http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-5.ZS.html
Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Morrison et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-5. Argued January 11, 2000 - Decided May 15, 20001
Petitioner Brzonkala filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was
raped by respondents while the three were students at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, and that this attack violated 42 U.S.C. § 13981
which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of
gender-motivated violence. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the complaint failed to state a claim and that §13981’s civil
remedy is unconstitutional. Petitioner United States intervened to
defend the section’s constitutionality. In dismissing the complaint, the
District Court held that it stated a claim against respondents, but that
Congress lacked authority to enact §13981 under either §8 of the
Commerce Clause or §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had
explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for §13981.
The en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause or §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 7-28.
(a) The Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with authority to
enact §13981’s federal civil remedy. A congressional enactment will be
invalidated only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568,
577-578. Petitioners assert that §13981 can be sustained under Congress’
commerce power as a regulation of activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce. The proper framework for analyzing such a claim is
provided by the principles the Court set out in Lopez. First, in Lopez,
the noneconomic, criminal nature of possessing a firearm in a school
zone was central to the Court’s conclusion that Congress lacks authority
to regulate such possession. Similarly, gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense, economic activity. Second, like the
statute at issue in Lopez, §13981 contains no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce. Although Lopez makes clear
that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument
that §13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to come within
Congress’ authority, Congress elected to cast §13981’s remedy over a
wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime. Third,
although §13981, unlike the Lopez statute, is supported by numerous
findings regarding the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on
victims and their families, these findings are substantially weakened by
the fact that they rely on reasoning that this Court has rejected,
namely a but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent
crime to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If accepted,
this reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime whose
nationwide, aggregated impact has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption. Moreover, such reasoning will not
limit Congress to regulating violence, but may be applied equally as
well to family law and other areas of state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant. The Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, and
there is no better example of the police power, which the Founders
undeniably left reposed in the States and denied the central government,
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.
Congress therefore may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on the conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. Pp. 7-19.
(b) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits Congress
to enforce by appropriate legislation the constitutional guarantee that
no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, also does not give Congress the
authority to enact §13981. Petitioners’ assertion that there is
pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of
gender-motivated violence is supported by a voluminous congressional
record. However, the Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the
manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. Foremost
among them is the principle that the Amendment prohibits only state
action, not private conduct. This was the conclusion reached in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
which were both decided shortly after the Amendment’s adoption. The
force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not
only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from
the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time, who
all had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding
the Amendment’s adoption. Neither United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
nor District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, casts any doubt on the
enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris. Assuming that
there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in
this case, it would not be enough to save §13981’s civil remedy, which
is directed not at a State or state actor but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. Section 13981 visits
no consequence on any Virginia public official involved in investigating
or prosecuting Brzonkala’s assault, and it is thus unlike any of the §5
remedies this Court has previously upheld. See e.g., South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301. Section 13981 is also different from
previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly throughout the
Nation, even though Congress’ findings indicate that the problem
addressed does not exist in all, or even most, States. In contrast, the
§5 remedy in Katzenbach was directed only to those States in which
Congress found that there had been discrimination. Pp. 19-27.
169 F.3d 820, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a
concurring opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Souter
and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Part I-A.
Notes
1. Together with No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.