prince. ¹⁷ Job xxxvi, 11, 12.

CHAPTER VII

WHAT MISCHIEFS AND ADVANTAGES BEFALL SUBJECTS FROM THE CHARACTER OF THEIR PRINCES; WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY EXAMPLES OF SEVERAL STRATAGEMS.

He that giveth honor to a fool is said to be as one who adds a stone to Mercury's pile. This is interpreted differently by different commentators. For my own part, craving the indulgence of wiser men, I think that by Mercury's pile is signified that which controls the art of calculation, because Mercury is the god of those who transact business and attend vigilantly to their accounts. Therefore, to add a stone to the pile by which the art of calculating is regulated, is to throw the reckoning of all calculations into confusion, just as to confer honor on a fool is to overturn the life of a commonwealth. It is impossible for one to govern others to their profit who trips ever upon his own errors. For it is written, "Where there is no ruler, the people will fall."^l And elsewhere: "An unwise king will be the ruin of his people, and cities shall be inhabited through the prudence of the wise."² "Short-lived is all power; a disease long-drawn out burdeneth the physician. A short disease the physician cutteth off; so a king is today and tomorrow he shall die. When a man dies, he shall inherit creeping things and beasts and worms."³ Why is it, then, I ask, that the poor are crushed beneath wrongs and outrages, made lean with exactions, despoiled by manifold and oft-repeated rapine, why are the peoples bidden to clash together in arms and shake the world, to no end but that

¹ Prov. xi, 14. ² Eccli. x, 3. ³ Eccli. x, 11-13.

princes may be succeeded by their natural heirs? For the latter always succeed in their own right; no formality of a will is required, they spring up on an intestacy; willing or unwilling, you will have these heirs to rule over you. In the field of secular literature Plato is said to have written: "When the magistrate oppresses his subjects, it is as though the head of the body were to swell to such a size that the members either have not the strength to sustain it at all, or not without grave inconvenience. This disease can neither be endured, nor yet healed, without causing the sharpest pain to the members. If the disease proves to be wholly incurable, it is more wretched to live on such terms than to die. For nothing is better for the miserable than to put an end to their misery in any way whatsoever." It is written elsewhere that the same author also said: "When the ruler tyrannizes over his subjects, it is as if a guardian were to persecute his ward, or as if you were to cut a man's throat with his own sword, which he had given you, and you had accepted, for the purpose of defending him. For it is common knowledge that the commonwealth enjoys the rights and legal position of a ward, and it advances along the path of good fortune only when its head recognizes that he is unprofitable unless he faithfully coheres to the members." These are his words, and I think well and truly put. But it seems to me that there can be no faithful and firm cohesion where there is not an enduring union of wills and as it were a cementing together of souls. If this is lacking, it is in vain that the works of men are in harmony, since hollow pretence will develop into open injury, unless the real spirit of helpfulness is present. "Dissemblers and crafty men," says Job, "provoke the wrath of God, nor shall they complain when He bindeth them; their soul perisheth early and their life is among the effeminate and unclean." ⁴ Works may be the result only of a sense of propriety, or sometimes of fear. But the

⁴ Job xxxvi, 13, 14.

solidest union is that which is cemented with the glue of faith and love, and stands wholly upon the foundation of virtue. Nevertheless works, because they are an indication of character, win favor; and nothing is more useful or more effective toward securing the position and success of magistrates. Hence the words of that excellent emperor, or (if you prefer) of the excellent poet who puts them into his mouth, since there can be no doubt that both were of the same opinion:

"Be pious before all else; for if we are surpassed in every virtue,

Mercy alone makes us equal to the gods.

Act not on doubtful suspicions, nor be false to your friends,

Or eager for rumors; who heeds such things

Will tremble at every idle sound, and no hour will be free from

anxiety. Wakefulness and spears standing guard give no such security

As when love keeps watch. You cannot extort love by force;

It is the gift of mutual faith and simple favor."⁵

Once Alexander, when leading an expedition in the winter, was sitting by the fire and began to inspect his troops as they marched past. Seeing one soldier almost lifeless from the cold, he had him sit down in his own place, saying: "If you had been born among the Persians it would be a capital offence for you to sit in the king's seat, but it is the privilege of a man born in Macedonia." Another story is told of the same king to this effect: When news was brought to him that a virgin of surpassing beauty, who was betrothed to the prince of a neighboring nation, was among the captives, he preserved the highest degree of abstinence with regard to her, not even going to look at her; and shortly afterwards he sent her back to her betrothed, and by this act of kindness won for himself the good-will of that whole nation. Thus by his humanity he won to him the minds of his own subjects, and by his justice those of alien

⁵ Claudian, IV Cons. Hon., ll. 276-283.

peoples. We read that Scipio Africanus pursued the same course in Spain, when a noble virgin was brought before him who by her beauty drew to herself in admiration the eyes of all beholders. He restored her to her betrothed, Alicius by name, adding the gold which her parents had brought to ransom her from captivity, as a dower for the virgin or a wedding gift for the husband. By this double generosity the whole nation was conquered, as perhaps it would not have been otherwise, and was annexed to the people of the Roman empire. While Camillus was besieging the Falisci, a school-master of the city brought some of the children of the Falisci outside the walls as if for a stroll and then handed them over to Camillus, saying that by holding them as hostages he had the means of compelling the city to do his bidding. But Camillus not only spurned this perfidy, but binding the school-master's hands behind his back, delivered him to the children to be whipped back to their parents with rods; and by this act of kindness he won the victory which he had not been willing to win by fraud; for because of this act of justice the Falisci surrendered of their own free will. There is another instructive story concerning this same Camillus which shows him in a not less noble light. For after he had subdued cities and enjoyed notable triumphs, he was condemned and banished from Rome because of the envy which he had aroused among the military element, on the pretext that he had unfairly distributed the common booty. Afterwards when the Senonian Gauls broke into the city, having defeated the Romans at the eleventh milestone near the river Allia, nor in the city itself could any place be held against them but the Capitol, money was paid to induce the Gauls to withdraw. Then Camillus, sympathizing with his fatherland in spite of its ingratitude, fell upon them and cut them to pieces, recovered the money from them, and brought back the Roman eagles. Wherefore in the sixth book of Virgil, Eneas among his other descendants is shown

"Camillus, restorer of the ensigns."⁶

And he was recalled from his exile, and entering the city in a third triumph, was called a second Romulus as if he had founded the city anew.

Julius Iginus in the sixth book of his "Life and Deeds of Illustrious Men" tells the following incident of Fabricius (the preceding ones are from Plutarch's "Instruction of Trajan," and from the "Book of Stratagems" of Julius Frontinus): There came envoys from the Samnites to Gaius Fabricius, who reminded him of the many and important services and acts of good-will which he had done for the Samnites since the restoration of peace, and begged him to accept the gift of a large sum of money for his own use, as it was obvious that so important a man must have many needs for his necessary living expenses and to maintain the splendor of his household. For this was not luxurious or corresponding to the greatness of the man or the worth of his virtues. But Fabricius passed the flat of his hands from his ears to his eyes, and then lower down to his nostrils and throat and mouth, and then to his belly and below, and answered the envoys in these words: "While I can resist and control all these members which I have touched, I shall lack for nought. Therefore keep your money, which you need for your own use, and do not force it upon those to whom it is neither necessary nor welcome; Romans do not care to own gold, but to rule over those who own gold."⁷ This is the story of Julius Iginus. But Frontinus tells that when Fabricius was commanding the Romans, a doctor of Pirrus, the king of the Epirots, came to him and promised that he would give poison to Pirrus if he were paid what the deed was worth. Fabricius, not thinking that he stood in need of such villainy to win the victory, discovered the physician to the king, and for this act of good faith he was well rewarded, for he compelled Pirrus to sue for the friendship of

⁶ Aen. vi, 825. ⁷ Aulus Gellius i, 14.

the Romans. I will not meddle in the controversy about this incident between Valerius Maximus and Claudius Quadrigarius concerning the name and office of the traitor. Whether, according to Valerius, he was Timocares the father of the king's cupbearer, or, according to Quadrigarius, Nicias the physician, I do not greatly care, so long as both authors agree that the consuls of the Romans vanquished Pirrus because they had scorned to take advantage of treachery. Quadrigarius further relates that the letter of the consuls to Pirrus was in these words: "The Roman consuls send greeting to Pirrus the king. For the wrongs that you have done, our purpose is steadfast and unmoved to make war against you as enemies; but with due observance of good example and good faith. Therefore it has seemed to us that we should desire your life to be preserved to the end that we may be able to vanquish you by arms. There has come to us Nicias your attendant, asking a reward from us if he killed you secretly. We declare that this is not our wish, and we have announced to him that he was not to expect any advantage from us by reason of such a deed. At the same time, it has seemed good to us to send you this information for fear that if anything of the kind happened it might be thought to have been done by our counsel, and to the end that the cities may know that we do not care to fight by means of promises and bribery and treachery. If you do not take precautions, you will be done to death."⁸ Why should I refer to the fact that when Pirrus had offered him half his kingdom as the price of granting him peace on equal terms, he spurned the offer? Nor would he consent, either, to receive half of the kingdom at the price of promising friendship to the king. And when the illustrious Cineas, who had been sent to Rome and returned, was asked what manner of place Rome was, he replied that he had indeed beheld a nation of kings, for there practically all held the same

⁸ Aulus Gellius iii, 8.

position which Pirrus alone held in Epirus and the rest of Greece. Then, hearing of the steadfastness of Fabricius, the king said, "This is assuredly the Fabricius whom it would be more difficult to turn from the path of virtue than the sun from his course."

The Emperor Cæsar Augustus Germanicus, in the course of the war which won for him the surname of Germanicus because of his victory over the enemy, having built a fort for his troops on the boundary, gave orders that payment should be made for the produce of the localities, which he enclosed with a wall. The reputation for justice which he thus acquired attached to him the loyalty of all.

What shall I say concerning self-restraint and contempt of possessions, since I have also promised some of the stratagems of Plutarch? There is a tradition that Marcus Cato was content with the same wine as boatmen. Attilius Regulus, after he had held the most important commands, was still so poor that he supported himself and his wife and children from a small farm which was tilled by a single laborer, and when he heard of the death of the latter, he wrote to the Senate about appointing a successor for himself, saying that his private affairs had been so reduced by the death of his slave that his presence was necessary at home. Gneius Scipio, after his successes in Spain, died in the greatest poverty, not even leaving sufficient money to provide a dowry for his daughters; so that because of their indigence the Senate granted them dowries at the public expense. The Athenians did the same for the daughters of Aristides, who died in utter poverty after administering the most important affairs. Hannibal, who was accustomed to rise while it was yet dark, never retired to rest before nightfall, but at dusk invited his companions to dinner and never were more than two couches needed for his guests. When he was serving under Hasdrubal's command, he generally slept on the bare ground, covered only with a military cloak. It is told of Emilius Scipio that he was

accustomed to eat on the march as he walked with his friends, taking bread with him. The same story is told of Alexander of Macedon. Augustus Cæsar was most sparing in his diet, and ate the plainest food. He was especially fond of bread of the second quality and of small fishes, of porous cheese pressed by hand, and of green figs of the kind that bear twice a year. He ate before dinner at whatever time and place his stomach desired food. Hence he says in one of his letters: "No Jew, my Tiberius, keeps his sabbath so diligently as I have kept today, for I only chewed two mouthfuls in the bath after the first hour of night and just before I began to be anointed."⁹ Also his anger cooled very quickly, for he perceived that an angry man cannot change his mind, and, therefore, as he used to say, they are cooked up more quickly than asparagus; which was his favorite expression for too precipitate action. In his talk he used this and other quaint turns of speech, as is shown in his autograph letters, wherein, for example, when he wished to say that a thing would never happen, he would say that it would happen at the Greek Kalends. We read that Massinissa, when in the ninetieth year of his age, was accustomed to take his food at midday, while standing or walking before his tent. Gaius Curius, when after his victory over the Sabines he was voted by decree of the Senate the quantity of land which eminent soldiers were in the habit of receiving, contented himself with the portion of a common soldier, saying that a man was a bad citizen who was not satisfied with the same share as others.

Whole armies have been notable for abstinence, as for example that which won fame and glory under Marcus Scaurus. For Scaurus has perpetuated the memory of his soldiers' abstinence: "There was an apple tree," he says, "at the foot of the camp, and included within its limits; and on the last day, when the trumpeters were sounding the march and we were de-

⁹ Suetonius, Augustus, 76.

parting, the army left with the fruit untouched and the tree unharmed." In the reign of Cæsar Augustus Domitian, during the war which was begun by Julius Civilis in Gaul, the wealthy city of the Lingones, which had revolted to Civilis, feared that it would be sacked by the approaching army of Cæsar, and when, contrary to expectation, it was left unharmed and lost none of its possessions, it returned to its obedience, and surrendered seventy thousand armed men. Lucilius Mommius, who after the capture of Corinth adorned not only Italian soil but also the province with its pictures and statues, kept nothing from the enormous booty for his own use, so that the Senate even gave a dowry to his daughter from the public funds because of her poverty.

Steadfastness was another virtue for which the Romans were very famous, as appears from several stratagems. Indeed, the splendor and virtue of that people is not surpassed if you search through the histories of all the nations. This is shown by the grandeur of their vast empire, than which the memory of man records none that was smaller at the beginning or grew to greater size through the continual addition of successive increments. For by the cultivation of peaceful liberty and justice, by reverence for the laws, and by friendly alliances with neighboring peoples, by ripeness of counsels and by the sageness of their words and deeds they brought it to pass that they subjected the entire world to their sway. But, since I commenced to speak of their steadfastness, let one example from the stratagems of Julius Frontenius be set down as representative of many. When Hannibal was camped before the walls of the city, they sent out by a different gate reinforcements to the armies which they had in Spain that they might in this way show their confidence and assurance. Likewise the very field in which Hannibal had his camp, the owner thereof having died, was put up for sale and sold at the same price which it had brought before the war.

Furthermore, at the same time when they were beseiged by Hannibal, they themselves were beseiging Capua, and they passed a decree that the army should not be recalled thence until after the city had been taken.

CHAPTER VIII

WHY TRAJAN SEEMS WORTHY OF PREFERENCE BEFORE ALL. PRINCES.

To conclude these borrowings from Plutarch's "Stratagems" with the case of Trajan, so great was the courage of this emperor and his skill in government, that he extended far and wide the boundaries of the Roman empire, which since the time of Augustus had been rather defended as they were than nobly advanced and augmented. Yet he kept military glory at all times within the bounds of moderation, showing himself just to all men both at Rome and throughout the provinces, visiting his friends to pay his respects to them, or when they were sick, or on holidays, exchanging informal meals with them, making use of their carriages and garments quite as if there were no distinction of rank between himself and them, enriching all men publicly and privately, bestowing immunities generously upon cities, decreasing the tribute of the provinces, oppressing none, beloved by all, so that down to our own day princes are wont to be acclaimed in their councils with the words, "May you be more fortunate than Augustus, and better than Trajan!" For in such terms has his memory been handed down, and so mightily has the reputation of his goodness prevailed, that he occurs at once to admiring friends or flatterers as the most superb example and comparison. Julius is justly praised for the greatness of his unconquered spirit, and for the power of accomplishment of a man whose mind and hand were equal to almost impossible performances. His greatness in arms is evidenced not merely by his conquest of the Gauls and Britons,

whom he was the first to subdue, but by the whole successful history of the civil war as well, and by the line of emperors of the house of Cæsar. So great was his literary skill that he could dictate four letters simultaneously. His learning in the civil law is shown by the old Roman statutes. How ceaselessly he applied the strength of his mighty intellect to philosophy would be proved, if by nothing else, by his invention of the intercalary day. But, most marvellous of all, he gave his attention at the same time to love and to business, and in each thing that he undertook, was so great that he seemed devoted to that alone; so that he was at one and the same time the whole of each and all things.

The praise of Augustus is celebrated by all the world, and memory takes pleasure in revering Titus as the darling and favorite of the human race. But I do not hesitate to prefer Trajan before all of these because he founded the greatness of his reign solely on the practice of virtue. According to the ethical poet,¹ "He who has done rightly is to be regarded as a king." To the same effect is the advice which Claudian puts into the mouth of Theodosius:

"Though thy rule extends far over the utmost Indies, Though the Mede, the soft Arabian, and the Chinese adore thee, Still if thou art a prey to fear, desirest wrong and art swayed by

wrath,

Thou wilt bear the yoke of slavery and be subject within thyself To unjust laws; then only wilt thou have a just title to rule over

all things

When thou canst be king of thyself; habit slips easily downhill From bad to worse; privilege lures on to luxury, And, if given, free reign, succumbs to wanton charms; 'Tis the harder to live chastely when love is so easy; 'tis the harder

to govern wrath When the instrument of punishment is in our hands:

¹ Hor., Ep., i, 1, 50-60.

Wherefore, suppress thy emotions;

And think not of what thou hast power to do, but of what it will

become thee to have done, And let regard for the right ever rule thy mind."²

Even those who think that others are to be preferred before Trajan may be the more readily brought to join in his praise when they read that his virtues were commended by the most holy Pope Gregory who, by his tears shed for that emperor, delivered him from the fires of the underworld, God in the richness of His mercy rewarding the justice which Trajan had shown to the weeping widow. For once when the famous emperor had mounted his horse to set forth to war, this widow, seizing his foot, and miserably lamenting, besought him that justice might be done her against those who had foully slain her son, a fine blameless youth. "Thou art emperor, O Augustus," said she, "and must I bear so cruel a wrong?" "I will see that thou have satisfaction," replied the emperor, "when I return." "And what if thou dost never return?" she asked. "Then my successor," answered Trajan, "will give thee satisfaction." "But how," she asked, "wilt thou then profit by the good deed which another does? It is thou who owest this thing, and thou shalt be rewarded according to thine own works; it is fraud for one not to render that which he owes. Thy successor will be bound on his own account to those who suffer wrong; thy debt will not be discharged by the justice which another does; well for thy successor if he discharge his own debts!" The emperor, moved by these words, dismounted from his horse, and immediately examined the case, and brought consolation to the poor widow by giving her the satisfaction which was due to her. Therefore it is said that the blessed Pope so long shed tears for him until it was notified to him in a revelation that Trajan had been set free from the pains of Hell, on

2 Claudian, IV Cons. Hon., ll. 257-268.

this condition, however, that Gregory should not again presume to solicit God on behalf of any other infidel. Therefore does he rightly deserve to be preferred before others whose virtue was so pleasing to the saints that for their merits he, and he alone, was set free. So much concerning the head of the commonwealth.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING THOSE WHO FILL THE PLACE OF THE HEART IN THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THAT UNJUST MEN ARE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COUNSELS OF RULERS: AND OF THE FEAR OF GOD, AND OF WISDOM AND PHILOSOPHY.

The place of the heart, on the authority of Plutarch, is filled by the senate. Now "senate," according to the opinion of the ancients, is the name of an office, and its distinguishing mark is old age; the word senate is itself derived from "senectus," which means old age. The Athenians called it Areopagus, as if for the reason that in its members was gathered the strength of the whole people; and although that nation made many notable inventions, they established nothing more wholesome nor more famous than their senate. For what is more noble than an assembly of elders, who having faithfully completed their terms in the ordinary offices, then pass on to the duty of giving counsel and exercising rulership, and in feeble bodies thus put forth the strength of the mind? They are the better fitted to the business of wisdom in proportion as they are the less able to perform feats of the body. Truly they came into such honor among the Greeks that the leaders of the commonwealth nowhere took any step, and nothing considerable was done, which the appointed elders did not initiate or approve; and what is more, from the foundation of the City [of Rome] their names were inscribed in letters of gold, and they were therefore called by all "conscript" fathers, as excelling all others in wisdom, age, and fatherly affection. In their hands was the authority of counsel

and of carrying out all public undertakings. Moreover, though we have seen that their name was derived from their age, I think that what was meant was not merely age of body but of mind.

For age of mind is the wisdom which consists in properly apportioning all duties and in practising the whole art of life. For the art of right living, as the Stoics thought, is the art of arts. To say that there is no art of the greatest of all things, although everyone admits that the minor things have each their respective art, is an opinion of those who speak with too little reflection, and who in respect to the largest things fall into the error of thinking that everything is a matter of the arbitrary will and discretion of those who make decisions, instead of being rather a matter of truth and science.¹ But there is, as the ancient philosophers knew, a supreme guiding principle of things divine and human, namely wisdom, and a science of things to be done and to be left undone. To apply one's self to this is to philosophize, for philosophy is the study of wisdom. Therefore, as the ancients thought, philosophy knocks at the gate of wisdom, and when it is opened to her and the soul is sweetly illuminated with the light of things, the name of philosophy then vanishes; or, as has seemed to the clearer-sighted, the desire of the will is then fulfilled with satisfaction, and the flower of study turns into the fruit; for philosophy finds its completion and end in wisdom. But I know not by what means we can become conversant with the end before we know the beginning, which in all things is regarded as the most effective part. Truly, he who knows the end cannot be ignorant of the beginning, since the beginning is the root which through the manifold paths of virtue pushes its way upward, and penetrates by its firmness and lively energy to the crown of the end and the sweetness of the fruit.

"Behold," says blessed Job, "the fear of the Lord is wisdom,

¹ Quoted from Cicero, de Off., II, ii, 6. John adds the last clause.

and to depart from evil is understanding."² I find nowhere any other root of wisdom, since all agree in this, that the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God. Fear, then, is the beginning, and in fear is the increase; and the apex of all the virtues, whether you call it charity or wisdom, is not far removed from fear. Distinguish, however, servile from filial fear; the former is the beginning, the latter the achievement and perfection, of wisdom. In whatever manner the pomp of words clothes its vanity, the truth is that wisdom begins in fear, and that the holy fear of the Lord endureth forever. And so the root remains, and, drawing strength from increments of grace, puts forth into the branches of the virtues, until its vital force issues finally in the fruit of perfected charity, which no longer acts under the stimulus of penalties; for in charity there is no terror or servile fear, which acts by penalties, but rather it is the mark of this holy fear that it continually performs good works, and, clinging to justice, holds it fast. Terror then is seen to pass away, while grace grows into virtue; because now there is no servile fear, but instead filial affection, which instigates to reverence and good works. "Always have I feared God," says blessed Job, "as waves swelling over me, and I could not endure the weight thereof."³ Note that he does not say that he feared Him sometimes, but always, and there is no doubt

² Job. xxviii, 28. Cf. with this passage Fortescue, "De Laudibus Legum Angliae," c. i.: "Of what nature is the fear which the laws propose to the keepers thereof? Verily it is not that fear whereof it is written that 'perfect charity casteth out fear'; and yet even the latter sort of fear, though servile, often stirs up kings to read the laws, though it is not itself the child of the law. But the fear whereof Moses here speaks, and which is the child of the law, is that whereof the prophet says, 'The holy fear of the Lord endureth forever.' This fear is filial, and knows no dread of penalties, as does the fear which charity casteth out; for this fear proceeds from the laws, which teach to do the will of God, whereby it escapes deserving punishment. This fear is the same which Job speaks of: 'Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding.'"

³ Job xxxi, 23.

that he who said this was a perfect man, and one who, according to the testimony of God himself, had not his like upon earth. It is not credible that he refrained from evil solely through terror of punishment and without the active impulse of charity, being a man who beyond doubt was consummate and perfected in justice.

So far my argument has advanced in praise of fear, but what fear is we have left as yet unconsidered. And would that it might be fixed in the heart instead of the word being continually rolled over and over in the mouth! For if it has once touched the mind, the tongue will discourse more effectively and with greater profit to itself. For it is vain to turn over words in the mouth if the works of virtue are wanting. The fear of God, then, as the blessed Pope Gregory asserts, is nothing else than not to omit to do any of the things which it is our duty to do. To omit to do a thing means not to perform it either in fact or in will. For what you will to do, but have not the power to accomplish in fact, God will none the less regard and impute to you as done, for a fully completed act of will receives the reward of the intended act as though the latter were in truth accomplished.

It is certain that he who fears God, omits nothing and does good works. A man who searches diligently into all things, and knows the things which ought to be done, and does them, is verily a wise man and such as is most fit to be a counsellor of princes. Where such gravity of character is observed to exist, the question of bodily or physical age is not material. For he is truly an elder whose wise advice shows him fit to be chosen to give counsel. For it is written, "Old age is worshipful not in days, nor reckoned by the number of years." ⁴ "The glory of old men is their white hair."⁵ "White hairs are a man's understanding and old age is a spotless life."⁶ Happy

⁴ Wisdom iv, 8. ⁵ Prov. xx, 29. ⁶ Wisdom iv, 8, 9.

indeed is the man who attains to this kind of old age, so that by the testimony of his own conscience he may take pleasure in the innocence of his life!

But perhaps you will say: "Who is this man? Show him to us and we will praise him." ⁷ Truly I do not think that we can wait to find a man for counsellor who has never once sinned, but only one who takes no delight in sinning, who hates sin, and rejoices in virtue, and desires it with a great desire, or in other words, a man of good-will. But even this is not to be pushed to extremes; rather, as the common saying is, "with due allowance for the limitations of human nature," a man who appears blameless when judged not by an absolute standard, but in comparison with others. For who will boast that he has always kept his heart clean, since not even the stars are clean in the sight of Him who has found wickedness even in His angels?

Unjust men are therefore to be excluded, and men who are overbearing and avaricious, and all such manner of human plagues. Nought, indeed, is more deadly than the unrighteous counsellor of a rich man. "With all watchfulness," it is written, "guard thy heart, for it is the source of life."⁸ Therefore the ruler should provide that his counsellors be not needy, lest they covet immoderately the things of others. The same principle extends to all whose duties touch the inner parts of the body of the commonwealth, and whom we called above financial officials and bailiffs and overseers of private property. For all these must have subsistence in sufficient quantity, and this should be interpreted on the basis of necessity and usage, having due regard to distinction between persons. For if it is absorbed too greedily and not sufficiently distributed, distempers will be produced which are incurable, or difficult to cure. Certainly it is impossible to seek justice and money at one and the same time; either a man will cleave to the one and despise the other,

⁷ Eccli. xxxi, 9. ⁸ Prov. iv, 23.

or else he will be perverted by the worse and lose the better. For according to the testimony of Wisdom, "there is nought more wicked than a covetous man, and nought more unjust than love of money; for such a one setteth even his soul to sale and while he liveth, he hath cast away his bowels."⁹ And perchance it is for this reason that mother nature, the most loving of parents, has prudently protected the inner parts of the body with the crating of the chest and the solid structure of the ribs and the barrier of the outer flesh, to the end that they may be the more safe against all violence from without; and then proceeds to supply them with their several necessities; nor are they ever exposed to external contacts without injury to their health. So in the commonwealth it behooves us to follow this pattern of nature's craftsmanship and from the public store supply these officials with a sufficiency for their needs.

⁹ Eccli. x, 9, 10.

CHAPTER X

OF THE SIDES OF RULERS, WHOSE NECESSITIES MUST BE SATISFIED AND THEIR MALICE CURBED.

The same rule of nature is also to be followed in the case of the "sides," namely those whose duty it is to attend upon the prince. For it is clear that character is formed from association. "He that toucheth pitch is defiled thereby,"¹ and

"One bunch of grapes is spoiled by contact with another."²

You cannot suppose that justice or truth or godliness are at home with men whom you see putting all things up for sale. They bar out Christ Himself, and, though He knocks at the gate, it is not opened to Him; they fly from God's grace, and put God's grace to flight, who do all things for a price and nothing gratis. If petitions are to be furthered, if a case is to be examined, if execution is to be issued on a judgment, if a bond is to be furnished, money is the sole driving-force, truth is blind, piety limps, while

"The money which a man keeps in his strong-box Is the measure of the credit given to his oath."³ "The poor man

is thought

To defy the lightnings of the gods and even the gods themselves pardon him therefor."⁴

The more corrupt a man is in character and the more given to corrupting others by bribes, the more favor he enjoys in the

¹ Eccli. xiii, I. ² Juv., Sat. ii, 81.

³ Juv., Sat. iii, 143, 4. ⁴ Juv., Sat. iii, 145, 6.

eyes of this kind of people. If you will escape from the hand of princes, a long road stretches before you, and a narrow and a steep one; before you get clear of the last torturers you will sweat much. Cossus prepares your papers; if you are permitted to pay your respects to him, count it as a great thing. If you do not bring the proper passport with you, you approach him in vain. But if you have brought it, then it is of no use, and he will not consent to soil his noble hands with the taint of parchment. What more should I say? You must buy some of his, since neither attention nor pen nor the juice of sepia or the black cuttlefish will be supplied you unless you buy and pay for them. If you do not make him favorable to you, he will so twist the very syllables and strokes of the letters, he will lay so many verbal snares for you in a seemingly friendly instrument, as to write you into war rather than peace, into litigation rather than security. If you chance to have a handsome belt, a good trencher, or anything else especially attractive in the way of small fittings, add it to his possessions, if you do not wish to lose all your trouble and expense. For it will be wrung from you by direct requests if you do not forestall these by your own generosity. In the end your friend will even carry away your hat, no matter how mean it is, to remember you by. Now you are clear of Cossus, but the fire of purgatory threatens you, Vegento is still left, whom you will have to solicit insistently and with a whole skilful battery of gestures, prayers, and gifts to move him even to look at you without opening his lips. Then follow consultations about each word, he fixes a time for deliberation, and even the t-strokes are weighed in the balance. Unless you soften him in advance you will be met with the objection that your order of statement is wrongly conceived, or that the style is inartificial, or that the partiality of the notary or scribe, or his ignorance of law, has departed from the prescribed form; and there is always some knot which requires money to untie. The least of your troubles is that you will be racked by long de-

lays, while that is postponed which cannot be denied to you. Believe a man who speaks from experience, I have fallen into their hands a thousand times, and, to borrow somewhat from ancient fable, the harsh porter Charon, who never spares anyone, is far more merciful than they; for it is said that he is usually content with a triens, or other small coin; while these people demand whole pounds, multiplied many times over, for their hire.

But why should I complain that among the court officials all things are for sale when even things which are not, namely omissions and inaction, are also matter of venality? Not merely is there no act, no word, to be had without payment, but they will not even keep silent unless paid a price; silence itself is a thing for sale. This perhaps they have learned from Demostenes, who once asked the player Aristodimus how much he had been paid for acting. He replied, "a talent." "I have been paid more than that," said Demostenes, "for keeping silent." For the tongue of pleaders can be most damaging unless, as the saying is, you tie it up with silver cords.

Nor is it worth while simply to snare one official in your net with gifts unless he happens to be an extremely influential one, because by winning for yourself the favor of one, you excite the envy of all the rest. For they regard themselves as deprived to their own hurt of whatever is bestowed upon others. This attitude runs down from the greatest to the smallest, who, unless they are softened by attentions and refreshed with gifts, imagine that they are being wronged.

"Every great house is full of overbearing slaves,"⁵ and likewise of greedy and grasping ones.

Among all the idle parasites of the court, those are the most harmful who are wont to color their wretched tricks under the pretext of gentlemanly liberality, who go about handsomely at-

⁵ Juv., Sat.. v, 66.

tired, feast splendidly, frequently invite strangers to dine at their table, are kindly at home, benign abroad, affable of speech, liberal in their opinions, munificent in cultivating their neighbors, and famous for their imitation of all the virtues. As the ethical writer⁶ says, "Of all varieties of injustice there is none more capital than that of those who at the very moment when they are most false so act as to seem virtuous. These men employ the appearance of virtue as a cloak for license; and seek to make of acts which should scarcely leave room for hope of pardon, a substantial ground of glory and reputation." The greatest exactions can be extorted with impunity by men who cannot, or rather who disdain to, be content with little. It is a well-known and common proverb that

"He will forever be a slave who does not know how to get along with a little."⁷

That I may not be thought, however, to wage implacable warfare against these people, I am willing to concede that court officials may accept gifts so long as they do not shamelessly extort them. For shame is cast away as soon as they descend to making exactions. It is written⁸ that the words, "I ask," are words which a supplicant should speak modestly and with a low voice; and a man who receives in response to his asking cannot be said to receive gratis. For a man who asks buys at a double price; he sells his modesty at the price of the thing asked for, or for the hope of it. The stigma of shame does not justly attach to gifts which are offered by and accepted from the liberality of the donor, and which are not extorted by the infamy of the suitor. But the gifts of unjust men should not be accepted, since a man will be ungrateful if he does not return kindness for kindness, and the Lord Himself says that it is unjust to give

⁶ Cic., de Off. i, 13, § 41. ⁷ Hor., Ep. I, 10, l. 41.

⁸ Seneca, Benefic. ii, 2, § I.

judgment in favor of a wrong-doer in return for gifts.⁹ In any event, to accept a kindness is to sell one's freedom; and it is shameful for those men to be slaves whose duty it is to rule over others. However, regard should be had for the case and the person; gifts should not be received from an infamous giver nor under infamous circumstances; but the time, the place, and the manner should be thoroughly looked into. Gifts are either honorable or sordid most frequently by reason of the donor or the cause of the gift; occasionally by reason of the time, the place, or the manner. However, the dishonesty of court officials is so well-known that it is vain for a suitor to place his trust in the testimony of his conscience, the integrity of his character, his unblemished reputation, the genuineness of his case, or the eloquence with which it is presented, without the intervention of a bribe:

"Though you should come in person, accompanied by the Muses,

Homer,

If you bring nothing in your hand, Homer, you will be turned out of doors."¹⁰

Orpheus is said not merely to have tamed lions and tigers by the effect of his eloquence, but before Dis himself his voice did not falter but rather grew more sweet; and his appealing case prevailed upon the three-headed dog so that he was permitted, contrary to the custom of the underworld, to carry back Euridice after she had once entered. But though you should be Orpheus, or Arion, or he who according to the tale melted the rocks with only the music of a shell, you will accomplish nought among the court officials unless you soften their leaden hearts with a hammer of gold or silver on the anvil of vanity or greed. All men abhor the pitilessness of Cerberus; I am certain that I have seen

⁹ Isa. v, 23. ¹⁰ Ovid, Ars. Amat, ii, 279-280.

ushers who in comparison with Cerberus were still more pitiless. Besides, in the underworld there is only one Cerberus; at the court there is a Cerberus in each of the cubbyholes set apart for an official to lurk in. You will have these bureaucratic Cerberuses upon you with their whole brood forever biting or barking. I suppose they have all heard the physicians saying in unison, "When you have a pain, take something"; so that they are always ready, if they think it to their advantage, to create a pain in a healthy organ. There is one point, however, wherein you will marvel to see how dutiful they are, and that is the joy with which they listen to quarrels, foment the cases of the humble and extend their protection to the afflicted whenever they can thereby drain the strong-boxes of the rich. For however the case goes, it always turns out that their coffers are well filled in spite of the fact that their avarice is insatiable. If the man who falls into their hands repents, I think that the torments which he suffers from them will be sufficient penance to absolve him. There is no sin so grave that it cannot thus be expiated. For what greater misery is there than to wait upon the thresholds of the proud, to endure the arrogance of passers-by, to be trodden under the contempt of the contemptible, to bear annoyance from outcasts, and to suffer every sort of indignity from the unworthy? Socrates was once asked by Alcibiades why he did not drive out of his house Xantippe, who was an extremely ill-tempered and quarrelsome wife, and night and day kept up a continual stream of shrewishness. He replied that by enduring such a woman at home he practised and accustomed himself to bear more patiently the ill-humor and abuse of others out of doors.

There is a well-known old proverb that the petition of an empty hand is a rash one; and he is indeed an unpractised suitor who thinks that things will be given in exchange for words. For everywhere among courtiers and physicians the rule applies:

"In exchange for words we prescribe mountain herbs; For things of price we give drugs and spices."¹¹

Of course there are always a few among the rest who are more kindly disposed, but these can do but little, as almost all are inclined toward harm, which is a far easier thing than to be helpful. So let them ply their traffic, draining the coffers of others, stuffing their own, possessing as much as Pacuvius, piling up gold as high as mountains, loving no one and loved of none, the admiration of all who do not know them, but scorned or hated by their familiars. You will find this situation noted in the writings of the old Romans. When Publius Cineas Grecinus (or any other name will do as well) was blamed by his friends because he divorced his wife, who was beautiful, chaste, and of noble birth, he replied, "Yes, and this shoe which you see is new, fashionable and attractive to all who see it, but no one besides myself knows exactly where it pinches."

We read in the book of Numbers that Israel by fornicating with the Madianitish women provoked the anger of the Lord, until with a drawn sword Finees pierced Zambri the son of Salu with his Madianitish paramour, and in the destruction of the evil-doers the wrath of God was appeased. The Lord then spoke unto Moyses, saying: "Take all the chief men of the people and hang them up on gibbets against the sun."¹² It was the people who had sinned, and the fornication of the chief men is not expressly mentioned, but none the less the command was that the chief men should be taken first and brought to the gallows to the end that through their punishment peace might be restored to the offending people; for the negligence of rulers is most often the source of the wickedness of the subjects.

Therefore, it is important to the prince to curb the malice of his officials and provide for them out of the public funds to the

¹¹ Regimen Sanitatis, seu Scholae Saliternae; see Webb, vol. i, p. 327.

¹² Numbers xxv, 4.

end that all occasion for extortion may be removed. As was anciently provided in the Roman law, so generally it seems fair and just to regard a man as the author of a misdeed which he might have corrected had he not scorned to do his duty. The more famous and powerful is a court, the more thickly and harmfully it is generally infested with these scourges of mankind, these torturers of the innocent. For it commonly happens that a court receives vicious men, or else soon makes them vicious, and their boldness in wrong-doing increases because, through the friendship of those in high place, their vices are treated with indulgence. It is vain to rely upon the strength of good qualities formed earlier in life, since it is almost impossible for a man to retain his innocence among courtiers. Who is there whose virtue would not be destroyed by the follies of the courtiers?¹³ Who is so strong, so firm, that he cannot be corrupted? The best man is he who resists longest and most effectively, and is corrupted least. For, if virtue is to be preserved intact, the only way is to flee from the life of the court. The author of the following lines expressed the nature of a court with prophetic insight:

"Let him depart from court Who desires to be righteous."¹⁴

Whence it has been aptly compared to the fountain of Salmacis,¹⁵ ill-famed for its enervating effects. Its waters, according to

¹³ The "follies of courtiers" is the subtitle of the Policraticus ("Policraticus, sive De Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum"), and is the central theme about which the book was built. It was a title and theme which immediately found imitators. In the next generation Walter Map entitled his important work "De Nugis Curialium," borrowing the title, his recent translators suggest, from John of Salisbury (Walter Map, "De Nugis Curialium," Englished by Tupper and Ogle, introduction, p. xx.). Giraldus Cambrensis wrote of the "follies of courtiers" in the introduction to his "De Principis Instruction" (Opera, Rolls Series, vol. VIII., p. lvii).

¹⁴ Lucan, Phars., viii, 493. ¹⁵ Ovid, Metam., iv., 285 ff.

the tale, were fair to the sight, sweet to the taste, pleasant to the touch and most agreeable to every sense, but so enervated all men who entered therein that they made them effeminate and deprived them of their nobler sex; and no man came forth therefrom without perceiving to his amazement and sorrow that he had been changed into a woman. For either his sex was totally destroyed and converted into the weaker counterpart, or else some trace of its old dignity remaining, he became a hermaphrodite, who by a sport of erring nature wears the likeness of both sexes without retaining the true substance of either. This poetic fiction represents the nature of the life at court, which enfeebles men by the loss of their manhood or perverts them while they yet retain its semblance. For he who has plunged into the follies of that life and still wears the outward semblance of philosophy and goodness, is like a hermaphrodite who deforms womanly beauty with a harsh and bristly countenance, while he pollutes and defiles manhood with womanish weakness. Such a monstrous thing is a courtier-philosopher, who, while he affects to be both, is neither, because the court casts out philosophy utterly, and the true philosopher will in no wise participate in the follies of a court. The simile, however, does not hold good for every court, but only for one which is made sick by the rule of an unwise prince. For a wise man drives away all nonsense, sets his house in order, and composes all things under him to reason. As the book of Wisdom says: "What fellowship hath a holy man with a dog, or light with darkness?"¹⁶ "Every living thing delighteth in its like, and every man in his like. All flesh consorteth with its like and every man will associate with his like. If ever the wolf holds fellowship with the lamb, such is that between the sinner and the righteous man."¹⁷

¹⁶ Eccl:, xiii, 22; 2 Cor. vi, 14. ¹⁷ Eccli. xiii, 19-21.

CHAPTER XI

OF THE EYES, EARS, AND TONGUE OF RULERS; AND OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR; AND THAT A JUDGE SHOULD HAVE

KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW AND OF EQUITY, A WILL DISPOSED TOWARD GOOD, AND ADEQUATE POWER OF ENFORCEMENT, AND THAT HE SHOULD BE BOUND BY AN OATH TO KEEP THE LAWS AND SHOULD BE FREE FROM THE TAINT OF RECEIVING GIFTS.

Next in order comes the simile of eyes, ears, and tongue, which, as above-mentioned, is applied to provincial governors. A governor is one who presides over the administration of justice among the people of a province. He therefore should have knowledge of the just and the unjust, and should have the means and the will" to enforce justice. For although the common lot of death ought not to be imputed to the physician, yet if tragic consequences are the result of his ignorance or lack of skill, they are deservedly charged to him. Furthermore if he knows the proper remedy and refuses to apply it, he is condemned not for ignorance but for wilful wrong. Condemnation results in either situation; though the punishment of ignorance is the milder of the two, except in cases where the ignorance has been brought about by negligence. For if ignorance is invincible, it does not lead to the death penalty but is excused by innate incapacity. So if a governor knows and wishes to do equity, but has not adequate power, the fault is not so much his own as it is the fault of the prince. It is, however, most certain that the duty of a judge and his religion should include the following things: he ought to have a knowl-

edge of law, a will disposed toward good, and adequate power to enforce his decisions, and he should be bound by an oath to keep the laws so that he may know that it is not permissible for him to depart in any particular from the purity thereof. The book of Wisdom instructs us with regard to the wisdom of a judge: "A wise judge judges the people, and the rule of a prudent man shall stand firm. As is the judge of a people, so also are his ministers; and what manner of man is the ruler of a city, such likewise are they that dwell therein."¹ But it is also pointed out that power is necessary: "Seek not to be made a judge unless thou have power and strength to break down iniquities, lest perchance thou quail before the face of the powerful and in thy obsequiousness lay a stone of stumbling for thyself. Sin not against the populace of a city, nor thrust thyself in among them, nor make thyself guilty of two sins, for not even in one shalt thou escape untouched. Be not cowardly in thine own spirit; despise not to pray and to give alms. Say not 'God will look with favor on the multitude of my gifts, and when I offer them to God the Most High, He will accept my offerings.' Laugh at no man in the bitterness of his soul; for it is all-seeing God alone who exalteth and bringeth low."² From these words the attentive reader will observe that a will disposed toward good is not less necessary to a judge than are knowledge and power; since he is held responsible not only for his own offences but for those of others, and, laboring under the double burden of both, he will not be accounted faithful before God merely because of the multitude of his gifts without cleanness of will also. Wherefore Plato says³ well and pointedly (if men would but heed his words) that those who contend with one another for the prize of bearing public office act as if sailors in the face of a tempest were to fight over which of them should be helmsman of the

¹ Eccli. x, 1-2. ² Eccli. vii., 6-12.

³ Cic. De Off., i., 25, § 87, quoting Plato, Rep., vi., 488B.

ship. At such a turn of fortune the man does not exist, or only rarely, and he is a rash man indeed, who makes good his title to the magistracy without skill and strength. And in my own time, I have seen nought more lamentable than judges ignorant of the science of law and devoid of good-will, as is proved by their love of gifts and rewards, exercising the power which they have in the service of avarice or ostentation or advancing the fortunes of their own flesh and blood, and exempted from the necessity of swearing obedience to the laws. From this it is plain that the princes who have conferred regular jurisdiction on such judges are themselves either ignorant of law or else hold it in contempt. But, whatever we may say regarding legal learning or the power of enforcement, at least a judge ought to be an eminently religious man, and one who hates all injustice worse than death itself.

Since provincial governors have as part of their office a regular jurisdiction to administer justice, the same considerations apply to them as to other judges; and therefore what is said of them can be extended in its consequences to the others. The first thing which is marked out for both by the necessity of their office is that they should in all things obey justice, and that none of the things which it is their duty to do should be done for price. For if a thing is unjust, it is unlawful to the degree that it must not even be done as the price of this temporal life itself. On the other hand, what is just does not need the addition of a price, since its performance is owed as an obligation, and it is unjust to charge a price for performing an existing obligation. To sell justice is therefore iniquity; to sell injustice is not only iniquity but insanity. For injustice is universally disapproved and there is general agreement that it ought nowhere to exist; justice on the other hand is everywhere an obligation or indebtedness in such a sense that no price may be charged for it without committing a crime. The fault of Balaam was not that he had injured the cause of the people

of God or spoken other words than those which the Lord inspired, but rather that, blinded by avarice, and acting under the sway of malice, he contrived, for the aid of the infidels, how Israel might by sin provoke against themselves the wrath of God. Therefore he sought how he might justly justify the cause of impiety, and as it were cozen God to withdraw His favor from His elect. And if he could not justify the cause of their adversaries, he at least accomplished this, that God withdrew His favor from their cause; and in a contest in which both the contenders are unjust it is said that victory usually goes to the side which is superior in strength. You will see among judges many followers of Balaam, who although they will not pass an unjust sentence, yet under the corrupt influence of gifts struggle by every act to transfer the justice which belongs to one party to the other party.

I cannot easily say which is worse, the seller or the buyer of justice, although the seller colors his wickedness with a more deceitful dye. Still it is possible to regard his as the deeper crime, since he exposes for sale the mistress and queen of his office, to whom he owes fealty and obedience, like merchandise in the market-place, and like an unfaithful slave sells his master into slavery. For every magistrate is but the slave of justice. Moreover it is obvious that while equity is alienated by the seller, it does not pass to the buyer; and purchased iniquity passes to the buyer on such terms that it does not depart from the seller. And, unlike what is found in other contracts, only a man can sell justice who does not have it. Before the transaction it slips away from the sordid seller. For is he not sordid who for a bribe in hand, or for one that is offered, defiles his conscience, and offers for sale not so much justice as his own soul? The teacher of the gentiles despised riches and honors and the many-colored trappings of the whole world as but dung, to the end that he might gain Christ alone, deem-

ing that all things which bring loss of salvation are to be counted as uncleanness. And rightly and truly so, because nothing that is clean, nothing that is honorable, nothing that is fair, stands as an obstacle to salvation, but only base actions which, as they bring disgrace, are therefore unclean and certainly of no profit, nay rather are so hurtful that they cannot be compensated by any earthly gain. For what profits a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? ⁴ And note that he did not say that the world is unprofitable merely in the case where it leads to loss of salvation, but also whenever glory is diminished. Let gems sparkle however brightly, gold glisten and the gay world smile with all its allurements, — still whatsoever robs a man of his cleanness is sordid; whatsoever extinguishes the beauty of his soul is infamous; whatsoever destroys his honor is shameful. Wherefore even the ancients,⁵ although they know not the Truth which brings Salvation, counted it as a sordid thing to sell for a price that which ought to be done gratuitously as part of the duty of office. And they so extended the interpretation of the word "price" as to include not merely money or any physical object, but also obeisance and every kind of service which is not owed for some other reason. For a thing which proceeds from filth, how can it be otherwise than filthy? An ill tree cannot bring forth good fruits, for the power of nature follows the principle that like produces like. Further, since we have premised that the case of governors and of other judges is the same, they are alike ministers of equity and the public peace, who ought to be the more circumspect and cautious, and take the greater care, since they must expect to be weighed in the balance of Him whose foresight cannot be circumvented nor His justice corrupted; so that according to His declaration, by what judgment they

⁴ Luke, ix., 25. ⁵ Cic, De Off., ii., 6, §§ 21-22.

have judged, they shall themselves be judged, and from the Judge who is just they shall receive back their own good measure, pressed down and shaken together and running over, into their own bosoms.

CHAPTER X II

OF THE OATH OF JUDGES, WITH A COMPARISON OF PITAGORAS AND ALEXANDER, AND IN WHAT MATTERS A JUDGE MAY SHOW FAVOR TO THE PARTIES BEFORE HIM; AND CONCERNING SOPHISTICAL QUESTIONS.

Judges should be bound to the laws by an oath,¹ since they are always to dispense judgment in accordance with truth and in obedience to the laws. It is provided by the law itself that the awful books of the Holy Evangelists shall be placed before the judgment seat, and shall there remain from the beginning of a suit to the end thereof, and shall not be removed until the decision is handed down, to the end that the breadth of the whole judgment-hall may be filled with the presence of God Himself, inspiring all with the fear of the sacred scriptures, and with reverence; and to the further end that the investigation of the truth may be shielded from all iniquity. Also the duty and religion of a judge should scrupulously banish all affections of flesh and blood, and eliminate anger and hatred, fear and friendship; for as Julius Cæsar says, it is not easy for the mind to perceive the truth when these feelings prevail. Hence that proverb of Cicero's which was so well-known among the ancients: "He puts off the character of a judge who puts on that of a friend." ² For equity, to which the judge owes obedience, does not know the left hand of hatred nor the right hand of love; because in judgments it is not permissible to deviate from the right line of the truth. To make the greatest pos-

¹ Justin., Cod., iii, I. 14. ² Cic., De Off., iii, 10, § 43.

sible concession to friendship, the favor of postponement may sometimes be granted to a friend. But even this is rare, and only upon the showing of good cause. Furthermore when the case is a doubtful one, there is always a postponement, if not of the trial, at least of the decision. For hasty judgments bring forth fruit of repentence. Wherefore the Greeks, when urged to render a decision before the case was clear, answered that their ancestors did not see the sun at the antipodes, but always waited for it to rise to the level of their own eyes. A traveller is called overhasty who before the morning star rises sets out upon his day's journey in thick darkness and without light.

A judge should not be intimidated by the influence or personal importance of the litigants.³ Thus an action brought by Pitagoras was postponed permanently, and Alexander of Macedon once lost a suit in a military court; which the latter took in the utmost good part, thanking the judges whose good faith he saw demonstrated by the fact that they preferred justice before the power of any ruler, however great. In my own esteem I have found nought more creditable than this in any story told of Alexander, whom public opinion⁴ asserts to be a great man. For myself (though I speak with no desire to enter into controversy with those who prefer recklessness to virtue), I shall always regard Pitagoras, the poor man, as greater than Alexander, in spite of the vast riches of the latter. To convert you to my way of thinking on this point, I suggest that you turn over the comparison of Philip and Alexander by Trogus Pompeius, or, if you prefer, by his abbreviator Justin.⁵ He says, "Philip was a king more eager for a campaign than for feasting, whose greatest wealth consisted in munitions of war, and who was more active in the quest than in the keeping

³ I use the conjectural reading "litigatorum."

⁴ "publica opinio" — note the phrase again. See above, Bk. iv, c. 8.

⁵ Justin, ix, 8, §§ 4-21.

of riches. Therefore in the midst of daily plunder, he was always poor. He delighted equally in mercy and in treachery. In his eyes nothing which might lead to victory was infamous. A man alike engaging and crafty of speech, and who always promised more than he performed; a craftsman in the serious and the sportive. He cultivated friendships for profit and not for fidelity. To pretend favor where he hated, to sow hatred among those who were in agreement, to curry favor with both sides, was his established habit. Add to this, a gift of eloquence and a power of speech notable for sharp insight and shrewdness, and wherein facility did not lack for ornament, nor ornament for facility of invention. He was succeeded by his son Alexander, who was a greater man than his father in both his virtues and his vices. And so their methods of victory were correspondingly different. The younger man made war in the open, the older by resort to artifice. The one delighted in deceiving the enemy, the other in routing them in open conflict. The former was more prudent in council, the latter more magnificent in conception. The father could dissimulate his anger, and generally even quell it; when the son's was once kindled, there was no delay nor moderation in his revenge. Neither was addicted excessively to strong drink, but both had many of the sober vices. It was the father's habit to rush from the banquet table against the foe and recklessly expose himself to danger; Alexander vented his rage not against the foe but against his own friends and attendants. Wherefore Philip was often brought back wounded from the battle-field while Alexander frequently rose from a feast where his friends lay slain. The former wished to reign in company with his friends, the latter used his power against them. The father preferred to be loved, the son to be feared. Both alike fostered letters. The father was the more shrewd, the son's good faith was the greater. Philip was the more restrained in words and public speech, his son in action. The

son was the more ready and honorable in sparing the vanquished. The father was the more given to frugality, the son to luxury. By the same arts which the father had used in laying the foundation of world empire, the son completed the glory of the great work. But in one respect he surpassed the vices of his father and of all men of honorable birth, namely that he suffered from the most violent envy, so that even the triumphs of his father wrung tears from his eyes as if his father's merit had torn from him the glory of doing all things himself. He even slew with his own hands, or ordered the immediate death penalty to be inflicted upon, those who proclaimed the praises of his father's valor."

Turning to Pitagoras, he was held as such an authority among philosophers that it sufficed for the decision of any question if Pitagoras was known to have taken one side or the other. So influential was his opinion when known in advance, that the opposition could never regain strength when it was once published that he had taken the contrary side, and from the usage of those who followed his opinion, the mere use of the pronoun "he" signified Pitagoras. For when it was said without more, "He has said this," we learn from Tully that the authority meant to be cited was Pitagoras.⁶ Nevertheless even the weight of this great authority did not influence the decision of his case, but a postponement was granted because of the doubtfulness of the point in controversy, and the sentence remains suspended to this day. The issue was of this nature:

Evallus was a wealthy young man who was desirous of learning eloquence and the pleading of causes. For this purpose he placed himself under the instruction of Pitagoras, promising to pay the sum of money which Pitagoras had asked. Half was paid down before the instruction commenced, the other half was to be paid on the first occasion when he had argued

⁶ Cic., De Natura Deorum, i. 5, § 10.

a case before the judges and been successful. After he had been a pupil and follower of Pitagoras for a long while, and had improved his speaking by study, time passed and yet he still refused to take clients, for the purpose, it was supposed, of evading his obligation to make the second payment to his teacher. Pitagoras therefore, after taking advice, brought suit against him. When they appeared before the judges for the purpose of explaining and proving the case, Pitagoras began as follows: "Oh foolish youth," said he, "learn that whichever way this case is decided, you will have to pay me what I sue for, whether judgment is pronounced in your favor or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be owed me on the judgment, because I shall have prevailed in the suit; but if the judgment is given in your favor, the money will then be owed me on our contract, because you will have won your first case." To which Evallus replied calmly: "I might have chosen to meet your two-pronged sophism by not pleading my case myself, and employing an advocate instead. But there is better sport in a victory on the present terms, won by defeating you not merely on the point of the case but also in the argument. Learn, then, for your part, oh wisest master, that whichever way the case is decided, I shall be equally relieved of having to pay you what you sue for, whether judgment is pronounced against me or in my favor. For if the judges decide in my favor, then by virtue of the judgment I shall owe you nothing because I shall have prevailed in the suit; but if the case is decided in the opposite way, then by virtue of our contract I shall owe you nothing, for I shall not have been successful in my first case." Thus by a youthful pupil was this famous master of eloquence refuted in his plea and checkmated in his shrewd and carefully devised sophism. Then, in the words of the old narrative, the judges, thinking that what was said on both sides raised a grave and inexplicable doubt, and for fear lest their de-

cision in favor of either party might defeat itself, left the case undecided, postponing it permanently.

It does not make much difference for my purpose whether this story is told of Pitagoras or Protagoras, according to Quintilian and Agellius respectively; for there is no significance in the name so long as the point is established that a doubtful matter cannot be brought to final decision without temerity.⁷ For there are many sophistical questions which are more safely and conveniently postponed than hastened to a conclusion, especially in the decision of law-suits. Wherefore among dialecticians this is called "tractus" and the term is applied by the Greeks to situations where whatever you determine to be true will be found to be false.⁸ And even though the result in such cases may generally be righted by the exceptio doli mali, and equity can sometimes relax the rigor of the law, nevertheless, except where urgent necessity compels otherwise, it is better in such matters to postpone decision than to render it. From your boyhood you have learned that the solution of questions which include circular positions, or involve latent contraries, is most difficult, unless perchance you regard yourself as more cunning than old Nestor. "Do not believe a dream," Agamemnon was told in a dream while Greece was laboring for the overthrow of Troy. The interpretation of this dream the wisest among the Greeks thought should be left to Jove himself. I have seen many toiling over the question whether a man who says, "I am lying" can be said to be telling the truth or not. But I have never seen any

⁷ A contemporary illustration of a refusal to decide a doubtful point is afforded by the outcome of Matilda's appeal to Rome against the right of Stephen to the English crown. Stephen's advocates raised the point that Matilda was illegitimate, as her mother, prior to being married to Henry I., had been a nun. The Pope broke off the debate and announced that he would not decide the point or allow it to be raised again. Adams, Political History of England, 1066-1216, pp. 202-3.

⁸ Dig. xxxv, 2, 88.

who could avoid both Scilla and Caribdis unless he was contending against a feeble or a friendly adversary. In practice-moots and scholastic declamations, these questions may be thrashed out safely. But when one of them gets into a law-court, where empty show of wit is repressed, and only serious matters are debated, an error in the reckoning of the decision cannot be made without endangering both the litigants and the judge. Nothing is better in my opinion than to postpone a danger if it cannot be wholly avoided. But it is the height of injustice to postpone suits when the interest of either litigant is thereby put in jeopardy, and when the difficulty of the case does not necessitate delay. Therefore, whatever can be expedited, should be; and only that postponed which requires more mature deliberation.

CHAPTER XIII

HOW A LAW-SUIT SHOULD PROCEED, AND OF THE FORMULA OF THE OATH AGAINST MALICIOUS LITIGATION WHICH THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE; AND OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO TAKE THE OATH; AND OF THE OATH OF ADVOCATES, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT OF FALSE PROSECUTION, CONCEALMENT OF THE TRUTH, AND REFUSAL TO PROCEED.

In order that the truth of the facts may more speedily be brought to light, the judge does not permit the litigants, to wit the principal parties, to proceed to issue until they pledge their faith by an oath that they will insist only on justice for their rights, and will put all malice and chicane away from them. The plaintiff swears that he has brought his action with no vexatious purpose but because he believes that he has a good cause of action, and that he will do nothing with malice at any point in the proceedings, as by demanding unnecessary proofs or delays, and that he will ask only for what appears to be in conformity with the requirements of justice. The defendant then swears that he has reached the determination to resist the plaintiff's claim because he thinks he has a good defense, and that at no point throughout the suit will he deal maliciously, or make any demand upon the judge or the opposing party except what he honestly thinks ought to be granted to fulfil the requirements of justice.¹ Both oaths contain the same final clause, in which the parties swear that they have not given or

¹ Justin., Cod., ii., 58, 2.

promised to give, and that they will not give, anything either directly or through the medium of any third person to the judges or to any other persons as payment in connection with the case except what may lawfully be paid to the lawyers and to certain other persons by permission of law.² If the plaintiff refuses to swear to this effect, he is non-suited and dropped from the action as an unjust litigant. The defendant who refuses to take the oath is held to have admitted the plaintiff's claim, and sentence of condemnation will be passed against him.³ So too the lawyers, in order to insure the good faith of the trial, are bound by an oath at the very joinder of issue to observe truthfulness and good faith, swearing that with all their strength and ability they will seek to procure for their clients what they deem to be just and in accordance with the truth, and without remission of zeal so far as in them lies, and also that they will not use their ingenuity to prolong the suit unduly.⁴ For suits should be terminated by the judges within two or three years.⁵

The judge will also equalize the lawyers by a fair allotment among the parties, whether the latter have sought them or not, in order that the case may go forward as an equal contest. This equality consists both in integrity of character and quickness of intelligence, in sagacity of counsel, reputation for knowledge, and in the impressiveness of a man's name, so that all these advantages, so far as possible, are to be balanced between the parties by the beam of equity. But if the fame of one advocate is more illustrious than all the rest, the adverse party should so far as possible be compensated by the aid of the judge.⁶ Moreover a lawyer who knows the secrets of one of the litigants will not be allowed to serve as advocate for his opponent, unless perchance one party with or without the connivance of the judge has dealt separately with several lawyers in

² Nov. cxxiv., i. ³ Justin., Cod., ii, 58, 2 §§ 6-8.

⁴ Justin., Cod., iii, 1, 14, § 4. ⁵ Ibid. iii, 1, 13. ⁶ Ibid. ii, 6, 7.

order to deprive the other of the opportunity of an equal defense.⁷

Nor can a lawyer after a warning from the judge refuse without probable cause to represent a party unless he is willing to be debarred from the courts so that afterward he may not be heard to plead causes.⁸ And if an advocate has concealed the truth he should receive on conviction the severest punishment, proportioned to the nature of the offence. The duty of advocacy must be performed with the utmost good faith and without abuse of the opposite side. For it is a contest of reasons, not of insults, and in accordance with the edict of the prince the advocate suffers loss of reputation who, leaving the business in hand, digresses into wanton malice against his adversary, openly or underhandedly.⁹ Although a fee is due to the advocate by way of an honorarium, it is not lawful for him to be an instigator or purchaser of litigation by bargaining for the payment of a share of the amount in controversy, to the serious damage, and as it were robbery, of the suitor.¹⁰ Whatever the advocate has alleged in the presence of his principal is thereafter to be considered as if it came from the principal himself unless he contradicts it immediately, that is to say within the next three days.¹¹ Although it chances that the advocate is defeated, his reputation is in no wise damaged if he has not failed to make the best of his opportunities, and has faithfully furthered his client's rights; for the advocate is not required to lie. If the case brings any loss or hurt, it falls upon the litigants, whether it is a civil or criminal action. This is determined ultimately by the final decision, which condemns or acquits the defendants, and at times deliberately and with good reason pours upon the plaintiffs themselves the shafts of severity. For, to say nothing of civil cases, in which,

⁷ Cf Justin., Cod., ii, 6, 7, § 3. ⁸ Justin., Cod., ii, 6, 7, § 2.

⁹ Justin., Cod., ii, 6. 6, § I. ¹⁰ Justin., Cod., ii, 6, 5.

¹¹ Justin., Cod., ii, 9. §§ 1-3.

however, the same rule prevails, the rashness of those who make accusations improperly is detected in three ways and subject to three kinds of punishment.¹² For they are either "calumniators," or "prevaricators," or "tergiversators." A "calumniator" is one who brings a false accusation; a "prevaricator" is one who conceals the truth; a "tergiversator" is one who refuses altogether to prosecute the charge. By the lex Remia calumniators are required to undergo the same punishment as that prescribed for the crime named in the accusation, provided, however, that after the defendant has been acquitted, there must be a determination of the accuser's knowledge and intention, and if he merely fell into a reasonable error, he must be acquitted. But if he is detected in evident malice, he is condemned to the punishment prescribed by law. This is indicated by the language of the sentence pronounced; for if the words are, "You have not made proof," the plaintiff or prosecutor is acquitted; but if they are "You are guilty of calumny," he is condemned; and though the penalty does not directly carry infamy with it, nevertheless the power of the law will be exercised against him so that infamy may result.

¹² Dig. xlviii, 16, 1, §§ 1-4.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCERNING THE RATIONALE OF PROOFS.

In discussing the matters which are to be given weight in civil as in criminal cases we must consider the kinds of proofs which must be examined to determine whether a case has been established. The term "proof" is applied to all the means by which a case can be established,¹ whether written depositions or witnesses; the latter have greater weight than the former, because witnesses are preferred to written depositions.² For while witnesses can be examined and tested, written depositions are always and in the eyes of all the same. But in examining witnesses and weighing their testimony no definite rule can be laid down to determine which the judge ought rather to follow. For if all the witnesses are equal in social position and reputation, and if the nature of the transaction and the inclination of the judge agrees with them, all the testimony should be followed. But if some have said one thing and others another, though the number is unequal, that is to be believed which squares best with the nature of the transaction, and affords no suspicion of the taint of hostility or partiality; and the judge will confirm the inclination of his own mind from the inferences and evi-

¹ Dig. xvi., 99, §§ 2, 3.

² Dig. xxii, 5, 3, § 3, testibus, non testimoniis erediturum. In this connection testimonium apparently means the deposition of an absent witness, — what is elsewhere called testimonium per tabulas. Bethmann-Hollweg (Civilprocess, ii, 599,) thinks that under the Republic and earlier Empire such depositions were regarded as less trustworthy than oral testimony (see Quintilian, V, vii, 1, 2); but that later, written evidence came to be preferred (Civilprocess, iii, 279).

dence which he finds most consistent with the facts and closest to the truth. For regard is to be had not to the number of witnesses, but to their good faith, and to the testimony which seems to be best supported by the light of truth. Frequently also the case will stand upon presumptions until the contrary is proved. Thus Salomon, in the case of the harlots, ordered the child to be divided; and when one of them was willing to yield it to the other if only its life were spared, but the other cried out, "Let it be neither mine nor thine, but let it be divided" — he decided that the child should be given alive to the one who was not willing that, being alive, it should be put to death. For he followed the argument from probability that he ought to believe that she was the mother who loved the child, so long as no contrary proof destroyed that supposition or assumption. Therefore the deified Adrian made a rescript which extended the power of the judge in the examination of witnesses. The words of the text are as follows: "You are best able to judge the credit which is to be given witnesses, since you know what their standing and reputation is, and have seen directly whether they seem to be telling the same prepared story which they have all brought ready-made into court or whether they have answered with apparent truth on the spur of the moment the questions which you have put to them. What inferences and proofs are sufficient to establish each point cannot be satisfactorily defined in any rigid or uniform way. Sometimes the number of witnesses, sometimes their standing and influence, sometimes the concurrence of common report, confirms the trustworthiness of the matter in question. All, then, that I can reply to you is in substance that reliance ought not to be immediately placed on any one species of proof, but that in accordance with the judgment of your own mind you must determine what to believe and what to regard as not sufficiently proved."³ Therefore wide power is given to the judge so

³ Dig. xxii, 5, 3, §§ 1, 2.

long as in all things he serves the truth; and when he perceives, as is generally the case, that it is in jeopardy among rascals, he shall summon the witnesses who are necessary to declare it, and compel them to testify even though they are unwilling, with only the exception of those whom the laws will not compel to testify against certain persons.

CHAPTER XV

WHAT THINGS PERTAIN TO THE DUTY OF PROCONSULS, GOVERNORS, AND ORDINARY JUDGES; AND HOW FAR PRESENTS MAY BE OFFERED AND ACCEPTED; AND CONCERNING CICERO, BERNARD, MARTIN AND GAUFRED OF CHARTRES.

It pertains to the sacred duty of a governor to take care that the more powerful do not oppress the more humble wrongfully, and that those who should be defenders of the innocent do not instead persecute them with feigned accusations.¹ He will also prohibit unfounded exactions, and acts of violence, and sales compelled under duress, and contracts of security made without the payment of money;² and will take care not to burden his province by his excessive hospitality;³ and lastly will provide that no one gains profit or suffers damage unjustly. For it is the part of a good and grave governor to see that his province is peaceful and quiet;⁴ which he will easily bring to pass if he acts watchfully to rid the province of bad men, and to that end hunts them down and drives them out. For he should hunt down men guilty of sacrilege, robbers, thieves, and kidnappers, and chastise each for his crimes as well as those who harbor them, and without whose aid the robber cannot long remain concealed. Further, every man whose task is to administer

¹ Dig. i., 18, 6, § 2.

² Dig. i., 18, 6, init. Flach suggests that the practice here prohibited may have been one of the reasons which during the days of the later Empire induced many smaller proprietors to solicit the "patrocinium" of their more powerful neighbors, thus paving the way for feudalism. (Les Origines de l'ancienne France, t. i., p. 72).

³ Dig. i, 16, 4, init. ⁴ Dig. i, 18, 13.

justice should take care to be easy of access but not in such a way as to bring himself into contempt. Wherefore a clause is added to the commissions of governors bidding them not to admit provincials to too great familiarity; for association on equal terms produces contempt for a man's dignity. And, in short, he should so mete out justice as to increase the authority of his office by his talents and character. In hearing cases he ought not to burst out in anger against those whom he thinks wrong-doers, nor on the other hand be brought to tears by the petitions of the unfortunate; for it is not the part of a firm and just judge to display his emotions in his face. For what is more unseemly in a grave man than if at a breath his cheeks grow pale, his skin contracts into wrinkles, his eyes flash, his looks are distracted; or if wrath brings the blood to his face, and as it were confines it to the surface, his lips foam and twitch, his arms toss about, his feet jump, his body quivers and his whole bearing betokens not so much an irate man as a mad man? Truly, when I see men acting so, I pity them while fearing for myself, when I remember the men who live in Africa, as I have read in Pliny, in his book of Natural History.⁵ For they are said to have a magic power of fascinating with voice or tongue, so that if any has chanced thoughtlessly to praise their beautiful trees, generous crops, laughing children, fine horses, well-fed and well-kept cattle, he will suddenly die or in some way be made to lose his life. There is also a kind of fascination by means of the eyes which is fatal. The same author reports that there are men among the Illyrians who can slay by their gaze those at whom they have looked long in anger, and that those males and females who have this power of harmful sight have two pupils in each eye. Appollonides also informs us that in Sitia women are born who are called "Bithiæ," and that these likewise have two pupils in each eye, and can destroy anyone at whom they chance to look in anger. I fear that irascible

⁵ Pliny vii, 2, § 16.

judges are somehow related to these monsters. Those, too, who have spotted eyes are said by physiognomists to be more than others prone to badness.

What I have said concerning governors and other judges should apply also to proconsuls, whom our countrymen commonly call itinerant or "wandering" justices. The name is erroneous, but still it fits, if not the office, at least the persons, because, following their own desires in pursuit of avarice, they "wander" from the path of equity and plunder the people.⁶

The duties of every office should be performed gratuitously, without the exaction or receipt of aught in excess of the statute. Perhaps you will ask what the statute provides. It is contained in a plebiscite which enacts that no governor shall receive a gift or donation except of food and drink, and that this must be consumed within the next few days.⁷ The same rule is extended to proconsuls and other magistrates by the prince's commission. They are not obliged to abstain wholly from accepting friendly presents, but to observe moderation in doing so. This permission, and the accompanying requirement of moderation, are appropriately defined in a letter of the deified Severus and the Emperor Antoninus. The words of this letter are as follows: "So far as pertains to presents, hear what our opinion is. There is an old proverb, 'Not all things, nor at all times, nor from all persons.' For certainly it passes human nature not to accept from anyone; but there can be nought more vile than to accept from everyone; nor more avaricious than to accept for any and every reason. A provision is contained in our mandates

⁶ For criticism of the itinerant justices in England, particularly in the matter of bribe-taking, see, for the twelfth century, Walter Map (who was himself an itinerant justice), "De Nugis Curialium," I., x., (tr. Tupper and Ogle, pp. 7 ff.); for the thirteenth century, Maitland, "Bracton's Note Book," vol. I., pp. 15-16, and references to Matthew Paris there cited.

⁷ Dig. i, 18. 18.

that no proconsul or holder of other office shall accept a gift or donation, or buy anything, except for the sake of subsistence from day to day, but this does not apply to friendly presents but to those things which go beyond eatables. Such presents, however, are not to be enlarged to the nature of donations."⁸

Though an advocate can sell his proper services and a jurist his good advice, it is never lawful to sell justice. When Cicero wished to buy a house on the Palatine and had not the money at hand, he secretly accepted a loan of two million sisterces from Silla, who was then a defendant under accusation. Before the house was bought, the matter was betrayed and became public; and he was reproached with having accepted money from a defendant for the purpose of buying a house. Cicero, disconcerted by the unexpected charge, denied that he had received any money, saying that he had no intention of buying a house; "Your accusation is so false," he said, "that if I do buy a house, it will be true that I have taken the money." Later, after he had bought the house and was charged with the lie by his enemies in the senate, he laughed heartily, and, still laughing, said; "You are certainly foolish men if you do not know that it is the part of a prudent and cautious pater-familias when he wishes to buy anything, to deny that he intends to do so for fear of possible competitors." Thus with an urbane witticism he explained away what he could not deny, making it appear rather a matter for laughter than for blame. Indeed this was his habit, whenever he could not deny some dishonorable act with which he was charged, to evade it by a witty answer.

The Supreme Pontiff Eugenius, whom you yourself have seen and whose memory is to be embraced and his holiness imitated, refused altogether to receive any gift from a litigant, or from one whom he thought likely soon to become a litigant. Wherefore, when at his accession a certain prior of moderate

⁸ Dig. i., 16. 6 § 3.

means, whose case he had not yet heard, offered him with much insistence a mark of gold as a token of his devotion, he said to him: "You have not yet entered the house and do you seek already to corrupt the master?" For the holy man regarded as corruption whatever was offered to the judge while the suit was pending. Also Bernard, the monk of Clairvaux, who was deacon of Saints Cosmas and Damian, and cardinal, while living at Rome dwelled apart on the heights, withholding his hands from every gift, so that the man is not yet born whose gold or silver he ever accepted. Why should I mention Martin, who contrary to all custom and experience returned as a poor man from discharging an embassy as papal legate, and when he was forced by the insistence of the bishop of Florence to accept a horse which was needed by one of his companions, restored it to the donor immediately upon learning that the bishop at the date of the gift had a case which was pending for hearing in the Roman Church? All of which is more fully told by holy Bernard, the abbot of Clairvaux, who knew him well, in the instructive book "Concerning Contemplation or Reflection" which he wrote for holy Eugenius. I shall pass over the fact that the venerable father Gaufred of Chartres, the legate of Aquitaine, refused to receive gifts from the provincials except in the way of food and drink, and the latter most sparingly; but whatever was offered to him in the guise of a present he spurned as dung. The Saint of Clairvaux bears witness that he even refused to accept from a faithful priest of his suite the present of a fish, which is commonly called a sturgeon, and yielded to the insistence of the offerer only after he had paid him the price of the present which he accepted.⁹

⁹ St. Bernard, De Consideraiione, iv, 5, 14.

CHAPTER XVI

OF THE CRIME OF EXTORTION, WHEREOF GOVERNORS AND JUDGES ARE GUILTY WHO ACCEPT ANYTHING FOR DOING WHAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THEIR OFFICE TO DO; AND OF SAMUEL, WHO TEACHES THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONTINUAL SACRIFICE IN THE HOUSE OF A JUDGE, WHICH SHOULD SHOW ITSELF TO BE A TEMPLE OF GOD BY OFFERINGS OF JUSTICE AND GOOD WORKS.

But such examples of self-restraint are extremely rare even among the clergy in this day of increasing vices, although the highest measure of self-restraint is enjoined on all magistrates by the law. So great is its severity on this point that one who has held an ordinary office will be sent back to the province and there compelled to make good out of his own means whatever damage he did in excess of his former authority, besides being condemned to loss of reputation and fortune, honor and dignity. Furthermore, the penalties of the lex Julia concerning extortion ¹ apply to one who while holding any office has accepted money for hearing a case or not hearing it, deciding or not deciding, summoning a witness or failing to summon him, and in short for doing anything more or less than is required by the duty of his office. Nor can he usucapt what he has received, unless it has first passed back into the power of the former owner or his heir. The same law also invalidates all sales and leases made at too high or too low a figure, and prohibits one who is found guilty of any of these things from giving testimony in court or

¹ Dig. xlviii, 11, 3.

serving as a judge or bringing an action; and though today they are tried and punished by the extraordinary procedure, they are generally condemned to exile or some penalty even more severe, in proportion to the gravity of their offence. Furthermore, a penalty is even exacted of their heirs. Examine the words of the law² and observe with what indignation it hunts down this crime: "To the end that the punishment of one may be an example and warning for many, we have commanded that a governor³ who has acquitted himself ill shall return to the province which he has despoiled under a competent guard, and shall there be compelled to repay fourfold the value not merely of what, I do not say any personal servant, but any private soldier or agent of his may have received by way of presents, and also of all that he himself has seized or stolen from my provincials," and likewise, "All attorneys, and all judges, shall keep their hands off the money and estates of others, and shall not think to make plunder out of the law-suit of another. For an attorney who acts for his own gain shall be compelled to submit to the penalty prescribed by the laws." And further: "We recommend and exhort that if any of the honorati, or decuriones, or possessores, or finally if any even of the coloni, has been made the victim of extortion in any way by a judge of any rank; if any one knows that a penalty has been remitted for a bribe or inflicted because of the vice of cupidity; finally if any one can prove that a judge is corrupt for any reason, let the person having such knowledge make the fact public either during the administration of the judge or after he has laid down his office, let him file an accusation, let him prove the charge, and by proving it win victory and glory." Would that these words might at least make themselves heard in our own times; for I scarcely dare hope that they would be followed. Indeed, as often as I look closely, I seem to see rather extortioners than judges, as if they were given to a province only to the end that they might de-

² Justin., Cod., ix, 27, 1-4. ³ ducetn.

spoil it. Even the laws and customs themselves under which we now live are traps and gins of falsehood. Snares for words and nets for syllables are stretched everywhere; woe to the simple-minded man who does not know how to syllabize! It it written, "I have done justice and judgment; give me not up to false accusers";⁴ as if it were said in plain speech, "Those who pervert judgment and depart from justice are to be handed over to the false accuser who day and night accuses the sons of Adam in the sight of God." We read in the book of Kings that Samuel said to all Israel:⁵ "Behold, I have hearkened to your voice and have heard all the things which you have spoken to me, and I have set a king over you. And now the king leads you; I am old and my hair is white; further, my sons are with you; so I have dealt with you from my youth even to this day. Behold me, here I stand. Speak concerning me before the Lord and His anointed, whether I have ever taken from any his ox or his ass, whether I ever accused any falsely, whether I ever oppressed any, whether I ever accepted a gift from the hand of any; and today I will despise that thing and make restitution thereof." Oh spirit full of shamefaced modesty! oh hand of self-restraint! oh uncorrupted judge! oh magnificent words worthy of the admiration and imitation of all, which are thus spoken out of a pure conscience! "Speak concerning me before God and His anointed," who judge judges in Heaven and on earth — "Speak," he says, "whether I took from any his ox or his ass." Surely this man did not extort villas and lands, or immense sums of gold or silver, or masses of costly furniture and apparel, who accounted it as so great a thing for a judge even to have accepted the offering of an ox or ass. "If ever I accused any falsely, if ever I oppressed any," — he has harassed none unjustly, who has kept himself guiltless of accusing any falsely; nor was his judgment perverted by flesh and

⁴ Ps. cxix., 121. ⁵ 1 Sam. xii, 1-3.

blood who never oppressed any. For if any fell into his hands, it was not the judge but the man's own wickedness that condemned him. "If ever I accepted a gift from the hand of any, today I will despise that thing and make restitution thereof." What, I ask, could be more plain-spoken? Finally, to remove all suspicion of avarice, he shows that he had no knowledge of having received any gift by his readiness to despise and restore it if there were aught at all that could be demanded back. For he preferred to restore it presently rather than return it with usury in the future, and he judged it better to despise it today than because of it to appear contemptible for eternity in the sight of God and all the elect. What did his hearers reply to this challenge? Hear what they replied, — "And they said, — " Who said? The whole people of Israel together; for he had addressed his words to all, — "Thou hast not accused us falsely, nor oppressed us, nor taken aught from the hand of any man."⁶ If ever any proconsul, or governor, or tribune, or centurion, or decurion or, in short any magistrate whatsoever merited such testimony from his provincials, I ask that he may come to our province to the end that he may instruct our magistrates. For nothing of this kind is heard concerning our sheriffs and our justices, who, to use our common name for them, are rightly called "errant" because they love gifts and follow after hire, and do not deliver the poor man from the powerful, do not give judgment in favor of the stranger and the orphan, nor does the case of the widow ever come before them. Moreover, neither do the ecclesiastical judges follow Samuel, for as is the people, so is the priest. Wisdom complains aloud: "They that handle the law have not known me; princes have arisen and I knew it not."⁷ To illustrate the same point by examples drawn from the lower ranks of the clergy, what else are deacons or archdeacons (as Symon our venerable teacher in the law

⁶ I Sam. xii, 4. ⁷ Jer. ii, 8; Hos. viii, 4.

of God was wont to say), but men in whose hands are iniquities and their right hand is filled with bribes? Ask our most happy king of England and as yet unconquered duke of the Normans and of Aquitania what his honest opinion is of those whom he thrusts into the offices of the church, and he will say, I think, that there is no malady in the clergy of which such men are not the cause.

Bishops hold a venerable name and office if it were only filled with as much diligence and sincerity as it is at times sought with ambition. And they would be loved as fathers, feared as lords, worshipped as saints, would they but refrain from exactions, and exclude from their minds whatever proceeds from trickery, and if they would cease to count all gain as godliness. But as it is, they deprive themselves of all reverence and love by their ambition for honors, and their greed for money, and by either contriving intrigues of their own or furthering those of others. Nor do I know in what way they can escape infamy and punishment when they claim for themselves a "rake-off," and one which is equal to at least two-thirds of the whole ill-gotten gain. For they either appropriate the solid pound, or, as is frequently the case, leave only the third part thereof to the archdeacons and other officials, if I call them such and do not rather use the language of the people, who call them ministers of iniquity. Not even legates of the Apostolic See keep their hands pure from gifts, but at times rage through the provinces in such bacchanalian frenzy as if Satan himself had come forth from the presence of the Lord to scourge the Church. They shake the corners of the house until they prostrate the sons and daughters of Him who upon the cross healed the ills and pains of souls. They throw the land into commotion and uproar so that they seem to be suffering from some disease which cries aloud for a cure. I am not speaking, of course, of all, but of those who, scorning the will of the Father, serve their own. For it appears that in every office of God's household while some fall

behind, others are added to do their work. Among all of these, accordingly, both deacons, archdeacons, bishops, and legates, I have seen some who labored with such earnestness in the harvest of the Lord that from the merits of their faith and virtue it could be seen that the vineyard of the Father had been rightly placed under their care, and prudently and profitably. But others conduct themselves as if Thesephone or Megera were sent from the underworld to stir up Thebes to wickedness.⁸ For the most part such men have been promoted by the court to the offices of the church against the unanimous wishes of the faithful. In the eyes of these men

"Judgment is nought but public merchandise. And the knight who judges a case gives whatsoever decision is bought and paid for."⁹

They decide in favor of the unjust in return for bribes, they exult in the worst wickedness, rejoice when evil is done,

"And can scarce restrain their tears when they see nought to provoke tears."¹⁰

Verily they feed on the sins of the people and are clothed therein, and luxuriate therein in manifold ways, these respecters of persons, and as it were hammers of the good; for this they have learned from those who chose them. Wisdom says: "The wild ass in the desert is the prey of the lion, and so are the poor the food of the rich. And as humility is an abomination in the eyes of the haughty, so is the poor man abhorred by the rich. The rich man when in trouble will find strength in his friends; but when a humble man falls, he is driven away by those who know him. If the rich man is cozened he has many to aid him; he speaks proudly and they justify him. When the man of poor

⁸ Statius, Thebaid xi, 57-61.

⁹ Petron., Sat. c. 14. ¹⁰ Ovid., Metam., ii, 796.

estate is cozened, he is only blamed therefor; he speaks wisely and no place is made for him. The rich man speaks, and all keep silence, and extol even to the clouds what he said; the poor man speaks, and they say, 'Who is this man?' and if he stumble, they destroy him."¹¹ Such are the judgments of those who prefer lucre to justice and deem nought better than to have riches, than which, in truth, almost nothing is more vain and useless. None of them rejoices when he sees Christ on earth, there is none among them who wishes Him to go abroad among men none who at the good works of his neighbors sings, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will."¹² Yet surely this is the song of faithful prelates who walk with feet which are beautiful and forever blessed because they bring peace, the peace which is allied to the holiness without which none shall see God. These say with Wisdom that "he is a man of true riches that hath no sin upon his conscience, and the worst poverty is in the mouth of the ungodly."¹³ They proclaim in the market-place that "he is the blessed man who is found without spot, and who has not gone astray after gold."¹⁴ Which is as if they should say in plain language, "Whoever in filling the post of any magistracy seeks after gold, stains himself with a stigma without which gold cannot be acquired nor retained by a greedy owner." For whoever long trafficked in money without soiling his hands? Yet it is not so much his hand that he soils therefrom as his soul. I have no desire that the thresholds of the great shall become chilly towards me or that what I here write should sound like the barking of a dog; I do not set my mouth against heaven or desire to say ought save what is full of loyalty, charity and reverence toward the fathers of the Church who judge the world and are judged by none on earth. Nevertheless I mean to say that which is so true that none of the faithful dare gainsay it; I shall say what they them-

¹¹ Eccli. xiii, 23-29. ¹² Luke ii, 14.

¹³ Eccli. xiii, 30. ¹⁴ ib. xxxi, 8.

selves preach. I shall say then that a city can not be hidden which is set upon a hill, and that it is vain to try to keep from public knowledge things which are done in the sight of the nations; indeed,

"Every sin incurs a more conspicuous condemnation In proportion as the offender holds a higher rank."¹⁵

Salt that has lost its savor is good for nought but to be cast away and trampled under foot by men as worthless refuse which is not even of value for manuring the fields. Also the sun gives more light in proportion as it is higher above the earth. Why should I say more? The works of individuals testify concerning them. So Samuel was justified by the testimony of his own works. But that the people might not be thought to flatter him and from fear or error to give false testimony regarding his innocence and justice, he desired that the people should be bound by the sanction of an oath to declare the truth, and he said, "The Lord is my witness against you, and His anointed is my witness this day, that you have not found anything in my hand. And the people said, 'He is witness'";¹⁶ as if they pledged the faith which they owed to God and to their king as a pledge of the sincerity of their declaration. That he ever accepted a gift even of food and drink I do not regard as certain from the scripture. For it is written: "And Samuel judged Israel all the days of his life and every year he went about to Bethel and Galgala and Masphat, and he judged Israel in the aforesaid places, and then returned to Ramatha. For there was his house and there he judged Israel."¹⁷ What else do the words seem to mean than that he made an official circuit of the province for the purpose of administering justice, and then returned home to satisfy his own necessities? "Also he built there an altar to the Lord."¹⁸ And rightly so, because there should be unceasing

¹⁵ Juv., Sat. vii, 140-141. ¹⁶ I Sam. xii, 5.

¹⁷ I Sam. xii, 15-17. ¹⁸ I Sam. vii, 17.

sacrifice in the house of a judge, which should show itself as a very temple of God in the worship and practice of justice, and and in propriety of manners, and in the shining example of good works; not a place where the blood of goats and calves is offered up immoderately, nor can the ashes of a heifer sanctify the unclean to the cleansing of their flesh, but this can only be wrought by the great pontiff who has pierced the heavens, Jesus the Son of God; and there of all places should be offered up

A spirit composed to justice and religion, and the secret depths Of a holy mind and a heart steeped in generous virtue.¹⁹

It is thus that true worshippers worship the Father in spirit and in truth.

Or do you think that he accepted aught under the name of "fees"? For under this pretext men seek to color iniquity who are not so much judges as publicans of justice, but who strive to excuse their wrong-doing under color of honest privilege as though they were but seeking some portion of the profits from transactions of which they partially bear the burdens. Or if profit is not permitted, at least there should be compensation for outlays and expenses. But these men are rare. For will not a man blush to say, "What will you give me if I do justice for you? For you will wait in vain for justice on its own account." Is it not as if one should say: "What will you give me that I shall deny myself, betray my duty, and sell my master?"

¹⁹ Pers., Sat. ii, 73-74.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT MONEY IS TO BE DESPISED IN COMPARISON WITH WISDOM; WHICH IS PROVED BY EXAMPLES OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.

We read that most of the philosophers not only despised riches but utterly discarded them, as being a stumbling block to wisdom and virtue. Thus did Socrates, whom all sects of philosophers unite in reverencing as the unique fountain of prudence and truth. It is said that Antistenes, who had made a great reputation as a teacher of rhetoric, after he heard Socrates, said to his pupils, "Go, get yourself a master, for I have found mine." And he at once sold all that he owned, and distributed the proceeds among the people, keeping for himself nought save a paltry cloak. His most famous follower was the well-known Diogenes, who showed himself a mightier man than king Alexander, and a victor over human nature itself. Since Antistenes was no longer receiving pupils, but could not get rid of Diogenes, who persisted in following him, he finally threatened him with a stick if he did not go away. But Diogenes is said to have bowed his head meekly before him and replied: "No stick can be so hard as to separate me from your company." Satirus, who writes the histories of famous men, relates that Diogenes used a double cloak on account of the cold, and for his larder had a wallet which he always carried about with him, and that because of the frailness of his body he also carried a stick, wherewith, being now an old man, he was wont to support his legs, and was commonly called a beggar, or "hand-to-mouth man,"

because he asked and received food for the present hour from any chance person whom he met. He lived in the vestibules of gates and in city porticos, everywhere preaching truth and correcting or denouncing in passers-by the vices which defile the character. And when he wound himself up in a barrel or great jar, he used to say jocularly that he had a movable house and one which changed and adapted itself to the seasons. For in cold weather he turned the mouth of the jar to the south, in hot weather to the north; and whatever was the direction of the sun, thither faced the mansion of Diogenes. Once when he was carrying a wooden cup for use in drinking, he saw a boy drinking out of the hollow of his hand, and he dashed the cup to the ground, saying: "To think that I did not discover before this that nature had provided her own cup!" He never relaxed aught of the vigor of his mind, but persisted in keeping the same unmoved countenance even when opponents were hurling questions at him, and, what you will recognize as marking the true disciple of Socrates, he crushed the adverse turns of fortune under foot, enduring every pain and misery with uniform self-command. For he said that such things are always of no concern to a philosopher, and that the man is not master of his own mind who permits himself to be injured by fortune. His manliness and restraint are also shown by the manner of his death. For when in his old age he was making his way to the Olympic games, whereto thronged a great multitude from all the parts of Greece, he was stricken on the way with a fever, and laid himself down upon an embankment by the wayside. His friends wished to put him upon a beast or into a carriage, but he refused, and crossing over to the shade of a tree, said to them: "I ask you to leave me here and go on to the spectacle. This night will prove me victor or vanquished; if I conquer the fever, I shall come on to the games; if it conquers me, I shall go down to the underworld." And there, during the night, he strangled himself, saying that he was not so much dying as rather putting

an end to the fever by death. For he was misled by the opinion and example of brave men, when cornered by some extreme difficulty, into the idea that death should be sought of a man's own volition to prevent having it thrust upon him by an outside force. Indeed the latter opinion had become an established conviction or prejudice which led many wise men to believe that they should choose to provoke death rather than endure dishonor. This was done by Cato, it was done by others, who anticipating fate by the sword, or the hemlock, or some other kind of poison, sought to escape the slightest stigma of dishonor, which alone they esteemed a stigma. These men can plead ignorance of the Truth as their defence; but surely it is a gross and poor-spirited attitude which postpones certainties to uncertainties, and casts away and drives out the best that men have for a fruitless object. Nor do they thereby attain to the name of bravery, which their deceitful opinion boasts that above all else it wins for them. But this is wholly deceitful and untrue, because, as the poet says,

"In the midst of adversity it is an easy thing to despise life; He does the braver thing who can dare to be miserable."¹

None of those who provoke death is excusable; more excusable are they who draw back from it when it threatens; for who knows the secret counsels of God and whether or not he can in any way escape impending death? Sandrococtus, when ordered by king Alexander to be put to death, sought safety in the swiftness of his feet; and afterwards, as he lay overcome with sleep from weariness, a lion of gigantic size came and stood by him as he slept, and with its tongue licked the sweat that flowed from him, and left him after gently waking him. From this marvellous happening he first conceived the hope of royal power, because of the majestic nature of the portent. Later,

¹ Martial, xi, 56, ll., 15-16.

while he was making war against Alexander's prefects, an elephant of mammoth size came and offered itself to him, and, as though overcome with gentleness, took him upon its back, and he ultimately became a leader in war and a famous general. Likewise Andronicus, when he was condemned to the beasts, was thrown before a lion which drew to it the eyes of all the spectators because of the huge size of its body, the fury of its onrush, its terrific and resounding roar, and the swelling muscles and curling mane of its great neck; but he escaped unharmed, for when the lion looked at him from afar, it suddenly halted and stood as if in amazement, and then walked up to him slowly and quite peacefully, and in a playful way. Then it gently and mildly wagged its tail like an affectionate dog, and clasping the body of the man, who was now almost dead with fright, licked his legs and hands softly with its tongue, so that the man, who had almost lost his mind at the caresses of the fierce beast, was able to collect himself and little by little open his eyes and look at the lion. Apion relates that he saw this himself at the spectacles at Rome which are called the "urban games," adding that then there seemed to follow a sort of mutual recognition between the man and the lion so that you saw them as it were greeting each other with joy. And for this reason, as well as because of the great shouting of the people, the man was summoned before Cæsar, and a diligent effort was made to discover why such an exceptionally fierce lion had singled out this particular man and spared him. He told a story which was passing strange, saying: "When my master was appointed proconsul of the province of Africa I went there with him; but I could not endure his daily injustices and floggings and I fled. Because I thought I would be safer from my master in some hidden spot, I withdrew to the solitudes of the plains and sands. And if all else failed me I made up my mind to seek some way to die. Because of the swift blazing heat of the noon-day sun, I had halted for the time at a dark cave and

went into it and hid myself. Not long afterwards there came to the same cave this lion, dragging a lame and bleeding foot, and uttering dreadful groans and whimpers, roaring the while from the pain and torture of the wound, so as to move the pity of any who chanced to see it. At first I was terrified at the sight of the approaching lion and completely paralyzed. But after the lion had entered what was apparently his regular living-place, and saw me retreating as far as I could and trying to conceal myself, he came up to me gently, and like a tame animal, and seemed to hold up and stretch out his paw to me for help. Then," said the man, "I drew out an immense thorn which was stuck in the sole of his foot, and pressed out the pus which had formed in the bottom of the wound, and having by this time lost most of my fear, dried it thoroughly and carefully, and wiped away all the blood. Being thus relieved by my aid and medical attention, he lay down, placing his paw in my hand, and became quite quiet, and from that day for three whole years I and the lion lived in the same cave and shared the same food. For he would bring to the cave the better parts of the beasts which he killed and I, having no way of making a fire, ate them, cooked only in the heat of the noon-day sun. At last," he said, "I grew weary of this savage life, and one day when the lion had gone forth to hunt, I left the cave. I had travelled along the road for nearly three days when I was seen by soldiers and captured, and sent back from Africa to my master in Rome. He at once caused me to be condemned to death and thrown to the beasts. I now know that the lion was also captured during my absence and seeks today to repay me with gratitude for my kindness to him and for the fact that I healed his wound."

Andronicus was thereupon granted a reprieve from punishment, and, by vote of the whole people, the lion was given to him as a present. Therefore, like two friends, the man and the lion went about through the city, and everyone said, "This

is the lion which gave hospitality to the man, this is the man who healed the lion."

Do you ask for tales which are better known? Daniel came forth from the den of the lions, and the three youths escaped unharmed from the fiery furnace. And among all nations many have been unexpectedly delivered from impending ills by grace. Wherefore, to my mind, none of those who lay hands on themselves have sufficient ground for excuse, although the history of the Church bestows high praise on some who did themselves to death because they preferred to risk their lot in this temporal life rather than lose their honor. But they were thus excused by the weakness of the flesh, and by their ignorance of the law and by the zeal of their charity, and perhaps also in some cases by the immediate commandment of God to the end that thus in their simplicity they might be saved from bearing the consequences which their straightforwardness had provoked. For what room is left for courage if the soul thus tires of its life, so that, suppressing patience and cutting short the span of merits in midcourse, it fails or neglects to endure its appointed lot? The scorn which wise men have of life is such that as the price of infamy even the other life seems too cheap, but their love of life is such that so long as it can be retained with innocence, they do not cast it away when they are suddenly cornered by some difficulty. Life is therefore to be preserved to the end that, and provided that, it be held in scorn; it is to be scorned to the end that, and provided that, it be used profitably for salvation.

But who is there today who scorns life, since there is none, or only one here and there, who yearns not after money with his whole mind gaping wide? Why not? Since

"Birth and beauty are gifts of Queen Money, And a well-moneyed man is decorated by the goddesses of Persuasion and Love."²

² Hor., Ep. 1. 6, ll. 37-8.

A man who is rich, who prospers in his undertakings, is thought to be the wise and happy man. To this end one man takes a wife, another buys five yokes of oxen or a villa, each paying for his purchase with his own soul. Meanwhile those are reputed blind and lame and crippled upon whom the world does not smile, but whom wisdom none the less, to the exclusion of the rich, admits to her marriage feast, where the elect are intoxicated with the richness of God's household and made drunk from the torrent of eternal pleasure. Meanwhile whoever has not riches is a fool, an ass, a log, a block, a dolt, or aught else that is without sense or feeling. A man is a fool and a wretch, if he is poor. A man cannot even afford to be loved by one who is crushed beneath ill fortune, for, as has been said,

"Sincerity was never so great as to choose unfortunates for friends,"³

and a man is supposed to suffer justly all the ills which come upon him. And so the kingdom of money has grown so powerful that we do not even hope for a judge honest enough to repulse the gifts which are offered to him. If you are a judge and refuse to chaffer, you will be thought prejudiced against the case of the suitor who makes the offer; and perchance you will even be thought to have been corrupted in advance in favor of the other party by bribery or prejudice, if you merely desire to remain uncorrupted. Honor and reputation have already departed from philosophers, while everyone runs after riches, as if repose from labor and solace for grief were nowhere else to be found; it is precisely as if shipwrecked men should think that they could more easily win out of the deep by loading themselves down with a heavy pack. What man covered with sores ever collected thorns to the end that by wrapping himself therein he might rest the more softly? Truly, if we perfectly believed

³ Lucan, Pharsal. viii, 535.

Him who says "Riches are thorns,"⁴ the wise men of our time would not be seeking riches with such eager zeal. The rich, as Publius Carpus says, are in truth more miserable than the poor, in so far as they are at a greater distance from wisdom. For the appetite for riches is the exclusion of wisdom and banishes the virtues; poverty, fruitful of manhood, follows nature, the best guide of right living, and is the parent and guardian of the virtues, and alone brings in her train that security which is free from aught that incites to wars and strife. The man is troubled by no law-suits who is without the things that cause contentions. The world trembles and the poor man alone fears not the hand of Cæsar.

Even if riches should be avoided or despised for no other reason than that they hedge the paths of wisdom with thorns, it would be our duty not to love them. However, to prevent a bad opinion of philosophers from being conceived by those who are ashamed to be soiled by the meanness of poverty, philosophy does not enjoin us to flee from riches, but only forbids our lusting after them. It demands a mind which is master of itself, and which in every turn of fortune suffices unto itself, provided only that its sufficiency be from God. Thus it will use gold like clay and clay like gold, indifferently. For as riches are permitted because of the uses to which they may be put, so they are despised by the wise man when they are turned to abuse. It may be that simple apparel and outfit will appear shameful in the eyes of magnates, and that a slender fortune will tarnish the splendor of honor; and yet it is a far more excellent thing to be splendid in character than in the possession of physical things, nor will physical things ever bring glory to a man who is dishonored by the stain of his own infamy.

"The story is told that Anatocles the King dined from earthen ware,

⁴ Matt. xiii, 22.

And that his sideboard was often loaded down with Samian

clay; To one who asked the reason he replied: 'Although I am king

Of Sicily, I was born a potter's son. Treat fortune reverently, you who suddenly Are raised to riches from a poor station.'"⁵

And so it is not the thing which is vicious, but rather the use that it is put to.

And then the fruit of the philosophic spirit is a noble and generous equanimity of mind; for while it is a mark of stupidity or dullness to bear all things indifferently, none the less the mind is sick which loses its independence. Although there are many paths whereby to pursue philosophy, the one that seems to me the noblest, and more praiseworthy than others, is that

"Which feasts patiently on garden-herbs that it may learn To use things and which thus practices itself in the use of things,"⁶

to the end that it may thus train itself not to disdain garden-herbs and the other dainties of extreme poverty. Indeed, it is the finest fruit of philosophy to know how to bear both poverty and abundance, so that a man will meet every fate with a happy and even mind, and, presenting a front of solid virtue, wholly disarm fortune. Surely a man who has attained to this, will neither hope nor fear; and against such a man the attacks of fortune are always crippled. What has philosophy given you? asks someone who is inquisitive about philosophy. And Aristippus answers, "The power of speaking fearlessly to all men."⁷ For if a man were seeking honor or money or some other thing, this would often prevent him from giving a truthful answer.

⁵ Auson., Epigram. ii.

⁶ Apparently a misquotation of Hor., Ep. i, 17, 13-15

⁷ Apul., de Deo Socratis, Prol., 106.

The surest road to salvation is that of the man who is not encumbered by riches and other things. For it is most difficult for them not to impede the advance of those who possess them. Who does not know that Ypodamia reached the goal first because she could slacken the speed of her contending suitors by throwing before them a ball of gold? And so the virgin remained unvanquished until one came who was a despiser of money, and who by his disdain of gold outran the virgin, and thereby won the gold and thereafter, according to the tale, caused waxen axles to be made for the girl contender therefrom to signify that love of incorruption had consumed love of money. Does not the judgment of God itself commend this and make riches contemptible because the unjust abound in them while the good are often in poverty? Nevertheless, it sometimes chances I know not how, that for the undoing of just men, riches force themselves upon them; and the more diligently they are excluded, the more eagerly they knock at the door of the man who despises them. The more earnestly the blessed Eugenius refused gifts, the greater was the number thereof that poured in upon him from all sides. And indeed in almost all cases it happens that things which are sought, flee from the seeker, while if one flies from a thing, it hastens forward to meet him. And this indeed is the shortest and most honorable road to riches. For when riches are barred out by prudence, it comes to pass both that eternal life is won and at the same time wealth does not fail to accumulate. Even if this course is too hard for others to follow, it ought at least to be pursued by judges, whether ecclesiastical or temporal, who are bound to justice by their profession or by an oath. Samuel is the type and model for both, who so presided over the sacrifices that he did not spare the blood of the ungodly, and so dealt out justice of both kinds that he oppressed no man and accepted nought from the hand of any. This was attested both by his own conscience and by the people, yet his scrupulous conscience was not satisfied until

the people confirmed their testimony by an oath. For he said, "God is my witness against you, and His anointed is my witness on this day that you have not found anything in my hand." And they said, "He is witness."⁸ A judge to whom the people of a province give such testimony, may approach without anxiety the judgment seat of the all-powerful and all-knowing God. For the man prepares his case prudently who places in the balance his own conscience and human judgment, whereof the Judge on high is aware. But those who, unlike Samuel, do not lay open their judgments in this way, but run at once into excuses for their sins and, as if washing their hands, cry out with Pilate, "I am innocent of the blood of this just man," — these men because they have sinned against the law will be condemned by the law. And those likewise shall share in their condemnation who have power to restrain them but will not. Of these matters enough has been said for a wise man. And now let my pen pass on to those who are likened to the hands in the simile of Plutarch.

⁸ 1 Sam. xii, 5.

Here ends the Fifth Book

Here Begins THE SIXTH BOOK

(AND HEREIN OF THE ARMED HAND OF

THE COMMONWEALTH, AND OF

THE MUTUAL COHESION OF

HEAD AND MEMBERS)

PROLOGUE

There is a well-known passage from the ethical writer to the effect that:

"Near the Emilian school you will find a smith who is unique

In his skill to shape the finger-nails and imitate the waves of the hair in bronze;

But the total effect of his work is unhappy because he does not know

How to achieve a complete whole. If I desired to compose anything,

I would no more wish to be this man than to have a deformed nose

While everyone gazed in admiration at my black eyes and raven locks."^l

I regard this simile as applicable to my own attempt to follow faithfully and closely the footsteps of Plutarch in his "Instruction of Trajan," and I shall be an object of universal ridicule unless I carry through to completion the task which I have commenced. Therefore I shall continue in his steps and shall descend with him from the head of the commonwealth even to the feet, with the proviso, however, that if in this part of the work it shall seem to those who are permitted to be without knowledge of the law that I am cutting too deep, they shall charge it not to me but to Plutarch, or rather to themselves, because they have been unwilling to learn the rule which they acknowledge, and in accordance with which they are obliged to live. As to what I shall say regarding my own countrymen, I

¹ Horace, Ars Poetica, 32-37.

have added it with only this intention, that they may return into the way of virtue even though unwillingly. For to inspire them to do the things which they ought to do, it should suffice for them that they have not merely the examples of the men of old times, but have also before their eyes the greatness of our own unconquered prince, whose titles of honor I now gather together into one place, that even as the trumpet and clarions of others and every kind of musical instrument shall sound in unison his praise in one great burst of sound, so I, a man of humble birth and unlearned, may likewise spread abroad his fame among those of my own station with my strident reed. For who expects from one who is half a rustic the music of a flute jointed with copper and rivalling the grandeur of the trumpet? Yet I shall not stand back, but shall boldly enter upon the solemn task; and what I lack in ability will be supplied by the abundance of my devotion.

"While the wild boar loves the mountain sides and the fish love

the streams,

While bees feed on thyme and the cicadas on dew, His honor and his name and his praises shall stand fast forever."²

But if great men think that aught is said to their injury, let them be taught by their prince that bitter medicines are drunk not for the destruction but for the healing of the sick. With so much by way of preface, let me now proceed to what remains.

² Verg., Ecl. v, 76-78.

CHAPTER I

THAT THE HAND OF THE COMMONWEALTH IS EITHER ARMED

OR UNARMED; AND OF THE HAND WHICH IS UNARMED,

AND ITS FUNCTION.

The hand of the commonwealth is either armed or unarmed. The armed hand is that which performs the soldiering of camps and blood; the unarmed is that which administers justice and, keeping holiday from arms, is enlisted in the service of the law. For not those alone do military service for the commonwealth¹ who, protected by helmets and cuirasses, ply their swords or what other weapons you please against the foe, but also the advocates and pleaders of causes who, trusting to the bulwark of their glorious voice, lift up the fallen, refresh the weary; nor do they less serve mankind, than if they were preserving from the foe by the use of weapons the life, hope and posterity of those who are hard-pressed. Publicans, apparitors, and all officers of the law courts may also be said to perform military service. For as some offices are of peace and others of war, so it is necessary that the ones should be performed by one set of officials, the others by another.

The armed hand is employed only against the enemy, the unarmed is stretched out against the citizen also. It is needful that both should be subject to discipline, because both have a noteworthy tendency to viciousness. Besides, the way in which the hands are used bears witness to the character of the head, because, as Wisdom says, an unjust king has none but ungodly

¹ Justin., Cod., ii, 7, 14.

ministers; and as is the ruler of a state, so are those who inhabit therein.² A magistrate, said Perides, blaming his colleague Soffocles, should not only have continent hands, but continent eyes as well. And the continence of rulers is praiseworthy when it is such that they not merely refrain their own hands from extortion and wrong, but restrain the hands of others as well.

The hand of each militia, to wit both the armed and the unarmed, is the hand of the prince himself; and unless he restrains both, he is not continent. And in truth the unarmed hand is to be curbed the more tightly for the reason that while the soldiery of arms are enjoined to abstain from extortion and rapine, the unarmed hand is debarred even from taking gifts. But if a lawful penalty is demanded of anyone, if it is a question in other words of exacting or receiving that which is fixed or allowed by law, then there is no ground for punishment or blame. Whatever it is, it cannot properly be called an exaction; nor does it fall into the class of gifts which officials are forbidden to receive.

Because the license of officials has a freer rein in that they can use the pretext of their office to despoil or harass private persons, all usurpations contrary to their official duty must be punished with a proportionately heavier penalty. Blessed Laurence, the bishop of Milan, says, "What is a publican? Is he not a person given over to rapine, whose law is violence? What is a publican? A plunderer without shame, a physician of destruction. Is not a publican more monstrous than a thief? For the thief steals timidly; but this man sins boldly."³ The thief fears the noose of the law; this man thinks that whatever he may do is the law. The law frightens the thief from unlawful acts; but this man debases the law into a handy instrument of injustice for his own evil purposes.

Who is more unjust than one who with the words of justice

² Proverbs xxix, 12. ³ Migne, P. L., tom. lxvi, 118.

condemns justice and with the weapons of innocence despoils, wounds, and slays the innocent? By law he utterly annihilates law, and while he impels others to keep the law, he is himself an outlaw. "For as the magistrate, even when he decides unjustly, speaks the law, having regard not to what he does but to what he ought to do; so the publican, even when he offends against the law, seems to fulfil it, having regard to his official duty and not to his wicked intent."⁴ But what is the official duty of a publican? We learn from the narrative of Luke that the publicans came to John to be baptized, and asked him. "Master, what shall we do?" And, answering, he said to them, "Exact no more than that which is appointed for you."⁵ This, then, is the duty of a publican, to exact and receive no more than is appointed. Every excess proceeds from the evil of him who exacts and receives, and not of him who gives. This principle is extended to the officials of all magistracies, namely, that their exactions shall not exceed this limit.

Apparitors also may properly exact that which is due to them by way of fees,⁶ and all grades of military commanders may justly accept their appointed stipend. But they may not resort to oppression or abuse to extort gifts in addition. "Fire," says blessed Job, "shall devour the tents of those who love to accept gifts. Their coming together hath conceived pain and brought forth iniquity, and the womb thereof prepareth deceits."⁷ The whole tribe of publicans from the greatest down to the least has now no time for justice but only for extortion, and rages so furiously against the people that what one leaves, the rest do not long delay to carry off; as if they were appointed, according to the complaint of the prophet, to the end that what was left by the locust might be eaten up by the brucus.⁸ And that their opportunity of doing harm may be enlarged, one man will

⁴ Dig. i, 1, 11. ⁵ Luke iii, 12, 13.

⁶ Dig. iv, 6, § 24; Justin., Cod. i, 3, 32, § 5; iii, 2, 5. ⁷ See Job. xv, 34, 35. ⁸ Joel i, 4.

pile up for himself a plurality of offices, so that the profit which he does not draw from one, he will reap from another. The phisiologers tell that from the locust is produced the brucus, or larva of the locust, which is called so until it has wings. Then, while its wings are growing, and when it first begins to fly, it is called athelebus. When it has fully gained the power to fly, it becomes a locust once more; and much more grievous is the brucus than the locust and the athelebus, because being without wings it cannot move quickly from place to place, and so, wherever it comes, it devours the fruits of the earth utterly. The locust and athelebus are harmful when they come, and perhaps in many different places, but less so, however, than the brucus, which after it has once set itself down, never moves away from that place until it has wholly eaten up the labors of men. And among officials you will meet with this same brucus, athelebus, and locust, who harms those near-by and those afar off, and when he has once settled himself down upon any person, devours his fortune and does not depart until he carries away all his victim's substance. Who can count how many wards such an official has most dutifully defrauded, how many farms his wrong-doing has put up for sale, and how many of our people the license of such men has stripped of their possessions and in the name of religion or on some other pretext has sent them overseas, not so much as pilgrims to Rome or some other shrine, as in reality exiles? Verily, these things are done openly, and neither governors nor proconsuls check them, because, as the saying is, the raven rejoices in the works of the wolf, and the unjust judge applauds the minister of injustice.

From experience this has become a familiar occurrence in lands whose princes are infidels and the associates of thieves, and when they see the latter engaged in wrong-doing, do but run to their aid, and add their own share of iniquity to the end that they may get for themselves some portion of the spoil. If you are an official and take pity on some poor man, if you weep

over some failure of justice, if you resolve to give aid, if you even dare to speak mildly against these men, and do not say to all that they say or do, "Well-done! Well-done!" then these same officials of Herod will accuse you of lèse majesté and you will have to give an account of yourself before the governor. And if you do not bend to him in all things, you will be contradicting Cæsar, and if you do not agree to whatsoever he says, that so indeed it is and so indeed it goes, then you will be acting against the person of the king and against the crown. Then there will be a rising up and crying out against you, and to the very clouds will go up the clamor of the officials, repeating with a great voice: "We have found this man perverting the people, and prohibiting the payment of tribute to Cæsar, and denying that Cæsar is king and that all things are lawful for his ministers; we have found this man bringing to nought the laws of our fathers, seeking to introduce new ones, and despising most ancient custom; of this we are witnesses." If then you wish to clear your innocence or to add aught for the sake of justice, if you say that Christ is king and that it is more important to obey Him than to obey men, if you bring forward some privilege of the Church (for this is in their eyes the most hateful plea of all), straightway lifting up their voices they will chant, "What further witnesses do you want? Lo, you yourselves hear his blasphemy; whoever asserts such things, contradicts Christ." But if the judge, recognizing innocence before him and respecting justice, hesitates, then from all sides they cry out: "If you set free this man, you are not a friend of Cæsar. That the punishment of one may be the deliverance of many, take this man and destroy him, to the end that Barrabas may live and prosper." For they are all like one body, whose father, as their manifest works declare, is the devil himself, and of which body they are the limbs. Well does blessed Job say of them that their "body is like a shield fused together and compacted of scales adhering closely; one is joined to an-

other so that there is not even a breathing space between them; one coheres to another and they lock, so that they cannot be sundered."⁹ For they stand by one another, because they have banded together against God and His Christ. So great is their authority that whatever they say has the same force as if it were found in the statute-book. Their testimony is conclusive against the truth. There is none except the prince who can lawfully go against their decisions. If the prince curbs them not, then although all men should say that there is peace, there is in truth no peace, or only that peace in which is the bitterest bitterness. For though in other cases it is lawful to repel force with force provided that one keeps within the bounds of permissible self-defence, yet against these men, although they are extortioners, despoilers and torturers, it is not permissible even to breathe a word; for they are the visible ministers of the law. A man is excused by the law for that which he does for the protection of his own body; but if he resists these traitors when they seek to wrong him, he will be judged worthy of any punishment, no matter how severe. If one of them rumples or soils or tears your hair, plucks out your beard, pulls your ears as though they needed lengthening, if he gives you a cuff or shamefully strikes you with his fist, if he gouges out one eye, be careful to submit with all patience unless you wish to lose the other also; for whatever they presume to do, they boast that it is done with the right hand of Cæsar. If you brandish a weapon in your hand, if you refuse of your own accord to bow your neck to the blow, the man will bare his belly, point to his throat, hold out his neck and defy you to lay open with your sword, if you dare, the bowels of Cæsar, or to lay your hand in any manner upon the body of Cæsar; for he boasts that he bears the person of Cæsar. But if this is the right hand of Cæsar, what can his left hand be? Truly the behavior of these ministers does not execute justice but turns it to ridicule, does not fulfil the ⁹ Job. xli, 6-8.

law but brings it to nought, although some furiously employ their prerogative of words to defend by falsehood their offence against the intention of the law; for "they are wise men to do evil." ¹⁰ But although they are a most hurtful pest to the provincials, to no one can they really be more hurtful than to the prince himself; for what is to the advantage of the provincials is to the advantage of the prince. All things belonging to the provincials are by law subjected and made available to the necessity and advantage of the prince. The whole province is accordingly like the prince's strong-box, and whosoever drains it, offends most grievously against the prince by diminishing his resources. For the provincials are like tenants by superficies, and when the advantage of the ruling power so requires, they are not so much owners of their possessions as mere custodians. But if there is no such pressure of necessity, then the goods of the provincials are their own and not even the prince himself may lawfully abuse them. For if it is to the advantage of the commonwealth that no one should use his own property wrongfully, obviously it is not lawful to abuse that which belongs to another. Besides, after a province has been exhausted by these ministers of iniquity and wickedness and satellites of Satan, these men of Herod, what resources will the prince have available for his use when need arises? Therefore if he is wise, he will curb their jaws with bit and bridle, so that they cannot, after the way of wolves driven on by unclean gluttony, lay waste and mangle the province, and, to the prince's injury, exhaust the whole strength of the commonwealth. O