Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force
1. Of offensive Force. Offensive force is
regulated by the law of nations, which is the political law of each
country considered in its relation to every other.
2. Of War. The life of governments is like
that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence:
the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation.
In the case of natural defence I have a right to kill, because my life
is in respect to me what the life of my antagonist is to him: in the same
manner a state wages war because its preservation is like that of any
With individuals the right of natural defence does not imply a necessity
of attacking. Instead of attacking they need only have recourse to proper
tribunals. They cannot therefore exercise this right of defence but in
sudden cases, when immediate death would be the consequence of waiting for
the assistance of the law. But with states the right of natural defence
carries along with it sometimes the necessity of attacking; as for
instance, when one nation sees that a continuance of peace will enable
another to destroy her, and that to attack that nation instantly is the
only way to prevent her own destruction.
Thence it follows that petty states have oftener a right to declare war
than great ones, because they are oftener in the case of being afraid of
The right of war, therefore, is derived from necessity and strict
justice. If those who direct the conscience or councils of princes do not
abide by this maxim, the consequence is dreadful: when they proceed on
arbitrary principles of glory, convenience, and utility, torrents of blood
must overspread the earth.
But, above all, let them not plead such an idle pretext as the glory of
the prince: his glory is nothing but pride; it is a passion, and not a
It is true the fame of his power might increase the strength of his
government; but it might be equally increased by the reputation of his
3. Of the Right of Conquest. From the right
of war comes that of conquest; which is the consequence of that right, and
ought therefore to follow its spirit.
The right the conqueror has over a conquered people is directed by four
sorts of laws: the law of nature, which makes everything tend to the
preservation of the species; the law of natural reason, which teaches us
to do to others what we would have done to ourselves; the law that forms
political societies, whose duration nature has not limited; and, in fine,
the law derived from the nature of the thing itself. Conquest is an
acquisition, and carries with it the spirit of preservation and use, not
The inhabitants of a conquered country are treated by the conqueror in
one of the four following ways: Either he continues to rule them according
to their own laws, and assumes to himself only the exercise of the
political and civil government; or he gives them new political and civil
government; or he destroys and disperses the society; or, in fine, he
exterminates the people.
The first way is conformable to the law of nations now followed; the
fourth is more agreeable to the law of nations followed by the Romans: in
respect to which I leave the reader to judge how far we have improved upon
the ancients. We must give due commendations to our modern refinements in
reason, religion, philosophy, and manners.
The authors of our public law, guided by ancient histories, without
confining themselves to cases of strict necessity, have fallen into very
great errors. They have adopted tyrannical and arbitrary principles, by
supposing the conquerors to be invested with I know not what right to
kill: thence they have drawn consequences as terrible as the very
principle, and established maxims which the conquerors themselves, when
possessed of the least grain of sense, never presumed to follow. It is a
plain case that when the conquest is completed, the conqueror has no
longer a right to kill, because he has no longer the plea of natural
defence and self-preservation.
What has led them into this mistake is, that they imagined a conqueror
had a right to destroy the state; whence they inferred that he had a right
to destroy the men that compose it: a wrong consequence from a false
principle. For from the destruction of the state it does not at all follow
that the people who compose it ought to be also destroyed. The state is
the association of men, and not the men themselves; the citizen may
perish, and the man remain.
From the right of killing in the case of conquest, politicians have
drawn that of reducing to slavery — a consequence as ill-grounded as
There is no such thing as a right of reducing people to slavery, save
when it becomes necessary for the preservation of the conquest.
Preservation, and not servitude, is the end of conquest; though servitude
may happen sometimes to be a necessary means of preservation.
Even in that case it is contrary to the nature of things that the
slavery should be perpetual. The people enslaved ought to be rendered
capable of becoming subjects. Slavery in conquests is an accidental thing.
When after the expiration of a certain space of time all the parts of the
conquering state are connected with the conquered nation, by custom,
marriages, laws, associations, and by a certain conformity of disposition,
there ought to be an end of the slavery. For the rights of the conqueror
are founded entirely on the opposition between the two nations in those
very articles, whence prejudices arise, and the want of mutual confidence.
A conqueror, therefore, who reduces the conquered people to slavery,
ought always to reserve to himself the means (for means there are without
number) of restoring them to their liberty.
These are far from being vague and uncertain notions. Thus our ancestors
acted, those ancestors who conquered the Roman empire. The laws they made
in the heat and transport of passion and in the insolence of victory were
gradually softened; those laws were at first severe, but were afterwards
rendered impartial. The Burgundians, Goths, and Lombards would have the
Romans continue a conquered people; but the laws of Euric, Gundebald, and
Rotharis made the Romans and barbarians fellow-citizens.1
Charlemagne, to tame the Saxons, deprived them of their liberty and
property. Louis the Debonnaire made them a free people,2
and this was one of the most prudent regulations during his whole reign.
Time and servitude had softened their manners, and they ever after adhered
to him with the greatest fidelity.
4. Some Advantages of a conquered People.
Instead of inferring such destructive consequences from the right of
conquest, much better would it have been for politicians to mention the
advantages which this very right may sometimes give to a conquered people
— advantages which would be more sensibly and more universally
experienced were our law of nations exactly followed, and established in
every part of the globe.
Conquered countries are, generally speaking, degenerated from their
original institution. Corruption has crept in, the execution of the laws
has been neglected, and the government has grown oppressive. Who can
question but such a state would be a gainer, and derive some advantages
from the very conquest itself, if it did not prove destructive? When a
government has arrived at that degree of corruption as to be incapable of
reforming itself, it would not lose much by being newly moulded. A
conqueror who enters triumphant into a country where the moneyed men have,
by a variety of artifices, insensibly arrived at innumerable ways of
encroaching on the public, where the miserable people, who see abuses
grown into laws, are ready to sink under the weight of impression, yet
think they have no right to apply for redress — a conqueror, I say,
may make a total change, and then the tyranny of those wretches will be
the first thing exposed to his resentment.
We have beheld, for instance, countries oppressed by the farmers of the
revenues, and eased afterwards by the conqueror, who had neither the
engagements nor wants of the legitimate prince. Even the abuses have been
often redressed without any interposition of the conqueror.
Sometimes the frugality of a conquering nation has enabled them to allow
the conquered those necessaries of which they had been deprived under a
A conquest may destroy pernicious prejudices, and lay, if I may presume
to use the expression, the nation under a better genius.
What good might not the Spaniards have done to the Mexicans? They had a
mild religion to impart to them; but they filled their heads with a
frantic superstition. They might have set slaves at liberty; they made
freemen slaves. They might have undeceived them with regard to the abuse
of human sacrifices; instead of that they destroyed them. Never should I
have finished, were I to recount all the good they might have done, and
all the mischief they committed.
It is a conqueror's business to repair a part of the mischief he has
occasioned. The right, therefore, of conquest I define thus: a necessary,
lawful, but unhappy power, which leaves the conqueror under a heavy
obligation of repairing the injuries done to humanity.
5. Gelon, King of Syracuse. The noblest
treaty of peace ever mentioned in history is, in my opinion, that which
Gelon made with the Carthaginians. He insisted upon their abolishing the
custom of sacrificing their children.3
Glorious indeed! After having defeated three hundred thousand
Carthaginians, he required a condition that was advantageous only to
themselves, or rather he stipulated in favour of human nature.
The Bactrians exposed their aged fathers to be devoured by large
mastiffs — a custom suppressed by Alexander, whereby he obtained a
signal triumph over superstition.
6. Of Conquest made by a Republic. It is
contrary to the nature of things that in a confederate government one
state should make any conquest over another, as in our days we have seen
in Switzerland.4 In mixed
confederate republics, where the association is between petty republics
and monarchies, of a small extent, this is not so absurd.
Contrary is it also to the nature of things that a democratic republic
should conquer towns which cannot enter into the sphere of its democracy.
It is necessary that the conquered people should be capable of enjoying
the privileges of sovereignty, as was settled in the very beginning among
the Romans. The conquest ought to be limited to the number of citizens
fixed for the democracy.
If a democratic republic subdues a nation in order to govern them as
subjects, it exposes its own liberty; because it entrusts too great a
power to those who are appointed to the command of the conquered
How dangerous would have been the situation of the republic of Carthage
had Hannibal made himself master of Rome? What would he not have done in
his own country, had he been victorious, he who caused so many revolutions
in it after his defeat?5
Hanno could never have dissuaded the senate from sending succour to
Hannibal, had he used no other argument than his own jealousy. The
Carthaginian senate, whose wisdom is so highly extolled by Aristotle (and
which has been evidently proved by the prosperity of that republic), could
never have been determined by other than solid reasons. They must have
been stupid not to see that an army at the distance of three hundred
leagues would necessarily be exposed to losses which required reparation.
Hanno's party insisted that Hannibal should be delivered up to the
Romans.6 They could not at that
time be afraid of the Romans; they were therefore apprehensive of
It was impossible, some will say, for them to imagine that Hannibal had
been so successful. But how was it possible for them to doubt it? Could
the Carthaginians, a people spread over all the earth, be ignorant of what
was transacting in Italy? No: they were sufficiently acquainted with it,
and for that reason they did not care to send supplies to Hannibal.
Hanno became more resolute after the battle of Trebia, after the battle
of Thrasimenus, after that of Cannæ; it was not his incredulity that
increased, but his fear.
7. The same Subject continued. There is still
another inconvenience in conquests made by democracies: their government
is ever odious to the conquered states. It is apparently monarchical: but
in reality it is much more oppressive than monarchy, as the experience of
all ages and countries evinces.
The conquered people are in a melancholy situation; they neither enjoy
the advantages of a republic, nor those of a monarchy.
What has been here said of a popular state is applicable to aristocracy.
8. The same Subject continued. When a
republic, therefore, keeps another nation in subjection, it should
endeavour to repair the inconveniences arising from the nature of its
situation by giving it good laws both for the political and civil
government of the people.
We have an instance of an island in the Mediterranean, subject to an
Italian republic, whose political and civil laws with regard to the
inhabitants of that island were extremely defective. The act of indemnity,7
by which it ordained that no one should be condemned to bodily punishment
in consequence of the private knowledge of the governor, ex informata
conscientia, is still recent in everybody's memory. There have been
frequent instances of the people's petitioning for privileges; here the
sovereign grants only the common right of all nations.
9. Of Conquests made by a Monarchy. If a
monarchy can long subsist before it is weakened by its increase, it will
become formidable; and its strength will remain entire, while pent up by
the neighbouring monarchies.
It ought not, therefore, to aim at conquests beyond the natural limits
of its government. So soon as it has passed these limits, it is prudence
In this kind of conquest things must be left as they were found —
the same courts of judicature, the same laws, the same customs, the same
privileges: there ought to be no other alteration than that of the army
and of the name of the sovereign.
When a monarchy has extended its limits by the conquest of neighbouring
provinces, it should treat those provinces with great lenity.
If a monarchy has been long endeavouring at conquest, the provinces of
its ancient demesne are generally ill-used. They are obliged to submit
both to the new and to the ancient abuses; and to be depopulated by a vast
metropolis, that swallows up the whole. Now if, after having made
conquests round this demesne, the conquered people were treated like the
ancient subjects, the state would be undone; the taxes sent by the
conquered provinces to the capital would never return; the inhabitants of
the frontiers would be ruined, and consequently the frontiers would be
weaker; the people would be disaffected; and the subsistence of the armies
designed to act and remain there would become more precarious.
Such is the necessary state of a conquering monarchy: a shocking luxury
in the capital; misery in the provinces somewhat distant; and plenty in
the most remote. It is the same with such a monarchy as with our planet;
fire at the centre, verdure on the surface, and between both a dry, cold,
and barren earth.
10. Of one Monarchy that subdues another.
Sometimes one monarchy subdues another. The smaller the latter, the better
it is overawed by fortresses; and the larger it is, the better will it be
preserved by colonies.
11. Of the Manners of a conquered People. It
is not sufficient in those conquests to let the conquered nation enjoy
their own laws; it is, perhaps, more necessary to leave them also their
manners, because people in general have a stronger attachment to these
than to their laws.
The French have been driven nine times out of Italy, because, as
historians say,8 of their insolent
familiarities with the fair sex. It is too much for a nation to be obliged
to bear not only with the pride of conquerors, but with their incontinence
and indiscretion; these are, without doubt, most grievous and intolerable,
as they are the source of infinite outrages.
12. Of a Law of Cyrus. Far am I from thinking
that a good law which Cyrus made to oblige the Lydians to practise none
but mean or infamous professions. It is true he directed his attention to
an object of the greatest importance: he thought of guarding against
revolts, and not invasions; but invasions will soon come, when the
Persians and Lydians unite and corrupt each other. I would therefore much
rather support by laws the simplicity and rudeness of the conquering
nation than the effeminacy of the conquered.
Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumæ,9
used all his endeavours to banish courage, and to enervate the minds of
youth. He ordered that boys should let their hair grow in the same manner
as girls, that they should deck it with flowers, and wear long robes of
different colours down to their heels; that when they went to their
masters of music and dancing, they should have women with them to carry
their umbrellas, perfumes, and fans, and to present them with combs and
looking-glasses whenever they bathed. This education lasted till the age
of twenty — an education that could be agreeable to none but to a
petty tyrant, who exposes his sovereignty to defend his life.
13. Charles XII. This prince, who depended
entirely on his own strength, hastened his ruin by forming designs that
could never be executed but by a long war — a thing which his kingdom
was unable to support.
It was not a declining state he undertook to subvert, but a rising
empire. The Russians made use of the war he waged against them as of a
military school. Every defeat brought them nearer to victory; and, losing
abroad, they learned to defend themselves at home.
Charles, in the deserts of Poland, imagined himself sovereign of the
whole world: here he wandered, and with him in some measure wandered
Sweden; while his capital enemy acquired new strength against him, locked
him up, made settlements along the Baltic, destroyed or subdued Livonia.
Sweden was like a river whose waters are cut off at the fountain head in
order to change its course.
It was not the affair of Pultowa that ruined Charles. Had he not been
destroyed at that place, he would have been in another. The casualties of
fortune are easily repaired; but who can be guarded against events that
incessantly arise from the nature of things?
But neither nature nor fortune were ever so much against him as he
He was not directed by the present situation of things, but by a kind of
plan of his forming; and even this he followed very ill. He was not an
Alexander; but he would have made an excellent soldier under that monarch.
Alexander's project succeeded because it was prudently concerted. The
bad success of the Persians in their several invasions of Greece, the
conquests of Agesilaus, and the retreat of the ten thousand had shown to
demonstration the superiority of the Greeks in their manner of fighting
and in their arms; and it was well known that the Persians were too proud
to be corrected.
It was no longer possible for them to weaken Greece by divisions: Greece
was then united under one head, which could not pitch upon a better method
of rendering her insensible to her servitude than by flattering her vanity
with the destruction of her hereditary enemy, and with the hopes of the
conquest of Asia.
An empire cultivated by the most industrious nation in the world, that
followed agriculture from a principle of religion — an empire
abounding with every convenience of life, furnished the enemy with all
necessary means of subsisting.
It was easy to judge by the pride of those kings, who in vain were
mortified by their numerous defeats, that they would precipitate their
ruin by their forwardness in venturing battles; and that the flattery of
their courtiers would never permit them to doubt of their grandeur.
The project was not only wise, but wisely executed. Alexander, in the
rapidity of his conquests, even in the impetuosity of his passion, had, if
I may so express myself, a flash of reason by which he was directed, and
which those who would fain have made a romance of his history, and whose
minds were more corrupt than his, could not conceal from our view. Let us
descend more minutely into his history.
14. Alexander. He did not set out upon his
expedition till he had secured Macedonia against the neighbouring
barbarians, and completed the reduction of Greece; he availed himself of
this conquest for no other end than for the execution of his grand
enterprise; he rendered the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians of no
effect; he attacked the maritime provinces; he caused his land forces to
keep close to the sea-coast, that they might not be separated from his
fleet; he made an admirable use of discipline against numbers; he never
wanted provisions; and if it be true that victory gave him everything, he,
in his turn, did everything to obtain it.
In the beginning of his enterprise — a time when the least check
might have proved his destruction — he trusted very little to
fortune; but when his reputation was established by a series of prosperous
events, he sometimes had recourse to temerity. When before his departure
for Asia he marched against the Triballians and Illyrians, you find he
waged war10 against those people in
the very same manner as Cæsar afterwards conducted that against the
Gauls. Upon his return to Greece,11
it was in some measure against his will that he took and destroyed Thebes.
When he invested that city, he wanted the inhabitants to come into terms
of peace; but they hastened their own ruin. When it was debated whether he
should attack the Persian fleet,12
it is Parmenio who shows his presumption, Alexander his wisdom. His aim
was to draw the Persians from the sea-coast, and to lay them under a
necessity of abandoning their marine, in which they had a manifest
superiority. Tyre being from principle attached to the Persians, who could
not subsist without the commerce and navigation of that city, Alexander
destroyed it. He subdued Egypt, which Darius had left bare of troops while
he was assembling immense armies in another world.
To the passage of the Granicus, Alexander owed the conquest of the Greek
colonies; to the battle of Issus, the reduction of Tyre and Egypt; to the
battle of Arbela, the empire of the world.
After the battle of Issus, he suffered Darius to escape, and employed
his time in securing and regulating his conquests: after the battle of
Arbela, he pursued him so close13
as to leave him no place of refuge in his empire. Darius enters his towns,
his provinces, to quit them the next moment; and Alexander marches with
such rapidity that the empire of the world seems to be rather the prize of
an Olympian race than the fruit of a great victory. In this manner he
carried on his conquests: let us now see how he preserved them.
He opposed those who would have had him treat the Greeks as masters14
and the Persians as slaves. He thought only of uniting the two nations,
and of abolishing the distinctions of a conquering and a conquered people.
After he had completed his victories, he relinquished all those prejudices
that had helped him to obtain them. He assumed the manners of the
Persians, that he might not chagrin them too much by obliging them to
conform to those of the Greeks. It was this humanity which made him show
so great a respect for the wife and mother of Darius; and this that made
him so continent. What a conqueror! He is lamented by all the nations he
has subdued! What a usurper! At his death the very family he has cast from
the throne is all in tears. These were the most glorious passages in his
life, and such as history cannot produce an instance of in any other
Nothing consolidates a conquest more than the union formed between the
two nations by marriages.15
Alexander chose his wives from the nation he had subdued; he insisted on
his courtiers doing the same; and the rest of the Macedonians followed the
example. The Franks and Burgundians permitted those marriages;16
the Visigoths forbade them in Spain, and afterwards allowed them.17
By the Lombards they were not only allowed but encouraged.18
When the Romans wanted to weaken Macedonia, they ordered that there should
be no intermarriages between the people of different provinces.
Alexander, whose aim was to unite the two nations, thought fit to
establish in Persia a great number of Greek colonies. He built, therefore,
a multitude of towns; and so strongly were all the parts of this new
empire cemented, that after his decease, amidst the disturbances and
confusion of the most frightful civil wars, when the Greeks had reduced
themselves, as it were, to a state of annihilation, not a single province
of Persia revolted.
To prevent Greece and Macedon from being too much exhausted, he sent a
colony of Jews19 to Alexandria; the
manners of those people signified nothing to him, provided he could be
sure of their fidelity.
He not only suffered the conquered nations to retain their own customs
and manners, but likewise their civil laws; and frequently the very kings
and governors to whom they had been subject: the Macedonians20
he placed at the head of the troops, and the natives of the country at the
head of the government, rather choosing to run the hazard of a particular
disloyalty (which sometimes happened) than of a general revolt.
He paid great respect to the ancient traditions, and to all the public
monuments of the glory or vanity of nations. The Persian monarchs having
destroyed the temples of the Greeks, Babylonians, and Egyptians, Alexander
rebuilt them:21 few nations
submitted to his yoke to whose religion he did not conform; and his
conquests seem to have been intended only to make him the particular
monarch of each nation, and the first inhabitant of each city. The aim of
the Romans in conquest was to destroy, his to preserve; and wherever he
directed his victorious arms, his chief view was to achieve something
whence that country might derive an increase of prosperity and power. To
attain this end, he was enabled first of all by the greatness of his
genius; secondly, by his frugality and private economy;22
thirdly, by his profusion in matters of importance. He was close and
reserved in his private expenses, but generous to the highest degree in
those of a public nature. In regulating his household, he was the private
Macedonian; but in paying the troops, in sharing his conquests with the
Greeks, and in his largesses to every soldier in his army, he was
He committed two very bad actions in setting Persepolis on fire and
slaying Clitus; but he rendered them famous by his repentance. Hence it is
that his crimes are forgotten, while his regard for virtue was recorded:
they were considered rather as unlucky accidents than as his own
deliberate acts. Posterity, struck with the beauty of his mind, even in
the midst of his irregular passion, can view him only with pity, but never
with an eye of hatred.
Let us draw a comparison between him and Cæsar. The Roman general,
by attempting to imitate the Asiatic monarch, flung his fellow-citizens
into a state of despair for a matter of mere ostentation; the Macedonian
prince, by the same imitation, did a thing which was quite agreeable to
his original scheme of conquest.
15. New Methods of preserving a Conquest.
When a monarch has subdued a large country, he may make use of an
admirable method, equally proper for moderating despotic power, and for
preserving the conquest; it is a method practised by the conquerors of
In order to prevent the vanquished nation from falling into despair, the
victors from growing insolent and proud, the government from becoming
military, and to contain the two nations within their duty, the Tartar
family now on the throne of China has ordained that every military corps
in the provinces should be composed half of Chinese and half Tartars, to
the end that the jealousy between the two nations may keep them within
bounds. The courts of judicature are likewise half Chinese and half
Tartars. This is productive of several good effects, 1. The two nations
are a check to one another. 2. They both preserve the civil and military
power, and one is not destroyed by the other, 3. The conquering nation may
spread itself without being weakened and lost. It is likewise enabled to
withstand civil and foreign wars. The want of so wise an institution as
this has been the ruin of almost all the conquerors that ever existed.
16. Of Conquests made by a despotic Prince.
When a conquest happens to be vastly large, it supposes a despotic power;
and then the army dispersed in the provinces is not sufficient. There
should be always a body of faithful troops near the prince, ready to fall
instantly upon any part of the empire that may chance to waver. This
military corps ought to awe the rest, and to strike terror into those who
through necessity have been entrusted with any authority in the empire.
The emperor of China has always a large body of Tartars near his person,
ready upon all occasions. In India, in Turkey, in Japan, the prince has
always a body-guard independent of the other regular forces. This
particular corps keeps the dispersed troops in awe.
17. The same Subject continued. We have
observed that the countries subdued by a despotic monarch ought to be held
by a vassal. Historians are very lavish of their praises of the generosity
of those conquerors who restored the princes to the throne whom they had
vanquished. Extremely generous then were the Romans, who made such a
number of kings, in order to have instruments of slavery.23
A proceeding of that kind is absolutely necessary. If the conqueror
intends to preserve the country which he has subdued, neither the
governors he sends will be able to contain the subjects within duty, nor
he himself the governors. He will be obliged to strip his ancient
patrimony of troops, in order to secure his new dominions. The miseries of
each nation will be common to both; civil broils will spread themselves
from one to the other. On the contrary, if the conqueror restores the
legitimate prince to the throne, he will of course have an ally; by the
junction of whose forces his own power will be augmented. We have a recent
instance of this in Shah Nadir, who conquered the Mogul, seized his
treasures, and left him in possession of Hindostan.
1. See the Code of Barbarian Laws,
and Book xxviii below.
2. See the anonymous author of the
Life of Louis le Debonnaire, in Duchesne's collection, ii, p. 296.
3. See M. Barbeyrac's collection,
4. With regard to Tockenburg.
5. He was at the head of a faction.
6. Hanno wanted to deliver Hannibal
up to the Romans, as Cato would fain have delivered up Cæsar to the
7. Of the 18th of October, 1738,
printed at Genoa by Franchelli. See also the Amsterdam Gazette,
Dec. 23, 1738.
8. See Pufendorff's Universal
9. Dionysius Halicarnassus, vii.
10. See Arrian, De Expedit. Alex.,
13. Ibid., iii.
14. This was Aristotle's advice.
Plutarch, Of the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander.
15. Arrian, De Expedit. Alex.,
16. See the Law of the Burgundians,
tit. 12, art. 5.
17. See the Law of the Visigoths,
iii, tit. 1, § 1, which abrogates the ancient law that had more
regard, it says, to the difference of nations than to that of people's
18. See the Law of the Lombards, ii,
tit. 7, §§ 1, 2.
19. The kings of Syria, abandoning
the plan laid down by the founder of the empire, resolved to oblige the
Jews to conform to the manners of the Greeks — a resolution that gave
the most terrible shock to their government.
20. See Arrian, De Expedit. Alex.,
iii, and others.
22. Ibid., vii.
23. Tacitus, Life of Agricola,
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