To The Inhabitants Of America
March 21, 1778
WITH all the pleasure with
which a man exchanges bad company for good, I take my leave of Sir William and
return to you. It is now nearly three years since the tyranny of Britain
received its first repulse by the arms of America. A period which has given
birth to a new world, and erected a monument to the folly of the old.
I cannot help being sometimes surprised at the complimentary references
which I have seen and heard made to ancient histories and transactions. The
wisdom, civil governments, and sense of honor of the states of Greece and Rome,
are frequently held up as objects of excellence and imitation. Mankind have
lived to very little purpose, if, at this period of the world, they must go two
or three thousand years back for lessons and examples. We do great injustice to
ourselves by placing them in such a superior line. We have no just authority
for it, neither can we tell why it is that we should suppose ourselves
Could the mist of antiquity be cleared away, and men and things be viewed as
they really were, it is more than probable that they would admire us, rather
than we them. America has surmounted a greater variety and combination of
difficulties, than, I believe, ever fell to the share of any one people, in the
same space of time, and has replenished the world with more useful knowledge
and sounder maxims of civil government than were ever produced in any age
before. Had it not been for America, there had been no such thing as freedom
left throughout the whole universe. England has lost hers in a long chain of
right reasoning from wrong principles, and it is from this country, now, that
she must learn the resolution to redress herself, and the wisdom how to
The Grecians and Romans were strongly possessed of the spirit of liberty but
not the principle, for at the time that they were determined not to be slaves
themselves, they employed their power to enslave the rest of mankind. But this
distinguished era is blotted by no one misanthropical vice. In short, if the
principle on which the cause is founded, the universal blessings that are to
arise from it, the difficulties that accompanied it, the wisdom with which it
has been debated, the fortitude by which it has been supported, the strength of
the power which we had to oppose, and the condition in which we undertook it,
be all taken in one view, we may justly style it the most virtuous and
illustrious revolution that ever graced the history of mankind.
A good opinion of ourselves is exceedingly necessary in private life, but
absolutely necessary in public life, and of the utmost importance in supporting
national character. I have no notion of yielding the palm of the United States
to any Grecians or Romans that were ever born. We have equalled the bravest in
times of danger, and excelled the wisest in construction of civil governments.
From this agreeable eminence let us take a review of present affairs. The
spirit of corruption is so inseparably interwoven with British politics, that
their ministry suppose all mankind are governed by the same motives. They have
no idea of a people submitting even to temporary inconvenience from an
attachment to rights and privileges. Their plans of business are calculated by
the hour and for the hour, and are uniform in nothing but the corruption which
gives them birth. They never had, neither have they at this time, any regular
plan for the conquest of America by arms. They know not how to go about it,
neither have they power to effect it if they did know. The thing is not within
the compass of human practicability, for America is too extensive either to be
fully conquered or passively defended. But she may be actively defended by
defeating or making prisoners of the army that invades her. And this is the
only system of defence that can be effectual in a large country.
There is something in a war carried on by invasion which makes it differ in
circumstances from any other mode of war, because he who conducts it cannot
tell whether the ground he gains be for him, or against him, when he first
obtains it. In the winter of 1776, General Howe marched with an air of victory
through the Jerseys, the consequence of which was his defeat; and General
Burgoyne at Saratoga experienced the same fate from the same cause. The
Spaniards, about two years ago, were defeated by the Algerines in the same
manner, that is, their first triumphs became a trap in which they were totally
routed. And whoever will attend to the circumstances and events of a war
carried on by invasion, will find, that any invader, in order to be finally
conquered must first begin to conquer.
I confess myself one of those who believe the loss of Philadelphia to be
attended with more advantages than injuries. The case stood thus: The enemy
imagined Philadelphia to be of more importance to us than it really was; for we
all know that it had long ceased to be a port: not a cargo of goods had been
brought into it for near a twelvemonth, nor any fixed manufactories, nor even
ship-building, carried on in it; yet as the enemy believed the conquest of it
to be practicable, and to that belief added the absurd idea that the soul of
all America was centred there, and would be conquered there, it naturally
follows that their possession of it, by not answering the end proposed, must
break up the plans they had so foolishly gone upon, and either oblige them to
form a new one, for which their present strength is not sufficient, or to give
over the attempt.
We never had so small an army to fight against, nor so fair an opportunity
of final success as now. The death wound is already given. The day is ours if
we follow it up. The enemy, by his situation, is within our reach, and by his
reduced strength is within our power. The ministers of Britain may rage as they
please, but our part is to conquer their armies. Let them wrangle and welcome,
but let, it not draw our attention from the one thing needful. Here, in this
spot is our own business to be accomplished, our felicity secured. What we have
now to do is as clear as light, and the way to do it is as straight as a line.
It needs not to be commented upon, yet, in order to be perfectly understood I
will put a case that cannot admit of a mistake.
Had the armies under Generals Howe and Burgoyne been united, and taken post
at Germantown, and had the northern army under General Gates been joined to
that under General Washington, at Whitemarsh, the consequence would have been a
general action; and if in that action we had killed and taken the same number
of officers and men, that is, between nine and ten thousand, with the same
quantity of artillery, arms, stores, etc., as have been taken at the northward,
and obliged General Howe with the remains of his army, that is, with the same
number he now commands, to take shelter in Philadelphia, we should certainly
have thought ourselves the greatest heroes in the world; and should, as soon as
the season permitted, have collected together all the force of the continent
and laid siege to the city, for it requires a much greater force to besiege an
enemy in a town than to defeat him in the field. The case now is just the same
as if it had been produced by the means I have here supposed. Between nine and
ten thousand have been killed and taken, all their stores are in our
possession, and General Howe, in consequence of that victory, has thrown
himself for shelter into Philadelphia. He, or his trifling friend Galloway, may
form what pretences they please, yet no just reason can be given for their
going into winter quarters so early as the 19th of October, but their
apprehensions of a defeat if they continued out, or their conscious inability
of keeping the field with safety. I see no advantage which can arise to America
by hunting the enemy from state to state. It is a triumph without a prize, and
wholly unworthy the attention of a people determined to conquer. Neither can
any state promise itself security while the enemy remains in a condition to
transport themselves from one part of the continent to another. Howe, likewise,
cannot conquer where we have no army to oppose, therefore any such removals in
him are mean and cowardly, and reduces Britain to a common pilferer. If he
retreats from Philadelphia, he will be despised; if he stays, he may be shut up
and starved out, and the country, if he advances into it, may become his
Saratoga. He has his choice of evils and we of opportunities. If he moves
early, it is not only a sign but a proof that he expects no reinforcement, and
his delay will prove that he either waits for the arrival of a plan to go upon,
or force to execute it, or both; in which case our strength will increase more
than his, therefore in any case we cannot be wrong if we do but proceed.
The particular condition of Pennsylvania deserves the attention of all the
other States. Her military strength must not be estimated by the number of
inhabitants. Here are men of all nations, characters, professions and
interests. Here are the firmest Whigs, surviving, like sparks in the ocean,
unquenched and uncooled in the midst of discouragement and disaffection. Here
are men losing their all with cheerfulness, and collecting fire and fortitude
from the flames of their own estates. Here are others skulking in secret, many
making a market of the times, and numbers who are changing to Whig or Tory with
the circumstances of every day.
It is by a mere dint of fortitude and perseverance that the Whigs of this
State have been able to maintain so good a countenance, and do even what they
have done. We want help, and the sooner it can arrive the more effectual it
will be. The invaded State, be it which it may, will always feel an additional
burden upon its back, and be hard set to support its civil power with
sufficient authority; and this difficulty will rise or fall, in proportion as
the other states throw in their assistance to the common cause.
The enemy will most probably make many manoeuvres at the opening of this
campaign, to amuse and draw off the attention of the several States from the
one thing needful. We may expect to hear of alarms and pretended expeditions to
this place and that place, to the southward, the eastward, and the northward,
all intended to prevent our forming into one formidable body. The less the
enemy's strength is, the more subtleties of this kind will they make use of.
Their existence depends upon it, because the force of America, when collected,
is sufficient to swallow their present army up. It is therefore our business to
make short work of it, by bending our whole attention to this one principal
point, for the instant that the main body under General Howe is defeated, all
the inferior alarms throughout the continent, like so many shadows, will follow
The only way to finish a war with the least possible bloodshed, or perhaps
without any, is to collect an army, against the power of which the enemy shall
have no chance. By not doing this, we prolong the war, and double both the
calamities and expenses of it. What a rich and happy country would America be,
were she, by a vigorous exertion, to reduce Howe as she has reduced Burgoyne.
Her currency would rise to millions beyond its present value. Every man would
be rich, and every man would have it in his power to be happy. And why not do
these things? What is there to hinder? America is her own mistress and can do
what she pleases.
If we had not at this time a man in the field, we could, nevertheless, raise
an army in a few weeks sufficient to overwhelm all the force which General Howe
at present commands. Vigor and determination will do anything and everything.
We began the war with this kind of spirit, why not end it with the same? Here,
gentlemen, is the enemy. Here is the army. The interest, the happiness of all
America, is centred in this half ruined spot. Come and help us. Here are
laurels, come and share them. Here are Tories, come and help us to expel them.
Here are Whigs that will make you welcome, and enemies that dread your coming.
The worst of all policies is that of doing things by halves. Penny-wise and
pound-foolish, has been the ruin of thousands. The present spring, if rightly
improved, will free us from our troubles, and save us the expense of millions.
We have now only one army to cope with. No opportunity can be fairer; no
prospect more promising. I shall conclude this paper with a few outlines of a
plan, either for filling up the battalions with expedition, or for raising an
additional force, for any limited time, on any sudden emergency.
That in which every man is interested, is every man's duty to support. And
any burden which falls equally on all men, and from which every man is to
receive an equal benefit, is consistent with the most perfect ideas of liberty.
I would wish to revive something of that virtuous ambition which first called
America into the field. Then every man was eager to do his part, and perhaps
the principal reason why we have in any degree fallen therefrom, is because we
did not set a right value by it at first, but left it to blaze out of itself,
instead of regulating and preserving it by just proportions of rest and
Suppose any State whose number of effective inhabitants was 80,000, should
be required to furnish 3,200 men towards the defence of the continent on any
1st, Let the whole number of effective inhabitants be divided into hundreds;
then if each of those hundreds turn out four men, the whole number of 3,200
will be had.
2d, Let the name of each hundred men be entered in a book, and let four
dollars be collected from each man, with as much more as any of the gentlemen,
whose abilities can afford it, shall please to throw in, which gifts likewise
shall be entered against the names of the donors.
3d, Let the sums so collected be offered as a present, over and above the
bounty of twenty dollars, to any four who may be inclined to propose themselves
as volunteers: if more than four offer, the majority of the subscribers present
shall determine which; if none offer, then four out of the hundred shall be
taken by lot, who shall be entitled to the said sums, and shall either go, or
provide others that will, in the space of six days.
4th, As it will always happen that in the space of ground on which a hundred
men shall live, there will be always a number of persons who, by age and
infirmity, are incapable of doing personal service, and as such persons are
generally possessed of the greatest part of property in any country, their
portion of service, therefore, will be to furnish each man with a blanket,
which will make a regimental coat, jacket, and breeches, or clothes in lieu
thereof, and another for a watch cloak, and two pair of shoes; for however
choice people may be of these things matters not in cases of this kind; those
who live always in houses can find many ways to keep themselves warm, but it is
a shame and a sin to suffer a soldier in the field to want a blanket while
there is one in the country.
Should the clothing not be wanted, the superannuated or infirm persons
possessing property, may, in lieu thereof, throw in their money subscriptions
towards increasing the bounty; for though age will naturally exempt a person
from personal service, it cannot exempt him from his share of the charge,
because the men are raised for the defence of property and liberty jointly.
There never was a scheme against which objections might not be raised. But
this alone is not a sufficient reason for rejection. The only line to judge
truly upon is to draw out and admit all the objections which can fairly be
made, and place against them all the contrary qualities, conveniences and
advantages, then by striking a balance you come at the true character of any
scheme, principle or position.
The most material advantages of the plan here proposed are, ease,
expedition, and cheapness; yet the men so raised get a much larger bounty than
is any where at present given; because all the expenses, extravagance, and
consequent idleness of recruiting are saved or prevented. The country incurs no
new debt nor interest thereon; the whole matter being all settled at once and
entirely done with. It is a subscription answering all the purposes of a tax,
without either the charge or trouble of collecting. The men are ready for the
field with the greatest possible expedition, because it becomes the duty of the
inhabitants themselves, in every part of the country, to find their proportion
of men instead of leaving it to a recruiting sergeant, who, be he ever so
industrious, cannot know always where to apply.
I do not propose this as a regular digested plan, neither will the limits of
this paper admit of any further remarks upon it. I believe it to be a hint
capable of much improvement, and as such submit it to the public.