| Dedication |
|
| Book |
I |
[Decisions made by the
Romans pertinent to the internal affairs of the City] |
| Chapter |
I |
What have generally been the beginnings
of some Cities, and what was that of Rome |
| |
II |
Of the kinds of Republics there are, and
of which was the Roman Republic |
| |
III |
What events caused the creation of the
Tribunes of the Plebs in Rome, which made the Republic more perfect |
| |
IV |
That disunion of the Plebs and the Roman
Senate made that Republic free and powerful |
| |
V |
Where the guarding of liberty is more
securely placed, either in the People or in the Nobles; and which have the
greater reason to become tumultuous either he who wants to acquire or he who
wants to maintain |
| |
VI |
Whether it was possible to establish a
government in Rome which could eliminate the enmity between the Populace and
the Senate |
| |
VII |
How much the faculty of accusing
(Judiciary) is necessary for a Republic for the maintenance of liberty |
| |
VIII |
As much as accusations are useful to a
Republic, so much so are calumnies pernicious |
| |
IX |
How it is necessary for one man alone in
desiring to organize a new Republic to reform its institutions entirely outside
the ancient ones |
| |
X |
As much as the founders of Republics and
Kingdoms are laudable, so much are those of a Tyranny shameful |
| |
XI |
Of the religions of the Romans |
| |
XII |
Of how much importance should be given
Religion; and how Italy, because the medium of the Roman Church was lacking,
was ruined |
| |
XIII |
How the Romans served themselves of
Religion to establish the City and to carry out their enterprises and stop
tumults |
| |
XIV |
The Romans interpreted the auspices
according to necessity, and with their prudence made a show of observing
Religion, even when they were forced not to observe it, and if anyone
recklessly disparaged it they punished him |
| |
XV |
How the Samnites had recourse to Religion
as an extreme remedy for the things afflicting them |
| |
XVI |
A People accustomed to living under a
Prince, if by some accident becomes free, maintains its liberty with
difficulty |
| |
XVII |
A corrupt People coming into their
liberty can maintain itself free only with the greatest difficulty |
| |
XVIII |
In what way in a corrupt City a free
State can be maintained, if there is one there, or if not, how to establish
it |
| |
XIX |
A weak Prince who succeeds an excellent
Prince can be maintained, but any Kingdom cannot be maintained if a weak one is
succeeded by another weak one |
| |
XX |
Two continuous successions of Princes of
virtu achieve great results; and that well organized Republics of necessity
have successions of virtu; therefore their acquisitions and expansions are
great |
| |
XXI |
How much blame that Prince and Republic
merit who lack their own arms |
| |
XXII |
What is to be noted in the case of the
three Roman Horatii and of the three Alban Curatii |
| |
XXIII |
That one ought not to put in peril all
his fortune and all his forces; and because of this the guarding of passes is
often harmful |
| |
XXIV |
Well organized Republics establish
rewards and penalties for their Citizens, but never compensate one (at the
expense) of the other |
| |
XXV |
Whoever wants to reform an ancient State
into a free City, should retain at least a shadow of the ancient forms |
| |
XXVI |
A new Prince in a City or Province taken
by him ought to organize everything anew |
| |
XXVII |
Very rarely do men know how to be
entirely good or entirely bad |
| |
XXVIII |
For what reasons the Romans were less
ungrateful to their Citizens than the Athenians |
| |
XXIX |
Which is more ungrateful, a People or a
Prince |
| |
XXX |
What means a Prince or a Republic ought
to use to avoid this vice of ingratitude, and what that Captain or that Citizen
ought to do so as not to be touched by it |
| |
XXXI |
That Roman Captains were never
extraordinarily punished for errors committed; nor were they yet punished when,
by their ignorance or bad proceedings undertaken by them, harm ensued to the
Republic |
| |
XXXII |
A Republic or a Prince ought not to defer
benefiting men in their necessity |
| |
XXXIII |
When an evil has sprung up either within
a State or against a State, it is a more salutary proceeding to temporize with
it than to attack it rashly |
| |
XXXIV |
The dictatorial authority did good and
not harm to the Roman Republic; and that the authority which Citizens take
away, not those are given them by free suffrage, are pernicious to Civil
Society |
| |
XXXV |
The reason why the creation of the
Decemvirs in Rome was harmful to the liberty of that Republic, notwithstanding
that it was created by public and free suffrage |
| |
XXXVI |
Citizens who have been given the higher
honors ought not to disdain the lesser |
| |
XXXVII |
What troubles the Agrarian law brought
forth in Rome; and how troublesome it is to make a law in a Republic which
greatly regards the past but contrary to the ancient customs of the City |
| |
XXXVIII |
Weak Republics are irresolute and do not
know how to decide; and if they take up any proceeding, it results more from
necessity than from election |
| |
XXXIX |
The same incidents often happen to
different People |
| |
XL |
The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome,
and what is to be noted in it; and where it will be considered among many other
things how a Republic can be saved or ruined because of similar accidents |
| |
XLI |
To jump from humility to pride and from
mercy to cruelty without profitable means, is an imprudent and useless
thing |
| |
XLII |
How easily man may be corrupted |
| |
XLIII |
Those who combat for their own glory are
good and faithful Soldiers |
| |
XLIV |
A multitude without a head is useless,
and one ought not to threaten first, and then seek authority |
| |
XLV |
It is a bad example not to observe a Law
that has been made, and especially by the author of it; and it is most harmful
to renew every day new injuries in a City and to the one who governs it |
| |
XLVI |
Men jump from one ambition to another,
and first they seek not to be offended, then to offend others |
| |
XLVII |
Men, although they deceive themselves in
general matters do not deceive themselves in the particulars |
| |
XLVIII |
Whoever wants a Magistracy not to be
given to a vile or wicked one, will have it asked by a man more vile and more
wicked, or by one more noble and more good |
| |
XLIX |
If those Cities which had their beginning
free as Rome, have had difficulty in finding laws that would maintain them,
those that had their beginning in servitude have almost an impossibility |
| |
L |
A Council or Magistrate ought not to be
able to stop the activities of a City |
| |
LI |
A Republic or a Prince ought to feign to
do through liberality, that which necessity constrains them |
| |
LII |
To reprimand the insolence of a powerful
one who springs up in a Republic, there is no more secure and less troublesome
way than to forestall him those ways by which he comes to power |
| |
LIII |
The People many times desire their ruin,
deceived by a false species of good: and how great hopes and strong promises
easily move them |
| |
LIV |
How much authority a great Man has in
restraining an excited Multitude (mob) |
| |
LV |
How easily things are managed in that
City where the Multitude is not corrupt, and that where there is equality a
Principality cannot be established, and where there is none a Republic cannot
be established |
| |
LVI |
Before great events occur in a City or a
Province, signs come which foretell them, or men who predict them |
| |
LVII |
Together the Plebs are strong, dispersed
they are weak |
| |
LVIII |
The Multitude is wiser and more constant
than a Prince |
| |
LIX |
Which Alliances or Leagues can be
trusted, whether those made with a Republic or those made with a Prince |
| |
LX |
How the Consulship and every other
Magistracy in Rome ought to be (bestowed) without any regard to age |
| Book |
II |
[That which the Roman
people did pertinent to the aggrandizement of their Empire] |
| Chapter |
I |
Whether Virtu or Fortune was the greater
cause for the Empire which the Romans acquired |
| |
II |
With what People the Romans had to
combat, and how obstinately they defended their liberty |
| |
III |
Rome became a great City by ruining the
surrounding Cities and admitting foreigners easily to her honors |
| |
IV |
Republics have had three ways of
expanding |
| |
V |
That the changes of sects and languages,
together with the accident of deluges and pestilence, extinguished the memory
of things |
| |
VI |
How the Romans proceeded in making
war |
| |
VII |
How much land the Romans gave each
colonist |
| |
VIII |
The reason why People depart from their
national places and inundate the country of others |
| |
IX |
What causes commonly make wars arise
between the powerful |
| |
X |
Money is not the sinew of war although
this is common opinion |
| |
XI |
It is not a prudent proceeding to make an
alliance with a Prince who has more reputation than power |
| |
XII |
Is it better, fearing to be assaulted, to
carry out or await war |
| |
XIII |
That one comes from the bottom to a great
fortune more by fraud than by force |
| |
XIV |
Men often deceive themselves believing
that by humility they overcome haughtiness |
| |
XV |
Weak States are always ambiguous in their
resolutions, and weak decisions are always harmful |
| |
XVI |
How much the soldiers in our times are
different from the ancient organization |
| |
XVII |
How much the army ought to esteem the
artillery in the present times, and if that opinion that is generally had of it
is true |
| |
XVIII |
That because of the authority of the
Romans and by the example of ancient armies, the infantry ought to be more
esteemed than cavalry |
| |
XIX |
That acquisitions in Republics not well
organized and that do not proceed according to Roman virtu, are the ruin and
not the exaltation of them |
| |
XX |
What perils are brought to that Prince or
that Republic which avails itself of auxiliary and mercenary troops |
| |
XXI |
The first Praetor which the Romans sent
any place was the Capua, four hundred years after they had begun to make war
(against that City) |
| |
XXII |
How often the opinions of men in judging
things (to be) great are false |
| |
XXIII |
How much the Romans, in judging the
matters for any incident that should necessitate such judgment, avoided
half-way measures |
| |
XXIV |
Fortresses are generally more harmful
than useful |
| |
XXV |
That the assaulting of a disunited City
in order to occupy it by means of its disunion is an error |
| |
XXVI |
Contempt and insult generate hatred
against those who employ them, without any usefulness to them |
| |
XXVII |
To prudent Princes and Republics, it
ought to be enough to win, for often it is not enough if they lose |
| |
XXVIII |
How dangerous it is for a Prince or a
Republic, not to avenge an injury made against the public or a private
(citizen) |
| |
XXIX |
Fortune blinds the minds of men when she
does not want them to oppose her designs |
| |
XXX |
Truly powerful Republics and Princes do
not purchase friendship with money, but with virtu and reputation of
strength |
| |
XXXI |
How dangerous it is to believe
exiles |
| |
XXXII |
In how many ways the Romans occupied
Towns |
| |
XXXIII |
How the Romans gave their Captains of
armies uncontrolled commissions |
| Book |
III |
[Preservation and
governance of the State] |
| Chapter |
I |
To want that a Sect or a Republic exist
for long, it is necessary to return them often to their Principles |
| |
II |
How at times it is a very wise thing to
simulate madness |
| |
III |
How it was necessary, in wanting to
maintain the newly acquired liberty, to kill the sons of Brutus |
| |
IV |
A prince does not live securely in a
Principality while those who have been despoiled of it live |
| |
V |
That which makes a King lose the Kingdom
that was inherited by him |
| |
VI |
Of conspiracies |
| |
VII |
Whence that when changes take place from
liberty to slavery, and from slavery to liberty, some are effected without
bloodshed, and some are full of it |
| |
VIII |
He who wants to alter a Republic ought to
consider its condition |
| |
IX |
How one must change with the times, if he
wants to have good fortune always |
| |
X |
That a Captain cannot avoid an engagement
if the Adversary wants to do so in every way |
| |
XI |
That he who has to do with many, even
though he is inferior, as long as he resists the first attack, wins |
| |
XII |
How a prudent Captain ought to impose
every necessity for fighting on his soldiers, and take them away from the
Enemy |
| |
XIII |
Where one should have more confidence,
either in a good Captain who has a weak Army, or in a good Army which has a
weak Captain |
| |
XIV |
What effects the new invention and new
voices have that appear in the midst of battle |
| |
XV |
That an Army should have one, and not
many, in charge, and that many Commanders are harmful |
| |
XVI |
That true virtu is difficult to find in
difficult times, and in easy times it is not men of virtu that prevail, but
those who have more favor because of riches or (powerful) relation |
| |
XVII |
That one who has been offended ought not
to be placed in any administration and government of importance |
| |
XVIII |
Nothing is more worthy of a Captain than
to penetrate the proceedings of the Enemy |
| |
XIX |
Whether obsequies are more necessary than
punishment in ruling a multitude |
| |
XX |
An example of how humanity did influence
the Faliscians more than all the power of Rome |
| |
XXI |
Whence it happened that Hannibal, with a
different method of proceeding than Scipio, achieved the same result in Italy
as the latter (did in Spain) |
| |
XXII |
How the harshness of Manlius Torquatus
and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus acquired the same glory for each |
| |
XXIII |
For what reason Camillus was driven out
of Rome |
| |
XXIV |
The prolongation of (military) commands
made Rome slave |
| |
XXV |
Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and many
Roman citizens |
| |
XXVI |
How a State is ruined because of
women |
| |
XXVII |
How a divided City is to be united, and
how that opinion is not true which supposes that it is necessary to keep a City
disunited in order to hold it |
| |
XXVIII |
That the actions of citizens ought to be
observed, for many times a beginning of tyranny is hidden under a pious
act |
| |
XXIX |
That the faults of the People arise from
the Princes |
| |
XXX |
For a citizen who wants to do some good
deed in his Republic on his own authority, it is first necessary to extinguish
envy; and how the defense of a City ought to be organized on the coming of the
Enemy |
| |
XXXI |
Strong Republics and excellent men retain
the same courage and dignity in any fortune |
| |
XXXII |
What means some have had to disturb a
peace |
| |
XXXIII |
In wanting to win an engagement, it is
necessary to make the army have confidence both in themselves and in their
captain |
| |
XXXIV |
What fame or voice or opinion which a
people make begins to favor a citizen; and whether they distribute the
magistracies with greater prudence than a Prince |
| |
XXXV |
What dangers occur in making oneself head
in counselling a thing, and how much the danger increases when it is an
extraordinary thing |
| |
XXXVI |
The reason why the Gauls have been, and
still are, judged at the beginning of a battle to be more than men, and
afterwards less than women |
| |
XXXVII |
Whether skirmishes before an engagement
are necessary, and how to recognize a new enemy if they are avoided |
| |
XXXVIII |
How a Captain ought to be constituted, in
whom in army can confide |
| |
XXXIX |
That a Captain ought to be one having a
knowledge of sites |
| |
XL |
That to use deceit in the managing of a
war is a glorious thing |
| |
XLI |
That one's country ought to be defended,
whether with ignominy or with glory, but it can be defended in whatever
manner |
| |
XLII |
That promises made by force ought not to
be observed |
| |
XLIII |
That men born in a province observe for
all time almost the same natures |
| |
XLIV |
Impetuosity and audacity many times can
obtain that which, with ordinary means, can never be obtained |
| |
XLV |
What is the better proceeding in battle,
either to sustain the first shock of the enemy, and having sustained it, hurl
them back, or rather to assault him first with fury |
| |
XLVI |
Whence it happens that a family in a city
for a time, have the same customs |
| |
XLVII |
That for the love of his country, a good
citizen ought to forget private injuries |
| |
XLVIII |
When a good error is seen to be made by
the enemy, it ought to be believed that it is done under deceit |
| |
XLIX |
A Republic wanting to maintain itself
free has some need of new precautions, and it was by such methods that Q.
Fabius was called Maximus |
