Volume 1 — Appendix
[Section 4 — Powers of Congress]
Let us now take a view of the federal and state constitutions, and examine
the structure and organization of the government, arising from their mutual
connection, and the distribution of power among the several branches or
departments of each, respectively.
The powers of government, both by the federal and state constitutions, are
distributed under three heads, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; and
these three departments the state constitution 53 expressly declares shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other.
We shall nevertheless find that the constitution itself has in many respects
blended them; assigning to the legislative body, duties, which, in strictness,
belong to the executive; as in the appointment of the officers of government,
&c. Yet this is undoubtedly conformable to the nature of a democracy in
this, that the appointment is vested in the immediate representatives of the
people. The constitution of the United States seems upon the same principle to
have vested congress, in whom the legislative power is reposed, with powers
absolutely foreign from the exercise of legislation, strictly speaking; but
which will appear upon a scrutiny to have been more safely and beneficially
entrusted to that department, than they could have been to any other
whatsoever. Yet these deviations from the fundamental maxims of the government
are to be construed strictly, and not made use of as precedents to justify
others, where the constitution by its silence must be presumed to have referred
it to that head under which it properly falls.
In the course of this investigation, we shall have occasion to enquire into
the constituent parts of these several departments; with the mode of
constituting them; the periods for which they are chosen; their respective
qualifications, duties, and privileges; with the manner of removing them from,
and punishing them for, any misconduct in office.
We shall begin with the federal government.
I. Of the congress.
1. The first article or the federal constitution, declares, that all
legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. These,
therefore, are the constituent parts of the federal legislature.
2. & 3. The next section prescribes the manner in which the last of
these bodies shall be chosen 54, that is to
say, every second year, by the people of the several states; the qualifications
of the electors being the same as that of electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature 55.
The same article provides that representatives and direct taxes shall be
apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, to
be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other persons; according to an actual enumeration to be made
every ten years 56: but the number
of representatives is limited to one for every thirty thousand persons
This mode of ascertaining the number of representatives, and the inseperable
connection thereby established between the benefits and burthens of the state,
seems to be more consonant with the true principles of representation than any
other which has hitherto been suggested 58.
For every man, in his individual capacity, has an equal right to vote in
matters which concern the whole community: no just reason therefore can be
assigned why ten men in one part of the community should have greater weight in
it's councils, than one hundred in a different place, as is the case in
England, where a borough composed of half a dozen freeholders, sends perhaps as
many representatives to parliament, as a county which contains as many
thousands; this unreasonable disparity appears to be happily guarded against by
our constitution. It may be doubted indeed how the apportionment of the
numbers, as it respects slaves, is founded upon the principles of perfect
equality; and if it be not, it may be a further question whether the advantage
preponderates on the side of the states that have the most, or the fewest
slaves amongst them; for, if on the one hand it be urged, that slaves are not
in the rank of persons 59, being no more
than goods or chattels, according to the opinion of the Roman jurists, and
consequently not entitled to representation, it may be answered that the ratio
of representation and taxation being the same, this additional weight in
council is purchased at an expence which secures the opposite party from the
abuse of it in the imposition of burthens on the government. On the other hand,
it must be remembered, that the two fifths of this class of people who are not
represented, are by that means exempted from taxation. An exemption which
probably took its rise from the unprofitable condition of that proportion of
the number of slaves.
The times, places and manner of holding elections for representatives and
senators, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature; subject
nevertheless to such alterations as congress may make, except as to the places
of choosing senators 60.
It cannot be denied, that this article vests a power in congress, the
exercise of which, if not really dangerous to the liberties of the states
61, may at least interrupt their
tranquility, unless dictated by the utmost wisdom and discretion. In some of
the states the vote is conducted by ballot, in others viva voce. In some the
members are chosen by a general ticket or ballot of the whole state; in others
the representatives are chosen by districts. Without entering into the
discussion of the preference due to either of these modes, we may venture to
pronounce that the states respectively will be tenacious of that to which their
own constitution or laws may have given the preference: any attempt to render
the manner of election uniform must therefore inevitably produce discontents
among the states. Hitherto the congress has wisely left this article to the
direction of the state governments. The manner of proceeding in this state, as
established by the act of 1788, (V. L.) c. 2. amended by the act of 1792. c. 1
62, is shortly, as follows.
The act divides the states into as many districts, as there are
representatives to be chosen, and directs that the persons qualified by law to
vote for members to the house of delegates, in each county composing a
district, shall assemble at their respective court houses, on the third Monday
in March, (now altered by the act of 1798. c. 14. to the fourth Wednesday in
April) in every second year, and then and there vote for a proper person as a
representative in congress. The election to be conducted by the high sheriff,
or in case of sickness or inability to attend, one of his deputies, in the same
manner as the elections for delegates, except that as no determination is to be
had by view, but only by the polls, the votes being publickly taken viva voce.
Immediately after the closing of the poll, the clerk having first signed the
same and made oath to the truth thereof, is to deliver it to the sheriff; the
sheriffs of the respective counties in the district shall within seven days
thereafter, assemble at the court house of the county first named in the
district, compare their respective polls, and return the person having the
greater number of votes, or in case of an equality of votes, giving their own
votes. Duplicates of such return under the hands and seals of the sheriffs are
to be sent one to the governor, the other to the representative elected, within
ten days thereafter under the penalty of 100, and the poll book under a similar
penalty are to be returned again to the clerk of the counties respectively. The
governor is moreover required to transmit to congress without delay the returns
made to him. The act further provides that no person shall, during the same
election, vote more than once for the same candidate; under the penalty of one
hundred dollars. This provision was made to prevent persons voting in several
counties within the same district.
The representatives by this bill are chosen immediately by the people, in a
public manner, by the electors within an aggregate number of counties composing
a district. The person chosen seems to be strictly the delegate of those by
whom he is chosen, and bound by their instructions whenever they think proper
to exercise the right. This principle has been denied by the British writers
63 on their own government, and a deference
to the maxims of that government probably prevented the decision of the
question, when agitated in congress in the form of am article to a proposed
bill of rights: but if the maxim be true, that all power is derived from the
people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times
amenable to them for their conduct, it seems impossible to withhold our assent
from the proposition, that in a popular government the representative is bound
to speak the sense of his constituents upon every subject, where he is informed
of it. The difficulty of collecting the sense of the people upon any question,
forms no argument against their right to express that sense when they shall
think proper so to do. Otherwise, by whatever denomination the government may
be called, it is a confined aristocracy, in which the people have nothing more
to do than to choose their rulers, over whose proceedings, however despotic,
and repugnant to the nature and principles of the fundamental laws of the
state, they have no control 64. It will be
answered, that the power of removing and punishing is not denied by this
doctrine. I answer, that the power of preventing offences against the
commonwealth, is to be preferred to that of punishing offenders: and if the
government is virtually in the people, it ought to be so organized, that
whenever they chuse to exercise the right of governing, they may do it without
destroying it's existence. Corruption and mal-administration, unchecked, may
drive them to a resumption of all the powers which they have entrusted to the
government, and bring on tumults and disturbances which will end only with it's
final dissolution: an event to be apprehended in all governments, but
particularly in democracies, since dissatisfaction towards the administration
may produce a desire of change in the constitution itself; and every change by
which the government is in the smallest degree removed from its republican
nature and principle, must be for the worse. This danger is effectually avoided
by the principle here contended for. The aggregate of mankind understand their
own interest and their own happiness better than any individual: they never can
he supposed to have resigned the right of judging for themselves to any set of
men whatsoever; it is a right which can never be voluntarily resigned, though
it may be wrested from their hands by tyranny, or violated by the infidelity
and perfidy of their servants.
When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the executive
authority thereof, shall issue writs of election to fill the vacancies
The manner of electing senators is much shorter, being vested in the
legislatures of the several states; each state being entitled to two senators,
whose periods of service are six years, and each senator is entitled to one
The election of representatives we have seen; is by a mode strictly popular.
Had the distinction of states been entirely done away, there could have been no
good reason assigned, perhaps, why the elections of senators should not have
been assimilated thereto, at least in respect to numbers, since in a government
where all parts are equal, no preference under any pretext whatsoever ought to
be allowed to any one part, over the rest. Why then should Rhode Island and
Delaware have as many representatives in the senate as Virginia and
Massachusetts, which contain ten times their respective numbers? It has been
answered, the senate are chosen to represent the states in their sovereign
capacity, as moral bodies, who as such, are all equal; the smallest republic,
as a sovereign state, being equal to the most powerful monarchy upon earth
67, As states, then, Rhode Island and
Delaware are entitled to an equal weight in council on all occasions, where
that weight does not impose a burthen upon the other states in the union. Now
as the relation between taxation and representation, in one branch of the
legislature, was fixed by an invariable standard, and as that branch of the
legislature possesses the exclusive right of originating bills on the subject
of revenue, the undue weight of the smaller states is guarded against,
effectually, in the imposition of burdens. In all other cases their interests,
as states, are equal, and deserve equal attention from the confederate
government. This could no way he so effectually provided for, as in giving them
equal weight in the second branch of the legislature; and in the executive
whose province it is to make treaties, &c.... Without this equality,
somewhere, the union could not, under any possible view, have been considered
as an equal alliance between equal states. The disparity which must have
prevailed, had the apportionment of representation been the same in the senate
as in the other house, would have been such as to have submitted the smaller
states to the most debasing dependence, I cannot, therefore, but regard this
particular in the constitution, as one of the happiest traits in it, and
calculated to cement the union equally with any other provision that it
This body is not, like the former, dissolved at the end of the period for
which it's members were ejected; it is a permanent, perpetual body; the
members, indeed, are liable to a partial change every two years, the senate
being divided into three classes, one of which is vacated every second year, so
that a total change in the members may be made in six years, but cannot
possibly be effected, without the intervention of death, in less time....
According to the arrangements of the classes actually made, both the senators
from the same state shall never vacate their seats at the same time; a
provision which certainly has it's advantages, as no state is thereby in danger
of being not represented at any time.
This mode of constituting the senate, seems liable to some important
objections 68. The perpetuity of the body
is favorable to every stride it may be disposed to make towards extending power
and influence in the government: a tendency to be discovered in all bodies,
however constituted, and to which no effectual check can be opposed, but
frequent dissolutions and elections. It is no satisfactory answer to this
objection, that the members are removable, though the body itself be perpetual.
The change, even were the members ineligible a second time, would be too
gradual, to effect any counterpoise to this prevailing principle.
It has been insisted that the perpetuity of this body, is the only security
to be found in the constitution against that instability of councils and of
measures which has marked the proceedings of those States, where no such check
is provided by the constitution 69. To
which it may be answered, that every newly established government must be a
government of experiment.... The design of a machine may appear correct, the
model perfect, and adapted to all the purposes which the original inventor
proposed: yet a thousand defects may be discovered when the actual application
of it's powers is made, and, many useful improvements, in time, become obvious,
to the eyes of a far less skilful mechanic. Their success and perfection must,
however, still depend upon actual experiment, and that experiment may suggest
still further improvement. Are we to reject these because they did not occur to
the first projector, though evidently growing out of his original design? Or,
if on the other hand we have unwarily adopted that as an improvement, which
experiment shall evince to he a defect, shall we be so wedded to error as to
persist in the practice of it, for no better reason than that we have once
fallen into it.
In case of vacancies in the office of senator, the executive of the state
are authorized to make a temporary appointment until the next meeting of the
legislature, who are then to fill the vacancy 70.
4. The qualifications of the members of these bodies respectively, are, that
both senators and representatives should have been citizens of the United
States, the former nine, and the latter seven years 71 and be citizens also of that state for
which they shall be chosen, at the time of their election; to which the law of
the state adds, that a representative should be a freeholder and resident of
the district for which he is chosen 72: a
wise provision and perfectly consonant with the principles of representation,
which should be made from the body of the people with whom the representative
must be presumed to have a common interest, but which perhaps may be rendered
nugatory, by the constitution which imposes no such condition, and which makes
each house the judge of the qualifications, as well as of the elections and
returns of its own members. The constitution further requires that a
representative should be twenty-five, and a senator thirty years of age
73; to which may be added that no person
holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house
during his continuance in office 74.
So much for the qualifications of the members of congress, to which we may
subjoin their incapacities, as individuals, during the period for which they
are elected; these are shortly an incapacity of being appointed to any civil
office under the United States, which shall have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during their time 75. An
admirable provision against venality, but which, it is to be feared, is not
sufficiently guarded to prevent evasion. And to preclude undue influence on the
part of the federal government over that of the commonwealth, it is provided by
a law of the state 76, that the members of
congress shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any seat in either
house of assembly, or any legislative, executive, or judicial office, or other
lucrative office whatsoever, under the government of this commonwealth: and
this last provision is by the same act extended to all persons holding any
legislative, executive, judicial or other lucrative office whatsoever under the
United States, with a proviso in favour of militia officers, and county court
5. Senators and representatives during their attendance in congress, as also
in travelling to and returning from the place of their session, are privileged
from arrest in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace
77; and no speech or debate in either house
can be questioned in any other place. They are also entitled to a compensation
for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of
the United States 78.
These are all the personal privileges which the constitution gives to the
members of the federal legislature. And here I shall transcribe the words of
one of it's former members on a similar occasion.... "The members of the
legislature ought certainly to have no privilege but what is demonstrably
essential to the freedom, and welfare of their constituents. The state is not
made to dignify it's officers, but the the E2 officers to serve the state. The dignity of
a commonwealth does not consist in the elevation of one, or a few, but in the
equal freedom of the whole. The privileges of the legislature ought to be
defined by the constitution, and should be fixed as low as is consistent with
the public welfare.".... This is the point which the constitution appears
to have had in view, and very happily to have attained; and it is to be
sincerely wished, the question may never arise whether they ought to have been
more, or less, limitted.
Thus much for the privileges of the members; each house has moreover it's
own distinct privileges and powers; those of the house of representatives are,
1. To chuse their own speaker, and other officers 79.
2. To originate all bills for raising a revenue; but the senate may
propose, or concur with amendments, as on other bills 80.
3. This house also possesses the sole power of impeachment 81. These are all it's exclusive privileges.
The vice-president of the United States is, by virtue of his office,
president of the senate; but has no vote unless they be equally divided
This power may at first view appear to be of no great consequence: it is
however of the utmost importance; and the occasions on which it is said to have
been exercised, will demonstrate the necessity of leaving it, as seldom as
possible, to it's full scope 83.
In fact this part of the constitution gives a decided influence in the
legislature to that part of the United States from which the vice-president
shall be elected. He has eventually a veto, without being obliged to assign his
reasons for it; it is otherwise with the president. But to return to the
1. In case of the absence of the vice-president, or of his exercising the
office of president of the United States, they may choose a president pro
tempore.... they have also a right of choosing all their other officers
2. The senate have the sole power of trying impeachments 85. A most inordinate power, and, in some
instances, utterly incompatible with their other functions, as we shall
hereafter have occasion more fully to demonstrate.
3. The senate likewise constitute a part of the executive department
86 .... the examination of which part of
their constitution we shall take up under its proper head.
Exclusive of these privileges which the two houses possess, as
contradistinguished from each other, each house possesses the right of
determining the rules of it's own proceedings; of punishing it's members for
disorderly behaviour; and of expulsion, provided two-thirds concur therein
Each house is moreover the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of it's own members 95, as
we have before observed; a majority of each is requisite to form a quorum to do
business; a provision of no small importance, since otherwise it is possible
that the concerns of the nation might be decided by a very small portion of
it's representatives; if; as has been done in other assemblies, the quorum were
left to the decision of the body itself. In England, where there are near six
hundred members in the house of commons, the number of 45 constitutes a quorum
to do business. Is it possible that the nation can be represented by that
number, whilst the elections stand upon their present footing? But although it
requires a majority of the house of representatives, or the senate, to do the
business of the nation, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
96, and compel the attendance of absent
Each house is moreover required to keep a journal of its proceedings
97, and from time to time to publish the
same; excepting such parts as may in their judgments require secrecy; a
provision evidently calculated to defeat the salutary purposes of the former
part of the rule; since every measure which intrigue may dictate, or cabal
enforce, may thus be hid from the public eye, by being consigned to the secret
journals an expedient too obvious to be neglected whenever it may be found
The yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at
the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal
98. Any member of the house of lords in
England may enter his protest on the journals of the house, but the commons
possess no such privilege. In a representative government, it is of the utmost
consequence that the people should be informed of the conduct of their
delegates individually, as well as collectively. This purpose is fully answered
by the rule here spoken of. But to prevent a call of the yeas and nays too
frequently, as is said to have been practised in the former congress, the
constitution has set some reasonable limits to the exercise of this power, by
requiring that at least one-fifth of the members present should concur in the
expediency of it.
To prevent those inconveniencies which might arise from the national
legislatures omitting to assemble as often as the affairs of the nation
require, the constitution provides, that congress shall assemble 99, at least once a year, and fixes the period
of assembling to the first Monday of December, unless they shall by law appoint
another day. It likewise vests the president of the United States with the
power of convening them, or either house, on extraordinary occasions
Lastly, to prevent the evils which might result from the want of a proper
concert and good understanding between the houses, it is provided
101, that neither house, during the
session of congress shall, without consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be
sitting. And further to guard against any inconvenience which might result from
their disagreement, it is provided 102,
that in such case the president may adjourn them to any time he shall think
proper. This is the only instance in which the constitution permits an
interference, with the duration of the session, on the part of the executive;
and we have already seen, that though the power of convening the congress is
entrusted, on extraordinary occasions, to the president of the United States,
yet he has none to prevent, or even retard their assembling, at any time, by
their own adjournment, or at certain stated periods fixed by law, or by the
The duration of congress is necessarily limited to two years, the period for
which the house of representatives is chosen. The period of its commencement
seems to have been fixed to the fourth day of March, the day on which the first
congress assembled, and that of it's expiration to the third of that month
biennially .... It is incapable of any other mode of termination, their being
no power in any part of the government to dissolve it. By these wise and
salutary provisions; it is effectually guarded against every possible
encroachment on it's independence. Very different from the constitution of the
British parliament, since the crown may, at any time, put an end to a session
by a prorogation, or to the existence of a parliament by a dissolution.
The president of the United States may be considered sub modo, as one of the
constituent parts of congress 103, since
the constitution requires that every bill, order, resolution, or vote, to which
the concurrence of the senate and house of representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to him: if he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to that
house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at
large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
reconsideration two thirds of that house agree to pass it, it shall be sent,
together with the objections to the other house, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that house shall become a law.
In all such cases the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journals of both
houses. If any bill, &c. be not returned by the president within ten days,
Sundays excepted, unless in case of adjournment, whereby the return is
prevented, it shall nevertheless be a law &c.
This closes our hasty sketch of the constituent parts of the congress of the
United States, with a short view of the duration and the outlines of the
distinct powers, and privileges of both houses, as also of the individuals who
compose them. Before we proceed to the investigation of the powers of the whole
body thus formed, let us compare some of it's most distinguished features, with
those of the two houses of the British parliament, long held in idolatrous
veneration, as a palladium of political freedom which some partial deity had
bestowed upon that favourite nation, and presenting a model of perfection which
the combined wisdom of nations, and of ages, could but faintly imitate, and
never equal. We shall occasionally resume this comparison at different periods
of our enquiry, in order to assist the student in the application of what he
will meet with in authors on the subject of that far famed constitution, to the
more recent institutions of our own.
53. C. V. Art. 3.
54. On this subject the student is referred
to the Federalist, Nos. 52. and 53.
55. The act of 1785 c. 55. (V. L.) fixes
the qualification of electors to be a freehold estate, in twenty-five acres of
land, with a house the superficial content of the foundation whereof is twelve
feet square or equal to that quantity, and a plantation thereon; or in fifty
acres of unimproved land; or in a lot, or part of a lot of land in a city or
town established by act of assembly, with a house thereon of the like
superficial content or quantity; but the possession of lands, in virtue of
which the right of suffrage is claimed, unless acquired by descent, devise, or
marriage settlement, must have continued six months.
In Williamsburg and Norfolk every house-keeper being a citizen is entitled to
Free negroes, mullattoes, persons under the age of twenty-one years, and such
as have refused to give assurance of fidelity to the commonwealth, are excluded
from the right of suffrage.
[56. Separate file.]
57. On this subject the student is referred
to the Federalist No. 55, 56, 57, 58.
58. The student is referred to the
Federalist, No. 51.
59. Spavan's Puffendorf, p.
60. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect. 4, see also
Federalist, No. 59, 60, 61, upon this subject.
61. Amendments on this subject have been
proposed by the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island, New-York,
Virginia, North-Carolina, and South-Carolina.
62. These two acts are omitted in the
compilation of 1794.
63. Black. Com. 159.
64. "When we elect persons to
represent us in parliament" (says a judicious writer) "we must not be
supposed to depart from the smallest right which we have deposited with them.
We make a lodgment, not a gift; we entrust, but part with
nothing. And, were it possible that they should attempt to destroy that
constitution which we had appointed them to maintain, they can no more he held
in the rank of representatives than a factor turned pirate, can continue to be
called the factor of those merchants whose goods he had plundered, and whose
confidence he had betrayed. The men, whom we thus depute to parliament, are not
the bare likeness or reflection of us their constituents; they actually contain
our powers and privileges, and are, as it were, the very persons of the people
they represent. We are the parliament in them? we speak and act by them. We
have, therefore, a right to know what they are saying and doing. And should
they contradict our sense, or swerve from our interests, we have a right to
remonstrate in form, and direct them. By which means we become the regulators
of our own conduct, and the institutors of our own laws, and nothing material
can be done but by our authority and consent." Burgh's Political
Disquisitions, Vol. 1. p. 202.... However inadmissible this doctrine may be
in Great Britain, it seems perfectly adapted to the principles of our
65. C. U. S. art. 1. sect. 2.
66. Ibid. sect. 3. See the
Federalist, No. 62.
67. Vattel, 9, 16.
68. See Federalist, No. 62.
70. C. U. S. Art. 1. §. 3.
71. Ibid. §. 2 & 3.
72. V. L. Acts of 1788, c. 2. 1792, c.
73. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sec. 2 and 3.
74. Ibidem, Sec. 6.
75. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sec. 6.
76. V. L. Acts of 1788, c .38, 1794, c. 36.
Amended 1798, c. 15.
77. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sec. 6.
78. The act of the first congress, 1
Session, c. 17 fixed the compensation to the members of congress at six dollars
per diem, and the same for every twenty miles distance, which they travel in
coming to and returning from congress, until the fourth of March, 1795. After
which period the members of the senate were to receive seven dollars, and the
representatives six dollars only per diem. But the act of the 4th congress, c.
4. places the members of both houses exactly on the same footing, allowing them
six dollars per diem, without distinction.
79. C. U. S. Art. 1. s. 2.
80. Ibid. s. 7.
81. C. U. S. Art. 1. s. 2.
82. Ibid. s. 3.
83. In the first session of the second
congress, the house of representatives passed a bill apportioning the number of
representatives in the ratio of one for thirty thousand. The senate were
equally divided upon this bill. Some of the members, though momently expected,
being absent, the question was put, and carried by the decision of the vice
president against the bill. If ever a case could he named under the
constitution which seemed to belong solely to the representatives to determine,
it was this.
84. C. U. S. Art. 1. s. 3.
86. Ibid. Art. 2. s. 2.
[87. Separate file.]
[89-94 in Footnote 87 file.]
95. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect. 5.
96. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect. 5.
98. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect. 5.
99. Art. 1. S. 4.
100. Art. 2. S. 3.
101. Art. 1. S. 5.
102. C. U. S. Art. 2. Sect. 3.
103. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect. 7.
E2. The double "the" is in the
original text. Perhaps a typesetter error.
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