THE 



                   LAW OF NATIONS 



                         OR 



 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE

              CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF 

             NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 



                FROM THE FRENCH OF 

               MONSIEUR DE VATTEL. 



"Nihil est enim illi principi Deo qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem 

in terris fiat, acceptlum, quam concilia coestusque hominum jure sociati, 

quĉ civitates appellantur." Cicero, Som Scip. 



             FROM THE NEW EDITION, BY 



       JOSEPH CHITTY, Esq. Barrister At Law 



     WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES AND REFERENCES, 

           By EDWARD D. INGRAHAM, Esq. 



                     PHILADELPHIA: 

         T. & J.W. JOHNSON & CO., LAW BOOKSELLERS, 

                 No. 535 CHESTNUT STREET. 

                         1883. 





              Prefaces to the several

              editions



              Detailed Table of Contents



              Preliminaries



              Book I



              Book II



              Book III



              Book IV



              Index



              Commentaries by Chitty and

              others



____________



Preface to the 1999 Digital Edition



This digital edition is taken from the 1883 printing of the 1852 edition

of Joseph Chitty, which contained numerous typographical and spelling

errors which have been silently corrected. We have followed Chitty's

convention of surrounding his endnotes in parentheses, and indicating

which endnotes are his and which are from previous editions, but we

have converted Vattel's footnotes into numbered chapter endnotes. We

have also silently substituted chapter and section references for page

references wherever these can be ascertained, and made a few other

minor changes and additions, indicated by enclosure in square

brackets. Greek characters have been converted into Latin characters

pending support for the Greek character set in these digital formats.



This 1758 work by Swiss legal philosopher Emmerich de Vattel is of

special importance to scholars of constitutional history and law, for it

was read by many of the Founders of the United States of America,

and informed their understanding of the principles of law which became

established in the Constitution of 1787. Chitty's notes and the

appended commentaries by Edward D. Ingraham, used in lectures at

William and Mary College, provide a valuable perspective on Vattel's

exposition from the viewpoint of American jurists who had adapted

those principles to the American legal experience.



Endnotes added to this digital edition are separately numbered, with the

numbers surrounded by double square brackets [[]].



All errors are the responsibility of the digital editor and anyone finding

an error is urged to submit the correction. Particular attention should be

paid to the Latin and Greek endnotes, which may contain errors taken

from the printed editions.



Jon Roland, April 26, 1999 







 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1852, by T. & J.W.

   Johnson, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Eastern

                  District of Pennsylvania.







PREFACE TO [1852] EDITION. 



The text of the present translation of Vattel has been carefully

compared with that of the original work, in the first edition which

appeared, (Londres, 1758, 2 vol. in quarto,) published at Neufchatel;

in that of Amsterdam, (Van Harrevelt, 1775, 2 vol. in quarto,) the

best known till recently; and in that of M. de Hoffmans, (Paris, 1839,

2 vol. in octavo,) the last and best edition. Great care has been taken

also in regard to the British decisions cited by the English editor. It was

discovered, that many inaccuracies existed in the citations, particularly

in the names of the cases cited, which have been corrected by

references to the original reports of the decisions: and wherever it

appeared that the notes of the English editor required additions to

render the doctrine advanced in them clearer, or more intelligible, such

additions have been made; care having been taken to distinguish the

matter added by enclosing it in brackets. The editor regrets very much

that the size of the volume -- which would have been too much

increased by such an extension -- did not permit him to annex to it the

"Bibliographie choisie et systematique du Droit de la Nature et des

Gens, et du Droit Public," of M. de Hoffmans, which is an excellent

guide in the choice of Works upon a subject much less attended to than

is demanded by its importance.



Philadelphia, Sept. 29,1852.







ADVERTISEMENT 



TO THE EDITION OF A.D. 1797. 



IN undertaking this new edition of Monsieur De Vattel's treatise, it was

not my intention to give what might strictly be called a new translation.

To add the author's valuable notes from the posthumous edition,

printed at Neufchatel in 1773, -- to correct some errors I had

observed in the former version, -- and occasionally to amend the

language where doubtful or obscure, -- were the utmost limits of my

original plan. As I proceeded, however, my alterations became more

numerous; but whether they will be acknowledged as amendments, it

must rest with the reader to determine. Even if this decision should be

more favourable than I have any reason to expect, I lay no claim to

praise for my humble efforts, but shall esteem myself very fortunate if I

escape the severity of censure for presenting the work to the public in a

state still so far short of perfection. Conscious of its defects, I declare,

with great sincerity, --



... Veniam pro laude peto, -- laudatus abunde, Non fastiditus si

tibi, lector, ero.



THE EDITOR,



London, May 1, 1797.







                      PREFACE 



                TO THE [1797] EDITION. 



THE merits and increasing utility of this admirable work have not, as

yet, been sufficiently known, or justly appreciated. It has been generally

supposed that it is only adapted for the study of sovereigns and

statesmen, and in that view certainly the author's excellent Preface

points out its pre-eminent importance. But it is of infinitely more

extended utility. It contains a practical collection of ethics, principles,

and rules of conduct to be observed and pursued, as well by private

individuals as by states, and these of the utmost practical importance

to the well-being, happiness, and ultimate and permanent advantage

and benefit of all mankind; and, therefore, ought to be studied by every

gentleman of liberal education, and by youth, in whom the best

moral principles should be inculcated. The work should be familiar in

the Universities, and in every class above the inferior ranks of society.

And, as regards lawyers, it contains the clearest rules of construing

private contracts, and respecting the Admiralty and Insurance Law.

The positions of the author, moreover, have been so sensibly and

clearly supported and explained, and so happily illustrated by historical

and other interesting examples, that the perusal cannot fail to entertain

as well as instruct. The present Editor, therefore, affirms, without the

hazard of contradiction, that every one who has attentively read this

work, will admit that he has acquired a knowledge of superior

sentiments and more important information than he ever derived from

any other work.







         PREFACE TO THE [1833] EDITION 



Many years have elapsed since the original work was published, long

before the invaluable decisions of Sir William Scott, Sir C. Robinson,

and Sir John Nichol, and other eminent Judges in the Courts of

Admiralty, and Prize and other Courts; and the last edition upon which

any care was bestowed, was published in A.D. 1797; since which

time, and especially during the last general war, many most important

rules respecting the Law of Nations were established. The object of the

present Editor has, therefore, been to collect and condense, in

numerous notes, the modern rules and decisions, and to fortify the

positions in the text by references to other authors of eminence, and by

which he hopes that this edition will be found of more practical utility,

without interfering with the text, or materially increasing its size.



The Editor had proposed to form an Index, so as to render the work

more readily accessible; but, in that desire, he has been overruled by

the publishers, who think that the exceedingly full Analytical Table of

Contents following the Preface, and naming the pages where each

position is to be found, are sufficient, without increasing the bulk of the

work, and, consequently, the expense. The Editor hopes that the

student who may examine his numerous notes will not think that he has

wasted time.



J. CHITTY.



        Chambers, 6, Chancery Lane, November, 1833







                      PREFACE 

                     [Vattel 1758]



THE Law of Nations, though so noble and important a subject, has

not, hitherto, been treated of with all the care it deserves. The greater

part of mankind have, therefore, only a vague, a very incomplete, and

often even a false notion of it. The generality of writers, and even

celebrated authors, almost exclusively confine the name of "Law of

Nations" to certain maxims and treatises recognised among nations,

and which the mutual consent of the parties has rendered obligatory on

them. This is confining within very narrow bounds a law so extensive in

its own nature, and in which the whole human race are so intimately

concerned; it is, at the same time, a degradation of that law, in

consequence of a misconception of its real origin.



There certainly exists a natural law of nations, since the obligations of

the law of nature are no less binding on states, on men united in political

society, than on individuals. But, to acquire an exact knowledge of that

law, it is not sufficient to know what the law of nature prescribes to the

individuals of the human race. The application of a rule to various

subjects, can no otherwise be made than in a manner agreeable to the

nature of each subject. Hence, it follows, that the natural law of nations

is a particular science, consisting in a just and rational application of the

law of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations or sovereigns. All

treatises, therefore, in which the law of nations is blended and

confounded with the ordinary law of nature, are incapable of conveying

a distinct idea, or a substantial knowledge of the sacred law of nations.



The Romans often confounded the law of nations with the law of

nature, giving the name of "the law of nations" (Jus Gentium) to the

law of nature, as being generally acknowledged and adopted by all

civilized nations.1 The definitions given by the emperor Justinian, of the

law of nature, the law of nations, and the civil law, are well known.

"The law of nature," says he, "is that which nature teaches to all

animals":2 thus he defines the natural law in its most extensive sense,

not that natural law which is peculiar to man, and which is derived as

well from his rational as from his animal nature. "The civil law," that

emperor adds, "is that which each nation has established for herself,

and which peculiarly belongs to each state or civil society. And that

law, which natural reason has established among all mankind, and

which is equally observed by all people, is called the law of nations, as

being law which all nations follow.3 In the succeeding paragraph, the

emperor seems to approach nearer to the sense we at present give to

that term. "The law of nations," says he, "is common to the whole

human race. The exigencies and necessities of mankind have induced

all nations to lay down and adopt certain rules of right. For wars have

arisen, and produced captivity and servitude, which are contrary to the

law of nature; since, by the law of nature, all men were originally born

free."4 But from what he adds, -- that almost all kinds of contracts,

those of buying and selling, of hire, partnership, trust, and an infinite

number of others, owe their origin to that law of nations,-- it plainly

appears to have been Justinian's idea, that, according to the situations

and circumstances in which men were placed, right reason has dictated

to them certain maxims of equity, so founded on the nature of things,

that they have been universally acknowledged and adopted. Still this is

nothing more than the law of nature, which is equally applicable to all

mankind.



The Romans, however, acknowledged a law whose obligations are

reciprocally binding on nations: and to that law they referred the right of

embassies. They had also their fecial law, which was nothing more than

the law of nations in its particular relation to public treaties, and

especially to war. The feciales were the interpreters, the guardians,

and, in a manner, the priests of the public faith.5 The moderns are

generally agreed in restricting the appellation of "the law of nations" to

that system of right and justice which ought to prevail between nations

or sovereign states. They differ only in the ideas they entertain of the

origin whence that system arose, and of the foundations upon which it

rests. The celebrated Grotius understands it to be a system established

by the common consent of nations: and he thus distinguishes it from the

law of nature: "When several persons, at different times, and in various

places, maintain the same thing as certain, such coincidence of

sentiment must be attributed to some general cause. Now, in the

questions before us, that cause must necessarily be one or the other of

these two -- either a just consequence drawn from natural principles,

or a universal consent. The former discovers to us the law of nature,

and the latter the law of nations."6



That great man, as appears from many passages in his excellent work,

had a glimpse of the truth: but as he had the task of extracting from the

rude ore, as it were, and reducing into regular shape and form, a new

and important subject, which had been much neglected before this

time, it is not surprising that, having his mind burthened with an

immense variety of objects, and with a numberless train of quotations,

which formed a part of his plan, he could not always acquire those

distinct ideas so necessary in the sciences. Persuaded that nations, or

sovereign powers, are subject to the authority of the law of nature, the

observance of which he so frequently recommends to them, that

learned man, in fact, acknowledged a natural law of nations, which he

somewhere calls the internal law of nations: and, perhaps it will appear

that the only difference between him and us lies in the terms. But we

have already observed, that, in order to form this natural law of nations,

it is not sufficient simply to apply to nations what the law of nature

decides with respect to individuals. And, besides, Grotius, by his very

distinction, and by exclusively appropriating the name of "the law of

nations" to those maxims which have been established by the common

consent of mankind, seems to intimate that sovereigns, in their

transactions with each other, cannot insist on the observance of any but

those last-mentioned maxims, reserving the internal law for the

direction of their own consciences. If, setting out with the idea that

political societies or nations live, with respect to each other, in a

reciprocal independence, in the state of nature, and that, as political

bodies, they are subject to the natural law, Grotius had, moreover,

considered that the law must be applied to these new subjects in a

manner suitable to their nature, that judicious author would easily have

discovered that the natural law of nations is a particular science; that it

produces between nations even an external obligation wholly

independent of their will; and that the common consent of mankind is

only the foundation and source of a particular kind of law, called the

Arbitrary Law of Nations.



Hobbes, in whose work we discover the hand of a master,

notwithstanding his paradoxes and detestable maxims, -- Hobbes was,

I believe, the first who gave a distinct, though imperfect idea, of the law

of nations. He divides the law of nature into that of man, and that of

states: and the latter is, according to him, what we usually call the law

of nations. "The maxims," he adds, "of each of these laws are precisely

the same: but as states, once established, assume personal properties,

that which is termed the natural law, when we speak of the duties of

individuals is called the law of nations when applied to whole nations or

states."7 This author has well observed, that the law of nations is the

law of nature applied to states or nations. But we shall see, in the

course of this work, that he was mistaken in the idea that the law of

nature does not suffer any necessary change in that application, an idea,

from which he concluded that the maxims of the law of nature and

those of the law of nations are precisely the same.



Pufendorf declares that he unreservedly subscribes to this opinion

espoused by Hobbes.8 He has not, therefore, separately treated of the

law of nations, but has everywhere blended it with the law of nature,

properly so called.



Barbeyrac, who performed the office of translator and commentator to

Grotius and Pufendorf, has approached much nearer to the true idea of

the law of nations. Though the work is in everybody's hands, I shall

here, for the readers' convenience, transcribe one of that learned

translator's notes on Grotius's Law of War and Peace.9 "I

acknowledge," says he, "that there are laws common to all nations --

things which all nations ought to practise towards each other: and if

people choose to call these the law of nations, they may do so with

great propriety. But, setting aside the consideration that the consent of

mankind is not the basis of the obligation by which we are bound to

observe those laws, and that it cannot even possibly take place in this

instance -- the principles and the rules of such a law are, in fact, the

same as these of the law of nature, properly so called; the only

difference consisting in the mode of their application, which may be

somewhat varied, on account of the difference that sometimes happens

in the manner in which nations settle their affairs with each other."



It did not escape the notice of the author we have just quoted, that the

rules and decisions of the law of nature cannot be purely and simply

applied to sovereign states, and that they must necessarily undergo

some modifications in order to accommodate them to the nature of the

new subjects to which they are applied. But it does not appear that he

discovered the full extent of this idea, since he seems not to approve of

the mode of treating the law of nations separately from the law of

nature as relating to individuals. He only commends Budĉus's method,

saying, "It was right in that author to point out,10 after each article of

the law of nature, the application which may be made of it to nations in

their mutual relations to each other, so far, at least as his plan permitted

or required that he should do this,"11 Here Barbeyrac made one step,

at least, in the right track: but it required more profound reflection, and

more extensive views, in order to conceive the idea of a system of

natural law of nations, which should claim the obedience of states and

sovereigns, to perceive the utility of such a work, and especially to be

the first to execute it.



This glory was reserved for the Baron de Wolf. That great philosopher

saw that the law of nature could not, with such modifications as the

nature of the subjects required, and with sufficient precision, clearness,

and solidity, be applied to incorporated nations, or states, without the

assistance of those general principles and leading ideas by which the

application is to be directed; that it is by those principles alone we are

enabled evidently to demonstrate that the decisions of the law of

nature, respecting individuals, must, pursuant to the intentions of that

very taw, be changed and modified in their application to states and

political societies, and thus to form a natural and necessary law of

nations:12 whence he concluded, that it was proper to form a distinct

system of the law of nations, a task which he has happily executed. But

it is just that we should hear what Wolf himself says in his Preface.



"Nations,"13 says he, "do not, in their mutual relations to each other,

acknowledge any other law than that which Nature herself has

established. Perhaps, therefore, it may appear superfluous to give a

treatise on the law of nations, as distinct from the law of nature. But

those who entertain this idea have not sufficiently studied the subject.

Nations, it is true, can only be considered as so many individual

persons living together in the state of nature; and, for that reason, we

must apply to them all the duties and rights which nature prescribes and

attributes to men in general, as being naturally born free, and bound to

each other by no ties but those of nature alone. The law which arises

from this application, and the obligations resulting from it, proceed from

that immutable law founded on the nature of man; and thus the law of

nations certainly belongs to the law of nature: it is, therefore, on

account of its origin, called the natural, and, by reason of its obligatory

force, the necessary law of nations. That law is common to all nations;

and if any one of them does not respect it in her actions, she violates

the common rights of all the others.



"But nations or sovereign states being moral persons, and the subjects

of the obligations and rights resulting, in virtue of the law of nature, from

the act of association which has formed the political body, the nature

and essence of these moral persons necessarily differ, in many

respects, from the nature and essence of the physical individuals, or

men, of whom they are composed. When, therefore, we would apply

to nations the duties which the law of nature prescribes to individual

man, and the rights it confers on him in order to enable him to fulfil his

duties, since those rights and those duties can be no other than what

are consistent with the nature of their subjects, they must, in their

application, necessarily undergo a change suitable to the new subjects

to which they are applied. Thus, we see that the law of nations does

not, in every particular, remain the same as the law of nature, regulating

the actions of individuals. Why may it not, therefore, be separately

treated of, as a law peculiar to nations?"



Being myself convinced of the utility of such a work, I impatiently

waited for Monsieur Wolf's production, and, as soon as it appeared,

formed the design of facilitating, for the advantage of a greater number

of readers, the knowledge of the luminous ideas which it contains. The

treatise of the philosopher of Hall on the law of nations is dependent on

all those of the same author on philosophy and the law of nature. In

order to read and understand it, it is necessary to have previously

studied sixteen or seventeen quarto volumes which precede it. Besides,

it is written in the manner and even in the formal method of geometrical

works. These circumstances present obstacles which render it nearly

useless to those very persons in whom the knowledge and taste of the

true principles of the law of nations are most important and most

desirable. At first I thought that I should have had nothing farther to do

than to detach this treatise from the entire system, by rendering it

independent of every thing Monsieur Wolf had said before, and to give

it a new form, more agreeable, and better calculated to insure it a

reception in the polite world. With that view, I made some attempts;

but I soon found, that if I indulged the expectation of procuring readers

among that class of persons for whom I intended to write, and of

rendering my efforts beneficial to mankind, it was necessary that I

should form a very different work from that which lay before me, and

undertake to furnish an original production. The method followed by

Monsieur Wolf has had the effect of rendering his work dry, and in

many respects incomplete. The different subjects are scattered through

it in a manner that is extremely fatiguing to the attention; and, as the

author had, in his "Law of Nature," treated of universal public law, he

frequently contents himself with a bare reference to his former

production, when, in handling the law of nations, he speaks of the

duties of a nation towards herself.



From Monsieur Wolf's treatise, therefore, I have only borrowed

whatever appeared most worth of attention, especially the definitions

and general principles; but I have been careful in selecting what I drew

from that source, and have accommodated to my own plan the

materials with which he furnished me. Those who have read Monsieur

Wolf's treatises on the law of nature and the law of nations, will see

what advantage I have made of them. Had I everywhere pointed out

what I have borrowed, my pages would be crowded with quotations

equally useless and disagreeable to the reader. It is better to

acknowledge here, once for all, the obligations I am under to that great

master. Although my work be very different from his, (as will appear to

those who are willing to take the trouble of making the comparison,) I

confess that I should never have had the courage to launch into so

extensive a field, if the celebrated philosopher of Hall had not preceded

my steps, and held forth a torch to guide me on my way.



Sometimes, however, I have ventured to deviate from the path which

he had pointed out, and adopted sentiments opposite to his.



I will here quote a few instances. Monsieur Wolf, influenced, perhaps,

by the example of numerous other writers, has devoted several

sections14 to the express purpose of treating of the nature of

patrimonial kingdoms, without rejecting or rectifying that idea so

degrading to human kind. I do not even admit of such a denomination,

which I think equally shocking, improper, and dangerous, both in its

effects, and in the impressions it may give to sovereigns: and in this, I

flatter myself I shall obtain the suffrage of every man who possesses the

smallest spark of reason and sentiment, in short, of every true citizen.



Monsieur Wolf determines (Jus Gent. § 878) that it is naturally lawful

to make use of poisoned weapons in war. I am shocked at such a

decision, and sorry to find it in the work of so great a man. Happily for

the human race, it is not difficult to prove the contrary, even from

Monsieur Wolf's own principles. What I have said on this subject may

be seen in Book III. § 156.



In the very outset of my work, it will be found that I differ entirely from

Monsieur Wolf in the manner of establishing the foundations of that

species of law of nations which we call voluntary. Monsieur Wolf

deduces it from the idea of a great republic (civitatis maximĉ)

instituted by nature herself, and of which all nations of the world are

members. According to him, the voluntary law of nations is, as it

were, the civil law of that great republic. This idea does not satisfy me;

nor do I think the fiction of such a republic either admissible in itself, or

capable of affording sufficiently solid grounds on which to build the

rules of the universal law of nations, which shall necessarily claim the

obedient acquiescence of sovereign stales. I acknowledge no other

natural society between nations than that which nature has established

between mankind in general. It is essential to every civil society

(civitati) that each member have resigned a part of his right to the

body of the society, and that there exist in it an authority capable of

commanding all the members, of giving them laws, and of compelling

those who should refuse to obey. Nothing of this kind can be

conceived or supposed to subsist between nations. Each sovereign

state claims, and actually possesses an absolute independence on all

the others. They are all, according to Monsieur Wolf himself, to be

considered as so many individuals who live together in the slate of

nature, and who acknowledge no other laws but those of nature, or of

her Great Author. Now, although nature has indeed established a

general society between mankind, by creating them subject to such

wants as render me assistance of their fellow creatures indispensably

necessary to enable them to live in a manner suitable to men, yet she

has not imposed on them any particular obligation to unite in civil

society, properly so called: and if the all obeyed the injunctions of that

good parent, their subjection to the restraints of civil society would be

unnecessary. It is true, that as there does not exist in mankind a

disposition voluntarily to observe towards each other the rules of the

law of nature, they have had recourse to a political association, as the

only adequate remedy against the depravity of the majority the only

means of securing the condition of the good, and repressing the

wicked: and the law of nature itself approves of this establishment. But

it is easy to perceive that the civic association is very far from being

equally necessary between nations, as it was between individuals. We

cannot, therefore, say, that nature equally recommends it, much less

that she has prescribed it. Individuals are so constituted, and are

capable of doing so little by themselves, that they can scarcely subsist

without the aid and the laws of civil society. But, as soon as a

considerable number of them have united under this same government,

they become able to supply most of their wants; and the assistance of

other political societies is not so necessary to them as that of individuals

is to an individual. These societies have still, it is true, powerful motives

for carrying on a communication and commerce with each other; and it

is even their duty to do it; since no man can, without good reasons,

refuse assistance to another man. But the law of nature may suffice to

regulate this commerce, and this correspondence. States conduct

themselves in a different manner from individuals. It is not usually the

caprice or blind impetuosity of a single person that forms the

resolutions and determines the measures of the public: they are carried

on with more deliberation and circumspection; and, on difficult or

important occasions, arrangements are made and regulations

established by means of treaties. To this we may add, that

independence is even necessary to each state, in order to enable her

properly to discharge the duties she owes to herself and to her citizens,

and to govern herself in the manner best suited to her circumstances. It

is, therefore, sufficient (as I have already said) that nations should

conform to what is required of them by the natural and general society

established between all mankind.



But, says Monsieur Wolf, a rigid adherence to the law of nature cannot

always prevail in that commerce and society of nations; it must undergo

various modifications, which can only be deduced from this idea of a

kind of great republic of nations, whose laws, dictated by sound

reason, and founded on necessity, shall regulate the alterations to be

made in the natural and necessary law of nations, as the civil laws of a

particular state determine what modifications shall take place in the

natural law of individuals. I do not perceive the necessity of this

consequence; and I flatter myself that I shall, in the course of this work,

be able to prove, that all the modifications, all the restrictions, -- in a

word, all the alterations which the rigour of the natural law must be

made to undergo in the affairs of nations, and from which the voluntary

law of nations is formed, -- to prove, I say, that all these alterations

are deducible from the natural liberty of nations, from the attention due

to their common safely, from the nature of their mutual

correspondence, their reciprocal duties, and the distinctions of their

various rights, internal and external, perfect and imperfect, -- by a

mode of reasoning nearly similar to that which Monsieur Wolf has

pursued, with respect to individuals, in his treatise on the law of nature.



In that treatise it is made to appear that the rules which, in consequence

of the natural liberty of mankind, must be admitted in questions of

external right, do not cancel the obligation which the internal right

imposes on the conscience of each individual. It is easy to apply this

doctrine to nations, and, by carefully drawing the line of distinction

between the internal and external right -- between the necessary and

the voluntary law of nations -- to teach them not to indulge themselves

in the commission of every act which they may do with impunity, unless

it be approved by the immutable laws of justice and the voice of

conscience.



Since nations, in their transactions with each other, are equally bound

to admit those exceptions to, and those modifications of, the rigour of

the necessary law, whether they be deduced from the idea of a great

republic of which all nations are supposed to be the members, or

derived from the source from whence I propose to draw them, --

there can be no reason why the system which thence results should not

be called the Voluntary Law of nations, in contradistinction to the

necessary, internal, and consciential law. Names are of very little

consequence: but it is of considerable importance carefully to

distinguish these two kinds of law, in order that we may never

confound what is just and good in itself, with what is only tolerated

through necessity.



The necessary and the voluntary laws of nations are therefore both

established by nature, but each in a different manner: the former, as a

sacred law which nations and sovereigns are bound to respect and

follow in all their actions; the latter, as a rule which the general welfare

and safety oblige them to admit in their transactions with each other.

The necessary law immediately proceeds from nature; and that

common mother of mankind recommends the observance of the

voluntary law of nations, in consideration of the state in which nations

stand with respect to each other, and for the advantage of their affairs.

This double law, founded on certain and invariable principles, is

susceptible of demonstration, and will constitute the principal subject of

this work.



There is another kind of law of nations, which authors call arbitrary,

because it proceeds from the will or consent of nations. States, as well

as individuals, may acquire rights and contract obligations, by express

engagements, by compact and treaties; hence results a conventional

law of nations, peculiar to the contracting powers. Nations may also

bind themselves by their tacit consent: upon this ground rest all those

regulations which custom has introduced between different states, and

which constitute the wage of nations, or the law of nations founded on

custom. It is evident that this law cannot impose any obligation except

on those particular nations who have, by long use, given their sanction

to its maxims: it is a peculiar law, and limited in its operations, as the

conventional law; both the one and the other derive all their obligatory

force from that maxim of the natural law which makes it the duty of

nations to fulfil their engagements, whether express or tacit. The same

maxim ought to regulate the conduct of states with regard to the treaties

they conclude and the customs they adopt. I must content myself with

simply laying down the general rules and principles which the law of

nature furnishes for the direction of sovereigns in this respect. A

particular detail of the various treaties and customs of different states

belongs to history, and not to a systematic treatise on the law of

nations.



Such a treatise ought, as we have already observed, principally to

consist in a judicious and rational application of the principles of the law

of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations and sovereigns. The

study of the law of nations supposes therefore a previous knowledge of

the ordinary law of nature; and, in fact, I proceed on the supposition

that my readers are already, to a certain degree at least, possessed of

that knowledge. Nevertheless, as it is not agreeable to readers in

general to be obliged to recur to other authorities for proofs of what an

author advances, I have taken care to establish, in a few words, the

most important of those principles of the law of nature which I intend to

apply to nations. But I have not always thought it necessary to trace

them to their primary foundations for the purpose of demonstration, but

have sometimes contented myself with supporting them by common

truths which are acknowledged by every candid reader, without

carrying the analysis any farther. It is sufficient for me to persuade, and

for this purpose to advance nothing as a principle that will not readily

be admitted by every sensible man.



The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them,

and for their ministers, that it ought to be written. All mankind are

indeed interested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is

a proper employment for every citizen; but it would be of little

consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individuals,

who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no

influence in directing the public measures. If the conductors of slates, if

all those who are employed in public affairs, condescended to apply

seriously to the study of a science which ought to be their law, and, as

it were, the compass by which to steer their course, what happy effects

might we not expect from a good treatise on the law of nations! We

every day feel the advantages of a good body of laws in civil society:

-- the law of nations is, in point of importance, as much superior to the

civil law, as the proceedings of nations and sovereigns are more

momentous in their consequences than those of private persons.



But fatal experience too plainly proves how little regard those who are

at the head of affairs pay to the dictates of justice, in conjunctures

where they hope to find their advantage. Satisfied with bestowing their

attention on a system of politics which is often false, since often unjust,

the generality of them think they have done enough when they have

thoroughly studied that. Nevertheless, we may truly apply to states a

maxim which has long been acknowledged as true with respect to

individuals, -- that the best and safest policy is that which is founded

on virtue. Cicero, as a great master in the art of government as in

eloquence and philosophy, does not content himself with rejecting the

vulgar maxim, that "a state cannot be happily governed without

committing injustice;" he even proceeds so far as to lay down the very

reverse of the proposition as an invariable truth, and maintains, that

"without a strict attention to the most rigid justice, public affairs cannot

be advantageously administered."15



Providence occasionally bestows on the world kings and ministers

whose minds are impressed with this great truth. Let us not renounce

the pleasing hope that the number of those wise conductors of nations

will one day be multiplied; and in the interim let us, each in his own

sphere, exert our best efforts to accelerate the happy period.



It is principally with a view of rendering my work palatable to those by

whom it is of the most importance that it should be read and relished,

that I have sometimes joined examples to the maxims I advance: and in

that idea I have been confirmed by the approbation of one of those

ministers who are the enlightened friends of the human race, and who

alone ought to be admitted into the councils of kings. But I have been

sparing in the use of such embellishments. Without ever aiming at a vain

parade of erudition, I only sought to afford an occasional relaxation to

the reader's mind, or to render the doctrine more impressive by an

example, and sometimes to show that the practice of nations is

conformable to the principles laid down: and, whenever I found a

convenient opportunity, I have, above all things, endeavoured to inspire

a love of virtue, by showing, from striking passage of history, how

amiable it is, how worthy of our homage in some truly great men, and

even productive of solid advantage. I have quoted the chief part of my

examples from modern history, as well because these are more

interesting, as to avoid a repetition of those which have been already

accumulated by Grotius, Pufendorf, and their commentators.



As to the rest, I have, both in these examples and in my reasonings

studiously endeavoured to avoid giving offence; it being my intention

religiously to observe the respect due to nations and sovereign powers:

but I have made it a still more sacred rule to respect the truth, and the

interests of the human race. If among the base flatterers of despotic

power, my principles meet with opponents, I shall have on my side the

virtuous man, the friend of the laws, the man of probity, and the true

citizen.



I should prefer the alternative of total silence, were I not at liberty in my

writings to obey the dictates of my conscience. By my pen lies under

no restraint, and I am incapable of prostituting it to flattery. I was born

in a country of which liberty is the soul, the treasure, and the

fundamental law; and my birth qualifies me to be the friend of all

nations. These favourable circumstances have encouraged me in the

attempt to render myself useful to mankind by this work. I felt

conscious of my deficiency in knowledge and abilities: I saw that I was

undertaking an arduous task; but I shall rest satisfied if that class of

readers whose opinions are entitled to respect, discover in my labours

the traces of the honest man and the good citizen.







[Notes to the Vattel Preface]



1. Neque vero hoc solum naturâ. Id est, jure gentium, &c. Cicero do Offic. lib. iii.

c.5.



2. Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Instit. lib. i. tit. 2.



3. Quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis, est,

vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis

ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes perœque custoditur,

vacaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utantur. Instit. lib. i. tit. ii.

§ 1. 



4. Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est; nam usu exigente et

humanis necessitatibus, gentes humanœ jura quĉdam sibi constituerunt. Bella

etenim orta sunt, et captivitates secutĉ et servitutes, quĉ sunt naturali juri

contrariĉ. Jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur Id. § 2. 



5. Feciales, quod fidel publicĉ inter populos prĉrant: nam per hos fiebat ut

justum conciperetur bellum (et inde desitum), et ut foedere fides pacis cons tit

ueretur. Ex his mittebant, antequam conciperetur, qui res repeterent: et per hos

etiam nunc fit foedus. Varro de Ling. Lat. lib. iv.



6. De Jure Belli et Pacis, translated by Barbeyrac: Preliminary Discourse, § 41.



7. Rursus (lex) naturalis dividi potest in naturalem hominum. quĉ sola obtinuit

dici lex Naturĉ, et naturalem civitatum, quĉ dici potest Lex Gentium, vulgo

autem Jus Gentium appellatur. Prĉcepta utriusque eadem sunt: sed quia

civitates semel institutĉ induunt proprietates hominum personales, lex quam,

loquentes de hominum singulorum officio, naturalem dicimus, applicata totis

civitatibus, nationibus, sive gentlbus, vocatur Jus Gentium, De Cive, c. xiv. § 4.



8. Pufendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. iii. § 23.



9. Book i. chap. i. § 14, note 3. 



10. In his Elementa Philos. Pract. 



11. Note 2 on Pufendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. 3, § 23. I

have not been able to procure Budĉus's work from which I suspect that

Barbeyrac derived this idea of the Law of Nations.



12. If it were not more advisable for the sake of brevity, of avoiding repetitions,

and taking advantage of the Ideas already formed and established in the minds

of men, -- if, for all these reasons. It were not more convenient to presuppose,

in this instance, a knowledge of the ordinary law of nature, and on that ground

to undertake the task of applying it to sovereign states, -- it would, instead of

speaking of such application, be more accurate to say, that, as the law of nature,

properly so called, is the natural law of individuals and founded on the nature of

man, so the natural law of nations is the natural law of political societies, and

founded on the nature of those societies. But as the result of either mode is

ultimately the same, I have, in preference, adopted the more compendious one.

As the law of nature has already been treated of in an ample and satisfactory

manner, the shortest way is simply to make a rational application of it to nations.



13. A nation here means a sovereign state, an independent political society.



14. In the VIIIth part of his Law of Nature, and in his Law of Nations.



15. Nihil est quod adhuc de republica putem dictum, et quo possim longius

progredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse istud, sine injuria non

posse; sed hoc verissimum, sine summa justicia remplubicam regi non posse.

Cicero, Fragment, ex lib. de Republica.



____________



CONTENTS



    PRELIMINARIES. 

Idea and General Principles of the Law of Nations. 



1. What is meant by a nation or state.



2. It is a moral person.



3. Definition of the law of nations.



4. In what light nations or states are to be considered.



5. To what laws nations are subject.



6. In what the law of nations originally consists.



7. Definition of the necessary law of nations.



8. It is immutable.



9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the arising from

it. 



10. Society established by nature between all mankind.



11. And between all nations.



12. The object of this society of nations. 



13. General obligation imposed by it.



14. Explanation of this observation.



15. The second general law is the liberty and independence of nations.



16. Effect of that liberty.



17. Distinctions between internal and external, perfect and imperfect

obligations and rights.



18. Equality of nations.



19. Effect of that equality.



20. Each nation is mistress of her own actions, when they do not affect

the perfect rights of others.



21. Foundation of the voluntary law of nations.



22. Right of nations against the infractors of the law of nations.



23. Measure of that right.



24. Conventional law of nations, or law of treaties.



25. Customary law of nations.



26. General rule respecting that law.



27. Positive law of nations.



28. General maxim respecting the use of the necessary and the

voluntary law. 



                       BOOK I.



   OF NATIONS CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES.



CHAP. I. 

Of Nations or Sovereign States.



1. Of the state, and of sovereignty.



2. Authority of the body politic over the members.



3. Of the several kinds of government.



4. What are sovereign states.



5. States bound by unequal alliance.



6. ------ or by treaties of protection.



7. Tributary states.



8. Feudatory states.



9. Two states subject to the same prince.



10. States forming a federal republic.



11. A state that has passed under the dominion of another.



12. Objects of this treatise.



CHAP. II. 

General Principles of the Duties of a Nation towards herself.



13. A nation ought to act agreeably to her nature.



14. Preservation and perfection of a nation.



15. End of civil society.



16. A nation is under an obligation to preserve herself.



17. -------- and to preserve her members.



18. A nation has a right to every thing necessary for her preservation.



19. She ought to avoid every thing that might occasion her destruction.



20. Her right to every thing that may promote this end.



21. A nation ought to perfect herself and her condition.



22. -------- and to avoid every thing contrary to her perfection.



23. The right she derives from these obligations.



24. Examples.



25. A nation ought to know herself.



CHAP. III. 

Of the Constitution of a Stale, and the Duties and rights of a

Nation in that respect.



26. Of the public authority.



27. What is the constitution of a state.



28. The nation ought to choose the best constitution.



29. Political, fundamental, and civil laws.



30. Support of the constitution, and obedience to the laws.



31. Right of a nation with respect to her constitution and government.



32. She may reform the government.



33. -------- and may alter the constitution.



34. Of the legislative power, and whether it can alter the constitution.



35. The nation ought not to attempt it without great caution.



36. She is the judge of all disputes relative to the government.



37. No foreign power has a right to interfere.



CHAP. IV. 

Of the Sovereign, his Obligations, and his Rights.



38. Of the sovereign.



39. He is solely established for the safety and advantage of society.



40. His representative character.



41. He is intrusted with the obligations of the nation, and invested with

her rights.



42. His duty with respect to the preservation and perfection of the

nation. 



43. His rights in that respect.



44. He ought to know the nation.



45. Extent of his power: -- prerogatives of majesty.



46. The prince is bound to respect and support the fundamental laws.



47. He may change the laws not fundamental.



48. He is bound to maintain and observe the existing laws.



49. In what sense he is subject to the laws.



50. His person is sacred and inviolable.



51. But the nation may repress a tyrant, and renounce her allegiance to

him. 



52. Arbitration between the king and his subjects.



53. Obedience which subjects owe to a sovereign.



54. In what cases they may resist him.



55. Ministers.



CHAP. V. 

Of States, Elective, Successive, or Hereditary and of those

called Patrimonial 



56. Elective states.



57. Whether elective kings be real sovereigns.



58. Successive and hereditary states: -- origin of the right of

succession.



59. Other origin of that right.



60. Other sources, which still amount to the same thing.



61. A nation may change the order of the succession.



62. Renunciations.



63. The order of succession ought commonly to be observed.



64. Regents.



65. Indivisibility of sovereignties.



66. Who are to decide disputes respecting the succession to a

sovereignty. 



67. The right of succession not to depend on the judgment of a foreign

power. 



68. States called patrimonial.



69. Every true sovereignty is unalienable.



70. Duty of a prince who is empowered to nominate his successor.



71. His nomination must be sanctioned by at least the tacit ratification

of the people.



CHAP. VI. 

Principal Objects of a good Government; and first, to provide for

the Necessities of the Nation.



The object of society points out the duties of the sovereign:



72. ------ he is bound to procure plenty.



73. ------ to take care that there be a sufficient number of workmen.



74. ------ to prevent the emigration of those that are useful. 



75. Emissaries who entice them away.



76. Labour and industry must be encouraged.



CHAP. VII. 

Of the Cultivation of the Soil.



77. Utility of Agriculture.



Regulations necessary in that respect:



78. ------ for the distribution of land.



79. ------ for the protection of husbandsmen.



80. Husbandry ought to be placed in an honourable light.



81. Cultivation of the soil a natural obligation.



82. Public granaries.



CHAP. VIII. 

Of Commerce.



83. Domestic and foreign trade.



84. Utility of domestic trade.



85. Utility of foreign trade.



86. Obligation to cultivate domestic trade.



87. Obligation to carry on foreign trade.



88. Foundation of the laws of commerce: -- right of purchasing.



89. Right of selling.



90. Prohibition of foreign merchandises.



91. Nature of the right of purchasing.



92. Each nation to determine for herself how she will carry on

commerce.



93. How A nation acquires a perfect right to a foreign trade.



94. Simple permission to carry on trade.



95. Whether commercial rights be subject to prescription.



96. Imprescriplibility of rights founded on treaty.



97. Monopolies, and trading companies with exclusive privileges.



98. Balance of trade, and attention of government in that respect.



99. Import duties.



CHAP. IX. 

Of the Care of the Public Ways; and of Tolls.



100. Utility of highways, canals, &c.



101. Duty of government in that respect.



102. Its right In that respect.



103. Foundation of the right to demand toll.



104. Abuse of that right.



CHAP. X. 

Of Money and Exchange.



105. Establishment of money.



106. Duty of the nation or prince with respect to the coin.



107. Their rights in that respect.



108. How one nation may injure another in the article of coin.



109. Exchange, and commercial laws.



CHAP. XI. 

Second Object of a good Government, -- to procure the true

Happiness of a Nation.



110. A nation is bound to labour after her own happiness.



111. Instruction.



112. Education of youth.



113. Arts and sciences.



114. Freedom of philosophical discussion.



115. Love of virtue, and abhorrence of vice, to be excited.



116. The nation may hence discover the intention other rulers.



117. The nation, or public person, bound to perfect her understanding

and will.



118. ------ and to direct the knowledge and virtues of the citizens to

the welfare of the society.



119. Love for their country.



120. ------ in individuals.



121. ------ in the nation or state itself, and in the sovereign. 



122. Definition of the term "country".



123. How shameful and criminal to injure our country.



124. The glory of good citizens; -- Examples.



CHAP. XII. 

Of Piety and Religion. 



125. Piety.



126. It ought to be attended with knowledge.



127. Religion, internal and external.



128. Rights of individuals: -- liberty of conscience.



129. Public establishment of religion: -- rights and duties of the nation.



130. ------ when there is as yet no established religion.



131. ------ when there is an established religion.



132. Duties and rights of the sovereign with respect to religion.



133. ------ where there is an established religion.



134. Objects of his care, and the means he ought to employ.



135. Toleration.



136. How the prince is to act when the nation is resolved to change her

religion.



137. Difference of religion does not deprive a prince of his crown.



138. Duties and rights of the sovereign reconciled with those of the

subjects.



139. The sovereign ought to have the inspection of the affairs of

religion, and authority over those who teach it.



140. He is bound to prevent the abuse of the established religion.



141. His authority over the ministers of religion.



142. Nature of that authority.



143. Rule to be observed with respect to ecclesiastics.



144. Recapitulation of the reasons which establish the sovereign's rights

in mailers of religion, -- Authorities and examples.



145. Pernicious consequences of the contrary opinion.



Abuses particularized. --



146. 1. The popes.



147. 2. Important employments conferred by a foreign power



148. 3. Powerful subjects dependent on a foreign court.



149. 4. Celibacy of the priests: -- Convents.



150. 5. Enormous pretensions of the clergy; -- Pre-eminence.



151. 6. Independence, immunities.



152. 7. Immunity of church possessions.



153. 8. Excommunication of men in office.



154. 9. and of sovereigns themselves.



155. 10. The clergy drawing every thing to themselves, and interrupting

the course of justice.



156. 11. Money drawn to Rome.



157. 12. Laws and customs inimical to the welfare of states.



CHAP. XIII. 

Of Justice and Polity.



158. A nation is bound to make justice flourish.



159. ------ to establish good laws.



160. ------ to enforce them.



161. Functions and duties of the prince in that respect.



162. How he is to dispense justice.



163. His duty to appoint upright and enlightened judges.



164. The ordinary courts should determine causes relating to the

revenue. 



165. Necessary to establish supreme courts, from whose sentence

there shall be no appeal.



166. The prince bound to observe the forms of justice.



167. ---- to support the authority of the judges, and enforce their

decrees.



168. Distributive justice: -- distribution of employments and rewards. 



169. Punishment of transgressors; -- foundation of the right of

punishing.



170. Criminal laws.



171. Degree of punishment.



172. Execution of the laws.



173. Right of pardoning.



174. Internal police.



175. Duel or single combat.



176. Means of putting a slop to that disorder.



CHAP. XIV. 

Third Object of a good Government, -- to fortify itself against

External Attacks.



177. A nation ought to fortify herself against external attacks.



178. National strength.



179. Increase of population.



180. Valour.



181. Other military virtues.



182. Riches.



183. Public revenues and taxes.



184. The nation ought not to increase her power by unlawful means.



185. Power is but relative.



CHAP. XV. 

Of the Glory of a Nation.



186. Advantages of glory.



187. Duly of the nation. -- How true glory is acquired.



188. Duty of the prince.



189. Duty of the citizens.



190. Example of the Swiss.



191. Attacking the glory of a nation is doing her an injury.



CHAP. XVI. 

Protection sought by a Nation, and her voluntary submission to a

Foreign Power. 



192. Protection.



193. Voluntary submission of one nation to another.



194. Several kinds of submission.



195. Right of the citizens when the nation submits to a foreign power.



196. These compacts annulled by the failure of protection.



197. ------ or by the infidelity of the party protected.



198. ------ and by the encroachments of the protector.



199. How the right of the nation protected is lost by her silence.



CHAP. XVII. 

How a Nation may separate herself from the State of which she

is a Member, and renounce her Allegiance to her Sovereign

when she is not protected.



200. Difference between the present case and those in the proceeding

chapter. 



201. Duty of the members of a stale, or subjects of a prince who are in

danger.



202. Their right when they are abandoned.



CHAP. XVIII. 

Establishment of a Nation in a Country



203. Possession of a country by a nation.



204. Her right over the part in her possession.



205. Acquisition of the sovereignly in a vacant country.



206. Another manner of acquiring the empire in a free country.



207. How a nation acquires the property of a desert country.



208. A question on this subject.



209. Whether it be lawful to take possession of part of a country

inhabited only by a few wandering tribes.



210. Colonies.



211. What is our country.



212. Citizens and natives.



213. Inhabitants.



214. Naturalization.



215. Citizens' children born in a foreign country.



216. Children born at sea.



217. Children born in the armies of the state, or in the house of its

minister at a foreign court.



218. Settlement.



219. Vagrants.



220. Whether a person may quit his country.



221. How a person may absent himself for a time.



222. Variation of the political laws in that respect: -- they must be

obeyed.



223. Cases in which a citizen has a right to quit his country.



224. Emigrants.



225. Sources of their right.



226. If the sovereign infringes their right, he injures them.



227. Supplicants.



228. Exile and banishment.



229. The exile and the banished man have a right to live somewhere.



230. Nature of that right.



231. Duly of nations towards them.



232. A nation cannot punish them for faults committed out of her

territories. 



233. ------ except such as affect the common safety of mankind. 



CHAP. XX. 

Public, Common, and Private Property.



234. What the Romans called res communes.



235. Aggregate wealth of a nation, and its divisions.



236. Two modes of acquiring public properly.



237. The income of the public property is naturally at the sovereign's

disposal.



238. The nation may grant him the use and properly of her common

possessions. 



239. ------ or allow him the domain, and reserve to herself the use of

them.



240. Taxes.



241. The nation may reserve to herself the right of imposing them.



242. Sovereign possessing that power.



243. Duties of the prince with respect to taxes.



244. Eminent domain annexed to the sovereignty.



245. Dominion over public property.



246. The sovereign may make laws respecting the use of things

possessed in common.



247. Alienation of the property of a corporation.



248. Use of common property.



249. How each member is to enjoy it.



250. Right of anticipation in the use of it.



251. The same right in another case.



252. Preservation and repairs of common possessions.



253. Duty and right of the sovereign in that respect.



254. Private property.



255. The sovereign may subject it to regulations of police.



256. Inheritances.



CHAP. XXI. 

Of the Alienation of the Public Properly, or the Domain, and that

of a Part of the State.



257. The nation may alienate her public property.



258. Duties of the nation in that respect.



259. Duties of the prince.



260. He cannot alienate the public property.



261. The nation may give him a right to do it.



262. Rules on that subject with respect to treaties between nation and

nation.



263. Alienation of a part of the state.



264. Rights of the dismembered party.



265. Whether the prince has power to dismember the state.



CHAP. XXII. 

Of Rivers, Streams, and Lakes.



266. A river that separates two territories.



267. Bed of a river which is dried up or takes another course.



268. Right of alluvion.



269. Whether alluvion produces any change in the right to a river.



270. Consequence of a river changing its bed.



271. Works tending to turn the current.



272. ------ or generally prejudicial to the rights of others. 



273. Rules relative to interfering rights.



274. Lakes.



275. Increase of a lake.



276. Land formed on the banks of a lake.



277. Bed of a lake dried up.



278. Jurisdiction over lakes and rivers.



CHAP. XXIII. 

Of the Sea.



279. The sea, and its use.



280. Whether the sea can be possessed, and its dominion

appropriated.



281. Nobody has a right to appropriate to himself the use of the open

sea. 



282. A nation attempting to exclude another does her an injury.



283. She even does an injury to all nations.



284. She may acquire an exclusive right by treaties.



285. ---- but not by prescription and long use.



286. ---- unless by virtue of a tacit agreement.



287. The sea near the coasts may become properly.



288. Another reason for appropriating the sea bordering on coasts.



289. How far that possession may extend.



290. Shores and ports.



291. bays and straits.



292. Straits in particular.



293. Right to wrecks.



294. A sea inclosed within the territories of a nation.



295. The parts of the sea possessed by a sovereign are within his

jurisdiction.



                      BOOK II.



  OF A NATION CONSIDERED IN HER RELATION

                 TO OTHER STATES



CHAP. I. 

Of the common Duties of a Nation towards other States, or the

Offices of Humanity between Nations.



1. Foundation of the common and mutual duties of nations.



2. Offices of humanity, and their foundation.



3. General principles of all the mutual duties of nations.



4. Duties of a nation for the preservation of others.



5. She is bound to assist a nation afflicted with famine or any other

calamity.



6. She is bound to contribute to the perfection of other states.



7. ------but not by force.



8. The right to require the offices of humanity.



9. The right of judging whether they are to be granted.



10. A nation is not to compel another to perform those offices of which

the refusal is no wrong.



13. Mutual love of nations.



12. Each nation is bound to cultivate the friendship of others.



13. ------ to perfect herself, with the view to the advantage of others,

and to set them good examples.



14. ------ to take care of their glory.



15. Difference of religion ought not to preclude the offices of humanity. 



16. Rule and measure of the offices of humanity.



17. Particular limitation with respect to the prince.



18. No nation ought to injure others.



19. Offences.



20. Bad custom of the ancients.



CHAP. II. 

Of the Mutual Commerce between Nations.



21. General obligation of nations to carry on mutual commerce.



22. They are bound to favour trade.



23. Freedom of trade.



24. Right of trading belonging to nations.



25. Bach nation is sole judge of the propriety of commerce on her own

part. 



26. Necessity of commercial treaties.



27. General rule concerning those treaties.



28. Duty of nations in making such treaties.



29. Perpetual or temporary treaties, or treaties revocable at pleasure.



30. Nothing contrary to the tenor of a treaty can be granted to a third

party.



31. How far lawful to give up by treaty the liberty of trading with other

nations.



32. A nation may restrict her commerce in favour of another nation.



33. A nation may appropriate to herself a particular branch of trade.



34. Consuls.



CHAP. III. 

Of the Dignity and Equality of Nations, -- of Titles, -- and

other Marks of Honour.



35. Dignity of nations or sovereign states.



36. Their equality.



37. Precedency.



38. The form of government is foreign to this question.



39. A state ought to retain her rank, notwithstanding any changes in the

form of her government.



40. Treaties and established customs are to be observed in that

respect.



41. Name and honours given by the nation to her conductor.



42. Whether a sovereign may assume what title and honours he

pleases.



43. Right of other nations in that respect.



44. Their duty.



45. How titles and honours may be secured.



46. We must conform to general custom.



47. Mutual respect due by sovereigns to each other.



48. How a sovereign ought to maintain his dignity.



CHAP. IV. 

Of the Right to Security, and the Effects of the Sovereignty and

Independence of Nations.



49. Right to security.



50. It produces the right of resistance.



51. ------ and that of obtaining reparation.



52. ------ and the right of punishing.



53. Right of all nations against a mischievous people.



54. No nation has a right to interfere in the government of another

state. 



55. One sovereign cannot make himself judge of the conduct of

another.



56. How far lawful to interfere in a quarrel between a sovereign and his

subjects.



57. Right of opposing the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of

government.



58. The same right with respect to religion.



59. No nation can be constrained in religious concerns.



60. Offices of humanity in these matters: -- missionaries.



61. Circumspection to be used.



62. What a sovereign may do in favour of those who profess his

religion in another state.



CHAP. V. 

Of the Observance of Justice between Nations.



63. Necessity of the observance of justice in human society.



64. Obligation of all nations to cultivate and observe justice.



65. Right of refusing to submit to injustice.



66. This right is a perfect one.



67. It produces -- the right of self-defence.



68. ------ the right of doing ourselves justice.



69. The right of punishing injustice.



70. Right of all nations against one that openly despises justice



CHAP. VI. 

Of the concern a Nation may have in the Actions of her Citizens.



71. The sovereign is bound to avenge the wrongs of the state and to

protect the citizens.



72. He must not suffer his subject to offend other nations or their

citizens. 



73. The ads of individuals not imputable to the nation.



74. ------ unless she approve or ratify them.



75. Conduct to be pursued by the offended party.



76. Duty of the aggressor's sovereign.



77. If he refuses justice, he becomes a party in the fault and offence.



78. Another case in which the nation is guilty of the crimes of the

citizens. 



CHAP. VII. 

Effects of the Domain, between Nations.



79. General effects of the domain.



80. What is comprehended in the domain of a nation.



81. The property of the citizens is the national property with respect to

foreign states.



82. A consequence of that principle.



83. Connection of the domain of the nation with the sovereignty.



84. Jurisdiction.



85. Effects of the Jurisdiction in foreign countries.



86. Desert and uncultivated places.



87. Duty of the nation in that respect.



88. Right of possessing things that have no owner.



89. Rights granted to another nation.



90. Not allowable to expel a nation from the country she inhabits.



91. ------ nor to extend by violence the bounds of empire.



92. the limits of territories ought to be carefully ascertained.



93. Violation of territory.



94. Prohibition to enter the territory.



95. A country possessed by several nations at the same time.



96. A country possessed by a private person.



97. Independent families in a country.



98. Possessions of certain places only, or of certain rights, in a vacant

country.



CHAP. VIII. 

Rules respecting Foreigners.



99. General idea of the conduct a state ought to observe toward

foreigners. 



100. Entering the territory.



101. Foreigners are subject to the laws.



102. ------ and punishable according to the laws.



103. Who is the judge of their disputes.



104. Protection due to foreigners.



105. Their duties.



106. To what burthens they are subject.



107. Foreigners continue members of their own nation.



108. The state has no right over the person of a foreigner.



109. ------ nor over his property.



110. Who are the heirs of a foreigner.



111. Will of a foreigner.



112. Escheatage.



113. The right of traite foraine.



114. Immovable property possessed by an alien.



115. Marriages of aliens.



CHAP. IX. 

Of the Rights retained by all Nations after the Introduction of

Domain and Property.



116. What are the rights of which men cannot be deprived.



117. Rights still remaining from the primitive stale of communion.



118. Right retained by each nation over the property of others.



119. Right of necessity.



120. Right of procuring provision by force.



121. Right of making use of things belonging to others.



122. Right of carrying off women.



123. Right of passage.



124. ------ and of procuring necessaries.



125. Right of dwelling in a foreign country.



126. Things, of which the use is inexhaustible.



127. Right of innocent use.



128. Nature of that right in general.



129. ------ and in cases not doubtful.



130. Exercise of that right between nations.



CHAP. X. 

How a Nation is to use her Right of Domain, in order to

discharge her Duties towards other Nations, with respect to the

Innocent Use of Things. 



131. General duty of the proprietor.



132. Innocent passage.



133. Securities may be required.



134. Passage of merchandise.



135. Residence in the country.



136. How we are to act towards foreigners who desire a perpetual

residence. 



137. Right accruing from a general permission.



138. A right granted as a favour.



139. The nation ought to be courteous.



CHAP. XI. 

Of Usucaption and Prescription between Nations.



140. Definition of usucaption and prescription.



141. Usucaption and prescription derived from the law of nature.



142. What foundation is required for ordinary prescription.



143. Immemorial prescription.



144. Claimant alleging reasons for his silence.



145. Proprietor sufficiently showing that he does not mean to abandon

his right.



146. Prescription founded on the actions of the proprietor.



147. Usucaption and prescription take place between nations.



148. More difficult, between nations, to found them on a presumptive

desertion.



149. Other principles that enforce prescription.



150. Effects of the voluntary law of nations on this subject.



151. Law of treaties, or custom, in this matter.



CHAP. XII. 

Of Treaties of Alliance and other Public Treaties.



152. Nature of treaties.



153. Compacts, agreements, or conventions.



154. By whom treaties are made.



155. Whether a state under protection may make treaties.



156. Treaties concluded by proxies or plenipotentiaries.



157. Validity of treaties.



158. Injury does not render them void.



159. Duly of nations in that respect.



160. Nullity of treaties which are pernicious to the state.



161. Nullity of treaties made for an unjust or dishonest purpose.



162. Whether an alliance may be contracted with those who do not

profess the true religion.



163. Obligation to observe treaties.



164. The violation of a treaty is an act of injustice.



165. Treaties cannot be made contrary to those already existing.



166. How treaties may be concluded with several nations with the

same view. 



167. The more ancient ally entitled to a preference.



168. We owe no assistance in an unjust war.



169. General division of treaties; -- those that relate to things already

due by the law of nature.



170. Collision of those treaties with the duties we owe to ourselves.



171. Treaties in which we barely promise to do no injury.



172. Treaties concerning things that are not naturally due: -- equal

treaties.



173. Obligation to preserve equality in treaties.



174. Difference between equal treaties and equal alliances.



175. Unequal treaties, and unequal alliances.



176. An alliance with diminution of sovereignty may annul preceding

treaties. 



177. We ought, as much as possible, to avoid making unequal

alliances.



178. Mutual duties of nations with respect to unequal alliances.



179. ------ in alliances where the inequality is on the side of the more

powerful party.



180. How inequality of treaties and alliances may be conformable to

the law of nature.



181. Inequality imposed by way of punishment.



182. Other kinds, of which we have spoken elsewhere.



183. Personal and real treaties.



184. Naming the contracting parties in the treaty does not render it

personal.



185. An alliance made by a republic is real.



186. Treaties concluded by kings or other monarchs.



187. Perpetual treaties, and those for a certain time.



188. Treaties made for the king and his successors.



189. Treaties made for the good of the kingdom.



190. How presumption ought to be founded in doubtful cases.



191. The obligations and rights resulting from a real treaty pass to the

successors.



192. Treaties accomplished once for all, and perfected.



193. Treaties already accomplished on the one part.



194. The personal alliance expires if one of the parties ceases to reign. 



195. Treaties in their own nature personal.



196. Alliance concluded for the defence of the king and royal family.



197. Obligation of a real alliance, when the allied king is deposed.



CHAP. XIII. 

Of the Dissolution and Renewal of Treaties.



198. Expiration of alliances made for a limited time.



199. Renewal of treaties.



200. How a treaty is dissolved, when violated by one of the contracting

parties.



201. The violation of one treaty does not cancel another.



202. The violation of one article in a treaty may cancel the whole.



203. The treaty is void by the destruction of one of the contracting

powers. 



204. Alliances of a state that has afterwards put herself under the

protection of another.



205. Treaties dissolved by mutual consent.



CHAP. XIV. 

Of other public Conventions, -- of those that are made by

Subordinate Powers, -- particularly of the Agreement called in

Latin, Sponsio, -- and of Conventions between the Sovereign

and Private Persons.



206. Conventions made by sovereigns.



207. Those made by subordinate powers.



208. Treaties concluded by a public person, without orders from the

sovereign, or without sufficient powers.



209. The agreement called sponsio.



210. The state is not bound by such an agreement.



211. To what the promiser is bound when it is disavowed.



212. To what the sovereign is bound.



213. Private contracts of the sovereign.



214. Contracts made by him with private persons, in the name of the

state. 



215. They are binding on the nation, and on his successors.



216. Debts of the sovereign and the state.



217. Donations of the sovereign.



CHAP. XV. 

Of the Faith of Treaties.



218. What is sacred among nations.



219. Treaties sacred between nations.



220. The faith of treaties is sacred.



221. He who violates his treaties, violates the law of nations.



222 Right of nations against him who disregards the faith of treaties.



223. The law of nations violated by the popes.



224. This abuse authorized by princes.



225. Use of an oath in treaties. -- It does not constitute the obligation.



226. It does not change the nature of obligations.



227. It gives no pre-eminence to one treaty above another.



228. It cannot give force to a treaty that is invalid.



229. Asseverations.



230. The faith of treaties does not depend on the difference of religion. 



231. Precaution to be taken in wording treaties.



232. Subterfuges in treaties.



233. An evidently false interpretation inconsistent with the faith of

treaties.



234. Faith tacitly pledged.



CHAP. XVI. 

Of Securities given for the Observance of Treaties.



235. Guaranty.



236. It gives the guarantee no right to interfere unasked in the execution

of a treaty.



237. Nature of the obligation it imposes.



238. The guaranty cannot impair the rights of a third parly.



239. The duration of the guaranty.



240. Treaties with surety.



241. Pawns, securities, and mortgages.



242. A nation's right over what she holds as a pledge.



243. How she is obliged to restore it.



244. How she may appropriate it to herself.



245. Hostages.



246. What right we have over hostages.



247. Their liberty alone is pledged.



248. When they are to be sent back.



249. Whether they may be detained on any other account.



250. They may be detained for their own actions.



251. Of the support of hostages.



252. A subject cannot refuse to be a hostage.



253. Rank of the hostages.



254. They ought not to make their escape.



255. Whether a hostage who dies is to be replaced.



256. Substitute for a hostage.



257. Hostage succeeding to the crown.



258. The liability of the hostage ends with the treaty.



259. The violation of the treaty is an injury done to the hostages



260. The fate of the hostage when he who has given him fails in his

engagements.



261. Right founded on custom.



CHAP. XVII. 

Of the Interpretation of Treaties.



262. Necessity of establishing rules of interpretation.



263. First general maxim -- it is not allowable to interpret what has no

need of interpretation.



264. Second general maxim -- if he who could and ought to have

explained himself, has not done it, it is to his own detriment.



265. Third general maxim -- neither of the contracting parties has a

right to interpret the treaty according to his own fancy.



266. Fourth general maxim -- what is sufficiently declared is to be

taken for true.



267. We ought to attend rather to the words of the person promising,

than to those of the party stipulating.



268. Fifth general maxim -- the interpretation ought to be made

according to certain rules.



269. The faith of treaties imposes an obligation to follow those rules.



270. General rule of interpretation.



271. The terms are to be explained conformably to common usage.



272. Interpretation of ancient treaties.



273. Quibbles on words.



274. A rule on that subject.



275. Mental reservations.



276. Interpretation of technical terms.



277. Terms whose signification admits of degrees.



278. Figurative expressions.



279. Equivocal expressions.



280. The rule for these two cases.



281. Not necessary to give a term the same sense everywhere in the

same deed. 



282. We ought to reject every interpretation which leads to an

absurdity. 



283. ------ or which renders the act null and void of effect. 



284. Obscure expressions interpreted by others more clear in the same

author. 



285. Interpretation founded on the connection of the discourse.



286. Interpretation drawn from the connection and relation of the things

themselves.



287. Interpretation founded on the reason of the deed.



288. Where many reasons have concurred to determine the will.



289. What constitutes a sufficient reason for an act of the will.



290. Extensive interpretation founded on the reason of the act.



291. Frauds tending to elude laws or promises.



292. Restrictive interpretation.



293. Us use, in order to avoid falling into absurdities, or into what is

unlawful.



294. ---- or what is too severe and burthensome.



295. How it ought to restrict the signification agreeably to the subject. 



296. How a change happening in the state of things may form an

exception. 



297. Interpretation of a deed in unforeseen cases.



298. Reasons arising from the possibility, and not the existence of a

thing. 



299. Expressions susceptible of an extensive and a limited sense.



300. Things favourable, and things odious.



301. What tends to the common advantage, and to equality, is

favourable: the contrary is odious.



302. What is useful to human society, is favourable: the contrary is

odious. 



303. Whatever contains a penalty is odious.



304. Whatever renders a deed void is odious.



305. Whatever tends to change the present state of things, is odious,

the contrary is favourable.



306. Things of a mixed nature.



307. Interpretation of favourable things.



308. Interpretation of odious things.



309. Examples.



310. How we ought to interpret deeds of pure liberality.



311. Collison of laws or treaties.



312. First rule in cases of collison.



313. Second rule.



314. Third rule.



315. Fourth rule.



316. Fifth rule.



317. Sixth rule.



318. Seventh rule.



319. Eighth rule.



320. Ninth rule.



321. Tenth rule.



322. General remark on the manner of observing all the preceding

rules.



CHAP. XVIII. 

Of the Mode of Terminating Deputes between Nations.



323. General direction on this subject.



324. Every nation is bound to give satisfaction respecting the just

complaints of another.



325. How nations may abandon their rights and just complaints.



326. Means suggested by the law of nature for terminating their

disputes: amicable accommodation.



327. Compromise.



328. Mediation.



329. Arbitration.



330. Conferences and congresses.



331. Distinction to be made between evident and doubtful cases.



332. Essential rights, and those of less importance.



333. How we acquire a right of recurring to force in a doubtful case.



334. ------ and even without attempting other measures.



335. Voluntary law of nations on that subject.



336. Equitable conditions to be offered.



337. Possessor's right in doubtful cases.



338. How reparation of an injury is to be sought.



339. Retaliation.



340. Various modes of punishing, without having recourse to arms.



341. Retortion.



342. Reprisals.



343. What is required to render them lawful.



344. Upon what effects reprisals are made.



345. The state is bound to compensate those who suffer by reprisals.



346. The sovereign alone can order reprisals.



347. Reprisals against a nation for actions of her subjects, and in favour

of the injured subjects.



348. -------- but not in favour of foreigners.



349. Those who have given cause for reprisals are bound to indemnify

those who suffer by them.



350. What may be deemed a refusal to do justice.



353. Subjects arrested by way of reprisals.



352. Our right against those who oppose reprisals.



353. Just reprisals do not afford a just cause for war.



354. How we ought to confine ourselves to reprisals, or at length

proceed to hostilities.



                      BOOK III.



                      OF WAR.



CHAP. I. 

Of War, -- its different Kinds, -- and the Right of making War.



1. Definition of war.



2. Public war.



3. Right of making war.



4. It belongs only to the sovereign power.



5. Defensive and offensive war.



CHAP. II. 

Of the Instruments of War, -- the Raising of Troops, &c. --

their Commanders, or the Subordinate Powers in War.



6. Instruments of war.



7. Right of levying troops.



8. Obligation of the citizens or subjects.



9. Enlisting or raising of troops.



10. Whether there be any exemptions from carrying arms.



11. Soldiers' pay and quarters.



12. Hospitals for invalids.



13. Mercenary soldiers.



14. Rule to be observed in their enlistment.



15. Enlisting in foreign countries.



16. Obligation of Soldiers.



17. Military laws.



18. Military discipline.



19. Subordinate powers in war.



20. How their promises bind the sovereign.



21. In what cases their promises bind only themselves.



22. Their assumption of an authority which they do not possess.



23. How they bind their inferiors.



CHAP. III. 

Of the Just Causes of War.



24. War never to be undertaken without very cogent reasons.



25. Justificatory reasons, and motives for making war.



26. What is in general a just cause of war.



27. What war is unjust.



28. The object of war.



29. But justificatory reasons and proper motives requisite in

undertaking a war.



30. Proper motives -- vicious motives.



31. War undertaken upon just grounds, but from vicious motives.



32. Pretexts.



33. War undertaken merely for advantage.



34. Nations who make war without reason or apparent motives.



35. How defensive war is just or unjust.



36. How it may become just against an offensive war which was

originally just.



37. How an offensive war is just in an evident cause.



38. ------ in a doubtful cause.



39. War cannot be just on both sides.



40. Sometimes reputed lawful.



41. War undertaken to punish a nation.



42. Whether the aggrandizement of a neighbouring power can authorize

a war against him.



43. Alone, and of itself, it cannot give a right to attack him.



44. How the appearances of danger give that right.



45. Another case more evident.



46. Other allowable means of defence against a formidable power.



47. Political equilibrium.



48. Ways of maintaining it.



49. How he that destroys the equilibrium may be restrained or even

weakened. 



50. Behaviour allowable towards a neighbour preparing for war.



CHAP. IV. 

Of the Declaration of War, -- and of War in due Form.



51. Declaration of war: -- necessity thereof.



52. What it is to contain.



53. It is simple or conditional.



54. The right to make war ceases on the offer of equitable conditions.



55. Formalities of a declaration of war.



56. Other reasons for the necessity of its publication.



57. Defensive war requires no declaration.



58. When it may be omitted in an offensive war.



59. It is not to be omitted by way of retaliation.



60. Time of the declaration.



61. Duty of the inhabitants on a foreign army's entering a country

before a declaration of war.



62. Commencement of hostilities.



63. Conduct to be observed towards the enemy's subjects who are in

the country at the time of the declaration of war.



64. Publication of the war, and manifestoes.



65. Decorum and moderation to be observed in the manifestoes.



66. What is a lawful war in due form.



67. It is to be distinguished from informal and unlawful war.



68. Grounds of this distinction.



CHAP. V. 

Of the Enemy, and of Things belonging to the Enemy.



69. Who is an enemy.



70. All the subjects of the two stales at war are enemies.



71. ------ and continue to be enemies in all places.



72. Whether women and children are to be accounted enemies



73. Things belonging to an enemy.



74. ------ continue such everywhere.



75. Neutral things found with an enemy.



76. Lands possessed by foreigners in an enemy's country.



77. Things due to the enemy by a third party.



CHAP. VI. 

Of the Enemy's Allies, -- of Warlike Associations, -- of

Auxiliaries and Subsidies.



78. Treaties relative to war.



79. Defensive and offensive alliances.



80. Difference between warlike alliances and defensive treaties.



81. Auxiliary troops.



82. Subsidies.



83. When a nation is authorized to assist another.



84. ------ and to make alliances for war.



85. Alliances made with a nation actually engaged in war.



86. Tacit clause in every warlike alliance.



87. To refuse succours for an unjust war is no breach of alliance.



88. What the casus fœderis is.



89. It never takes place in an unjust war.



90. How it exists in a defensive war.



91. ------ and in a treaty of a guaranty.



92. The succour is not due under an inability to furnish it, or when the

public safety would be exposed.



93. Other cases: -- two of the parties in an alliance coming to a

rupture.



94. Refusal of the succours due in virtue of an alliance.



95. The enemy's associates.



96. Those who make a common cause with the enemy are his

associates.



97. ------ and those who assist him, without being obliged to it by

treaties.



98. ------ or who are in an offensive alliance with him.



99. How a defensive alliance associates with the enemy.



100. Another case.



101. In what case it does not produce the same effect.



102. Whether it be necessary to declare war against the enemy's

associates. 



CHAP. VII. 

Of Neutrality, -- and the Passage of Troops through a Neutral

Country.



103. Neutral nations.



104. Conduct to be pursued by a neutral nation.



105. Anally may furnish the succour due from him, and remain neuter.



106. Right of remaining neuter.



107. Treaties of neutrality.



108. Additional reasons for making those treaties.



109. Foundation of the rules of neutrality.



130. How levies may be allowed, money lent, and every kind of things

sold, without a breach of neutrality.



111. Trade of neutral nations with those which are at war.



112. Contraband goods.



113. Whether such goods may be confiscated.



114. Searching neutral ships.



115. Enemy's property on board a neutral ship.



116. Neutral property on board an enemy's ship.



117. Trade with a besieged town.



118. Impartial offices of neutrals.



119. Passage of troops through a neutral country.



120. Passage to be asked.



121. It may be refused for good reasons.



122. In what case it may be forced.



123. The fear of danger authorizes a refusal.



124. ------ or a demand of every reasonable security.



125. Whether always necessary to give every kind of security required.



126. Equality to be observed towards both parties, as to the passage.



127. No complaint lies against a neutral state for granting passage.



128. That state may refuse it from fear of the resentment of the

opposite party.



129. -------- and lest her country should become the theatre of war.



130. What is included in the grant of passage.



131. Safely of the passage.



132. No hostility to be committed in a neutral country.



133. Neutral country not to afford a retreat to troops, that they may

again attack their enemies.



134. Conduct to be pursued by troops passing through a neutral

country.



135. A passage may be refused for a war evidently unjust.



CHAP. VIII. 

Of the Rights of Nations in War, -- and first, of what we have a

Right to do and what we are allowed to do, to the Enemy's

Person in a just War.



136. General principle of the rights against an enemy in a just war.



137. Difference between what we have a right to do, and what is

barely allowed to be done with impunity between enemies.



138. The right to weaken an enemy by every justifiable method.



139. The right over the enemy's person.



140. Limits of that right: -- an enemy not to be killed after ceasing to

resist.



141. A particular case in which quarter may be refused.



142. Reprisals.



143. Whether a governor of a town can be punished with death for an

obstinate defence.



144. Fugitives and deserters.



145. Women, children, the aged, and sick.



146. Clergy, men of letters, &c.



147. Peasants, and, in general, all who do not carry arms.



148. The right of making prisoners of war.



149. A prisoner of war not to be put to death.



150. How prisoners of war are to be treated.



151. Whether prisoners, who cannot be kept or fed, may be put to

death.



152. Whether prisoners of war may be made slaves.



153. Exchange and ransom of prisoners.



154. The state is bound to procure their release.



155. Whether an enemy may lawfully be assassinated or poisoned.



156. Whether poisoned weapons may be used in war.



157. Whether springs may be poisoned.



158. Disposition to be entertained towards an enemy.



159. Tenderness for the person of a king who is in arms against us.



CHAP. IX. 

Of the Right of War, with Respect to Things belonging to the

Enemy. 



160. Principles of the right over things belonging to the enemy.



161. The right of seizing them.



162. What is taken from the enemy by way of penalty.



163. What is withheld from him, in order to oblige him to give just

satisfaction.



164. Booty.



165. Contribution.



166. Waste and destruction.



167. Ravaging and burning.



168. What things are to be spared.



169. Bombarding towns.



170. Demolition of fortresses.



171. Safeguards.



172. General rule of moderation respecting the evil which may be done

to an enemy.



173. Rule of the voluntary law of nations on the same subject.



CHAP. X. 

Of Faith between Enemies, -- of Stratagems, Artifices in War,

Spies, and some other Practices.



174. Faith to be sacred between enemies.



175. What treaties are to be observed between enemies.



176. On what occasions they may be broken.



177. Lies.



178. Stratagems and artifices in war.



179. Spies.



180. Clandestine seduction of the enemy's people.



181. Whether the offers of a traitor may be accepted.



182. Deceitful intelligence.



CHAP. XI. 

Of the Sovereign who wages an unjust war. 



183. An unjust war gives no right whatever.



184. Great guilt of the sovereign who undertakes it.



185. His obligations.



166. Difficulty of repairing the injury he has done.



186. Whether the nation and the military are bound to anything.



CHAP. XII. 

Of the Voluntary Law of Nations, as it regards the Effects of

Regular Warfare, independently of the Justice of the Cause.



188. Nations not rigidly to enforce the law of nature against each other.



189. Why they are bound to admit the voluntary law of nations



190. Regular war, as to its effects, is to be accounted just on both

sides. 



191. Whatever is permitted to one party, is so to the other.



192. The voluntary law gives no more than impunity to him who wages

an unjust war.



CHAP. XIII. 

Of Acquisitions by War, and particularly of Conquests.



193. War a mode of acquisition.



194. Measure of the right it gives.



195. Rules of the voluntary law of nations.



196. Acquisition of movable property.



197. Acquisition of immovables, -- or conquest.



198. How to transfer them validly.



199. Conditions on which a conquered town is acquired.



200. Lands of private persons.



201. Conquest of the whole state.



202. To whom the conquest belongs.



203. Whether we are to set at liberty a people whom the enemy had

unjustly conquered.



CHAP. XIV. 

Of the Right of Postliminium.



204. Definition of the right of postliminium.



205. Foundation of that right.



206. How it takes effect.



207. Whether it takes effect among the allies.



208. Of no validity in neutral nations.



209. What things are recoverable by that right.



210. Of those who cannot return by the right of postliminium.



211. They enjoy that right when retaken.



212. Whether that right extends to their properly alienated by the

enemy. 



213. Whether a nation that has been entirely subdued can enjoy the

right of postliminium.



214. Right of postliminium for what is restored at the peace.



215. ------and for things ceded to the enemy.



216. The right of postliminium does not exist after a peace.



217. Why always in force for prisoners.



218. They are free even by escaping into a neutral country.



219. How the rights and obligations of prisoners subsist.



220. Testament of a prisoner of war.



221. Marriage.



222. Regulations established by treaty or custom, respecting

postliminium. 



CHAP. XV. 

Of the Right of Private Persons in War.



223. Subjects cannot commit hostilities without the sovereign's order.



224. That order may be general or particular.



225. Source of the necessity of such an order.



226. Why the law of nations should have adopted this rule.



227. Precise meaning of the order.



228. What may be undertaken by private persons, presuming on the

sovereign's will.



229. Privateers.



230. Volunteers.



231. What soldiers and subalterns may do.



232. Whether the stale is bound to indemnify the subjects for damages

sustained in war.



CHAP. XVI. 

Of various Conventions made during the Course of the War.



233. Truce and suspension of arms.



234. ------ does not terminate the war.



235. A truce is either partial or general.



236. General truce for many years.



237. By whom those agreements may be concluded.



238. The sovereign's faith engaged in them.



239. When the truce begins to be obligatory.



240. Publication of the truce.



241. Subjects contravening the truce.



242. Violation of the truce.



243. Stipulation of a penalty against the infractor.



244. Time of the truce.



245. Effects of a truce: what is allowed or not, during its continuance.

-- First rule -- Each party may do at home what they have a right to

do in time of peace.



246. Second rule -- not to lake advantage of the truce in doing what

hostilities would have prevented.



247. ------ for instance, continuing the works of a siege, or repairing

breaches.



248. -------- or introducing succours.



249. Distinction of a particular case.



250. Retreat of an army during a suspension of hostilities.



251. Third rule -- Nothing to be attempted in contested places, but

every thing to be left as it was.



252. Places quitted or neglected by the enemy.



253. Subjects inclined to revolt against their prince not to be received

during the truce.



254. ------ much less to be solicited to treason.



255. Persons or effects of enemies not to be seized during the truce.



256. Right of postliminium during the truce.



257. Intercourse allowed during a truce.



258. Persons detained by unsurmountable obstacles after the expiration

of the truce.



259. Particular conditions added to truces.



260. At the expiration of the truce the war recommences without any

new declaration.



261. Capitulations; and by whom they may be concluded.



262. Clauses contained in them.



263. Observance of capitulations, and its utility.



264. Promises made to the enemy by individuals.



CHAP. XVII. 

Of Safe-conducts and Passports, and Questions on the Ransom

of Prisoners of War.



265. Nature of safe-conducts and passports.



266. From what authority they emanate.



267. Not transferable from one person to another.



268. Extent of the promised security.



269. How to judge of the right derived from a safe conduct.



270. Whether it includes baggage and domestics.



271. Safe conduct granted to the father does not include his family.



272. Safe conduct given in general to any one and his retinue.



273. Term of the safe conduct.



274. A person unavoidably detained beyond the term.



275. The safe conduct does not expire at the death of him who gave it.



276. How it may be revoked.



277. Safe conduct, with the clause "for such time as we shall think fit".



278. Conventions relating to the ransom of prisoners.



279. The right of demanding a ransom may be transferred.



280. What may annul the convention made for the rate of the ransom.



281. A prisoner dying before payment of ransom.



282. Prisoner released on condition of procuring the release of another.



283. Prisoner retaken before he has paid his former ransom.



284. Prisoner rescued before he has received his liberty.



285. Whether the things which a prisoner has found means to conceal,

belong to him.



286. Hostage given for the release of a prisoner.



CHAP. XVIII. 

Of Civil War.



287. Foundation of the sovereign's rights against the rebels.



288. Who are rebels.



289. Popular commotion, insurrection, sedition.



290. How the sovereign is to suppress them.



291. He is bound to perform the promises he has made to the rebels.



292. Civil war.



293. A civil war produces two independent parties.



294. They are to observe the common laws of war.



295. The effects of civil war distinguished according to cases.



296. Conduct to be pursued by foreign nations.



                      BOOK IV.



    OF THE RESTORATION OF PEACE: AND OF

                     EMBASSIES.



CHAP. I. 

Of Peace, and the Obligation to cultivate it.



1. What peace is.



2. Obligation of cultivating it.



3. The sovereign's obligation in that respect.



4. Extent of that duty.



5. Disturbers of the public peace.



6. How far war may be continued.



7. Peace the end of war.



8. General effects of peace.



CHAP. II. 

Treaties of Peace.



9. Definition of a treaty of peace.



10. By whom it may be concluded.



11. Alienations made by a treaty of peace.



12. How the sovereign may, in a treaty, dispose of what concerns

individuals. 



13. Whether a king who is a prisoner of war can make peace.



14. Whether peace can be made with an usurper.



15. Allies included in the treaty of peace.



16. Associates to treat, each for himself.



17. Mediation.



18. On what footing peace may be concluded.



19. General effect of the treaty of peace.



20. Amnesty.



21. Things not mentioned in the treaty.



22. Things not included in the compromise or amnesty.



23. Former treaties, mentioned or confirmed in the new, are a part of

it. 



CHAP. III. 

Of the Execution of the Treaty of Peace.



24. When the obligation of the treaty commences.



25. Publication of the peace.



26. Time of the execution.



27. A lawful excuse to be admitted.



28. The promise is void when the party to whom it was made has

himself hindered the performance of it.



29. Cessation of contributions.



30. Products of the thing restored or ceded.



31. In what condition things are to be restored.



32. The interpretation of a treaty of peace is to be against the superior

party.



33. Names of ceded countries.



34. Restoration not to be understood of those who have voluntarily

given themselves up.



CHAP. IV. 

Of the Observance and Breach of the Treaty of Peace.



35. The treaty of peace binds the nation and successors.



36. It is to be faithfully observed.



37. The plea of fear or force does not dispense with the observance.



38. How many ways a treaty of peace may be broken.



39. ------ by a conduct contrary to the nature of every treaty of

peace.



40. To take up arms for a fresh cause is no breach of the treaty of

peace. 



41. A subsequent alliance with an enemy is likewise no breach of the

treaty . 



42. Why a distinction is to be made between a new war and a breach

of the treaty.



43. Justifiable self-defence is no breach of the treaty.



44. Causes of rupture on account of allies.



45. The treaty is broken by what is contrary to its particular nature.



46. ------ by the violation of any article.



47. The violation of a single article breaks the whole treaty.



48. Whether a distinction may here be made between the more and the

less important articles.



49. Penally annexed to the violation of an article.



50. Studied delays.



51. Unsurmountable impediments.



52. Infractions of the treaty of peace by the subjects.



53. ------ or by allies.



54. Right of the offended party against him who has violated the treaty.



CHAP. V. 

Of the Right of Embassy, or the Right of sending and receiving

Public Ministers.



55. It is necessary that nations be enabled to treat and communicate

together.



56. They do that by the agency of public ministers.



57. Every sovereign state has a right to send and receive public

ministers. 



58. An unequal alliance, or a treaty of protection, does not take away

that right.



59. Right of the princes and states of the empire in that respect.



60. Cities that have the right of banner.



61. Ministers of viceroys.



62. Ministers of the nation or of the regents during an interregnum.



63. Sovereign molesting another in the exercise of the right of embassy.



64. What is allowable in that respect in time of war.



65. The minister of a friendly power is to be received.



66. Resident ministers.



67. Admission of an enemy's ministers.



68. Whether ministers may be received from or sent to an usurper.



CHAP. VI. 

Of the several Orders of Public Ministers -- of the

Representative Character, and of the Honours due to Ministers.



69. Origin of the several orders of public ministers.



70. Representative character.



71. Ambassadors.



72. Envoys.



73. Residents.



74. Ministers.



75. Consuls, agents, deputies, commissioners, &c.



76. Credentials.



77. Instructions.



78. Right of sending ambassadors.



79. Honours due to ambassadors.



CHAP. VII. 

Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Ambassadors, and

other Public Ministers.



80. Respect due to public ministers.



81. Their persons sacred and inviolable.



82. Particular protection due to them.



83. When it commences.



84. What is due to them in the countries through which they pass.



85. Ambassadors going to an enemy's country.



86. Embassies between enemies.



87. Heralds, trumpeters, and drummers.



88. Ministers, trumpeters, &c., to be respected even in a civil war.



89. Sometimes they may be refused admittance.



90. Every thing which has the appearance of insult to them must be

avoided. 



91. By and to whom they may be sent.



92. Independence of foreign ministers.



93. How the foreign minister is to behave.



94. How he may be punished for ordinary transgressions.



95. ------ for faults committed against the prince.



96. Right of ordering away an ambassador who is guilty or justly

suspected. 



97. Right of repressing him by force, if he behaves as an enemy.



98. Ambassador forming dangerous plots and conspiracies.



99. What may be done to him according to the exigency of the case.



100. Ambassador attempting against the sovereign's life.



101. Two remarkable instances respecting the immunities of public

ministers. 



102. Whether reprisals may be made on an ambassador.



103. Agreement of nations concerning the privileges of ambassadors.



104. Free exercise of religion.



105. Whether an ambassador be exempted from all imposts.



106. Obligation founded on use and custom.



107. A minister whose character is not public.



108. A sovereign in a foreign country.



109. Deputies to the states.



CHAP. VIII. 

Of the Judge of Ambassadors in Civil Cases.



110. The ambassador is exempt from the civil jurisdiction of the

country where he resides.



111. How he may voluntarily subject himself to it.



112. A minister who is a subject of the state where he is employed.



113. Immunity of the minister extends to his properly.



114. The exemption cannot extend to effects belonging to any trade the

minister may carry on.



115. -------- nor to immovable property which he possesses in the

country.



116. How justice may be obtained against an ambassador.



CHAP. IX. 

Of the Ambassador's House and Domestics.



117. The ambassador's house.



118. Right of asylum.



119. Exemption of an ambassador's carriages.



120. ------ of his retinue.



121. ------ of his wife and family.



122. ------ of the secretary of the embassy.



123. ------ of the ambassador's couriers and despatches.



124. The ambassador's authority over his retinue.



125. When the rights of an ambassador expire.



126. Cases when new credentials are necessary.



127. Conclusion.



____________



THE 

              LAW OF NATIONS



                 PRELIMINARIES. 

  IDEA AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW

                    OF NATIONS.



§ 1. What is meant by a nation or state.



NATIONS or states are bodies politic, societies of men united together

for the purpose of promoting their mutual safely and advantage by the

joint efforts of their combined strength. 



§ 2. It is a moral person.



Such a society has her affairs and her interests; she deliberates and

takes resolutions in common; thus becoming a moral person, who

possesses an understanding and a will peculiar to herself, and is

susceptible of obligations and rights.



To establish on a solid foundation the obligations and rights of

nations, is the design of this work.



§ 3. Definition of the law of nations.



The Law of Nations is the science which teaches the rights

subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations

correspondent to those rights. (1)







         IDEA AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES



In this treatise it will appear, in what manner States, as such, ought to

regulate all their actions. We shall examine the obligations of a people

as well towards themselves as towards other nations; and by that

means we shall discover the Rights which result from these obligations.

For, the right being nothing more than the power of doing what is

morally possible, that is to say, what is proper and consistent with duty

-- it is evident that right is derived from duty, or passive obligation,

-- the obligation we lie under to act in such or such manner. It is

therefore necessary that a Nation should acquire a knowledge of the

obligations incumbent on her, in order that she may not only avoid all

violation of her duty, but also be able distinctly to ascertain her rights,

or what she may lawfully require from other nations.



§ 4. In what light nations or states are to be considered.



Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and

who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the

state of nature, -- Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered

as so many free persons living together in the state of nature.



It is a settled point with writers on the natural law, that all men inherit

from nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot

be deprived without their own consent. In a State, the individual

citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have

made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. But the body of the

nation, the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect

to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily

submitted to them.



§ 5. To what laws nations are subject.



As men are subject to the laws of nature, -- and as their union in civil

society cannot have exempted them from the obligation to observe

those laws, since by that union they do not cease to be men, -- the

entire nation, whose common will is but the result of the united wills of

the citizens, remains subject to the laws of nature, and is bound to

respect them in all her proceedings. And since right arises from

obligation, as we have just observed (§3), the nation possesses also the

same rights which nature has conferred upon men in order to enable

them to perform their duties



§ 6. In what the law of nations originally consists. 



We must therefore apply to nations the rules of the law of nature, in

order to discover what their obligations are, and what their rights:

consequently, the law of Nations is originally no other than the law of

Nature applied to Nations. But as the application of a rule cannot be

just and reasonable unless it be made in a manner suitable to the

subject, we are not to imagine that the law of nations is precisely and in

every case the same as the law of nature, with the difference only of the

subjects to which it is applied, so as to allow of our substituting nations

for individuals. A state or civil society is a subject very different from an

individual of the human race; from which circumstance, pursuant to the

law of nature itself, there result, in many cases, very different

obligations and rights: since the same general rule, applied to two

subjects, cannot produce exactly the same decisions, when the subjects

are different; and a particular rule which is perfectly just with respect to

one subject, is not applicable to another subject of a quite different

nature. There are many cases, therefore, in which the law of Nature

does not decide between state and state in the same manner as it

would between man and man. We must therefore know how to

accommodate the application of it to different subjects; and it is the art

of thus applying it with a precision founded on right reason, that renders

the law of Nations a distinct science. (2)







§ 7. Definition of the necessary law of nations. 



We call that the Necessary Law of Nations which consists in the

application of the law of nature to Nations. It is Necessary because

nations are absolutely bound to observe it. This law contains the

precepts prescribed by the law of nature to states, on whom that law

is not less obligatory than on individuals, since states are composed of

men, their resolutions are taken by men, and the law of nature is

binding on all men, under whatever relation they act. This is the law

which Grotius, and those who follow him, call the Internal law of

Nations, on account of its being obligatory on nations in point of

conscience. (3) Several writers term it the Natural law of Nations.



§ 8. It is immutable



Since therefore the necessary law of nations consists in the application

of the law of nature to states, -- which law is immutable, as being

founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man,

-- it follows that the Necessary law of nations is immutable.



§ 9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the

obligations arising from it.



Whence, as this law is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it

necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it

by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor

reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.



This is the principle by which we may distinguish lawful conventions or

treaties from those that are not lawful, and innocent and rational

customs from those that are unjust or censurable.



There are things, just in themselves, and allowed by the necessary law

of nations, on which states may mutually agree with each other, and

which they may consecrate and enforce by their manners and customs.

There are others of an indifferent nature, respecting which, it rests at

the option of nations to make in their treaties whatever agreements they

please, or to introduce whatever custom or practice they think proper.

But every treaty, every custom, which contravenes the injunctions or

prohibitions of the Necessary law of nations is unlawful. It will appear,

however, in the sequel that it is only by the Internal law, by the law of

Conscience, such conventions or treaties are always condemned as

unlawful, and that, for reasons which shall be given in their proper

place, they are nevertheless often valid by the external law. Nations

being free and independent, though the conduct of one of them be

illegal and condemnable by the laws of conscience, the others are

bound to acquiesce in it, when it does not infringe upon their perfect

rights. The liberty of that nation would not remain entire, if the others

were to arrogate to themselves the right of inspecting and regulating her

actions; an assumption on their part, that would be contrary to the law

of nature, which declares every nation free and independent of all the

others.



§ 10. Society established by nature between all mankind



Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants,

but necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his

fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the

sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a

rational being. This is sufficiently proved by experience. We have

instances of persons, who, having grown up to manhood among the

bears of the forest, enjoyed not the use of speech or of reason, but

were, like the brute beasts, possessed only of sensitive faculties. We

see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same

strength and natural weapons of defence with which she has furnished

other animals -- having, in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind

with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of

acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech

enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other

mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge; and having

thus become intelligent, they find a thousand methods of preserving

themselves, and supplying their wants. Each individual, moreover, is

intimately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his

nature without the intercourse and assistance of others. Since,

therefore, nature has thus formed mankind, it is a convincing proof of

her intention that they should communicate with, and mutually aid and

assist each other.



Hence is deduced the establishment of natural society among men. The

general law of that society is, that each individual should do for

the others every thing which their necessities require, and which

he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to

himself: (4) a law which all men must observe in order to live in a

manner consonant to their nature, and conformable to the views of their

common Creator -- a law which our own safety, our happiness, our

dearest interests, ought to render sacred to every one of us. Such is the

general obligation that binds us to the observance of our duties: let us

fulfil them with care, if we would wisely endeavour to promote our own

advantage. (5)



It is easy to conceive what exalted felicity the world would enjoy, were

all men willing to observe the rule that we have just laid down. On the

contrary, if each man wholly and immediately directs all his thoughts to

his own interest, if he does nothing for the sake of other men, the

whole human race together will be immersed in the deepest

wretchedness. Let us therefore endeavour to promote the general

happiness of mankind; all mankind, in return, will endeavour to

promote ours, and thus we shall establish our felicity on the most solid

foundations.



§ 11. And between all nations.



The universal society of the human race being an institution of nature

herself, that is to say, a necessary consequence of the nature of man,

-- all men, in whatever stations they are placed, are bound to

cultivate it, and to discharge its duties. They cannot liberate

themselves from the obligation by any convention, by any private

association. When, therefore, the unit in civil society for the purpose of

forming a separate state or nation, they may indeed enter into particular

engagements towards those with whom they associate themselves; but

they remain still bound to the performance of their duties towards the

rest of mankind. All the difference consists in this, that having agreed

to act in common, and having resigned their rights and submitted their

will to the body of the society, in every thing that concerns their

common welfare, it thenceforward belongs to that body, that state, and

its rulers, to fulfil the duties of humanity towards strangers, in every

thing that no longer depends on the liberty of individuals; and it is the

state more particularly that is to perform those duties towards other

states. We have already seen, (§ 5), that men united in society remain

subject to the obligations imposed upon them by human nature. That

society, considered as a moral person, since possessed of an

understanding, volition, and strength peculiar to itself, is therefore

obliged to live on the same terms with other societies or states, as

individual man was obliged, before those establishments, to live

with other men, that is to say, according to the laws of the natural

society established among the human race, with the difference only of

such exceptions as may arise from the different nature of the subjects.



§ 12. The object of this society of nations



Since the object of the natural society established between all mankind

is -- that they should lend each other mutual assistance, in order to

attain perfection themselves, and to render their condition as perfect as

possible, -- and since nations, considered as so many free persons

living together in a state of nature, are bound to cultivate human society

with each other, -- the object of the great society established by nature

between all nations is also the interchange of mutual assistance for

their own improvement, and that of their condition.



§ 13. General obligation imposed by it.



The first general law that we discover in the very object of the society

of nations, is that each individual nation is bound to contribute

every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the

others.1



§ 14. Explanation of this observation.



But the duties that we owe to ourselves being unquestionably

paramount to those we owe to others, -- a nation owes herself in the

first instance, and in preference to all other nations, to do every thing

she can to promote her own happiness and perfection. (I say every

thing she can, not only in a physical but in a moral sense, -- that is,

every thing that she can do lawfully, and consistently with justice

and honour.) When, therefore, she cannot contribute to the welfare of

another nation without doing an essential injury to herself, her obligation

ceases on that particular occasion, and she is considered as lying under

a disability to perform the office in question. (6)



§ 15. The second general law is the liberty and independence of

nations.



Nations being free and independent of each other, in the same manner

as men are naturally free and independent, the second general law of

their society is, that each nation should be left in the peaceable

enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature. The

natural society of nations cannot subsist, unless the natural rights of

each be duly respected. No nation is willing to renounce her liberty; she

will rather break off all commerce with those stales that should attempt

to infringe upon it.



§ 16. Effect of that liberty.



As a consequence of that liberty and independence, it exclusively

belongs to each nation to form her own judgment of what her

conscience prescribes to her, -- of what she can or cannot do, -- of

what it is proper or improper for her to do: and of course it rests solely

with her to examine and determine whether she can perform any

office for another nation without neglecting the duty which she

owes to herself. In all cases, therefore, in which a nation has the right

of judging what her duty requires, no other nation can compel her to

act in such or such particular manner: for any attempt at such

compulsion would be an infringement on the liberty of nations. We have

no right to use constraint against a free person, except in those cases

where such person is bound to perform some particular thing for us,

and for some particular reason which does not depend on his

judgment, -- in those cases, in short, where we have a perfect right

against him.



§ 17. Distinctions between internal and external, perfect and

imperfect obligations and rights.



In order perfectly to understand this, it is necessary to observe, that the

obligation, and the right which corresponds to or is derived from it, are

distinguished into external and internal. The obligation is internal, as

it binds the conscience, and is deduced from the rules of our duty: it is

external, as it is considered relatively to other men, and produces

some right between them. The internal obligation is always the same in

its nature, though it varies in degree; but the external obligation is

divided into perfect and imperfect; and the right that results from it is

also perfect or imperfect. The perfect right is that which is

accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfill the

correspondent obligation; the imperfect right is unaccompanied by that

right of compulsion. The perfect obligation is that which gives to the

opposite party the right of compulsion; the imperfect gives him only a

right to ask.



It is now easy to conceive why the right is always imperfect, when the

correspondent obligation depends on the judgment of the party in

whose breast it exists; for if, in such a case, we had a right to compel

him, he would no longer enjoy the freedom of determination respecting

the conduct he is to pursue in order to obey the dictates of his own

conscienc