Descriptions of various gun court cases (a-t)

Various gun court case links with no descriptions (same cases as this document)

Cases u-z

• Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F.Supp 771 (D.N.M. 1987)
  
• Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc. 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988)
  n this case the 10th circuit appeals court rejects a suit that attempts to hold the maker and importer of a handgun liable for its use in a crime. The court says that there is no liability for making or selling a non-defective handgun.
• Auto-Ordnance Corp. v. U.S., 822 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
  This is a case about the application of the firearms excise tax, 11% of "sale price" on long guns sold for resale, 10% on handguns, and 11% on ammo. All of these apply in the commercial making context, of whole guns only, not parts, and only at the time of sale. Anyway the tax doesn't apply to accessories, even if sold with a gun, the question was what is an accessory? Auto-Ord claimed the things that made the Deluxe semi- auto Thompson different from the Std. model, an adjustable rear sight and front sight/compensator unit, were accessories; that an accessory was anything not needed to use the gun as a gun, ie fire a bullet. The court agreed, and agreed that there was no tax due on the price difference between the Std. model and Deluxe model. I believe Auto-Ord dropped the Std. Model soon after this case came out... In any case, the case can give you an idea of how the firearms excise tax works.
• Bagdonas v. Department of Treasury, 93 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1996)
  In this case a guy who was a felon, having been convicted of selling a rifle equipped with a silencer made out of a lawn mower mufffler to a ATF agent, asks ATF to remove his firearms disability. ATF refuses; but refuses to give any reasons. He sues. While court expresses its disgust at ATF's refusal to give its reasons; when ATF does cough up post-hoc reasons, the court finds that the law gives them so much discretion that their reasons are good enough to uphold their determination. The court also suggests that ATF actually comply with the law and the constitution, and give its reasons, the fact that they got away with it here suggests they won't. The cutoff of funds for such investigations was not a factor in this case, apparently because the investigation that led ATF to turn Bagdonas down was completed before the cut-off, and he was appealing from a refusal to reconsider that decision, not from a refusal to investigate at all. While this case deals with the firearms disability issue, it is instructive as to ATF's action on all administrative issues, that are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
• Ballew v. U.S., 389 F. Supp. 47 (D. Md. 1975)
  This is a civil suit against the government by Kenyon Ballew, a guy who was raided by the ATF in 1971, in Maryland for having unregistered grenades, and was shot when he brandished a pistol at the invading officers. The court totally rejects his claims, saying they were his own fault, the search warrant was fine, and that he did in fact possess unregistered grenades (although he apparently was never prosecuted) by having dummy casings, black and smokeless powder, and fuzes from smoke grenades. This case was alluded to by Doug Oefinger in his interview in MGN a while back. The NRA also points to this incident on occasion as an example of ATF excess and BS.
• Benjamin v. B.A.T.F., 771 F.Supp. 307 (D.Ore. 1991)
  In this case the court upholds ATF's revocation of Benjamin's FFL, for refusing to permit agents to conduct a compliance inspection of the licensed premises. Benjamin's licensed premises were a garage adjacent to his parent's house. The agents requested to see the inside of the house, which Benjamin's mom refused. The agents never asked to see the garage - they asked to see the "licensed premises", then indicated the house. The court decided that even though the agents asked to see a place they were not permitted to go, he would construe the request to see the "licensed premises" to mean the garage, even though that was not what the agent nor Benjamin, nor his mom indicated in testimony they understood the agent to mean, and thus uphold the revocation.
• Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., Inc. 353 F.Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973)
  In this case a woman shot by the driver of a taxi cab she took home from work sued the cab company and the importer of the pistol used by the assailant. In this decision the court rejects her contention that the importer of the handgun is responsible for its use in the crime, and rejects her argument that the gun was sold in violation of the Gun Control Act, noting that it was sold to the Kentucky dealer that sold it to the driver before the GCA was enacted.
• Bieder v. United States, 662 A.2d 185 (D.C. App. 1995)
  Bieder was a guy with a NY CCW permit. He was visiting our Nation's Kapitol, and at security at the Kapitol Building he gave the guard his fanny pack and handgun, telling him he had a NYC permit. He was prosecuted for: Having an unregistered gun in D.C.; having unregistered ammunition in D.C.; and carrying a firearm concealed. His defense, in part, was that he was moving the gun through D.C. (in his trunk and unloaded at that time) in compliance with 18 U.S.C. sec 926A, the preemption of local bans while traveling part of the FOPA. The trial court declined to let him present that defense, and he appealed. The appeals court reversed, and agreed that as the law did allow him to carry his gun through D.C. under those circumstances, he should have been able to assert it. I haven't found too many cases construing that section, and some folks are nervous it won't be applied the way it reads. This court did, and also seemed to apply it to the ammo, although that is not expressly covered. BTW, Bieder had a different defense for the time he had the gun in the fanny pack, loaded. It wasn't real persuasive to me though. Clearly a guy who was so used to going armed he forgot he shouldn't outside NY.
• Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co., Inc., 968 F.Supp. 16 (D.Mass. 1997)
  In this brief opinion the trial court dismisses a product liability suit against Colt, over the design of their Mustang pistol, in particular their failure to include a magazine disconnect safety in the gun - a safety that prevents the gun from being fired if the magazine is removed, even if there is a live round left in the chamber of the gun. The plaintiff is the executor of the estate of a drunken man who was goofing around with a friend's Mustang, and shot himself in the head with it, apparently thinking it was unloaded when he put it to his head and pulled the trigger. The court notes that intentional misuse, and went on to note that under Mass. law, a suggested design defeciency had to not impair the utility of the gun. The court said that given that numerous users of the pistol rejected magazine disconnect safeties, it would impair the utility of the gun to include them. This claim that a magazine disconnect would have prevented injury in cases of reckless and intentional misuse of automatic pistols is regularly made, and nearly always rejected.
• Bradley v. B.A.T.F., 736 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984)
  
• Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir 1992)
  This case doesn't have much to do with gun laws, but I got inquiries about the case around Soldier of Fortune magazine's liability for running a classified ad that someone used to find a hired killer. This is the case upholding that liability, and the resulting judgment threatened to put the magazine out of business. Apparently in the end the publisher was able to convince the plaintiffs to take significantly less money, a sum SOF could pay, and stay in business. See also the Eimann case, on a similar subject, that SOF won.
• Brennan v. U.S., 435 F.Supp. 451 (E.D.Mich. 1977)
  In this case the court refuses to permit the reimportation into the USA of 89 NFA firearms exported from the USA to Canada when the owner moved there. The court also refuses to permit the importation of an additional 7 NFA firearms apparently obtained by the owner while living in Canada. While the guns were registered in the USA when they were exported, once exported they were removed from the NFA Registry, and had to comply with current law in order to be imported (ie as sample guns, for experimentation or research, or for sale to government entities).
• Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 F.Supp. 729 (W.D.Tenn 1997)
  In this case the trial court refuses to grant Wal-Mart summary judgment on claims that the store was negligent in selling ammunition which was later used in a homicide. The court notes that the killer was 18, and the ammo was suitable for use in both a handgun and rifle (.357 magnum) and that under ATF regulations they were supposed to inquire as to the use of the ammo before selling it to someone under 21. The court rejected cases holding (impliedly) that the regulation was without basis in the Gun Control Act, and that persons over 18 could buy any ammunition for a rifle from a dealer, whether it was usable in a handgun or not, and without regard to the intended use. The court also found that there was a cause of action in Tennessee for selling ammunition to someone likely to misuse it, in this case someone under 21.
• Bryan v. U.S., 373 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1967)
  In this case the 5th circuit decides that it is a question for the jury whether a particular gun is covered by the NFA, and the fact that the judge refused to permit testimony on whether a H&R Handy Gun was or was not a NFA gun was error, as was his instructing the jury that the gun was covered by the NFA as a matter of law. The court rejected the argument that its prior decision in US v. Fisher forclosed evidence on the issue of whether a smooth bore pistol was an NFA weapon.
• Burtch v. Department of the Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 9th circuit follows the 5th circuit case of McGill, and decides that felons may not petition for the restoration of their gun ownership rights, since Congress cut off funding for that. The court rejects the 3rd circuit in the Rice case.
• Burton v. U.S., 414 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1969)
  In this case the 5th circuit decides that, under the pre-68 NFA, there is no self incrimination problem with a charge of possessing an NFA firearm made in violation of the NFA, since the defendant is not the person who made the gun, and is not being asked to make any statements. Implicitly the court rejects the argument that the fact that since the maker was called on to incriminate himself, the regulation of makers is void, and thus possessing a gun made in violation of a void law is also void, as another court ruled.
• B-West v. U.S., 880 F.Supp. 853 (CIT 1995)
  
• B-West Imports, Inc., v. U.S., 75 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
  In this case the Federal Circuit court of appeals upholds the constitutionality and legality of the suspension of arms imports from China, under the President's authority under the Arms Export Control Act. The court decides it is a lawful exercise of the authoirty to bar imports, and to suspend already granted import permits. The court also decides that as the import of firearms is so regulated that there is no property right in such a permit, such that revoking is a "taking" of property for which compenation is owed, under the 5th amendment.
• Caplan v. B.A.T.F., 587 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1978)
  In this case the court decides that ATF's Raids and Searches manual is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, as it relates to internal practices of the agency, and is exempt under exemption (b)(2). See Hardy v. BATF.
• Capooth v. U.S., 238 F.Supp. 583 (S.D. Tx. 1965)
  In this case the district court upholds the pre-68 NFA section 5851, prohibiting possession of an unregistered NFA weapon, against the claim that it violates the defendant's right against self incrimination, in the same way that punishing the failure to register does. The court disagrees, and follows the 9th circuit cases of Frye and Starks.
• Carew v. Centracchio, 17 F.Supp.2d 56 (D.R.I. 1998)
  In this decision the court upholds the firing of a Air National Guard security guard for being convicted of a doemestic violence misdemeanor, meaning he could no longer possess a firearm on the job. The court finds that the law is valid, and the firing proper.
• Casanova Guns, Inc., v. Connally, 454 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1972)
  In this case the court upholds the rejection of a license renewal application from a company that ATF found, and the court agreed, was controlled by a second company that had been convicted of a felony.
• Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942)
  This is a case from 1942, deciding, among other things, whether the 2nd amendment prohibited the feds from regulating possession of a handgun and ammunition for it, under the now defunct Federal Firearms Act. Cases was a felon who had a pistol and ammo he used to shoot someone in Puerto Rico. The court decides that the Miller case can be ignored, as it would lead to the result that if a gun has any relation to an armed citizenry, the feds couldn't regulate it. And virtually all guns, except perhaps flintlock's and "harquebuses" have such a relation. Or so the court says. They uphold Cases' conviction. I don't really know how this is perverted by the court in Warin to say that the 2nd amendment means states can have a National Guard. Guess the judges in the Warin case were hoping no one would read the cases they cited as precedent....
• Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., 1996 WL 276830 (N.D.Cal. May 17, 1996)
  In this unpublished case a federal court in California throws out a suit against the maker of a handgun styled after the Thompson machine gun, based on the gun's use in a criminal shooting. The court rejects the traditional claims that selling handguns or guns is an ultrahazardous activity, and that the gun was marketed to criminals. The court also rejects a theory that the gun is an assault weapon banned by California law, and thus, based on a trial court decision in a case involving a shooting spree with an Intratect TEC-DC9, the seller of an illegal gun is liable for shootings with the gun. The court notes that the gun in question is not listed as an assault weapon, and that the decision in the Intratec case is not binding on this court. The court further notes that the federal assault weapon ban does not affect this gun, as it was made and sold well before the federal law took effect.
• Castellano v. U.S., 350 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1965)
  In this case the 10th circuit follows Starks and Frye cases, and decides that a prosecution for possessing an unregistered NFA gun, under the pre-68 NFA does not violate the right against self incrimination in the way that a prosecution for non-registration would, even though registering the gun you possess would incriminate you in the same way as registering a gun would, period. The logic of this case was overruled by the Supreme Court in the Haynes v. US case.
• Castro v. U.S., 296 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1961)
  
• Caveny v. Raven Arms, 665 F.Supp. 530 (D.S.Ohio 1987)
  In this case the federal district court, construing Ohio law, rejects a claim that the maker of a gun used to murder a woman is responsible for the crime. The court decides that the maker of a non-defective gun that is used in a crime is not liable for that use.
• Center to Prevent Handgun Violence v. Dept. of Treasury, - F.Supp. - (D.D.C. 1997)
  In this case the court rejects ATF's arguments as to why the multiple handgun sale reports should not be released to the anti-gun Center to Prevent Handgun Violence under the Freedom of Information Act. While the Center did not request the names and addresses of the handgun buyers, they did want the make model and serial number of the guns, and the name and address of the dealer that submitted the form. ATF did not want to release the serial numbers or the dealer names, however the court rejected their arguments as to why they should be removed, and directed ATF to release them as the Center asked.
• Century Arms, Inc., v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Vt. 1971)
  This is from 1971, where Century got screwed in the enacting of the GCA, which cut off from import $300,000+ worth of military surplus guns they were all set to import, had permits and everything, and the GCA barred them from import. Century sued, and lost. Mostly this is interesting for the history on the enactment of the GCA, and how evil and dangerous cheap military surplus guns were considered - long guns and handguns. Senator Dodd, father of the current Sen. Dodd from Ct, and a gun-grabber in his own right, was a master of the Charles Schumer lies and rhetoric at the time, note his sniveling about the "gunrunners" as if Century was not in a legitimate business, but was working to undermine the nation by arming youths, and bad people. A lot of the reforms in 1986 were very very necessary, as this case points out, although the MG making ban was a hell of a compromise, in my book.
• Chronister v. Bryco Arms, 125 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the plaintiff won a judgment against Bryco Arms over their sale of, and failure to warn about, a model 59 9mm pistol that discharged when the slide was back, causing permanent hearing damage to the plaintiff, as he was not wearing hearing protection. The court upheld the verdict against Bryco, noting that the plaintiff's failure to wear hearing protection while shooting was a foreseeable misuse of the gun, so it was not the basis for an automatic verdict for Bryco. The court noted that Bryco could suggest to the jury that the shooter was contributorily negligent, as they did (and the jury found the plaintiff partly responsible for his injuries, and the judgment amount was reduced by a commensurate amount), but that it was foreseeable that a shooter would ignore the instruction to wear hearing protection. The case notes that a firearms expert for Federal Cartridge (maker of the ammo used in the pistol) bought 5 model 59 pistols for testing, and all jammed in one fashion or another between 20 and 50% of the time.
• Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F.Supp. 602 (D.N.J. 1990)
  
• Conway v. King, 718 F.Supp. 1059 (D.N.H. 1989)
  In this case the federal court throws out a suit against the Manchester, NH police chief for refusing to issue the plaintiff a renewal of his concealed carry permit. The court decides that there is no property or liberty right in concealed carry of a firearm, so that there is no right ot it under the 14th amendment, and therefore the chief cannot be sued under 42 USC 1983 for denying it (because no constitutional right is implicated).
• Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 10th circuit agrees with the trial court that the plaintiff, who was wounded by her husband with a handgun made by Smith & Wesson, does not have a case against S&W for making the handgun that was used to injure her. She claimed that making handguns was an ultrahazardous activity, like blasting, or storing deadly chemicals, and that the manufacturer of handguns, because they are used to kill and injure people, should be held strictly liable for any harm caused by the use of the handgun. The court, construing Utah law, rejects this theory, as have all courts asked the question. See, for example, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, and Perkins v. FIE, on this page.
• Cox v. B.A.T.F., 571 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1978)
  This case gives a clue why ATF brought what looked like a retarded case against Roger Cox, in just the year or two after this case. This is from 1978, Cox wanted to buy a 1921 Thompson from the West Virginia Pen., but they hadn't registered their gun before 1968, or during the Amnesty, and instead registered it on a Form 10, in 1974. Cox and the Prison argued that not allowing the gun to be transferred was wrong. The court disagreed, and decided it was very consistent with the NFA, as amended in 1968; where the only existing weapons that could be added to the Registry were forfeited or confiscated weapons, by law enforcement/government entities, for their own use. And that such weapons must be either retained by such entities, or forfeited to the US Government, which may retain them, destroy them, or sell/give them to other governmental entities. And that's it, they could not be sold into commercial channels. The court said Cox and the Prison were stuck with how the law treated forfeited/confiscated guns, as the gun had been registered as one, even if it wasn't one. From this one can read that even a governmental agency may not register an NFA gun, unless it was forfeited or confiscated by them, or on their behalf. However they can represent a gun as forfeited or confiscated, even if it wasn't and register it on a Form 10. I wouldn't be surprised if bringing this suit made Cox some enemies....
• Crapo v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944)
  
• Crapo v. United States, 100 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1939)
  
• Crooker v. B.A.T.F., 789 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1986)
  In this case the DC Court of Appeals decides that BATF may not refuse a Freedom of Information Act request by asserting the information requested is contained in enforcement investigation files, but must provide more information on how the requested documents are part of an investigation, not with a blnket statement.
• Davis v. Erdmann Gov't motion to dismiss of Nov. 1975
  
• Plaintiff's brief for Davis v. Erdmann
  
• Defendant's brief for Davis v. Erdmann
  
• Plaintiff's brief2 for Davis v. Erdmann
  
• Davis v. Erdmann, 607 F.2d 917 (10th Cir 1979)
  This is one from 1979, where ATF (the same one raiding the NRA museum for NFA violations, the ATF under Rex Davis was worse than what we have now, in my opinion, Waco notwithstanding) refused to let Davis (no relation to Rex) import a AOW type "knife-pistol." He contended it was removed from the NFA as a collector's item, like a Nazi belt buckle gun, and the other things on the C&R list, but ATF claimed it had utility as a weapon, but had no evidence whatsoever to support that contention, and the court clearly thought they were just being jerks. The court ordered ATF, after 6 years of back and forth, to issue the Form 6 to get the gun through Customs.
• Davis v. Erdmann, Case No. 75-C-356 Order of January 14, 1980 (N.D.Ok.)
  
• Deckard v. U.S., 260 F.Supp. 565 (E.D.Mo. 1966)
  In this case the trial court refuses to reverse the defendant's conviction for failing to register a firearm, under the pre-68 NFA, since the 8th circuit court had refused to consider the question in another case. The 8th circuit reversed this decision, reversing itself, and decided to follow the other circuits which found this section, 5841, unconstitutional.
• Deckard v. U.S., 381 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1967)
  In this case the 8th Circuit overrules its decision in , and decides to follow other circuits in finding that section 5841 of the pre-68 NFA was unconstitutional, in that it compelled self incrimination.
• Decker v. Gibson Products Company of Albany, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 34 (M.D.Ga. 1980)
  In this case the court rrejects a suit brought by the family of a woman killed by a man using a gun he bought at the defendant's store. The court decides that the federal Gun Control Act does not create a private right of action; persons claiming to have been injured by persons who got a gun from someone who violated the statute cannot use the violation of the statute to recover damages from the party that violated the statute in the gun sale. The court also decides that in this case the defendant wasn't negligent in selling the defendant a gun. While he told the clerk he was a convicted felon, he also produced paperwork showing he had been pardoned, and the county sheriff told the store that persons who were pardoned were then able to buy firearms.
• DePugh v. U.S., 401 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the trial court exhaustively goes over DePugh's reasons why his convictions should be overturned. Some of the judge's decisions on charges involving section 5841, which required registration of firearms, and which was found in Haynes v. US to violate the right against selfincrimination, were reversed in the 8th circuit's decision in US v. DePugh. The main point of interest in this case (to me anyway) is the court deciding that a $200 making tax could indeed be due on re-activating a machine gun registered as an unservicable gun, because making it servicable fell within the very broad definition of "making" under the Act. The court was construing the pre-1968 NFA however, and there was no ban on making new machine guns as we now have, in 922(o).
• DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 509 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
  In this case a federal judge grants the motion of Remington to throw out a jury verdict against it, based upon a claimed design defect in the trigger pull of the 870 shotgun. The plaintiff's husband, a police officer, was accidentally killed by his partner when the partner discharged the shotgun. The plaintiff claimed the shotgun should have had a stronger trigger pull. The court found the plaintiff had not proved the higher pull would have avoided the accident, that the trigger pull was appropriate for police work, and that the carelessness of the decedent's partner in handling the shotgun superseded any culpability of Remington.
• Dillon v. U.S., 389 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the court throws out a conviction for possessing an unregistered sawed off shotgun, based on the Haynes v. US case.
• Doty v. Magnum Research, Inc., 994 F.Supp. 894 (N.D.Ohio 1997)
  In this decision in a case involving a suit against the maker and importer of a handgun that supposedly discharged when the safety was on, the court decides that the maker of the handgun, Israeli Military Industries was properly served with the lawsuit, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. IMI argued it was a foreign state, as it was wholly owned by the Israeli government, and was thus not properly served under U.S. law.
• Dreher v. B.A.T.F., 943 F.Supp. 680 (W.D.La. 1996)
  In this case the court refuses to grant the plaintiffs request for relief from firearm disability, since he is a felon, pointing to the law which only allows the court to review a decision of ATF. Since Congress cut off funding for that, there is no decision for them to review. See McGill and Rice cases. The court also decides that the plaintiff's conviction for mail fraud is not a case of antitrust or similar crimes, which do not subject one to the firearms disability, whether punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or not.
• Dreher v. U.S., 115 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1997)
  
• Drennon v. U.S., 393 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the 8th circuit decides that the fact that the defendant didn't make a self incriminaiton argument against his pre-68 NFA conviction until after the Supreme Court decided the Haynes case does not bar him from raising the argument on appeal, immediately after Haynes was decided. The court decides in view of the fact that every appeals court to consider this argument had rejected it that the defendant didn't need to raise it at the trial court in order to not have waived it, since it would have been a futile argument.
• Dugan v. U.S., 341 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1965)
  In this case the 7th circuit follows the 9th circuit case of Russell, and decides that making it a crime to fail to register an NFA firearm, under the pre-68 NFA, violates the defendant's right against self incrimination.
• Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 981 F.Supp. 406 (E.D.N.C. 1997)
  In this case the court throws out a suit agains the city by a city police officer after he was disciplined for taking a second job teaching firearms safety classes for CCW permit applicants. The officer argued that the action violated his constitutional rights, including his right to association and under the second amendment. The court disagreed.
• Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989)
  This case is similar to the Braun v. SOF case, but in this case the estate's of the persons killed by a guy located through a classified ad in SOF don't get anything. The court basically decides that because the ad in question was ambiguous as to committing crimes, SOF had no duty to investigate, or to not run it. Although as far as I could tell the ad in the Braun case was very similar, the court there distinguished this case as depending on the ambiguous language of the ad, while they said the Braun case ad was not so ambiguous. I would disagree.
• Ellman v. Davis, 838 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
  This is a pretty outrageous case. Ellman was a corporate officer in a private society to prevent cruelty to children. Officers of such societies were peace officers under NY law, and as such did not need to get permits to buy or carry handguns. The same was true of societies to prevent cruelty to animals; the idea was to promote public welfare in these areas, by private action of the charitable societies. In practice some became shams, to let people avoid the onerous and arbitrary NY handgun licensing procedures. As a result the NY legislature changed the law, and limited the class of peace officers who could possess and carry handguns without a permit. Obviously the NY AG was out to get Mr. Ellman, and engaged in a very vindictive and obviously illegal campaign against him; all as part of getting the court to dissolve the Westchester Society to Prevent Cruelty to Children. The AG's office got the court to order Mr. Ellman to turn over to the police all the handguns he had gotten with his peace officer status, even though the guns were legally held in New Jersey, where he had moved. For almost 9 months the judge renewed a interlocutory order of civil and then criminal contempt, for Ellman's refusal to give his property to the state of New York. Ellman finally made it to federal court, which ordered him released on bond, and then forbade his incarceration for anything to do with the NY judge's order, by this decision. Unfortunately, the ones who should be in jail, the assistant AG, and Judge Aldo Nastasi, are almost certainly immune for their gross abuse of their office.
  This is what you can look forward to in the war on guns.
• Erdelyi v. O'Brien, 680 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1982)
  This is a 9th circuit case where the court says that as the Calif. law on issuing concealed carry permits expressly gives the issuing officers complete discretion. There is no property or liberty right to such a permit under that law, such that one could sue the officer for refusing to issue it, as a violation of one's 14th amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. This is all a matter of statutory interpretation, see the Indiana Kellogg case for a contrary conclusion.
• Evans v. Higgins, 1989 WL 7365 (D.D.C. 1989)
  In this brief, unpublished, decision, the court transfers Evans' suit over his prosecution for selling Sten machine gun parts kits, and suggestions on where to get plans and receiver tubing to Montana, where his criminal prosecution was then pending. As can be seen in the 9th circuit court of appeals decision also on the web page (US v. Evans) he was convicted of conspiring to help people build unregistered Sten guns.
• Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990)
  This is the case that was a challenge to the making ban, 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Rather than challenge it on constitutional grounds, this consists for making the courts decide what it meant, particularly that mg's could still be made "under authority" of the government. J.D. Farmer, of Hard Times Armory, claimed this meant that same as before with an approved Form 1 one could make an mg for private ownership. The district court agreed, but the court of appeals reversed, saying that reading of the law would mean it did not change anything from the way it was before, and that it was not proper statutory interpretation to decide an act of congress meant nothing. They looked at the legislative history, and the law, and decided it meant what congress apparently intended, no more making mg's for private ownership.
• Fin & Feather Sport Shop, Inc., v. U.S., 481 F.Supp. 800 (D.Neb. 1979)
  In this case the court upholds the denial of renewal of the plaintiff's FFL, because of poor record keeping.
• First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt's Manufacturing Co., Inc., 77 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1996)
  In this case the 8th Circuit rejects an argument that Colt is responsible for the fatal injuries of a child caught in the crossfire of shots fired by drug dealers, one of whom was armed with a Colt pistol. The court says it is bound by an Arkansas state court case, brought by the same lawyer, out of the same incident, against Lorcin. The Ark. court decided that there was no tort liability for selling an "inexpensive" handgun, nor for selling a handgun, or ammo, or making a handgun or ammo, that was used in a crime, in itself.
• Fleish v. Johnston, 145 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1944)
  
• Fleish v. Swope, 226 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1955)
  In this case, Fleish's argument that his NFA conviction and 30 year sentence were incorrectly calculated and not cumulative, is rejected. He made a number of appeals of his sentence.
• Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S., 981 F.Supp 1 (D.D.C. 1997)
  In this case the court upholds the ban on firearm possession by persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence against a challenge brought by the Fraternal Order of Police, an anti-gun police administrator's group. The court decides that the classification difference of people convicted of violent misdemeanors and violent domestic misdemeanors is rational, and that the law does not infringe on any fundamental rights including any right to keep and bear arms. The court also decides the law does not violate the tenth amendment, in that it is a regulation on interstate commerce.
• Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S., 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
  In this case the DC Court of Appeals decides that the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment, banning persons convicted of domestic violence from possessing firearms, violates the equal protection clause of the constitution insofar as it prohibits government employees convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms, while permitting those same government employees to possess firearms while being convicted felons.
• Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S., 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.Cir 1999)
  In this decision the DC Court of Appeals reverses its earlier decision in FOP v. U.S., and now decides that in fact the ban on police officers convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors does not violate the Constitution, under the 2nd amendment, the 5th amendment right to due process, ro the 5th amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Somehow in the space of a few months between the two decisions what was once an irrational distinction between persons convcited of felony domestic violence (who may still possess firearms as government employees) and persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence (who may not) is now suddenly a rational one. Guess they saw the light, when the government held it up to them.
• Frank v. U.S., 860 F.Supp. 1030 (D.Vt. 1994)
  In this case the district court strikes down the requirements of the Brady law as they apply to chief law enforcement officers. The 2nd circuit reversed this decision, and was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court decision in Printz v. US. The decision on remand from the Supremes is also on the page.
• Frank v. U.S., 78 F.3d 815 (2nd Cir. 1996)
  In this case the 2nd circuit decides that the burdens placed on local law enforcement as part of the Brady handgun law are not in violation of the Constitution, specifically the limits allegedly placed on Congress' ability to burden states by the 10th amendment. Sort of agreeing with the 9th circuit, in Mack v. US, and disagreeing with the 5th circuit, in Koog v. US, the court decides the burden is very light, and as it doesn't try to require a state to pass a law or suffer a penalty, it is OK. The Supremes have taken cert. on the Mack case, and should resolve the conflict among the circuits.
• Frank v. U.S., 129 F.3d 273 (2nd Cir. 1997)
  This is the decision after remand by the Supreme Court for reconsideration (after reversal) in light of the decision in Printz v. US, that the sheriff had standing to raise the issue of the invalidity of the Brady law, and that the law as applied to CLEO's was unconstitutional. The court (reluctantly) modifies their decision as a result, but reverses the trial court on the severability issue, saying that since no person affected by the remainder of the law was before them, no decision in favor or against the rest of the law could be made.
• Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc., v. Van de Camp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992)
  This is the NRA challenge to the Calif Roberti-Roos AW ban, decided in 1992. They lost. The court said, agreeing with the Morton Grove case, that the 2nd amendment didn't apply to states. And they said the law wasn't a bill of attainder, as listing banned guns wasn't punishment, in the meaning that has from the Supreme Court. And they also tried a novel argument, that as the law banned the "Colt AR-15 Sporter" and that was one of very few rifles usable in the DCM competition program, the Calif. law was pre-empted by the federal CMP program. The court disagreed, saying one could still compete with M1 rifles, and M14 rifles (M1A's I guess). Note that a similar law listing guns was partially struck down in the Springfield Armory case in Ohio, because the list was irrational and arbitrary, banning one gun but not an identical one with a different name. That sort of challenge is still viable to the Calif. law, which does not use a criteria list, but only bans named guns, and is evaded by renaming the gun faster than the AG can get it added to the list.
• Frye v. U.S., 315 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1963)
  In this case the 9th circuit essentially repeats its decision in the Starks case, and decides that the offense of possessing an unregistered NFA weapon, under the pre-68 NFA does not violate the defendant's rights as to self incrimination, even though the punishment for a mere failure to register does. This case, and a host of others, were overruled by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. US, and made moot by amendments to the NFA in 1968.
• Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F.Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1985)
  In this case the trial court finds that the provision of the Gun Control Act that (then) prohibited former mental patients from owning guns, and did not provide them a way to be released from the disability denied the former patients due process, and was void. While an appeal to the Supreme Court of this was pending, Congress re-wrote this section as part of the FOPA in 1986, and made the Supreme Court review moot.
• Gargotta v. U.S., 77 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1935)
  In this 1935 case the Court throws out a conviction for receiving stolen US property, two 1911 pistols. The court states that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have decided that the defendant knew the guns were stolen. The fact that they were US Property marked was not enough, without proof the defendant read the marking, or the uniqueness of the guns. The defendant used the guns in a shootout w. Kansas City police - persumably he was convicted of state charges for that.
• Gilbert Equipment Co., Inc., v. Higgins, 709 F. Supp. 1071 (D. Ala. 1989)
  This is a federal district court decision, and paved the way for the backdoor ban on the USAS-12, Striker and Street Sweeper shotguns by endorsing the ATF's "non- sporting" finding as to the USAS-12 (at issue in this case) and the prior non-sporting finding of the Striker-12, that apparently was not appealed to the courts. A gun must be found to be particularly suitable for sporting use, or readily adaptable to that, in order to be lawfully imported after the Gun Control Act of 1968. Prior to 1984 or so that just meant meeting safety standards. After that ATF decided to become arbiters of what sport was, and decided the USAS-12 wasn't suited for hunting, nor trap or skeet, and thus was unsporting. They rescinded their decision that combat shotgun matches were sport, which had allowed the import of the SPAS-12, and decided they were really police training. However they continued to approve permits for the SPAS-12 until this particular case came to trial. The non-sporting finding meant the gun was not covered by the "sporting shotgun" exemption to being considered a DD, although ATF didn't pick up on this for a number of years. In any case the Crime Bill solved the problem, making law out of what had been administrative rulings from ATF. The non-sporting finding is crap made up after the case was filed, and not part of the administrative record. As the court itself notes, one of the principles of administrative law (basically how the courts will treat actions by administrative agencies like ATF) is that the record generated by the process itself must justify the decision, the Agency cannot make stuff up to justify the decision after the fact. Period. But the court allows it here, basically because (I think) they agreed that this gun needed to be banned from import due to its evil looks.

  The case also has a rather interesting discussion of whether or not the 2nd amendment includes a right to import guns. The judge (magistrate really) concedes who the right applies to (people, not states), but refuses to agree "keep and bear" includes importation. I don't know where he thought the guns to be borne were going to come from though. And he says flat out, to decide otherwise would gut gun control laws he thinks are good.

• Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F.Supp.2d 811 (S.D.Ind. 1998)
  In this case the trial court dismisses a lawsuit by a police officer challenging the application of the Lautenberg Amendment to him, banning him from ever possessing a firearm because of a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction.
• Gillespie v. City of Indianaopis, - F.3d - (7th Cir. 1999)
  
• Gott v. U.S., 432 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970)
  In this case the court of appeals reverses a conviction for possessing a short barreled rifle made in violation of the NFA. The case was right after the new NFA was enacted, and the defendant contended the government had to prove the rifle was made after the statute he was being charged with was enacted, which the government didn't do. The court agreed, saying if the rifle was made before the law took effect, then he didn't violate the law.
• Gun South, Inc., v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1989)
  This case is from the 11th Circuit court of Appeals, and concerns the "suspension" of GSI's import permit to bring a large quantity of AUG-SA rifles. They were in Customs when ATF decided to administratively ban semi-auto imports, and Customs refused to release them, on orders from ATF. The court upholds the suspension of the permit, but does agree it might well be a violation of the 5th amendment (a "taking" of private property), and thus while the suspension may be OK, the government may have to pay for the value of the rifles. This would be determined in a separate action before the Claims Court. As you all may know the settlement in this case was that ATF let GSI import the guns, but GSI had to agree to only sell to police officers and military persons who could produce a note from their CO saying the guns were for duty use. They are personal property of the officer though. Most AUG-SA guns out there are from this lot of guns, the cops and military persons can sell them, if they wish. See US v. Vollmer for the limits on this doctrine, and about lying on the form GSI submits to the feds to sell someone a AUG. In Colorado, the Pueblo county sheriff was convicted of a crime for certifying the paperwork for persons who weren't really within the definition allowed by ATF. See People v. Buckallew.
• Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
  In this case, for the first time I know of, the judge refuses to summarily dismiss a lawsuit against over 25 handgun makers, premised on the idea that the makers conspired together to either market the handguns to juveniles and criminals, and/or that they flooded the gun market in such a way as to make handguns available to children and criminals by sheer numbers of handguns. The judge did thoughtfully reject claims based on collective political lobbying (because of the first amendment) and based on fraud upon government officials.

  The suit was brought on behalf of two persons who represented relatives who had been killed (apparently in a criminal manner) by persons using handguns. More plaintiffs were to be added.

  This has been the goal of the trial lawyers gun grabbers for years. See the Perkins v. FIE case, for instance. To get the courts to make gun makers liable for the criminal misuse of handguns, and ban them that way. In this case they actually have a chance at it, since the court refused to reject the proposal of enterprise liability - where all makers in a field have committed tortious acts, but the specific maker to be blamed cannot be figured out in each case, liability is apportioned based on market share or some other method which is supposed to be fair, as between the defendants.

  And you wonder why Clinton got millions from trial lawyers and trial lawyer lobbies, for his reelection? They share common goals.

• Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 13 F.Supp.2d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
  In this decision in this pending suit by people shot with guns against the makers and distributors of the guns, the judge again shows his rather striking bias against guns, and decides that the credibility of the mother of one of the persons shot with guns, who is seeking to get free money with this suit, outweighs a rather large mountain of documentary evidence as to what state her son was a "domiciliary" of. If her son was a Virginia resident, as he acted and represented when he was alive, then the mother's case could not be brought with this set of defendant's, and in fact probably could not be brought in New York at all, and thus not be before this most anti-gun judge. However, the judge decides that the mother's testimony that her son was going to move back to New York was more persuasive than the son's representations on his driver's license application, motor vehicle registration, and the fact of his living in Virginia at the time he was killed. Judge Weinstein has also presided over other trials against gun makers, and has shown his feelings in those as well.
• Hardy v. B.A.T.F., 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980)
  In this case the court decides that ATF's Raids and Searches manual is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, as it relates to internal practices of the agency, and is exempt under exemption (b)(2). See Caplan v. BATF.
• Harris v. Roderick, 933 F.Supp. 977 (D.Idaho 1996)
  In this decision the trial court finds that under most claims, the government defendants that shot and wounded Harris, as well as those who allegedly perjured themselves at his trial, are not entitled to immunity for their actions, and thus they claims can proceed to trial. The 9th Circuit upheld the decisions made in this decision (at least those that were appealed). See Harris v. Roderick.
• Harris v. Roderick, - F.3d - (9th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 9th circuit affirms the trial court decision finding that federal agents that participated in the siege at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, that resulted in the wounding of the plaintiff, Kevin Harris, as well as the killing of a US Marshal, and two members of the Weaver family, are not entitled to immunity for their actions. In particular the court agreed that the shoot to kill policy put in effect, the decision to shoot Vickie Weaver and Harris, and a conspiracy among the initial US Marshals to lie about the circumstances that led to the killing of another US Marshal, all were clearly outside the boundaries of the Constitution, and should have been so to the officials being sued. A civil trial on the merits of Harris' claims can proceed.
• Harris v. U.S., 933 F.Supp. 972 (D.Idaho 1995)
  This case is a ruling by the trial judge in the civil suit Kenvin Harris filed from injuries he received during the Ruby Ridge seige by the FBI and US Marshals. It mostly concerns procedural issues.
• Haynes v. U.S., 372 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967), reversed, 390 U.S. 85 (1968)
  This is the appeals court case that was reversed by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. U.S., regarding whether the registration requirements of the pre-68 NFA violated the right against self incrimination of the Constitution. Interestingly, while the Court seems to acknowledge that the Act compels self incrimination, it notes that the solution is for persons not to possess the weapons at all (unless they comply with the NFA). This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. However the 5th circuit, and several circuits have revived this same argument to get around the problem that 18 USC 922(o) created in complying with the NFA - how can one pay a tax on a gun that the government will not accept? The answer in the Ardoin case was the flippant suggestion not to possess the weapon at all. Pity the 5th circuit didn't learn from the treatment this same argument got in the Supreme Court in 1967.
• Hazelwood v. U.S., 208 F.Supp. 622 (N.D.Ca. 1962)
  
• HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston, - F.3d - (5th Cir. 2000)
  
• Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 652 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1981)
  In this case the circuit court of appeals strikes down part of Delaware's gun control law on constitutional grounds. Delaware required gun buyers to be identified by two Delaware "freeholders", which the court took to mean land owners. The court decided that the law lacked rationality, as there was no reason renters also couldn't id a gun buyer, and the court decided that the Supreme Court treated classifications based on land ownership suspectly. While the case was pending Delaware revised the law to require identification by any two people who lived in Delaware. The case suggests the law was ignored; Sears had sold a gun in violation of the law to a man who used it to shoot Hetherton, the plaintiff. Hetherton was trying to show Sears was negligent because its sale had violated Delaware law. As the court found that law unconstitutional, Sears wasn't negligent by virtue of having sold a gun in violation of it.
• Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996)
  In this case the 9th circuit decides that an individual denied a CCW permit by the LA county sheriff cannot raise a 2nd amendment claim, as that claim can only be raised by a state denied a right to have a militia by the federal government, and does not apply to individuals. In other words, the plaintiff lacked standing to raise the claim.
• Hunter v. U.S., 73 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1996)
  In this case the 9th circuit rejects the Dalton case, and its own precedent in Kurt, and decides that it is not a problem for the feds to prosecute someone for not paying the tax on a gun when the government is precluded from accepting the tax by the ban on new machine guns. The court correctly points out that the same logic ought to apply to persons who are precluded from registering guns because they are felons, but does not. Although not an issue in this case, it should also apply to the non-registerability of existing guns, an idea rejected in the Tepper case, in the 10th circuit, and to the inability to register guns in states that essentially ban them, like California.
• Illinois Sporting Goods Association v. County of Cook, 845 F.Supp. 582 (N.D.Ill. 1994)
  In this case the federal court grants an injunction against part of a 1993 Cook County, Illinois, ordinance that restricted the location of gun dealers in Cook county, to more than 1/2 mile from schools and playgrounds, on the basis that children shouldn't see that guns are an acceptable part of daily life. Sort of like pornography shops, I suppose. In any case, the dealers association challenged the law on several grounds, only one of which the court agreed with. The court agreed that the law irrationally distinguished between different gun sellers, and thus violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Constitution. In particular the law only forced dealers on leased premises to leave, dealers that owned their business premises could stay, and stores that sold guns, but did not primarily sell guns could also stay, places like Wal-Mart, K-Mart and the like. The court said that such a distinction between dealers who leased and those that owned, or those that sold other items, was irrational, and did not further the purposes of the ordinance, as identified by the county.
• Interport, Inc. v. Magaw, 923 F.Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1996)
  In this case the court upholds a made up ATF requirement that importers of post-86 surplus machine guns get a purchase order from a governmnetal agency to import the guns for that purpose, even though they declined to put that requirement in their regulations, and even though the statute makes no such requirement. The court found that it was fine anyway. However the court did decline to let US Customs destroy the plaintiff's machine guns, since the plaintiff was having trouble finding a bonded warehouse in which to store the guns pending getting purchase orders. However Interport's request to import the guns w/o a purchase order, given the storage problems, were denied.
• The International Islamic Community of Masjid Baytulkhaliq, Inc., v. U.S., 981 F.Supp. 352 (D.V.I. 1997)
  In this case the court throws out a complaint that the ATF and DEA conspired to slander, injure or kill members of an Islamic community in the Virgin Islands. One of the members had an FFL, and ATF hassled him aobut renewing it, although they did renew it in the end. Later the local police raided the house looking for illegal guns and drugs, a raid in which the ATF agent participated in planning. However, the plaintiffs were not able to show the feds participated in the raid, nor that the basis for the raid was a pretext for harassment.
• Jackson v. U.S., 926 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1991)
  The court here upholds Jackson's sentence for numerous violations of the NFA. He argued that he could only get a maximum of one 10 year sentence for possessing NFA guns at any one time. The court disagreed, deciding that he could get ten years for each weapon possessed, and thus his sentence was fine, based on the statute's use of the singular "firearm" rather than anything else to describe for what the sentence could be imposed.
• Jersey Arms Works, Inc. v. Secertary of Treasury, No. 83- 1130 (D.N.J. July 25, 1983)
  
• Juhnke v. EIG Corp., 444 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1971)
  Like the Scurfield case, this case concerns a suit by a person who shot himself in the face with a tear gas pen gun against the maker of the gun, claiming negligence in its design and marketing. The court upholds a jury verdict in favor of the maker of the gun.
• Matter of Search Warrant for K-Sports, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 594 (C.D.Cal. 1995)
  In this case the court decides, in a request for the return of items seized pursuant to a search warrant, but where no criminal prosecution was initiated, that K-Sports is entitled to the return of all items, including firearms, except 1000 alleged machine guns, and documents related to the machine guns, which the government is entitled to copy and then return. The court holds that the search warrant that was issued was illegal, in that it did not reasonably describe what was to be searched, but was more in the way of a general writ, and allowed the seizure of anything on the premises. The court indicated that as the government had started a proceeding to forfeit the alleged machine guns, the court could not order their return, but the return of the machine guns would depend on the outcome of the forfeiture case.
• Kanarr Corp. v. U.S., 413 F.2d 1143 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
  In this case Kanarr Corp., one maker of M-79 grenade launchers for the US Government, appeals the assessment of back due NFA manufacturer taxes for having made these weapons. The then ATF (ATT division of the IRS) claims the guns are short rifles, and as there was no exception for government contractors, they have to have an SOT to make the guns. The court agrees. Partly as a result of Kanarr's complaining the 1968 revisions to the NFA included a way for the SOT to be waived for government contractors who did not sell to the public. And of course the 1968 NFA changes made the M-79 a destructive device, and not a short barreled rifle.
• Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the 9th circuit upholds the defendants conviction for dealing in firearms without a license, under the now repealed Federal Firearms Act, based on his having arranged for some handguns to be smuggled into Japan, for sale there.
• complaint in Katona, Jr., v. U.S.
  Also see US v. DLO
• Kilcrease v. U.S., 457 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1972)
  In this case the court rejects the argument that a prosecution for possessing an unregistered NFA firearm under the post-1968 NFA violates the defendants right against self incrimination. The court notes that the offense does not call for registration, and in fact the defendant cannot register the firearm whether he wants to or not. He does not have a choice between registering the gun and incriminating himself for possessing it, or possessing it and being prosecuted for failing to register it, as defendants did under the pre-68 NFA. See also US v. Black
• King v. U.S., 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966)
  
• King v. U.S., 292 F.Supp. 767 (D.Colo. 1968)
  
• Kitchens v. Department of the Treasury, 535 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976)
  In this 1976 case, the court of appeals rejects the suggestion that ATF's refusal to grant the plaintiff relief from his felony related firearms disability is unreviewable by the courts, and thus orders ATF to explain why they refused to grant him the relief, and says that the court can review that explanation for an abuse of discretion. ATF claimed they could do whatever they wanted, with no accountability.
• Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 889 F.Supp. 1532 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
  In this case a woman is trying to score free money because the father of her child killed himself with a gun he bought at Wal-mart. He had previously been judicially committed to a mental institution, and was thus barred by the GCA from buying a firearm from a licensee. The plaintiff claimed that Wal-mart was negligent in that the sale of the gun was in violation of the GCA. The court threw out this claim, deciding that the plaintiff had not shown Wal-mart knew about the commitment, and further the decedent had lied on the 4473 form. The court rejected a line of cases that basically made the seller of a gun absolutely liable if it turned out the buyer was unfit to buy a gun based on the mental health criteria. The court said that if the seller complied with the GCA; did not sell to people it knew were ineligible, and had the buyer fill out the form, it was not liable based on a violation of the GCA. However, the court set the case for trial on whether Wal-mart knew the decedent was unstable; under Georgia law a person who provides a gun to a person they knew was unsuitable to have it can be held responsible for resulting mayhem. In this case some Wal-mart personnel apparently believed the decedent was crazy, and he supposedly acted in a crazy way on the day he bought the gun, by dressing inappropriately for the weather, and taking to himself. Gun sellers in southern states would be wise to be careful.
• Koog v. U.S., 852 F.Supp. 1376 (W.D.Tex 1994)
  In this case a sheriff challenges the burdens on local law enforcement placed by the Brady law. The court agrees with the government, that the burdens regarding performing background checks are minimal and non-instrusive, and thus do not violate the 10th amendment. This decision was reversed by the 5th Circuit court of appeals, when they also upheld the Romero case, which reached the opposite conclusion. This conclusion was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Printz v. US case.
• Koog v. U.S., 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996)
  Case striking down much of the Brady law.
• complaint in Kropelnicki v. U.S., Case No. 1:94cv186, United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina.
  This is a case filed by a NC attorney on his own behalf challenging the constitutionality of the assault weapon and large capacity magazine bans in the 1994 Crime Bill. This document is the complaint, the description of the plaintiff's case. This case was apparently tossed out on the same basis as the San Diego and NRA cases, that there was no standing, by an unreported decision.
• Complaint in Landies v. Magaw, No. 95CV476 (D.D.C. 1995)
  
• Lane v. Washington Daily News 85 F.2d 822 (D.C.Cir. 1936)
  This is a libel case, not a criminal prosecution. The paper printed a story, apprently untrue, saying the plaintiff had been in a car accident, which revealed he was carrying a cache of weapons, including two sawed-off shotguns. The question was whether the story was a libel per se, or a libel per quod. For a libel per se, anyone reading the story will understand the defamation; it is usually accusations of criminal conduct, dishonesty, infedility, infection with a loathsome disease, and a few otehrs I can't remember. A per quod libel requires additional facts be added to the story, facts the plaintiff alleges were known to the intended audience. Since Lane alleged no additional facts, the court had to decide if merely the suggestion of carrying a cache of weapons, as described in the story, was libelous. The court decided it was; that the sawed-off shotgun was the instrument of only the gangster or the lawman, and the story didn't say he was a lawman. This story was printed in the days before the enactment of the NFA, so the gun was legal under federal law; had the NFA been in existence the decision might have been easier, since the story would have more clearly alleged a violation of law. In fact one is left to wonder if the story was printed to keep up the pressure to ban the evil gangster weapons.
• Lawmaster v. Ward, - F.3d - (10th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 10th circuit upholds a grant of summary judgment to ATF agents who conducted a search at the plaintiff's house, on all grounds, except that regarding whether the conduct of the search violated the 4th amendment. The court said that there the plaintiff stated a case, and that issue could proceed to trial. ATF, led by Agent Blair Ward (see, for his exploits, US v. One DLO Machine Gun, US v. Fleming, and US v. Staples) received information that the plaintiff had a AR-15 converted into a machine gun with a drop-in auto sear type device. They got a search warrant based on that information, and proceeded to trash out his house. There was no machine gun found. The court said that because they had a search warrant, the search was lawful, as was the entry onto the property (on a state law claim for trespass). However, the court did say that certain conduct in the search, (the occurrence of which was denied by the defendants) in particular grinding cigarette and cigar ashes into his bedding and clothes, as well as leaving one of his pistols in a dog dish full of water, were outside lawful conduct in conducting a search. The court noted that other claimed conduct, in particular tracking dog crap through the house, could also constitute such conduct, but since it wasn't raised on appeal, they weren't addressing it one way or the other.
• Lee v. U.S., No. 95-2269 (10th Cir. 1997)
  In this brief case the 10th circuit appeals court reverses a New Mexico district court which had found the burdens on law enforcement imposed by the Brady law to be lawful. The court notes that the Supreme Court decision in the Printz case requires the case be reversed.
• Leslie v. United States, 986 F.Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997)
  In this case the trial court throws out a lawsuit against the Post Office and Olin, the maker of Black Talon bullets, brought by the families of persons killed at the robbery of a post office. The court says that the Post Office is immune from suit over its decisions as to whether or not have security at the Post Office. And the court decides that the Black Talon bullets were not defective, thus there was no case against them for selling them, under New Jersey law.
• Lewin v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1979)
  In this decision the 8th circuit reverses a trial court decision restoring the plaintiffs FFL, revoked for recordkeeping violations, and instead decides that there was sufficient evidence for the ATF to take the action it took, and decides that the trial judge is not able to evaluate the evidence for himself.
• Lewis v. U.S., 408 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir 1969)
  This case interprets the pre-68 NFA, and decides whether the self incrimination problem found by the Supreme Court in the Haynes case in section 5841, also applies to a prosecution for possessing a gun made in violation of section 5821, ie without pre-approval. The court decides no, unlike the registration section, this crime does not call for any act which will self-incriminate, noting also that no state law would prohibit possession of the gun should someone volunteer an intent to make one. A similar logic would apply today to a prosecution for possessing a gun made in violation of the NFA, mere possession is the crime, not a failure to register.
• Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995)
  This is an interesting case from the 4th circuit, where a woman denied a handgun purchase authorization under Maryland law, without a basis in the law, sued for deprivation of her constitutional (property) rights, under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The court denies it, but does so by weaseling, and pretending the deprivation was inadvertent, and not intentional, which it in fact was. However, this will come up more and more, as government's abuse their Brady law power to deny permission to buy handguns for reasons which the law does not permit.
• Petition for certiorari to US Supreme Court in Love v. Pepersack
  
• Lovelace v. U.S., 357 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1966)
  In this case the 5th circuit upholds the pre-68 NFA ban on possessing unregistered firearms, although agreeing that the crime of failing to register the same gun violates the defendant's right against self incrimination, following the 9th circuit cases of Frye and Starks, as well as their decision in Russell. In this case, although the defendant was ostensibly charged with possessing an unregistered gun, and not with failing to register it (charged under sec. 5851, not sec. 5841) because the indictment included the statement that the defendant himself had not registered the gun, and that element was submitted to the jury, the court voided his conviction. As with Frye, Starks and a line of other cases, the logic of this case was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Haynes v. US case, where they decided that punishment for possession of an un-registered firearm also violated the 5th amendment.
• Mack v. U.S., 856 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz. 1994)
  In this case a sheriff challenges the constitutionality of the Brady law requirements on chief law enforcement officers. The the court agrees with the sheriff, and voids the requirement that the sheriff conduct any sort of background check, but rejects the argument that the sheriff can challenge the criminal sanctions for violating the Brady act, saying that representations by the Justice Department that CLEO's won't be prosecuted for ignoring the statute means they do not have standing to make the challenge, as there is no real likelihood of prosecution, and thus there is no actual dispute or controversy. See also McGee, Printz, and Romero.
• Mack v. U.S., 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995)
  This is an appeal from two cases where lower courts decided that the part of the Brady law that required local law enforcement to do background checks for the federal law violated the tenth amendment. the 9th circuit, predictably, disagrees, and says that since this burden is light, and potentially cheap, the feds can force local law enforcement to do work without any money. The court decides that the part of the law that threatens criminal prosecution for non-compliance either doesn't apply to law enforcement or will never be applied against them, and thus that is not a basis for complaint. Similar cases are pending in other circuits, if another court of appeals reaches a contrary decision the matter could well go to the supreme court.
• Marshall v. U.S., 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for possessing a sawed off shotgun made in violation of the pre-68 NFA, against a challenge that it violated the maker's right against self incrimination. The court decides that because he couldn't have gotten the LE certification to make the gun, his complying with the law in making the gun wouldn't have incriminated him, he would have not been able to make the gun legally.
• Marshall v. Walker, 958 F.Supp. 359 (N.D.Ill. 1997)
  In this case the district court throws out a section 1983 lawsuit against police officers who arrested the defendant at an apartment buildiug he owned, and rented out. The court decides that none of the statutory exceptions to the general bar on carrying a firearm in Illinois applied. Specifically the court decided that the building open areas were not his place of business, or lands under his control, and that a FOID card did not authorize carrying in a holster, only in a box or gun case. It appeared the lawsuit was not well pleaded, as the court was guessing about a lot of issues.
• Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984)
  In this case the 7th circuit, construing Illinois law, rejects a suit attempting to hold the maker of a handgun liable for its use in a crime.
• Mavilia v. Stoeger Industries, 574 F.Supp. 107 (D.Mass 1983)
  In this case the trial court grants Llama and Stoeger, the maker and seller of a handgun that was used to kill the plaintiff's husband. He was accidentally shot during a shootout, apparently. The suit was premised on the idea that selling handguns is a strict liability tort, as they are unreasonably dangerous, and that the utility of the handgun is outweighed by the harm done by it. The court states that these are basically public policy arguments, not legal ones, and that since the Mass. legislature has repeatedly refused to ban handguns, it is inappropriate for the courts to do so. The plaintiff's lawyer on this case, Windle Turley, is a big personal injury/ambulance chaser from Dallas. During the early/mid 1980's he filed a number of suits like this, trying to get the courts to let persons injured with guns sue the maker or seller of the gun. He was also the plaintiff's counsel in the Richman v. Charter Arms case, consolidated for appeal with, and cited as Perkins v. FIE Corp, also on this page. I believe he is now making money suing Catholic dioceses, on behalf of persons who claim they were injured by having sex with priests, or were molested by priests as children.
• Mayesh v. Schultz, 58 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.Ill. 1973)
  In this case the court upholds ATF's refusal to renew the plaintiff's FFL because he sold guns without complying with the Illinois state waiting period, after being solicited to do so by ATF agents.
• McCann v. U.S., 217 F.Supp. 751 (D.Colo. 1963)
  In this case the district court voids a conviction for failing to register a short barreled rifle, under the pre-68 NFA, based on the Russell case, finding that the section requires self incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment to the constitution.
• McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 2nd circuit court of appeals upholds the trial court's dismissal, in McCarthy v. Sturm Ruger, of the plaintiff's suit against Olin, for making "Black Talon" ammunition, based on it haveing a negligent design, having been negligently marketed, and based on a products liability theory that it was too dangerous to be sold to the public. As did that trial court, the court of appeals, with one anti-gun dissenter, decides that none of the claims state a cause of action under NY law, and dismisses the case. The opinion notes that claims against Ruger and Ram-Line, the makers of the gun and the magazine used, respectively, were dismissed earlier, perhaps after a settlement.
• McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., Inc., 916 F.Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
  In this case Judge Baer rejects a suit against Winchester for making and selling the "Black Talon" handgun ammo Colin Ferguson used to kill people on a NY commuter train. The court decides that there is no negligence cause of action for selling more dangerous than average ammo, for criminal use of ammo, nor is there any strict liability for the criminal use of ammo, on the part of the maker.

  Judge Baer recently got a fair amount of press for deciding, in another case, that there was no probable cause to search a vehicle just because the occupants fled at the sight of the police; fleeing at the sight of the police was appropriate in the neighborhood inquestion. After much whining, and politicking about Pres. Klinton's liberal judicial appointments, the judge suddenly reheard the motion and did a 180 degree turn, and decided the search was OK, and the drugs seized could be used as evidence. The lead plaintiff, Carolyn McCarthy, is now (1996) running on a gun confiscation platform for Congress.

• McGee v. U.S., 863 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.Miss. 1994)
  In this case a sheriff challenges the constitutionality of the Brady law requirements on chief law enforcement officers. The the court agrees with the sheriff, and voids the requirement that the sheriff conduct any sort of background check, but rejects the argument that the sheriff can challenge the criminal sanctions for violating the Brady act, saying that representations by the Justice Department that CLEO's won't be prosecuted for ignoring the statute means they do not have standing to make the challenge, as there is no real likelihood of prosecution, and See also Mack, Printz, and Romero.
• McKeehan v. U.S., 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the court tosses out an attempt by the government to civilly forfeit 3 machine guns the plaintiff attempted to register after the Amnesty. The guns had been brought back by the plaintiff in 1945 from his serivce in WWII. When he attempted to register them the government seized them, and began a criminal prosecution as well as the forfeiture case. The government later agreed to a dismissal of the criminal case. The court decided that the lack of any use of the guns by plaintiff, in any way (they sat at a friends house from 1945 until the attempted registration), and the dismissal of the criminal case precluded the government from forfeiting them.
• McLemore v. U.S., 317 F.Supp. 1077 (N.D.Fla. 1970)
  In this case the court upholds the revocation of the plaintiff's FFL for poor record keeping. The court refuses to give the licensee a new trial, but rather decides that the administrative hearing before ATF contained adequate evidence to sustain the revocation.
• Milentz v. U.S., 446 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the court upholds the defendant's conviction for possessing an unregistered short shotgun. The defendant's main argument was that the NFA violated the due process clause of the constitution because it didn't require a showing of specific intent for a conviction. Specific intent means that the defendant meant to break the law, or at least commit a bad act, rather than general intent, which just means the defendant knew he was possessing a shotgun. The Supremes rejected any need for specific intent in the Freed case, and the defendant's argument was rejected here as well. Exactly what general intent had to be shown was the subject of the Staples case - whether it was possession of a gun, or of a gun with the characteristics that brought it within the NFA. The Supremes, rejecting a lot of lower court cases since Freed, opted for the second, more narrow, requirement.
• Mitchell Arms Inc., v. U.S., 7 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
  In this case the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decides that ATF's suspension and later revocation of Mitchell's permits to import some Yugoslav made semi-auto AK type rifles was not a "taking" of private property, such that they would owe compensation for it, under the 5th amendment. The court decided that as gun import was an area that was very regulated, and that import permits were at the whim of ATF, no property interest was created by the law. The court further decided that as the government did not confiscate the guns, and Mitchell was free to sell them elsewhere, or to law enforcement and military organizations in this country, they had suffered no compensable loss. The court reached a similar conclusion in the B-West case.
• Modern Muzzleloading, Inc. v. Magaw, 1997 WL 785623 (D.D.C. 1997)
  Denial of TRO in below case
• Modern Muzzleloading, Inc. v. Magaw, 18 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998)
  In this case the court upholds ATF's decision that muzzle loading rifles that use modern ammunition primers are not antique firearms, but rather ordinary firearms. This decision was basically made moot by an amendment to the definition of antique firearm in the GCA, including all muzzle loading firearms within the definition.
• Montgomery v. U.S., 146 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1944)
  
• Moodyes v. U.S., 400 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the appeals court upholds the defendants conviction for possessing a sawed off shotgun made in violation of the pre-68 NFA. The court upholds the search that resulted in finding the shotgun. The court also notes in a footnote that while the Supremes court decision in Haynes did not apply the self incrimination defense to possesion of NFA weapons made in violation of the statute, if the Supremes ever did do that, the defendant could raise a self incrimination defense at that time.
• Moore v. R.G. Industries, 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986)
  In this 9th circuit case, construing California law, the court decides that there is no cause of action for selling a non-defective handgun that is later used in a crime.
• Moore v. U.S., 512 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1975)
  
• Mower v. U.S., 402 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the court of appeals upholds a conviction for possessing an unservicable machine gun transferred in violation of the NFA (the registered owner just handed it over, w/o submitting paperwork first), but voids a charge of moving in interstate commerce an unregistered gun, finding that Haynes applies to such a charge. The defendant was a follower of Robert DePugh (see the cases related to him) and his Minuteman outfit. He bought the unservicable gun from someone in Calif., who had it legally. When he discovered the guy never submitted the paperwork, he tried to do it himself, and got arrested for his trouble.
• Moyer v. Secretary of the Treasury, 830 F.Supp. 516 (W.D .Mo. 1993)
  In this case a federal district court rejects the claim of a felon who sued after ATF said they could not act on his request for relief from his federal firearm disability, because Congress precluded spending appropriated funds for such a purpose. The court said that Congress could lawfully do this, it did not infringe on his second or fifth amendment rights. The court further said that the court could not review ATF's lack of action in this case, they could only review after ATF had done an investigation, and rejected the request. If ATF could not act, the petitioner was without any remedy. Compare this to the 3rd circuit's decision in Rice v. BATF, reversing a district court decision very similar to this one.
• N.A.G.E. v. Barrett, 968 F.Supp. 1564 (N.D.Ga. 1997) aff'd w/o opinion, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998)
  In this case a federal district court upholds 18 USC 922(g)(9) the firearms disability passed in 1996 for persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. The court rejects a challenge based on equal protection, the tenth amendment, ex post facto and bill of attainder protections, and due process.
• Text of complaint in Napolilli v. U.S., No. F93-0037 (D.Alaska 1993)
  
• National Coalition to Ban Handguns v. B.A.T.F., 715 F.2d 632 (D.C.Cir 1983)
  In this case the court agrees that ATF's regulations on who may be issued a FFL are consistent with the statute, and the statute does not require bona fide business premises, compliance with local zoning, or anything more than a plan to conduct business. These criteria were altered as part of the 1994 Brady law, as can be seen from this 1983 case, while gun controllers would like no one to qualify for an FFL, they would also like every sale of a gun to be "engaged in the business', and if done w/o an FFL, be a crime. As this case was decided before the 1986 amendment that added a definition of "engaged in the business" you can see that its loose interpretation at that time persuaded the court that darn near anyone who wanted an FFL should be able to get one, and that ATF's construction of the GCA to that end was correct.
• Navegar, Inc., v. U.S., 914 F.Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1996)
  In this decision the trial court decides that Navegar, the maker of the TEC-9, and Penn Arms, the maker of the Striker 12 shotgun, lack standing to challenge the bans imposed on their respective guns by the 1994 Crime Bill. This decision was overturned by the DC Court of Appeals, see Navegar v. U.S., so the case is proceeding to a trial.
• Navegar, Inc. v. U.S., 103 F.3d 994 (D.C.Cir. 1997)
  The first challenge to the assault weapon law will finally go to trial. In this case the DC Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and instructed it to hear the challenge of Navegar, the maker of Intratec firearms, and Penn Arms, the maker of the Striker 12 to the ban on those weapons by name. All challenges to the AW law up to this case had been thrown out by the courts, as raising issues not yet ripe for adjudication; i.e. the plaintiffs had not convinced the court there was a real chance the law would be used against them - to do that you basically had to shout out that you planned to violate the law, and not surprisingly few folks want to do that. However in this case the court said the makers of the specified guns could challenge the singling out of their product, as that and a visit from ATF to inventory their product on hand were sufficient to create a controversy between the maker and the government.
• Navegar, Inc., v. U.S. - F.Supp.2d - (D.D.C. 1998)
  
• Nichols v. U.S., 325 F.Supp. 130 (D.Kan. 1971)
  
• Nordyke v. Santa Clara County, 110 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 9th circuit court of appeals upholds a decision striking down a clause in the lease the county made for its fairgrounds, prohibitng gun shows and related activities at the fairgrounds. The county leased the grounds to another entity, which in turn leased it to promoters who wanted to have events there, the county amendment ot the lease was designed to keep the fairgrounds from being sub-leased to gun show promoters. To the extent the amendment was a ban on commercial speech for the sale of a lawful product in a lawful manner (ie solicitations to buy guns at a gun show) the court said the action of the county was in violation of the first amendment. The court pointed out that gun shows are legal under state and federal law, as well as involve a lawful product, guns. The court also indicated that a ban on gun sales, but not on speech, would probably pass constitutional scrutiny, but in a footnote noted it might not pass scrutiny under the California pre-emption statute relating to firearms.
• Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F.Supp 1397 (W.D.Ark 1987)
  This is the decision of the trial judge on a motion to dismiss from a third case filed against SOF from a "gun for hire" ad they ran. The judge says things that are partially overturned by the 11th Circuit decision in the Braun case, about the first amendment protection afforded to a publisher int he case of an ad. The judge is rather clearly biased against SOF, due to their content. He has two paragraphs where he rails against the "right to 'bear arms'", and the right ot have gun shows, when they are just for tools to hurt perople, and tools of destruction. There doesn't seem to be an appeal of this case, or this decision to the 11th circuit, perhaps they dropped it, perhaps they settled. But this judge was rather clearly bad news. Mostly I include it for completeness on the saga of SOF and the gun for hire ads.
• NRA v. Bentsen, 999 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1993)
  
• National Rifle Ass'n v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1990)
  This is a suit by the NRA against the ATF over the regulations they created to implement the 1986 FOPA. Administratively they weakened a lot of the reforms in record keeping and the place of business rules for FFL's. And of course the recent Brady and Crime Bills made things even worse, but by law not regulation. In any event the case goes over why Collector FFL holders don't have to record their own C&R collection when they get a C&R FFL, why dealer FFL holders don't have to record drivers license info when they sell out of their personal collection, despite what the regs printed in the ATF Red Book say. The case gives a good overview of how administrative law works, for those who wondered why ATF can make up rules that have little to no basis in the statutes they are supposed to be implementing.
• Complaint in NRA v Magaw Text of complaint NRA filed challenging 1994 AW ban - the case was thrown out for lack of standing
• NRA v. Magaw, 909 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Mich. 1995)
  In this case a federal district court dismisses a pre-enforcement challenge by the NRA and others to the 1994 assault weapon ban. The court decides that the issue isn't ripe yet, and that the plaintiffs in court do not have standing to challenge the law.
• NRA v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 6th circuit disagrees, in part, with the trial judge's decision (also on this page) that the manufacturer plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the magazine and assault weapon ban provisions of the 1994 Crime Bill. The court agrees with the Navegar v. US case, that maker's whose product is banned by the law suffer an economic injury sufficient to let them challenge the law. On the other hand, the court agrees with the trial court that the organizations and individuals who want to own the guns lack standing, as the threat of prosecution is remote and speculative as to them (since they declined to claim they were breaking, or going to break, the law), and since they alleged no real economic injury (the court agreed with the San Diego Gun Rights Committee case, that an increase in the price of the guns is not enough.)
• NRA v. Reno - 11/98 Complaint in NRA suit over FBI gun owner record retention
  
• Oefinger v. Baker, No. 86-1396 (D.D.C. October 29, 1986)
  In this unpublished decision, the DC district court refuses to stop the 1986 machinegun making ban, based on a facial challenge to the Act. As with the more recent challenges to the 1994 ban on semi-auto "assault weapons", the court decides that the law is not subject to one of the very limited exceptions to the federal courts refusing to entertain a facial challenge to a law. The court suggests the proper case is one where the agency has acted adversely to someone based on the law. See Farmer v. Higgins.
• Oefinger v. Zimmerman, 601 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.Pa. 1984)
  This is a 1984 case from Pennsylvania, over the then ban on possessing NFA weapons there, even by class 3's. Oefinger (the guy who is DLO, and is in MGN regularly with his ideas on how to sue to overturn the law enforcement certification) sues, claiming the federal licensing scheme for gun dealers precludes Pa. from banning federal licensees from engaging in their trade in Pa. The court disagrees, saying the GCA and NFA do not preclude a state from banning even licensees from possessing the weapons, or making a living peddling or repairing them. During the pendency of the case the current Pa. law was enacted, making it a defense to a charge under the law that the weapon (exc. a bomb) was possessed in compliance with the NFA; making the case moot to a large extent. Oefinger lost the case, but won the war, as it were.
• Owen v. Magaw, 936 F.Supp. 1568 (D.Kan. 1996)
  In this case the district court for Kansas decides to reject the Rice case, and follow the McGill case, and decides that the prohibition on ATF spending money to act on requests for relief from the federal firearm disability (by felons) does not mean the courts can review such an application, but that felons are left without a remedy.
• Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 10th circuit upholds the trial court decision, also on the page, that felons may not apply for relief from their firearm disability since Congress cut off funding for ATF to act on the petitions. The court agrees with the 5th circuit, in McGill, and the 9th, in Burtch, and rejects the 3d circuit decision in Rice. Felons serious about trying to get their rights restored need to move to a state in the third circuit court of appeals, at least until the Supremes deign to grant cert. in one of these cases.
• Page v. U.S., 282 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1960)
  
• Para-Ordnance v. SGS, 73 F.3d 1085 (Fed.Cir. 1995)
  In this case the court upholds the invalidation of Para-Ordnance's patent on the frame design for their high capacity 1911 pistol frame, after Para-Ord sued the importer of the Llama XI-A and XI-B pistols, which are apparently total ripoffs of the Para-Ord, to the point that the mags fit in both frames, although the mag catch is in a different place. The court decides that the alleged innovations of the Para-Ord patent are nothing more than an obvious evolution from the Browning High-Power and Llama Omni pistols. This case is probably why Entreprise Arms is now cranking out frames that also ripoff the Para-Ord idea. Or sure look like they do.
• Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F.Supp. 1206 (N.D.Tex 1985)
  In this case a Texas federal district court rejects a suit claiming that making or selling cheap handguns is an ultrahazardous activity, and that the seller is otherwise liable for selling a handgun because they inherently defective.
• P.A.W.S. v. Benson, 837 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Or. 1993)
  They couldn't even spell his name right, they meant Lloyd Bentsen, the Sec'y of the Treasury when this case was brought. Anyway, this is a suit brought by PAWS against ATF because they refused to accept the registration of over 1000 mg receivers PAWS made in the time right before the 1986 ban took effect. ATF claimed they weren't done; PAWS said they made 'em the way they always had (these were apparently the Sterling clones they make, they were described as tube receivers), and in any case, if the receivers weren't done enough, the tubes together with parts (for this only about 600 guns though) they had on hand meant they had an mg in the form of a "combination of parts from which an mg may be assembled". ATF agreed with that, but refused to register them as pre-ban guns anyway, saying PAWS didn't ask to register a combination of parts, but to register receivers. PAWS said the law made no distinction, an MG is an mg, neither the law nor the regs required they be that specific. In a decision I would have appealed, but PAWS didn't, the court sides with ATF, and decides that if ATF says they have to be more specific, they have to be more specific; and also that PAWS missed their chance to appeal the decision as to the registrability of the tubes, by waiting over 6 years from when ATF sent them a letter saying the tube registration was refused. I think PAWS's lawyers screwed up; not getting Lloyd Bentsen's name right is a poor sign. As is not appealing this case, as is missing the statute of limitations cutoff for appealing the decision on the tubes. Between these machineguns, the ones that were disallowed in the St Augustine Gun Works case, the Goff case, and so on; ATF was very effective in truncating the supply of civilian MG's before that ban. They put in a lot of work to disallow as many as they could.
• Pencak v. Concealed Weapon Licensing Board for the County of St. Clair, 872 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.Mich. 1991)
  In this case the federal court throws out a section 1983 suit against the permit board, based on its refusal to issue concealed carry permits to anyone, apparently, including the plaintiff. The court decides that there is no property interest in a permit, as state law gives the board complete discretion in issuing the permits, and if there is no property interest there is no constitutional right violated when they are arbitrary and capricious in issuing permits.
• Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus, 925 F.Supp. 1254 (S.D.Ohio 1996)
  In this case the federal district court judge strikes down nearly all of the revised city of Columbus, OH, assault weapon ban. The first such ordinance was voided by the 6th Circuit in Springfield Armory v. Columbus. The court finds most of the ordinance void as too vague, and failing to give gun owners notice of what is prohibited. The vagueness, given that the law requires no state of mind for a violation (scienter), and is criminal in nature, means it is unacceptable under the fourteenth amendment. The court upholds the laws regulation of large capacity magazines, and of assault shotguns.
• Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 6th circuit upholds the trial court's decision striking down the city of Columbus assault weapon ban ordinance as unconstitutionally vague, as to the definitions of assault weapons, and also striking down the grandfather clause as being so irrational as to be beyond the power of the city to enact, constitutionally. This case speaks well for the challenge to parts of the federal assault weapon law also being challenged in this circuit.
• Perez v. Reno, No. SA-97-CA-0604 (W.D.Tex. 1997) Government brief
  This is a brief from the government, in a case filed by persons who home school their kids, over whether the Gun Free School Zones Act applies to home schooling. In their brief the government claims that they do not believe the Act applies to persons home schooling their own kids, although the language of the law would lead one to think otherwise. As the plaintiffs were not being prosecuted, and the government claimed they would not try to prosecute for what the plaintiffs wanted to do, the government requested that the case be dismissed, and I believe that it was.
• Perri v. Department of Treasury, 637 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1980)
  In this case the 9th circuit upholds the revocation of the plaintiff's FFL, for selling firearms to persons who were unqualified to buy them, through an internediary, a so called "strawman" transaction. ATF sent a felon to the plainitff's gun shop, to try and buy a handgun, and when the plaintiff refused, they sent the felon and a second agent, to try and act as a straw purchaser. The plaintiff sold a handgun to the second man, and was accused of making the strawman sale as a result. The court decides there was sufficient evidence that the dealer knew the straw transaction was prohibited, and further that there was evidence he knew the second man was purchasing the handgun for the first person.
• Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985)
  In this case the 5th circuit rules in two cases, consolidated for appeal, where the hiers of persons murdered with handguns want to hold the makers liable for selling the guns to the public. The court is acting under Louisiana law, although La. uses the strange French civil law, the result would be the same under the law of most/all other states. The court decides that there can be no strict liability for marketing a handgun, that such liability is either based on ultrahzardous activities, which only relate to land, or on tort principles that do not apply in La. The court finds that there is no defect in design for selling a small handgun. Only if a handgun causes injury by not functioning as it should can there be liability. In this case the guns worked as designed.
• Porter v. U.S., 335 F.Supp. 498 (N.D.Tx. 1971)
  
• Porter v. U.S., 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973)
  
• Powers v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 505 F.Supp. 695 (M.D.Fla. 1980)
  In this case the court upholds ATF's decision not to renew the plaintiff's FFL. The court agrees with ATF that Powers wilfully failed to keep records on firearm acquisitions and dispositions, as required by the law, including on some NFA weapons.
• Prino v. Simon, 606 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1979)
  In this case the appeals court upholds the decision denying the plaintiff a renewal of his FFL, based on violations of the GCA recordkeeping requirements.
• Printz v. U.S., 854 F.Supp. 1503 (D.Mont. 1994)
  In this case a sheriff challenges the constitutionality of the Brady law requirements on chief law enforcement officers. The the court agrees with the sheriff, and voids the requirement that the sheriff conduct any sort of background check, but rejects the argument that the sheriff can challenge the criminal sanctions for violating the Brady act, saying that representations by the Justice Department that CLEO's won't be prosecuted for ignoring the statute means they do not have standing to make the challenge, as there is no real likelihood of prosecution, and See also Mack, McGee, and Romero.
• Pruitt v. U.S., 364 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1966)
  In this case the Court rejects the argument that section 5851 of the pre-68 NFA compels self incrimination in the same way that section 5841 was found by some courts to do. This conclusion was in turn rejected by the Supreme Court in the Haynes decision, which found that essentially section 5851 incorporated the registration problem in 5841, by providing for a punishment for possessing an unregistered firearm.
• Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995)
  In this case the court of appeals upholds the order of a new trial in a lawsuit over a Thompson Contender pistol that fired and killed its owner after it was dropped. In the first trial Thompson withheld a video test of the pistol that showed it firing when it was dropped, as well as presented perjured testimony about whether the pistol had fired when dropped in testing. The court decided that Thompson's vice president and general counsel had breached his duty as an attorney to the court, and that Thompson should not be able to gain from its deception. In the first trial the plaintiff's lost.
• Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir 1982)
  As this case came up in the 7/95 MGN Forms column, I decided to add it. It is a challenge to the 1981 Morton Grove ('burb of Chicago), Ill ban on the possession of live handguns by residents of that town. The court upholds it as not pre-empted by Ill law (which it clearly was, I strongly agree with the dissent here), and as not violative of any "fundamental right" under the Constitution, nor violative of a joke of an Ill constitution (what happens when you have a modern era constitutional convention) and of course not violative of any right under the 2nd amendment, allegedly because the Presser case stands for the proposition that the second amendment is not binding on the states (at best the crap the court quotes is dicta, it was totally irrelevant to the issue at hand in Presser), and because the 2nd amendment does not protect private possession of handguns. In a footnote, also dicta, the court indicates it doesn't think handguns are military weapons. There is a dissent where the judge correctly, in my opinion, argues that the Morton Grove ordinance is preempted by a comprehensive state handgun regulation system in Ill. The dissent also argues there is a fundamental right to privacy in possessing handgun in the home, which in my opinion is a pretty stupid argument, one the Supremes or any other court is unlikely to buy. Despite my thoughts, the Illinois Supreme Court has also ruled that ordinances like Morton Grove's are not pre- empted by state law or the state constitution.
• Raines v. Colt Industries, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 819 (E.D.Mich 1991)
  This is a product liability suit, claiming that the Colt Huntsman pistol that one druggie shot another with, was defective in that you had to open the slide to see if it was loaded, and that it did not have a magazine disconnect safety - it could still fire even if the magazine was removed. Druggie 1 shot his buddy after removing the magazine, pointing at his friends head, and pulling the trigger. He said he was hoping to scare him. The court decided that the firearm was not defective, in that the friend intentionally operated the gun in the way it was meant to be operated (including loading the chamber of the gun from the magazine, before removing it), and that the fact that it could fire with the magazine removed was not a defect. In other words the gun worked exactly as intended, and as designed and intended was a potentially deadly instrument.
• Ramsey v. U.S., 329 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1964)
  In this case the court of appeals tosses out a finding that some firearms were forfeited to the US, because they were unregistered NFA firearms. The court decides that there was no proof the guns were subject to the NFA. The government also did not follow the requirements of the forfeiture statute.
• Rayborn v. U.S., 234 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1956)
  
• Reed v. U.S., 401 F.2d 756 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for possessing a sawed off shotgun made in violation of the NFA against a challenge that the section violates the defendant's right against self incrimination, ll under the pre-68 NFA. The court noting that the defendant was not required to provide any information to the government to avoid violating the section, decides that it does not violate his right against self incrimination.
• Rice v. U.S. Dep't of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 850 F.Supp. 306 (E.D.Pa. 1994)
  This is the district court's decision that was reversed in by the 3rd circuit, in a case also on the server. The court decided that they could only review a decision of ATF, not their lack of a decision due to a funding constraint from Congress. They also said the lack of such a remedy to the firearms disability did not violate the second amendment or the fifth amendment to the US Constitution.
• Rice v. Dep't of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 68 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995)
  In this case a felon sought to have ATF, pursuant to the GCA, remove his inability to own guns. However, midway though Congress started passing, and continues to, appropriations bills that prohibit the agency from spending any federal money to investigate and act on such petitions. The guy challenges their failure to act, and his apparent inability to be able to take advantage of the procedure provided for by law. The court decides that the appropriations bills do not repeal the section of the GCA providing for relief from the disability, and that if ATF cannot or will not act on the petition, the courts can do so, pursuant to a different section of the GCA. Rice also made a claim that the failure to provide the relief violated his 2nd amendment rights, but the court rejected this argument in a two sentence footnote.
• Rice v. Paladin Press, 940 F.Supp. 836 (D.Md. 1996)
  In this case the trial court dismisses a suit against the publisher of a book on how to be a hit man, and how to make silencers, based on the alleged use of the information in the books to kill three people. The court decides that the books are protected by the first amendment, and the fact that the information can be used for criminal purposes, and is apparently intended at least in part for a criminal audience, does not strip the books of first amendment protection. Only incitement to imminent violence, in this context, is sufficient to strip the book of first amendment protection.
• Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. - F.3d - (4th Cir. 1997)
  Appeals court reversal of above case.
• Rich v. U.S., 383 F.Supp 787 (S.D. Ohio 1974)
  In this case the court decides that revoking the plaintiff's FFL for paperwork violations is too harsh, and instead orders ATF to suspend the license for a period of time.
• Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc., v. City of New York, 896 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
  In this case a gun club, and others, sue the City of New York over its assault weapon ban. They lose. The federal district court rejects arguments that it violates the right to bear arms, that it is superseded by the federal Civilian Marksmanship Program (DCM deal), or that it violates due process or other federal rights. The court applies a rationality test to the law, and finds that it is fine.
• Richmond Boro Gun Club v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681 (2nd Cir. 1996)
  
• Robbins v. U.S., 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973)
  In this case a bar owner who made firebombs to put his competition out of business was convicted of possessing unregistered and unserialized destructive devices. The court upheld the conviction bvased on challenges to the submission of a declaration by a NFA Registry clerk indicating that the defendant had not registered any NFA weapons. The court said that while this was not conclusive proof, the jury was allowed to hear it on the issue of registration.
• Rodriguez v. Glock, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 1064 (N.D.Ill. 1998)
  In this case the court finds that the cause of the injury to Plaintiff's husband (he was killed by a drunk off-duty cop with his Glock pistol) was not the lack of a safety on the Glock but rather the struggle between the decedent, who was a bouncer at a bar, and the drunk police officer, over the pistol. See People v. Bedoya, the appeal from the conviction of the police officer for murder, for more details on his "night on the town" in Chicago, which resulted in his killing of the bouncer.
• Romero v. U.S., 883 F.Supp. 1076 (W.D.La. 1994)
  In this case a sheriff challenges the constitutionality of the Brady law requirements on chief law enforcement officers. The the court agrees with the sheriff, and voids the requirement that the sheriff conduct any sort of background check, but rejects the argument that the sheriff can challenge the criminal sanctions for violating the Brady act, saying that representations by the Justice Department that CLEO's won't be prosecuted for ignoring the statute means they do not have standing to make the challenge, as there is no real likelihood of prosecution, and thus there is no actual dispute or controversy. See also Mack, McGee, and Printz .
• R.P.B. Industries, Inc., v. Secretary of Treasury, Case No. C 82-1149 A (N.D.Ga. July 21, 1982)
  In this unpublished case, the district court upholds the ATF decision reclassifying the RPB open bolt MAC style guns as machine guns, since they were easily converted to machine guns. The court finds the decision consistent with the NFA, and within ATF's power. See also Jersey Arms v. Secretary, and York v. Secretary.
• Russell v. U.S., 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962)
  In this case the 9th circuit finds that section 5841 of the pre-68 NFA violates the defendant's rights against self incrimination in that it punishes a failure to register an NFA weapon a person possesses, while other parts of the same law punish the possession. It requires the defendant admit to violating a second law, in other words. Similar logic to this case was the basis for the Supreme Court agreeing with this case, and extending it, in Haynes v. US.
• In re St. Augustine Gun Works, Inc., 75 B.R. 495 (M.D.Fla 1987)
  This is a bankruptcy court case, about a class 2 that had a claim against it in bankruptcy court from the ATF, for unpaid SOT, and transfer taxes it was exempt from as an SOT. The company's main defense was that it owed nothing on guns it made, as ATF disallowed most of their May, 1986 registrations of similar guns for which ATF was claiming they owed SOT and or transfer taxes when they were registered before. While the company agreed the earlier guns were mg's, in their opinion, as ATF had disallowed the 1986 versions of the guns (apparently M-2 carbines and converted AR's, among other things) they must be wrong. The court disagreed; saying they accepted the ATF explanation that the 1986 guns were disallowed because they were not actually made when the Form 2 was filed, which they need to be. The earlier guns were in fact made (although who knows when, as compared to when the Form 2's were filed) thus the SOT and or transfer tax was due on them. The case has serial numbers for most/all of the guns made by this company, if you have one of their products you could learn a little history on your gun. Bottom line, ATF was added to the list of creditors, to the tune of $15 grand or so.
• San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 926 F.Supp. 1415 (S.D.Cal. 1995)
  
• San Diego Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996)
  
• Sanders v. U.S., 441 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the court upholds the defendants conviction for possessing two unregistered NFA weapons. The defendant first argued the evidence didn't show he possessed the weapons, and second that multiple possession of unregistered weapons was only one offense under the statute, not two separate offenses. The court rejected both suggestions.
• Searcy v. City of Dayton, docket listing
  
• Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 1994)
  This one is a hoot. A cop who was off- duty went with a buddy to bust up a drug house in his friend's neighborhood. He brought along a personally owned "MAC-11" machine gun. His friend brought a shotgun. They went to the house, where the cop shot one of the drug minions with his mg; his buddy then shot the other drug pusher with his shotgun. The one shot with the mg died, and his estate sued the city and police chief. The cop and friend went to prison. One of the claims for damages was state law negligence against the police chief for signing the transfer paperwork for the murder weapon. The court decided that that was not negligence per-se, nor reckless or wanton conduct. Unless the plaintiff asserted some connection between the paperwork signature and the harm (the murder) they were SOL. That is, just signing the paperwork does not confer any civil liability. Signing for someone the chief knew to be unstable, or a criminal, could, conceivably.
• Sendra Corp. v. Magaw, 1995 WL 434451 (D.D.C. 1995)
  In this brief, unpublished, order, the court refuses a discovery request by Sendra against ATF in a suit Sendra brought against ATF for disallowing, as transferrable machine guns, some guns Sendra made in the days before the 1986 making ban. I have no further info on the substance, or outcome, of this case.
• Sendra Corp. v. Magaw, 111 F.3d 162 (D.C.Cir. 1997)
  In this case the court upholds the dismissal of a suit filed by Sendra against ATF, over the status of a bunch of machine guns made by Sendra immediately before the making ban in 1986, which ATF refused to register, claiming they were not done enough to be "machine guns". The trial court had decided the case on the merits, finding, apparently, that they items indeed were not machine guns. The court of appeals decided that the statute of limitations had run before Sendra filed suit, and so dismissed the case without deciding whether the items were machine guns or not. Sendra had stalled filing suit in part because some officers of the company were being prosecuted for possessing unregistered short barreled rifles, among other things. See U.S. v. Drasen, on this web page. See PAWS v. Benson for a case similar to this.
• Service Arms Company, Inc., v. U.S., 76 F.R.D. 109 (W.D.Okla. 1977)
  In this decision a court denies ATF summary judgment on the issue of whether the plaintiff's FFL should have not been renewed, based on alleged wilful violations of the GCA, poor recordkeeping in particular. The court decides that based on the representations of the plaintiff, there is additional evidence to hear, and thus refuses to give the U.S. summary judgment.
• Service Arms Company, Inc., v. U.S., 463 F.Supp. 21 (W.D.Okla. 1978)
  In this decision the court affirms ATF's decision not to renew the license of the plaintiff, based on record keeping problems, and failing to require handgun buyers obtain a permit required by a city ordinance in the city where the gun shop is located.
• Sherwood Int'l Export Corp. v. Higgins, 1986 WL 15702 (D.D.C. 1986)
  In this unpublished case, the court decides that, contrary to the conclusion of the court in the 7 Misc. Firearms case, a machine gun receiver is a machine gun as defined in the NFA, even though that isn't what the statute clearly says. This judge decides that statute is unclear, and therefore decides what it says based on the legislative history; self serving reports or debates generated by Congress which purport to explain what Congress was trying to do with a piece of legislation. The judge in the 7 Misc. Firearms case found the statutory definition to be clear on its face, and required a receiver be possessed with parts to assemble it, to be a machine gun. However, as that is apparently not what Congress meant, even though it is what they wrote, this court chooses to ignore the statute in favor of committee reports about the statute.
• Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986)
  In this case the 11th circuit rejects a suit brought under Florida law, attempting to hold the maker of a handgun responsible for its criminal use. This is one in a parade of such suits brought by a Dallas TX attorney, Windle Turley, who makes a very good living doing personal injury suits.
• Shyda v. Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 448 F.Supp. 409 (M.D.Pa. 1977)
  In this case the court decides that review of a BATF decision to revoke an FFL is de novo, that is there is a new trial, if there is any additional evidence not presented at the administrative revocation hearing. In this case, as the FFL holder did not have any new evidence, the court made findings of fact which it said were sufficient to revoke the FFL, based on poor record keeping after being warned about how to do it right. However the court withholds a decision on the appropriateness of revocation for another hearing, and does not decide it in this decision.
• Sipes v. U.S., 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963)
  This case opinion is by Judge Blackmun, who was later appointed to be on the Supreme court. Sipes got caught in St. Louis with a sawed-off single shot .22 Stevens rifle. He said he didn't know it was an illegal weapon. The court said it didn't matter, he need not know the gun was illegal, and implicitly rejected the idea he needed to know it was a sawed off rifle, as opposed to, say, a regular pistol, which a sawed off rifle can exactly resemble. The court also opines that a sawed off rifle, like a sawed-off shotgun has no legal use or purpose. I guess, by implication, neither to handguns... This is a pre-68 case, and reveals some of the features of the law the Supremes in the Haynes case had a problem with, although this court is quite comfortable with a requirement the defendant explain his possession, or be convicted. And with the lack of a requirement of any knowledge that the gun works, or is a sawed-off rifle.
• Sizemore v. U.S., 393 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the court throws out a NFA conviction, based on the Haynes v. US case. The court finds that there was not sufficient evidence the defendant found the gun, which the government argued would make the self incrimination argument inapplicable to the defendant, since he would not have transferred or made the sawed off shotgun illegally.
• Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984)
  In this case a federal court upholds the Chicago ordinance that both required handgun registration, and refused to register handguns after a certain date. The court finds that the law does not violate the equal protection cluse in discriminating between people who live in Chicago (and thus could register a handgun there before the cutoff) and those who move there later; as the court says it is really just a grandfathering, residents of Chicago who didn't register a handgun are as precluded as folks who move there later from registering and thus legally owning a handgun. The court finds that allowing grandfathered guns is a reasonable action by the city. The court also finds that the law is not pre-empted, or prohibited by Illinois law or the state constitution, simiar conclusions the court in the Morton Grove case reached.
• Sonzinsky v. U.S., 86 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1936)
  
• Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 5th circuit throws out a civil rights suit brought by a woman who was arrested for carrying a weapon illegally by Dallas, Texas, area police officers. The gun was in her trunk, and they arrested her for illegally carrying a weapon, on or about her person. While the court noted that she was apparently arrested by the officers not because they thought the case would actually be prosecuted, but to punish her extra-judicially, nonetheless, the court threw out her case, saying that it is not clearly established under Texas law that carrying a firearm in the trunk was legal.
• Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994)
  In this case the 6th circuit voided most of the Columbus, OH AW ban, which was ripped off of the California ban law, which is the model for many ban laws (Denver's for example). Columbus subsequently rewrote the law. This case was not decided on 2nd amendment grounds, but on vagueness grounds mostly. The court decided the part of the law banning clones of listed guns was vague, for lack of definition of what guns were banned. Also the city showed no rational basis for banning the listed guns, but not others nearly identical. They suggested a criteria test, not a name list would be acceptable, if the city was to claim certain features of the guns made them evil. As the federal AW ban was modeled on the Calif law parts of that are almost certainly void, and ATF has apparently been ignoring them. For example the "list" of guns, which is not a list at all. At least not of semi-auto guns, or guns at all in some cases. The criteria section of the federal law would probably pass muster under the standard of this case. The court saw no problem with the Columbus ban on large capacity magazines.
• Stanford v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1954)
  This case decides whether a certain toy gun is a "firearm" so as to make it nonmailable, as a handgun, through the US Mail. The gun shot a single shotgun pellet through a barrel under the force of a cap as used in a toy cap pistol. The court, after firing it and finding that it merely produced a feeling like a mosquito bite on the hand said that it was not a lethal weapon, and it was absurd to apply the law on mailing handguns to the toy. Note that Warren Burger, later to be chief justice of the supreme court, and an avid gun-grabber, was the chief lawyer for the government on the case. He was at it as far back as 1954.
• Starks v. U.S., 316 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1963)
  In this case the 9th circuit rejects the argument that the pre-68 NFA statute prohibitng posssession of an unregistered gun violates the 5th amendment rights of the possessor of the gun in the same way that the 9th circuit found the section penalizing non-registration did (in the Russell case). The court makes a distinction between possessing an unregistered gun, even though registration would incriminate the defendant, and penalizing the non-registration. The supreme court rejected this sort fo nonsensical distinction in the Haynes v. US case.
• Steele v. NFA Branch, 755 F.2d 1410 (11 Cir. 1985)
  This case is one of two cases I am aware of where there was a challenge to the problems of getting the law enforcement signoff on a transfer to an individual. Steele was a Dade Cty FL, class 3 (doing business as "Machinegun Kelly's") who was having trouble getting a signoff for his customers. Ever since the at least the early 1980's sheriffs and local police chiefs in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties have conspired together to refuse to provide the signoff for NFA stuff, due to their personal belief that civilians should not be able to possess such items. The lower court ruled in his favor, that he ought to be able to do the transfers w/o it, and the government appealed. The court decided that there could be a suit by a transferor to compel the transfer w/o the signoff. But the transferor needed to claim that the transferee was otherwise eligible to receive the gun (otherwise the court could not decide if the relief asked for would help, maybe the transferee was a felon, and the transfer couldn't happen without regard to the signoff) and Steele didn't. Also Steele didn't exhaust the list of persons ATF would accept for the certification; he needed to be stonewalled in that regard also before he could go to court. The court remanded the case to the trial court for Steele to claim his customer was otherwise eligible to own the gun. The case appears to have been settled or abandoned at that point. Steele was a lawyer, but may have run out of money or patience. One interesting thing is to compare the footnoted text of the rule that creates the signoff requirement, to the current one. After this case, where Steele sued a number of federal law enforcement agents, they apparently asked ATF to remove federal agencies from the list of acceptable persons. And now only state and local agencies are listed in the regulation. See Westfall v. Miller for a similar case
• Stein's, Inc., v. Blumenthal, 649 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1980)
  In this case the 7th circuit rejects an appeal of a decision upholding ATF's decision to not renew the plaintiff's FFL, due to recordkeeping violations. The court decides that the decision not to renew was fine.
• Stevens v. U.S., 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971)
  
• S.W. Daniel, Inc., v. U.S., 831 F.2d 253 (11th Cir. 1987)
  This is where SWD, after ATF re-interpreted the definition of machine gun to include open bolt semi-autos cooked up a gun (the SSM11A1) to mess with ATF. It is the same open bolt semi-auto, with a plate welded in the receiver, over the opening in the handle/mag well, at the top, making it into an open bolt, single shot gun. ATF decides that is an MG. SWD takes them to court, and loses. In this case the court re-writes the language of the law defining mg's in the NFA to preclude the result about receivers that the 7 Misc. Firearms court reached. Then they ignore the criteria that the gun must shoot, be designed to shoot, or readily restored to shoot more than one shot. Even though it is a single shot, and is NOT easily restored (or modified, ATF thinks they are interchangeable, although they are not) to shoot as a mg, the court refuses to look at the issue at all, and disposes of the whole case in less than two printed pages. This is a good example of the more recent judicial thinking on guns; they are evil, we won't interfere with governmental attempts to regulate or ban them. I am informed some of these "SSM11A1" marked guns are now registered, pre-86 M11A1 SMG's.
• T.T. Salvage Auction Co., Inc., v. Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, 859 F.Supp. 977 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
  In this case the court grants summary judgment on the plainitff's appeal of ATF's revocation of its FFL, for wilfull violations of the Gun Control Act. The court decides that ATF has shown wilfull violations, and that the plaintiff has no defense, and therefore summary judgment is appropriate. The interesting part of this case (aside from all the cites to other appeals of ATF revocation appeals) is that the court says that a wilfull violation can be a knowing violation of the rules, or when a licensee knows about the rules, "was indifferent" to them. Knowledge of the rules in this case was shown by the licensee having a copy of the Red Book, and having been lectured on the rules by ATF personnel after violations turned up on a prior compliance inspection.
• Taylor v. U.S., 333 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1964)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for possessing a weapon made or transferred in violation of the pre-68 NFA, deciding that the government need not show the defendant is the one who made the weapon. As the government need not show the defendant made the weapon, there is no problem with self incrimination, since there was no registration or non-registration element to this offense.
• Thompson/Center Arms v. U.S., 924 F.2d 1041 (Fed.Cir. 1991)
  In this case the court of appeals decides that Thompson/Center's kit consisting of a Contender frame a barrel less than 16 inches, a buttstock and a barrel more than 16 inches is not a short barreled rifle as covered by the NFA, unless it is actually assembled into a short rifle. The feds appealed to the Supreme Court, in T/C v. U.S., and the Supreme court agreed with this case as to the item in question, but expressly rejected the idea expressed in this case that the rifle must be assembled to be covered, and decided that a set of parts that could only be assembled into a short rifle was also covered by the NFA. Since the T/C kit could be assembled into legal firearm(s), it was fine.
• Treadway v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 950 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D.Mich 1996)
  
• Turner v. U.S., 707 F. Supp. 201 (W.D.N.C. 1989)
  This is an odd one. A FFL bought a few pre-ban AK's and two of them were converted into machine guns. Apparently one of them was used in a crime, and the dealer surrendered one converted gun to the cops, and got prosecuted. But the deal was that the surrendered guns both had the auto-sear hole drilled in them, but otherwise had semi parts installed. One of them was turned into the cops by a co-defendant, and later the cops found a conversion kit (ie a full auto internal parts set) at his house, and he apparently admitted he had converted and then de-converted the gun. However Turner's gun also had the sear hole drilled, and an ATF drone testified from looking at it it had also had full auto parts installed, but apparently they didn't find the parts on Turner. Turner pled guilty; then got a clue and tried to overturn his conviction, claiming merely drilling the hole was not making a machine gun. The court kicks the decision to a magistrate, who decides that the hole drilling can be making a machine gun within the statute; given that is "altering" the gun, and given the ATF expert testimony that the hole was made, given its location, to install full auto parts, and that the gun had in fact had full auto parts installed. Thus the court suggests, but doesn't really have to decide if merely drilling the hole is making an mg, as Dan Shea claims ATF believes, on guns that use a sear pin, like the M-16 and AK. Turner's real problem was that he copped a plea, and let the ATF put on the record, without any fight, the fact that the hole drilling was to make a machine gun, and that the gun had had full auto parts installed. Heck, he shoulda thrown the gun into the woods, not turned it over to the cops himself. Now he's a felon, can't own guns, forget about deal in them.