CHAPTER XIV



              INTERNAL PROCEDURE



[§1. Convention has sole power over its own proceedings.]



{170} WHATEVER control the other departments of the government have over a 

convention, it is obvious that the internal control of the convention by 

itself presents an entirely different question. As Dodd says:



     Even if we should assume that the legislature may limit a

     convention as to the submission of a constitution, or as to

     methods of submission, it would yet seem clear that the

     legislature cannot deprive a convention of powers

     necessary for its conduct as a deliberative assembly. The

     convention would seem in any case, in the absence of

     constitutional requirements in the matter, to have power to

     establish its own rules of order and of procedure, elect its

     officers, pass upon the qualifications and election of its

     members, and to issue orders for elections to fill vacancies

     in its membership.[1]



And compare:



     It is a deliberative body, having all the necessary authority

     to make rules for its own procedure, and to decide upon

     all questions falling within the scope of its authority.[2]



We have already seen in the discussion of the legislative powers of a 

convention that it has undoubted power to pass such rules and ordinances as 

are necessary for its own proceedings.[3]



[§2. Convention is the sole judge of the elections of its own members.]



Primarily, a convention is the sole judge of the elections of its own 

members. This is illustrated by the case of the New York convention of 1894. 

The convention was proceeding to determine a contested election case, 

whereupon one of the contestants applied to the Supreme Court for an 

injunction to prohibit the convention from passing upon the question, 

claiming that whether or not he was entitled to the seat was {171} a 

question for the determination of the courts. The court assumed jurisdiction 

and was about to proceed with the case, but the Judiciary Committee of the 

convention adopted a strong report denying the power of the court, and the 

court promptly accepted the rebuke and discontinued the case.[4] The 

following quotation from the convention report, to which the court yielded, 

is instructive:



It is of the greatest importance that a body chosen by the people of this 

state to revise the organic law of the state, should be as free from 

interference from the several departments of government, as the legislative, 

executive and judiciary are, from interference by each other.[5]



This report also contains a valuable collection of precedents of contested 

elections in ninety-four American conventions, and concludes therefrom that: 



     Without any exception, the practice has been uniform from

     first to last in favor of the Convention exercising the

     prerogative of deciding who were elected members.[6]



[§3. Convention may fill vacancies, subject to convention act.] 



The power to be the judge of their own elections may carry with it by 

implication the power to fill vacancies. This, however, is denied by Jameson 

at considerable length. Jameson denies that a convention can itself fill 

vacancies in its own ranks because, as he says, that would render the 

convention pro tanto self-appointing; and for the same reason he denies its 

right to authorize the colleagues of resigning or deceased members to name 

their successors.[7] No cases have arisen in which a convention has tried to 

do either of these things without being expressly authorized by the 

convention act.



A different question is presented, however, when we consider whether a 

convention can issue precepts to the constituencies of retiring or deceased 

delegates, directing new elections to fill the vacancies. The only case in 

which any dispute has arisen over this power was the Berlin controversy in 

the Massachusetts {172} convention of 1853, which is discussed at length by 

Jameson.[8] It must be remembered, however, that this contest was in reality 

the first struggle for supremacy between two opposing parties in that 

convention, and was based more on the question of the power of the 

legislature to amend the convention act by abolishing the secret ballot, 

than on the question of the power of the convention to authorize the filling 

of vacancies. But, whatever we may think of the arguments pro and con in 

that convention, we cannot evade the fact that the convention by an 

overwhelming majority decided in favor of its power to authorize the filling 

of vacancies. 



This precedent, coupled with the well-known power of all parliamentary bodies to provide for the filling of vacancies in as 

near as possible the same manner as the original seats were filled,[9] leads 

inevitably to the conclusion that conventions do have the power which was 

successfully asserted by the Massachusetts convention of 1853.



A book published by the recent Constitutional Convention Commission in New 

York says:



     Another question of importance is that as to the filling of

     vacancies which may occur after delegates have once

     been elected to a constitutional convention. In conventions

     there have been a number of elaborate and somewhat

     theoretical arguments regarding the power of a convention

     to provide for the filling of vacancies therein, in the

     absence of constitutional or statutory provision for this

     purpose. The more sensible view under such

     circumstances is that the convention may direct an election

     to fill a vacancy.[10]



The status and oaths of delegates are discussed in the next chapter.



[§4. Convention has power and duty to obtain quarters and officers.]



Obviously the first duty of a convention is to obtain quarters. Jameson 

says:



     The general rule is undoubtedly this: -- as Conventions

     are commonly numerous assemblies, containing, in most

     cases, the same number of members as the State

     legislatures, they are {173} possessed of such powers as

     are requisite to secure their own comfort, to protect and

     preserve their dignity and efficiency, and to insure orderly

     procedure in their business. For the attainment of these

     ends, they are not without the authority possessed by

     agents in general, and, in my judgment, they are possessed

     of no other or greater. Thus, they must have a suitable hall,

     adequately warmed and lighted; and, though the Acts

     calling them were silent on the point, they would

     unquestionably have power to engage one, and to pledge

     the faith of the State for the rental thereof.[11]



The next requirement would be to obtain suitable officers.



There can be no doubt, a Convention would be authorized to appoint such 

officers and servants as the custom of public assemblies, in free 

communities, has sanctioned, or as may seem under the circumstances to be 

necessary.



In respect to a president and secretary or secretaries there can be no 

question. The convenience of members and the despatch of business would 

point also to messengers or pages as requisite. The same may be said perhaps 

of one or more door-keepers, since, if the hall where the session is held, 

were accessible to everybody, at all hours, the functions of the Convention 

might be seriously interrupted, and its dignity insulted. With respect to a 

sergeant-at-arms, some doubt exists. It is a universal practice in 

Conventions to appoint such an officer, and the right of doing so for 

certain purposes cannot be denied.[12]



The doubt with relation to the powers of this officer comes under the head 

of maintaining order to be discussed a little later in this chapter.[13]



[§5. Convention has power and duty to adopt rules of procedure.]



Having engaged its hall and chosen its officers, the convention must next 

adopt some method of procedure, and to this end may establish all necessary 

rules. These are frequently modeled after the rules of the more numerous 

legislative body of the State.



A Convention having provided itself with the officers needed to do or to 

expedite its work, its attention would be next directed to the subject of 

maintaining order in the transaction of its business, and in the conduct of 

its members. For this purpose rules of order are necessary. There is 

sometimes inserted in the Act calling the Convention, a power to establish 

such rules as should be deemed {174} requisite; but, without such a clause, 

a Convention would clearly be authorized so to do. It is usual, before rules 

have been reported by the special committee for that purpose, to adopt 

temporarily those of the last Convention, or of the last State House of 

Representatives. In the absence of such a vote, it has been said that the 

lex parliamentaria, as laid down in the best writers, is in force.[14]



Legislative acts, under which conventions have been assembled, have usually 

not attempted to determine in any detail how conventions should proceed. A 

constitutional convention should have freedom to determine its own 

organization and procedure.[15]



If the purpose is merely that of proposing a few amendments to the 

constitution, as has several times been the case in New Hampshire, the 

procedure should naturally differ from that in a convention which proposes 

to submit a complete revision of the constitution, or at least to scrutinize 

carefully all provisions of an existing constitution.[16]



Jameson points out that the convention may enter upon its task of framing or 

amending the constitution either directly as a body or by resolving itself 

into a committee or committees. Two of the three common methods of procedure 

by committees are (a) the committee of the whole, or (b) to appoint a single 

selected committee of limited numbers to draft the amendments. Jameson 

refers to only ten conventions which have adopted the second plan, all but 

two of these occurring during the Revolutionary War period.[17] It is 

obvious that the reason for adopting this method at that time was that the 

main duties of those conventions was governmental rather than 

constitution-framing. 



[§6. Convention has power to appoint committees.]



The third and most common method of procedure is for the convention

to apportion the work among several committees.



The Cyclopaedia of American Government says of these three alternative 

methods:



     In the framing of a constitution it, of course, may be

     possible for a convention to conduct all of its work directly

     in convention -- that is, acting, as a body, without going

     into committee of the whole or dividing the work among

     committees. But such a plan would be cumbersome and

     unsatisfactory and has not been employed. {175} The

     plan ordinarily employed is that of using committees. In the

     use of committees three methods have been employed: (1)

     The transaction of business mainly in committee of the

     whole, with perhaps some smaller committees appointed

     to handle particular matters. This method is one which

     would be apt to work unsatisfactorily unless the plans for a

     constitution had been pretty well matured before the

     meeting of the convention. The committee of the whole

     was used to a large extent by the federal convention of

     1787, and was adopted also by the Pennsylvania

     convention which met in 1789.



     (2) In a number of the earlier conventions the plan was

     adopted of appointing a small committee, with full power

     to prepare and report a draft of a constitution to the full

     convention. This plan was adopted by the revolutionary

     conventions of Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey and

     Pennsylvania in 1776, and by those of New York and

     Vermont in 1777, but the conventions in these cases were

     assembled not only for the framing of constitutions, but

     also for the conduct of warlike operations, and the

     appointment of a special committee left the other members

     of the convention free to attend to the general duties of

     these bodies, which were equally urgent. The

     Massachusetts general court in 1778 appointed a special

     committee to frame a constitution, as also did the

     Massachusetts convention of 1779-80, the Tennessee

     convention of 1796, and the California convention of

     1849.



     (3) But the more usual practice has been for a convention

     to appoint a number of committees, and to distribute

     among them the several parts of the constitution, to be

     considered and reported upon to the convention either in

     regular session or in committee of the whole. The number

     of committees appointed for such a purpose has varied

     considerably, running from four in one case to more than

     thirty in others. The members of such committees have

     been as a rule appointed by the president of the

     convention. One of the most important committees of a

     convention is the committee on style or on arrangement

     and phraseology, which is usually appointed for the

     purpose of harmonizing the various proposals adopted by

     the convention and putting a constitution into something

     like the final form in which it should be adopted.[18]



It is well not to model these committees directly on the committees of the 

legislature, for if this is done, some committees will be found overburdened 

by work and others without a single matter referred to them.



{176} See the following further quotations on the number and make-up of 

committees:



     The New York convention of 1894 had thirty-one

     committees; the Virginia convention of 1901-02, sixteen;

     the Michigan convention of 1907-08, twenty-nine; the

     Ohio convention of 1912, twenty-five. The Illinois

     convention of 1869-70 had thirty-nine committees, a

     number much larger than was needed; of these

     committees, six made no report whatever to the

     convention.[19]



     For a convention there may be said to be three types of

     committees: 1, those on the formal business of the

     convention, such as committees on rules, on printing, etc.;

     2, those whose functions are largely technical, such as a

     committee on arrangement and phraseology; 3, those

     whose function would be largely that of obtaining

     agreement upon broad questions of principle, such as

     might be to a large extent a committee dealing with the

     subject of municipal home rule. Of course, most

     committees will have duties of all three types, but some

     difference in size is justified. Committees of the first type

     should naturally be small; those of the second type may

     well be larger, but even for the third type committees

     having many more than nine members are not apt to work

     very effectively. The average size of committees in the

     Illinois convention of 1869-70 was nine. The average size

     of committees in the Ohio convention of 1912 was

     seventeen, and because of this the committee work was

     less effective than it might have been.[20]



     In the Michigan convention of 1907-08 the first committee

     appointed was one on permanent organization and order

     of business. This committee was afterward made

     permanent. It reported the plan of committee organization,

     and made other reports during the session of the

     convention. One of its recommendations, which was

     adopted, provided for a weekly meeting of chairmen of

     committees, to be presided over by the president of the

     convention, "at which meeting the chairmen of the several

     committees shall report progress and consider such other

     matters as may be of interest in advancing the work of the

     convention." Such a plan, if properly carried out should do

     much to unify the work of a Convention.[21]



     The committee on arrangement and phraseology should

     serve in large part as a central drafting organ to give unity

     to the work of the convention.[22]



{177} Separate committees will also be necessary to deal with questions 

which are at the time of great popular interest, because an effort will 

naturally be made to have these subjects dealt with in the constitution. For 

example if a convention were assembled in Illinois today it would be almost 

necessary to have separate committees upon the liquor traffic, taxation, the 

initiative and referendum, and apportionment and minority 

representation.[23] 



The following are the more important committees common to three of the most 

recent constitutional conventions: Arrangement and Phraseology, Banks, 

Corporations, Counties and Towns, Education, Suffrage, Judiciary, Bill of 

Rights, Legislature, Methods of Amendment, Miscellaneous, Municipal 

Government, Rules, Submission and Address, Taxation.[24]



Committees are of course organs of the convention, appointed for the purpose 

of maturing matters for consideration by that body. A committee should 

therefore at all times be subject to control by a majority of the 

convention, and should have no power (by failing to report upon any matter) 

to prevent its consideration by the convention.[25]



The committee must do the detailed work of the Convention, and each 

committee should have before it as soon as possible all of the proposals 

relating to the subject which it is to consider. In order to accomplish this 

purpose, some conventions have definitely agreed that after a certain day no 

proposals should be entertained, unless presented by one of the standing 

committees.[26]



Many convention rules have very properly prescribed the form in which the 

proposals should be introduced, requiring that all proposals be in writing, 

contain but one subject, and have titles.[27]



[§7. Convention has power to pledge the faith of the State for expenses.]



A convention may undoubtedly incur expense for its legitimate needs. We have 

already seen that a convention can pledge the faith of the State for the 

expense of hiring a hall.[28] But it is a far cry from pledging the faith of 

the State to pledging the credit of the State. Thus, although the attempts 

{178} of the earlier conventions to appropriate money were successful,[29] 

they have been uniformly unsuccessful in later years,[30] and the attorneys 

general of three States have ruled against the legality of such a 

proceeding.[31] Nevertheless, the legislature, when called on, has never 

failed to make the necessary appropriations to meet the expenses incurred by 

the convention.[32]



Reverting now to the various proper objects of expenditure. A convention 

undoubtedly has power to supply its members with stationery, and probably 

with newspapers[33] Jameson has the following valuable suggestions to make, 

relative to the stenographic reports and printing for the convention: 



     The same principle applies to the case of phonographic

     reports and printing for the Convention. It would be a

     most niggardly policy which would refuse the expenditure

     necessary to the preservation of most full and accurate

     reports of its debates and proceedings. Upon this subject,

     however, there has been very great difference of views in

     different Conventions. In many of the States, volumes have

     been published, containing both the journals and the

     debates of all their Conventions. In others, the subject

     seems not to have been regarded as of any consequence

     whatsoever; and what little has been preserved has been

     owing to the private enterprise of the newspaper press.

     The result is, that the memorials of the most important

     public bodies ever assembled in those States, are often

     very meagre, and more often confused and inaccurate.

     Such a policy is "penny wise and pound foolish." In after

     years, when it has become impossible to replace what has

     been lost, more enlightened public opinion commonly finds

     cause to regret a paltry economy which deprives history of

     its most important data. It should be remembered, that our

     Conventions lay the foundations of States, many of which

     are to rival the greatness and glory of Rome, of England,

     and of France. In a hundred years from now, what

     treasures would they not expend, could they purchase

     therewith complete copies of their early constitutional

     records -- documents {179} standing to their several

     organizations in the same relation as would the discussions

     of those ancient sages who framed the Twelve Tables of

     the Roman law, to the Republic of Rome.[34]



[§8. Convention has power over recording and reporting of its proceedings.]



The question of printing the proceedings of the Minnesota convention of 1857 

came before the courts because Goodrich, the State printer, claimed that he 

was entitled, by virtue of his business, to do the printing, and obtained an 

injunction from the lower court to prevent Moore, the convention printer, 

from doing it. The Supreme Court said, in dissolving this injunction:



     But even had the legislature intended and attempted to

     claim and exercise the act of providing a printer for the

     constitutional convention, it would have been an

     unauthorized and unwarrantable interference with the rights

     of that body. The admission of such a right in the

     legislature, would place the convention under its entire

     control, leaving it without authority even to appoint or elect

     its own officers, or adopt measures for the transaction of

     its legitimate business. It would have less power than a

     town meeting, and be incompetent to perform the objects

     for which it convened. It would be absurd to suppose a

     constitutional convention had only such limited authority. It

     is the highest legislative assembly recognized in law,

     invested with the right of enacting or framing the supreme

     law of the state. It must have plenary power for this, and

     over all of the incidents thereof. The fact that the

     convention assembled by authority of the legislature

     renders it in no respect inferior thereto, as it may well be

     questioned whether, had the legislature refused to make

     provision for calling a convention, the people in their

     sovereign capacity would not have had the right to have

     taken such measures for framing and adopting a

     constitution as to them seemed meet. At all events there

     can be no doubt but that, however called, the convention

     had full control of all its proceedings, and may provide in

     such manner as it sees fit to perpetuate its records either

     by printing or manuscript, or may refuse to do either.[35]



And Ruling Case Law says:



     A constitutional convention has full control of all its

     proceedings, and may provide in such manner as it sees fit

     to perpetuate its record, either by printing or by

     manuscript.[36]



{180} The convention has equal control over other printing necessarily 

incidental to its business. As Jameson says:



     In relation to the printing for the Convention, the case is

     very clear. If the Act calling the body provides for it, or

     requires it to be done in a particular manner or by a

     designated person, or limits it in amount or in cost,

     doubtless the Act should be obeyed. But, unless thus

     restricted, the power of the body to order its printing to be

     done, is as undoubted as to engage a hall or the requisite

     executive officers. The only alternative is, the employment

     of secretaries enough to furnish written copies of all papers

     and documents used in the course of its business. This

     would be possible, and such provision would, after a sort,

     answer the purpose. But it is certain, that the measures

     proposed would be neither so well understood nor so

     rapidly matured, if thus presented, as if they were printed.

     To this may be added, that the expense of printed would

     be much less than of written copies, and that the length of

     the session would probably be reduced by the use of

     them. The employment, then, of printed matter, being

     clearly within the power of the Convention, as incident to

     the speedy and convenient execution of its commission,

     the extent of it rests in the discretion of that body, and it

     can bind the government, within reasonable limits, by its

     contracts therefor.[37]



[§9. Convention has power to expel, and, subject to the convention act, to 

punish members and outsiders.]



A further important consideration is the power of the convention to maintain 

order and punish for contempt. Jameson doubts the power of the 

Sergeant-at-Arms of the convention to be anything more than a mere 

doorkeeper.[38] But that really is a subsidiary question depending on what 

power the convention itself has to enforce order. Jameson says:



     The power of a Convention to discipline its own members

     for offences committed in its presence is undoubted, and

     of considerable extent. The order and dignity of public

     deliberative bodies may, in many ways, be so assailed as

     seriously to interfere with the progress of business, if not

     wholly to interrupt it, yet without the commission of any

     misdemeanor for which the offenders would be amenable

     to the laws. A Convention, having no power to make laws

     giving the magistrates jurisdiction of such offences, unless it

     could, by sanctions of its own, enforce its rules for the

     preservation of order, it would be at the mercy of such

     members as chose to do the work of violence, but to do it

     in such a manner as to elude the penalties for a breach of

     the peace. To prevent this is the principal {181} object of

     rules; and every public assembly, by its very nature, must

     have power to make and to enforce them in some modes

     appropriate to its own Constitution. To Conventions,

     however, it must be admitted, the range of sanctions is not

     very wide. For minor offences, it would be confined,

     probably, to reprimand, and for the more heinous, to

     expulsion from the body; or, in cases of actual violence to

     arrest and tradition to the public authorities. Power to this

     extent I conceive to be indispensable to the existence of

     any deliberative assembly; and, without assuming the

     character of a legislature, with power to create and to

     invest officers and tribunals with jurisdiction to punish

     offences, I can imagine it possessed of no greater. The

     power to arrest an offender, in the case supposed of

     actual violence, would involve that of safely keeping, and,

     if necessary, of confining him until he could be delivered to

     the officers of the law. So, the power to expel a member

     would carry with it that of suspending, which is less, or of

     suspending with forfeiture of pay, temporarily or

     altogether, according to the degree of the offence. But the

     power could not be claimed, in the former case, to

     imprison as a punishment, or for a longer time than should

     be necessary to secure the arrested member until he could

     be transferred to the magistrates, on complaint regularly

     made; or, in the latter, to pass from a forfeiture of pay (if

     that be regarded as allowable) to the imposition of

     pecuniary mulcts.[39]



Many convention acts expressly give to conventions the power to expel 

members and punish its members and officers by imprisonment or otherwise. 

The Georgia convention of 1867 expelled a member for insulting the president 

of that body.[40]



The report of the Judiciary Committee to the New York convention of 1894 

asserts that a convention has the power of expulsion.[41]



The power of a convention to discipline strangers is a different question. 

Jameson denies this power, because of his desire to belittle conventions in 

comparison with legislatures, for the purpose of the main thesis of his 

book, namely legislative supremacy over conventions. Thus Jameson says:



     As a Convention is not a legislature, though a body, by

     delegation, exercising some legislative functions, but of so

     limited and subordinate a character as to entitle it to rank

     only as a legislative {182} committee, it cannot do, even

     for its own defence, acts within the competence only of a

     legislature, or of a body with powers of definite

     legislation.[42]



But in view of the modern theory that a convention is a legislative body of 

superior standing to the ordinary legislature,[43] it would appear that a 

convention would have at least the same degree of powers in this particular 

as is inherent in inferior legislative bodies.[44] 



The Illinois convention of 1862 appointed a committee to investigate charges 

against certain of its members, with power to send for persons and papers 

and to swear witnesses.[45] The Louisiana convention of 1864 caused a 

newspaper editor to be arrested and brought before it for contempt for 

publishing certain criticisms of the president and other members of the 

convention. In this they had the assistance of the Federal Department 

Commander and the Federal Provost Marshal. General Banks released the 

editor, however, before the contempt proceedings were completed.[46]



Various convention acts have contained provisions expressly authorizing 

conventions to discipline strangers.[47] The author knows of no case in 

which this has been done, however, either with or without the express 

authority of the convention act.



In all the foregoing discussion the author has assumed the absence of 

anything in any popular statute, restricting or enlarging the powers and 

duties of the convention. The convention has certain express powers and 

certain powers implied from the inherent nature of the body, all of which 

are delegated to it by the people in their sovereign capacity. No 

constitution except that of the Federal government can restrict the people 

in delegating to a convention or in withholding from a convention any powers 

that they choose.[48] Therefore the language of any convention act, provided 

it be passed by the people, should be carefully consulted upon the question 

of determining the powers of any particular convention.



[§10. Convention may have power to reconvene to codify constitution ratified 

by the people.]



One very important power of the convention has been {183} reserved for the 

last, and that is the power of the convention to reconvene after the 

election (to which it submits its proposed changes in the constitution), in 

order to make and promulgate a codification of the constitution. The 

convention act which created the Kentucky convention of 1890 provided that, 

before any changes in the constitution should become operative, they should 

be submitted to the voters of the State and ratified by a majority thereof. 

Proposed changes were ratified by a popular vote in April, 1891. The 

convention reconvened in September, 1891, to which date they had adjourned, 

and made numerous changes in the constitution, some of which were claimed to 

have been material, and promulgated the codified instrument. An effort was 

made to enjoin the printing and preservation of this constitution, but the 

Court of Appeals recognized as valid the constitution promulgated by the 

convention.[49] It is probable that the court was influenced by the extreme 

practical convenience of enabling a convention to make a codification of the 

instrument after the adoption of changes by the people.



The convention which framed the original constitution of Massachusetts 

assumed that it had a similar power, although no such power had been granted 

it by the convention act. The convention act provided that the constitution 

should not take effect unless ratified by a two thirds vote of the 

people.[50] The convention, however, desiring to secure an acceptable 

constitution, provided that the instrument which it drew should be voted on, 

article by article, by the people of the State, and that in any town where a 

majority voted against an article, the town meeting should suggest what 

changes would render that article acceptable.



In order that the said Convention, at the adjournment, may collect the 

general sense of their constituents on the several parts of the proposed 

Constitution: And if there doth not appear to be two thirds of their 

constituents in favour thereof, that the Convention may alter it in such a 

manner as that it may be agreeable to the sentiments of two thirds of the 

voters throughout the State.[51]



This power of altering was not exercised, for it appeared from the returns 

that two thirds of the voters were in favor of the instrument as drawn; and 

it was accordingly promulgated by {184} the convention without change.[52] 

But the assumption by the convention of its power to make changes after 

submission is an important precedent. A fortiori would a convention have the 

power to codify the constitution without making any changes.



An alternative method of procedure would be for the convention to submit on 

the ballot a proposition authorizing the convention, or a committee thereof 

or some other body, to codify the constitution as amended at that election, 

and to promulgate the codification.



The legislature of Maine, in submitting various amendments in 1875, 

submitted a proposition that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should 

have power to codify the constitution, by including amendments then adopted 

and all prior amendments, and by striking out all obsolete matter. This 

proposition was accepted by the voters and was accordingly followed by the 

Chief Justice, with the result that the constitution of Maine was brought up 

to date and put into a much more workable form than formerly.[53]



Similarly a convention might submit to the people an ordinance authorizing 

itself to make such a codification, although it would probably have power to 

do this without such authorization, particularly in States where the 

convention procedure is extraconstitutional rather than constitutional.



The importance of such a power of codification is not to be overlooked.



Thus we see that a convention ordinarily has full control over its internal 

affairs, including its own membership, the filling of vacancies, the 

obtaining of quarters, the election of officers and employees, the 

establishment of rules, the purchasing of supplies, the printing of records, 

etc., the maintenance of internal order, and even the disciplining of 

strangers; but these powers may be enlarged or curtailed by popular vote.



The convention's control over the process of submitting its work for popular 

ratification will be discussed in a later chapter.[54] Its power to pass 

necessary incidental legislation has already been discussed.[55]



------



1. Dodd, p. 88.



2. Wells v. Bain (1872), 75 Pa. 39, 55. 



3. See [Ch. XI §11] pp. 146-147, supra.



4. Lincoln, Const. Hist. of N. Y., Vol. III, p. 666. Elihu Root was chairman 

of this committee. Lincoln himself drew the report. It was unanimously 

accepted by the convention. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 270.



5. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 250.



6. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, Vol. I, p. 267-270. 



7. Jameson, p. 331.



8. Jameson, pp. 333-342. 



9. Opinion of Justices (1826), 3 Pick. 517, 520. 



10. N. Y. Rev. of Consts., p. 58. The full title is "Revision of the State 

Constitution," published by the New York Constitutional Convention 

Commission in 1915.



11. Jameson, pp. 455-456. 



12. Jameson, p. 456.



13. See [Ch. XIV §8] p. 180, infra.



14. Jameson, pp. 460-461. 



15. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 60.



16. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 62.



17. Jameson, pp. 287-289. 



18. I Cyc. American Govt., 428. 



19. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 63.



20. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 64.



21. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 69.



22. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 69.



23. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 63.



24. Journal, Mich. Conv. 1907-1908, Vol. I, p. 15; Journal, Ohio Conv. 1912, 

p. 41; Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1915, Vol. I, pp. 49-52.



25. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 64.



26. N. Y. Revision of Consts., pp. 66-67.



27. N. Y. Revision of Consts., p. 67.



28. See [Ch. XIV §4] p. 173, supra.



29. Pennsylvania (1837); Louisiana (1844 and 1864). Jameson, pp. 436-437.



30. Illinois (1862); New York (1867); Georgia (1867 and 1877); Pennsylvania 

(1873). Jameson, pp. 437-438, 441-442, 444-446. But see p. 180, infra.



31. Massachusetts (1779-80); United States (1787); Illinois (1862); New York 

(1867); Georgia (1877); Pennsylvania (1873). Jameson, pp. 435-436, 438, 445, 

446.



32. Hon. J. H. Martindale of New York in 1867; Hon. R. N. Ely of Georgia in 

1877; and Hon. Samuel E. Dimmick of Pennsylvania in 1873. Jameson, pp. 442, 

445-446.



33. Jameson, pp. 457-458. 



34. Jameson, p. 458.



35. Goodrich v. Moore (1858), 2 Minn. 61, 66.



36. 6 R. C. L., § 17, p. 27.



37. Jameson, p. 460.



38. Jameson, pp 456-457. 



39. Jameson, pp. 463-464. 



40. Jameson, p. 466.



41. Rev. Record, N. Y. Conv. 1894, pp. 267-269.



42. Jameson, p. 461.



43. See [Ch. VII §1] p. 90, supra.



44. Jameson, pp. 466-467. See 36 Cyc. 851 on the contempt and other powers 

of legislatures.



45. Jameson, pp. 468-470. 



46. Jameson, pp. 470-472. 



47. Jameson, pp. 472-473. 



48. See [Ch. XIII §1] pp. 165-168, supra.



49. Miller v. Johnson (1892), 92 Ky. 589.



50. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, p. 6.



51. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, p. 169.



52. Journal, Mass. Conv. 1779-1780, pp. 186-187.



53. Thorpe, Vol. III, p. 1646, n. a.



54. See [Ch. XVI §3-13] pp. 196-213, infra.



55. See [Ch. XI §11] pp. 146-147, supra.



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